Estudo de Caso - Conflict Management in Indonesia

8/6/2019 Estudo de Caso - Conflict Management in Indonesia

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Conflict Management in Indonesia

An Analysis of the Conflicts in

Maluku, Papua and Poso

June 2011

The Indonesian Institute of Sciences,

Current Asia and the Centre for

Humanitarian Dialogue


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Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

114, rue de Lausanne

Geneva 1202

Switzerland

t + 41 22 908 11 30

f +41 22 908 11 40

e [email protected]

w www.hdcentre.org

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre)

Mediation for peace

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) is an independent mediation

organisation dedicated to helping improve the global response to armed conflict.

It attempts to achieve this by mediating between warring parties and providing

support to the broader mediation community.

The HD Centre is driven by humanitarian values and its ultimate goal to reduce

the consequences of violent conflict, improve security, and contribute to the

peaceful resolution of conflict.

It maintains a neutral stance towards the warring parties that it mediates

between and, in order to maintain its impartiality it is funded by a variety of

governments, private foundations and philanthropists.

Cover images

Front: World Indigenous Peoples Day, 9 August, Wamena in Papua. Muridan Widjojo

Back: A batik design from Indonesia. iStockphoto

Supported by the MacArthur Foundation


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Conflict Management in Indonesia

An Analysis of the Conflicts in

Maluku, Papua and Poso

The Indonesian Institute of Sciences,

Current Asia and the Centre for

Humanitarian Dialogue

June 2011


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Conflict Management in Indonesia2

Copyright and credits

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

114, rue de LausanneGeneva 1202

Switzerland

t + 41 22 908 11 30

f +41 22 908 11 40

e [email protected]

w www.hdcentre.org

Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011

Reproduction o all or part o this publication may be

authorised only with written consent and acknowl-

edgement o the source.

Editor: Cate Buchanan ([email protected])

Deputy editor: Adam Cooper

Design and layout: Rick Jones ([email protected])


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An Analysis of the Conflicts in Maluku, Papua and Poso 3

Acronyms and terminology .................................................................................................................................................................... 5

About the contributors ................................................................................................................................................................................. 8

Summary ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10

Introduction 10

Significant issues in peace processes in Indonesia 11

Observations 14

Case Study One

Conflict and violence in Maluku:Resolution and management approaches ................................................................................................................... 16

Introduction 16

Figure 1: Map of Maluku 17

Box 1: The chronology of the conflict in Maluku 18

Conflict management actors and initiatives 20

The emergency and security approach to conflict management 21

The Malino Peace Agreement 25

Box 2: The Malino II Agreeement 26

The recovery and development phase 27

Conclusion 31

Case Study Two

Jakarta Papua: A dialogue in the making ................................................................................................................ 32

Introduction 32

Figure 1: Map of Papua 33

Conflict management initiatives for Papua 35

Contents


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Box 1: OTSUS Its origins and contents 37

Box 2: Assessing OTSUS 38

Resolving the Papua Conflict 40

Preparing the ground for dialogue 42

Recommendations 44

Papuan Perspectives on Peace in West PapuaOtto Ondawame ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 46

Colonization, conflict and violence in West Papua 46

Melanesian conflict resolution styles and approaches 49

Recommendations 50

Case Study ThreeViolent conflict and its management in Poso, Central Sulawesi ................................................. 52

Introduction 52

Figure 1: Map of Poso 54

Box 1: Timeline of the conflict in Poso 55

Conflict resolution initiatives 57

Box 2: Ten points of the Malino I Declaration 60

Conclusion 67

Annexes .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 69


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Adat

Group o customary laws or the unwritten traditionalcode that regulates social political, and economic

practices, as well as dispute resolution

AJI

Te Indonesian Journalists Alliance /

Aliansi Jurnalis Idependen

BAKORNAS PBP

Te National Coordinating Body or Disaster

and Internally Displaced Persons Management /

Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanganan Bencanadan Pengungsi

Bappenas

National Development Planning Agency /

Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional

BIN

State Intelligence Agency / Badan Intelijen Negara

Brimob

Mobile Brigade / Brigade Mobil

BupatiIndonesia is divided into provinces. Provinces

are made up o regencies and cities. Provinces,

regencies and cities do have their own local gov-

ernments and parliamentary bodies. Regencies are

headed by a bupati, normally translated into English

as regent

DOM

Military operation zone / Daerah Operasi Militer

DPDRegional Representatives Council /

Dewan Perwakilan Daerah

DPR

Peoples Representative Council /Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat

ELSHAM

Institute or Human Rights Study and Advocacy /

Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia

GoI

Government o Indonesia

IDP

Internally displaced people or person

Kodam

Military Regional Command /

Komando Daerah Militer

Kodap

erritorial War Command /

Komando Daerah Perang

KOMNAS HAM

Indonesias National Commission or Human

Rights / Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia

KontraS

Commission on Missing Persons and Victims o

Violence / Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban

indak Kekerasan

KOPASSUS

Special Forces Command / Komando Pasukan Khusus

Korem

Sub-regional military command /

Komando Resort Militer

LBH Jakarta

Jakarta Legal Aid Institute / Lembaga Bantuan Hukum

Acronyms and terminology


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LIPI

Indonesian Institute o Sciences /

Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia

Menko Kesra

Coordinating Ministry or Peoples Welare /

Kementrian Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat

Pemekaran

Division o provinces and districts into smaller

administrative units

Perda

Regional regulations / Peraturan Daerah

POLRI

Indonesian National Police /

Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia

TNIIndonesian National Army /

entara Nasional Indonesia

UKP4

Presidential Working Unit or Supervision

and Management o Development /

Unit Kerja Presiden bidang Pengawasan dan

Pengendalian Pembangunan

YLBHI

Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation /

Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia

Maluku specific

FKM

Maluku Front Sovereignty /

Front Kedaulatan Maluku

GPM

Maluku Protestant Churches /

Geredja Protestant Maluku

ICMI

Association o Muslim Intellectuals /

Ikatan cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia

Malino II

Malino Peace Agreement /

Perjanjian Malino II

MMC

Maluku Media Centre

PARKINDOTe Indonesian Christian Party /

Partai Kristen Indonesia

PDI

Te Indonesian Democratic Party /

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia

PDI-P

Te Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle /

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan

RMS

Republic o South Maluku /

Republik Maluku Selatan

Papua specific

DAP

Papua Customary Council / Dewan Adat Papua

DPRD

Parliament o the West Papua Province /Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah

DPRP

Papuan Peoples Representative Council /

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua

Foker LSM

Papua NGO Cooperation Forum /

Forum Kerja Sama Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat

FORERI

Forum or Reconciliation o the Irian Community /

Forum Rekonsiliasi Masyarakat Irian Jaya

FWPC

Free West Papua Campaign

KNPB

West Papua National Committee /

Komite Nasional Papua Barat

MRP

Papuan People Council / Peoples Consultative

Assembly / Majelis Rakyat Papua

OPM

Papua Freedom Organisation / Papua Freedom

Movement / Organisasi Papua Merdeka. Some

authors reer to them as the Papua Freedom

Organization and others as the Papua Freedom

Movement.

OTSUS

Special Autonomy Law No. 21/2001 /

Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papua

PDPPapuan Presidium Council /

Presidium Dewan Papua


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PPN

Papua Peace Network /

Jaringan Damai Papua

PVC

Papuan Volunteer Corps

UP4BUnit or the Acceleration o Development in Papua

and West Papua / Unit Percepatan Pembangunan

Papua dan Papua Barat

WPNA

West Papua National Authority

Poso specific

GKST

Central Sulawesi Christian Church /

Gereja Kristen Sulawesi engah

Malino I

Malino Peace Declaration /Deklarasi Perdamaian Malino

POKJA-RKP

Te task orce or Poso conflict reconciliation /

Kelompok Kerja Resolusi Konflik Poso

PRKP

Te Reconciliation Center or Poso conflict /

Pusat Resolusi Konflik dan Perdamaian


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Acknowledgements and contributors

Te HD Centre would like to thank the MacArthur

Foundation and International Development

Research Centre or their support o the project

over 20092011.

Te HD Centre also wishes to thank YuliIsmartono and John McBeth or their critical peer

review o the case studies.

