T3 B11 Team 3 Interim Reports Fdr- Emails- Memos- CIA Document Index 997

8/14/2019 T3 B11 Team 3 Interim Reports Fdr- Emails- Memos- CIA Document Index 997

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Mail :: INBOX:Fwd: DoD Litmus Test Responses Page 1 o f 1

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99.89MB /476.84MB (20.95%)INBOX: Fwd: DoD Litmus Test Responses w o v e(1 of CeDelete | Reply | Reply to All | Forward | Redirect | Blackl ist | Message Source | Resume | S ave as | Print Back to INBOX Date: Thu,18 Sep 2003 12:29:58 -0400

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Subject: Fwd:DoD Litmus Test ResponsesD a n - -A h e a d s u p f o r y o u o n s o m e D O D d p c u m e n t s . T h e a t t a c h ed i n t e r n a l m e s s a g e i ss e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y . T h i s s o u n d s l i k e a m a t t e r t h a t s h o u l d b e m a n a g e a b l e .P h i l i p- - - - - F o r w a r d e d m e s s a g e f r o m " " < b j e n k i n s @ 9 - l l c o m m i s s i o n . g o v > - - - - -D a t e : T h u , 18 Sep 2003 11:37:05 -0400F r o m : "" < b j e n k i n s @ 9 - l l c o m m i s s i o n . g o v >R e p l y - T o : "" S u b j e c t : DoD L i t m u s Test R e s p o n s e sTo: "" < d m a r c u s @ 9 - l l c o m m i s s i o n . g o v > , "" Dan,R e g a r d i n g DOD, w e h a v e n o t r e c e i v e d a n y d o c u m e n t s o n w h a t T e at h e " l i t m u s t e s t " r e s p o n s e s (Document 6, p a r a g r a p h s 1, 2, 4).Team 3 w o u l d c a l l4). H o w e v e r , t h e r ea r e d o c u m e n t s s i t t i n g i n t h e d o c u m e n t p r o c e s s i n g f a c i l i t y t h a t a r e " u n d e rr e v i e w " i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e p a r a g r a p h s . F o r e x a m p l e , Pat's l a t e s t l i s t n o t e sa p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 5 4 p a g e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n o n e p a r t o f p a r a g r a p h 2 th a t i s a tt he f a c i l i t y , s h e a l s o n o t es 9 1 5 p a ge s o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n o n e p a r t o f p a r a g r a p h1 t h a t i s a t t h e f a c i l i t y . H o w e v e r , s o m e o f t h e se d o c u m e n t s h a v e b e e n i n t h ef a c i l i t y s i n c e J u l y . P a t i n f o r m e d m e a f e w weeks a g o t h a t t h e p r o b l e m w i t hm o s t o f t h e d o c u m e n t s w e r e r e l a t e d t o E x e c u t i v e P r i v i l e g e i s s u e s , b u t a s Iu n d e r s t a n d i t , t h e E P i s s u e h a s be e n r e s o l v e d . I h a v e n o t b e e n a b l e t o g e t ag o o d a n s w e r a s t o w h a t i s th e h o l d u p a n d i t m i g h t b e go o d t o k n o w e x a c t l yw h a t i s t h e p r o b l e m i n s h a k i n g t h e d o c u m e n t s o u t o f t h e f a c i l i t y .DOD ha s r e s p o n d e d to s o m e of the D o c u m e n t 6 q u e s t i o n s a s ke d r e l a t e d tob u d g e t i n g ( t hr ee p a r a g r a p h s ) a n d a c o u p l e o f p a r a g r a p h s r e l a t e d t o q u e s t i o n sp u t f o r t h b y Team 2 . A n s w e r s t o r e l e v a n t p o l i c y i s s u e s , h o w e v e r , a r e n o t a sf o r t h c o m i n g .B o n n i e

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Team 3: Agency Performance on Litmus Test Items

