The Vertical Dimension of Social Relations and Accurate ... · The Vertical Dimension of Social Relations and Accurate Interpersonal Perception: A Meta-Analysis Judith A. Hall •

REVIEW PAPER

The Vertical Dimension of Social Relations and AccurateInterpersonal Perception: A Meta-Analysis

Judith A. Hall • Marianne Schmid Mast • Ioana-Maria Latu

Published online: 24 October 2014� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Abstract There is little consensus regarding how verticality (social power, dominance,

and status) is related to accurate interpersonal perception. The relation could be either

positive or negative, and there could be many causal processes at play. The present article

discusses the theoretical possibilities and presents a meta-analysis of this question. In

studies using a standard test of interpersonal accuracy, higher socioeconomic status (SES)

predicted higher accuracy defined as accurate inference about the meanings of cues; also,

higher experimentally manipulated vertical position predicted higher accuracy defined as

accurate recall of others’ words. In addition, although personality dominance did not

predict accurate inference overall, the type of personality dominance did, such that

empathic/responsible dominance had a positive relation and egoistic/aggressive dominance

had a negative relation to accuracy. In studies involving live interaction, higher experi-

mentally manipulated vertical position produced lower accuracy defined as accurate

inference about cues; however, methodological problems place this result in doubt.

Keywords Verticality � Power � Dominance � SES � Accuracy of interpersonal

perception � Emotion recognition � Recall

Introduction

For decades, researchers and theorists have asked whether social power, status, and

dominance—here called the ‘‘vertical dimension’’ to capture a variety of specific

J. A. Hall (&)Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USAe-mail: [email protected]

M. Schmid MastDepartment of Organizational Behavior, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerlande-mail: [email protected]

I.-M. LatuDepartment of Psychology, Rutgers University, Camden, USAe-mail: [email protected]

123

J Nonverbal Behav (2015) 39:131–163DOI 10.1007/s10919-014-0205-1

definitions (Hall et al. 2005)—are correlated with accuracy in perceiving other people. Yet,

a consensus has not been reached either empirically or theoretically.

Interpersonal accuracy has many documented correlates. For example, interpersonally

accurate salespeople are more successful (Byron et al. 2007), interpersonally accurate

doctors have more satisfied patients and patients who are more likely to keep their

appointments (DiMatteo et al. 1979, 1986), and interpersonally accurate negotiators pro-

duce more value in their negotiations (Elfenbein et al. 2007). Accurate interpersonal

perception correlates with relationship quality, psychological adjustment, and favorable

workplace outcomes (Hall et al. 2009a).

The intersection of the vertical dimension and interpersonal accuracy is the topic of the

present review. We focus on the question of how a perceiver’s own vertical position, defined

in multiple ways, is correlated with that person’s accuracy in forming judgments of other

people and in recalling their behavior or attributes. Understanding whether people high or

low in verticality are more or less accurate in perceiving others—and if so, how and why—

could have great practical significance. If it were shown, for example, that people become

less and less accurate in judging the people around them as they move up the ranks in an

organization, this could have important consequences. Or, if people lower in socioeconomic

status (SES) are less accurate perceivers of other people, this could have consequences in

terms of their chances for upward mobility. Furthermore, there are many possible causal

paths that need to be considered and tested, as well as many possible moderators.

Despite the importance of these questions, research has thus far produced inconsistent

results. These may stem from different ways of understanding verticality and the wide

variety of methodologies used. In the present article, the relation of the vertical dimension

to interpersonal accuracy is addressed in terms of how verticality is operationally defined

and how accuracy is measured. The only previous meta-analysis on this topic was not

comprehensive and is no longer up to date (Hall et al. 1997).

As prologue to the meta-analysis, we review basic definitions and theoretical questions.

This conceptual discussion extends well beyond what the meta-analysis can demonstrate,

yet it is important for establishing a theoretical framework within which the empirical

literature can be considered.

The Multifaceted Nature of the Verticality Construct

Common operational definitions of verticality include hierarchical role, personality dom-

inance, SES, and expertise (Guinote and Vescio 2010; Hall et al. 2005). It can be defined as

having or striving for control over others or having access to more resources explicitly or

by implication (Keltner et al. 2003). It also encompasses structural power, status, and

dominance. Structural power describes hierarchical differences in functions or positions

(Ellyson and Dovidio 1985). Status is considered to be real or implied power derived from

membership in a specific social group (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius et al. 2004) or the

respect awarded by group members to a specific individual. Dominance can reflect both an

enduring trait of personality (Ellyson and Dovidio 1985) indicating the extent to which a

person desires to control others (Hall et al. 2005) or a more transient behavior (Schmid

Mast 2010).

In the present literature, four definitions of verticality were investigated in enough

studies for a meaningful analysis: vertical positions already attained by participants at the

time their accuracy was assessed (such as real-life hierarchical rank), the dominance of

their personalities, their SES, and their verticality as experimentally manipulated in the

laboratory.

132 J Nonverbal Behav (2015) 39:131–163

123

Inferential Versus Recall Accuracy

There are two main ways of defining accuracy of interpersonal perception and both are

included in the present analyses. The first and most common is making accurate inferences

about other people’s states (such as emotions), traits, attitudes, or personal attributes as

conveyed through their nonverbal cues or their combined nonverbal and verbal cues. The

second is accurately noticing and/or recalling others’ behavior (including their words) or

their attributes, such as appearance (Bernieri 2001). This kind of accuracy holds a minor

place in the overall field of interpersonal accuracy measurement (Hall et al. 2006a) but not

such a minor place in research on verticality and accuracy. Noticing and recalling infor-

mation about another person may be a precursor to accurate inference about that person’s

states or traits, but it is not synonymous with it. Accurate interpersonal recall may serve

important functions in daily life that are both instrumental (because getting tasks

accomplished may be facilitated if people remember what others have said and done) and

socioemotional (because remembering things about others may be a way to show regard

for them).

Theoretical Issues

The first question, of course, is whether there is any relation between verticality and

interpersonal accuracy. If there is a relation, many theoretical issues emerge, which we

discuss in this section.

Are People High in Verticality More Accurate than Those Who Are Low, or Is it

the Reverse?

Early on, Thomas et al. (1972) and Henley (1977) argued that subordinate status is

associated with more accurate interpersonal perception because being accurate has adap-

tive value in coping with a low vertical position. Interpersonal accuracy would be adaptive

for such people because their welfare may depend on discerning the intentions, moods,

desires, and attitudes of those with higher vertical position. People with low vertical

position may use the knowledge they acquire in this manner to predict the behavior of

higher others and thereby adjust their own behavior.1 Arguments for why low vertical

position might be associated with high accuracy have been made by Keltner et al. (2003),

Fiske (1993), LaFrance and Henley (1997), Kraus et al. (2012), and Magee and Smith

(2013), among others.

The opposite possibility, that high vertical position is associated with greater inter-

personal accuracy, has long been voiced by researchers in the leadership field (Riggio

2001; Walter et al. 2012). To the extent that leaders are selected for their skills and

deselected if they fail to demonstrate them, the general picture should be one in which

people with high positions in organizations are more accurate than those lower down. In

organizational psychology, increased interpersonal accuracy is considered one of the skills

required for good leadership (Mumford et al. 2007). As Lord and Hall put it, ‘‘a critical

quality in leaders may be their sensitivity to the emotions of others’’ (2005, p. 606).

Furthermore, empirical studies repeatedly show positive correlations between interpersonal

1 Henley (1977) tied this hypothesis to the established finding that women (considered to be low power)score higher on most interpersonal accuracy tests than men (considered to be high power) [for summaries ofthese gender differences see Hall (1984), or Hall and Gunnery (2013)].

J Nonverbal Behav (2015) 39:131–163 133

123

accuracy and measures of leadership quality. For instance, the ability to assess others’

emotions correctly was a significant predictor of transformational leadership behavior, a

leadership style that is associated with positive outcomes (Rubin et al. 2005). Similarly,

female managers who were better at recognizing facial emotions had more satisfied sub-

ordinates (Byron 2007); supervisors who had more such skill received higher employee

ratings of effectiveness (Kerr et al. 2006); and executives who had more such skill received

higher ratings on building effective working relationships from their superiors (Rosete and

Ciarrochi 2005). Also, in a laboratory setting, participants in a leader role who were better

at correctly assessing others’ thoughts and feelings had more satisfied subordinates

(Schmid Mast et al. 2012). With this kind of evidence connecting high interpersonal

accuracy to good leadership, it is unlikely that the prevailing trend would be for people

lower in the hierarchy to be more interpersonally accurate than those higher up, although

specific circumstances could probably be found in which this would be the case.

There are good reasons why people high in verticality might need to have superior

interpersonal accuracy (Hall and Halberstadt 1997; Hall et al. 1997; Schmid Mast et al.

2009). Often, people with power and responsibility—military officers, teachers, parents,

religious leaders, bosses, people who are influential in their social group—have a strong

need to be astute judges of the states and traits of the people around them, in order to

advance or maintain their position and to further the collective goals of the group. Inter-

personal accuracy in people with higher verticality may help them to achieve important

goals such as deciding whom to trust and promote, averting confusion and demoralization,

and earning the respect and support of others. Other authors who argue that people with

higher vertical position could be more accurate than lower people include Overbeck and

Park (2001, 2006) as well as some who suggest this same relation from the perspective of

the lower person, who may suffer cognitive and motivational deficits when judging others

(Lord and Saenz 1985).

Is it a Causal Relation at All?

If verticality and accuracy are correlated with each other, either positively or negatively,

they may or may not be causally related. A non-causal relation is a real possibility in

studies without experimental assignment to vertical roles or mindsets. To illustrate

hypothetically, if managers in a supermarket are more accurate than those who stock the

shelves, the relation could be due to general intelligence or extraversion insofar as such

qualities might underlie both the attainment of high position and the development of skill

in interpersonal perception (Hall et al. 2009a; Murphy and Hall 2011).

What Causes What?

If there is indeed a causal connection between verticality and accuracy, either positive or

negative, which way does the causal arrow point? Verticality could influence accuracy, or

accuracy could influence verticality. In social psychology, most authors talk of verticality

as a determinant of accuracy. However, in management and business it is often assumed

that good communication skills contribute to the attainment and maintenance of high

position. Referring to accuracy in perceiving the structure of informal networks within an

organization, Casciaro said, ‘‘Perceiver accuracy … is an important source of power.

Individuals who perceive accurately the structure of advice relations in their work envi-

ronment are more capable of getting what they want’’ (1998, p. 332). Scherer and Scherer

worked from the stated assumption that ‘‘greater emotion recognition skills further


123

advancement on the career ladder’’ (2011, p. 323). Because in many domains, not just

management and business, power is conferred by other people, good communication skills

could make the difference in promotions, recommendations, votes, reputation, and all the

other ways in which other people determine a person’s social position. Conversely,

interpersonal obtuseness could cause one to stagnate in one’s rank or social standing, or

even to slip, lowering the person’s position and possibly even impacting a more distal

variable such as SES.

Johnson and Bechler (1998) performed a study of ‘‘listening skills’’ as a predictor of

emergent leadership in initially leaderless groups. This study was not included in the meta-

analysis because the operational definition of listening skills did not fit the inclusion

criteria (see ‘‘Method’’). However, the study did measure group members’ and neutral

observers’ ratings of interest and attention to others in the group, which is conceptually

akin to accuracy of interpersonal perception. Johnson and Bechler (1998) found that lis-

tening skills positively and strongly predicted emergent leadership as measured by group

members and neutral observers. Thus, this study supports the argument that interpersonal

accuracy can lead to increases in social position.

What Is the Locus of the Effect?

