T3 B5 Analysis 2 of 2 Fdr- Emails and Memos Re Policy Analysis and Recommendations 017

8/14/2019 T3 B5 Analysis 2 of 2 Fdr- Emails and Memos Re Policy Analysis and Recommendations 017

1/15

Page 1 of 1

Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Monday, January 05, 2004 7:47 AMTo: Dan BymanCc: Mike HurleySubject: A Couple of Things

Hi Dan:Hope you had a good weekend.

I've made a little progress pulling my ideas together on our analysis/judgmentsection and I'll have some additions to the thread you started within a couple ofdays. I'll let you know so you can look at it, critique it, push it further.

I'd appreciate if you could give Len some ideas for what he should be writingabout re FBI and DoJ involvement in CT policy. He came to this exercise a bit late,and I think the overlap with other teams on this issue is bewildering. He's doingthe right thing by coordinating closely with Chris Healey and other team leadersthat have an interest particularly in the FBI. Still, knowing exactly what is our(Team 3's) slice of all this is murky at best.

I thought some of your Jl experience could help here. What are the 4 or five keyquestions Len needs to focus on.

Len really wants to do pol mil plans and strategies. That's fine and we'll do asection on that. But he feels less comfortable about the chronology and writing ahistory of what agencies did. He thinks that's water under the bridge. He thinksour real role is to make sure that our country is safer. Are we doing the rightthings? Well, he's right about that. Unfortunately, our mandate requires that weinvestigate the facts and circumstances surrounding 9/11. That will have to bedone.Any guidance you could provide him would be helpful. All three of us can talk if youthink that's the best way to go.Thanks,Mike

1/5/2004


2/15

Pagel ofl

Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Monday, December 29, 2003 9:09AMTo: '[email protected]'Cc: Mike HurleySubject: Our Plan

Dan,Per our conversation this morning, I'd like to work with you on pulling together thelessons of the counterterrorism policy story. Let's get our thoughts down and refinethem over the coming weeks.We should also include practical recommendations.Commissioners are going to be looking for this kind of analysis from Team 3.Thanks,Mike

12/29/2003


3/15

WITHDRAWAL NOTICERG: 148 Exp osition, Anniversary, and Memorial CommissionsSERIES: Team 3 ,9 /1 1 CommissionN D PROJECT NU MB ER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUM BER: 31107

WITHDRA WA L DATE : 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 23 DOC ID: 31207911COPIES: 1 PAGES: 5

_ _ _ RESTRICTEDThe item iden tified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Analysis & Recomm endations [2of2]DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2004 DOCU MEN T TYPE: Briefing PaperFROM:TO:SUBJECT: Policy Findings

This docum ent has been w ithdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 Classified Inform ation

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


4/15

Mike HurleyFrom: Daniel BymanSent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 3:27 PMTo: Mike HurleySubject: Recommendation

Mike ,A recommendation for us to consider from a "30,000 feet" point of viewis that the USG should engage in a wholesale transformation ofinstitutions to target the jihadist threat. This would include along-term investment in languages, area expertise, developing a globalpresence, bolstering the Middle East in particular, and so on.PZ's comparison with our emphasis on Russia, and to a lesser extentChina, was instructive in this regard.This may be too vague though.Best,Dan


5/15

Mike HurleyFrom: Daniel BymanSent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 4:21 PMTo: Mike HurleyS u b j e c t : R e : R e c o m m e n d a t i o n

We can offer some notional suggestions: LT language training, largerintel presence in the ME, more attention to Islamist issues outside theME, aggressive aid programs, sustained public diplomacy, making regionalcooperation with the ME more important than with other regions. Justsome thoughts.DanMike Hurley wrote:>Dan, I think it is a good suggestion.>>Are we approaching this as a 30 year, long-term, Cold War kind of>problem? That's the question?>>Maybe we can make the recommendation more concrete.>>Mike>> Original Message>From: Daniel Byman>Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 3:27 PM>To: Mike Hurley>Subject: Recommendation>>Mike,>>A recommendation for us to consider from a "30,000 feet" point of view>is that the USG should engage in a wholesale transformation ofinstitutions to target the jihadist threat. This would include a>long-term investment in languages, area expertise, developing a global>presence, bolstering the Middle East in particular, and so on.>>PZ's comparison with our emphasis on Russia, and to a lesser extent>China, was instructive in this regard.>>This may be too vague though.>>Best,>Dan


