Valentina Fava Istituto di Storia Economica, Università L ... · 1 The paper is based on my doctoral thesis «Taylorismo e Socialismo. Organizzazione del lavoro e della produzione

IEHC 2006SESSION 101: Cold War and Neutrality: East-West Economic Relations in Europe

Valentina FavaIstituto di Storia Economica, Università L. Bocconi

[email protected]

Automobiles vs dollars: selling socialist cars in neutral markets.

Some evidence from the ŠKODA- Auto case.

The paper deals with the theme «Cold War, Neutrality and East-West

Economic Relations» from the perspective of the largest Czechoslovak

automobile company, Škoda Auto, and in particular it tackles the issue of

the relationship with dealers in Austria, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden

in the years from 1948 to 1964.

It aims to offer a preliminary overview of the historical sources and the

potential avenues of research to be undertaken for a comprehensive

report on the subject.

The takeover of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in February 1948 and

the rising tensions of the emerging Cold War made inevitable the

progressive isolation of the Czechoslovakian manufacturer from the

European and Global automobile industry. This translated into a wholesale

shift of the commercial, financial and technical relationships that Škoda

had originally established, resulting in a redirection of the export of its

automobiles and commercial vehicles towards the Soviet Union and the

People’s democracies.

Nonetheless, an analysis of the documentation from Škoda reveals how

from the technological and productive perspectives, the technicians of

Škoda continued to jealously conserve their own “know-how”, acquired

before 1949 and for the most part foreign to the Soviet industrial

paradigm.1

1 The paper is based on my doctoral thesis «Taylorismo e Socialismo. Organizzazione dellavoro e della produzione negli impianti della Škoda Auto di Mladá Boleslav (1948-1963)», Istituto di storia economica, Università Luigi Bocconi. The work reconstructed thehistory of the organisation of work and production in the Czechoslovak automotiveindustry after the Second World War, with particular emphasis on the years between theFirst Five Year plan (1949-1953) and the early Sixties. It enlightened Škoda‘s«European» path towards an hybridisation of the American model of mass production.

mailto:[email protected]


Under this light, the paper examines the function of the technical and

commercial relationships maintained by Škoda and Motokov -the State

monopoly in charge of exporting automotive products- with Škoda

automobile dealers in the neutral countries, in particular Finland,

Switzerland, Austria and Sweden.

In these markets, Škoda’s production continued to compete with other

products and marketing strategies, which were beginning to proliferate in

the global automobile industry.

The paper suggests that such technical and commercial relationships

played an important role in stimulating and orienting the modernization of

the Czechoslovakian automobile production.

The lead track of the paper is represented on one hand in the letters of

grievance received by Škoda and Motokov from their Austrian,

Scandinavian and Finnish partners concerning the quality of products and

services in the late fifties.

On the other hand the paper also examines their impact on the

Czechoslovak planning authorities and on the fate of the industry.

In the late fifties, these letters and the progressively closer involvement

with the foreign dealers seem to have furnished a valid learning tool,

pointing out defects and bottlenecks of both Škoda production cycle and

products.2

Concerning the «Americanisation debate» see J. Zeitlin, G. Herrigel, (eds)Americanization and its limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in PostwarEurope and Japan, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. In order to compare theŠkoda’s case with the history of other European car producers see J. Laux, The EuropeanAutomobile Industry, New York, 1992; J.P. Bardou, J.J. Chanaron, P. Fridenson, J. Laux,The Automobile Revolution, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Seealso V. Fava, «Between American Fordism and «Soviet Fordism»: the Czechoslovak waytowards mass production», paper presented at the workshop: «New Perspectives onSovietisation and Modernity in Central and Eastern Europe 1945-1964», Fiesole, IUE,May 26th-27th, 2005.2 The reference is to Keith Pavitt’s taxonomy of the learning modalities and of theinternational transfer of technologies.In the European automotive industry, the circulation of technical information betweencompetitors- which from the Twenties was quite free- as well as the feedback comingfrom parts suppliers and tools suppliers had an important role in stimulating the learningand innovation processes. One of the key hypotesis of the present paper is that, in theŠkoda’s context, the learning by mistakes process activated by the confrontation with


The observation and criticism of the dealers in neutral countries, coupled

with growing export difficulties in traditionally friendly markets, appear to

have alarmed the planning authorities regarding the «functional

inefficiency» of the socialist system, carrying much more impact than

similar complaints originating from the production unit, and elicited a

prompter response.

Finally, again in the first half of the Sixties, foreign distributors helped

Škoda take the first steps in automobile marketing, as well as in designing

an assistance system of repair centres and overseas assembly plants

based on licensing, fundamental to the establishment of an effective

foreign distribution system worthy of an important automobile

manufacturer that seemed to be poised for a return to competing in the

European market.

Sources

The paper is based both on research conducted at the Škoda-Auto

Archives, in Mladá Boleslav - the AZNP (Automobilové Závody, Národní

Podnik) records - and at the Central State Archives of the Czech Republic

(SÚA Státní Ust ední Archiv) - ZAL ( eskoslovenské závody

automobilové a letecké), MAP (Ministerstvo automobilového pr myslu a

zem lských stroj ) and MVS (Ministerstvo všeobecného strojírenství)

records; Archìv HR ÚV KS , Hospodá ská rada Komunistická Strana

eskoslovenska documents.

The records of Motokov in SUA are unfortunately closed to scholars’

consultation.

some foreign dealers and their complaints had an important role. Concerning the«taxonomy» see K. Pavitt, Alcuni fondamenti della teoria della grande impresainnovativa, in R. Giannetti e P.A. Toninelli, Innovazione, impresa e sviluppo economico,Bologna, Mulino, 1991; N. Rosenberg, Dentro la scatola nera: tecnologia e economia,Bologna, Mulino, 1991; an adaptation to the automotive sector can be found in D.Bigazzi, La grande fabbrica. Organizzazione industriale e modello americano alla Fiat dalLingotto a Mirafiori, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2000, pp.143-144.


However, both sources need to be integrated with quantitative data and

with the records from the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MZO)

and Statistika Ro enka.3

1. Škoda and the “internationalisation” strategies: from the

origins to the first five year plan

To better comprehend the relationship between Škoda and its partners in

the neutral countries it is necessary to briefly review the bohemian

manufacturer’s history in the first half of the century.

Škoda Auto (also known as ASAP, Akciová Spole nost Automobilový

Pr mysl) was a large automobile maker in the years between the two

wars, as well as a competitor for the other European car makers in

Eastern and Southeastern European Countries and in some overseas

markets. It was founded in 1925 as a result of the merger between the

Škoda Works engineering and armament combine with Laurin & Klement,

of Mladá Boleslav, one of the leading automobile factories in interwar

Czechoslovakia.4

Although there is a lack of literature on a hypothetical internationalisation

strategy in the Interwar period, it is reasonable to state that Škoda did

not have a commercial organisation able to support an export-oriented

growth strategy. Instead, the Czechoslovak producer simply had close

financial, technical and commercial ties with foreign companies.

Škoda Works was controlled by the French Schneider et Cie combine

through a holding company, Union Européenne Industrielle et Financière,

created in 1920 to control industrial and banking participations in the ex-

3 I would like to thank professor E. Kubu and V. Pr cha for their suggestions. Usualdisclaims apply.4 For the L&K company history see: I. Margolius, C. Miesl, Škoda-Laurin and Klement,London, Osprey Automotive, 1992; P. Kozisek and J. Kralik, L&K-Škoda, Prague, MotorPress, 1997, 2 vols and M. R.Cedrych, L. Nachtmann, Škoda. Auta známá i neznámá.Prototypy i seriové automobily vyráb né od roku 1934, Škoda, Praga, Grada, 2003. For acompany history of Škoda Works see: V.Karlický, P. Hofman, F. Janá ek, A. Klimek, V.Krátký, Sv t ok ídleného šípu. Koncern Škoda Plze . 1918-1945, Škoda, 1999 spec. pp395-403.