Here, the question is whose accuracy is influenced by his/her vertical position, the higher

person’s, the lower person’s, or both. If high individuals are more accurate than low

individuals, this might come about in different ways. High verticality might enhance one’s

accuracy while low verticality might either hamper or have no impact on one’s accuracy.

Likewise, high verticality might not affect one’s accuracy while low verticality reduces

one’s accuracy. Analogous possibilities would pertain if high individuals are less accurate

than low individuals. Unfortunately most studies do not allow an evaluation of this

question.

Methodologies for Studying Verticality and Their Implications

As stated earlier, the verticality construct has been operationalized in four main ways in

this literature: (1) pre-existing vertical position (e.g., rank in an organization), (2) per-

sonality dominance (e.g., on a self-report scale), (3) SES (e.g., education, income, or

occupational status), and (4) experimentally manipulated power (e.g., roles assigned in a

laboratory experiment).2 Within these, there are variations, for example experimental

manipulations include both creating temporary vertical roles and priming the verticality

2 A small number of studies did not fit these categories and were not included in the meta-analyticsummaries. Their verticality definitions were self-rating of dominance in one’s job, observer ratings ofdominance during an interaction, influence that emerged in a group interaction according to peer or observerreports (emergent leadership), and self-reported power within one’s family. Another study was not includedbecause though the power definition fitted our categories (personality dominance), it was the only per-sonality study using recall as the accuracy measure. The effects for these left-out studies were small andinconsistent, with only two being significant but both showing that higher verticality was associated withgreater interpersonal accuracy. In one, female medical students who scored higher on judging affective cueswere rated by observers as more dominant when interacting with a standardized patient (Hall et al. 2009c).In the other, undergraduate business students who scored higher on judging affective cues were more likelyto emerge as leaders within task groups to which they were assigned (Walter et al. 2012). Finally, althoughwe initially conceptualized ‘‘status’’ as a broader topic than just SES, no studies using a broader definition(such as others’ respect) emerged in the literature search.


123

concept. The four main categories of verticality might involve different causal

mechanisms.

Experimental manipulations have several features that may impact results. A manipu-

lation of vertical position may invoke in participants mainly stereotypes of how higher and

lower power people behave, and therefore their behavior may not correspond to the

behavior of people who ‘‘really’’ have an asymmetric relation to one another. Moreover,

manipulations may be weak because of ethical constraints or the lack of sufficient time to

develop convincing roles for participants. Also, such manipulations are typically imposed

on undergraduates who know they actually have equivalent power or status, have little at

stake, and have limited actual experience in high positions. Often in such experiments,

participants know that their roles are randomly assigned, which would likely diminish their

impact.

Another important point is that experimental manipulations of verticality allow as

potentially causal factors only the cognitive, motivational, or emotional states that can be

influenced by the experimental manipulation. This is important to keep in mind because, as

we explore further in the Discussion, it is not clear what kinds of systematic influence such

states have on accurate interpersonal perception. And even if such states do mediate a

verticality-accuracy process in experiments, those processes may be very different from the

processes that underlie a verticality-accuracy correlation in a more real-world situation.

Also, even among experimental manipulations, different manipulations may trigger

different mediating mechanisms. For example, if priming the verticality concept (for

example, by being asked to remember a situation in which one felt powerful or in charge of

others) influences accuracy, it is likely through a cognitive (maybe also more automatic)

route, whereas if being assigned to a higher or lower vertical role influences accuracy, the

mediating mechanism may be more emotional or motivational (maybe also more delib-

erate). Therefore, experimental manipulations produce insights only into very proximal

influences on accuracy and may rest on heterogeneous causal processes.

Other definitions of verticality may also trigger different causal processes in relation to

accuracy. Personality dominance may tell more about the desire for interpersonal control,

or one’s self-concept, than about attained or actual verticality. And, because individual

differences are precisely what are ruled out of causal influence when experimental

manipulations are used, whatever processes underlie correlations between personality

dominance and accuracy may be very different from the processes involved in experi-

mental settings. Pre-existing vertical position is similar to personality dominance in being a

person-level variable, yet different in that the person’s vertical position actually exists

(such as between people who differ in organizational rank) as opposed to possibly being

just yearned for or claimed. SES, too, is an individual difference that may have a very

different array of causal paths to (or from) accuracy.

If any of the non-experimental definitions of verticality listed above has a causal impact

on accuracy, that impact could also be based on either distal or proximal factors. Distal

factors would include prior experience and learning, such that people high or low on that

definition (e.g., personality dominance, pre-existing verticality, SES) may perform well or

poorly on the accuracy tasks because of skills they attained or failed to attain as a result of

their vertical position. Proximal factors, in contrast, would be responsible for a verticality-

accuracy relation if the setting triggers different cognitive, motivational, or emotional

states in people who are high versus low in verticality and it is these states that determine

accuracy. As a hypothetical example of this, a person high or low in SES may enter the

research setting with accuracy skills that are no better or worse than anyone else’s, but if

SES is made salient this could influence performance on an accuracy task through


123

psychological processes in the moment (e.g., motivation to accurately assess the other

person, distraction, or changes in momentary self-confidence or anxiety).

In sum, verticality is so diverse a construct that one should probably not posit a common

causal path or common mediators.

Accuracy Paradigms

The testing paradigm and the in vivo or person-to-person paradigm are analyzed sepa-

rately in the present meta-analysis. In the testing paradigm, the researcher administers an

accuracy test consisting of a standard set of stimuli (such as video clips of target

persons’ behavior) for which there is an accepted criterion for scoring accuracy. For

example, the test-taker may be asked to judge emotions from photographs of facial

expressions (an inference study) or to remember what a person in a video did or said (a

recall study).

The in vivo paradigm involves measuring accuracy between people who have engaged

in live interaction during or after which one or both people make judgments about the

other. For example, a person low in SES might interact with a person high in SES and each

may judge the other’s emotions. In such studies, the criterion is typically self-ratings made

by the partner-target, such as how they were feeling during the interaction. In the in vivo

paradigm, accuracy is typically defined as accurate inferences, but recall of the partner-

target’s words or other details can also be measured in the in vivo paradigm. Mostly, the

accuracy assessment is made during or immediately following the interaction, but some-

times it is made later, based on memory or inference about the other person based on

interactions that occurred at an earlier point in time.

There is no question that the in vivo paradigm captures better than does the testing

paradigm how interpersonal perception occurs in daily life: one person judges another

based on their interaction. Does she like me? Is she embarrassed? How much did she

smile? What did he say? This kind of interpersonal accuracy is not only real-life, but it is

personally relevant and motivating in ways that watching recorded stimuli is not. But

alongside these advantages, there are also problems with the in vivo method. One is simply

practical; it is a more labor-intensive method because it involves gathering data from two

people, not just one; and the criteria for scoring accuracy of judgment must be gathered

individually for each partner-target (Letzring 2008). In the testing paradigm, in contrast,

group administration is possible and the criteria need to be gathered only once, during test

development. Likely for these reasons, fewer studies on verticality and accuracy have used

the in vivo method compared to the testing method.

But there is a second challenge in doing in vivo studies, one with important impli-

cations for understanding results of research. It is self-evident that accurate perception of

another person is determined in part by how clear and interpretable the target person’s

cues are. If your partner in an interaction never shows his/her feelings (attitudes,

opinions, etc.), you cannot judge them accurately. Conversely, you are likely to be quite

accurate if the partner is an open book. Because of this, inferential accuracy in a dyadic

interaction is confounded between the perceiver’s perceptivity and the partner-target’s

expressive clarity, as has long been acknowledged (Alkire et al. 1968; Noller 1980;

Snodgrass et al. 1998).

When dyad partners differ in no systematic ways this confounding is a source of random

error. However, when dyad partners differ in vertical position, the confounding becomes a

potential source of systematic error that could dramatically influence conclusions about


123

whether the higher or lower vertical person is the more accurate perceiver. This is because

research has found systematic differences in the expressivity of people higher and lower in

verticality. People lower in situationally defined verticality or lower in personality domi-

nance have been found to be less variable in their behavior, less open about their views,

less expressive, less good at conveying emotions through nonverbal cues, and generally

more behaviorally inhibited [see reviews in Hall et al. (2006c) and in Russell and Fiske

(2010)]. Or, in one study, the opposite was found: the higher vertical person in the dyad

was less clear as a communicator than the lower power person (Alkire et al. 1968). Because

the partner’s expression may thus vary with his/her own vertical position, strong or weak

judgment accuracy in the perceiving member of the dyad should not be attributed—or at

least not without empirical justification—to the perceiving member’s vertical position.

Instead, accuracy could be due to the partner’s providing systematically good or poor

information as the basis for judgment (Funder 1995).

Separating the expressive clarity of the partner-target from the perceptivity of the

perceiver is possible and is typically done by showing the videotape of the partner-targets

to new, naıve viewers who make the same accuracy judgments that the original perceivers

did. Their accuracy is then considered the operational definition of the expressive clarity of

the partner-targets. By comparing the new viewers’ accuracy with the original perceivers’

accuracy (or, alternatively, by controlling for the new viewers’ accuracy while correlating

the original perceivers’ accuracy with other variables, such as power), one can reach valid

conclusions about perceiver accuracy [see Alkire et al. (1968), Hall et al. (2006c), and

Noller (1980), for demonstrations of this procedure]. In a given study, the expressive

clarity of partner-targets could account for all, some, or none of the variance in the original

perceivers’ accuracy.

Overview of Meta-Analysis

Different segments of the literature are analyzed separately due to important methodo-

logical differences. These include the way interpersonal accuracy was measured and how

the verticality construct was defined. Potential moderators were also examined.

Method

Literature Search

In addition to searching bibliographies and our own reprint files, we conducted searches on

PsycINFO that crossed power-related terms with accuracy-related terms. The power-

related terms included power, dominance, assertive, status, social class, SES, hierar*,

leader*, subordinat*, and boss. The accuracy-related terms included accuracy, emotion

recognition, decoding, nonverbal skill, nonverbal sensitivity, Profile of Nonverbal Sensi-

tivity, PONS, DANVA, Interpersonal Perception Task, personality judgment, social per-

ception, lie detection, role taking, and perspective taking. Also, in Sociological Abstracts

the terms power and dominance were crossed with accuracy. Finally, individual emails

were sent to selected researchers whom we thought might have published or unpublished

results to donate, and we broadcast an appeal on the listserv of the Society for Personality

and Social Psychology.


123

Inclusion Criteria

Study and Source Characteristics

The following criteria were used to determine inclusion of a study in the meta-analysis.

Participant criteria were: (1) age 13 and older,3 (2) sample size at least 10, and (3) no

special populations (clinically diagnosed, learning disabled, etc.). The sources could be: (1)

unpublished data solicited through the Society for Personality and Social Psychology

listserv and through personal contacts, as well as our own unpublished studies, (2) dis-

sertations, obtained from ProQuest, (3) supplemental unpublished results from published

articles, provided on request by the articles’ authors (these were categorized as published in

the database), and (4) English-language published articles or books.

Accuracy had to be scored using an independent criterion against which perceivers’

judgments were compared. Studies in which perceivers drew inferences about the mean-

ings of behavior are called inference studies, and studies in which perceivers had to

remember something about the target(s) are called recall studies.

Operational Definitions of Verticality

The definitions could include: (1) pre-existing vertical position (e.g., rank in a hierarchy),

(2) personality dominance, (3) SES (e.g., own or parents’ education, score on a social class

index), and (4) experimental manipulations (e.g., assigned higher and lower vertical roles,

power concept priming).

