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TheVelaIncident:AProductofPoliticalandNuclearCooperationBetweenIsraelandSouthAfricaByDanielAlsterThispaperwaswrittenforHistory396:GlobalNuclearProliferation,taughtbyProfessorGabrielleHechtinFall2008.
OnSeptember22,1979,Americansatellitesobserveda“doubleflash”
indicativeofanuclearweaponstestinthesouthIndianOcean.The“VelaIncident,”
so‐namedafterthesatellitethatdetectedtheflash,wasimmediatelydescribedby
nuclearexpertsasajointIsraeli‐SouthAfricannucleartest.1However,alackof
indisputablephysicalevidenceverifyingthenuclearityoftheevent,coupledwith
thevigorousdenialsoftheIsraeliandSouthAfricangovernments,haslimitedan
adequatescholarlyanalysisofthelikelihoodofIsraeli‐SouthAfricancooperationin
theVelaIncident.ThisessaydoesnotseektoprovethattheVelaIncidentwas
definitivelyanuclearexplosion.Instead,itinvestigatesthelikelihoodofIsraeliand
SouthAfricaninvolvementintheVelaIncidentbyoutliningthestates’growing
politicalandnuclearcooperationinthefifteenyearsprecedingtheevent.
Myargumentispresentedinthreeparts.First,evidencedemonstrativeofthe
increasinglyintimaterelationshipbetweenthegovernmentsofIsraelandSouth
AfricawillprovideafoundationforacircumstantialargumentoutliningwhyIsrael
andSouthAfricalikelycooperatedtoexplodeanuclearbomb.Second,Ianalyzethe
developmentofIsrael‘spolicyof“nuclearopacity”andSouthAfrica’spolicyof
“nuclearambiguity.”Third,Iexaminehowtheascendancyofthesepoliciesof
opacityandambiguity—coupledwithamutualrespectforthenormagainstnuclear
1Richelsen,Jeffrey."TheVelaIncident:NuclearTestorMeteoroid."NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBook190(May5,2006).
2
testing—determinedbothstates’insistenceonaclandestine,ratherthanovert,
nucleartest.
PartI:Alliance
The1960sweremarkedbyacoolrelationshipbetweenIsraelandSouth
AfricaasIsraelattemptedtoobtainsupportfromtheemergingpost‐colonialAfrican
states.Israel’sAfricanpolicyduringthedecadewassuccessful,asmanyAfrican
statesrefusedtosupportanti‐IsraelUnitedNationsResolutions.2In1961Israel
supportedthefirstUNresolutionadvocatingsanctionsagainstapartheidSouth
Africa,aresolutionthatdidnotevenenjoythesupportoftheWest.3TheSouth
AfricangovernmentthoughtIsrael’sAfricanpolicyhypocritical,since,asPrime
MinisterVerwoerdstated,“Israel,likeSouthAfrica,isanapartheidstate.”4
VerwoerdsawSouthAfrica‘sisolationinAfricaasanalogoustoIsrael’sisolation
withintheArabworld.Thisstrainedrelationshipdidnotlastlong.
WhiletheSixDayWarof1967markedawarmingintherelationship
betweenIsraelandSouthAfrica,TheOctoberWarof1973(YomKippurWar)was
thetransformativeeventinthedevelopmentoftheIsraeli‐SouthAfricanalliance.
TheSixDayWarpopularizedIsrael’simageamongstSouthAfricanleadersbecause
theIsraelivictorydemonstratedthemannerinwhichasmaller,besiegedstatecould
emergevictorious.5IntheOctoberWar,manyAfricannationsbrokediplomaticties
2Joseph,BenjaminM.BesiegedBedfellows:IsraelandtheLandofApartheid.(NewYork,NY:GreenwoodP,1988)14.3Ibid124Ibid5Joseph12
3
withIsraelwhenitcrossedintoEgypt.6Seeminglyabandonedbyitsformerallies,
IsraelrespondedtofriendlySouthAfricanovertures.SouthAfricaincludedIsraelin
itsso‐called“pariahstrategy,”7inwhichSouthAfricaattemptedtodiversifyreliance
ontheWestbyreachingouttootherostracizednations.However,despiteSouth
AfricanattemptstoestablishanideologicalalliancewiththeIsraelis,thereal
backboneoftherelationshipwasmaterial.
ThecrucialfactorinstrengtheningpoliticaltiesbetweenIsraelandSouth
Africainthe1970swasmilitarycooperation.Thiscooperationincludedcommercial
tradeofmilitarymaterials,aswellasofficervisitsandjointmilitaryadvising.Both
stateswereobsessedwiththeprocurementofmilitarymaterials.Israelconstantly
hadtorenegotiatearmsdealswithallies,andFrancecutoffmilitaryaidin1968.
UnitedStatesmilitaryaidwasusuallycontingentoncertainpoliticalcompromises.8
Similarly,SouthAfricawasatwarinAngolaandfelt(likeIsrael)thatamilitary
defeatcouldspelltheendofthestate.
WhiletheextenttowhichSouthAfricanandIsraelileadersviewed
themselvesasmarginalizedontheinternationalpoliticalstageisacomplicated
subject,theleadersofbothstatesundoubtedlysharedasimilarsenseofisolation.