Austro-Hungarian Empire (73% of the Joint stock capital in 1918,

declining to 46.49% in 1937).5

The merger between Škoda Works and L&K itself signalled a move

towards the technical modernization of Czechoslovakian automobile

production, in line with the «American model of mass production». The

technical modernisation of the Mladá Boleslav facilities in the late Twenties

resulted from the Škoda technicians’ many «industrial pilgrimages» to the

main American and European automotive companies, intended both to

study the new mass production methods and to buy machines and

prototypes.6

However , although the renewed factory was called «America» and was

equipped with machinery imported from the United States, the production

volumes of the new company could not compete with the volumes of the

US or European companies, but instead reflected its scarce international

activity. 7

5 A. Teichova, An Economic Background to Munich. International Business inCzechoslovakia, 1918-1938, London, 1976, pp. 203-217, and C. Beaud, Investments andProfits of the Multinational Schneider Group, 1894-1943, in Multinational Enterprise inHistorical Perspective, ed. by A. Teichova, M. Lévy-Leboyer and H. Nussbaum,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 87-102. For the economic contextsee: E. Kub , J. Pátek, Mýtus a realita hospodá ské vysp losti eskoslovenska mezisv tovými válkámi, Praha, Karolinum, 2000, p. 120 and V. Pr cha a kol., Hospodá ské asociální d jiny eskoslovenska 1918-1992, vol. I, Nakladatelství Dopln k, 2004, pp. 330-340.6 Some travel reports can be found in the Archiv of the Academy of Sciences of the CzechRepublic (AV R), fond Map (Masarykova Akademie Práce). More information about thesetrips can be found in: Pa ourek J. International Contacts of the Czech TechnicalAcademy.The Masaryk Labour Academy and the World in between the Two Worrld Wars,in «Studiae Historiae Academiae Scientiarum Bohemicae», serie C-2, Pragae, 1993,pp.35-50 and Id., Snahy o organizování praxe eskoslovenských inženýr v USA (20 a30 léta 20 století) in DVT, D jiny v dy a techniky, 3, a. 25, pp. 129-139. See alsospecifically concerning Škoda: V. Fava, Fears, hopes and automobiles:visions of Fordismin Interwar Czechoslovakia in engineers’ travel reports. Paper presented at the AAASSNational Conference Copley Hotel, Boston, 4-7 December 2004.7 See annex 1. To be confronted with the Fiat and Lancia export and production data in F.Amatori et al., Storia della Lancia. Impresa, Tecnologia e mercati, Fabbri Editori, 1992pp. 129-130 and 140; see also C. Casalino, V.Fava, La Fiat nel mondo il mondo dellaFiat, Padova, Marsilio, 2002; and with data concerning other European and Americanmanufacturers in J. Laux, The European Automobile Industry and in H. Bonin, Y. Lung, S.Tolliday, Ford of Europe 1967-2003, Ford 1903-2003: The European History, EditionsPLAGE, 2003 and G. Volpato, L’industria automobilistica internazionale, espansione, crisie riorganizzazione, Padova, CEDAM, 1983, pp. 34-65.


As far as the commercial organisation was concerned, Asap did not invest

in foreign branches or did not control foreign companies in charge of the

distribution of its products or repair companies in charge of customer

assistance, but instead relied on a network of independent dealers. The

export department of Škoda Plsen managed the export strategy for both

engineering and automotive products while the Mladá Boleslav factory

handled the technical relationships with the dealers. In the1920s-1930s,

exports were destined mainly towards Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,

Denmark, Greece, Holland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Spain (until the civil

war), Switzerland and the Middle East, in particular Egypt, Palestine and

Persia. On the other side of the ledger, Škoda imported many car

components from Western European countries: France (Solex), Germany

(Bosch) and Italy.8

Shortly after the war, on March 7, 1946, Škoda works was nationalized

and broken up into several independent enterprises. The Mladá Boleslav

plant, which was re-named the Automobilove Zavody, Narodni Podnik,

Aznp (National Automobile Factories), became the center of automobile

production.9

Between 1946 and 1947 a group of technicians from the ZKS- the

central directorates charged with coordinating national mechanical

8 Škoda -Auto Archives, Mladá Boleslav, hence forth Aša, records Automobilové Závody,Národní Podnik hence forth AZNP, 55, Export automobil , 5-7-1955. Author dr. Subotka.Confidential document to Ministerstvo strojírenství, hlávní správa odbytu.9 From an organizational standpoint, the enterprises created after the Nationalizationwere independent of each other and under the control of the ZKS, the centraldirectorate of heavy industry and metalworking. According to the first charter ofnationalized enterprises (1946), they would retain the legal status of a publicly-ownedfirm, whose stock was entirely owned by the state. Although the directors wereappointed by the government and nominated by the ministry of industry and the factorycouncils, each firm compiled its own balance sheets and retained a certain degree ofautonomy See Statní Ústrední Archiv, Central State Archives of Czech Republic henceforth SÚA, records eskoslovenské závody kovod lné a strojírenské a hence forth ZKS,Introduction to documents. See A. Teichová, The halting pace to scope and scale, in A.Chandler, F. Amatori, T. Hikino (eds), Big Business and the Wealth of Nations,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 447-461, A. Teichova, TheCzechoslovak Economy, 1918-1980, London-New York, Routledge, 1984. and V. Pr cha,Postwar Economic Planning in Czechoslovakia,paper presentend at the TenthInternational Economic History Congress, «Economic Planning in the Post 1945 period»,Milan, 1994, p.95.


production- developed a project to modernize the production facilities of

Mladá Boleslav and to rationalize the entire Czechoslovak automotive

industry. AZNP should raise its production volumes, design a «people’s

car» and hasten the motorisation of the country while reducing its

production costs. According to this plan, the Aznp would attempt to

penetrate the European automobile market, taking advantage of

Germany’s weakened position and England and France’s difficulty in

returning to their pre-war production levels in the short run. In this

scenario, Czechoslovak production would have replaced German products

on the foreign markets.10

The plans reflected the political climate and possibilities raised by

Czechoslovakia’s imminent decision on whether to participate in the

Marshall Plan. These options became unrealistic following the country’s

refusal and the events of February 1948. It became increasingly evident

that Czechoslovakia would not take advantage of the US plan, but would

instead have pursued an autarchic economic and commercial path,

navigating a difficult course between the Western embargo on the one

side and the difficulties of collaborating with the “new” people’s

democracies of Eastern Europe on the other.11

In terms of exports, during the Two-Year Plan there had been a decided

upswing in the export of automobiles, topping pre-war levels though

remaining largely limited to Škoda’s traditional markets: Belgium, Holland

and Scandinavia. With nationalisation, export management had been

shifted from Škoda Plsen to ZKS, and then to the KOVO. However,

10 Aša, AZNP/p, 4, A. Taub, A people’s technology. A report to dr. Ing. F. Fabinger,General Director of KOVO, Praha, september 1946, p. 6; F.H. Žalud, ežili jsme.Zkušenosti z mého života 1919-1993, popsané pro má vnou ata a jejich generaci, Praha,1996 p.61. See also Fava V., Tecnici, ingegneri e fordismo. Škoda e Fiat nelle relazioni diviaggio in America, in «Imprese e Storia», n.22, 2000, pp. 201-249.11 A. Teichova, For and Against the Marshall Plan in Czechoslovakia, in Le Plan Marshall etle relèvement économique de l’Europe. Colloque tenu à Bercy les 21, 22, 23 mars 1991,ed. By R. Girault and M. Lévy-Leboyer, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1993. SÚA, recordseskoslovenské závody automobilové a letecké, hence forth ZAL ZAL, 83, 31-8-1949;

13-4-1950; Výroba automobil v SR v ramci spolupráce s SSSR a zem mi lidovýchdemokracií, 12- 4- 1950. See also K. Kaplan, eskonslovensko a RHVP (1948-1953),Praha, Ústav pro soudobé d jiny AV R, 1995.


during these years, the ANZP had maintained direct relations with the

foreign dealers, not only in terms of contacts at auto salons and expos

with both technical and sales personnel, but also through frequent visits

by the dealers to the factory itself. Over the years, thanks partly to the

continuity in both the factory technical management and the workshop

personnel, an atmosphere of trust and cooperation had been created

between manufacturer and distributors, as can be seen from the tone of

some letters and memos written by the latter.