Excluded as operational definitions of power were: (1) gender, race, and age per se, (2)

gender-role variables (e.g., division of labor in marriage, femininity and masculinity,

feminist values), (3) peer popularity (sociometric status),4 (4) trait locus of control, because

it is not an indicator of social power even though it does connote a personal sense of

agency [see Hall et al. (2009c), for a meta-analysis showing that internal locus of control is

a positive correlate of interpersonal accuracy], (5) power-related social attitudes such as

ethnic prejudice, out-group derogation, or social dominance orientation, (6) experimental

manipulations that were not about vertical positions per se, but rather were manipulations

intended to mimic cognitive/emotional processes hypothesized to be associated with

vertical positions (e.g., global–local processing, perspective taking, motivation to be

accurate, compassion, emotional state, ingratiation, cognitive load).

Accuracy Task

Because we defined accuracy in terms of perceiving other people’s cues, important

inclusion criteria were that perceivers had to see and/or hear people, live or recorded, who

could be either real participants, confederates, or avatars; perceivers could also read

3 A priori, we did not include studies of young children because it was not clear how directly applicable theverticality construct is to that age group. In fact, it was a moot point because there were few if any suchstudies.4 Although it is true that high sociometric status (i.e., popularity, peer regard) has implications for powerand social influence in the peer group, the two are not synonymous. Popularity furthermore merges withother constructs that become increasingly tangential to the verticality construct, such as physical attrac-tiveness, personality traits (e.g., extraversion), and general social competence. Previous research has foundthat accurate interpersonal perception is positively correlated with popularity and general social competence(Hall et al. 2009c).


123

statements believed to be from real people, and they could respond about target persons

who were not immediately present but whom they already knew (such as coworkers).

However, studies in which perceivers’ judgments were about people abstractly (e.g.,

members of a social or professional group who were not known to the participants as

individuals) were not included.

Definition of a Study

The definition of a ‘‘study’’ was an independent sample of participants. If effect sizes were

available for subgroups within the total sample (e.g., men vs. women, or several irrelevant,

that is, ostensibly not power related, experimental conditions), then these subgroups were

entered as separate studies.

Coding of Study Characteristics

Study attributes were coded first by one person (JAH) after which a second person (IML)

checked every code. Discrepancies, which were few, were resolved by discussion. The

study attribute variables are shown in the Appendix. All were examined as possible

moderator variables when there were enough studies to merit doing so and when it made

sense given the distribution of moderator values. In these analyses, some of the categories

shown in the Appendix were dropped or merged with other categories due to small

numbers of studies. See Table 1 for frequencies.

Coding of Effect Sizes and Analysis

Coding of Effect Sizes

The relation of verticality to accuracy was expressed as the Pearson correlation (r), signed

such that positive correlations meant that higher vertical people were more accurate than

lower vertical people, and negative correlations meant the reverse. One person (JAH)

extracted all of the effect sizes and a second person (MSM) checked every effect size

against the original studies. Discrepancies, which were few, were resolved by discussion.

All effect sizes (r) representing the relation of verticality to accuracy were transformed to

Fisher’s z before analysis, and converted back to the r metric for presentation.

When the Pearson correlation was not directly reported, it was calculated using standard

formulas for converting different test statistics to r (e.g., 1-df F ratios, t tests, means and

SDs). In a small minority of studies the verticality-accuracy correlation could not be

calculated. These studies were not included in the database. However, when it was nec-

essary to average several non-independent effects from the same study and some of these

had known effect sizes and others were unknown, the unknown ones were imputed to be

zero and then averaged with the known effect sizes.

Analysis Models

Random-effects and fixed-effects models were both employed and are indicated in

Tables 2 and 3. Random-effects models offer generalization to new studies testing the

same hypothesis but possibly having different study designs, whereas fixed-effects models

offer generalization only to the same study designs with new participants from the same


123

Table 1 Study characteristics

Variable Testing paradigm (67 studies) In vivo paradigm (25 studies)

Published 48/67 (72 %) 21/25 (84 %)

Year (Md, range) 1998 (1954–2011) 2006 (1968–2012)

Female first author 34/67 (51 %) 18/25 (72 %)

Sample size (M, range) 231 (10–7,320) 107 (20–424)

Age in years (M, range) 24 (19–42) 26 (19–42)

Age category

13–17 5/67 (8 %) 0/25

18–22 33/67 (49 %) 19/25 (76 %)

23–27 2/67 (3 %) 1/25 (4 %)

28–32 2/67 (3 %) 0/25

33–37 1/67 (2 %) 0/25

Mix of age groups 24/67 (36 %) 5/25 (20 %)

Percent male (M, range) 48 (0–100) 39 (0–100)

Location

Laboratory 44/67 (66 %) 19/25 (76 %)

Field 23/67 (34 %) 6/25 (24 %)

Sample type

College/university 44/67 (66 %) 18/25 (72 %)

Employees 10/67 (15 %) 3/25 (12 %)

Community 10/67 (15 %) 3/25 (12 %)

Mix of types 3/67 (4 %) 1/25 (4 %)

Type of design/analysis

Experimental design 23/67 (34 %) 13/25 (52 %)

Known groups comparison 6/67 (9 %) 3/25 (12 %)

Correlational 38/67 (57 %) 9/25 (36 %)

Type of group comparison

Within-dyads 3/29 (10 %) 9/16 (56 %)

Between-groups 26/29 (90 %) 7/16 (44 %)

Accuracy test (if named)

PONS 22/55 (40 %) na

DANVA 8/55 (14 %) na

Other or combination 25/55 (44 %) na

Content of accuracy test

Affect or emotion 50/55 (91 %) 9/20 (45 %)

Thoughts/feelings of targets 4/55 (7 %) 4/20 (20 %)

Other 1/55 (2 %) 7/20 (35 %)

Content of recall

Words 11/12 (92 %) 0/5

Nonverbal behavior or appearance 0/12 5/5 (100 %)

Other 1/12 (8 %) 0/5

Percentages may not add to 100 % due to rounding. Some low-frequency categories were combined. PONSProfile of Nonverbal Sensitivity, DANVA Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy, na not applicable.Table includes the two positive outlier studies that were removed from all further analyses


123

population (Lipsey and Wilson 2001; Raudenbush 2009). Fixed-effects models gain sta-

tistical precision by incorporating information about sample sizes into the calculations but

not assuming between-studies variance (i.e., by treating variation among effect sizes as due

only to participant-level sampling error) and are typically more powerful, yielding stronger

effects in terms of significance tests. Fixed-effects results lack generality, however.

Because of the variety of methodologies used, it was clear that study-level variance

should be given weight as in the random-effects approach. Also, there was great heter-

ogeneity among the effect sizes (as discussed below), which argues against the fixed-

effects premise that the variance among studies represents only sampling variation from a

common population effect size. For these reasons, after calculating the basic results using

both random and fixed approaches for comparison purposes (Tables 2, 3), analysis of

moderator variables was conducted using a fully random-effects approach (Rosenthal

1995).

Most random-effects analyses were conducted using the IBM SPSS statistical package,

Version 20. Fixed-effects procedures were done using the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis

software (Borenstein et al. 2005). These included mean correlations weighted by the

inverse of their variance (which amounts to weighting by sample size, or more exactly

N - 3), test of the mean effect against zero, fixed-effects confidence intervals, heteroge-

neity statistic (to test whether the distribution of effect sizes is more variable than one

would expect based on participant sampling variation alone), and publication bias analysis

(file-drawer analysis; Rosenthal 1979).

Organization of Analyses

Analyses were conducted according to the following subgroupings, based on information

captured in the coded variables listed above. The testing paradigm and the in vivo para-

digm were analyzed separately. Within each of those paradigms, five meta-analyses were

conducted: the first four were for pre-existing vertical position, personality dominance,

SES, and experimental manipulations of verticality in relation to accurate interpersonal

inference, and the fifth was for experimental manipulations of verticality in relation to

accurate interpersonal recall (this was the only definition of verticality we could use with

recall studies).

Results

Verticality and Accuracy in the Testing Paradigm

Study Characteristics

Thirty-four sources reported 67 independent studies totaling 15,505 participants. Table 1

(left-hand column) presents the descriptive data for the coded study characteristics. In

overview, the studies dated from 1954 to 2011 and most were published. Most of the coded

characteristics showed a reasonable distribution but some were notably skewed; nearly all

of the inference studies were about judging emotions, while nearly all of the recall studies

were about recalling targets’ words. Some studies presented results for more than one

verticality definition; these are separately entered into their respective definitions in

Table 2, explaining why the total of studies across the power definitions exceeds 67.


123

Table

2Testingparadigm:correlationsbetweenverticality

andinterpersonal

accuracy

Typeofstudy

kRandom-effectsresults

Fixed-effects

results

Md

MSD

Range

tvs.0

M95%

CI

ZHeterogeneity

Filedrawer

k

Pre-existingverticalposition—inference

10

.04

.04

.18

-.23to

.34

.67

-.01

-.04to

.02

-.43

20.17*

na

Personalitydominance—

inference

24

.00

.04

.21

-.29to

.51

.98

.00

-.03to

.03

.21

39.88*

na

SES—inference

21

.07

.07

.15

-.16to

.40

2.17*

.02

-.00to

.04

1.95?

39.68**

26

Experim

entalmanipulation—

inference

11

-.07

-.01

.27

-.38to

.27

-.16

-.03

-.09to

.04

-.77

57.70***

na

Experim


recall

12

.20

.18

.33

-.40to

.61

1.97?

.19

.12to

.27

4.86***

49.59***

52

Positivevalues

ofrindicategreater

accuracy

byhigher

verticalparticipants,negativevalues

indicatethereverse.SESsocioeconomic

status,

nanotapplicable.Tests

of

significance

andthefile

drawer

analysisaretwo-tail

?p\

.10,*p\

.05,**p\

.01,***p\

.001


123

Table

3In

vivoparadigm:correlationsbetweenverticality

andinterpersonal

accuracy

Typeofstudy

kRandom-effectsresults

Fixed-effects

results

Md

MSD

Range

tvs.0

M95%

CI

ZHeterogeneity

Filedrawer

k

Pre-existingverticalposition—inference

4-.04

-.11

.27

-.46to

.14

-.80

-.04

-.13to

.06

-.81

5.80

na

Personalitydominance—

inference

5-.02

-.00

.17

-.23to

.19

-.03

-.05

-.12to

.03

-1.24

9.14?

na

SES—inference

2-.12

-.12

.11

-.20to

-.05

-1.67

-.14

-.28to

.01

-1.86?

.95

na

Experim


inference

8-.07

-.15

.26

-.44to

.27

-1.61

-.14

-.24to

-.03

-2.53**

18.38**

5

Experim


recall

5.01

-.04

.08

-.14to

.04

-.97

-.03

-.14to

.08

-.55

1.66

na

Positivevalues

ofrindicategreater

accuracy

byhigher

verticalparticipants,negativevalues

indicatethereverse.SESsocioeconomic

status,

nanotapplicable.Tests

of

significance

andthefile

drawer

analysisaretwo-tail

?p\

.10,**p\

.01


123

Pre-existing Vertical Position and Accurate Interpersonal Inference

Table 2, first row, shows results for pre-existing vertical position in relation to accurate

inference, based on both random- and fixed-effects models. For these 10 studies, which

were all based on rank in an organization, there was no evidence of an overall significant

effect although the effects were significantly heterogeneous. The two individual studies

with significant results found higher ranking individuals within organizations to be more

accurate than lower ranking individuals within the same organizations (Rosenthal et al.

1979; Schmid Mast and Darioly 2014). We calculated moderator analyses for all the

aforementioned moderator variables but none achieved statistical significance.

Personality Dominance and Accurate Interpersonal Inference

For personality dominance, there was one outlier effect size (r = .84, which was much

larger than the next largest effect size of .51; see Table 2, second row). In the outlier study,

in which participants were selected to have extreme high or low scores on the dominance

scale (Kombos and Fournet 1985), those with high dominant personalities had a highly

significant advantage in identifying emotions in facial expressions and gestures compared

to those with low dominant personalities. This outlier was removed from all analyses.