Rohaiza Ahmad Asi received a BA rom the

National University o Singapore where she majored

in Political Science and Inormation and Commu-

nications Management. She went on to pursue an

MSc in International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam

School o International Studies (RSIS) in Nanyang

echnological University. In 2004 Rohaiza joinedRSIS as a research analyst ocusing on conflict and

terrorism in Indonesia where she developed exten-

sive practical research experience. Rohaiza joined

the HD Centre in Singapore in 2007 and is currently

a Project Officer. Rohaiza was involved in the research

and drafing o the Poso and Maluku studies.

Johari Efendi graduated in 2000 with a Bachelor

o Law rom the General Soedirman University,

Purwokerto, Central Java. He worked at the Legal

Aid Foundation in Jakarta and became a lawyer in2002. He has more than a decade o experience in

acilitation, programme design, and training o

community groups and government officials across

Indonesia on the issues o conflict mediation, good

governance, peace-building, community justice,

human rights, human security, and local autonomy.

He has also worked with international agencies and

the Indonesian central government. He was previ-

ously the director o the Institut itian Perdamaian

and is now a staff member o Current Asia. Johariwas involved in the research and drafing o the

Poso and Maluku studies.

Irine Hiraswari Gayatri graduated with an MA in

peace and conflict studies, rom the Department o

Peace and Conflict Studies o Uppsala Universitet,

Sweden in August 2005. Prior to getting her MA,

she worked as researcher at the Centre or PoliticalStudies, Indonesian Institute o Sciences since 1997.

Between 2006 and 2008 she wrote three chapters in

different books on Aceh, namely on post-disaster

reconstruction, village governance and womens

political representation in Aceh politics. In 2006 and

early 2007, she was also with the United Nations

Recovery Coordinator (UNORC) as a field officer

in West Coast Aceh and Bener Meriah and Central

Aceh. In 2008 she supervised a joint survey o the

Center or Political Studies, LIPI and Oxord Uni-versity on Horizontal Inequality in Bireuen, Aceh.

Irine is also involved with the Jakarta-based NGO,

INERSEKSI Foundation, which ocuses on minority

issues and multiculturalism. Irine was involved in

the drafing o the Papua study.

Akiko Horiba graduated with a Masters o Teo-

logical Studies rom the Weston Jesuit School o

Teology, Cambridge, USA. Afer conducting local

research in Indonesia, she was awarded a PhD in

Area Studies rom Sophia University, okyo, Japan

in 2009. She was the research coordinator at the

Institut itian Perdamaian, joining in 2007. Since

2010, she has been a staff member o Current Asia.

Akiko was involved in the research and drafing o

the Poso and Maluku studies.

John Otto Ondawame is the Vice Chairperson o

the West Papua National Coalition or Liberation

(WPNCL). He was born in 1953 in Wanamum,

Mimika Regency in West Papua. Ondawame was amember o the OPM and went into exile in 1976. He

obtained his PhD in political science rom Australian


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National University in Canberra in 2000, MSc

degree rom the University o Western Sydney in

1995, Graduate Diplomas rom the University o

Sydney in 1994 and the Uppsala University in 1986,

and a Bachelor o Arts degree rom the Cenderawasih

University, West Papua in 1976. Ondawame was a

recipient o the 2001 Reconciliation Award bestowedby the Australians Against Execution group, and

the 1972 President Suharto Award or Academic

Excellence. In 2000, Ondawame joined the West

Papua Project at the Centre or Peace and Conflict

Studies o the University o Sydney as a project

coordinator. Currently he is Coordinator or Inter-

national Relations or the WPNCL operating rom

its new office in Port Vila, Vanuatu.

Marc Probst studied business administration,

economics, business ethics, law and internationalrelations at the University o St Gallen, Switzerland,

and at the Chinese University o Hong Kong. In

2004, he joined the Political Affairs Division o the

Swiss Department o Foreign Affairs as a project

officer in the Peace Policy Section. He was also

Head o the Desk, Human Security and Business,

in the Human Rights Promotion Section. Marc

joined the HD Centre in 2008 in Singapore and is a

Project Manager. He was involved in the research

and drafing o the Papua study.

Muridan Widjojo graduated in anthropology and

French literature rom the University o Indonesia.

Afer conducting archival and local research in

Papua and Maluku, he was awarded a PhD rom

the University o Leiden in the Netherlands. In

1993 he joined the Center or Political Studies at

the Indonesian Institute o Sciences in Jakarta and

specialises in the concerns o Papua and Maluku.

He was also a member o investigation team o the

National Commission o Human Rights in 2000and has acted as a consultant or various organisa-

tions in Papua since 2000. Muridan was involved

in the research and drafing o the Papua study.


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Introduction

When President Soeharto ell rom power in 1998

afer 32 years o authoritarian rule, it marked the

beginning oboth Indonesias democratic transition

and the eruption o the violent internal conflicts that

had been simmering across the country. Separatist

agitation increased across Aceh, Papua and East

imor (now imor Leste).1 In the period rom 1998

to 2003 (when most o the communal conflicts were

resolved) this violence is estimated to have displaced

more than a million people and led to the loss o

thousands o l ives. Post-Soeharto communal

conflict resulted in 1.3 million internally displaced

persons (IDPs).2

Indonesias dramatic democratic transition alsohad an impact on the ways in which conflict was

(and is) managed. During the New Order era such

conflict was systematically suppressed and not

publicised or ear that it would trigger sentiments

o ethnicity, religion and race among groups,

commonly reerred to as SARA (short or suku,

1 Te use o the word Papua in this report reers to Papua and West

Papua provinces. Te area was previously known by various names,

including Netherlands New Guinea (18951962), Western New Guinea

(1962May 1963), West Irian (19631973), Irian Jaya (19732000) andPapua (2001-2003). In 2003 the western-most third o the region was

split into a separate province, called West Irian Jaya, which was

renamed Western Papua province in April 2007. Indigenous people

reer to Papua and West Papua provinces as West Papua.

2 Varshney, Ashtosh et al., Patterns o Collective Violence in Indonesia

1990-2003, UNSFIR Working Paper 04/03, (Jakar ta: United Nations

Support Facility or Indonesian Recovery, 2004). On violence in

Indonesia post-Soeharto, see also: Colombijn, Freek and Lindblad,

Tomas J., Introduction, In Colombijn, Freek and Lindblad,

Tomas, J., (Eds.), Roots o Violence in Indonesia, (Singapore:ISEAS,

2002).On the Maluku conflict, see: Sri, Yanuarti et.al., Konflik di

Maluku engah: Penyebab, Karakteristik, dan Penyelesaian Jangka

Panjang, (Jakarta: LIPI, 2003). On the Aceh conflict, see: Aspinal,

Edward, Violence and Identity Formation in Aceh under Indonesian

Rule, In Anthony Reid (Ed.), Verandah o Violence, Te background

to the Aceh problem (Singapore: Singapore University Press and World

Scientific Publishing Co Pt y Ltd., (2006)

agama, ras, antargolongan). Indeed, it was this

policy that was blamed or the outbreak o violent

communal conflicts in the post-Soeharto era.3

Soehartos successor, Bacharuddin Jusu Habibie,

began the process o decentralising power romJakarta and reducing the extensive reach o the

military into political and economic lie. Tis politi-

cal transition remade the relationship between the

state and society and offered both challenges and

opportunities or peacemakers. Broad changes

took place across Indonesia, rom the increasing

role o civil society in peacemaking to the changing

relationship between the military and the police.

Tese trends interacted with local grievances to

produce a complex landscape o conflict that is still

not well understood.

The research gap

Te approaches to conflict management that have

emerged in Indonesia post-Soeharto thereore

deserve attention. Analysis o these issues (typically

through academic research) has ocused largely on

the structural and proximate conflict drivers, the

impact o these conflicts, and the actors involved:

all o which offer important inormation or under-standing the contours o grievances and violence.

Yet there is remarkably little comparative policy-

ocused analysis o conflict management in Indonesia.

Tis is striking given how requently the country has

experienced violent upheaval. Tose responsible or

conflict prevention and management lack access to

timely comparative research on actors which enabled

these violent conflicts to be settled, what potent issues

remain and issues to consider or conflict resolution.

3 Gershman, John, Indonesia: Islands o conflict,Asia imes Online,

26 October (2002).

Summary


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In this light, the Centre or Humanitarian

Dialogue (the HD Centre), the Indonesian Institute

o Sciences (LIPI), the Institut itian Perdamaian

(IP), and later Current Asia (CA), have worked

together to fill this important inormation gap and

produce policy relevant research which aims to

inorm uture peacemaking efforts within Indone-sia. In several areas the halting o violence has not

necessarily dealt conclusively with the underlying

causes o conflict, and issues that could stimulate

conflict remain unaddressed such as the role o

security orces; equitable resource allocation; and

the ongoing sensitive issues o ethnic and reli-

gious identity.

