1. AEIS CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT July 8,
2015
2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS 2 1 3 1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive
against AMISOM and Somali National Army troops. It seized ten towns
in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops
from the locations. 2. AQIM is resurging in northern Mali. It
claimed the 02 JUL ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed five UN
peacekeepers and injured nine others. 3. The Iranian regime is
taking steps to strengthen Irans economy and make it resistant to
Western sanctions as it pushes for sanctions relief in the ongoing
nuclear talks. 2
3. ASSESSMENT: al Qaeda Network Al Qaeda may be moving into
cyber warfare as well. Al Qaeda Electronic, a pro-al Qaeda hacking
group, announced the appointments of Qatada al Sainawi as the
deputy leader and Moaaz al Tikriti as the head of fundraising for
the group. Al Sainawi previously served as spokesman for the group,
while al Tikriti was a fighter with al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Al
Qaeda Electronic has been active lately, having defaced 22 British
websites on 03 JUL and several Russian, Norwegian, and Vietnamese
websites between 25 and 29 JUN. Outlook: Al Qaeda Electronic will
likely continue its recent surge in hacking activity, in an effort
to establish its presence on the internet. Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda
associates Bangladeshi security forces arrested 12 militants
affiliated with al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) during
raids in different parts of Dhaka. The security forces also
arrested Mainul Islam, the chief of AQIS Bangladesh and his top
adviser, Zafar Amin, during the raids. Police seized a large number
of weapons and explosives from the arrested militants. Pakistani
police recovered ISIS propaganda, maps of London and documents
threatening Pakistans army from three militants arrested in
Peshawar. Of the arrested, two are Afghan nationals, while the
other is Pakistani. It is suspected that these militants could have
been planning an attack in London on the 10th anniversary of the 07
JUL 2005 London bombings, which killed about 52 civilians and
injured over 700 more. Pakistani military launched the final phase
of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the offensive against militancy, in Shawal
Valley. Outlook: The Pakistani government will continue its attacks
against militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA). 3 AL QAEDA
4. ASSESSMENT: Political Yemeni stakeholders continue to seek a
political solution to the ongoing crisis. Representatives from
President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadis government and the al Houthi
movement stated that they expect a draft humanitarian ceasefire
agreement that will last through Eid al Fitr, the last day of the
Islamic holy month of Ramadan, after meetings with UN Special Envoy
Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and in Sanaa,
Yemen. The ceasefire conditions are still being negotiated, though
Hadis government stated that it seeks full implementation of UNSCR
2216, which calls for complete al Houthi disarmament. Outlook: A
brief humanitarian ceasefire may be agreed to given the rapidly
deteriorating conditions in Yemen, although the insistence on full
implementation of UNSCR 2216 will continue to be an obstacle in
negotiations. Security The al Houthi movement appears to be
overstretched and is struggling to maintain control of territory.
Local popular resistance fighters repelled an al Houthi attack in
al Dhaleh governorate, and popular resistance fighters have been
contesting the al Houthi presence in Taiz, Yemens third-largest
city. During a peak in the fighting there, approximately 1,200
prisoners broke out of the central prison. The al Houthi-run state
media described the escapees as dangerous criminals and alleged
there were al Qaeda suspects among them. Outlook: The al Houthis
may be willing to withdraw from certain areas in south Yemen as
part of a humanitarian ceasefire. A ceasefire would also be an
opportunity for both sides to replenish supplies and reposition. Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen ISIS
Wilayat Sanaa is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device (VBIED) campaign in Yemens capital in addition to sustaining
IED attacks. Wilayat Sanaa detonated a VBIED near a military
hospital in Shuaub district in Sanaa on June 29, the third such
attack claimed by Wilayat Sanaa since the beginning of Ramadan.
Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Sanaa will continue its VBIED campaign to
provoke a response from the al Houthis in Yemens capital. 4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF ADEN 5 1) 30 JUN: ISIS
Wilayat Sanaa detonated a VBIED near a military hospital in Shuaub
district in Sanaa. 2) 01 JUL: Popular resistance fighters repelled
an al Houthi attack north of Dhaleh city. 3) 06 JUL: Popular
resistance fighters secured a key position in Radfan district along
the road to al Anad, Lahij. 4) 05 JUL: Reported U.S. airstrike
killed 4 AQAP members in al Mukalla, Hadramawt. 1 4 2 3
6. ASSESSMENT: Political The breakaway region of Puntlands
administration remains unwilling to settle its border dispute with
the new central state of Galmudug, despite international and local
calls for reconciliation. Puntland Information Minister Mohamed
Hassan Soo-adde announced that his administration would not be
attending talks proposed by Galmudug President Abdikarin Hussein.
Puntland supported the moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunna wa al
Jamaas claim that the new Galmudug state was not legitimate.
Outlook: Tensions between the newly formed state of Galmudug and
local splinter groups, including Ahlu Sunna wa al Jamaa and local
clans, and the Puntland administration are likely to continue as
the federalization process moves forward. Al Shabaab is likely to
use these tensions to its advantage as the group moves on
Mogadishu. Security Security forces throughout East Africa remain
on high alert for possible terrorist attacks as the Islamic holy
month of Ramadan nears its end on July 17. Kenyan officials
arrested two Ugandans in Nairobi they believe to be recruiters for
the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Meanwhile, African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army
officials announced a plan to increase security in the key areas of
Kismayo, Baidoa, Beledweyne, Adado, and Mogadishu. Outlook:
Regional security forces will continue to remain on high alert as
the possibility for a large-scale al Shabaab attack during the
final days of Ramadan and as information about potential ISIS cells
in East Africa is uncovered. Al Shabaab Al Shabaab made significant
territorial gains in the past week. The group seized ten towns in
the Lower Shabelle region between July 2 and July 5 from which
AMISOM had previously withdrawn for tactical reasons. Al Shabaab
was also linked to several low-profile assassination attempts,
including a car bomb that injured a Somali intelligence officer and
the ambush of Turkish officials in Mogadishu. Outlook: Al Shabaab
will continue its campaign against AMISOM military bases in the
Lower Shabelle region and will continue to attempt high-profile
assassinations of foreign officials before the end of Ramadan. HORN
OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 6
7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 77777 1 2 3 4 7 1) 01 JUL: AMISOM
withdrew from bases in Buufow, Yaq-bari Weyne, Awdheegle, and
Qoryole, Lower Shabelle. 2) 03 05 JUL: Al Shabaab seized ten towns
deserted by AMISOM and SNA in Lower Shabelle. 3) 03 JUL:
Unidentified gunmen ambushed a vehicle containing Turkish officials
in Lido Beach, Mogadishu. 4) 05 JUL: Al Shabaab seized Jalalaqsi,
Hiraan region, after clashing with SNA. GULF OF ADEN HORN OF
AFRICA
8. ASSESSMENT: Political Updates from the UN-led peace
negotiations in Sakhirat, Morocco, have ceased following protests
and demonstrations from General National Congress (GNC) President
Sahmain over Draft 5s political rebalance in favor of the House of
Representatives. However, the continuing publication of
endorsements from a wide variety of Libyan factions and political
actors supports the notion that the talks are not over. Outlook:
Increasing political pressure from both international and domestic
groups will force the GNC to remain at the negotiating table and
accept necessary compromises, partly due to the revelations that
ISISs presence is growing in northwest Libya and that ISIS Wilayat
Tarablus is capable of attacks in Misrata. Security A resumption in
large-scale fighting throughout Benghazi has supplanted the threat
of gunmen from Derna, and the prospect of a new military front in
Derna is a secondary concern to the Libyan National Army (LNA).