WhileonecancertainlymaketheargumentthatneitherSouthAfricanorIsraeltruly
neededeachotherformilitarysurvival;nonetheless,bothstatesviewedmilitary
cooperationasmutuallybeneficial.IsraelandSouthAfricamightnothaveneeded
eachother,buttheyhadnoreasonnottofullyexploitsuchaproductivemilitary
6Ibid227Moore,J.D.L.SouthAfricaandNuclearProliferation:SouthAfrica'snuclearcapabilitiesandintentionsinthecontextofinternationalnonproliferationpolicies.(Hampshire:MacMillan,1987)124.
4
alliance.
Inthe1970s,everyIsraeliDefenseMinisteralongwithnumerousother
officersvisitedSouthAfricatodiscussarmssalesandotherendeavors.9Headsof
stateexchangedvisitsandalwaysmadesuretopraisetheclosetiesbetweentheir
respectivestates.From1963to1977,manystatesparticipatedinavoluntaryarms
embargoagainstSouthAfrica,thoughIsraelandwesternstateslikeFranceand
Germanyignoredtheeffort.10In1977,however,theUNstrengthenedthe
internationalembargosignificantly.TheIsraeliPrimeMinisterimmediately
announcedthatIsraelwouldnot“leaveher(SouthAfrica)tothemercyoffate,”and
theimportanceofmilitarycooperationbetweenthetwostatesbecameevenmore
significant.TheIsraeli‐SouthAfricanalliancecontinuedunabatedandinvolved
cooperationinmilitarystrategyontheactualbattlefield,asinNamibia,whereover
200IsraeliofficersprovidedstrategicadvicetoSouthAfricanunitswhilehundreds
ofSouthAfricanmilitarypersonneltrainedinIsrael.11
TheInternationalPoliticalResponsetoIsraeliSouthAfricanRelations
Theincreasingpolitical,military,andeconomictiesbetweenSouthAfrica
andIsraelsoonmadetherelationshipsubjectofinternationalcriticismandoutrage.
TheUNcondemnationsoftherelationshipinthemid‐1970sdidnotmention
nuclearcooperation,mostlikelybecauseinternationalactorswerenotawareof
suchcooperation.IntheGeneralAssembly’syearlycondemnationofrelations
8Ingeneral,IsraeldemandedstrongersecurityguaranteeswhiletheUnitedStatesattemptedtopacifyIsraeltoavoidaconflictwiththeUSSRintheMiddleEast.9Joseph44
5
betweenIsraelandSouthAfrica,theresolutionshighlightedcooperationin
“political,military,economic,andotherfields.”12Theinternationalcommunity
attemptedtoisolateSouthAfricatoforcetheeliminationofapartheid,sothe
publicizedrelationshipbetweenSouthAfricaandIsraelbecamethesubjectof
increasedcallsforIsraeltoterminatethisrelationship.OnlyinDecember1979did
theUNresolutionsaddcollaborationinthe“nuclearfield”toitslist.13Ironically,
SouthAfrica’s“PariahStrategy”hadmadeIsraelevenmoreofaninternational
outcast.
Itisimportant,however,nottooverestimatetheeffectoftheseUN
resolutions,oroverstatethesupposedisolationofSouthAfrica.Despite
internationalresolutionscondemningSouthAfrica,manywesternnations
continuedtotradewiththecountryunabated.Germancompanieseventraded
sensitivenucleartechnologiestoSouthAfrica,legally.14Furthermore,thecountry
enjoyedsubstantialsupportintheInternationalAtomicEnergyAssociationuntil
1977,whenitwasoustedfromtheBoardofGovernors(againstobjectionsfromthe
UnitedStates,UnitedKingdomandotherwesternallies).15Fordecades,SouthAfrica
10Ibid.11Joseph4712UnitedNations.GeneralAssembly.Resolution32/105D.1977.www.un.org/documents13UnitedNations.GeneralAssembly.Resolution34/93P.Dec.1979.www.un.org/documents.In1980and1981resolutions,theUNonlylisted“nuclearandmilitarycollaboration”ratherthantheprevious“political,nuclear,economic,andotherfields”.14AfricanNationalCongress,TheNuclearConspiracy:FRGcollaboratestoStrengthenApartheid(Bonn:PDW‐Verlag,1975).TheinvestigatoryreportshowshowGermancompaniessuppliedtheSouthAfricannuclearindustrywithnuclearmaterials,withthecomplicityoftheGermangovernment.Germanywasnotuniqueinitswillingnesstoputcommercialinterestsabovewishesoftheanti‐apartheidmovement.15Hecht,Gabrielle.“NegotiatingGlobalNuclearities:Apartheid,Decolonization,andtheColdWarinthemakingoftheIAEA,”inJohnKrigeandKai‐HenrikBarth,eds.,GlobalPowerKnowledge:Science,Technology,andInternationalAffairs,inOsiris21(July2006):48.Hechtexamineshowtheideaof“nuclearity”isnegotiable.Forexample,SouthAfricaattemptedtoincreaseitspowerintheIAEAby
6
wasaleaderintheIAEA—anorganizationofcrucialimportancefornuclearpolitics‐
despitemanystates’effortstomarginalizethecountryininternationalpolitics.
SouthAfricamaintainedanelevatedpositionintheIAEAthroughanefforttodefine
thenatureof“nuclearity”andcontinuouslyarguedthatthepoliticalmustbe
separatedfromthetechnological.16Nevertheless,thefactthatthecountryenjoyed
significantsupportintheIAEAevenin1977underminesthenotionthatworld
actorscommittedthemselvestoreallyisolatingSouthAfrica.