Table 2 shows that for the remaining 24 studies the overall effects were not significantly

different from zero, while significant heterogeneity was present.

Looking at the significance of individual studies, two found significant negative effects

[less dominant people scoring higher on facial and vocal cues of emotions in faces; both in

Moeller et al. (2011)] and one found a significant positive effect (high dominant women

scoring higher on judging facial expressions of emotion than low dominant women;

Schmid Mast et al. 2009, Study 3).

To investigate Schmid Mast et al.’s (2009) hypothesis that the type of personality

dominance is a moderator of the verticality-accuracy relation, we performed an analysis of

the distinction between egoistic/aggressive and empathic/responsible dominance. Three

analyses were done: (1) a matched t test for the four studies in which participants filled in

both types of dominance scales and separate correlations for them were reported, (2) an

independent samples t test for the 19 studies that used dominance scales that were of one or

the other type, and (3) single-sample t tests of each type of correlation against zero, based

on all of the available studies. To do the classification, two of the authors (JAH and IML)

independently inspected the content of the personality scales, independent of the results,

and classified the scales as egoistic/aggressive or empathic/responsible; in the one instance

of disagreement (which applied to three studies that all used the same scale), the remaining

author (MSM) rendered an independent judgment to break the tie.5 Items fitting the ego-

istic/aggressive description used terms such as aggressive, domineering, pushy, getting

one’s way, and seeking power, while items fitting the empathic/responsible description

were more about leadership, willingness to be in the spotlight, and problem solving. One

study, which used only a single item (assertive) was not classified in either category.

The matched t test mean correlations for empathic/responsible dominance and egoistic/

aggressive dominance when both were measured in the same study were .06 and -.13,

respectively, and their difference was marginally significant, t(3) = 2.84, p\ .07. The

independent-samples t test, which did not include those four studies, showed corresponding

5 When the three studies in question were classified as being of the other type of dominance, and the resultsrecalculated, little changed.


123

similar means of .18 and -.07 and their difference was significant, t(17) = 3.42, p\ .01.

Finally, for empathic/responsible dominance, the overall mean correlation of .15 was

significantly above zero, t(14) = 2.97, p = .01. In contrast, for egoistic/aggressive dom-

inance the mean correlation of -.09 was marginally more negative than zero, t(11) =

-1.87, p\ .09. Thus it can be concluded that empathic/responsible dominance was more

positively correlated with accurate interpersonal inference than egoistic/aggressive domi-

nance was. There was no evidence of other moderator effects.

SES and Accurate Interpersonal Inference

Table 2 (third row) shows that the overall effect for the 21 studies relating SES to accurate

interpersonal inference was significantly positive in both the random-effects and fixed-

effects analyses, meaning that higher SES people were more accurate than lower SES

people, and again the effects were significantly heterogeneous. The file-drawer analysis

revealed that the fixed-effects effect would be rendered non-significant by the addition of

26 results with an average effect size of r = .00.

Looking at individual studies that attained statistical significance, one had a significant

negative effect among employees in an organization who were tested on accuracy of

judging facial emotions (Kraus et al. 2010, Study 1), whereas four had significant positive

effects—two that tested teenagers judging vocal emotions or face, body, and vocal cues of

affect (Pfaff 1954; Rosenthal et al. 1979), one that tested college students judging face,

body, and vocal cues of affect (Stokes 1983), and one that tested college students and

community people on judging facial emotions (Alvarez and Fuentes 1994). Again, we

tested whether any of the moderators affected the results and there was no evidence of

moderator effects.

Experimental Manipulation of Verticality and Accurate Interpersonal Inference

Table 2 (fourth row) shows that there was no evidence of an overall verticality effect for

the 11 studies that employed an experimental manipulation in relation to accurate infer-

ence. The average effect sizes were indistinguishable whether based on the five studies of

assigned vertical roles or the six studies that used a verticality priming induction (-.01 and

-.02, respectively). Again, the heterogeneity among effect sizes was significant and other

moderator analyses were uninformative.

Four studies had significant negative effects: two for college students tested on accuracy

of judging facial or vocal emotions after a priming induction consisting of writing about a

powerful or neutral experience in their past (Galinsky et al. 2006) or a powerful or non-

powerful experience in their past (Paulmann 2011); one for college students tested on

accuracy of judging emotions expressed in the eyes after imagining themselves to have

high or low social class (Kraus et al. 2010, Study 3; this study was included in this analysis

rather than in the one for SES because SES was imagined, not actual); and one for college

students who were tested on accuracy of judging facial emotions after being assigned to

vertical roles in the laboratory (Bachmann and Schmid Mast 2010). Three studies had

significant positive effects: one for college students who were tested for accuracy of

judging targets’ thoughts and feelings after being assigned to vertical roles in the labo-

ratory (Schmid Mast et al. 2009, Study 1); one for college students who were tested on this

same kind of accuracy after being primed with verticality-related versus control word

completions (Schmid Mast et al. 2009, Study 2); and one for college students who were


123

tested on accuracy of judging facial emotions after writing about a powerful, neutral, or

powerless experience in their past (Schmid Mast et al. 2009, Study 3).

Experimental Manipulation of Verticality and Interpersonal Recall

The final line of Table 2 gives results for the 12 studies using experimental manipulations

in relation to recall accuracy. Both the random and fixed analyses showed evidence of a

significant effect such that people higher in verticality remembered more about target

persons than those lower in verticality. According to the file drawer analysis, the addition

of 52 studies with effect sizes averaging r = .00 would be required to make the combined

Z non-significant. Again, the heterogeneity among effect sizes was significant.

Looking at individual studies that were significant, one study found a significant neg-

ative effect, in which college students had to remember who it was who made a sexist

remark after being assigned to vertical roles in the laboratory (Barreto et al. 2010), while

four studies found a significant positive effect, all of which asked college students to

remember target persons’ words after being assigned to vertical roles in the laboratory

(Overbeck and Park 2001, Studies 1–3; Saenz and Lord 1989). The random-effects

(unweighted) effect size for just the 10 studies requiring participants to recall targets’

words (written or spoken) was r = .25, indicating that for recall studies this is the method

most likely to show a positive verticality effect. Other moderators were again

uninformative.

Overall Effects

Additional analyses were conducted that combined across some of the aforementioned

subgroupings. Because a few of the inference studies had more than one definition of

verticality, these effects were averaged within studies to maintain independence of

observations. Across all of the inference studies, again leaving out the outlier, the overall

unweighted mean r was .04 (SD = .20), which was not significantly different from zero,

t(53) = 1.54. A t test comparing these inference studies to the recall studies (M r = .18,

see Table 2) was significant, t(64) = 1.96, p = .05. Including the recall studies along with

the inference studies, the grand mean r for all independent studies in the testing paradigm

was .07 (SD = .23), a mean that was greater than zero, t(65) = 2.38, p\ .05, though

small in magnitude.

Within-Study Moderators

Individual studies within the testing paradigm were inspected to see what kinds of mod-

erators might have been identified by the authors of individual studies. Gender of partic-

ipant and/or target was examined as a within-study moderator (as shown by an interaction

of gender and verticality) by the original authors in 14 studies. All of these studies reported

that gender was not a moderator of the verticality effect, consistent with our between-

studies comparisons based on the percentage of male participants in the sample.

A few other within-studies moderators were reported, but these were neither consistent

nor theoretically interesting except for the following: In four studies of recall as a function

of experimentally assigned vertical roles, the tendency for the higher person to be more

accurate was significantly stronger when the information to be recalled was task relevant

(as opposed to task irrelevant; Cook 2002; Overbeck and Park 2001).


123

Verticality and Accuracy in the In Vivo Paradigm

Study Characteristics

Table 1 (right-hand column) presents the basic descriptive data for study characteristics.

The in vivo studies included a total of 2,674 participants and spanned the years 1968–2012.

Compared to the standardized testing studies, they were much more likely to be conducted

in laboratories with college students and the range of content being judged was somewhat

broader than in the standardized testing studies. Also, all of the in vivo recall studies

involved recall of behavior or nonverbal cues, not the target’s words.

Verticality Effects

Table 3 presents the results for the in vivo paradigm. Altogether there were fewer studies

(k = 25) than in the testing paradigm (k = 67), and this hampered the analyses of the

separate verticality definitions. There was one positive outlier effect (r = .65, which was

far larger than any other in vivo result; see Table 3). In that study, sorority members were

much more accurate than pledges to the same sorority in a referential communication task;

this study was removed from all analyses (Alkire et al. 1968). Overall, the mean

unweighted effect size was negative, meaning that people lower in verticality were more

accurate than people higher in verticality (M r = -.08, SD = .20), with the mean being

significantly different from zero, t(23) = -2.09, p\ .05. As the table shows, the most

statistical significance occurred for studies of experimentally manipulated verticality in

relation to inference.

Before taking the evidence in Table 3 at face value, however, one must consider the

expressive clarity confound mentioned earlier. The Table 3 results do not take this into

account. We begin discussion of this issue by observing that there is likely no such

confound in the case of recall accuracy because what is recalled is factual information, not

cues that can be ‘‘sent’’ by a partner with varying degrees of expressive clarity. Therefore,

the communication clarity of the targets should not be an issue in those studies. Table 3

(bottom row) shows that there was no verticality-accuracy relation when the task was to

recall things about the targets.

In contrast, for all of the inference studies there is the possibility that the accuracy of the

perceivers was determined to an unknown extent by how well the partner-target revealed

the attribute to be judged (e.g., his/her emotions). This could occur whether the accuracy

was based on a face-to-face interaction that just occurred, or on a more longstanding

personal acquaintanceship.

For inference studies, three of the studies using experimental manipulation of verticality

went to lengths to measure targets’ expressive clarity and to take account of it when

comparing the accuracy of higher versus lower vertical perceivers. The first was the

positive outlier study (Alkire et al. 1968). Even though its result was not included in the

meta-analysis, the methodological features of the study are very pertinent. In that study,

college sorority members and pledges participated in a dyadic task in which they had to

communicate the shapes of figures to the partner without the partner seeing either the

figures or the communicators (i.e., communication was through the speech channel only).

To measure communication clarity in the sending participant, independent data from new

observers who were in no vertical relation to the communicators listened to the original

communications and performed the same accuracy task that the original perceivers did.

Their average accuracy was therefore an unbiased indicator of the communicators’ clarity.


123

Alkire et al.’s (1968) uncorrected result showed the sorority members to be much more

accurate perceivers than the pledges. However, data from the new observers revealed that

the sorority members were in fact low on communication clarity and the authors concluded

that the pledges scored worse on accuracy than the sorority members because they had

lower quality stimulus material to use for their judgments, not because being a pledge

made them weak perceivers.

This pattern of one person’s expressive clarity impacting the other person’s perception

accuracy was again found by Snodgrass et al. (1998), which was an expanded analysis of

Snodgrass (1992), and also by Hall et al. (2006c). Those studies also showed the video-

tapes of the partners’ expressions to independent observers who made the same judgments

as those made by the original perceivers. In both the Snodgrass (1992) and Hall et al.

(2006c) studies the initial effect showed the person lower in verticality to be more accurate

than the person higher in verticality [although in Snodgrass (1992), this varied with task

characteristics so the combined trend was negative but not significant]. After taking

expressive clarity into account, however, the authors of both studies concluded that the

perceivers’ accuracy was accounted for by the expressive clarity of their partners.

Although expressive clarity was not measured in Snodgrass’s earlier (1985) study, the

same paradigm was used as in Snodgrass (1992) and one can probably assume that

expressive clarity was partly or wholly responsible for the significant negative verticality

effect in that study as well.

