FO B5 Public Hearing 4-13-04 Fdr- Tab 4- Suggested Questions for Janet Reno 741

8/14/2019 FO B5 Public Hearing 4-13-04 Fdr- Tab 4- Suggested Questions for Janet Reno 741

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SUGGESTED QUESTIONSFOR JANET RENODesignated Commissioners: Slade Gorton and Tim Roemer

1. Your understanding of and response to the growing foreign terrorist threat.During your eight years as Attorney General the nature and scope of the terrorist threat tothe United States changed significantly. The United States suffered a dramatic series ofterrorist attacks against this country, beginning with the first World Trade Centerbombing in 1993, continuing through the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, the 1998 EastAfrican embassy bombings, and the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole.

When did you recognize that the nature of the terrorist threat had changed? Whatdid you perceive to be the nature of that change?What policy and operational steps did you take at the Department of Justice torespond to that change?Did you redirect investigative and law enforcement resources to respond to theterrorist threat? How? Were those efforts effective? A re there things that youno w wish you had done differently?What was your role in overseeing the FBI's and the Department'scounterterrorism efforts? How often did you meet with senior FB I officials tomonitor the FBI's counterterrorism program? To what extent did you interact withU.S. Attorneys on counterterrorism matters?Did you direct Louis Freeh to make changes at the FBI in response to the growingterrorist threat? When? What did you ask him to do? Were your directivesimplemented?Did you see a role for the Immigration an d Naturalization Service in the effort toprevent terrorism? What was it?Did the nature of the Department of Justice's interaction with other governmentagencies with responsibility for counterterrorism, such as the CIA and the NSC,change in response to the terrorist threat? When? How?In your efforts to prevent and prosecute terrorist acts, did you get the support youneeded from the White House? From Congress?

2. Your approach to counterterrorism - prosecution vs.prevention. We have heardmuch discussion recently about a shift at the Department of Justice and the FBI awayfrom a reactive, prosecution-oriented approach to terrorism and toward a proactive,prevention-oriented approach.


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Was your approach to terrorism, or the response of the Justice D epartment toterrorism during your tenure, focused more on prosecution than prevention?As a matter ofpolicy in the 1990s, did ourgovernment as a whole - including theJustice Department, theWhite House, and theU.S. Intelligence Community -take too much of a law enforcement approach to international terrorism?During your tenure much of the Justice D epartment's response to internationalterrorism - andparticularly Usama bin Laden andal Qaeda - seems to have beencentered in the Southern District of New York U.S. A ttorney's Office. To whatdo you attribute this concentration of resources and expertise in a single office?Was it too much?Should there have been m ore involvement and direction by M ain Justice in thecounterterrorism mission of the F BI as the Department's understanding of thethreat from al Qaida grew? Should there have been more focus on prevention offuture attacks, and less focus on other p riorities?Was there an assumption within the Department of Justice that terrorist attackswere more likely to occur against U.S. interests overseas and that attacks here inthis country w ere much less likely? How did you and your colleagues at theDepartment of Justice and the FB I assess the relative risks of overseas anddomestic attacks during the 1990s? Did that assessment change over time?

3. Resources an d capabilities at the FBI. (Reno told us that when Freeh complainedhe did no t have enough counterterrorism personnel she suggested he shift personnel fromthe violent crime area, and he was not willing to do so.) A major issue facing theComm ission is whe ther the FBI has the right structure and sufficient resources to be theprimary domestic counterterrorism investigative and intelligence collection agency. TheCom mission is also aw are that the FBI has significant responsibilities for non-terrorismlaw enforcement and investigation.

There were significant problems at the FBIduring your tenure - did thoseproblems cause you to question the F BI's ability to investigate terrorism?During your tenure as Attorney General did the FB I devote sufficient resourcesand attention to international terrorism?Should the FBI have shifted personnel and resources from other areas tocounterterrorism?Were you confident that FBI field managers appreciated the extent andimportance of the terrorist threat?