Ithereforenoteacontradictionbetweeninternationalcondemnationofthe
SouthAfricangovernment(andIsraelicooperation),andtherealitythatmanyof
thesesamestatescontinuedtotradewithSouthAfricathroughoutthe1970s.
DespitetheineffectivenessofinternationaleffortstoisolateSouthAfricamaterially,
theeffectthesecondemnationshadontheSouthAfricangovernmentwouldhave
seriousimplicationswhentheSouthAfricansandIsraelisagreedona“clandestine
nucleartest.”
ANuclearPartnership
ThereisnowayofknowingthedateatwhichIsrael’smilitarypartnership
withSouthAfricaturnedintoanintimatenuclearpartnership.Whileorganizations
suchastheIAEAdocumentedtradeofnuclearmaterialsbetweenthetwocountries,
scholarshavenotuncoveredevidenceastowhenIsraelandSouthAfricadecidedto
pursueajointnucleartest.SomesuggestthatIsraelparticipatedinthe1977South
arguingthatacountry’srawuraniumresourcesoughttoaddtoitslevelofnuclearity,inthesamewayasanenrichmentfacilitywould.WhileIdiscussnuclearnormsinthethirdsection,Hecht’sanalysisisusefulformeherebecauseitshowshowSouthAfricamanagedtomaintainaleadingrole
7
AfricanKalahariTest,whichnevertookplaceafterSovietsatellitesdetectedthetest
site.WhileIdividetheconventionalrelationshipfromthenuclearrelationship,it
seemsmorelikelythattheconventionalrelationshipsimplyprogressedintoa
nuclearrelationship.
IsraelandSouthAfricawereidealcandidatesforanuclearpartnership.In
short,SouthAfricacouldprovideuraniumandalargegeographicareafornuclear
testing,whileIsraelcouldprovidenuclearknow‐howandexpertise.Intheearly
1960sSouthAfricainformedothermembersoftheWesternSuppliersGroupof
uraniumsalestoIsrael.After1968,however,thesystemfailedandIsraeliimportsof
nuclearmaterialsfromSouthAfricacouldnolongerbemonitored.17Asthe
internationalcommunityincreaseditseffortstoisolateSouthAfricawithin
internationalorganizationssuchastheIAEAandtheUN,itbecamehardertotrace
SouthAfrica’snuclearexports.Also,duringthe1960’sSouthAfricadidnotrequire
thatcustomersinformthegovernmentwhentheyusedmaterialforspent‐fuel
reprocessing.18IsraelhadsophisticatedtechnologicalexpertisethatSouthAfrica
needed.In1977SouthAfricaobtained30gramsofIsraelitritium,whichwas
apparentlyusedinasecrettrialforuseinnuclearbombs.19
Butunliketheconventionalweaponstrade,IsraelandSouthAfricahadnever
beencaughtinconspiringtoproducenuclearweapons.Anargumentforweapons
cooperationreliesonacircumstantialargument,thoughconventionalmilitaryand
intheIAEAinthemidstofgrowinginternationalpoliticalpressure.16Ibid27.17Moore7718Ibid79.19Liberman,Peter“TheRiseandFalloftheSouthAfricanBomb,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.26,no.2(Fall2001):45‐86.
8
nuclearmaterialstradebetweenthetwocountriesiswelldocumented.
Nevertheless,IcandrawonimportantviewpointsoftheAmericanintelligence
communityregardingthisrelationship.
Aninvaluabledocumentoutliningthepossibilityofsuchanuclearalliance
wasproducedbytheCIAinthemonthsaftertheVelaIncident.Thereportassumed
thattheVelaIncidentwasanuclearexplosion,andaimedtoidentifywhatstates
mightbeinvolvedinthetest.20Assuch,thedocumentisreflectiveoftheUnited
Statesintelligencecommunity’sconclusionsregardingSouthAfricanandIsraeli
involvementintheVelaIncident.
ThereportstatedthatIsraeland/orSouthAfricaweretheonlystatesthat
wouldhavebeenlikelyparticipantsintheVelaIncident.Theauthordiscardedthe
ideathatthetestwasasoloIsraeliundertakingbecausetheclosepolitical
relationshipbetweenthetwocountrieswouldpreventIsraelfromtryingtoplace
theblameonSouthAfrica.Thedocumentalsoconcludedthatbothcountrieswould
havehadampleincentivetotestnuclearweaponsfortechnicalreasons,butthat
secrecywouldhavebeenofutmostconcern.Over60percentofthesectionoutlining
SouthAfricanandIsraelinuclearcollaborationisredacted.Interestingly,these
redactionsinthesectionoutliningSouthAfrican‐Israelinuclearcollaborationare
significantlymorenumerousthanredactionsintheindividualsectionsoutlining
individualtestsbybothcountries.