Tis report includes three case studies on con-

flict management in Indonesia rom Papua, Poso in

Central Sulawesi and Maluku. Poso and Maluku

were chosen as case studies to provide insights on,

and lessons learned rom, managing communal

conflict. In both regions, the central government

mediated agreements to end the violence in 2001

and 2002 respectively but only afer the conflict

had been mismanaged or years. Research conducted

or these reports indicates that todays peace remains

ragile as root causes and new grievances emerging

rom the conflicts were not ully addressed. In the

main, government-mediated peace agreements

have not been ully implemented and many resi-dents o Maluku or Poso appear poorly inormed

o the contents o these agreements. Issues such

as the return o IDPs and land disputes between

different ethnic or religious groups, remain signifi-

cant sources o tension. o the extent that violence

has been reduced, it is important to decipher

which o the many initiatives taken by government

and non-government actors were responsible or

these changes. Tese studies ask how the conflict

was managed? o what effect? And what peace-

making approaches can indeed be regarded assuccessul?

Te case o Papua is even more pressing as the

conflict is very much ongoing. Te special autonomy

law (OSUS / Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papua)

approved in 2001 was expected to reduce disparities

between Papua and the Indonesian Government

(GoI). It was also expected to give people in Papua,

especially indigenous people, the chance to partici-

pate actively in development processes. However,

because the law has been poorly implemented, ithas ultimately uelled urther separatist sentiment.

Papua also suffers rom local conflicts among indig-

enous tribes, and more recently, tensions between

indigenous people (ofen Christians) and settlers

(ofen Muslims). Te Papua section is both retro-

spective and orward looking, asking how the conflict

can be de-escalated and who should be involved?

As well as what obstacles and opportunities there

are or peacemaking?

Methodology

With the support o the MacArthur Foundation

through its Asia Security Initiative, the HD Centre,

LIPI, IP (and eventually CA) undertook a wide

range o research. Support was also received rom

the International Development Research Centre.

Troughout 2009 and up to mid-2010 detailed

primary research was undertaken in Maluku, Poso

and Papua. Te methodology or this researchincluded ocus group discussions, workshops and

individual briefings. Tese were complemented by

interviews with officials rom the central govern-

ment and non-government actors in Jakarta, as well

as drawing on materials rom secondary sources.

An annotated bibliography containing selective

material relevant to conflict management in Papua,

Maluku and Poso was produced in early 2010.4 For

more detail see Annex 1: Research methodology.

Significant issues in peace

processes in Indonesia

Decentralization

Decentralisation and regional autonomy became a

national priority during the period oreormasi.5 A

number o laws introduced in 1999 shifed power

away rom the central government.6 Te heads o

regional governments, districts (bupati) and mayors

(walikota) became elected positions or the firsttime. Decentralisation with its many positive and

4 Available at www.hdcentre.org/files/Indonesia20Literature20

Review20January202010_0.pd

5 Te Post-Soeharto era in Indonesia began with the all o Soeharto

in 1998. Since then Indonesia has been in a per iod o transition. Tis

era has been called the period oreormasi (reorm).

6 Tese include Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government and Law

No. 25/1999 on Financial bala nce between the Centra l and Regional

Government. Tese two national laws replaced previous national

laws that regulated the admin istrative structure o regional govern-

ments, Law No. 5/1974 on Regional Government and Law No. 5/1979

on Village Government. Te latter law had previously introduced the

Javanese administrative structure or vi llages throughout Indonesia.


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democratic benefits also led to major challenges.

Te local population, ofen reerred to as sons o

the soil (putra daerah) were given priority or civil

service positions in local government. Control o

the civil service offered the power to allocate jobs,

contracts and engage in corruption. Unsurprisingly

then, those who controlled the bureaucracy underSoeharto (who were not necessarily rom the local

population) resented losing their privileged posi-

tions. Hence, there was sharp competition among

elites, sometimes along ethnic lines, and divisions

were sharpened between those considered locals

and migrants.

Tese changes had a proound impact on con-

flict management. In many cases they engendered

urther conusion within government. Te division

o power between provincial and district government

lacked clarity, and co-ordination in crisis situationswas disjointed. Corruption became more prevalent

because o the shif o financial power to local govern-

ment, compounded by the lack o sound supervision

and a strong central government to monitor the

implementation o these new laws. Local adminis-

trators throughout Indonesia now have considerable

power over the exploitation o resources.7

Such difficulties between provincial and district

governments led the central government to reassert

itsel in late 2001 with the result that the central gov-

ernment stepped up its efforts or conflict resolution.

Suffice to say, the post-Soeharto reorm process is

still a work in progress with the resulting decen-

tralisation having implications or effective conflict

resolution.

Consequently, the efforts o central government

ministers particularly Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

and Jusu Kalla8 led to the Malino peace declara-

tion in Poso in December 2001 (Malino I) and the

Malino peace agreement in Maluku and North Maluku

in February 2002 (Malino II).9

Both Malino I andMalino II were perceived as political announce-

ments to mark the end o conflict, but critically

neither was a participatory process in which local

7 Richard, Seymour, and urner, Sarah, Otonomi daerah: Indonesias

decentralisation experiment, New Zealand Journal o Asian Studies

4 (2002), pp.33-51.

8 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Coordinating Minister or Political

and Security Affairs, 2002-2004; Jusu Kalla, Coordinating Minister

or Peoples Welare, 2001-2004.

9 Te Malino Declaration on Poso can be accessed at www.relieweb.

int/rw/rwb.ns/db900SID/ACOS-64BRC3?OpenDocument; Mali no II

Peace Agreement on Maluku can be accessed at ww w.relieweb.int/

rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-64CDMA?OpenDocument.

communities were involved in the planning or imple-

mentation o the agreements. Tese agreements

were criticised or ocusing on physical recovery,

reconstruction and the provision o emergency aid

to IDPs instead o addressing root causes. Among

the major criticisms cited are: a lack o consultation

with the local community on the peace agreements;members o the negotiating teams did not repre-

sent the needs o the locals; and the agreements did

not address the structural causes o the conflicts.

For example, resources and economic opportuni-

ties are still unequally distributed, and relocated

IDPs have not been effectively re-integrated into

their new environments.

Security forces

It was only during the presidency o AbdurrahmanWahid (1999-2001) that military reorm started to

be taken seriously. While the military, entara

Nasional Indonesia (NI), and the police had been

two branches o the Republic o Indonesia Armed

Forces (ABRI) under Soeharto, by 2002 they had

been separated as part o the process o security

sector reorm.10 On paper the police were tasked

with internal security while the military was re-

sponsible or national deence. However, during

this transition, the division o responsibilities and

relations between the military and police were not

clearly defined. Tere was also a degree o resistance

rom elements o the military, which has a long

tradition o regarding the police as the inerior

orce. In practice, the military was still called upon

or internal security duties where they had to work

closely with the police. Te military remained politi-

cally influential, especially in ormulating national

security policy. Moreover, while the military had

10 wo pieces o legisl ation, Law No. 3/2002 on State Deense and Law

No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces, constitute the most

important laws in the reorm o t he security sector. Te role and

unctions o the military and the police are then urther defined in

the ollowing two new ac ts: according to the State Deence Act

No.2/2002, the NI is a deence instrument o the unitary Republic

o Indonesia (Article 10). Meanwhile, the National Police Act

No. 2/2002 states that the police orce is an instrument o the state

responsible or guarding public security and order and tasked with

protecting, guiding and serving the public as well as upholding the

law. Te Law No. 2/2002 also clea rly stipulates that the Police are a

civilian orce responsible or internal security matters. For more

inormation, see Sukma, Rizal and Prasetyono, Edy, Security sector

reorm in Indonesia: Te military and the police, Working Paper 9,

Netherlands Institute o International Relations Clingadael Conflict

Research Unit (Berlin: Bergho Research Centre or Constructive

Conflict Management, 2003).


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experience handling separatist or anti-government

violence, communal conflicts such as those in

Maluku and Poso had no clear enemy and proved

ar harder to manage, requiring skills the military

lacked. In recent years, the position o the police has

improved, not least in terms o budgetary support.