CIA:The Litmus Test items we identified for DCI Docum ent R equest 8 were: Items 1, 2, 3, 4,5, 6, 8, and 18.First,CIA has been quite responsive for the majority of the 40 requests contained in DocR e q 8 .It's performance on the Litmus Test items specified above, however, has been less strong.Item 1 concerns PDB's and production is a policy issue for the W hite House. Of theother Litm us items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 18CIA has produced documents only inresponse to item 5. That item requested documents or presentations used to prepare theDCI for meetings with the National S ecurity Advisor, SecDef, S ecState, and Director ofthe FBI. CIA has produced about 20 substantive pages. These includ e meetings that theDCI had with the Secretary of Defense an d Secretary of State from January 2001 throughSeptember 2001 (nothing after September 11). The 20 pages are of strong interest andinclude discussions of the UAV and policy toward Taliban and Saudi Arabia.We have been told that CIA does not have documents responsive to items 2,3, 4, and 6.W e suggest that we obtain a certification from CIA to that effect.CIA has noted that there are no docs responsive to item 18 (agendas for meetingsbetween DCI and SecDef or Dep SecDef), although some documents pertaining to DCIand Sec Rumsfeld CT discussions w ere included in part of the production responsive toitem 5.With regard to item 8, CIA notes that the request for docum ents on the 1993 WTC attackand the 1996 Khobar Towers attack were part of its response to DCI Doc R eq 6; and thatit has no docs responsive to the Document Request 8, Item 8 for in-house studies on theEast Africa bombings, the Millennium P lot, or the attack on the Cole.


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Team 3: Agency Performance on Litmus Test Items

FBI:The Team 3-generated FBI documen t request was FBI Document Request 9. TheCommission sent the request to the FBI on July 3.On Au gust 26, we identified Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 of that request as our Litmus Test.W ith regard to overall response, to date w e have received two installments of docu ments,one on July 25 (primarily non-Litm us related m aterials), and the other on Au gust 29.Roughly 400 pages have been provided to date. Some of this inform ation has been veryhelpful in gauging certain aspects of CT policy, however, we feel more needs to beproduced, especially guidance and communications from the Director-level. We wouldalso like to see more information relating to FBI cooperation with foreign counterparts.FBI Litmus Test Items:Item 1 (subs tantive policy docum ents relating to general CT policy and specifically theal-Qaida threat): W e have received some inform ation but expect more. If there is notmore, then we w ould like a certification to that effect.Item 2 (opinions on lethal force against UBL and al-Qaida): no response thu s far.Item 3 (Director, Dep Director comm unications with foreign counterparts in relation toal-Qaida): we have received a small amount of inform ation (a few pages of notes anddocumen ts), mo stly related to the Khobar investigation, and some Cole m aterial. If thereis no more, then we should ask for a certification.Item 4 (FBI staff comm unications with certain foreign governm ents in relation to al-Qaida, UBL, etc.): we are in receipt of a very small amount of docum entation inconnection with this item, none of which ha s shed m uch light on our investigation. Ifthere is no more, we should request a certification to that effect.

State:The Team 3-generated docu men t request to State was State Docum ent Reque st 3. TheCom mission sent the request on July 2.On August 26, we identified Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 as our Litmus Test.W ith regard to overall response to date, it is evident that the State Departm ent has made asubstantial effort to respond to our request. W e have seen a num ber of excellent


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documents and hope to see even m ore in future tranches . State has sent over near ly 1,300documents in response to our request.State Litmus Test Items:Item 1 (substan tive policy mem os, brief ing packets, and guidance docu ments to or fromSecState and/or Dep SecState): We have received helpful documents, including aquantity of cables, in connection with this itemsome good briefing materials for D Cson CT and regional issues. How ever, we would like to see more docum ents issuedcontaining guidance from SecState. We have just taken delivery of a new batch ofdocuments and have been advised that this will include documents which were circulatedat the highest level.Item 2 (DOS co mm unications with Taliban reps): State has provided a handful ofdocuments which touch on this issue. We expect more. If it's the case that State does nothold more records on this subject then w e would recomm end requesting a certification tothat effect.Item 3 (DOS comm unications with Pakistani and/or Saudi officials relating to UBL , al-Qaida, and/or Taliban): State has provided some extremely helpful documentation onthese issues, but in limited quantity. We expect more to be produc ed, especially DOScomm unications with Saudi Arabia on the UBL issue. If we do not receive any more onthis we would should request certification that no more records are available.Item 4 (DOS communications with Pakistan's ISFD): State has provided a small numberof helpful documents. We would expect more to be produced, or a certification fromState that no additional documents exist.