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What more, if anything, could the FBI have done during the 1990s to respond tothe growing international terrorist threat?What priority did you understand the FBI to be giving to the threat ofinternational terrorism in 2000? Did the FBI have a clear set of priorities in placethat communicated to the field how resources and attention should be allocated?Did you believe the FBI had enough translators in Arabic and Middle Easternlanguages?Did the FBI have enough analysts working on counterterrorism?

4. FBI Information Sharing Issues. You sent three written directives to FBI DirectorLouis Freeh in early 2000 that strongly urged immediate action to improve informationsharing by the FBI:

Your February 29,2000 memorandum to Freeh directed him to "develop andimplement a system to insure the linkage and sharing of intelligence, evidenceand other relevant information" among all components of the FBI and stating thatyou wanted "the system in place by October 1,2000."

What concerns prompted you to send this memorandum?What progress was made in accomplishing this goal before you left office?You stated in your memorandum that "this effort can be greatly enhancedby automation, but I do not think we can afford to wait until automation isin place." Why did you add the reference to not waiting for automation?What was the FBI's automation capability at that time?

Your March 8, 2000 letter to Freeh expressed concerns regardingcounterintelligence issues and stated: "The bottom line is that we must develop acapacity within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in all fields to identifyrelevant information and share it internally, and then share it securely with otheragencies as authorized by law and the Attorney General Guidelines."

What concerns did you have about the FBI's ability to identify relevantinformation and share it internally and with other agencies?What steps had been taken to address those concerns when you left office?

Your May 2,2000 memorandum to Freeh states that you believed it to be"imperative that the FBI immediately develop the capacity to fully assimilate andutilize intelligence information currently collected and contained in FBI files anduse that knowledge to work proactively to identify and protect against emergingnational security threats."


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Wh at concerns did you have about the FB I's ability to assimilate andutilize intelligence information in its own files?W hat particular incidents had prompted those concerns?What steps had been taken to address those concerns when you left office?

These three directives seem to indicate a lack of confidence in the FBI's systemsand procedures for information sharing - howserious did youperceive theproblem to be?Did you take steps to address these problems in addition to sending these threedirectives?To w hat extent had the FB I addressed its information sharing problems by thetime you left office?

5. FBI Cultural Issues. Some suggest that the FBI will never be able to transform itselfbecause of "cultural issues."Are there "cultural issues" at the FBI that need to be addressed to increase itsability to investigate and prevent terrorism? Do you think the FBI has a lawenforcement focus that makes it difficult for it to collect and share intelligence?FBI agents are usua lly generalists who rotate through different squads andassignments do you think this aspect of the FBI's culture provides sufficientopportunity for agents to develop expertise in counterterrorism?The FBI is largely divided between agents and support personnel. Some supportpersonnel, particularly analysts and translators, play a crucial role incounterterrorism. Are internal changes needed to recognize the importance ofthose roles and to attract and retain the best people for those critical roles?

7. FBI Legal Authorities Issues. Some suggest laws and regulations imposed on theFB I since the Church Comm ittee have hindered FBI's national security mission.Did the FBI seek new legal authorities or investigativepowers during yourtenure? If so, in what areas?Were you aw are of any dissatisfaction at the FBI w ith respect to the AttorneyGeneral's Guidelines governing FB I investigative activities? Did the FBI requestchanges in those guidelines? Were any such requests denied?


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8. FISA and "the Wall." One of the changes made by the USA PATRIOT Act was theelimination of the so-called "wall"between intelligence collection under the ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA") and criminal prosecutors. The degree ofseparation that was required seems to have increased during your tenure.

