The Philosophy of Ingenium: Concept and IngeniousMethod in Baltasar Gracian^

Emilio Hidalgo Serna

Every human undertaking arises from a certain set of historicalcircumstances. The impetus for this essay is the recent discussionof the notion of ingenium at congresses on Giambattista Vico inNew York and Venice, especially by Ernesto Grassi and DonaldVerene. I propose to carry tbe discussion a step further by exam-ining the place of ingenium in the work of the Spanish Jesuit,Baltasar Gracian (1601-1658), for whom the concept is also acentral concern.

In the discussion of Gracian's Agudeza y arte de ingenio of 1642the critics reduced the implications of ingenium to purely formaland aesthetic aspects. For Menendez y Pelayo the work embodies"the codex of poetic intellectualism."^ Croce adjudges Gracian atheoretician of literary conceptismo, whose principle, in his opin-ion, is "the literary form considered as ingenious and pleasantornament, added to the naked expression of thought."' But I doBOt believe that ingenium and its concepts can be so easily rele-gated to the category of mere formal and decorative additions torational expression.

According to Gracian, ingenium comprehends the true es-sence of things by taking into account the relationships anddifferences between them. For this reason it is necessary beforeanalyzing the method of ingenium to discuss briefly the tradi-tional Aristotelian logic. When the two thought structures havebeen contrasted and we can differentiate between them we shallbe able to understand more clearly the characteristics of inge-nium as a method of cognition.

1. The Rational Method and the Rational Concept in thePhilosophy of Aristotle.

It is agreed generally that Aristotelian and traditional logicrevolve around the concept. R. Verneaux, for example, says,"The basis of classical logic is the theory of the concept. It pre-supposes realism.'"* And C. Prantl observes, "The concept is the

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 13, No. 4, Fall 1980. Published by the Pennsylva-nia State University Press, University Park and London,

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principle of Aristotelian logic. "^ Since it is in the concept' thatthe encounter between Aristotle's logic and his ontology takesplace, it would not be proper to deal only with the Organon andneglect the Metaphysics. Further, in the concept can be perceivedthe key to the force and extent of the ratioeal method. Only inthe concept (horos), taking as a point of departure the expressedor expounded concept (logos), can the true nature ofthe premiss(protasis), the syllogism (syllogismos), the demonstration {apo-deixis), and demonstrative knowledge {episteme apodeiktike) bearrived at.^ Aristotle's definition of "concept" is the following:"that into which the premiss can be analyzed, viz., the predicateand the subject, with the addition or removal of the verb to be ornot tO' be."* This definition is somewhat ,ambiguous and inexact.It is significant that Aristotle did not leave us any tractate whichdeals specifically with the key elements of his logic'

In books I, II, and VI of the Prior Analytics the expression,horos, occurs twenty times.'" Translators of the book into Latinand into modern languages have made use of three renderings ofthe word, which they have used without distinction"term,""concept," and "definition." Especially interesting is the etymo-logical and semantic relationship between "concept" {horos) and"definition" (horismos). The close relationship between thesetwo words and between "concept" and "term," in the sense of"fixed," and "delineated," becomes evident from the derivationfrom horizo and the middle form of the same word, horizomai.Moerbeke translates horizo as determino (to limit, restrict) and astermino (to divide, terminate, finish). The verb, horizomai (fix,define, explain) expresses a somewhat sharper delimitation and istranslated as definio.^^ But if the Aristotelian concept is a defini-tion of being, positive or negative, the essential character andoriginal goal of this knowledge would involve a restriction ofbeing; it is thus possible to comprehend being and to define it, inorder to know it better.

Aristotle says, "All men by nature desire to know (eidenai),"and he adds, "knowledge and understanding belong to art ratherthan to experience,"'^ because "experience is knowledge of indi-viduals [hekaston], but art is perception of the universal[katholou]."'* Aristotle, of course, strives to attain knowledge of

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the universal, that is, demonstrative knowledge, which may makethe claim of having perceived the basis (dioti) and the cause (tenaitian) of things.'^ Taking philosophy as wisdom, he writes,"clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain principles andcauses.""' If the goal of this knowledge is to be the universal, itfollows that the Aristotelian concept on which such cognition isbased will also be universal and abstract and, thus, rational, thatis, neither imaginative nor representative of the individual andthe unique res.

In this realm of rational knowledge is realized all learning(mathesis) by means of previous knowledge, as well as learningby means of demonstration (apodeixeos) and learning by defini-tions (horismon). The same is true of learning through induction(epagoges)." But when knowledge presupposes other knowledge,in the same way as the conclusion presupposes the premisses,how and where does this previous knowledge emerge, and howvalid is it? On what are the premisses based?