Notably, in all three of the studies whose authors concluded that partners’ expressive

clarity accounted for the perceiver verticality effect, the new judges of targets’ expressive

clarity were asked to make exactly the same judgments as the original perceivers had

made, a crucial feature that allows a proper disambiguation of expressive clarity from

perception accuracy. Two other articles reporting on inference accuracy made an attempt

to control for expressive clarity, but their approaches were not optimal because, in both, the

measurement of expressive clarity was not identical to what the original perceivers were

asked to do when making their inferences. Kraus et al.’s (2010, Study 2) measurement of

accuracy in the original perceivers was the averaged difference between the perceiver’s

ratings of the partner on each of 20 emotions and the partner’s self-ratings on the same 20

emotions.6 However, the new observers did not perform the task that the original per-

ceivers did (rating the partner on 20 emotions) but rather rated overall emotional ex-

pressivity. Because the new observers’ impression of the targets’ overall emotional

expressivity cannot be turned into a measure of their accuracy in judging the targets’

specific emotions, this is an imperfect way to control for the expressive clarity of the

partners. Kraus et al. (2010) were commendable, however, in trying to control for partner

expressive clarity. Although the authors reported that controlling for overall expressivity

did not change the obtained verticality difference in accuracy, which was significant in

showing the vertically lower person to be more accurate than the vertically higher person

(defined as SES), their non-optimal method for measuring expressive clarity raises doubt

about that conclusion.

Gonzaga et al. (2008) asked their original perceivers to make emotion ratings of their

partners and collected the partners’ self-ratings on the same set of emotion terms, and they

measured accuracy for each perceiver as the correlation between these two sets of ratings.

To measure expressive clarity they had coders count the frequencies of a list of discrete

nonverbal behaviors (e.g., leg opening, gaze aversion, hair flipping). The authors reported

6 This description is not what was given in the Kraus et al. (2010) article. The correct description wasprovided by personal communication from Kraus (May 9, 2011).


123

that entering the nonverbal behavior coding as a control variable did not change their

overall verticality effects, which were in the direction of greater accuracy by the lower

vertical perceivers. However, it is difficult to see how that particular list of discrete non-

verbal behaviors could tell about the expressive clarity of the targets for showing emotions;

indeed, according to the authors the nonverbal behaviors were not chosen to be germane to

emotional experience, but rather to be relevant to the submission-dominance dimension.

Therefore, although the authors took the appropriate step of trying to control for partner

communication, they controlled for a kind of communication that did not conceptually

match the original accuracy measure.

One can see that drawing conclusions about the in vivo literature is problematic. To

summarize, three studies concluded that partners’ expressive clarity accounted for per-

ceiver verticality effects (Alkire et al. 1968; Hall et al. 2006c; Snodgrass et al. 1998, based

on re-analysis of Snodgrass 1992), and a fourth is strongly implicated because its method

was so similar to Snodgrass (1992) although the expressive clarity analysis was not per-

formed (Snodgrass 1985). Two studies that employed imperfect assessments of expressive

clarity concluded that perceiver verticality effects were not due to partners’ expressive

clarity (Gonzaga et al. 2008; Kraus et al. 2010). The remaining studies did not attempt to

correct for the potential expressive clarity of targets. Therefore the evidence from the

present meta-analysis suggesting that lower vertical perceivers are more accurate than

higher vertical perceivers after live interaction should be viewed with caution. Because of

this difficulty, and also because of the small numbers of studies, it was not considered

worthwhile to examine moderator effects for the in vivo studies.

Discussion

For decades, researchers have suggested that the vertical dimension of social relations is

related to accuracy of interpersonal perception, as cause or as effect. However, the

direction of this relation is not agreed on in theory, and the empirical literature is incon-

sistent. The present article documented what the literature currently shows and made

progress towards identifying the factors accounting for the great variability in studies’

results. The variability is itself one of the main findings: the results were often significantly

heterogeneous.

Testing Paradigm

Results differed according to the definition of verticality and also the method of measuring

accuracy (inference vs. recall). A person’s SES was significantly positively correlated with

more accurate inferences in the testing paradigm. Because this is a correlational result, it is

not possible to know whether it is a direct causal relation or is caused by third variables. If

it is causal, it is not clear what is cause and what is effect. Higher SES may lead to greater

accuracy in interpreting others’ cues because of distal factors such as life experiences

through which they learned the meanings of cues or acquired superior judgment strategies,

or because of factors operative at the time of testing such as higher motivation or self-

confidence. Or, in reverse, possessing superior skill could, over one’s life, advance a

person’s SES. However, this is unlikely in the present database because most studies were

on adolescents or college students for whom SES was a familial rather than individual

attribute.


123

Neither pre-existing vertical position nor personality dominance showed an overall

effect on accurate inference. However, type of personality dominance was a significant

moderator. Dominant personality of a more empathic/responsible type had a positive

relation to accuracy, whereas dominant personality of a more egoistic/aggressive type had

a negative relation. This same distinction likely applies similarly to vertical roles as well,

such that the relation of vertical position to accuracy will vary with how individuals define

their roles along the same dimension, as was indeed the case in the laboratory study of

Schmid Mast et al. (2009, Study 4). In that study, participants imagining themselves to be

high power were induced to have an empathic versus egoistic mindset; those in the

empathic condition had higher accuracy on a test of decoding nonverbal affective cues than

those in the egoistic condition.

Accuracy defined as recall of information about others (in this case, what a target said)

was significantly related to experimental manipulations of verticality. High vertical indi-

viduals might be better at recalling someone’s words because they are more task- and goal-

oriented (Galinsky et al. 2003; Guinote 2010). Consistent with this, a within-study mod-

erator, noted in the Results, found that the advantage of the higher vertical people in

recalling words was much more pronounced for task-relevant than task-irrelevant com-

munications. Task-relevant words may seem more attention-worthy by a person with high

vertical position than would the emotions of another person, which may explain why

experimentally manipulated vertical positions had no impact on accuracy of inferring

target persons’ emotions (which is what the inference studies mainly measured). Perhaps a

different result would be obtained if emotions were made to be task relevant for the persons

in high vertical positions. As shown by DeWall et al. (2011), people high in verticality are

very diligent when tasks seem worth doing and this might enhance their interpersonal

accuracy, although interpersonal accuracy was not measured in that research.

The fact that experimental manipulations of vertical position had a significant impact on

recall but only a negligible effect on accuracy defined as inference is consistent with

previous research on the impact of experimentally induced accuracy motivation on

interpersonal accuracy. Hall et al. (2009b) found evidence that experiments designed to

increase motivation to be accurate in perceiving others showed no impact when the

accuracy task was based wholly or mainly on nonverbal cues, but had a positive effect (i.e.,

increased motivation led to higher accuracy) when the task was wholly or mainly based on

verbal cues, specifically recall of other people’s words or judging thoughts and feelings in

tasks for which words are the main contributor to accuracy (Gesn and Ickes 1999; Hall and

Schmid Mast 2007). Insofar as having a higher vertical position might create a positive

motivation to be accurate, our results are consistent with these earlier findings because

people with experimentally manipulated higher positions were more accurate at recall

(which was about words) but not more accurate at inference (which was mainly about

nonverbal cues).

In Vivo Paradigm

In vivo studies are those in which one person perceives another person in a one-on-one

interaction, either in the laboratory or in more naturalistic settings. Overall, there was a

significant negative relation between vertical positions and accuracy, meaning that low

position people were more accurate than high position people, with the most evident effect

being for experimental manipulations of vertical positions in relation to accurate inter-

personal inference. However, this result has to be treated with caution owing to the pos-

sibility that the perceiver’s accuracy may be accounted for by the expressive clarity of the


123

other person, as explained earlier. This could mean that some perceiver verticality effects

should not be attributed to the perceiver. Strong empirical evidence from three studies that

controlled appropriately for targets’ expressive clarity supports the logic of this argument;

in all three, the authors concluded that verticality effects were due to the targets’ expressive

clarity, not the perceiver’s perceptivity. Because most of the in vivo studies either did not

correct for expressive clarity or did so in a non-optimal way (as described in Results), it is

necessary to conclude that studies using in vivo judgments permit no conclusions with

regard to perceiver vertical position. This is very unfortunate considering that in vivo

accuracy is the more interesting and true-to-life kind of accuracy. If future studies with

good controls for expressive clarity confirm a negative verticality-accuracy effect, it will

set the stage not only for research on the mechanisms involved, but also for efforts to

uncover why studies in the in vivo and testing paradigms show different results.

Heterogeneity and Moderators

Hall et al. (2005) argued that the vertical dimension is more structural than psychological:

if we know someone’s vertical position, by definition we know how high or low that person

is on that particular vertical dimension (the structure), but we do not know a great deal

beyond that. It would be important to know how the person construes his/her vertical

position (e.g., if a manager chooses a punitive, nurturant, or some other leadership style),

and about contextual aspects of that position (e.g., top dog in one’s friendship group

implies different behavior patterns than top dog in a business), as well as the cognitive,

emotional, and motivational states that might be intrinsic to that position, at least in the

given context. Also important to recognize is that many of those states are not the province

of only the vertically higher or lower person. People either high or low in verticality could

be self- or other-focused, confident or anxious, eager to accommodate or stubbornly

uncooperative, striving for power or content with their power level, motivated to be

accurate or not, cheerful or angry, and so on. Because verticality does not necessarily map

onto these states, there is little reason to theorize that vertical position per se—independent

of these construals and states—should have a consistent relation to accuracy. If the states

that impact accuracy are caused by people’s vertical position they would be mediators, but

if they are merely coincident with (i.e., not caused by) vertical position they would be

moderators. In the moderator case, the patterns of relative accuracy would undoubtedly

depend on the particular combinations of moderator variables. For example, the higher

vertical person might be high on a moderator that would make them accurate, while the

lower vertical person is high on a different moderator that would make them accurate too—

meaning there might be no difference in accuracy, but this would have nothing to do with

their relative verticality; or, there might be an accuracy difference but it’s due to one

person’s position on a moderator variable and not due to their relative verticality. A

number of authors have noted that the verticality-accuracy relation is likely to be a highly

moderated one (Galinsky et al. 2006; Hall et al. 2001; Kraus et al. 2010; Russell and Fiske

2010; Schmid Mast et al. 2009; Walter et al. 2012).

A main result of the present meta-analysis was the high degree of heterogeneity among

studies, especially in the testing paradigm. Finding that verticality has inconsistent, even

opposite, relations with behavior is not limited to the interpersonal accuracy domain (see

Guinote 2010, for a summary of contradictory results in the broader social power litera-

ture). However, our analysis of moderators yielded only a modest number of significant

results. It is unfortunate that we could not perform some moderator tests due to the small


123

number of studies that varied according to a given moderator or the too-skewed distri-

bution of moderator values for a given moderator.

Despite the advantages of employing meta-analysis, more studies that examine mod-

erators on a within-study basis would greatly clarify the role of moderators. Such studies

could, for example, compare different operational definitions of verticality, different

accuracy methods or tests, or different psychological states or personality traits in the high

and low vertical people to see if the verticality-accuracy link varies systematically. Walter

et al. (2012) found that emotion recognition skill led to emergent leadership only in

conjunction with high extraversion.

Probably, it is necessary to take into account not only one or two moderators, but many

more and maybe even interactions among moderators, to find the conditions under which

higher verticality is correlated with more or less interpersonal accuracy. As an example,

high verticality might lead to more interpersonal accuracy only when the vertical position

is understood as responsibility for others (prosocial, empathic orientation) and when

interpersonal accuracy is perceived to be relevant for the task solution by the high vertical

person, or relevant to some other goal such as personal advancement or coalition building.

Furthermore, the particular kind of interpersonal accuracy that is measured (inferring

emotions, remembering words, etc.; Guinote 2010) could be relevant in interaction with

these other moderators.