Resources will be refocused on the crucial territories of Laithi,
Sabra, and Buhdeima in Benghazi to reinforce the LNA against future
operations by the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council. Outlook:
The shift in the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Councils posture from
a defensive to an offensive one reflects a change in tactical
and/or strategic thinking. It is unclear if the Buhdeima assault on
04 JUL is simply an anomaly or the beginning of a new operation to
break the military stalemate in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia Libya and
ISIS in Libya ISIS-affiliated forces in Derna remain on the
defense. They conducted three vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device (VBIED) attacks on the same day, but have not regained
control of the city. ISIS Wilayat Tarabluss 06 JUL bombing of
Misratas air force base indicates growing capabilities and an
attempt to weaken ISISs opponents in Libya. Additionally, ISIS
forces have been moving into new villages outside of Sirte on the
main roads along the coast. Outlook: ISIS groups in Libya appear to
be creating conditions on the ground to support ISISs expansion
from Sirte and attempting to maintain some positions near Derna. 8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
9. ASSESSMENT: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) AQIM
demonstrated that it has regained its ability to carry out
asymmetrical attacks in northern Mali since the French intervention
in 2013. It claimed credit for an attack in Timbuktu, Mali that
killed six MINUSMA peacekeepers, which was the groups first attack
against peacekeepers in Mali since May. Separately, low-level
fighters continue to splinter from AQIM. Algeria dismantled a large
terrorist cell comprised of former AQIM members who now support
ISIS. Outlook: AQIM will continue to operate in Mali and take
advantage of the more permissive environment now that the French
have largely withdrawn. AQIM will also look to counter ISIS support
through increased operations and recruitment. Ansar al Sharia
(Tunisia) Tunisia began a heavy security crackdown in response to
the June 26 Sousse attack. President Essebsi declared a state of
emergency in effect from July 4 though August 2, giving the
executive and security branches more power and autonomy. This may
lead to increased concerns and protests from citizens concerned
about the possible evolution of a police state. Five terrorist
cells were dismantled in two days after the declaration, showing
the immediate effect of these increased powers. Outlook: The
expansion of government and military power will likely continue as
President Essebsi looks to ensure citizens safety during Ramadan,
but many will protest these new measures due to their similarity to
the laws of the Ben Ali regime. Such restrictions may create a
valuable recruiting tool for terrorist groups. Associated Movements
in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Ansar al Din continues
to expand its influence in southern Mali, and bordering countries
are growing increasingly concerned over potential spill over. The
Ivory Coast deployed troops to the Malian border and conducted
security operations with the Malian army in response to a threat
from Ansar al Din to expand operations in Mali and extend its
influence into the Ivory Coast and Mauritania. Ansar al Din also
confirmed coordination with the Massina Liberation Movement (MLM)
and referred to the MLM as one of its katibas. This may indicate
that Ansar al Din has fully incorporated the MLM into its network.
Separately, Mauritanian security forces dismantled a dormant ISIS
cell in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Security forces reported that
former members of this cell also participated in fighting in Syria
and Iraq, indicating that communication likely occurred between the
Mauritanian cell and ISIS fighters in other areas. Outlook: Ansar
al Din is likely to continue using local militia groups to solidify
its position in southern Mali. 9 MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA
10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 10 LIBYAWEST AFRICA 10101010101010 1
2 3 4 1) 01 JUL: ISIS forces continued expansion efforts in Sirte,
occupying the neighborhood of al Sawawa without resistance. 2) 03
JUL: ISIS conducted 3 SVBIED attacks throughout Derna, targeting
both Mujahideen Shura Council and civilian targets. 3) 04 JUL:
Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council militants besieged LNA forces
in Buhdeima, Benghazi. 4) 06 JUL: ISIS infiltrated Misrata AFB and
destroyed 4 jets.
11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST AFRICA 1) 30 JUN:
Algerian authorities dismantled an 18- member ISIS cell in Tizi
Ouzou, Algeria. 2) 30 JUN - 02 JUL: Tunisian authorities arrested
numerous suspects in connection to the 26 JUN Sousse attack. 3) 02
- 05 JUL: Tunisian authorities dismantled six terrorist cells in
various cities. Two were directly linked to ISIS and one to Ansar
al Sharia Tunisia. 1 3 2 11
12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST AFRICA 1) 01 JUL:
Mauritanian security forces dismantled a dormant ISIS cell in
Nouakchott, Mauritania. 2) 02 JUL: AQIM militants attacked a
MINSUMA convoy outside of Timbuktu, Mali, killing 6 peacekeepers.