DoJ:The Team 3-generated document request to the Department of Justice was DoJDocuments Request 2. The Commission sent the request on July 2.On August 26, we identified all Items as our Litmus T est.With regard to overall response to date, we have received over 7,000 pages of documents.While some of these are helpful fo r outlining DoJ's general CT concerns (both domesticand interna tional), we have not yet received high-level policy docu me nts related to UBLor the al-Qaida threat.DoJ Litmus Test Items:Item 1 (substan tive policy memos, briefing packets, an d guidance documents to or fromAG or Deputy AG ): We hav e received some policy guidance mem os circulated to orfrom the A G 's or Deputy AG's office. M uch of th is relates to the USG's 5-year


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interagency plan on terrorism. Such info rm ation is of value, but we are still need moreAG of Deputy AG policy documents, especially those relating to al-Qaida threat.Item 2 (DoJ's assessment of the legality of the use of lethal force): To date we havereceived no docum ents on this.Item 3 (DoJ policy guidance coming to or going from the DoJ as a result of East AfricaEmbassy bombings or the attack on the Cole): W e have received documents related toFBI investigations of these attacks but no high-level policy guidance.Item 4 (AG and D eputy AG co mm unications w ith senior foreign officials): To date wehave received no documents related to this request.Items 5 (Directives on funding for CT programs): We have received a substantialnumber of funding proposals and budgetary guides relating to both D oJ and itsubdivisions and to the FBI.Items 6-10: W e expect more docum entation on these items and suggest that th e FrontOffice raise these items at the appropriate level of DoJ.


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Mai l : : INBOX: agency performance on "litmus test" items Page 1 of 1

99.51 MB / 476.84MB (20.87%)Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 18:29:37 -0400From: " " ^?

To: " " 4P'Cc: "" 4|

Subject: agency performance on "litmus test" itemsReminder -- while the Commissioners have seen the agency letters of Sept. 5,and heard your reports on where things stand, they are still anxious to know ifthere are any significant holes in agency production of litmus test documents(other than the nigh-level policy documents that have been promised in thenexty two weeks). Please let Steve or meknow by noon Thursday if you haveidentified such holes (andwhat they are).

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7/22

Mai l : : INBOX: Re: Fwd: agency performance on "litmus test" items Page 1 of 1

99.51MB / 476.84MB (20.87%)Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 18:51:13 -0400From: " " 4|

To: " " ^Cc: " " 4|

Subject: Re : Fwd: agency performanceon "litmus test" itemsMike,I just received an update from Pat on DOD documents. I will rev iew it thisevening and call you tomorrow on a proper DOD response.BonnieQuoting "" :> t e a m 3 m a t e s :>> we n eed to go over t h i s on Thursday m o r n i n g .>> M i k e>> ----- Forwarded message from "" -----> Date: wed, 17 Sep 2003 18:29:37 -0400> From: "" > Reply-To: "" > Subject: agency performa nce on " l i t m u s test" ite ms> To: > Reminder -- while th e commissioners have seen the agency letters of Sept. 5,>> a nd heard your reports on where things stand, they a re still anxious to know> if> t h e re are any s ignificant h o l e s i n agency production of l i t m u s test document s>> (other than th e h i g h - l e v e l policy documents that have been promis ed in the> nexty two weeks). Please let Steve or me know by noon Thursday if you have> i d e n t i f i e d such holes (and what they are).>>> ----- End forwarded message -----

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9/11 Closed by Statute Team 3 Document Request TrackerCIADocument Request # 8

Item* Short Title Status

12345

6

78

910111213

14

151617

Office of the DCIPDBsRequests related to PDBsBriefing packages fo rPrincipals and DeputiesCommittee MeetingsDocs or presentationsgiven by DCI to Pres or VPDocs or presentations usedto prepare DCI formeetings w/ NSA, SecDef,SecState, Dir. FBIMaterials relations todiscussions between DCIan d senior-level foreignintell. or other officialsTransition Team materialAfter-action reports fo rterrorist strikes: (a) 1993WTC attack, (b) KhobarTowers, (c) 1998 EastAfrica, (d) USS Cole, (e )Milennium Plot, (f ) 9/11NIC analytic reportsIG reportsOGC reports re. DCIauthorityJeremiah reportOrganizational charts

(a) DCI's Strategic Intent(b) CIA's strategicdirection(c) DCI's intelligencepriorities frameworkDCI's annual report on 1CDCIDsDCI's annual performanceevaluation of NSA, NI M A ,N RO

8/81 lemail asking if we're interested in packets fo r meetingsthat were cancelled (yes!); no booklets for FBI meetings 1/01-9/01(they didn't start making books until later /02).8/25 Docs on the way by 8/29.