The roles of women

Tough women are ofen assumed to be victims in

armed conflicts, womens roles in violent conflicts

present a ar more complex picture. For example,

womens resilience through their economic activi-

ties, care o amily and children, and community

networks help prevent urther societal disinte-

gration in the midst o violence and insecurity.11

In Indonesia this is certainly the case. Women also

played important roles in inormal reconciliationbetween the conflicting parties. O course, women

also played active roles in perpetrating violence

as combatants, commanders, messengers and

provocateurs.

In Ambon, Poso and Aceh, women led many

inter-religious and peace dialogue processes at

the grassroots level. ypically perceived as non-

threatening (perhaps even powerless) by many in

the community, they are ofen able to influence men

and husbands to lay down their weapons. While

women have played an extensive role in managingconflict at the community level in a variety o

ways, their involvement in conflict resolution at

higher political levels is minimal. For example, in

the Helsinki agreement on Aceh, only one woman,

an advisor to the Free Aceh Movement (GAM),

was involved in the peace process.12 wo women

pastors rom the Christian community and a

Muslim woman participated in the Malino I process.

In Malino II, a woman pastor and two Catholic

women were chosen as representatives o the

Christian community, and no women represented

the Muslim community. In addition, the presence

o these women in these peace talks did not neces-

sarily mean issues o concern to women were

brought to the table, as they had to submit to the

11 Bell, Christine, Women address the problems o peace agreements,

In, Coomaraswamy, Radhika and Fonseka, Dilr ukshi (Eds.),Peace

work: Women, armed conflict and negotiation, (India:Women

Unlimited, 2004).

12 Te Helsink i Memorandum o Understanding between the

Government o the Republic o Indonesia and the Free Aceh

Movement is available at www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/

Helsinki20MoU.pd

broader agenda o their male-dominated teams.

Notably, not a single article in the Helsinki agree-

ment and Malino agreements explicitly addresses

gender issues.

Womens limited participation in peacemaking

reflects broader gender challenges in Indonesia.

Tough the country has a strong matrilineal com-ponent to its traditional culture, this is mostly

obscured by a narrow religious interpretation o

womens roles in society. Tis conservative cultural

context is exacerbated by a low level o awareness

among women about their rights both at a national

level and globally. Under such circumstances, it is

difficult to encourage women to contribute to a

higher political level o decision-making andor

many (male) decision-makers to create or share

political space to enable that to happen.13 As a

result the process loses access to a wide range operspectives and acute understanding o the stakes

involved in the violent conflict.

Civil society

Te record o representatives rom civil society in

resolving conflict in Indonesia has been mixed. In

many cases, they are an important bridge to the

central government. For example, the Papua Peace

Network (PPN) is leading an internal dialogue

among civil society groups to prepare or eventualtalks on the uture o Papua, and ensure that the

views o civil society are well represented in a

potential dialogue process.

Civil society representatives have also played an

active role as peace and reconciliation actors at the

grassroots level in the communal conflicts o

Maluku and Central Sulawesi. In these conflicts,

they were instrumental in delivering emergency

aid to the IDPs and the affected communities. In

addition, there were several initiatives rom villag-

ers to set up local mechanisms to prevent conflict.For example, in Wayame village in Maluku, villag-

ers created eam 20 consisting o ten people rom

the Muslim community and ten people rom the

Christian community who were responsible or

patrolling the village to ensure security and inves-

tigating any rumours circulating in the village with

13 See, Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue, Women at the Indonesian

peace table: Enhancing the contributions o women to conflict resolu-

tion, Report and policy recommendations with the Indonesian

Institute o Sciences (Geneva: Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue,

2010) available in Bahasa Indonesia and English at www.hdcentre.org/

projects/gender-amp-mediation/issues/women-peace-table--asia-pacific.


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the potential to incite conflict. Rules were also created

and enorced in the village that included a prohibi-

tion on making derogatory remarks about other

religions and being involved in violence. Any villagers

ound breaking the rules were punished accord-

ingly or told to leave the village. Other civil society

initiatives included providing education, incomegeneration or women and trauma counselling.

However, Soehartos authoritarian legacy lim-

ited civil societys ability to handle the challenging

diversity o ethnic groups in Indonesia. His unity

policy used a variety o legal and ideological methods

to either curtail or regulate civil society, the most

well-known o which was the 1985 Law on Social

Organisations (Undang-Undang Organisasi

Kemasyarakatan No. 8/1985, otherwise known as

UU ORMAS). Under this law, all organisations had

to adhere to the state ideology oPancasila.14 With

the removal o regulations controlling organisa-

tional activities in 1998, the number o NGOs and

other civil society organisations increased at a rapid

rate. However, many o these organisations are

ragmented along sectoral lines with a lack o co-

ordination between groups working on similar

issues; many are weak organisationally; and there

are very ew mechanisms through which these

organisations can be held accountable to the com-

munities which they endeavour to help or claimto represent.

Observations

Tough the conflicts in Maluku, Poso and Papua

are clearly different rom each other, there are a

number o common themes worth reflecting on

not least because the conflict in Papua is ongoing

and more needs to be done to ensure that peace in

Maluku and Poso is sustained.

A clear common challenge has been the appro-

priate use o the security orces. Inexperienced in

dealing with communal conflicts, the initial security

response in Maluku and Poso exacerbated tensions.

Te security orces aligned themselves with differ-

ent sides in the conflict, allegedly supplying arms

and ailing to arrest those who clearly violated the

law. In Papua, human rights abuses by security

14 Pancasila consists o five principles: Belie in the one and only God;

just and civilised humanity; unity o Indonesia; democracy guided

by the inner wisdom in the una nimity arising out o deliberations

amongst representatives; and, socia l justice or all .

agencies and competition between them or control

over natural resources has led to increased mistrust

against the central government as well as migrants.

However, at the same time, the lesson rom Maluku

and Poso is that when the security orces are seen

to enorce the law airly and arrest those known to

be instigating violence, conflict can be reduced.Funds or development and humanitarian assis-

tance should not be seen as a panacea. As violence

escalated in Maluku and Poso, the central govern-

ment and NGOs ocused on providing emergency

aid, particularly to those displaced. While this was

an essential humanitarian response, it was only

when the central government began to address more

undamental drivers o the conflict that violence

subsided. Similarly in Papua, relying on develop-

ment projects which suffer rom corruption and

poor co-ordination within government has ailed

to calm separatist sentiment. Indeed, uneven develop-

ment is a conflict driver. Tis lesson applies equally

to post-violence measures. Money was allocated in

Maluku and Poso to rebuilding inrastructure at

the expense o reconciliation and re-integration o

the conflicting parties. Such intangibles are harder

to address but essential or a lasting peace. Economic

wellbeing should not be regarded as a substitute or

political dialogue.

Tese case studies also ask difficult questionsabout who is responsible or managing conflicts in

Indonesia, reflecting an ongoing debate in govern-

ment circles where there should be attempts to rame

conflict management in a national law. District and

provincial governments have occasionally been

constructive but once violence escalates beyond a

certain point, the central government needs to step

in either as a acilitator o dialogue in a commu-

nal context, or a participant in dialogue i they are

party to the conflict.

Better co-ordination within government is alsoneeded. Competition between provincial and dis-

trict governments in Maluku and Poso weakened

attempts to manage the conflict. In the case o

Papua, while the Papua Desk o the Coordinating

Ministry or Legal, Political and Security Affairs

has the ormal mandate to deal with the region, at

times other agencies like the Ministry o Home

Affairs exercise greater power.

Civil society representatives whether rom the

NGO or religious community have an importantrole in prodding reluctant state authorities to take

action. It took a Christian leader, Pastor ubondo,


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to persuade Jusu Kalla to help mediate the conflict

in Poso. In Papua, LIPI has built up support within

government or dialogue starting with its 2008

proposal Te Papua Road Map.15Tis has been

complemented by the work o a Papuan Catholic

pastor, Father Neles ebay, who has promoted dia-

logue within the Papuan community and with thecentral government in Jakarta. In all this, public

participation is critical. Peace in Maluku and Poso

is less secure than it could be because the Malino I

and II agreements were elite agreements made

without any involvement o the public a lesson

which should be heeded by those involved in dia-

logue in Papua.

15 Widjojo, Muridan, (Ed.), Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past,

Improving the Present and Securing the Future, (Jakarta: YOI, Yayasan

IFA, LIPI, 2009).