3) 05 JUL: French Special Forces killed AQIM leader Mohammed Aly Ag
Wadoussene in an operation in Kidal, Mali. 2 1 12 3
13. ASSESSMENT: Nuclear Talks President Hassan Rouhani warned,
If the opposite side ignores the [possible nuclear] agreement we
will go back to the old path faster than they [the West] could
imagine, in a July 1 address. The old path likely refers to
previous uranium enrichment levels. In July 5 comments, Artesh
Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan
stated, the U.S. might make a deal with us within the framework of
the [P5+1]we should never see this as a positive gesture on the
part of our enemy. This articulation of distrust demonstrates that
a possible nuclear agreement will not significantly improve
existing strained relations between the U.S. and Iran. The
negotiations continued past the extended July 7 deadline, as EU
Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini stated on July 7 that the
talks will continue for the next few days. Outlook: These comments
indicate that Iran will pursue its nuclear programs full potential
should a possible P5+1 nuclear deal be breached. Economy Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei outlined provisions of the 6th
five-year national development plan, in a letter to President
Hassan Rouhani on July 1. Khamenei identified the resistance
economy doctrinehis plan to make the Iranian economy strong and
resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crisesas a
pillar of the 6th five-year plan. The plan called for enhanced
deterrence capabilities, with an emphasis on boosting the countrys
cyber infrastructure, and instructed the government to allocate
five percent of the public budget for defense expenditures.
Expediency Discernment Council (EDC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei,
meanwhile, stated If [we] are not able to reach a [nuclear] dealthe
sanctions will continue, but we will certainly decide to change our
economic policy... Outlook: The Iranian regime will continue to
integrate the resistance economy doctrine into its economic
planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
13 IRAN
14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN 1430 JUNE 06 JULY 2015 30 JUN:
The P5+1 and Iran extended nuclear negotiations to July 7. 30 JUN:
Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar
Salehi said that many technical issues have already been resolved
during the nuclear talks in Vienna. 30 JUN: IRGC Qods Force
Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani attended a commemoration for
Iranian fighters killed in Syria. 01 JUL: Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei announced the provisions for the Islamic Republics 6th
five-year development plan. 01 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani warned
the P5+1 that Iran will go back to the old path [Irans previous
levels of uranium enrichment] if Western powers do not uphold their
commitments under the final nuclear deal. 02 JUL: President Hassan
Rouhani met with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director
General Yukiya Amano in Tehran. 02 JUL: Expediency Discernment
Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei claimed if [we] are not able to
reach a [nuclear] dealthe sanctions will continue, but we will
certainly decide to change our economic policy. 02 JUL: Artesh Navy
Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari announced that the Fatah
submarine is continuing field testing. 04 JUL: Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that Irans scientific progress should
not slow down and described university professors as commanders of
the soft war against the West. 04 JUL: The Supreme Leaders Senior
Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stated Iran, Syria, and
Iraq, which are on the front line of resistance, are jointly
fighting terrorism. 04 JUL: Khatam al Anbia Air Defense Base
Commander Brig. Gen. Farzad Esmaili unveiled a long-range Ghadir
radar installation near Ahvaz city in southwestern Khuzestan
province. 06 JUL: The foreign ministers of the P5+1 and Iran, along
with EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini, met in Vienna. 06
JUL: President Hassan Rouhani received an official invitation from
Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) Summit on July 12 and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa) Summit on July 11.
15. ACRONYMS 15 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) al Qaeda
in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad
(CMA) Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA) Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham
(ISIS) Kataib Hezbollah (KH) Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) Libyan
National Army (LNA) Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) The
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) North
Waziristan (NWA) Pakistani Military (PakMil) Possible military
dimensions (PMD) Somalia National Army (SNA) South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
16. AEIS CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT Katherine Zimmerman senior al
Qaeda analyst [email protected] (202) 888-6576 Alexis
Knutsen al Qaeda analyst [email protected] (202) 888-6570 Paul
Bucala Iran analyst [email protected] (202) 888-6573 Heather
Malacaria program manager [email protected] (202) 888-6575
Marie Donovan Iran analyst [email protected] (202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian Iran analyst [email protected] (202)
888-6574 For more information about AEIs Critical Threats Project,
visit www.criticalthreats.org. Frederick W. Kagan director
[email protected] (202) 888-6569 16