Following the creation of the Motokov, in 1950, the separation between

production and export became more distinct than it had been, resulting in

the partial interruption of contacts between the factory and the foreign

dealers. Over the course of the first Five-Year Plan, the ANZP was

increasingly oriented exclusively towards production, without direct

relations with its suppliers or with possible clients and devoid of any

decision-making powers concerning production or distribution. Not only

were foreign trips by technicians suspended, but bureaucratic obstacles

prevented sending representatives to international auto exhibitions,

effectively isolating Mladá Boleslav in every sense.12

2. Automobile exports towards neutral countries

In 1949-1950, with the embargo by the western states and the formation

of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (Cocom)13

and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), it became more

difficult for Czechoslovakia to obtain strategic raw materials such as

12 Škoda -Auto Archives, Mladá Boleslav, hence forth Aša, records Automobilové Závody,Národní Podnik hence forth AZNP, 55, Export automobil , 5-7-1955. Author dr. Subotka.Confidential document to Ministerstvo strojírenství, hlávní správa odbytu.13 Concerning an innovative approach to the COCOM issue see L. Segreto, Europe vsUnited States or bellum omnium contra omnes? COCOM, National Economic Interests,Pressure Groups and Politics in East-West Trade in the 1950s and 1960s, paperpresented at the EBHA Conference «Business and Knowledge», Oslo, 2001.


chemicals, metal and non-metal products and machinery, as well to

export its own products.

As a consequence of this situation Czechoslovakia sought to strengthen

and increase its exchanges with the other people’s democracies of Eastern

Europe and with the neutral countries. Some of the latter had a long

history of commercial relations with Czechoslovakia, like Austria,

Switzerland, and Sweden, and others, such as Finland, saw their volume

of trade with Czechoslovakia grow enormously. While this report does not

dwell upon this issue, it is noteworthy to highlight that, according to the

commercial agreements stipulated in this period and to the available data

on foreign trade, neutral countries became an essential source of primary

goods and hard currency for Czechoslovakia. 14

These new realities had important repercussions on the production and

export of automobiles: the scarcity of key raw materials for mechanical

production and the growing difficulty in keeping up relationships with

foreign suppliers, especially those with whom Škoda had a long-term

tradition of collaboration, delayed the modernization of the firm and

affected the competitiveness of its products within the European market.15

In this context, the export destinations of the products, as previously

mentioned, also changed.

14 I do refer to the result of a very initial archival research in SÚA, records Hospodá skárada Úst ední vybor KS , hence forth HR UV KSC, Sv 43, AJ305, and in particular to:Informace o eskoslovenském zahrani ním obchod v roce 1950 in Material propresidium Hospodá ské rady, 3-3-1951, Tajné; Informace o zahrani ním obchod SRs kap. Státy za r. 1951 ve srovnání s r. 1950 a 1949, Tajné; Zahrani ní obchodeskoslovenska v prvním pololetí 1949, Tajné.

Concerning the Czechoslovak trade agreements with the neutral countries, the obviousreference goes to the papers presented at the EBHA Conference, 2005, Frankfurt: E.Kubu, Restoration and regularisation of Economic cooperation under the circustances ofAccelerating Cold War. Czechoslovak- Austrian Economic Relations in 1945-1955 and L.Hallon, M. Londak, Facilities, Forms and Areas of Economic activities of Firms in Neutraland Socialist Countries durng the Cold War: the Slovak Case.15 After the political upheaval of February 1948 and the launch of the first five-yearinvestments in the automotive sector diminished to the point of relegating it to nearirrelevance, with priority going to military production. SUA, ZAL, 86, Problematikavýroby automobil a motocykl , 1949; SUA, ZAL, 64, Program vývojového odd lení provozidla, 22 ervna 1949; SUA, ZAL, 83, N která hospodá ská porovnaní mezi USA aSR, 1949; Aša, AZNP\P, 1; 12; 14.


The data on the production of automobiles from 1949 to 1954 show a

significant negative trend: from 20,769 pieces produced in 1949 to 5,376

pieces in 1954.16 Exports during the same period fell proportionately,

going from 14,621 to 4,776.17 The data from AZNP confirms this situation,

both with regard to production and exports (from 11,645 vehicles sent

abroad in 1949 to 3,533 in 1954).18

It is possible to reconstruct, albeit with some gaps, the destination of the

Škoda – AZNP automobile exports for the periods between 1949 and

1955, for the year 1961 and from 1964 to 1978.

The sharp fall in exports towards the capitalist countries during the First

Five Year Plan was not at all compensated for by the raise in exports to

the people’s democracies.

Between 1949 and 1955, Aznp sent only 9 vehicles to the United

Kingdom, while those destined for France decreased from 77 in 1950 to 2

in 1955. Data from other countries are just as striking: exports to Holland

fell from 2,200 automobiles in 1949 to only 20 in 1955, then returned to

1,332 in 1961; exports rose again after 1964 and the launch of Škoda

MB1000.

A similar collapse in car imports from Czechoslovakia concerned Belgium-

another traditional export destination: in 1949 it imported 1,534

automobiles, that had decreased to 278 units by 1954, although imports

bounced back to 1,012 in 1955 and continued to rise, reaching 2,521 by

1961- and Canada, where Škoda imports dropped from 1,107 vehicles in

1950 to only 8 by 1955.

Concerning exports towards the people’s democracies: Yugoslavia’s quota

obviously decreased from 93 vehicles in 1949 to 34 in 1955, and fell

further, with just 11 in 1961; Hungary’s share fell from 1,127 in 1949 to 6

16 Annex 2: Aša, AZNP, 34, eský Statní U ad, Zprávy a Rozbory, rok 1970, Rozvojautomobilového pr myslu v SR, fig. 11.17 Annex 3: Ibidem, fig. 16.18 Annex 4: Aša, AZNP, 55, Expedice voz zahrani í od roku 1949 do r. 1955; P ehledexport za rok 1961; P ehled vývozu závodu Mladá Boleslav v letech 1964-1974. I thankyou Mgr. Lukaš Nachtman for sending me this document.


in 1955. Exports to Romania went from 923 units in 1949 to 9 in 1955,

while Poland’s peak of 2,779 in 1950 had bottomed out at just 3 in 1955.

The USSR only imported 5 automobiles between 1949 and 1955.19

In a similar scenario, the quotas pertinent to the neutral countries appear

to be relatively large when compared with those of the western capitalist

states and the people’s democracies.

The Finnish data need to be scrutinized closely, as Škoda’s exports rose

from 157 in 1949 to 1,677 in 1955, although they had a negative peak

(418 units) in 1952. The Swedish and Norwegian cases register a different

pattern: Škoda’s exports to Sweden fell from 1,165 automobiles in 1950

to only 604 in 1951, then increased to over 1,000 in 1952 and fell again in

1953-54.

On the contrary, Norwegian imports of Škoda cars showed a steady

positive trend, increasing from 364 units in 1952 to 817 by 1955.