8/19 Nos. 080413-080416. At CIA reading room.8/26 Nos. 08005817/15 (a) and (b) correspond to items already responded to from DCI#6(MacEachin) 1 .(a) on WTC and 2. on Khobar8/25 "N o docs responsive" ("no in-house studies most of this doneby outside entities".)7/24Nos. 80027-80068 delivered to KStreet7/15 3 IG reports re. CTC already provided responsive to DCI#5(MacEachin). Asks if we want additional items.8/25 Docs on the way ("we're sorting through production.")8/5 No. 80363. At CIA reading room7/23N o. 80001 organizational charts and related materials deliveredto K Street.As of 8/11, ODCI, CIA, DI, CTC, TTIC (2003) at K Street; S&T inprocess.8/25 Docs on the way ("The overall org charts are coming whichshould cover all the entities hi s should be complete production.")8/26 Nos. 0800582-0800584 &080061 17/23 Nos. 80006-80010 responsive to (a) and (b), including a writtenresponse from the ADCI/AP regarding (c), delivered to K Street

7/23Nos. 80002-8005, 80025 & 80026 delivered to KStreet8/26 Nos. 0800585-0800587 (?)7/23Nos. 80011-80020 delivered to KStreet8/11"We don't believe we have anything responsive

Created by A. AlbionLast updated August 14,2003Page 1 of4


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Mail:: INBOX: head up re: DCI Talking Points Page 1 of 1

INBOX Compose Folders Options Search Problem? Help Addressbook Tasks Memos Calendar Logout Open Folder99.88MB / 476.84MB (20.95%)

INBOX: head up re: DCI Talking Points w o v e | cop y UN* m e s s a g e to(93 of 1777) CDelete |Reply |Reply toAll |Forward |Redirect |Blacklist |Message Source |Resume |Save as |Print Back toINBOX

Date: Thu, 11Sep200315:27:26 -0400From:[ |@ucia.gov>*

Tc M Dan Marcus 9, "[email protected] *, Kevn Scheid *,Melissa Coftey *,Mike Hurley *. Philip Zelikow *, Steve Dunne *Cc: Bob Morean *, "[email protected] *

Subject: head up re: DCITalking PointsA l l : j u s t a h e a d s u p , t h e p a r a l e g a l s a r e n o w p r e p a r i n g t h e D C I T a l k i n gP o i n t s w / m e e t i n g s w i t h SecDef & sec State. T h e y w i l l be a v a i l a b l e int h e r e a d i n g r o o m a t s o m e p o i n t t o mo r r ow . T h e r e a r e 2 s e c oef m e e t i n g st h a t a r e s o l e l y m a d e u p o f c o m p a r t m e n t e d m a t e ri a l f o r w h i c h o n l y A l b i o n ,J e n k i n s & H u r l e y are r e a d on & I ' l l r e t ai n t h e m h e r e in my office f o rt h e m to r e v i e w ( p e r a t e l e c o n w / K e v i n S c h e i d of 9/11/03). A l s o r e c a l lt h a t t h e r e a r e n o D/FBI f r om t h at t i m e p e r i o d ( a l t h o u g h t h e y m e t , t h e yj u s t d i d n ' t k e e p a d v a n c e b o o k s a t t h a t time). P e r 9 u r l e t t e r , p a n L e v i nw i l l w o r k w i t h you on the t a l k i n g p o i n t s for the R i c e m e e t i n g s ,| |Delete |Reply |Reply to All Forward |Redirect |Blacklist |Message Source |Resume |Save as |Print Back toINBOX

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10/22

Team3Report to Commissioners

V> September 10, 2003Team 3 Counterterrorism Policy Team

First, a reminder of what we are responsible for, what I am responsible f o r . . .O ur Goal: Produce th e most objective, and authoritative review of U.S. PolicyDecision-making regarding al-Qaida with emphasis on the years 1998 through 9/11 1but also a review of how the fight has gone since then, and produce a limited numb er Iof concrete, feasible recomm endations that address big problems that we identify. / /

yx\

In the short time we have available, I want to tell you about this with an emphasison substance. There are 4 elements to what I want to report to you this morning:

1) What we have done substantively?2) What we have learned from what we have done?3) How w e are learning it?Here I'll tell you a couple of procedural points of interest4) Where w e are going?*And a word about problems -

\ t have we done substantively?