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Conflict and violence in

Maluku: Resolution and

management approaches

Introduction

Te violent conflict in Maluku, largely concentrated

in Ambon, was one o the most devastating to break

out afer the all o the Soeharto regime. Te con-

flict claimed almost 5,000 lives rom 1999 to 2002

and displaced a third o the population o Maluku

and North Maluku.16 Beore the outbreak o the

religious communal conflict in Ambon city, there

were several inter-religious skirmishes in other

parts o Indonesia. In November 1998, riots broke

out in Ketapang, north Jakarta, between Christian

Ambonesepreman, or thugs, and Muslims. It was

reported that afer the riots, almost 200 Ambonese

preman were shipped back to Maluku by the Indo-

nesian Navy. According to witnesses in Ambon, the

preman acted as provocateurs o the first outbreak

o violence.17 In December 1998, in several areas in

Ambon, fights and arson attacks occurred between

Christian and Muslim villages, ofen triggered bythe Indonesian Military (NI). On January 14, 1999,

there were riots between Christians and Muslims

in Dobo in southeast Maluku.

16 Brown, Graham., Wilson, Christopher and Hadi, Suprayoga.,

Overcoming Violent Conflict: Peace and Development Analysis in

Maluku and North Ma luku, Vol. 4, Bappenas, (Jaka rta: United

Nations Development Programme and Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan

Indonesia, 2005).

17 Van Klinken, Gerry, What caused the Ambon violence?, Inside

Indonesia, No.60 (1999). See also: Aditjondro, Di Balik Asap Mesiu,

Air Mata dan Anyir Darah di Ma luku, In Salampessy, Zairin and

Husain, Tamrin (Eds.), Ketika Semerbak Cengkih ergusur Asap

Mesiu, (Jakarta:APAK Ambon, 2001).

Te most requently cited trigger to the conflict

in Ambon is the event on 19 January 1999 during the

Muslim holiday o Idul Fitri. A petty dispute broke

out between a Christian youth rom Mardika, a district

in Ambon city, and a Muslim youth rom Batumerah,a village next to Mardika. Rumours that exacerbated

pre-existing divisions between Christian and Muslim

communities began, drawing surrounding villages

into the violence. Initially, fighting was mainly between

Ambon Christians and Muslim immigrants rom

South Sulawesi (Bugis, Buton and Makassar), with

each launching surprise attacks against the other.18

Conflict drivers

Te conflict in Maluku is ofen portrayed in terms

o longstanding animosities between Muslims and

Christians, although the reality is more complex.

As a result o European involvement in the spice

trade in the 16th century, nearly hal o the Maluku

population today are Christians (50.2 percent accord-

ing to the 2000 census); compared to the rest o

Indonesia where 88 per cent o the population is

Muslim. More than 300 years o Dutch colonialism

divided Maluku society along religious lines, both

geographically and socially.19

raditional practicesare thought to have kept tensions between Christians

and Muslims in a relatively stable state until the

1970s.20 Pela Gandong, a village alliance system

18 Panggabean, Samsu, Maluku: Te Challenge o Peace, In van

Deveen, Hans (Ed.), Searching or Peace in Asia Pacific , (Boulder:

Lynne Rienner Publication, 2004).

19 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos

in Maluku, Asia Report No. 10, (Jakarta / Brussels: ICG, 2000).

20 Bartels, Dieter, Your God is No Longer Mine: Muslim-Christian

Fratricide in the Central Moluccas afer a Hal -Millennium o

olerant Co-Existence and Ethnic Unity, In Pannell, Sandra (Ed.),

A State o Emergency: Violence, Society and the State in Eastern

Indonesia, (Darwin: Northern erritory University Press, 2003).

Case Study One


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unique to the Central Maluku, bound Muslim and

Christian villages together and played a pivotal role

in traditional social relationships and the experi-

ence o cultural identity.

Maluku underwent many social changes during

Soehartos rule. Te apparent peaceul relationship

between Christians and Muslims was only super-

ficial. Dutch colonialism led to Christians being

granted greater access to education and political

office, while Muslims made up the majority o traders

and business people. Following the government

policy o transmigration that began in 1950s, and

voluntary migration rom Bugis, Buton and Makassar

that grew in the 1970s, the population o Maluku

became increasingly Muslim. In 1990, Soeharto

ounded the Indonesian Association o Muslim

Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia,

or ICMI) as a means o securing political support

rom Islamic groups as his power within the mili-

tary aded. Soeharto intended ICMI to be a counter-balance to the military. Te ICMI became an increas-

ingly important source o individuals or important

government positions, including in Maluku. In 1992,

M. Akib Latuconsina, ICMI director in Maluku

was appointed governor. He was the first native

Malukan and the first civilian to hold the post,

which was usually occupied by military officers

rom Java. By 1996 all o the bupati, or district chies,

in the province were Muslims. Tese changes antago-

nised the Christian population and urther divided

Maluku along religious lines.

Evolution of the conflict

In the early stage o the conflict, the target o vio-

lence were Muslim migrants rom Bugis, Buton

and Makassar, a group whose dominant position

in the employment market and inormal labour

sector (e.g. market merchants) generated resentment.

Afer the large-scale exodus o those migrants, the

conflict spread to other parts o Maluku and became

more overtly religious. Te flare up o violence wasaggravated by rumours surrounding religious sym-

bols such as attacks on mosques and churches.

Courtesy of the UN OCHA Regional Office for Asia-Pacific, 2011.

Figure 1: Map of Maluku


20/73


Women and children were also involved in the vio-

lence, quickly learning to make spears, machetes,

arrows, and bombs.21

Te conflict in Maluku subsided in May 1999 as

attention shifed to the start o the general electioncampaign. Te Indonesian Democratic Party

Struggle (PDI-P) won the election in Ambon.

Te PDI-P was a reormulation o the Indonesian

Democratic Party (PDI) that used five political

parties, including the Indonesian Christian Party

(PARKINDO). Historically, PARKINDO was sup-

ported by the Ambonese Christian community

and hence PDI-P was perceived as the Christian

party in Maluku. Violence re-erupted in Ambon

21 Interview by Akiko Horiba with the Director o LAPPAN (Institute o

Woman and Children Empowerment), Ambon City, 17 November 2009.

in July 1999 when PDI-Ps election victory was

announced. Maluku was on the brink o a civil

war. People mobilised to deend their religion and

orchestrated violence against anyone o a different

religion. Many villages took part in the fighting. Tesecurity orces were also divided along religious lines

and were thereore unable to perorm their tasks

competently. Te peak o the conflict was the attack

on Silo Church and obelo massacre on 26 Decem-

ber, 1999.22 Te Silo church in the centre o Ambon

city was one o the biggest Maluku Protestant

Churches (Gereja Protestan Maluku, or GPM) and

was burnt to the ground the day afer Christmas.

Te same day, almost 800 Muslims in the mosque

at obelo village in North Maluku province were

22 International Crisis Group (2000).

Box 1: The chronology of the conflict in Maluku

1999 January Small scale street fights escalate into riots in Ambon city and its surroundings.

March Mass violence spreads to other islands in Maluku.

May The general election campaign begins and violence declines.

June General election.

July Mass violence restarts in Ambon city.

October North Maluku Province separated from Maluku Province.

December Conflict escalates after Silo church is burned and a massacre takes place in the Muslim village

of Tobelo in North Maluku.

2000 May Laskar Jihad arrives in Ambon.

June Massacre in Galela near Tobelo in North Maluku.

Police weapons stolen and distributed to civilians.

Civil emergency declared in Maluku and North Maluku and thousands of troops deployed.

December Maluku Front Sovereignty (FKM) declares independence of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS).

2001 January The armys joint battalion (Yongab) conducts a sweeping operation targeting strongholds of

Muslim groups.

June Yongab conducts another sweeping operation.

2002 February Malino Peace Agreement (Malino II) was signed.

April The Malukan provincial government office was burned.

Soya village is attacked, after which violence began to decline in Maluku.

May The leader of Laskar Jihad, Jafar Umar Talib, and the FKM, Alex Manuputti, both arrested.

October Laskar Jihad is dissolved in Maluku.

2003 May Civil emergency lifted from North Maluku province.

September Civil emergency lifted from Maluku Province.

2004 April FKM raised the RMS flag, prompting riots in Ambon city which left 40 dead.

June General election.


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killed by Christians. Tose attacks were in turn

used to call on Christians and Muslims to engage

in urther violent conflict, which the military could

do little to contain.