TheCIAremainedinterestedintheSouthAfrican‐Israelinuclearrelationship
intheyearsfollowingtheVelaIncident.A1983CIAreporttitled“NewInformation
20The22September1979Event.Rep.No.TheDirectorofCentralIntelligence,CentralIntelligence
9
onSouthAfrica’sNuclearProgramandSouthAfrican‐IsraeliNuclearandMilitary
Collaboration”alsodescribesthelonghistoryofscientificexchangesbetweenthe
twocountriesandthatSouthAfricasuppliedIsraelwithnaturaluraniumrodsfrom
1972through1975.WhilemuchofthediscussionofSouthAfrican‐Israeli
collaborationisredacted,itisnoteworthythatfouryearsaftertheVelaIncident,the
CIAstillthoughtthecountrieswereengaged—andhadbeenengaged—insignificant
nuclearcollaboration.Thereisevenapossibilitythatsomeoftheredactedtext
describesunknowninformationregardingcooperationintheVelaIncident.21
PartII:OpacityandAmbiguity
Differentiatingbetweentheconceptsof“nuclearambiguity”and“nuclear
opacity”iscriticaltounderstandingtheextremesecrecyoftheSouthAfricanand
Israelinuclearprograms.WhileIsraelpassedthroughaperiodof“nuclear
ambiguity”beforeitstransitionto“nuclearopacity”,SouthAfricaretainedapolicy
of“nuclearambiguity.”ThoughAvnerCohenusedthesetermstodescribeperiodsof
Israelinuclearpolicy,thetermsarealsousefulincontrastingIsrael’spolicieswith
thoseofSouthAfrica.
Onceweunderstandtheimplicationsbothtermshadoneachstate’snuclear
programs,wewillbeabletounderstandwhybothcountrieswouldhaveinsistedon
aclandestinenucleartest.Inotherwords,Iarguethatthesepolicies—once
Agency.January1980.21NewInformationonSouthAfrica'sNuclearProgramandSouthAfrican‐IsraeliNuclearandMilitaryCooperation.Rep.No.DirectorateofIntelligence,CentralIntelligenceAgency.March1983.Onenoteworthyaspectofthereportisthelocationoftheredactedsection.Thereportstates,“eachsidecouldcontributetothenuclearweaponsprogramoftheother”(3).Fourlinesareredacted,followedby,“Nonetheless,wehavenoconfirmedreportsofequipmentortechnologytransfer…”Itseemsat
10
developed—werenotcharacteristicsoftheSouthAfricanandIsraelinuclear
programsbutcomplexstrategiesthatcametodefinebothstates’nuclearpolicies.
TheDevelopmentofSouthAfricanNuclearAmbiguity
Cohenuses“nuclearambiguity”intwoways.Inthefirst,“thereisagenuine
uncertainty,thatislackofsufficientknowledgeastothetechnicalnuclearstatusof
thecountryunderstudy.”22Thesecondusage“referstoanambivalence—political,
military,orevenculturalinorigin—onthepartofthesuspectcountry’sleadership
concerningnuclearweapons.”23Thefirstusageof“nuclearambiguity”impliesthat
statesdonotunderstandaparticularnation’snuclearcapabilitiesbecauseofalack
oftransparency.Thesecondusageofthetermimpliesthatthespecifiedcountry’s
leadershiplacksanuclearweaponsprogramstrategy.SouthAfrica’snuclear
programdemonstratedbothimplicationsof“nuclearambiguity.”
SimilartotheIsraelinuclearprogram,theSouthAfricanprogramlackeda
coherentstrategyfromthebeginning.24OneSouthAfricanscientistlaterrecalled
thatheandotherscientistswereconcernedthatthislackofstrategycouldleadto
SouthAfricanleadersmaking“anirrationaldecisionsimplybecausetheyhaven’t
gottimetoreallyconsider.”25UnderstandingtheSouthAfricanleadership’s
motivationforestablishinganuclearweaponsprogramhasbeentheobjectofmuch
speculationanddebate.Nevertheless,itdoesappearthattheleadershipwas
adamantaboutoneaspectoftheprogram:thatitremainsecret.
leastplausiblethattheVelaIncidentisdescribedintheredactedouttext.22Cohen,Avner.IsraelandtheBomb.(NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1998)2.23Ibid3.
11
Thefirstuseoftheterm,“ambiguity”examinestheVelaIncidentwithinthe
contextofinternationalpolitics.Simplyput,theWestfailedtocomprehendboththe
existenceandcapabilitiesofaSouthAfricannuclearweaponsprogram.26TheCIA
couldnotdiscerntheSouthAfricanmethodofuraniumenrichment,theveracityof
IAEAreportsindicatingthequantityoffissilematerialproduced,andtheadvanced
degreeoftheSouthAfricannuclearprogrameveninthe1980s.27WhiletheUnited
StatesintelligencecommunitymighthavesuspectedaSouthAfricannuclear
weaponsprogramandinvolvementintheVelaIncident,documentsrevealasense
ofconfusionandbewilderment.SouthAfricahadeveryintentionofmaintainingthis
ambiguityandmaintainedlevelsofsecrecythatweremanifestedintheVela
Incident.
TheDevelopmentofIsraeliNuclearOpacity
Cohendefinesnuclearopacityasa“situationwhereastate’snuclear
capabilityhasnotbeenacknowledgedbutisfirmlyrecognizedinawaythatmakesa
differenceinothernation’sperceptions,strategies,andactions.”28Israeldeniesthat
ithasnuclearweapons,butthewidespreadbeliefandevidenceofIsrael’snuclear
capabilityhasshapedthewayinwhichfriendlyandrivalstatesalikehavetreated
Israel.