6/15

Page 1 of 1

Mike HurleyFrom: Bonnie JenkinsSent: Monday, December 29, 2003 8:59 AMTo: Team 3Subject: A Purple Pot

Colleagues,A recommendation that is standing out as I reassess the interviews I conducted is the need for there to be a"purple pot" of money dedicated to CT or other areas of national interest to the US. This would be administered byindividuals who would develop expertise in administering these funds. I have a couple of good quotes frominterviews on this, one from the Secretary of the Air Force who dealt these kinds of money issues on a regularbasis. This is an important conclusion from the UAV discussion as well.We've discussed this at some time in the past. I will continue to pursue this and prepare to write something up foryour review and assessment when I prepare the monograph.Best,Bonnie

12/29/2003


7/15

Page 1 of 1

Mike HurleyFrom: Warren BassSent: Monday, February 09, 2004 4:10 PMTo: Team 3Subject: Another Rec from RAG

Here's another suggested rec from Clarke: get rid of the H SC and the hom eland security adviser, which he sees astotally artificial.Instead, C larke would set up a DAPNSA for both CT and homeland security:

Rank of assistant to the presidentSome operational authorityStaffD ollars, and control over others' fundingRegular meetings with POTUS and the ability to walk in on POTUSA uthority to order people to do things, with the only avenue of appeal for the departm ent's head is to go toPOTUS

His rationale: you need somebody in charge, and you don't have that today. Gordon's not in charge, an d neither isTownsend, Clarke's successor. Even at the height of Clarke's influence, he couldn't order anything. The C SG head'sauthority is much diluted under the current set-up, C larke argues; there are now m ore players, no t less.I have a bit of a qualm about thisafter all, it sounds like C larke writing up his dream jobbut it's certainly worthconsidering. W e heard something similar from Jim Steinberg, who's no particular fan of C larke's.Warren

, 7 f k M

2/9/2004


8/15

Page 1 of2

Mike HurleyFrom: Len HawleySent: Saturday, February 07, 2004 9:59 AMTo: Mike HurleySubject: FW: WB recs

Mikejust a thought...Dan's recommendation is more about process rather than substance, like W arren's (exceptfor his numbe r 4 be low). I suggest we steer clear of recommenda tions that call for someone to study something,instead we should call for specific changes. Just a thought, LenOriginal MessageFrom: Daniel BymanSent: Monday, February 02, 2004 11:54 AMTo: Warren BassCc: Team 3Subject: Re: WB recs

Good recommendations.I would propose: "Each relevant agency must design a long-term plan to posture themselves againstterrorism and present it to the National Security Advisor. They should note resource changes, traininginitiiatives, hiring moves, etc. The purpose would be to develop a truly long-term plan, coordinatedacross agencies, for fighting terrorism."Warren Bass wrote:A few thoughts:

1. A national coordinator at the N SC for W M D proliferation, empow ered with a full DC and PC seat on theirissue and the ability to call DC s and PCs. A larger staff to match. A nd the power to involve the homelandsecurity side of W M D terrorism, including radiation screening at ports, consequence managem ent, and soon .2. Dramatically more effort to control "loose nukes" and inadequately guarded nuclear material, includingvastly more spendingbillions moreon security procedu res in the FSU and Pakistan. I can contact somepeople w ho really know this issue for more specific recs if we want to get into this.3. Measures to pass along institutional mem ory on CT in transitions, including executive-branch offices for 6-9 months after inauguration for the outgoing APNSA, DA PNSAs, and most if not all departing OCX staffers.They would be around as resources for the n ew team and backbenchers at CSGs; they w ould also have theopp ortunity to do strategic planning of the sort that nobody gets to do w hile they're running at an NSCpace.4. A blue-ribbon commission with a 6-month mandate to offer recommendations on public diplomacy. I'mopen to other ideas here rather than the lame mechanism ofanother commission, but it seems to me thatw e're getting hamm ered in the war of ideas, and if we don't start getting into that game in a serious waywhich we've so far failed miserably to dowe're continuing to let UBL make hay. W e have to start seeinganti-Americanism in the M iddle East as a national security menace, not an inconvenience.5. Immediate, sustained, and serious U .S. intervention to try to tamp down the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Notonly is it dreadful for Israelis and Palestinians, it's an incredible engine for generating anti-Americanism.(Dan, insert your snickers here.)