During this period, many villages were attacked,churches and mosques destroyed, and civilians killed

and displaced. Te inability o the Indonesian cen-

tral government and military to control the conflict

gave groups outside Maluku the opportunity to

exploit the situation. On 7 January 2000, afer the

massacre in obelo, more than 100,000 Muslims held

a protest in Jakarta at LapanganMonas (National

Monument Stadium), calling or ajihadin Maluku.

Te protest was organised by Muslim political par-

ties and Muslim organisations. One o the Muslim

organisations, called Forum Komunikasi AhluSunnah wal-Jamaah (FKAWJ) led by Jaar Umar

Talib, held a large meeting at Senayan Stadium on

6 April 2000 and created Laskar Jihad, a Muslim

militia group.23 In May 2000, this Java-based Muslim

militia announced they were launching ajihadin

Maluku and began sending its members to the

province. Tey stole more than 800 weapons roma police weapons store in June 2000 and subsequently

committed requent attacks on police officers. Both

Laskar Jihad and the military supplied weapons to

Muslim civilians, which allowed the conflict to

escalate. Te dynamics o the conflict changed sig-

nificantly, with more Christian than Muslim villages

attacked. A state o civil emergency was declared

on 27 June 2000 and a large military contingent

23 For more inormation on Laskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi, Hasan, Faith

and Politics: Te Rise o the Laskar Jihad in the Era o ransition in

Indonesia, Indonesia, Vol. 73, April, (2002), pp.145-170.

An Indonesian soldier stands guard above a village destroyed by fighting between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, January 14, 2000.

AP Photo/Achmad Ibrahim


22/73


deployed in Maluku at the time there were 17 army

battalions and two battalions o paramilitary police

though neither the army nor the police were suc-

cessul in controlling the situation.24

Te Governments inability to contain the con-

flict allowed or the emergence o Maluku Front

Sovereignty (FKM) in 2000, a movement which drewupon the legacy o the Republic o South Maluku

(RMS). RMS was ormed in 1950and advocated

separatism rom a predominantly Muslim state.25

Te RMS was thus perceived as a Christian move-

ment exacerbating the inter-religious dynamics o

the conflict.

A number o actors contributed to the decline

in violence by the end o 2001. Prolonged attacks had

segregated communities, making it more logisti-

cally difficult or Muslims and Christians to attack

each other. A special joint battalion, Yongab, madeup o special orces rom the army, navy and air

orce, conducted operations primarily against Laskar

Jihad, including against their base. Finally, Malukans

ofen say they simply grew tired o the fighting.

Te central government initiated peace talks

between the Christian and Muslim communities

which, in February 2002, culminated in the Malino II

peace agreement. Sporadic violence and bombing

continued (including attacks on the regional parlia-

ment and the governors office) but decreased in

requency and intensity so much that the state o

civil emergency was lifed in Maluku in 2003.

Another important turning point was the attack in

April 2002 on the village o Soya, in which 11 people

died and 22 houses were bombed.26 Residents o

Soya were Christians and had presumed that they

were sae rom attack because o their distance rom

Muslim communities. An investigation revealed

that Kopassus (NI special orces) and a Christian

24 All figures in this paragraph on the number o security personnel

are sourced rom: Yanuarti, Sri., Nusa Bhakti, Ikrar and Nurhasim,

Mochamad,Military Politics, Ethnicity and Conflict in Indonesia ,

Centre or Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity,

Working Paper No. 62 (2009).

25 Te FKM was ormed on 15 July 2000 by Alex Manuputti in Kudamati,

Ambon. It was initially ormed to boost the morale o the locals at the

height o the conflict when the role o the state was weak. However, it

did not receive much local support, with only several hundred active

members among the provinces population. Tis prompted Alex

Manuputti to use the old political flag o RMS to ront the FKM. Te

Republic o the South Moluccas (RMS) was promoted by the Dutch

to undermine opposition to its colonial rule immediately afer World

War II. It was a predominantly Christian organisation and advocated

or Maluku to be sepa rated rom the Republic o Indonesia.

26 Sinar Harapan, Belasan Preman Pelaku Pengeboman di Ambon,

22 October, (2002).

gang committed the attack, not Muslims as had

been previously assumed.27 According to many

observers, Kopassus tried to extend the conflict by

hiring a Christian gang to conduct the attack.

Indeed, Berty Loupatty, one o the leaders o the

Christianpreman, conessed that the Soya attack

was in act a Kopassus order.28

Tis gave Christiansand Muslims a common cause in their resentment

o the army. A shared sense o victimhood decreased

the level o communal conflict.

Later incidents did not spark mass violence in

the same way as they had in the past. In April 2004,

more than 40 people died in rioting ollowing the

raising o the RMS flag at the home o the FKM

leader.29 Rioting erupted again in Ambon city but

subsided within one week. Following this riot,

minor bombings occurred but did not provoke a

violent reaction rom the local community.

Conflict management actors

and initiatives

Various efforts were undertaken to end the conflict,

including those led by security orces; central and

local government; international and local NGOs;

and local community and womens groups. wo

broad approaches to conflict management in Maluku

emerge rom these efforts: the security and emer-gency approach; and the recovery and development

approach. Conflict management beore the Malino

Peace Agreement in February 2002 (Malino II) was

mostly reactive. Tere was no strategic or long-

term planning by either the Government nor civil

society. Te main conflict management tools used

were the delivery o aid and security, relying heavily

on the military which had been mobilised rom

outside Maluku. Malino II was a significant turn-

ing point which marked a shif to the recovery and

development approach. Afer the Malino II peace

process, the central and local government turned

to legal instruments arresting and prosecuting

those holding weapons and committing attacks

and ocused on long-term development and

27 Muhammad, Najib, Security sector reorm, democratic transition,

and social violence: Te case o Ambon, Indonesia , Bergho Research

Center or Constructive Conflict Management, (Berlin: Bergho

Research Center or Constructive C onflict Management, 2004).

28 Muhammad, Najib (2004), p.8.

29 International Crisis Group,Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon,

Asia Report No.32, (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 2004).


23/73


recovery planning. Civil society also shifed their

approach rom the provision o emergency assist-

ance to development and recovery.

The emergency and security

approach to conflict management

Government initiatives Pre-Malino II

Beore the Government initiated the Malino peace

talks, there were several unsuccessul attempts at

conflict resolution by the local government. For

example, the Maluku Governor set up an inormal

team o religious leaders, eam 6, at the end o

January 1999. Te team was composed o six leaders

rom the Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant commu-

nities. Teir mandate was to prevent the destruc-

tion o churches, mosques and homes, and to stop

widespread violence in Ambon city. However, the

leaders selected by the Governor were not seriously

committed to peace indeed, some suspect that they

were even complicit in the violence. In addition,

given the decentralised decision-making structure

within the Muslim community, it was difficult to

select representatives with genuine authority across

Maluku. Unsurprisingly, eam 6 had no effect on

conflict resolution or management.

Aid distribution was also problematic. Te localgovernment had stocks o ood supplies and other

basic necessities but could not distribute it without

military support. However, the reliance on the mil-

itary to distribute the aid ofen led to its disappear-

ance. Tere were claims that the military itsel had

no proper logistical support. Te breakdown o the

structure o government during the conflict meant

there was no leadership to provide directives on

where and how the distribution o emergency aid

should be carried out. Te segregation o Muslim

and Christian communities posed a urther chal-lenge to the distribution o the aid.

Te Government attempted to respond militar-

ily to the growing violence. During the early stages

o the conflict, between January and March 1999,

the Government deployed 5,300 security personnel,

both rom the mobile brigade (Brimob) o the police

and rom the military, to Maluku. On May 15,1999

the Maluku District Military Command (Korem

Maluku) was upgraded to a Regional Military

Command (Kodam) under the leadership o a brig-adier general, a move which gave the military both

greater status and a greater budget in Maluku. In

November 1999 the number o security personnel

was increased to 6,000, including officers rom the

new Regional Military Command (Kodam). In

January 2000, the military and Brimob orces were

increased to five battalions (11,250 personnel).30

However, this increased orce did not lead to a decline

in violence, not least because o the militarys inex-perience with communal conflict. Te military was

not trained or conflicts in which the concept o

the enemy was ambiguous and did not know what

actions to take when the two religious communities

were engaged in fighting.

In June 2000, rising violence, driven by the infil-

tration o Laskar Jihad, led to a civil emergency

being declared in Maluku and even more police

and military troops being deployed to the province.