Israelmovedfromapositionofnuclearambiguitytonuclearopacityinthe
24Liberman5525Ibid.26,“U.S.IntelligenceandtheSouthAfricanBomb”,NationalSecurityArchive,EBB181,<www.gwu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/index.htm>27Ibid.28Cohen,Introduction
12
fallof1968.Thecatalystforthistransformationwasaseriesofcriticalnegotiations
betweenAmericanandIsraelileadersregardingwhetherornotIsraelwouldsign
theNuclearNon‐ProliferationTreaty(NPT).PresidentJohnsonandmembersofthe
StateDepartmentbelievedinnon‐proliferationasastrategyandhopedthattheNPT
wouldresultinamorestableMiddleEast.29ThestakeswereraisedwhenAssistant
SecretaryofDefensePaulWarnkeattemptedtolinkthesaleof50Phantomfighter
jetstoIsrael’sparticipationintheNPT.30Israelseeminglydidnotfullyunderstand
theimplicationsofthetreaty,andwhentoldthatroutineIAEAinspectionswouldbe
involved,seniormembersoftheIsraelinuclearestablishmentwereastounded.31
IsraeldemandedsignificantsecurityassurancesfromtheUnitedStatesin
exchangeforsigningtheNPT.Oneoftheseincludedademandforaformal
guaranteeofAmericannuclearprotection,apricetoohighfortheUnitedStates.
Israelipolicymakersapparentlytooksometimebeforecomingtotheconclusion
thatsigningtheNPTunderminedthecountry’spositionofnuclearambiguity.32The
NPTposedadirectthreattothesecrecyoftheIsraeliprogram.Israelheldfirm,and
thesaleofthePhantomstoIsraelwascompleted.Anewconsensusemerged
betweentheUnitedStatesandIsrael:theUnitedStateswouldnotpressureIsrael
intosigningtheNPTaslongasIsraelmaintaineditspromisethatitwould“notbe
thefirsttointroducenuclearweaponsintotheArab‐Israeliarea.”33
Israel’s“non‐introduction”pledgeexemplifiedthemannerinwhichthe
countryexploitedexistingnuclearnormstoestablishastrategyofnuclearopacity.
29Cohen31630Ibid31931Ibid300
13
DuringthenegotiationsregardingIsraelandtheNPT,WarnkeaskedAmbassador
RabinofIsraelwhatIsraelmeantbyitsnon‐introductionpledge.Aftermuch
prodding,Rabinstated,“allnuclearpowers...havetestednuclearweapons.Doyou
reallybelieveintroductioncomesbeforetesting?”34Israelarguedthatpossessingan
operationalnuclearweapondidnotconstitute“introduction.”Anormhadbeen
establishedthatstatesonly“gonuclear”whentheyhavepubliclytestedanuclear
explosion.35Israelwasabletousethisnormtoitsadvantage.WhenWarne
commentedtoRabinthat“inyourview,anunadvertised,untestednucleardeviseis
notanuclearweapon,”Rabinrespondedthathewascorrect.By1970,theCIA
informedCongressthatIsraelpossessednuclearweapons.WhileIsraeldeniedtheir
existence,theworldnowbelievedthatIsraelpossessednuclearweapons.Israel
thusfinishedthetransformationfromnuclearambiguitytonuclearopacity.
PartIII:AClandestineTest
ThissectionfirstpresentshowsecurityconcernsmighthaveledIsraeland
SouthAfricatoperformaclandestineratherthanovertnucleartest.Second,Ishow
howapplyingthissecurityargumenttoIsraelandSouthAfricaiserroneous.Third,I
describetheriseofthenormagainstnucleartesting.Fourth,IshowhowIsrael’s
policyofnuclearopacityandSouthAfrica’spolicyofnuclearambiguity—coupled
withbothstates’respectforthenormagainstnucleartesting—providesabetter
32Ibid30333Ibid32034Cohen31735NinaTannenwald,“StigmatizingtheBomb:OriginsoftheNuclearTaboo,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.29,No.4(Spring2005):5‐49.Thenormagainsttestingnuclearweaponscanbeunderstoodasanextensionofthe“nucleartaboo.”
14
explanationforthedecisiontoconductaclandestinetest.
TheSecurityArgument
SouthAfricakeptitsnuclearprogramsecretwhileitexistedandstillremains
protectiveofthisinformation.Israelalsocastitsprograminsecrecy,andIsraelisare
prohibitedfromdiscussingtheirstate’snuclearcapabilitiestoday.36Oneexplanation
forthisextremesecrecyisthesecurityargument:nuclearmattersaresoessentialto
nationalsecuritythattheyoughttobeshroudedinextremesecrecy.Canthe
securityargumentexplaintheSouthAfricanandIsraelidecisiontoperforma
clandestine,ratherthanovertnucleartest?