I'd be glad to paddle around to get more ideas onloose nukes and public diplomacy; they're staggeringlyimportant areas, but I'm not sure I have that m any good, specific suggestions abou t how to fix 'em.

2/9/2004


9/15

Page 1 of 1

Mike HurleyFrom: Warren BassSent: Monday, February 09, 2004 3:51 PMTo: Team 3Subject: Another rec?

In session III, Clarke suggested having the Commission endorse an integrated CT budget with someone in chargeof it.Budget stalwartsLen, Mike, Dan, etc.does this make sense?Just a thought,Warren

\Jf}L -

2/9/2004


10/15

Extremely Tentative Policy Recommendations

1. National CT StrategyForm ulate a national counterterrorism (CT) strategy that comprehensively focuses on thethreat of radical Islamic terrorism to the United States, and on an expedited basisstrengthen the CT capabilities of federal agencies to successfully implement the focusednational strategy in the near term .

2. Enhancement of the National Security SystemIntegrate law enforcem ent and homeland security into the national security system byamending the N ational Security Act of 1947 to include the Attorney General, theSecretary of DHS and the Director of the FBI as full members of the National SecurityCouncil.

3. Coherent Management of the National CT EffortEstablish robust interagency authorities and coordinating mechanisms to strengthenunified direction of the national CT strategy across the federal government, assurecoherency of action among agency CT efforts within U.S. diplomatic missions abroad,and strengthen inter-governmental cooperation among federal, state, and local authoritieswithin the United S tates.

4. Legal Prohibitions onReligious Terrorist GroupsAmend federal law to effectively protect Americans from violence perpetrated byreligious fundam entalist groups, including those of radical Islamic terrorists, operating athome and abroad.

5. Effective Domestic Law EnforcementEnhance w ith substantial additional resources the C T capabilities of the FBI and D HS todeter potential terrorists and protect Americans from further attacks, including thoseinvolving CBRN weapons.


11/15

Pagel ofl

Mike HurleyFrom:Sent:To:Cc:

Scott AllanMonday, February 02, 2004 4:16 PMMike HurleyWarren Bass

Subject: SH A Rec'sMike:1) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. As for my rec's, public diplomacy is a serious issue as WB points out. His call for acommission is a good one as no agency seems to be taking a serious lead here and a commission could jumpstart things. Perhaps a commission could propose how to best "get the message out" while at the same timedetermining what exactly our "message" is.2) TERRORIST SANCTUARIES. Another area of great concern is the continuing problem of terrorist sanctuaries.With all the focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, I fear thaftthe USG is failing to identify and focus on the "nextAfghanistan". Regions in Africa and S.E. Asia, with large Muslim populations, porous borders and inept/corruptgovernments with few social support systems (i.e. primary schools) are ripe for problems.3) WORKING WITH THE INT'L COMMUNITY. While we shouldn't count on having other countries partake inmilitary operations, allies can be very helpful with public diplomacy and humanitarian missions to the regionsmentioned above. This said, Washington needs to keepe close pulse on how others view our counterterrorismconcerns and efforts. There should be no excuses, or surprises, when we call on our traditional allies to assist inaddressing terrorist sanctuaries.

-S (\4


12/15

Page 1 o f2

Mike HurleyFrom: Bonnie JenkinsSent: Monday, February 02, 2004 5:11 PMTo: Daniel Byman; Wa rren BassCc: Team 3Subject: RE: WB recs

I will pass on to you wh at I have heard most often and which I think are somewha t credible ideas:

1. "Draining the swamp." The U.S. should develop a comprehe nsive strategy with the goal of educating thosewho may one day be recruited by terrorists. Thefocu5=of-tkese^effortswould be Muslim countries wheregroups like A-Q can sw ay young minds. Tbe'lelidfederaljigfincy^ould be State but other agencies wouldplay a role in the development and implemCTrtatieft