However, poor civil-military co-ordination proved

to be a significant barrier to reducing the level oviolence. According to the law that governs emer-

gency rule (Law 23/1959), it is the responsibility o

governors to restore order in an emergency situation

and they have the authority to use the resources at

their disposal. However, neither the Governor nor

the district head in Maluku was able to command

the security orces, who worked only under the

direction o their central command. While there

was some degree o co-ordination between the secu-

rity orces and local government, it was not suffi-cient or both to respond effectively and promptly

to emergency situations. Te civil emergency in

north Maluku province lasted until May 2003 and

the civil emergency lasted until September 2003 in

Maluku province.

Security forces: in-fighting between

the military and police

Tere were significant co-ordination problems

within the security orces, particularly between the

military and the police.31 Te ineffectiveness o the

police and military stems in part rom the struc-

tural changes that these agencies underwent dur-

ing the transition to democracy. Te reorms that

ollowed Soeharto stepping down gave the police

the responsibility or internal security and greater

30 All figures in this paragraph on the number o security personnel

are sourced rom: Yanuarti, Sri et al (2009).

31 Muhammad, Nazib, Violence in Between, In Kingsbury, Damien

(Ed.), Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, Monash

Asia Institute (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 2005).


24/73


resources than they had previously, but the military

continued to assert its primacy, seeking to retain

both its authority and budget. So, while the divi-

sion o labour and relations between the military

and police was defined on paper, in reality it was

more fluid. Indeed, there was even active fighting

between the NI (military) and Polri (police). InJuly 2000, an exchange o weapons fire took place

between personnel rom Battalion 509 (Kodam

Diponegoro and Kodam Brawijaya) and personnel

rom Brimob in which at least one police officer died.32

Te perceived partiality o the security orces inevents such as the attack on Soya village bred dis-

trust amongst locals and though such involvement

has been officially denied by both the military and

the police, the results o various investigations sug-

gest otherwise.33 Te police stationed in Maluku

were mainly locally recruited and, unsurprisingly,

demonstrated affiliations with their respective ellow

Muslims and Christians. As or the military units,

although they were deliberately mixed and regularly

rotated rom one area to the other, soldiers became

acquainted with the villagers they deended andwere ofen given ood, drinks and cigarettes by

those villagers. It was not unusual, when clashes

took place, or the soldiers to side with the people

they had been meeting on a daily basis with the

result that Muslim soldiers sometimes deended

Muslim villages against Christian attacks and

Christian soldiers deended their riends against

Muslim attacks.34 In the second phase o the Maluku

conflict, some military personnel were even sup-

plying weapons and ammunition to the warring

parties.35 Soldiers were said to have paid or their

ood with bullets and, according to an Ambonese

member o the Peoples Representative Council (DPR):

Te ammunition and guns are sold by soldiers who

need money to live.36

32 Yanuarti , Sri et al (2009), p.26.

33 APOL, KOPASSUS and the Maluku Crisis, Online bulletin, January-

February (2003).

34 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Te search or peace in Maluku,

Asia Report No. 31, (Jak arta/Brussels: ICG 2002).

35 Yanuarti , Sri et al (2009), p.25.

36 Internat ional Crisis Group (2002), p.5.

Extortion by the security orces also tarnished

their reputation in Maluku. At the peak o the con-

flict, neither religious leaders nor government rep-

resentatives could pass through areas dominated

by one religious group without protection rom the

security orces. As the Secretary o Ambon City

put it: I I wanted to make a visit, I needed to asksecurity orces to accompany me. Without their pro-

tection, I could not have gone anywhere during the

conflict37. Security personnel exploited the situa-

tion, demanding protection money in return or

sae passage. One resident complained that to travel

back and orth rom Ambon city to visit his amily

security orces sometimes asked me to pay a very

expensive price. I paid because there was no other

option. . . the security orces benefited rom the

conflict.38

The non-governmental sector

As the local government was unable to operate during

the emergency period, international and local NGOs

attempted to fill the vacuum. NGOs were critical

providers o humanitarian aid, predominantly

sanitation, medical care and basic necessities par-

ticularly to the IDPs. As donors and international

NGOs had difficulty accessing conflict-affected

areas, local NGOs played an important role in the

distribution o the aid. Following the riot in January1999, local NGOs in Ambon created a consortium

called the Maluku Social Humanitarian Voluntary

eam (im Relawan Kemanusiaan Social Maluku,

IRUS), which operated out o a Catholic NGOs office.

Prior to the conflict, there were approximately

ten NGOs in Ambon and they ofen transcended

religious differences. However, the conflict produced

religiously segregated local NGOs,each providing

aid to their respective communities. Aid was pro-

vided less according to a systematic assessment o

needs and more to areas where particular NGOs

could gain access.

In the period beore the Malino agreement was

signed, international NGOs and UN agencies par-

ticularly ocused on humanitarian aid rather than

any peacebuilding activities.39 As well as providing

assistance to communities directly, they unded

37 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a ormer secretary o Ambon City,

16 July 2009.

38 Interview by Akiko Horiba with residents o Kebon Cengkeh, Ambon

City, 1 September 2009.

39 Brown, Graham et al (2005).

While the division of labour and relations

between the military and police was defined

on paper, in reality it was more fluid.


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local NGOs and ran capacity-building programmes

to improve local governance. Efforts were made to try

and provide an incentive or religious co-operation.

For example, the UNDPs Community Recovery

Program provided unds to local NGOs on the condi-

tion that Christian and Muslim NGOs collaborate.40

However, local government officials claimed that

international organisations did not co-ordinate

their activities with them, which led to overlapping

assistance in IDP camps.41

Efforts from the local community to

resolve the conflict

Beore the arrival o emergency aid in Ambon

rom the central government and international

40 Interview by Akiko Horiba with ormer staff o Lakspesdam NU

(Nahdlatul Ulama), Ambon City, 20 July 2009.

41 Interview by Akiko Horiba with ormer staff o Bapedda (Badan

Perencanaan Penbangunan Daerah) Province Maluku, Ambon City,

21 July 2009.

agencies, local communities relied heavily on their

religious institutions or assistance. As the residents

o Warigin in Ambon city put it: We assisted and

supported one another by sharing ood supplies and

other basic necessities, and accepting IDPs into our

houses. No one helped us or a long time. We survived

by ourselves until emergency aid came.42 Among

Christian communities, the churches unctioned

as distribution centres or emergency aid.43 Help

within Muslim communities was less institution-alised, with mosques unctioning as little more than

a shelter or Muslims.

At this stage o the conflict, peace was consid-

ered a taboo word within most communities. Tose

who talked o peace were ofen treated as enemies,

limiting their ability to start peace processes.

Nevertheless, there were several examples o success-

42 Focus group discussion with inhabitants o Warigin in Ambon City,

20 November 2009.

43 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a pastor at Silo church in Ambon

City, 16 July 2009.

Ambonese demand the UN intervene in renewed fighting between Christians and Muslims in Jakarta, May 22, 2000.

REUTERS/Darren Whiteside


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ul conflict prevention at the grassroots level. A

strong example is the case o eam 20 in Wayame

village, which maintained peaceul co-existence

between both its Christians and Muslims villagers.44

eam 20, which was composed o ten Christians

and ten Muslims, was responsible or veriying any

inormation aimed at provoking fighting betweenthe two religious communities. Tey also enorced

rules in the village prohibiting villagers rom taking

part in the fighting, misusing religious symbols, con-

suming alcohol and making derogatory remarks

about religion. Both the pastors and Muslim religious

leaders played a critical role in promoting religious

tolerance, constantly telling the local community

that it was not a conflict o religion. eam 20 also

created a market that was accessible to both reli-

gious communities. Tis not only demonstrated

the harmonious relations between the Christiansand Muslims but was also important or the eco-

nomic survival o the village during the conflict.