Moreover, a person may possess several degrees and kinds of verticality at the same

time. For example, two bosses of the same rank may differ greatly in how much influence

and control they actually wield over others. Or, a person in a high position may feel

subjectively weak and not powerful (Bugental 2010). This fragile sense of power makes

such a person sensitive to threats and stress. For our purposes, it affects information

processing, such that it interferes with the capacity to engage in cognitively demanding

tasks. Although not explicitly stated by Bugental (2010), this could impair accuracy.

Some researchers have looked at the effect of different verticality concepts with respect

to behavioral outcomes. For instance, Lammers et al. (2008) have investigated the effect of

legitimate and illegitimate power on the approach system and found that in the legitimate

situation, high vertical individuals showed more approach behavior than low vertical

individuals whereas this difference disappeared in the illegitimate condition. In the same

vein, Maner et al. (2007) showed that high power individuals took fewer risks when their

power position was unstable. Although approach behavior and risk taking were measured

and not interpersonal accuracy, these studies suggest the hypothesis that feeling unsure of

one’s vertical position could affect interpersonal accuracy in that these individuals search

for approval by others and thus use interpersonal accuracy as a means to better navigate the

social world and to connect to the people who will approve their high position.

Locus of the Effect

As mentioned in the Introduction, an important question is whose accuracy (the higher or

lower person’s) might be impacted by their vertical positions. Unfortunately, a predomi-

nant methodology was to compare higher individuals to lower individuals without com-

parison to a baseline, neutral, control, or equal vertical position. Just comparing higher to

lower does not answer the question about locus of effect. In one of the few studies that

included a neutral group (together with high and low vertical groups), results showed that

the neutral group was closer to the low vertical than to the high vertical group in accuracy

of judging emotions, meaning that high vertical position increased accuracy more than low

vertical position decreased it (Schmid Mast et al. 2009, Study 3). However, more evidence


123

is needed to investigate whether the effects on interpersonal accuracy are driven by the

high or the low end of the dimension (or both).

Relatedly, another prevailing methodology was to calculate only the linear relation

between verticality and accuracy. As an exception, Schmid Mast et al. (2009, Study 3) had

high, neutral, and low vertical positions and looked at both linear and quadratic effects.

There was no quadratic component, only linear. However, there may be situations in which

accuracy is highest when verticality is middling or when two people have equal (con-

cordant) vertical position, and being put in either a high or low position hurts (or helps)

accuracy. Concordance could help, for example, if equal positions meant people were more

at ease and able to focus on the other person rather than being consumed with monitoring

their own behavior (Patterson 1995). On the other hand, having equal verticality to an

interaction partner could interfere with accuracy if the parties were competing and this

were somehow disruptive of their ability to process, or care about, the other’s conveyed

cues.

Mediators

Mediators would be variables that are caused by verticality and, in turn, cause accuracy to

increase or decrease. As yet, it is not clear what variables are viable candidates as

mediators, but research is still in its infancy. A number of potential mediators are prob-

lematic because their relations to either verticality or accuracy are weak, and others have

simply not been investigated.

Consider cognitive overload as a possible mediator of the verticality-accuracy relation

(Fiske 1993). If being high in verticality causes a person to be cognitively overloaded (too

many responsibilities, too many people to respond to, etc.) then that person may suffer a

deficit in interpersonal accuracy because of a literal inability to attend to others’ cues. But

if, instead, the low-vertical role causes its occupants to be overloaded (more stressed, more

confused, etc.), then that person would suffer the deficit. Thus, it is difficult to predict what

would be the relation between verticality and cognitive load. Furthermore, verticality

aside, cognitive load has an inconsistent relation to performance on interpersonal accuracy

tasks (Ambady and Gray 2002; Phillips et al. 2007, 2008; Tracy and Robins 2008). For

these reasons, it is not straightforward to posit cognitive load as a mediator between

verticality and accuracy.

Motivation to be accurate has intuitive appeal as a mediator, yet experimental manip-

ulations designed to increase such motivation often do not result in higher accuracy (Hall

et al. 2009b); sometimes, increased motivation to be accurate even hurts accuracy. Hall

et al. (2009b) did, however, find evidence that increased motivation to be accurate

improved recall of people’s words as well as inferences based on stimuli with mainly

verbal content, a finding that is relevant to results for recall accuracy in the present meta-

analysis.

Emotional state is another possible mediator. Stress, sadness, and anxiety can be

associated with lower accuracy on interpersonal accuracy tasks (Ambady and Gray 2002;

Chepenik et al. 2007; Demenescu et al. 2010; Hanggi 2004), although the reverse is

sometimes found for anxiety (Hunter et al. 2009). It has been proposed that some such

states (sadness, for example) result in lower accuracy because they induce a deliberative

judgment style that is not optimal for judging nonverbal cues (Ambady and Gray 2002). If

higher or lower verticality produced negative affective states, then these states might serve

as mediators of verticality’s impact on accuracy.


123

Happy states are a potential mediator because there is evidence that people higher in

verticality have more positive mood (mostly measured as happiness) than those lower in

verticality (Anderson and Berdahl 2002; Berdahl and Martorana 2006; Langner and

Keltner 2008). More happy moods are associated with more global, holistic processing of

stimuli (Gasper and Clore 2002), which might increase accuracy to the extent that such

cognitive styles promote accuracy, although that is not clear. Schmid et al. (2011b) induced

happy and sad states in participants and then administered a facial emotion recognition test.

They found that happiness did produce more global processing, as determined through eye

tracking, but global processing was not a mediator because it was correlated with accuracy

only in the sad mood condition. Thus, whether positive mood states affect interpersonal

accuracy directly or indirectly remains an open question. Different information processing

styles in and of themselves might, however, be a potential mediator of the power-inter-

personal accuracy link.

Verticality has been shown to be related to specific information processing styles.

Relatively high verticality is related to more Gestalt-like, abstract processing (Magee and

Smith 2013; Smith et al. 2008). To the extent that an interpersonal accuracy task profits

from such an abstract processing style, increased verticality should help interpersonal

accuracy. Indeed some interpersonal accuracy tests seem to benefit from a more Gestalt-

like processing style (e.g., Schmid et al. 2011b). However, other interpersonal accuracy

tests seem to yield better results when the test taker focuses on the details (e.g., Martin

et al. 2012). Men increased their interpersonal accuracy on the PONS test when primed

with a detailed-oriented information processing style (Schmid et al. 2011a). Unless there is

better understanding of which cognitive information processing style is needed to achieve a

high score on the different interpersonal accuracy operationalizations, one can only

speculate about whether and how cognitive processing style can be a mediator of the

verticality-interpersonal accuracy link.

The fact that different studies find results that go in opposite directions might be the

reason why researchers have not yet dedicated much effort to trying to explain why high

verticality increases or decreases interpersonal accuracy. Schmid Mast et al. (2009, Study

3) found evidence for mediation of the verticality-to-accuracy path: Felt pride and felt

respect of the higher vertical person both partially mediated the positive effect of verti-

cality on interpersonal accuracy. If feeling proud and respected is indicative of under-

standing high verticality as a function accorded by others, this increased other-orientation

might be the reason why the high vertical individuals might be more interpersonally

accurate than the low.

As noted above, research does not provide strong support for variables that might

mediate an association between verticality and interpersonal accuracy. However, con-

sidering how unstable this phenomenon is, it is premature to be discussing mediators

except in a highly speculative manner. Assuming that eventually a paradigm will be

established that shows the effect in a consistent direction (either positive or negative),

mediator variables should be investigated. This is an important undertaking because if

the mechanism is understood, change can happen; for example, it would be possible to

develop targeted interpersonal accuracy training techniques for people in

organizations.7

7 Although meta-analysis has shown that training to improve interpersonal accuracy is effective, the specificmechanisms underlying the effectiveness of training are not well understood (Blanch-Hartigan et al. 2012).


123

Future Directions

In light of this meta-analysis and the theoretical issues raised, it is possible to make some

concrete suggestions for future researchers pursuing this important topic.

Apply More Theory to the Choice of What Is Being Judged

Researchers should give more attention to how different contents of accuracy judgments

are objectively relevant in the situation as well as to perceivers in the situation. At present,

it is mainly affect that is studied. Researchers should ask whether such judgments are truly

relevant in the situation, and whether other kinds of content might make more sense. It

might be the case, for example, that bosses are much better than subordinates in detecting

deception, but there is no difference in recognizing emotions. If others’ emotions are

considered a distraction from the high vertical person’s goals, the high person may ignore

them and be inaccurate at judging them, while he or she may actually have heightened

accuracy for other cues that are more relevant in the situation (Guinote 2010). Ralph Exline

foresaw this very possibility long ago (Exline 1960). Alhough Exline’s study was on

sociometric status (popularity) rather than on verticality as we have defined it in this

article, nevertheless his findings showed that the relation of sociometric status to inter-

personal accuracy depended on how relevant the particular content of the accuracy mea-

surement was to the group members’ goals.

And, even within the domain of affect, it will be important to discover whether there are

differences due to the cue modality and that too could guide researchers’ choices of what to

measure. Scherer and Scherer (2011) analyzed the relation of personality dominance to

accuracy separately for judging facial emotions versus vocal emotions. There was a sig-

nificant positive correlation between dominance and accuracy of judging vocal emotions

but none for facial emotions (in the meta-analysis, the average of these effects was entered

into analysis). Thus, there may exist patterns of cue-channel specificity that could help

investigators choose what instruments to use, depending on their research goals and

settings.

Look for Alternative Causal Paths

Clearly, randomized experiments in which verticality is experimentally manipulated leave

no ambiguity about causal direction. However, many studies are correlational and often

this cannot be avoided due to real-world constraints. Nevertheless, even in purely corre-

lational studies more attention could be paid to ruling out alternative paths (whether

verticality influences accuracy or accuracy influences verticality) or investigating possible

third-variable causation. Furthermore, it should be possible to conduct experiments that

treat accuracy as the independent variable by training it and seeing its impact on verti-

cality, or longitudinal studies that measure accuracy and follow people over time to look

for changes in their verticality.

Manipulate Moderators and Measure Mediators within Studies

Although we mentioned a large number of possible moderating and mediating variables,

there are certainly more to be considered both theoretically and empirically. Examining

these effects within studies controls for extraneous variables far better than meta-analysis

can.


123

Look for Curvilinear Effects and Verticality Concordance Effects

Curvilinear effects might show that accuracy is higher (or lower) when verticality is neither

very high nor very low. Concordance effects would tell whether the match between in-

teractants in terms of their verticality helps determine accuracy.

Control for Partners’ Expressive Clarity When In Vivo Designs Are Conducted

Until researchers routinely control for expressive clarity, it will not be possible to interpret

apparent perceiver power effects in these designs.

Do More Research Outside of the Laboratory

There are obvious trade-offs between laboratory settings where much can be controlled and

naturalistic settings where many ambiguities about cause and effect are usually present.

However, with verticality the laboratory approach risks creating an independent variable

with little motivational force, little credibility, and little consequence. In our opinion, the

demonstration that a verticality manipulation passes the standard of a self-reported

manipulation check is not sufficient grounds to believe the manipulation is potent enough

to actually produce effects on interpersonal accuracy.

Furthermore, aside from the possibility that effects would be more potent and consistent

outside the lab, it is in the real world of status, power, dominance, and hierarchy where

differences in accuracy might really matter for the welfare and outcomes of individuals and

groups.

Acknowledgments The authors thank Magali Ecabert for her assistance in coding, and the authors whoprovided their unpublished results.