A big step forward that we have taken is producing a detailed outline for Team3 's monograph. Ithink it's instructive tosay aword about our approach^\,OA iOutline: Our first effort didn't get us where we wanted to be. Tried to figure outhw to tell the story. One way was to address the questions that we wanted to

'/'

V


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answer. Why didn't we stopAQ before 9/11? What were the problems? Havethey been fixed? Seemed to lack clarity, iSo, we took another tack.We started by creating a timeline of key events and decision points a verydetailed one, it's about 35 pages and we add to it daily.

Wethen used that to construct a detailed chronological outlirie for the narrative.Into that chronological o utline we insert at what seem to us (to be the right pointsdiscussions of the various issues the adm inistrations and agencies faced, and thereasons fo r the decisions they took. An advantage of this approach is that when you review our monograph, you maydecide that no, in fact, this discussion would be better raised in another part of thenarrative, where it will flow better. Those judgm ents can be made and thechanges do ne easily, I think. Our job will be to get the individual stories right.They are "ornaments" that can be h ung in the narrative. We are still getting feedback from the front office on this but I believe we havethe basis fo r an approach that will serve us well on this very complicated task: ,How to tell the story fairly, and fully. 1 / ; & ^ rcJ(^-f . GuPfir*O(S^-


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What have we learned from what we are doing?One recurring theme w e have found in our review of DoD, fo r example is the belief inDod for a long time that the CT effort "is not fundamentally a military problem ." This isreflected no t only in the fact that DoD did not adequately plan for a military operationagainst al-Qaida beforejg/ljhut also that there was no military response to KhobarTowers, thdE|H&a^ taarafetoor the Cole. DoD believed, it seems, the task belongedtoothers. "Insert other key findings from other Agencies VUse of the armed UAV . That some of these things that the press reports there areinteragency squabbles over are actually mo ving ahead at the same time. Objectively,they may not be slowing things down. They are moving on parallel tracks. And thatreasons fo r deployment of certain systems may have fa r more to do with legitimateoperational concerns, than what have been characterized as juvenile or trivial fights. Ithink this important. We don't accept these as the d efinitive account, e ither; but theyrepresent points of view.How are we learning w hat we are learning?We have com pleted 12 substantive interviews. They have been substantive. We haveproduced substantive, high quality me m o's for the record on them.We have co mpleted 12 briefings, many of which I call ABIs, or "all but interviews".Trying to keep our minds open. How did people view their jobs? Pre-9/11. How theyview them and are doing them post-9/11.What impediments, if any, were in their way?Or are still in their way. What things did they do right? What things might they havedone wrong.Two recent key interviews, both at CIA, and at senior levels. One Monday, one Tuesday.We are getting to levels that the JI never go t to. Partly, because it may not have been inthe JI's mandate, but also, I'm not sure they knew of these people. If you are looking atintelligence failures, it may make sense to be down in the weeds. But they missed somepeople higher up that have illuminating stories to tell.

We obtained details, and I think a point of view, that has not been told to anyone else inthe U.S. government.Been through the open source and JI, those were goals. Now deeply into documents, andinterviews.


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Discussion: How did aQ and Taliban affect U.S.-Pakistani re lationsraid to cabDiscussion: Did DOJ and FBI ensure a robust legal/law enf orceme nt strategy?Discussion: Sanctions on the TalibanDiscussion: CT budge tDiscussion: CiA teams working with Northern Alliance.Discussion: The attack on the USS Cole

US Counterterrorism Policy, Nov2000 - January 2001: TheTransitionOutgoing officials views on aQ by AgencyIncoming officials views on aQ by AgencyDiscussion: What briefings for incoming administation? Guidance? Was the batonpassed properly.Structure of CT Policy makingUS Counterterrorism Policy, Jan-Sept 2001: The Bush Adm inistration andAQ before 9/11PrioriitiesClarke's drive for an interagency review .How was assessment on Cole reached?. Why was there no response?Grappling with TalibanHomelend security concernsSummer 2001: CT resources and preparationsDeputies and aQThe summer of threatDiplomatic effortsPredator debateDraft NSPD-9Sept 4 Principals Mee ting

US Counterterrorism Policy, Sept 11-20, 2001: The ImmediateAftermath of 9/11W e will do this day-by-dayAnalysis and Conclusions

J0Problem Areas cf^rAS.

r ^Current US CTPolicy VAJLV I

Recommendations *


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Where are we going? Near termAbout 100 people on our B L ist.About 35 on our A List. Front office role.Upcoming domestic travel: CENTCOM, SOCOM, JSOC

Where are we going mid-term?Scheduling al l high level meetings, in close concert w ith Front Office. Nothing wildcathere.Big round of hearings for top people in Bush administration and top people in ClintonAd ministration. Private interviews befo re we do these with everyone.