Atfirstglance,Israelseemstobolsterthesecurityargument.Israelpursueda
strategyofnuclearambiguityandthennuclearopacitybecauseitdidnotwant
enemystatesintheMiddleEasttodeveloptheirownnuclearprograms.Israelfelt
thatapublicIsraelinuclearprogramwouldputArabstatessuchasEgyptandSyria
intoasecuritysituationthatcouldprovoketheleadersofbothstatestopursuetheir
ownnuclearprograms.Furthermore,Arableadersunderstoodthepoliticalpressure
theywouldfacetoinitiateanuclearprogramifIsrael’salreadysuspectedprogram
becamepublicrecord.Theytoohadavestedinterest,atleastinthe1970s,that
Israelnotacknowledgeitsnuclearcapabilities.37Accordingtothissecurity
argument,Israelhadtoconductaclandestinenucleartestbecausemakingits
programpublicwouldcreatenewnuclearpowersintheMiddleEast,and
36Cohen341.Cohendiscussesthe“KdushatHabitachon”termusedtodescribethetabooagainstdiscussingnuclearmattersamongstIsraelis.“Kdushat”isliterallythesametermusedwithinbiblicaltextstosignifysanctity.“Habitachon”translatestosecurity.
15
compromiseIsraelinuclearhegemony.
ExplainingSouthAfrica’sdecisionforaclandestinetestwiththesecurity
argumentisalsopersuasive.PeterLibermandemonstrateshowthesecurity
argumentcannotaccountfortheSouthAfricandecisiontodevelopalatentnuclear
weaponscapability.38Intheearlytomid1970s,SouthAfricawasnotthreatenedby
anyofitsneighbors.Heargues,however,thatsecurityconcernsbestaccountforthe
SouthAfricandecisiontoweaponize,statingthat“thesignificanceandquickened
paceofmilitarizeddecisionsfrom1977to1979isconsistentwithasecurity
explanation.”39LibermannotesthatthedecisiontoopentheKalaharitestsite
resultedfromconcernovertheescalatingAngolanconflict.Apparently,P.W.Botha
thoughtthataSouthAfricannucleartestwouldcause“theYankstocomerunning”
totheaidofSouthAfrica.40IfthesecuritythreatexplainsSouthAfrica’sdecisionto
weaponize,canitalsoexplainthedecisiontoconductaclandestine,ratherthan
overt,nucleartest?Libermandoesnotaskthisquestion.
TheSecurityArgumentDisproved
TheIsraelinuclearweaponsstrategyinwarsagainstArabstatesin1967and
1973underminesthesecurityargument.Israellikelypossessedafunctionalnuclear
weaponin1967,anddefinitelyhadthecapabilitytodeploynuclearweaponsin
1973.Moreover,in1973Israelwasonthevergeofdefeat,andonlyturnedthetide
ofthewaronceavitalAmericanarmsshipmentarrived.Therefore,thesecurity
37Cohen321.38Liberman,Peter“TheRiseandFalloftheSouthAfricanBomb,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.26,no.2(Fall2001):45‐86.
16
argumentwouldhavedictatedeitheranuclearstrike,oratleastthethreatofa
nuclearstrike.AvnerCohen,however,hasshownthattheIsraelisviewednuclear
weaponsasusableonlyinthelastresort.HecallstheIsraeliattitudetonuclear
weaponsusagea“doublesenseofprohibition.”41Thefirstprohibitionresultedfrom
thegrowinguseofnuclearweaponsinafirst‐strike(the“nucleartaboo”),andthe
secondprohibitionresultedfromIsrael’scultureofnuclearopacity.42Thesetwo
prohibitionsmandatedthatIsraeloptforaclandestinetestin1979.
WhilethesecurityargumentmightaccountfortheSouthAfricandecisionto
weaponize,itcannotaccountforthespecificdecisiontoconductaclandestine
nucleartestwithIsrael.IfSouthAfricafeltthatitssecuritysituationwas
threatened,thecountrywouldhaveeveryincentivetoconductanoverttest.This
couldinfluenceSouthAfrica’senemies,orperhaps,asBothaincorrectlyassumedin
1977,winUnitedStatessupport.ThesecurityargumentmightfitSouthAfrica’s
decisiontoweaponize,butcertainlynotitsdecisiontoconductaclandestinetest.
IntheircritiqueofLiberman’sarticle,HelenPurkittandStephenBurgess
proposethatSouthAfricamovedtowardsasecretnuclearweaponsprogram
becauseofcriticismbytheUnitedStatesandothersofIndia’s1974“peaceful
nuclearexplosion,”andbecauseofSouthAfrican‐Israelinuclearcooperation.43
PurkittandBurgess,therefore,arguethatinternationaloutrageoverIndia’s
violationofthenormagainstnucleartesting,aswellasIsraeliinfluence,mandated
39Liberman4940Liberman60.41Cohen,Avner.IsraelandtheBomb.(NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1998)Chapter9.42Ibid.43Purkitt,HelenE.andBurgess,StephenS,“Correspondence:SouthAfrica’sNuclearDecisions,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.27,no.1(Summer2002):188.
17
theprogram’ssecrecy.IfPurkittandBurgess’argumentsareshiftedfromthe
program’ssecrecyingeneralandappliedtothe1979test,theyalsounderminethe
notionthatSouthAfricaconductedaclandestinenucleartestoutofaconcernforits
security.IbelievethatPurkittandBurgess’reasoningforthesecrecyofSouth
Africa’sprogramingeneralcanextendtothespecificdecisiontoconducta
clandestinenucleartestin1979.