13/15

Page 2 o f 2

A few thoughts:1. A national coordinator at the NSC for W M D proliferation, empowered with a full DC and PC seaton their issue and the ability to call DCs and PCs. A larger staff to match. And the power to involvethe homeland security side of W M D terrorism, including radiation screening at ports,consequence management, and so on.2. Dramatically more effort to control "loose nukes" an d inadequately guarded nuclear material,including vastly more spendingbillions moreon security procedures in the FSU and Pakistan. I

can contact some people who really know this issue for more specific recs if we want to get intothis.3. Measures to pass along institutional memory on CT in transitions, including executive-branchoffices for 6-9 months after inauguration for the outgoing APNSA, DAPNSAs, and most if not alldeparting OCT staffers. They would be around as resources for the ne w team an d backbenchers atCSGs; they would also have the opportunity to do strategic planning of the sort that nobody getsto do while they're running at an NSC pace.4. A blue-ribbon commission with a 6-month mandate to offer recommendations on publicdiplomacy. I'm open to other ideas here rather than the lame mechanism of another commission,but it seems to me that we're getting hammered in the war of ideas, and if we don't start gettinginto that game in a serious waywhich we've so far failed miserably to dowe're continuing to letUB L make hay. W e have to start seeing anti-Americanism in the Middle East as a nationalsecurity menace, not an inconvenience.5. Immediate, sustained, and serious U.S. intervention to try to tamp down the Israeli-Palestiniancrisis. Not only is it dreadful for Israelis an d Palestinians, it's an incredible engine for generatinganti-Americanism. (Dan, insert your snickers here.)

I'd be glad to paddle around to get more ideas on loose nukes and public diplomacy; they're staggeringlyimportant areas, but I'm not sure I have that many good, specific suggestions about how to fix 'em.Warren

2/2/2004


14/15

Team 3International Counterterrorism Policy

Recommendations(Under Consideration)

[Proposed format for recomm endation: State recom m endation; include your initials; dateyour entry. Team 3 colleagues sho uld review periodically and add, in "bullet" format,pros and cons as respective research indicates. In instances where the recommendation issubstantially similar to one advanced by informed 3 rd partiesauthors, journalists,counterterrorist experts, etc.please include citation for future reference. Suggest thateach recommendation be placed under one of three categories: near-term , medium -term ,long-term. Obviously, the order of the recommendations in each category will change aswe learn more and develop a better sense of what should be priorities.]

Near-TermIncrease Federal Funds for EducationIncrease federal funding fo r programs producing translators capable of working in Arabicand other languages relevant to regions of terrorism -related concerns; increase federalfunding for program s producing specialists on the M iddle East and terrorism . Increasefederal funding fo r undergraduate and graduate program s in international journalism.Pros: Increase pool of specialists and translators to better understand the Middle East andother ho t spots. Increase U.S. public understanding of foreign issues. (W B 6/9/03)Move Urgently to Secure Nuclear Weapons, Scientists, and Materials AbroadWith 27,000 nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, many of them under woefullyinadequate control, the US remains vulnerable to the most horrifying of all terroristscenarios: a nuclear explosion in an Am erican city. No nprolife ration experts virtuallyunanimously urge more action on "loose nukes," including th e Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Throw massive resources against this problem, going far beyond current Nunn-Lugar levels; work closely with Russia andPakistan to ensure their nuclear facilities are locked

firmly down; find and fund alternative employm ent for underemployed or underpaid Russiannuclear scientists;

place radiation detectors and stepped-up security forces at US ports to ensure thatnuclear devices can't make it into the country.


15/15

Pros: could save, literally, millions of lives; avoids the worst of all low-probability, high-impact events; defends against al-Qa'ida's demonstrated interest in nuclear attacks;avoids a scenario that could forever change America's role in the world.Cons: could cost several billion dollars (a small price, I'd argue).Note: might want to expand to Russian W M D facilities in general; their chemical andbiological facilities aren't impressively guarded, either.(W B July 2, 2003)

Medium-TermUnderstand and Communicate Opposition PartiesIdentify and understand opposition parties in countries which are or could becometerrorist sanctuaries should the current governing structure falter. Attempt to establishminim al contact with these parties to the extent possible.Pros: Allows the USG to quickly and knowledgably select a party to support in theevent the ruling structure collapses.Cons: Ma y require US G to deal with undesirable groups and may even create instabilitywithin a country should an opposition party becom e aggressive after misinterpreting USGdiscussions for outright support. (SA 6/9/03)

Long-Term

Documents

T3 B5 Analysis 2 of 2 Fdr- Emails and Memos Re Policy Analysis and Recommendations 017