Now, a word about documentsPD B's other key related m emos. I want to put it into perspective. W ork is going on.Ianticipate that some of the foc us on this is thatThere will com e a point, a drop-dead date if you will, not have documents and not havekey interviews. W e are aware of this and it will from the perspective of Team 3I have 5 people, including myself, full time, an d time to do the interviews, because wecan break up into teams of 2.Submit new Doc Reqs to all agencies parallel language wasn't captured in first request

Problems for usThere are always specific problem s that we resolve. One is to ensure that we get thehighest quality docu ments from the right levels. I believe the process is in place to m akethat happen. Any thing that can be done to accelerate that will obviously help.The big problem fo r us is really the volume of this undertaking for us and the complexityof the issues. W e don't underestimate that. W e are challenged by it and not daunted.And we are moving forward with determination. I think we are in good shape to meetexpectations including time deadlines. The re's not a lot of give to it, though. It's aproblem but one that we are confronting.


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Interviews/Briefings

19 completed with T3 LeadingT3 has "2d Chaired" roughly half a dozen others

B'fings (10 completed)GoodsonDaadlerDestlerCamboneFeithHawleyLongstrethOchmanekSiglerKarzaiInterviews (9 completed)AndersenShaloffShinnWeinbaumBenjaminTuckerGrandrimoCampbellSmithUpcoming Interviews (6 in the next tw o weeks)Martin Indyk (fmr. Ass't Sect. Of State for the Near East)Gayle Smith (fmr. NSC director for Africa)Robert Oakley (fmr. Amb. To Pakistan/Somalia; Former Coordinator for CounterTerrorism at DoS. After retirement in 1992, acted as advisor to UNOCAL on their Afgh .pipeline project)


16/22

Mark Steinitz (Current director for Terrorism Analysis at State's INR)Kenneth Pollack (fmr. NSC director fo r Near East Affairs)Gregory Newbold (fmr. Director of Operations with JCS)


17/22

To : Philip, Chris, Dan, Steve:What follows are the points I intend to make to Comm issioners tomorrow regardingTeam 3's progress and activities. I am providing them to you now for your advancereview.Update on Team 3 (Coun terterrorism Policy Team):1) We have sent major document requests to CIA, DoD, State, FBI, and DOJ. Therequests are both broad and deep. W e believe they wi}l capture the documents andrecords necessary for our research in the coming m & H m i n The due dates for receipt ofthe documents range from July 15-17.fin each of them we have asked tor a roilingproduction. W e are in frequent contact w ith the POCs at each of the Agenciesregarding the requests (making clear we are more than ready to clarify, answerquestions, etc., to facilitate timely responses).2) W e have 2 requests in to EOF. The 1 st request has been answered in full. The 2nd

request is still pending. W e have been told that we will be given access to documentscontained in the 2nd request this week. W e will begin our review of the documents assoon as access is confirmed. A 3rd EOF document requestanother rather substantialrequestis with the Front Office. [Philip: I defer to you to provide details toCommissioners on arrangements w ith EOF.] \\ . 6r^3) W e are preparingome next round of document requests./me contents of Wtfich willdepend in part on the responses to the requests currently pending and in part on wh at

we learn as our research c ontinues. < ? \\&i\) Team 3 has com piled a I jgfbf th e people we will intervie

interview s in July. And are also planning an aggressive interview schedule inAugust. ( -

i i \ ?

Team 3 members have been hard at work reviewing and taking detailed notes on theJoint Inq uiry report, as well as the other key documents the Commission holds. W eare also going through principal secondary sources.W e are also framing questions for upcoming interviewees.

7) W e have put together a rough outline fo r Team 3's monograph to guide ou r work.8) W e eagerly aw ait Team M ember Alexis Albion's clearances, and we expect that tooccur later this week. .- J u , - U < N M * tx,x*lPhilip: As noted above, I assume yo u will respond to Commissioners' questionsregarding EOF cooperation and/or how w e are handling document requests made to EOF.