Exports towards Austria (only 296 in 1949, 610 in 1955, but up to 1,163

in 1961) and Switzerland (174 in 1949, down to 79 in 1955 to 197 in

1961) are on the whole minor, but aside from a few oscillations,

consistent.

To summarize, the major destinations for exports of Škoda automobiles

from 1948 to 1955- excluding Holland (6,428) and Belgium (6,426), both

showing a clear downward trend- were Poland (7,198), Finland (7,115),

Switzerland (3,681), Hungary (2,914), Austria (2,614), Romania (2,465)

and Norway (2,400).

19 Indeed, between 1949 and 1950, the Cmea bureau decided not to endorse the CZALplan aiming at Škoda growth; the plan was based partially on the Czechoslovak project of1946-47, partially on a new project of international division of work among the CMEAcountries and was intended to justify investments and an increase of the productioncapacity. See SÚA, ZAL, 83, Výroba automobil v SR v ramci spolupráce s SSSR azem mi lidových demokracií, 12- 4- 1950. See also the series of Goldman’s letters fromthe first session of the CMEA in Moscow to Ludvik Frejka and the Hospodá ská Rada UVKS in SÚA, Records HR ÚV KS , sv. 43, a.j. 306. See also V. Fava, Between AmericanFordism and “Soviet Fordism”: the Czechoslovak way towards mass production, pp. 10-11.


Over the First Five Year Plan, the steadiest partners were clearly the

neutral states.

However, by 1961 the situation appears to have partially changed (even if

the data refers only to three models in production, the Škoda Octavia,

Touring Sport and Super), with a total volume of 29,456 vehicles exported

by Aznp out of a total of 33,954 exports for all vehicles exported by

Czechoslovakia that year. Concerning Škoda’s markets: Finland (4,061)

took first place, with East Germany (3,963) next, then Poland (3,167),

Belgium (2,521 non-assembled vehicles), Norway (1,928), West Germany

(1,624), the U.K. (1,528), Hungary (1,493), Holland (1,332), Austria

(1,163) and Switzerland (720).

The data for 1961 and 1964-5 show that the years of isolation were

largely over, and that there was a new impetus in exports towards

traditional markets, even in Western Europe, such as Belgium and

Holland, as well as to the U.K., France and West Germany. This was the

outcome of the modernization of the Mladá Bodeslav plant and the launch

of a more competitive people’s car, the Škoda MB1000. However, if we

compare these figures with those of the other large European automobile

manufacturers, we see that Škoda had lost market shares that it would

never recoup on the European and global automobile market, and in

proportion, even in the neutral countries, where it had done best. While

the principal reasons for this slide can certainly be ascribed to European

trade policies of the times, an examination of the correspondence between

the AZNP, Motokov and the foreign dealers may help us understand

exactly what was lacking in Škoda’s organization and products.

3. The automobile as an export item: the contradictions of the

First Five Year Plan policies concerning automobiles

If we compare the available data on Czechoslovakian automobile

production (until 1952 including Škoda, Tatra, and in 1948-9, also Jawa),


and their total exports, we see that from 1949 to 1955, the percentage of

total production devoted to export was 75%, on average. This figure

began falling in 1956, when a greater number of vehicles were made

available for the domestic market.

The data confirm that the Czechoslovakian automobile industry was

export-driven during the Cold War years, and underscores the importance

of the export markets in Scandinavia, Austria, Switzerland and Finland

during the first Five-Year Plan. To explain the data, it would be advisable

to review the role of the automobile industry in the political economy of

Czechoslovak socialism.

In contrast with the 1946-47 projects and the idea of launching a people’s

car and motorise the country, the mass production of automobiles was not

one of the priorities of the First Five Year Plan, approved in October 1948.

The planners considered automobiles to be superfluous items and a waste

of resources. However, they did not intend to abandon the motor vehicles

industry: not only because it was useful to increase road-based

transportation and because producing cars stimulated the growth of the

other, related manufacturing sectors, but also because the export of cars

and other vehicles could bring much-needed hard currency or could be an

exchange item with which to finance the sectors considered vital to the

nation’s survival or to obtain strategic raw materials. Last but not least,

there was the army, which needed vehicles and also wanted to be able to

rely on facilities that could easily be converted to military production.

As a matter of fact, the Czechoslovakian automobile industry which was

created, «strongly addressed towards exports», needed to vigorously

pursue its vocation.

However, the course of action undertaken was not free of inherent

contradictions and weaknesses. In the early 1950s problems and issues

were identified by the technicians of the Mladá Boleslav facility and the

planners, but it was only in the second half of the decade, partly thanks to


the relations with the foreign distributors, that these issues were forcefully

brought forward.

To reduce costs and to permit the AZNP to compete on the international

markets, the revenue from the sale of the automobiles should have been

reinvested in the modernization of the facilities and expansion of

production. Instead, the revenue generated by these sales was diverted to

heavy industry and the acquisition of raw materials, which called into

question the short and long term future of the sector.

In addition, the rules of the game were quite different in exporting,

especially towards those nations with strong currencies, very unlike those

for operating in the domestic market. The planners would have to consider

demand, and prices and products would have to be competitive. 20

The relationship with the neutral countries, which continued to trade with

Czechoslovakia and had become important sources of strategic raw

materials, soon revealed the limits of the policies followed until then.

Starting in 1952-1953, a real “annus horribilis” for Škoda automobile

production, the Mladá Boleslav automaker and Motokov were inundated by

complaints from the foreign resellers.21

20 The debate about the future of automobile production emerges from the Minutes of themeeting of the Technical board of the AKRCs Czechoslovak Automobil Club published on«Sv t Motor » between 1949-1950 as Minutes of the meeting of the Technical board ofthe AKRCs Czechoslovak Automobil Club: see in particular Nemístní luxus in «Sv tMotor », March 25th 1950, p. 164. SÚA, ZAL, 86, Problematika výroby automobil amotocykl , 1949. SÚA, ZAL, 64, 22 June 1949, Program vývojového odd lení provozidla, author ing. Výška. See also V. Fava, Between American Fordism and “SovietFordism”: the Czechoslovak way towards mass production…

21 Complaints came also from Škoda’s overseas markets but here we focus on theEuropean market. After the war Škoda- AZNP produced the Škoda 1101, Tudor whichwas based on the prewar Popular model. In 1949 its new version Š1102 was issued. InNovember 1950, the supreme economic council issued orders to transfer production ofthe Tatra 600 to the AZNP at Mladá Boleslav, progressively phasing out the Š1102, whichhad been made at Mladá Boleslav until that point, and shelving plans for making a newpopular car, Š1200. The Tatraplan, as the new program had been dubbed, projected theproduction of 16,600 Š1200s and 2,000 T600 vehicles in 1951. However, the plan for1951-1952 entailed the production of only one model of automobile in Czechoslovakia,the Tatra 600 and not the Š1200. The needs of the armed forces and of Ministery ofForeign Trade, which had required the setting aside of the greater part of industrialcapacity for military and commercial production at Kop ivnice, imposed the transfer ofthe Tatra production lines to Mladá Boleslav in 1951. But Tatra was unable to deliver themachine tools and instruments required for the making of the T600 to the AZNP. In


As is made clear in the letters from the dealers, what further compounded

the export difficulties for Škoda, aside from the embargo and the refocus

of exports, as evidenced in the letters from the dealers, were the serious

production defects of the Škoda automobiles, the lack of repair assistance

and the unavailability of spare parts.