Appendix: Coded Study Attributes

Year of study

Gender of first author

Sample type (college/university students, hereafter referred to as college students,

employees in organization, community people, or mix of groups)

Sample age (mean or median) and sample age group (13–17, 18–22, 23–27, 28–32,

33–37, 38–42, 43 and older, or mixed ages)

Sample size

Percentage of participants who were male

Type of design/analysis (experimental manipulation, known groups comparison, or

continuous correlation)

Type of comparison (within-dyads comparison between higher and lower vertical

partners or between-groups comparison of groups that differed in verticality)

Location (laboratory or field)

Verticality definition (role-played/assigned high and low vertical roles/imagined verti-

cal position, measured hierarchical position in organization, measured hierarchical position

in group, self-reported dominant personality, other-reported dominant personality,

behavioral measurement, SES, psychological induction other than assigned roles and if

yes, was it concept priming or autobiographical writing, self-reported feelings of verticality


123

in or after a situation, being minority or majority within a group, or self-reported power

vis-a-vis other family members)

If personality dominance was measured, a moderator was coded to capture the type of

dominance scale (egoistic/aggressive or empathic/responsible).

Accuracy paradigm (testing paradigm or in vivo)

Accuracy method (test, recall, correlation between perceiver and target ratings, or

difference between perceiver and target ratings)

If a test was used, which one: PONS (Rosenthal et al. 1979), DANVA (Nowicki and

Duke 1994), or other

If a test was given, content of accuracy inference (affect/emotion, personality, other’s

thoughts/feelings about self and partner, or other)

If recall was measured, content of recall (words, nonverbal cues or appearance, or

other).

Additional coding was done to estimate, from an observer’s perspective, the psycho-

logical states that the higher and lower vertical people in each study might have been

experiencing. Two coders who were blind to the studies’ results (IML and a research

assistant) performed ratings of psychological states based on the studies’ methodologies,

using two items for each of four constructs that were rated on nine-point unipolar scales:

(1) prosocial: helpful/cooperative, attentive to others’ feelings or thoughts, (2) self-cen-

tered: egocentric/concerned with own needs, wanting to promote self/self-aggrandizing, (3)

angry affect: angry/irritated, cheerful/pleasant (reversed), and (4) anxious affect: uncom-

fortable/awkward, fearful/worried. The two coders’ ratings were averaged, and the two

items belonging to each construct were averaged. These combined ratings were then

correlated with the effect sizes separately for the higher and lower vertical participants and

also after subtracting the ratings of the lower participants from the ratings of the higher

participants on each moderator, thus creating difference scores reflecting the disparity in

psychological states. Finally, given the predictions made by the social distance theory of

power (Magee and Smith 2013), namely that high power results in less interpersonal

accuracy (because high power results in feeling more distant and less similar to social

interaction partners and empathic accuracy is reduced between dissimilar interaction

partners), the two coders also directly rated the verticality gap (social distance) between the

higher and lower individuals on a 9-point scale that went from only a small gap to a very

big gap. Correlations between these variables and effect sizes were few and inconsistent.

Therefore, these moderator ratings are not discussed further.

References

Works marked with * contributed effect sizes to the reported analyses. T 5 testingparadigm, I 5 in vivo paradigm

Alkire, A. A., Collum, M. E., Kaswan, J., & Love, L. R. (1968). Information exchange and accuracy ofverbal communication under social power conditions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9,301–308. I

*Alvarez, G., & Fuentes, P. (1994). Recognition of facial expression in diverging socioeconomic levels.Brain and Cognition, 25, 235–239. T

Ambady, N., & Gray, H. M. (2002). On being sad and mistaken: Mood effects on the accuracy of thin-slicejudgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 947–961.

Ambady, N., & Skowronski, J. J. (Eds.). (2008). First impressions. New York: Guilford.


123

Anderson, C., & Berdahl, J. L. (2002). The experience of power: Examining the effects of power onapproach and inhibition tendencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1362–1377.

*Bachmann, M., & Schmid Mast, M. (2010). Unpublished data. T*Bachmann, M., & Schmid Mast, M. (2011). Unpublished data. T*Bailey, W., Nowicki, S., Jr., & Cole, S. P. (1998). The ability to decode nonverbal information in African

American, African and Afro-Caribbean, and European American Adults. Journal of Black Psychology,24, 418–431. T

*Barnes, M. L., & Sternberg, R. J. (1989). Social intelligence and decoding of nonverbal cues. Intelligence,13, 263–287. T

*Barreto, M., Ellemers, N., & Fiske, S. T. (2010). ‘‘What did you say, and who do you think you are?’’ Howpower differences affect emotional reactions to prejudice. Journal of Social Issues, 66, 477–492. T

Berdahl, J. L., & Martorana, P. (2006). Effects of power on emotion and expression during a controversialgroup discussion. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 497–509.

Bernieri, F. J. (2001). Toward a taxonomy of interpersonal sensitivity. In J. A. Hall & F. J. Bernieri (Eds.),Interpersonal sensitivity: Theory and measurement (pp. 3–20). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates.

Blanch-Hartigan, D., Andrzejewski, S., & Hill, K. (2012). The effectiveness of training to improve personperception accuracy: A meta-analysis. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 34, 483–498.

Borenstein, M., Hedges, L., Higgins, J., & Rothstein, H. (2005). Comprehensive meta-analysis (2nd ed.).Englewood, NJ: Biostat.

*Boucher, E. M., Hancock, J. T., & Dunham, P. J. (2008). Interpersonal sensitivity in computer-mediatedand face-to-face conversations. Media Psychology, 11, 235–258. I

Bugental, D. B. (2010). Paradoxical power manifestations: Power assertion by the subjectively powerless. InA. Guinote & T. K. Vescio (Eds.), The social psychology of power (pp. 209–230). New York: Guilford.

*Byron, K. (2003). Are better managers better at ‘‘reading’’ others? Testing the claim that emotionalintelligence predicts managerial performance. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Georgia State Uni-versity, Atlanta, GA. T

Byron, K. (2007). Male and female managers’ ability to read emotions: Relationships with supervisor’sperformance ratings and subordinates’ satisfaction ratings. Journal of Occupational and Organiza-tional Psychology, 80, 713.

Byron, K., Terranova, S., & Nowicki, S., Jr. (2007). Nonverbal emotion recognition and salespersons:Linking ability to perceived and actual success. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 37, 2600–2619.

*Carney, D. R. (2009). Unpublished data. T*Casciaro, T. (1998). Seeing things clearly: Social structure, personality, and accuracy in social network

perception. Social Networks, 20, 331–351. IChepenik, L. G., Cornew, L. A., & Farah, M. J. (2007). The influence of sad mood on cognition. Emotion, 7,

802–811.*Cook, K. E. (2002). Target and perceiver gender in person perception: Power as a possible explanation for

gender differences. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Psychology, University ofWashington. T

*Cote, S., Kraus, M. W., Cheng, B. H., Oveis, C., Van der Lowe, I., Lian, H., et al. (2011). Social powerfacilitates the effect of prosocial orientation on empathic accuracy. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 101, 217–232. I, T

*Delgado-Hachey, M., & Miller, S. A. (1993). Mothers’ accuracy in predicting their children’s IQs: Itsrelationship to antecedent variables, mothers’ academic achievement demands, and children’sachievement. Journal of Experimental Education, 62, 43–59. I

Demenescu, L. R., Kortekaas, R., den Boer, J. A., & Aleman, A. (2010). Impaired attribution of emotion tofacial expressions in anxiety and major depression. PLos ONE, 5, Article e15058.

DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Mead, N. L., & Vohs, K. D. (2011). How leaders self-regulate their taskperformance: Evidence that power promotes diligence, depletion, and disdain. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 100, 47–65.

DiMatteo, M. R., Friedman, H. S., & Taranta, A. (1979). Sensitivity to bodily nonverbal communication as afactor in practitioner–patient rapport. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 4, 18–26.

DiMatteo, M. R., Hays, R. D., & Prince, L. M. (1986). Relationship of physicians’ nonverbal communi-cation skill to patient satisfaction, appointment noncompliance, and physician workload. HealthPsychology, 5, 581–594.

Elfenbein, H. A., Foo, M. D., White, J., Tan, H. H., & Aik, V. C. (2007). Reading your counterpart: Thebenefit of emotion recognition accuracy for effectiveness in negotiation. Journal of NonverbalBehavior, 31, 205–223.


123

Ellyson, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1985). Power, dominance, and nonverbal behavior: Basic concepts andissues. In S. L. Ellyson & J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), Power, dominance, and nonverbal behavior (pp. 1–27).New York: Springer.

Exline, R. V. (1960). Interrelations among two dimensions of sociometric status, group congeniality andaccuracy of social perception. Sociometry, 23, 85–101.

Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. American Psychologist,48, 621–628.

Funder, D. C. (1995). On the accuracy of personality judgment: A realistic approach. Psychological Review,102, 652–670.

*Funder, D. C., & Harris, M. J. (1986). On the several facets of personality assessment: The case of socialacuity. Journal of Personality, 54, 528–550. T

Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 85, 453–466.

*Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and perspectives not taken.Psychological Science, 17, 1068–1074. T

Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Attending to the big picture: Mood and global versus local processing ofvisual information. Psychological Science, 13, 34–40.

Gesn, P. R., & Ickes, W. (1999). The development of meaning contexts for empathic accuracy: Channel andsequence effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 746–761.

*Gonzaga, G. C., Keltner, D., & Ward, D. (2008). Power in mixed-sex stranger interactions. Cognition andEmotion, 22, 1555–1568. I

*Gordon, A. M., & Chen, S. (2012). Unpublished data. IGuinote, A. (2010). The situated focus theory of power. In A. Guinote & T. K. Vescio (Eds.), The social

psychology of power (pp. 141–174). New York: Guilford.Guinote, A., & Vescio, T. K. (Eds.). (2010). The social psychology of power. New York: Guilford.Hall, J. A. (1984). Nonverbal sex differences: Communication accuracy and expressive style. Baltimore,

MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.*Hall, J. A. (2001). Unpublished data. IHall, J. A., Andrzejewski, S. A., & Yopchick, J. E. (2009a). Psychosocial correlates of interpersonal

sensitivity: A meta-analysis. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 33, 149–180.Hall, J. A., Blanch, D. C., Horgan, T. G., Murphy, N. A., Rosip, J. C., & Schmid Mast, M. (2009b).

Motivation and interpersonal sensitivity: Does it matter how hard you try? Motivation and Emotion,33, 291–302.

*Hall, J. A., Carter, J. D., & Horgan, T. G. (2001). Status roles and recall of nonverbal cues. Journal ofNonverbal Behavior, 25, 79–100. I

Hall, J. A., Coats, E. J., & Smith LeBeau, L. (2005). Nonverbal behavior and the vertical dimension of socialrelations: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 131, 898–924.

Hall, J. A., & Gunnery, S. D. (2013). Gender differences in nonverbal communication. In J. A. Hall & M.L. Knapp (Eds.), Handbook of nonverbal communication (pp. 639–669). Berlin: deGruyter Mouton.

*Hall, J. A., & Halberstadt, A. G. (1994). ‘‘Subordination’’ and sensitivity to nonverbal cues: A study ofmarried working women. Sex Roles, 31, 149–165. T

Hall, J. A., & Halberstadt, A. G. (1997). Subordination and nonverbal sensitivity: A hypothesis in search ofsupport. In M. R. Walsh (Ed.),Women, men, and gender: Ongoing debates (pp. 120–133). New Haven:Yale University Press.

*Hall, J. A., Halberstadt, A. G., & O’Brien, C. E. (1997). ‘‘Subordination’’ and nonverbal sensitivity: Astudy and synthesis of findings based on trait measures. Sex Roles, 37, 295–317. T

Hall, J. A., & Schmid Mast, M. (2007). Sources of accuracy in the empathic accuracy paradigm. Emotion, 7,438–446.