Te Baku Bae Peace Movement was another

notable conflict management initiative that helped

to orge a common identity between both groups, as

victims o violence. Baku Baeis a phrase indigenous

to Maluku which is commonly used by children to

restore riendship afer a misunderstanding or

quarrel. In the context o Malukus conflict, Baku

Baemeans ceasing the violence.45

It was a moreaccepted term than peace at the height o the

conflict. Te movement was developed and built by

a number o civil society actors in Ambon includ-

ing scholars, NGO activists, lawyers, journalists,

religious representatives, and village and traditional

leaders (raja). It was acilitated by peace activists rom

Jakarta. Human rights NGOs rom Jakarta, such as

the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan

Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI),

Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH Jakarta) and the

Commission or Missing Persons and Victims oViolence (Kontras), that supported the Baku Bae

movement conducted research in Ambon and con-

cluded the conflict was less about inherent religious

44 Comments on the workshop by ormer pastor in Wayame village,

one o the leaders o eam 20, Ambon City, 14 October 2009. Also

see, Horiba, Aki ko, Community Mechanism in Wayame on Ambon

Conflict, In, Peoples Survival Strategy: Success Stories in Conflict

(Poso, angkura village and Ambon, Wayame Village), Research

Report, (Jakarta: Institut itian Perdamaian, 2008).

45 Ichsan, Malik, Bakubae: the community based movement or recon-

ciliation process in Maluku, Bakubae Maluku, ia Foundation and

Yayasan Kemala, (Jakarta: Bakubae Maluku, ia a nd Kemala, 2003).

differences and more about the militarys negative

role in exploiting religious sentiment. Tese NGOs

then held a series o workshops in Jakarta in 2001

or Maluku religious leaders, village heads, adat

leaders, NGO activists, lawyers and journalists that

addressed the causes o the conflict and explored ways

to orge a common agenda. Tese workshops, andthe research undertaken by the human rights NGOs

rom Jakarta, helped engender a shif rom looking

at each other as enemises and fighting each other to

all being victims and blaming the government.46

One o the achievements o the workshops was

to establish the Maluku Media Centre (MMC)

which housed Christian and Muslim journalists

who had been trained in Baku Bae workshops. Upon

their return to Ambon, they spread the idea o

peace journalism and encouraged other journalists

to avoid writing or reporting provocative news.47

Role of the media

In conflict situations, the media can be used as a

peacebuilding tool as well as an instigator o vio-

lence. During the conflict in Ambon city, the media

(newspapers, radio and the internet) played a part

in promoting the violence. In addition, the media

were divided along religious lines and were used to

disseminate rumours and alse inormation. For

example, the conflict led to the division o a local

newspaper, Suara Maluku, into Suara Maluku (or

a Christian audience) and theAmbon Express (or

Muslims). Provocative inormation that was not

verified was ofen published in both papers. Te

radio and the internet had also triggered violence

during the Ambon conflict. Laskar Jihad had its

own radio station Suara Perjuangan Muslim

Maluku (Maluku Muslim Voice o Struggle) and

website (www.laskarjihad.or.id), which allegedly

became a tool or mobilising Muslims to carry outviolent attacks and spreading the groups propa-

ganda about the conflict. Christians and Muslims

also criticised each others cruel killings and arson

attacks on the internet.48

46 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a ormer vice director o YLBHI

(Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia /Te Legal Aid

Foundation Indonesia), Jakarta, 22 August 2009.

47 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a journalist romelevisi Republik

Indonesia /V Indonesia, Ambon City, 1 September 2009.

48 See: Brauchler, Birgit, Cyberidentities at War: Religion, Identity, and

the Internet in the Moluccas Conflict, Indonesia, No. 75 (New York:

Columbia University, 2003), pp.123-151.


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Tere are some examples o the media being

used as a peacebuilding tool during the conflict.

Te Baku Bae peace movement held workshops to

raise awareness o the importance o ending the vio-

lence in Maluku as well as workshops or journalists

on peace journalism training and subsequently

created the MMC. It was comprised o both Muslimand Christian journalists and became a way or

them to exchange and veriy inormation with

their counterparts rom across the religious divide,

which had previously been impossible. Tis resulted

in more objective reporting o the conflict.49

Roles of women

Women occupy an influential role in the amily.

As wives, women can persuade their husbands

not to engage in the conflict and as mothers,women can educate their children not to be

prejudiced against other religions.50

Women played active roles in peacemaking efforts

in Ambon. Inter-religious meetings among women

IDPs not only ensured the distribution o emergency

aid to IDPs, but also became an avenue or recon-

ciliation between the Muslim and Christian women.

Womens leadership in organizing inter-religious

meetings among displaced women was a notable

achievement in Maluku. Te shared identity omotherhood was an entry point or inter-religious

discussions. Expressing shared concerns about

their childrens saety and uture, ood, education,

medical care and other basic necessities, helped

bind women rom the two religious communities

together: Women create a culture o peace. Women

can ease the tension through singing and dancing.

Women have a big role to play in conflict manage-

ment, concluded one activist.51

Women, however, were most active at the grass-roots level. One strong example is the Caring Womens

Movement (Gerakan Perempuan Peduli, GPP) ormed

in September 1999 by more than 40 Muslim, Protes-

tant and Catholic women activists. Tey organised

rallies against violence in Maluku even when the

conflict was at its peak. Tey also had meetings

49 For more inormation on the MMC, reer to www.malukumedia

centre.org/

50 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a Christian representative to the

Malino Peace Agreement, Ambon, 31 August 2009.

51 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a Christian representative to the

Malino Peace Agreement, Ambon, 31 August 2009.

with government and security officials, religious

leaders and youths , as well as training women vol-

unteers in the field on mediation and counselling.

GPP also co-operated with other womens organi-

sations in Maluku.

Tere was less participation by women in ormal

high-level peacemaking in Maluku. For Malino II,a emale pastor and two Catholic women were cho-

sen as representatives o the Christian community,

while there were no Muslim women representatives.

Te difference is partly because, while women

pastors or Catholic nuns played a significant role

as leaders o the Christian community, the role o

women in the Muslim community was less visible.

Although some women in Ambon were involved

in bomb-making and instigating violence, sponta-

neous womens initiatives mostly brought about many

positive results. In Ambon, the reconciliation pro-cess between women rom the two religious commu-

nities began at the market. Women, both Muslims

and Christians, regularly braved the violence to

travel to the market, ofen located in Ambon city,

to purchase ood items or to sell their produce. For

example, women known asjibu-jibu, travelled

rom the Muslim village o Sirisori to the Christian

village o Owu to sell their produce, even during the

conflict.52 Teir efforts were aided by the perception

that women are less threatening, making it easieror them to enter and travel through areas domi-

nated by the other religion. While these efforts

may have been driven more by basic needs than

conscious attempts at conflict resolution, they laid

the oundation or more ormal reconciliation ini-

tiatives. In addition, due to interaction between the

women rom different religious communities, they

became messengers or their larger communities.

Tis put them in a good position to veriy or dispel

rumours and prevent acts o provocation.53

The Malino Peace Agreement

Te central government led the peace process very

short by comparative standards that culminated

in the signing o the Malino II peace agreement on

11 February 2002 in the highlands o Malino in

52 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a womens rights activist rom

Komnas HAM (National Human Rights Commission) in Ambon,

17 November 2009.

53 For more inormation on the role o women in the Maluku peace

process, see C entre or Humanitarian Dia logue, (2010).


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Box 2: The Malino II Agreeement

The Malino II Agreement comprised of 11 points:

1. End all conflicts and disputes;

2. Abide by due process of law enforcement. Existing

security officers are obliged to be professional in

exercising their mission;

3. Reject and oppose all kinds of separatist movements,

among others the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS);

4. The people of the Moluccas have the right to stay

and work legally and fairly in Indonesia nationwide

and vice versa;

5. Ban and disarm illegal armed organizations, groups,

or militias, in accordance with the existing law. Outside

parties that disturb the peace will be expelled from

the Moluccas;

6. Establish a national independent investigation team

to investigate among others, the tragic incident on

January 19, 1999, the Moluccas Sovereign Front,

Republic of South Moluccas, Christian Republic of

South Moluccas, jihad warrior (laskar jihad), Christ

Warrior, coercive conversion, and human rights

violations;

7. Call for the voluntary return of refugees to their homes,

and the return of properties;

8. Rehabilitate mental, social, economic and public

infrastructures, particularly educational, health,

religious, and housing facilities;

9. To preserve law and order for the people in the area,

it is absolutely necessary for the military and the

police to maintain coordination and firmness in

executing their function and mission. In line with this,

a number of military and police facilities must be

rebuilt and re-equipped;

10. Uphold good relationships and the harmony among

all elements of believers in the Moluccas, all efforts of

evangelism must highly honour the diversity and

acknowledge local culture;

11. Support the rehabilitation of Pattimura University for

common progress, as such, the recruitment system

and other po

Documents

Estudo de Caso - Conflict Management in Indonesia