Why did you and others at the Department of Justice believe that FISA required ahigh "wall"between FBI intelligence agents and criminal prosecutors? Was this arequirement of the FISA Court or the Department of Justice or both?What role did the Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review("OIPR") play in creating and maintaining the so-called "wall"? How closelywere you involved in those issues? Did you have any concerns that the "wall"was impairing the government's ability to fight terrorism?You implemented new Attorney General Guidelines in 1995 to addressinformation sharing and the "wall" - what changes were those new Guidelinesintended to implement? Were they successful?Did you have any perception that the "wall" requirement was not being properlyadministered orwas misunderstood in thefield- particularly at theFBI - duringyour tenure?Were you surprised by the 2002 opinion of the FISA Court of Review whichbasically concluded that both the Department of Justice and the lower FISA Courthad been misapplying the FISA law for years and that the "wall" was not requiredunder that law? How could there have been such a longstanding misinterpretationof the law?The provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that eliminated the "wall" requirement[sections 218 and 504] will "sunset" in 2005 [see section 224]. Should Congressact to make those provisions permanent?

9. Interaction with the U.S. Intelligence Community. Since the 9/11 attacks thegovernment has focused a great deal of attention and effort on improving the workingrelationships of the various agencies that have counterterrorism responsibilities.

During your tenure as Attorney General did you perceive that there wereproblems with cooperation and information sharing between the Department ofJustice and the rest of the Intelligence Community? Was the Department ofJustice fully integrated into the U.S. Government's counterterrorism policydevelopment structure in the 1990s?In the counterterrorism area, what was your working relationship with theDirector of Central Intelligence in the 1990s? Were you effective partners in thefight against terrorism? Did interagency rivalries or bureaucratic struggles


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interfere with your agencies' ability to work together? Do you think suchproblems exist now, or have they been addressed?Were there problems with cooperation and information sharing between the FBIand the CIA? Did you have any concerns that the structure and systems in placeat the time were not adequate to protect against the growing international terroristthreat?

10. The Millennium Threat. At the end of 1999 there was a great deal of concernwithin the U.S. Government about potential terrorist attacks at year-end. We have heardthat during the Millennium threat period extraordinary measures were taken to preventterrorist attacks and to protect thepublic.

Can you describe your personal role in the Millennium threat response efforts?How often did the Principals of the National Security Council meet on the threatduring December 1999? How often were you in contact with the NationalSecurity Advisor?What did you expect from the FBI during the Millennium threat period? Did youobserve any differences in the way the FBI was functioning during that period?Were any of the policy or operational changes that were implemented during thatperiod made permanent? Are there some changes that were not made but shouldhave been?

11. Transition to the Bush Administration. At the end of the ClintonAdministration, you had served as Attorney General for eight years and haddirected the Department of Justice's responses to a wide variety of terroristattacks.

Did you brief incoming Attorney General Ashcroft on the terrorism threat? Whatadvice did you give him? Did you identify particular groups or kinds of terroristsas particularly dangerous threats? Did you talk with him about al Qaeda or binLaden?Did you give incoming Attorney General Ashcroft any advice about the FBI orthe counterterrorism-related units at the Department of Justice, such as the Officeof Intelligence Policy Review?Were there any areas of "unfinished business" relating to terrorism that youidentified fo r incoming Attorney General Ashcroft as a priority for theDepartment of Justice?


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Did you express any concerns to him about ongoing issues, such as the FISAprocess and "the wall" or the capabilities of the FBI? Did you identify anyneeded new legal authorities to fight terrorism?Did he discuss with you his plans or intentions for new priorities or policies at theDepartment of Justice? Did he ask you for advice or suggestions related toterrorism?

13. The MI-5 question. We have heard prior testimony about the option of creating anew domestic intelligence agency. Some refer to the United Kingdom MI-5 model asone that should be considered.

What are your views on the advantages and disadvantages of assigning ourdomestic intelligence counterterrorism function to a new agency that does nothave law enforcement authority and arrest power?What do you think about the idea of creating a separate entity - but still within theDepartment of Justice andsubordinate to theAttorney General - withresponsibility for the counterterrorism and domestic intelligence mission currentlyassigned to the FBI?What do you think of the proposal for creating a "service within a service" at theFB I with a separate career track and chain of command for personnel working oncounterterrorism?

Documents

FO B5 Public Hearing 4-13-04 Fdr- Tab 4- Suggested Questions for Janet Reno 741