*Hall, J. A., Murphy, N. A., & Carney, D. R. (2006a). On the varieties of asymmetrical dependency:Feelings, motives, behavior, and accuracy in a dyadic interaction. European Journal of Social Psy-chology, 36, 583–599. I

Hall, J. A., Murphy, N. A., & Schmid Mast, M. (2006b). Recall of nonverbal cues: Exploring a newdefinition of interpersonal sensitivity. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 30, 141–155.

*Hall, J. A., Rosip, J. C., Smith LeBeau, L., Horgan, T. G., & Carter, J. D. (2006c). Attributing the sourcesof accuracy in unequal-power dyadic communication: Who is better and why? Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology, 42, 18–27. I

Hall, J. A., Roter, D. L., Blanch, D. C., & Frankel, R. M. (2009c). Nonverbal sensitivity in medical students:Implications for clinical interactions. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 24, 1217–1222.

Hanggi, Y. (2004). Stress and emotion recognition: An internet experiment using stress induction. SwissJournal of Psychology, 63, 113–125.


123

Henley, N. M. (1977). Body politics: Power, sex, and nonverbal communication. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.

Hunter, L. R., Buckner, J. D., & Schmidt, N. B. (2009). Interpreting facial expressions: The influence ofsocial anxiety, emotional valence, and race. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 482–488.

Johnson, S. D., & Bechler, C. (1998). Examining the relationship between listening effectiveness andleadership emergence: Perceptions, behaviors, and recall. Small Group Research, 29, 452–471.

*Jowett, S., & Clark-Carter, D. (2006). Perceptions of empathic accuracy and assumed similarity in thecoach–athlete relationship. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 617–637. I

Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. PsychologicalReview, 110, 265–284.

Kerr, R., Garvin, J., Heaton, N., & Boyle, E. (2006). Emotional intelligence and leadership effectiveness.Leadership and Organization Development Journal, 27, 265–279.

Kombos, N. A., & Fournet, G. P. (1985). Effects of dominance-submissiveness and gender on recognition ofnonverbal emotional cues. Educational and Psychological Research, 5, 19–28. T

*Krackhardt, D. (1990). Assessing the political landscape: Structure, cognition, and power in organizations.Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 342–369. I

*Kraus, M. W., Cote, S., & Keltner, D. (2010). Social class, contextualism, and empathic accuracy. Psy-chological Science, 21, 1716–1723. I, T

Kraus, M. W., Piff, P. K., Mendoza-Denton, R., Rheinschmidt, M. L., & Keltner, D. (2012). Social class,solipsism, and contextualism: How the rich are different from the poor. Psychological Review, 119,546–572.

*Kunstman, J. W., & Maner, J. K. (2011). Sexual overperception: Power, mating motives, and biases insocial judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 282–294. I

LaFrance, M., & Henley, N. M. (1997). On oppressing hypotheses: Or, differences in nonverbal sensitivityrevisited. In M. R. Walsh (Ed.), Women, men, and gender: Ongoing debates (pp. 104–119). NewHaven: Yale University Press.

Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H., & Otten, S. (2008). Illegitimacy moderates the effects ofpower on approach. Psychological Science, 19, 558–564.

Langner, C. A., & Keltner, D. (2008). Social power and emotional experience: Actor and partner effectswithin dyadic interactions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 848–856.

*Letzring, T. D. (2008). The good judge of personality: Characteristics, behaviors, and observer accuracy.Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 914–932. I

Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (2001). Practical meta-analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Lord, R. G., & Hall, R. J. (2005). Identity, deep structure and the development of leadership skill. Lead-

ership Quarterly, 16, 591–615.*Lord, C. G., & Saenz, D. S. (1985). Memory deficits and memory surfeits: Differential cognitive conse-

quences of tokenism for tokens and observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49,918–926. T

Magee, J. C., & Smith, P. K. (2013). The social distance theory of power. Personality and Social PsychologyReview, 17, 158–186.

Maner, J. K., Gailliot, M. T., Butz, D. A., & Peruche, B. M. (2007). Power, risk, and the status quo: Doespower promote riskier or more conservative decision making? Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin, 33, 451–462.

Martin, D., Slessor, G., Allen, R., Phillips, L. H., & Darling, S. (2012). Processing orientation and emotionrecognition. Emotion, 12, 39–43.

*McDonough, M. (1992). Gender and perceived power as predictors of accuracy in nonverbal decoding.Unpublished doctoral dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology. T

*Mill, A., Allik, J., Realo, A., & Valk, R. (2009). Age-related differences in emotion recognition ability: Across-sectional study. Emotion, 9, 619–630. T

*Moeller, S. K., Lee, E. A. E., & Robinson, M. D. (2011). You never think about my feelings: Interpersonaldominance as a predictor of emotion decoding accuracy. Emotion, 11, 816–824. T

Mumford, T. V., Campion, M. A., & Morgeson, F. P. (2007). The leadership skills strataplex: Leadershipskill requirements across organizational levels. Leadership Quarterly, 18, 154–166.

Murphy, N. A., & Hall, J. A. (2011). Intelligence and nonverbal sensitivity: A meta-analysis. Intelligence,39, 54–63.

Noller, P. (1980). Misunderstandings in marital communication: A study of couples’ nonverbal commu-nication. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 1135–1148.

Nowicki, S., Jr., & Duke, M. (1994). Individual differences in the nonverbal communication of affect: TheDiagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy Scale. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 18, 9–35.


123

*Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2001). When power does not corrupt: Superior individuation processes amongpowerful perceivers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 549–565. T

Overbeck, J. R., & Park, B. (2006). Powerful perceivers, powerless objects: Flexibility of powerholders’social attention. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99, 227–243.

Patterson, M. L. (1995). A parallel process model of nonverbal communication. Journal of NonverbalBehavior, 19, 3–29.

*Paulmann, S. (2011). Unpublished data. T*Pfaff, P. L. (1954). An experimental study of the communication of feeling without contextual material.

Speech Monographs, 21, 155. TPhillips, L. H., Channon, S., Tunstall, M., Hedenstrom, A., & Lyons, K. (2008). The role of working

memory in decoding emotions. Emotion, 8, 184–191.Phillips, L. H., Tunstall, M., & Channon, S. (2007). Exploring the role of working memory in dynamic

social cue decoding using dual task methodology. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 31, 137–152.Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality

variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67,741–763.

Raudenbush, S. W. (2009). Analyzing effect sizes: Random-effects models. In H. Cooper, L. V. Hedges, &J. C. Valentine (Eds.), The handbook of research synthesis and meta-analysis (2nd ed., pp. 295–315).New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Riggio, R. E. (2001). Interpersonal sensitivity research and organizational psychology: Theoretical andmethodological applications. In J. A. Hall & F. J. Bernieri (Eds.), Intepersonal sensitivity: Theory andmeasurement (pp. 305–317). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Rosenthal, R. (1979). The file drawer problem and tolerance for null results. Psychological Bulletin, 86(3),638–641.

Rosenthal, R. (1995). Writing meta-analytic reviews. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 183–192.*Rosenthal, R., Hall, J. A., DiMatteo, M. R., Rogers, P. L., & Archer, D. (1979). Sensitivity to nonverbal

communication: The PONS test. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. TRosete, D., & Ciarrochi, J. (2005). Emotional intelligence and its relationship to workplace performance

outcomes of leadership effectiveness. Leadership and Organization Development Journal, 26,388–399.

*Rosip, J. C. (2006). Encoding and decoding ability in unequal-status dyadic communication: Status/power,emotion, and comfort. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northeastern University, Boston, MA.

Rubin, R. S., Munz, D. C., & Bommer, W. H. (2005). Leading from within: The effects of emotionrecognition and personality on transformational leadership behavior. Academy of Management Jour-nal, 48, 845–858.

Russell, A. M., & Fiske, S. T. (2010). Power and social perception. In A. Guinote & T. K. Vescio (Eds.), Thesocial psychology of power (pp. 231–250). New York: Guilford.

*Sabatelli, R. M., Buck, R., & Dreyer, A. (1982). Nonverbal communication accuracy in married couples:Relationship with marital complaints. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 1088–1097. T

*Saenz, D. S., & Lord, C. G. (1989). Reversing roles: A cognitive strategy for undoing memory deficitsassociated with token status. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 698–708. T

*Sasson, N. J., Pinkham, A. E., Richard, J., Hughett, P., Gur, R. E., & Gur, R. C. (2010). Controlling forresponse biases clarifies sex and age differences in facial affect recognition. Journal of NonverbalBehavior, 34, 207–221. T

*Scherer, K. R., & Scherer, U. (2011). Assessing the ability to recognize facial and vocal expressions ofemotion: Construction and validation of the Emotion Recognition Index. Journal of NonverbalBehavior, 35, 305–326. T

Schmid, P. C., Schmid Mast, M., Bombari, D., & Mast, F. W. (2011a). Gender effects in informationprocessing on a nonverbal decoding task. Sex Roles, 65, 102–107.

Schmid, P. C., Schmid Mast, M., Bombari, D., Mast, F. W., & Lobmaier, J. (2011b). How mood states affectinformation processing during facial emotion recognition: An eye tracking study. Swiss Journal ofPsychology, 70, 223–231.

*Schmid Mast, M. (2008). Unpublished data. TSchmid Mast, M. (2010). Interpersonal behavior and social perception in a hierarchy: The Interpersonal

Power and Behaviour Model. European Review of Social Psychology, 21, 1–33.*Schmid Mast, M., & Darioly, A. (2014). Emotion recognition accuracy in hierarchical relationships. Swiss

Journal of Psychology, 73, 69–75. TSchmid Mast, M., Jonas, K., Cronauer, C. K., & Darioly, A. (2012). On the importance of the superior’s

interpersonal sensitivity for good leadership. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 42, 1043–1068.


123

*Schmid Mast, M., Jonas, K., & Hall, J. A. (2009). Give a person power and he or she will show inter-personal sensitivity: The phenomenon and its why and when. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 97, 835–850. T

Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., van Laar, C., & Levin, S. (2004). Social dominance theory: Its agenda and method.Political Psychology, 25, 845–880.

*Simpson, B., & Borch, C. (2005). Does power affect perception in social networks? Two arguments and anexperimental test. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68, 278. T

Smith, P. K., Wigboldus, D. H. J., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2008). Abstract thinking increases one’s sense ofpower. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 378–385.

*Snodgrass, S. E. (1985). Women’s intuition: The effect of subordinate role on interpersonal sensitivity.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 146–155. I

*Snodgrass, S. E. (1992). Further effects of role versus gender on interpersonal sensitivity. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 62, 154–158. I

Snodgrass, S. E., Hecht, M. A., & Ploutz-Snyder, R. (1998). Interpersonal sensitivity: Expressivity orperceptivity? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 238–249.

*Stokes, D. R. (1983). Nonverbal communication: Race, gender, social class, world view and the PONStest; Implications for the therapeutic dyad. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State Uni-versity. T

*Thomas, D. L., Franks, D. D., & Calonico, J. M. (1972). Role-taking and power in social psychology.American Sociological Review, 37, 605–614. I

Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008). The automaticity of emotion recognition. Emotion, 8, 81–95.*Trefry, M. G. (1991). Power and perspective-taking: The perspective-taking accuracy of employees and

managers. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University. IWalter, F., Cole, M. S., van der Vegt, G. S., Rubin, R. S., & Bommer, W. H. (2012). Emotion recognition

and emergent leadership: Unraveling mediating mechanisms and boundary conditions. LeadershipQuarterly, 23, 977–991.


123

Documents

The Vertical Dimension of Social Relations and Accurate ... · The Vertical Dimension of Social Relations and Accurate Interpersonal Perception: A Meta-Analysis Judith A. Hall •