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Team 3 has completed its big salvo of document requests. As noted above, we have anaggressive interview plan and schedule. Things appear to be on track.


19/22

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Mike HurleyFrom: Philip ZelikowSent: Saturday, December 20, 2003 3:01 PMTo: CommissionersCc: staffSubject: CBS Transcript of Interview with Governor Kean

Commissioners and Staff ~Attached you should find a partial transcript of the CBS interview with Governor Kean. We got itearlier today, when they posted it in order to answer our criticisms.The interview was conducted on December 3, so does not include some events that occurred after that(such as the Cleland resignation and Kerrey appointment).This transcript was prepared by CBS and is obviously a rush job. Also, it is only a transcript of theportion of the interview. It does not include most (we think about three-quarters) of the material theytaped at Drew University (including about Kean as university president, in his classroom, etc.). CBSdecided which portions to transcribe, not us.Even so, I invite you to read the CBS transcript and circulate it to anyone who is interested. Thematerial that got on the news is near the end; you can judge the context for yourself.Our Chairman has a well-founded reputation for fairness and integrity. I think a reasonable reader ofthis transcript will seewhy.Philip ZelikowExecutive DirectorNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United StatesP.S.: The Governor did mix up the number of pages to which we have access with the number ofdocuments (and that number of pages is also out of date). The Governor was also misinformed aboutthe number of interviews conducted so far and still to go. It would be more accurate to say that we haveconducted nearly 800 interviews or briefings and have about 200 still to go.

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Part 1: Interview With Thomas KeanDec. 19,2003

This appointment wasdifferent, part time it wassomething I didn't feel youcould turn down. Imean, this was one of the greatest national tragedies ever to happen to our country andIf you are asked to answer the questions, to resolve the issues, to finally issue a report to theAmerican people, which will hopefully make people safer in the end, I didn't see any way I couldsay no.We've got two jobs really. One is historical. We've got to answer all the questions, what happenedon 9/11, how did it happen, why did it happen, and secondly, we've got to makerecommendations and those recommendations, coming out of our research, coming out ofhistory, will hopefully make the American people feel safer.There have only been three investigations like this in American history, the first was the PearlHarbor investigation and that report. The second was the Warren commission on theassassination of President Kennedy, and the third is this report on 9/11.

So to me it has great importance in that historical context. I think the Warren commission, theywent as fast as they could because they were scared. Scared that people thought Fidel Castrowas involved, that Russia had been involved, some thought the mafia had been involved, andquestions had to be answered right away. If a foreign power had been involved, it might havebeen ....So the Warren commission really rushed their report and there were some problems because ofthat. There are still some questions left unanswered, and those questions bedevil us to this day.We've been given a timeline and it's a tight timeline, we're supposed to finish by the end of thisMay, and we're going to try and do it, but there's an enormous amount of material to cover,there's seven specific areas Congress has specifically asked us to look at and we've got to lookat them all fully and completely and do so with integrity.Q: What are those areas?It's everything from money laundering to immigration reform to visas to response of NYC andWashington to the attack itself, to the history of al Qaeda, the intelligence agencies-the FBI, theCIA, did they really do their job and if they didn't how did they fail, airline safety? Defense, allthose areas, and they're all specifically outlined by Congress, Congress told us this is what wehave to do.So we have various task forces deep into each of these subjects. Congress was limited to theintelligent functions of the United States government. This was the congressional committee onintelligence, they weren't able to get a number of documents they wanted. Particularly from theOffice of the President because there's a historic separation between the presidency and theCongress. And the president has always been upheld, when he asserts presidential privilege inthose areas by the courts.We don't have the same constraints. We're an independent commission, one of only three inhistory, and we feel we have to see everything in order to give the American people what theyreally need to know, so we've been doggedly saying there isn't a material or a piece of paperhaving to do with 9/11 which we don't have to see.Q: How close did you come to issuing subpoenas to the White House?


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M ail:: INBOX: further subpoenas? Page 1 of 1

124.11MB/476.84MB (26.03%)Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2003 17:35:48 -0400From: "" ^

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Report to CommissionersWe are interviewingWe are researching docum entsPrimary sourcesK ey travel for more interview sHave submitted our outline and re-tooled it