The premiss is "an affirmative or negative statement (logos) ofsomething about some subject""* and this logos as an expressedconcept of horos, or the content of the concept is, like the proof ofan "ultimate faith" (eschate doxa), based on a first and ultimateprinciple (arche): the principle of contradiction. This principle,which in itself is something defined, therefore needs no proof; "forthis principle according to its nature is at the same time the princi-ple of the other axioms."'' Determining the premisses, the princi-ple of contradiction fixes the concepts and their generative abilityand at the same time circumscribes them. Rational Aristotelianknowledge is based ultimately not only on this principle of contra-diction but also on other principles or a priori presuppositions.

It is possible to discover the rational and universal nature ofthe concept in direct relationship with reason. In Aristotelianconcepts the essences of things and such expressions are reduc-tions or generalizations of that which reason presupposes anddetermines as essential in things. The being of things, that is,their substance, is identical with their essence,,. But if rationalcognition remains limited to its essence, since "to know eachthing, at least is just to know its essence,""" then we would saythat reason's knowledge is concerned only with the universal in

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essences. Thereby reason forgets the extraordinary and the con-crete and in its concepts expresses only genus and species. Aris-totle adds that "for both the essence and the universal and thegenus, are thought to be the substance of each thing."-' Posses-sion of the truth of being, that is, the goal of all knowledge,seems to us impossible in the framework of the Aristotelianmethod. Reason, commencing with universal concepts and withthe assistance of laws and principles which need no proof, be-cause they are accepted a priori, is unable to represent theunique truth of things.

Within this cognitive structure nothing proves clearer than theuniversal character of the concept, since this horos expresses it-self about substances which, like the genus, have been conceivedof as universal (Cf. Meta. 1069a, 26-27). Aristotle proclaims that"knowledge is of uoiversals"^^ and builds on universal principles.In his philosophical search for first principles and for the causesof substances, he insists on the art of the universal: "since thescience of the philosopher treats of being qua being universallyand not in respect to a part of it."^ "' In spite of the "logicalpurity" and the "model strictness" of the Prior /incfyftc,^ '* deduc-tive and rational knowledge, commencing with universals, is ootable to make known the real. The same is true if "it is fromuniversal premises that the syllogism proceeds."'" In that casenothing new will be produced in the conclusion. That means thatnothing can be expressed which is not either affirmed or presup-posed already in the premisses. This sort of logic does not lead toinventio, for in the framework of deductive method invention isnot possible.

The value and the character of difference (diaphora) in theAristotelian system derives from the verbal root common to theconcept (horos) and the definition (horismos). The philosopherasserts, "clearly the definition is the formula which comprises thedifferentiae. But it is also necessary that the division be by thedifferentia of the differentia. "^ '' Apparently what is at stake hereis not real, but only logical and rational differences betweenthings,. If we affirm that "man is a rational animal," the differ-ence is expressed in the concept "rational," whereby "rational" isto be understood as the species or the specific difference.

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We shall keep the universal and abstract characteristic of therational concept in mind. Since Aristotelian science is concernedonly with knowledge of universals (katholou) the question mustbe allowed whether another valid, non-rational method of phi-losophizing may be permitted. Is it possible to express the es-sence and being of individual things (he kaston)? Must we give upthe individual, or should we decide, rather, that the Aristotelianneed not be the only valid science?

2. The Concept of Imaginative Language as Creations ofIngenium.

The goal which Baltasar Gracian set for himself in his Agudezay arte de ingenio is very clear. He attempts to explain "all formsand differences of concepts"^^ by means of concrete examples.But what does Gracian understand by "concept?" What humanability produces concepts? What is specific to the concept, andhow does it differ from the rational and Aristotelian concept?These problems and questions can be dealt with only by means ofan interpretation of the Gracian definition of concepto.

For Gracian, "The concept is an act of understanding whichexpresses the existing and present correspondence between ob-jects."^* The first difficulty is to determine whether this "act ofunderstanding" is a consequence of reason, judgment, or of inge-nium. Graciao makes a distinction within understanding betweentwo qualities, judgment and ingenium. In his first book he writes,"Of everything in the world which can be seen, man is the best,and within man himself it is enderstanding . . . this main facultyfinds its expression in two othersdepth of Judgment and eleva-tion of ingenium."-'

Since attention here is concentrated on the concept in order todetect within it already objectivized or concentrated truth, itmust be asked which of these qualities, judgment or ingenium, isthe cause and source of the formation of concepts. Gracian dif-ferentiates between them: "Judgment is the throne of prudence;ingenium is the sphere of agudeza."^ Here the reciprocal rela-tionship between ingenium and agudeza is affirmed, for the latteris conditioned by ingenium. That means that agudeza can appearand move only within the action radius of ingenium. Judgment is

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circumscribed by the practical and posterior activity of men,which cognition presupposes. If prudence has need of judgment,both have a common need for the primacy of ingenium, of agu-deza and cognition. In the third chapter of El Heroe, "TheGreatest Quality of the Hero," Gracian says nothing about judg^ment but emphasizes the importance of ingenium and agudeza.