During the second half of the Fifties, the authorities began to explore

courses of action that could break the vicious circle caused by the lack of

investment and make the Czechoslovak product competitive again.22

The export of automobiles remained a necessity and a priority for

Czechoslovakian automobile production. On the one hand, western

capitalist markets were gradually beginning to reopen to exports, and this

generated interest in the potential for building assembly plants in Austria

and Belgium as bridges to export parts that would be assembled on

location, to take advantage of the emerging common market and the new

tax laws. On the other hand, the pressing need to obtain hard currency

with which to fund imports of foodstuffs, in addition to products for the

chemical and steel industry products, including foreign machinery, became

more insistent by the day.

addition, the differences in the type of production at the Mladá Boleslav plant –continuous production, though not highly automated, with a decrease in skilledmanpower – and at the Tatra Kop ivnice facility – production organized in small serieswith an abundance of skilled workers – made it necessary to modify most of theprocesses used at Mladá Boleslav, making it extremely complex to produce the T600 withthe machinery available at the Mladá Boleslav plant. It didn’t take long for the criticalsituation in materials and production process to require the re-utilization of the Š1200production lines and the return to production of the Š1200 in Mladá Boleslav in order notto break the continuity of production. In 1952, 12,000 Tatras were to be produced andthe Š1200 was to be slowly eased out of production. However, by the end of 1953,«there was no longer any trace» of the plan that had projected the production of a totalof 38,000 T600 autos by the end of 1955. In addition, the cost of the operation had beenenormous. By 1952-53, the number of automobiles produced in Czechoslovakia haddropped to the lowest level ever recorded: 6,300 vehicles per year. See SÚA, ZAL, 86,Rámcové p edpoklady pro výrobu voz Škoda 1200 a T 600, v Automobilových závodechn.p. Ml- Boleslav, v roce 1951 a 1952, Ml. Boleslav, 14-11- 1950. Aša, AZNP, 27,Kontrola pln ní planu rozbory, 1951-1953. Stru ní rozbory zm n výrobního programu odr. 1946 do r. 1953, signed by Václav Medek, 25th March, 1954. KS , ÚV, HR, SV.39, AJ283 list 228. Letter to Frejka, on May, 29th 1951. SÚA, ZAL, 86, Appendix to a letter tothe Ministry of Industry, P edb žný návrh reorganisace výroby osobních automobilnového typu v Automobilových závodech, n.p. Mladá Boleslav, 16-6-195022 SÚA, MAP, 200, Návrh perspektivního plánu oboru osobní automobily od roku 1956 doroku 1975.


In this context, in plans for the development of the sector between 1955

and 1960, it was stressed that large-scale automobile production was

particularly desirable for Czechoslovakia, because it restricted the export

of raw and semi-worked materials, which Czechoslovakia lacked, and

favoured the export of work. It was, however, necessary to lower

production costs while increasing the volume of production, by creating a

vehicle whose reliance on foreign primary components would be reduced

to a minimum (from 20% in 1957 to 10% in 1960). 23

The result of this initiative was the reconstruction of the Mladá Bodeslav

plant, finished in 1964, and the launch of the Škoda MB1000, which was

intended as the confirmation of the opening of a new stage of

Czechoslovakian automobile production, including a new approach to

exports.24

In this new phase as well, the relationships with foreign dealers illustrates

some of the limits of the new «lidový v z», Škoda MB 1000, and the

contradictions inherent to the socialist planning system.

1.4 Grievance letters from Neutral Countries

The criticisms originating from foreign dealers, in particular from Austria,

Switzerland, Finland and the other Scandinavian countries, were at the

heart of an interesting debate within the higher echelons of the

Czechoslovakian production apparatus between 1953 and 1965.

The first reference to the grievance letters from the foreign dealers

regarding the deteriorating quality of Škoda vehicles dates to 1953, when

37 letters were received in August and September alone concerning the

defective quality of the Škoda products (in particular the Š1200 and the T

600). The complaints were mostly from Austria, Finland, Norway and

Sweden, and concerned everything from the “body work”, the electrical

23 SÚA, MAP, 94, cit.; Aša, AZNP, 26, 1956, Vyhledové plánování. Osobní automobilyv Mladá Boleslav, dne 27 února.24 see Košíšek, Králík, L&K- Škoda, pp. 116-126.


systems, the transmission, the clutch and the brakes to the finishing of

the doors and interiors. Tarbruck, the Austrian dealer, even lodged an

official protest with the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna.25

The complaints were irrefutable, as they corresponded neatly with

communiqués from Mladá Boleslav to the appropriate central authorities

requesting funds with which to purchase new machinery, which Mladá

Boleslav had been asking for since 1947. In this first phase, the

production defects of the automobiles were attributed to inadequate

workmanship at Mladá Boleslav and a lack of efficient quality control by

OTK, in line with the attempt to introduce socialist work practices in the

production facility during those same years. However, neither the

introduction of the dispatching system nor the expansion of the OTK, nor

interventions involving salaries and disciplinary measures were able to

resolve the problems caused by defective parts and products. On the

contrary, the recalls increased, even with the launch of the new Š440.26

In 1958, in Sweden alone, there were 4,333 recalls, with problems

pertaining to nearly every aspect of the Š440, which had little to do with

the particular climatic conditions of the Scandinavian region, as the local

representatives stressed.27 Furthermore, during a meeting with dealers in

1965, when production of the Š440 was halted and the Škoda MB1000

was introduced, Tarbruck’s Austrian founder unleashed a diatribe that

made it clear how little had changed since the first official recall back in

1953 and that Škoda still had a long way to go before it launched a

product that would be competitive in Western european markets. While

initial complaints had mostly referred to the technical quality of the Škoda

vehicles, by the early sixties, the subjects raised in the discussions by the

25 SÚA, UPVT, 48, 14-9-1953.26 Aša, AZNP, 1, Resolution of the president of the central committee of the PCC and thegovernment, 27-4-1953 concerning the measures taken to improve discipline in thetechnological departments, in order to decrease the number of defective pieces producedand improve the quality of the final product. Aša, AZNP, 11-7-1953. See also V. Fava,Taylorismo e socialismo...; concerning the Š440- Spartak- Octavia see Košíšek, Králík,L&K- Škoda, pp. 103-108.27 Aša, AZNP, 8a, Zápis z aktivu s delegaty Motokovu ze zahrani í a zastupci Motokovu sezástupci AZNP konaný dne 11.12.1958.


foreign dealers and consequently by the Czechoslovak authorities focused

on Škoda’s lack of competitiveness in areas such as aesthetics, marketing

and technical assistance abroad.28

The seriousness of the situation and the weight given to these letters is

accentuated by the multiple resolutions issued by the Central Committee

of the Communist Party in their regard, as well as the copious flow of

correspondence between the various production ministries, party organs,

Motokov and the production units involved. The importance given to these

letters and the initiatives they led to were not merely the result of

apprehension about the possible commercial repercussions, but were also

instigated by fears that these production defects could be traced to acts of

sabotage or political disobedience on the part of the workforce, which

could easily be exploited by anti-Soviet propaganda.29

The difficulties Motokov faced in attempting to modernize the sector were

not the only reason why projects that had lain untouched in drawers for

nearly a decade were suddenly made operative: the changed political

climate and the new emphasis on socialist technology were essential

drivers. Nevertheless, the letters and recalls, particularly the recalls from

partners, which had never interrupted relations and exchanges even

during the years of greatest tensions, played an important role in the

revisions which were implemented, especially as they resonated clearly

with the grievances originating from the sector’s technical personnel.30

28 Aša, AZNP, 8, and 8a, Zápis z konference technik zahrani ních zástupc o voze Škoda1000 MB po ádané v AZNP Mladá Boleslav ve dnech 14 a 15 b ezna 1966: U el:Vysv tlení zm n a zlepšení provedených na voze Škoda 1000 MB na základ p ipomínek

i konferenci zahrani ích zástupc dne 1-10-1965 v Praze. Participants: Belgie(Krahulík), Denmark (Frahm), Finland (Kalio), France (Vausell), Holland (Jansen), WestGermany (Hingerl), Austria (Prainer), Sweden (Sieurin). Aša, AZNP, 8a, Zpráva oopat eních k zavedení prodeje vozu Škoda 1000 MB na vybraných kapitalistických trzích,8-4-1964 and Problematika trhu a cenová politika v novych podmínkách ízení, 6-6-1967.29 SÚA, UPVT, 1012, 16-4-1957; 14-12-1957.30 Aša, AZNP, 8, Oborová Konference pro osobní automobily konaná dne 30-31 brzna1956.