TheNormAgainstNuclearTesting
Beginninginthemid‐1950s,anormagainsttestingnuclearweapons
developedalongsidethedevelopmentofa“taboo”44againstthefirstuseofnuclear
weapons.NinaTanenwalddefineda“norm”as“astandardofrightorwrong,a
prescriptionorproscriptionforbehavior“foragivenidentity.”45Shecalledthe
tabooagainstfirstuseofnuclearweaponsa“defactonormativeprohibition”46
becauseinternationallawdoesnotprohibittheuseofnuclearweapons,andthefive
declarednuclearstatesareallowedtopossesstheseweapons.47
Thedevelopmentofanormagainstnucleartesting(Iarguethatitisanorm,
notataboo)48complementedthecreationofthistabooagainstfirst‐useofnuclear
44Tannenwald,Nina,“StigmatizingtheBomb:OriginsoftheNuclearTaboo,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.29,No.4(Spring2005):8.45ibid.46Ibid.47Tanenwald948Tanenwaldstatesthat“therearetwoelementstoataboo:itsobjectivecharacteristicsanditsintersubjective,phenomenologicalaspect,thatis,themeaningithasforpeople…Further,itisalsoa‘brightline’norm:oncethethresholdhasbeencrossed,oneisimmediatelyinanewworldwithalltheunimaginableconsequencestofollow”.Tanenwald’s“brightline”aspectofataboomakesnucleartestingincongruentwiththeidea.Therehavebeenhundredsofnucleartestsconductedsince1954.Whilethevastmajorityofthesetestsweredonebytherecognizednuclearpowers,otherstateslikeChina,India,andPakistanhavealsoperformednucleartests.Thenormhasheld,however,andwedonotfindourselvesinthe“newworld”thatmightdevelopshouldastateviolatethefirst‐usetaboo.
18
weapons.IsraelandSouthAfricawereconcernedwithanucleartest,so
understandingthenormagainsttestingasacorollaryofthetabooagainstfirst‐use
illuminatesinternationalpoliticalunderstandingsofnucleartestingintheyears
precedingtheVelaIncident.DidanormagainstnucleartestingexistbySeptember
1979?WereIsraelandSouthAfricaboundbythisnorm?
Thedevelopmentofanormagainstnucleartestingfirstgainedmomentum
aftera1954UShydrogenbombtestoverthepacific.49Unexpectedfalloutfromthe
explosionsickenedanumberofJapanesefishermenontheLuckyDragon,andPrime
MinisterJawaharlalNehruofIndiasubsequentlycalledforabanofnucleartesting.50
Forthenextfortyyears,theinternationalcommunityengagedinattemptsto
produceagreementonpartialbansontesting.
In1963,thePartialTestBanTreatybannednucleartestsunderwater,inthe
atmosphere,orinspace.In1968,thenuclearnon‐proliferationtreatyindirectly
forbadeparticipatingcountriesfromnucleartesting(asidefromthe5declared
powers)becauseitprohibitedthemanufactureofanucleardevice.Furthermore,
throughoutthe1950s‐1970smanycountriesmadestatementsandendorsedUN
measurescondemningnuclearweaponstests.Forexample,a1962UNresolution
that“condemnsallnuclearweaponstests”enjoyedwidespreadpopularity(theU.S.,
USSR,andotherWesternstatesabstainedfromvoting,)andwhenChinatesteda
49Bunn,George."TheStatusofNormsAgainstNuclearTesting."TheNonproliferationReviewwinter(1999):20‐32.GeorgeBunn,thefirstgeneralcounseloftheUSArmsControlandDisarmamentAgencyanalyzedthestatusofnormsagainstnucleartestinginthewakeofthe1998testsbyIndiaandPakisitan.Hisanalysisilluminateshowanormagainstnucleartestingdevelopedfrom1954tothepresentday,andhowthisnormoftenappliestostatesthatarenotlegallyboundbyinternationaltreatiesorlawsagainstnucleartesting.Hecallsthisphenomenonanexampleofa“politicallybinding”norm(21).
19
nuclearweaponin1964manystatescondemnedthetest.51
Ironically,the1974Indiannucleartestdemonstratedthestrengthofthe
normagainstnucleartesting.OnMay18,1974,Indiaexplodeditsfirstnuclear
bomb,theSmilingBuddha.WhileIndia’sactionmightseemtoweakenanargument
outliningthestrengthofthenormagainstnucleartesting,themannerinwhich
Indiajustifiedthetestwasstrikinginitsdeferencetothisnorm.Indiainsistedthatit
hadperformeda“peacefulnuclearexplosion,”andthattheUNshouldnotcondemn
Indiasincethetestwasforpeacefulpurposes.52India,despitenotevensigningthe
NPT,feltthatithadtodefenditsactionssinceitviolatedaninternationalnorm
againstnucleartesting.ThedeferenceIndiapaidtothisnormwasdemonstrated
whenIndiaannouncedin1978thatitwouldnolongertestweaponsevenfor
peacefulpurposes.Indiadidnottestanotherweaponuntil1998.53
IsraelandSouthAfricaratifiedthePartialTestBanTreatyin1963,but
neithercountrysignedtheNPTbeforetheVelaIncident.SouthAfricafinallysigned
andratifiedtheNPTin1991,andIsraelisstillnotamember.EventhoughIsrael
andSouthAfricadidnotsigntheNPT,onecanarguethatbothcountrieswerestill
“politicallybound”54tothetreaty.WhilethePartialTestBanTreatyprohibitedboth
countriesfromconductinganucleartest,theNPTspecificallyprohibitscountries
fromdiscretelycollaboratingtospreadnucleartechnologyandknow‐how.And
IsraelandSouthAfricawereengagedinexactlythisactivityintheyearsleadingup
totheVelaIncident.Nevertheless,IsraelandSouthAfricawereinfluencedbythe
50Ibid23.51Ibid2352Ibid23.