The criticisms of the foreign dealers affected the Czechoslovakian

automobile industry in three ways, briefly summarized below, which

present interesting research possibilities:

1) The letters of grievance contributed to underscoring the design defects

of the Škoda Š1200, T600 and Š440 and were also useful in explaining

some of the difficulties of the Škoda MB1000. Furthermore, the letters

appeared to guide and set in motion the interventions to modernize the

production facility of Mladá Boleslav, finding a convergence with the needs

expressed by the technical personnel in the automobile sector.

The largest part of the complaints concerned particular aspects of the

Š440, which were gradually resolved, but only in part. The Š440 was

rushed into production due to a governmental resolution of May 7, 1954,

expressing the need to put a small vehicle of Czechoslovakian production

on the market. It was decided to utilize chassis that would have over 70%

of their parts in common with the Š1200, which would enable a rapid

change of product without stopping the productive cycle. The Š440 was

designed to be produced until 1960 and had good performance

characteristics and fuel consumption, as well as the space and design

aesthetics to be competitive with other vehicles in its class. However,

even during the initial planning stages there were serious limitations, in

particular with regard to the weight and suspension. The weight was

around 150-180 kg greater than those of the other vehicles in its class,

which was in part due to the separation of the chassis and the body and

the use of heavier steel and tyres, and in part to the design of the vehicle

itself, which was based on the Š1200.

The letters of grievance drew a series of resolutions from the PCC, the

ministries and the company itself, all aimed at resolving the problems.31

31 SÚA, MAP, 93, 9-12-1957, Zpráva o kvalit voz Š440; SÚA, MAP, 95, 30-6-1958,Zpráva o kvalit voz Š440 Author Josef Kade ávek, AZNP; SÚA, UPVT, 1012, Informacek material pro PB ÚV KS o nedostatcích našich exportních automobil Š440 anákladních automobil Š706, 13-4-1957; 29- 7-1957 Úvaha o možnosti zvýšení výroby


Between 1956 and 1960, a plan was formulated to restructure the

Czechoslovakian automobile industry, but it was not until 1964, with the

construction of a new plant, that they were implemented, resulting in the

production of the MB1000, the first Czechoslovakian people’s car. The

initial interventions were aimed at rationalizing and mechanizing the

existing plant by introducing an assembly line, single-purpose machines

and by partially re-equipping some departments.

In particular, the plans concentrated on reequiping the body shops, which

had already been pronounced obsolete in 1946 and 1956 by the

technicians at Mladá Boleslav, and had been the object of complaints from

the dealers from 1953 onwards.32 These decisions had some positive

results, but were unable to completely eliminate the problem: the 1956

Swedish recalls were halved, but there was still much to do.

It was not until June 1957 that a design for a new facility, executed by the

Projecta Praga, was submitted. The new plant would transform the

«America» facilities, founded in 1928 and further expanded without an

overall plan after WWII in response to the production needs, into a

modern factory complex. The aim was to reduce production times and

costs, reaching production volumes equal or at least comparable with,

those achieved in the rest of Europe.33

The new production facility, and more importantly, the new Škoda

MB1000, represented a step forward, as the data relative to exports

motor a chassis osobního automobil Š440; 14-12-1957 Zpráva o pln ní usnesenípolitického byra ÚV KS ze dne 16-4 a 9-10-1957 o opat eních k zájíšt ní kvalitynákladních automobil Š706 a osobních automobil Š440.32 Aša, AZNP, 8, Oborová Konference pro osobní automobily konaná dne 30-31 brzna1956.33 The project of the new plant can be analyzed using documents that can be found inboth Aša and SUA, fond MAP. See, among the others: Aša, AZNP, 8, Oborová Konferencepro osobní automobily konaná dne 30-31 brzna 1956; SÚA, MAP, 94, 9-1-1958; SÚA,MAP, 200, Návrh perspektivního plánu oboru osobní automobily od roku 1956 do roku1975; Aša, AZNP, 26, 1956, Vyhledové plánování. Osobní automobily v Mladá Boleslav,dne 27 února¸ Aša, AZNP, 34, III etapa plánu royvoje a specialisace pro osobníautomobily 1955-1960 ; SÚA, MAP, 188, Návrh plánu výroby –rok 1956. K 4 záv rce.AZNP MB.


towards capitalist economies confirm, but a serious recall problem

resurfaced in the second half of the sixties.

2) Motokov’s growing difficulties in selling Škoda products abroad led the

exporter’s questioning of the organization of exports as it had been

conceived in the early fifties. Gradually, a two-pronged strategy emerged:

foreign dealers were involved in developing techniques and improving the

quality of Škoda products, while an in-house effort with the same

objectives was also launched. To this end, Motokov first elaborated a

series of questionnaires regarding the quality of Škoda products, which

was distributed to the export organization, the foreign dealers and the

technicians at Mladá Boleslav. Periodical meetings were then held, with

the participation of delegates from Motokov, technicians from AZNP and

several foreign representatives.34

With regard to AZNP, over the years of the “New Way”, the grievance

letters became one with the demands of the production company for a re-

decentralization of the economic decision-making process, and in

particular, of the relations between production and export. In 1955, in

response to a questionnaire from the Ministry of Mechanization, Mladá

Boleslav stressed the need to return to the practices of the pre-1950

period, re-establish contacts with the dealers, begin travelling again in

order to foster direct and personal relationships, which alone «permitted

[the company] to keep up with the foreign competition, staying up to date

on technical progress, the transfer of information and patents», including

the «positive effects from the psychological point of view on the foreign

representatives and their clients». The contacts with the foreign dealers

could not continue to be filtered by Motokov, passing only through the

recall department, nor could Mladá Boleslav continue to be the scapegoat.

On the other hand, the company itself and the workers’ collectives had

frequently complained of organizational inefficiencies that could impact

negatively on product quality.

34 Aša, AZNP, 8, and 8a.


In addition, the same questionnaire underlined the difficulty of organizing

a foreign service of technical assistance and the creation of assembly

plants without a direct relationship between the producer and foreign

distributors.This appeared to be the first step to take in order to improve

Škoda’s export prospects.

From this standpoint, back in 1955, a project had been drawn up to apply

the experience acquired in the neutral countries and Belgium (regarding

the network of technical assistance), extending it to other countries. The

plan also envisaged utilizing these traditional friendly states as

beachheads to gain access to new markets and overcome customs

barriers and political discrimination.

In 1955 Škoda had a technical assistance service only in Belgium, Austria

and Switzerland. Mladá Boleslav underlined how important it would be to

be able to send its technical teams to the foreign dealers, to provide

equipment and organize complete service stations in other countries.

Furthermore, it was deemed opportune to promote the construction of

assembly facilities in foreign countries in order to gain ground on the

international competition. Austria and Belgium were considered the most

favourable locations, the first for exports towards neutral states and the

second towards the capitalist countries.35

Hence if the experience of the relations with Austria, Switzerland and

Belgium was to be taken as exemplary by the company for the

reorganization of exports in Europe, the interventions of the foreign

dealers from the neutral countries in the debate which accompanied the

reorganization of the export appear particularly interesting.