20
NPTtosuchadegreethattheydidnotwanttopublicizethedetailsoftheirnuclear
partnership.Thisexemplifiesthemannerinwhichanon‐legalnormcanbejustas
effectiveasalegallybindingnormininfluencingacountry’sbehavior.
Opacity,Ambiguity,andtheNormAgainstNuclearTesting
By1979,IsraelandSouthAfricahadformedwell‐developedstrategiesof
nuclearopacityandnuclearambiguity.Furthermore,bothcountriesunderstoodthe
strengthofthenormagainstnucleartesting,aswellasthenegativeconsequencesa
violationofthisnormcouldbring.Theideathatthesetwofactorscontributedtothe
secrecyofbothcountries’nuclearprogramsisnotmyown;AvnerCohenargues
boththesepoints,whilePurkittandBurgessdemonstratehowtheanti‐testingnorm
contributedtothesecretnatureoftheSouthAfricanprogram.Myanalysisfurthers
thesehistorians’arguments,however,byarguingthatthesetworeasonsalsoapply
totheSouthAfricanandIsraelidecisiontojointlyconductaclandestinetestin
1979.
AvnerCohenproposedthatIsraelkeptitsnuclearprogramsecretbecauseof
respectforthenormagainstnucleartestingandbecauseofitspolicyofnuclear
opacity.Thesesametworeasonsaccountforthedecisiontoperformaclandestine
nucleartestin1979.IsraelhaddevelopedanunderstandingwithboththeUnited
StatesanditsArabneighborsthatitwouldnot“introduce”nuclearweaponsintothe
MiddleEast.After1970,Israelwasknowntopossessnuclearweapons.Israel,
however,decidedforaclandestinenucleartestin1979becauseanoverttestwould
53Ibid.
21
haveunderminedthecountry’spolicyofnuclearopacity.Furthermore,Israel
understoodthestrengthofthenormagainstnucleartesting,andtheconsequencesa
testwouldhavehadonitsinternationalpoliticalrelationships.
Similarly,IdrawonPurkittandBurgess’argumentthatthesecrecyofthe
SouthAfricanprogramwasaresultofboththenormagainstnucleartestingand
Israeliinfluence.TheyarerighttopointoutthatiftheVelaIncidentwasajoint
decision,IsraelorSouthAfricacouldhavepersuadedtheotherforaclandestine
test.Iadditionallyargue,however,thatSouthAfrica’spolicyofnuclearambiguity
influencedthedecisiontoconductaclandestinenucleartest.
OneseeminglyobviouspointthatPurkittandBurgessfailtomake,while
consistentwiththeirargument,istheconnectionbetweentheKalahariTestandthe
VelaIncident.SouthAfricadidnotneedtolookatthefalloutfromIndia’sPNEin
1974whenitwasdecidingwhethertoperformanovertorclandestinetestin1979.
SouthAfrica’sleadershadalreadybeenhumiliatedbythepoliticaloutragecaused
byatemporaryexitfromtheirprogram’ssecrecy,theKalahariTest.In1977,South
Africanleadersapparentlydecidedtoconductanovertnucleartest,andthen
changedtheirmindswhentheybecamesubjectofnumerousinternational
condemnations.Inotherwords,theytemporarilymovedtowardsanovertnuclear
strategy,beforeretreatingbacktothestrategyofnuclearambiguity.SouthAfrica’s
decisionforaclandestinetestin1979demonstratedthisretreatbacktoapolicyof
nuclearambiguity.
54Seefootnote49.
22
Conclusion:
PartIofthispapershowedhowagrowingmilitaryandpoliticalalliance
betweenIsraelandSouthAfricalikelyledtoanintimatenuclearpartnership.PartII
describedthedevelopmentofIsraelinuclearopacityandSouthAfricannuclear
ambiguity.PartIIIarguedthatthesepoliciesofopacityandambiguity—coupled
withIsraeliandSouthAfricandeferenceforthenormagainstnucleartesting—led
toaclandestine,ratherthanovert,nucleartest.
Whilehistorianshavedocumentedtheconstructionofagrowingpolitical,
military,andscientificrelationshipbetweenIsraelandSouthAfrica,onecannotdate
themomentatwhichIsraelandSouthAfricadecidedtoconductajointnucleartest.
Thislackofdirectevidenceimplicatingbothstateshaspreventedmanyscholars
fromaddressingtheVelaIncidentwithinthehistoricalcontextofbothstates’
nuclearprograms.
Ifoneallowsforacircumstantialargument,however,thedecisionbyboth
statestoperformaclandestinenucleartestfitsrightintothehistoricalnarrativeof
bothnuclearprograms.Notonlydidamilitaryandpoliticalalliancebetweenthe
twostatesallowfornuclearcollaboration,butthedecisiontoconductaclandestine
testseemstofollownaturallyfromIsraelandSouthAfrica’srespectivestrategiesof
opacityandambiguityaswellastheirdeferencetothenormagainstnucleartesting.
Viewedinthismanner,theambiguousVelaIncidentactuallyincreasesour
understandingofbothnations’nuclearprograms.
23
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