In 1954, Motokov sent out a first questionnaire to the dealers collecting

suggestions on how to improve the foreign distribution of Škoda products

and on the principal defects of the current structure. Following this up, in

1958 a conference was called, with the participation of partners from

35 Aša, AZNP, 55, Export automobil , 5-7-1955. Author dr. Subotka. Confidentialdocument to Ministerstvo strojírenství, hlávní správa odbytu. See also SÚA, MAP, 200,Návrh perspektivního plánu oboru osobní automobily od roku 1956 do roku 1975.


several other countries, with the slogan: «the experiences of foreign

workers as an input to eliminate production defects and commercial

techniques for the export of Czechoslovakian automobiles».36 Lastly, in

1965, the interventions by the president of Tarbruck and of the Finnish

representative shed light on those deficiencies still creating problems,

both in the quality of Škoda products and in the organization and

management of exports.37

Letters from Sweden (in 1958) and Austria and Finland (in 1965), drew

attention to the need for Motokov to pay more attention to the specificities

of the individual export markets and to the marketing strategies to be

used in these states. The Swedish delegate underlined how an

improvement in quality and a competitive price were no longer sufficient,

that greater attention must be given to consumer buying habits and that

targeted advertising campaigns were also needed. In particular, the

complaint pertained to how Škoda underestimated the importance of small

annual changes in its product line, the colour range and other such

“details”. In any case, he stressed, Škoda’s drop in sales was not

attributable to political reasons, at least not in Sweden, but due to the

diminishing esteem for Škoda autos since 1952. This was in part due to a

qualitative problem of the vehicles and the defects with which they were

delivered to the dealers, but also to the lack of spare parts and technical

assistance. Similarly, in 1965, the Finnish delegate complained of the

quantity of defects found during the warranty period, the impossibility of

sending the automobiles back to Czechoslovakia for repairs and the

unwillingness on the part of Škoda to adequately reimburse the Finnish

service stations for the repairs undertaken.

3) The letters presented the authorities with the indisputable limitations of

the coordination between ministries and with the problems of sub-supply

36 Aša, AZNP, 8a, Zápis z aktivu s delegaty Motokovu ze zahrani í a zastupci Motokovu sezástupci AZNP konaný dne 11.12.1958.37 Aša, AZNP, 8, Pracovní konference generálních zástupc voz Škoda, konaná 1-10-1965. Spec.: Diskusní p ísp vek p. Ing. Kalia z Finska, pp. 42-43, and Diskusní

ísp vek, ing. Prainer and F.M. Tarbuk, pp.10-14


in the socialist planning system. There were over a hundred interventions

between 1955 and 1958 concerning planning, organization and production

at the Mladá Boleslav plant.38 These did bring about some improvements,

but on the whole the production problems at Škoda remained unresolved,

not only in terms of automobile design, but more importantly, in terms of

the deficiencies of the production process and in the coordination of

planning. What emerged quite quickly as the main source of the problems

that beset the quality of the vehicles had more to do with the inability to

guarantee steady supplies and the lack of coordination between the

ministries and the companies. While one could create new warehouses to

store automobiles or rebuild and modernize the facilities for producing

bodies, as well as purchase new machinery for finishing the autos, it was

far more complicated to ensure continuous production and a steady supply

of components from other companies, sometimes governed by other

ministries.

While some of the problems - the stiffness of the clutch, the presence of

water in the boot, the excessive consumption of oil at high speeds on

foreign motorways or the poor functioning of the hand brake - could be

solved through project-based interventions, others, regarding the

electrical and electromechanical equipment, the frequent damage to the

springs and the Gufaro rings and the peeling of the paint, could only be

resolved through drastic changes. The cause of such defects was to be

found in the poor quality of the components, complicated by difficult

relations between Mladá Boleslav and its suppliers, which neither the

company nor the MAP were unable to control. The quality of the materials

and of the steel depended on the ministry of steel inustry and the ministry

of mining, while the problems with the tyres and the paint reflected the

grave limits of the Czechoslovak chemical sector. In order to present a

38 SÚA, MAP, 96, 1957 -58; 94, Zpráva o výsledku kontroly uskute nování usneseníúnorového zasedání Ustredniho výboru Komunistické strany Ceskoslovenska o zvýšeníefektivnosti národního hospodarstvi v souvislosti s pripravou planu na rok 1958 podleusneseni vlady c. 848.


competitive product on the European markets, it would have been

necessary to import, aside from machinery which was not worth producing

in-house, semi-worked chemical and steel products not available in

Czechoslovakia or the other popular democracies.

The difficulties facing each ministry were worsened by the nature of the

“cooperation” between companies and ministries, as well as between the

various ministries involved in the production of automobiles. There was a

lack of planned coordination between AZNP and many suppliers (more

than 100), who answered to different ministries. Predictably, the

relationships between AZNP and its suppliers were marred by continuous

disputes over the quality of the goods and delays in delivery. Moreover,

cooperation was made more difficult by long and costly transportation and

other onerous production costs.39

These were the types of problems which failed to be resolved.

Conclusions

This paper has established three avenues for research necessitating

further examination: the internationalisation of Škoda as a growth

strategy; the automobile as an export item in the socialist system; the

grievance letters and neutral state markets as technological learning tools,

especially for experimenting with marketing techniques.

39 The difficulties arising from the building of the new plant can be studied through thedocuments in SÚA, MVS, 186, Výstavba automobilových závod n.p. Mladá Boleslav,1961-1965 ; SÚA, MVS, 190, 26 september 1961, Zpráva o stavu zajišt ní dodávektechnologického za ízení, stroi , projekce,a stavebních prací pro centralisovanouvýstavbu AZ MB z podniku ministerstva TS, MZO, MV e MVS; SÚA, MVS, 37, 1962,Zvýšení cen u jednoúc lových a upravnených specielních stroj a za ízení; SÚA, MVS, 37,1961, Zpráva o p ekro ení investi ních náklad na centralisovanou stavbu rekonstrukce adostavba n.p. AZMB; Aša, AZNP, 8, Porady editel ,1952-1968. Aša, AZNP, 6, Zápisy zezasedání tech. Ekonomické rady 1960-1962-1963. See also Aša, AZNP, 48, Specialisacea kooperace jako jeden z vázných initel ovlivnujících dálší rozvoj vyroby ozubených kola p evodových sk íní pro automobily, za í 1957, tajiné.


A few tentative and partial conclusions can be drawn, which need to be

integrated with documentation from the neutral states and from

participating companies, as well as documentation from the

Czechoslovakian ministry of foreign trade. Although the absolute volume

of Czechoslovakian automobiles exported to the neutral countries during

the Fifties and Sixties is not significant, from the point of view of technical

relationships, exports permitted Škoda, however tortuously, to

continuously verify the competitiveness of its products, locate

technological bottlenecks and learn new marketing techniques. This

permitted it to maintain foreign contacts with capitalist markets and

producers around the world even during the years of greatest isolation.

Overall, the neutral countries contributed important inputs to Škoda and

especially to its the decision-making bodies, which stimulated

modernization and the expansion of production facilities and kept the

company’s technicians up to date in technical and marketing know how.

However, the socialist planning system did not always permit the

suggestions to be enacted and thus resolve the problems Škoda faced.


Annex 1

Automobile production in Czechoslovakia from 1898 to 1968 (in units)

Year AutomobilesYear AutomobilesYear AutomobilesYear Automobiles

1898 1 1920 400 19424.100 196442.115

1899 7 1921400 19433.900 196577.705

1900 19 1922 700 19441.700 196692.717

1901 13 1923 1.300 1945300 1967111.718

1902 12 19242.000 19463.792 1968125.517

1903 13 1925 2.800 19479.372

1904 3 1926 5.500 194817.971

1.905- 1927 3.400 194920.769

1906 - 13289.100 195024.463

1907 230 192910.200 195117.064

1908 260 19307.700 19526.295

1909 440. 19319.000 19537.300

1910 350 19327.100 19545.375

1911 350 19335.600 195512.530

1912 450 19348.000 195625.068

1913 600 19359.000 195734.561

1914 500 193611.700 195843.439

1915 450 193713.300 195950.605

1916 350 193813.900 196056.211

1917 400 193910.800 196158.840

1918 300 19403.600 196264.325

1919 450 19414.200 196356.477

Source: Aša, AZNP, 34, eský Statní U ad, Zprávy a Rozbory,rok 1970,

Rozvoj automobilového pr myslu v SR, tab. 11.


Annex 2 :

Development of the Czechoslovak motor vehicles foreign exchange

Source: Aša, AZNP, 34, eský Statní U ad, Zprávy a Rozbory,rok 1970, Rozvoj automobilového pr myslu v SR, tab. 1

Exports Imports

Year Commercial Vehicles Buses Automobiles Commercial Vehicles Automobiles

1948 1.435 - 7.064 - -

1949 3.338 - 14.611 - -

1950 2.921 - 19.380 - -

1951 2.480 - 13.054 - -

1952 1.587 - 6.762 - -

1953 4.554 - 6.167 - -

1954 2.692 - 4.776 - -

1955 2.527 - 9.441 - -

1956 2.486 242 14.718 583 5.804

1957 2.602 549 15.858 3.593 10.551

1958 4.829 593 25.037 3.005 9.538

1959 5.913 658 30.875 3.962 10.981

1960 7.363 830 30.557 3.339 13.278

1961 6.365 545 33.954 1.091 10.889

1962 6.405 616 34.741 690 12.674

1963 6.817 605 37.047 885 12.864

1964 6.047 202 25.419 1.890 16.497

1965 6.302 168 49.195 3.668 15.339

1966 6.594 75 51.331 3.259 20.966

1967 7.031 232 55.728 1.839 22.468

1968 8.179 260 60.527 3.540 35.359


29

Annex 3

Automotive production in AZNP (1946-1954)

Year Model Units

1946 Tudor S1101 942

1947 Tudor S1101

Superb OHV

5296

28

1948 Tudor S1101

Superb OHV

10186

103

1949 Tudor S1101

Cabr. S1101

Sedan S1101

4469

936

5307

1950 Tudor S1101

Cabr. S1101

Sedan S1101

SW S1101

4501

998

6524

85

1951 Tudor Š1102

Sedan Š1102

Tatraplan T600

3602

5504

236

1952 Tatraplan T600

Sedan Š1200

1864

2000

1953 Sedan Š1200

T 805 (military vehicle)

2600

2098

1954 S 1200

T 805

2933

2811

1955 Š1200

Š440

T805

S706

8001

2105

13

40

Source: Aša, AZNP, 5, March 26th 1954, author J. Vavrin.


30

ŠKODA AUTOMOBILES EXPORTS, MLADÁ BOLESLAV FACTORY, 1964-74

Country 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 TOTALAlbania 0 0 2 4 0 0 1 2 0 13 22Bulgaria 0 187 1 807 1 715 1 289 0 200 2 105 1 237 2 006 10 543Yugoslavia 1 052 2 521 2 081 11 632 13 836 13 117 16 137 12 550 13 458 19 963 106 647Cuba 1 0 1 2 0 16 0 8 14 21 63Hungary 2 1 243 4 271 2 350 4 056 1 955 6 309 5 566 7 357 13 265 45 374East Germany 1 486 10 268 12 165 11 178 12 759 17 499 20 189 17 094 18 483 16 006 137 127Poland 1 2 495 1 597 1 426 1 804 4 764 3 027 7 048 7 105 19 584 48 851Romania 0 3 5 3 523 4 761 1 924 4 076 3 001 5 550 0 22 865URSS 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6

Austria 305 5 503 4 077 2 632 2 551 1 769 2 787 2 329 2 137 1 537 25 627Finland 183 1 492 1 685 867 632 1 556 1 558 1 252 946 1 243 11 412Norway 40 1 890 948 1 191 670 1 176 633 686 481 571 8 286Sweden 59 838 329 31 335 83 300 177 227 213 2 612Switzerland 62 322 207 213 188 210 128 77 96 44 1 547

Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1Angola 21 62 146 84 76 20 0 90 0 0 499Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2Australia 0 65 129 113 40 16 51 11 1 0 428Belgium 503 1 959 1 465 1 811 1 595 1 535 1 895 1 060 1 472 1 500 14 795Bolivia 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 7Brazil 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3Ceuta 0 7 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17Camerun 0 2 0 0 0 10 30 58 166 47 504Canada 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 40 31 1 76Ceylon 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1Colombia 0 533 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 537Costa-Rica 0 1 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 14Congo 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 52Curacao 0 0 0 0 16 20 0 0 0 0 36Cyprus 0 38 65 44 26 12 71 60 65 59 440Chile 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2Denmark 2 604 551 422 516 204 171 215 323 493 3 499DominicanRepublic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 20 30Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 3 9Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 4France 143 2 124 1 502 420 2 034 1 846 948 1 901 6 053 5 554 22 525Ghana 0 32 22 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 85Greece 0 99 338 232 100 169 460 803 1 343 2 256 5800Holland 357 2 525 1 437 831 1 511 1 623 1 687 1 719 1 437 1 431 14 558Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 39 57 180 120 120 80 596Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Japan 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

West Germany 207 4 994 3 319 2 136 3 362 3 266 3 422 3 398 3 302 3 504 31 910Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Guadaloupe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0India 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3Indonesia 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3Irak 0 0 0 0 131 13 0 0 1 1 146Iran 0 1 2 102 0 0 0 0 0 0 105Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1Iceland 0 144 157 191 150 92 220 240 180 233 1 507ltaly 49 334 335 406 580 616 1 175 1 736 2 177 3 001 10 403Kenya 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 40 31 1 76Kuwait 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 2 0 52Lebanon 0 1 176 67 1 0 0 2 55 42 344Libia 0 22 42 45 7 1 2 0 1 0 120Malaysia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1Malta 0 0 67 43 10 40 46 11 22 20 259Motokov 22 29 26 38 55 20 32 20 0 0 199Mozambique 0 79 31 10 7 20 32 20 0 0 199Nigeria 0 2 0 0 0 0 14 15 0 0 31New Caledonia 0 0 0 0 0 9 18 0 0 0 27Pakistan 0 16 1 938 50 8 20 1 0 0 0 2 033Panama 0 0 0 55 30 0 0 0 0 0 85Peru 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1Portugal 53 75 75 54 75 50 75 110 24 15 606Quatar 0 0 0 62 36 0 0 0 0 0 98New Zealand 0 50 47 21 2 346 156 142 52 140 956New Zealand(notassembled) 0 0 400 940 0 0 300 540 120 0 2 300Salvador 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 10Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 10 20 0 0 0 30Sierra Leone 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4Syria 0 1 1 0 0 54 27 94 53 66 713Thailand 0 21 20 90 180 70 80 0 0 0 461Tunisia 0 15 26 5 5 1 0 1 0 0 8Turkey 0 2 2 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 8Turkey (notassembled) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 2700 3 100Uganda 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1Uruguay 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 10UK 6 1 854 1 624 1 703 362 684 1 294 2 551 8 012 11 248 29 338USA 0 4 0 0 1 3 0 2 0 0 10Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 346 156 142 52 140 956TOTAL 4559 42470 43143 46794 53892 55253 67910 67042 82605 107029 571621Source: Aša, Aznp, P ehled vývozu závodu Mladá Boleslav 1964-1974.

Documents

Valentina Fava Istituto di Storia Economica, Università L ... · 1 The paper is based on my doctoral thesis «Taylorismo e Socialismo. Organizzazione del lavoro e della produzione