Knowledge and the concepts constitute the flexible foundationand the first activity of ingenium. These concepts represent inthemselves objective agudeza. As sender of agudeza, ingeniumcreates the concepts, and they reflect at the same time its power(agudeza). Therefore in Arte de ingenio, concept and agudeza areused interchangeably. Gracian maintains "that understandingwithout agudeza and without concepts is like a sun without lightand without rays; and so many concepts, which glitter in heavenlylight, are the materials of ingenium.''-^ By using rruetaphors,Gracian wants to communicate to us that these offspring of inge-nium (agudeza and concepts) are the foundation of clarity andthe true life of understanding. Only ingenium is able to send outlight (agudeza) and rays (concepts). Thus the Gracian concept isnot a rational act of understanding, or of "ratio," or of logos aswe encounter in Aristotle. By no means can ingenium, agudeza,and "concept" be interpreted merely as ability, activity, and or-namental and literary expression in the service of rational expres-sion. What Gracian suggests is a new model of thinking, of un-derstanding and of expressing being. Gracian, representative of aspecial conceptismo, which until now has been interpreted onlyfrom a literary standpoint, differentiates three areas of agudezade artifico viz., three "modi" or ways of expressing ingenium:agudeza of the concept, verbal agudeza, and agudeza of practicalaction.^ ^ "Verbal agudeza, which is based more on the word," isthe aesthetic expression of ingenium, while the "agudeza of thepractical action" represents Gracian's formula for practical andingenious morals.^' We should not forget at this point our ownconcern, "the agudeza of the concept," which, according toGracian, "is based more on the subtlety of thought than onwords."*" This "subtlety of concept" is the object and the funda-mental material of the work, Agudeza y arte de ingenio. Graciandoes not forget his "soul" (the word)for, in contrast to judg-

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ment, ingenium is not satisfied with truth alone, but aspires tobeauty.'^ The "agudeza of the concept" is also called the "sub-tlety of ingenium"^'' and the "subtlety of thought."

Obviously "subtlety of thought" appears as a characteristic ofman's ingenious activity in the service of cognition. In the work.El discreto, we read of ingenium as the "courage to under-stand," whose victory is represented through "that which is un-derstood" (the concept).'" In this understanding we see thephilosophical meaning of ingenium as a faculty which links oneman cognitively with others and with the natural world. Notwithout reason was ingenium for the Latins synonymous withnature and the equivalent of the Greek physis. There exists inthe totality of all things in nature a graduated and diverse com-plex. Nature implies a different grade of ontological ingenuity.Such differences do not, however, destroy the relationship be-tween beings. In the case of ingenium, "subtlety of thinking"and the "courage to understand" are realized not through ab-straction on the basis of universal principles, but through thevision and through the conceptual expression of correspon-dences, which unite individual objects.

In his Criticon, Gracian maintains that plants and animals can-not progress beyond certain limits in the development of feelingsand in growth. In the case of man, in contrast, ingenium appearsas creative ability. With man appears a new and, in comparisonwith other creatures, higher structure, since "beyond growingand feeling are added judging, reflecting and comprehending."-"*Man develops as a "compendium of al! that nature is"'' andfeels, but he goes beyond that, he transcends himself. Thatmeans that all his strivings are directed towards his appearance asmediator and as the ordering bridge of being. He is able to un-derstand something in that, like Andrenio in the Grottohe dif-ferentiates, compares, observes, and recognizes the "palpabledifferences" which give to each being its individuality in existen-tial fellowship with other beings. The Gracian equation betweenthe "understood" and ingenium is instructive. In ingenium ismade certain the mutual dependence of nature, of being, of man,and of truth. Gracian asserts that "every gain in understanding(ingenium) is also a gain in being."* Being, knowing, and inge-

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nium are united in a close natural relationship. Thereforeandbecause the universal is not present, that is, does not exist innaturethe concept of ingenium becomes only the expression ofconcrete knowledge and a measure for individual perception.

The concept of ingenium appears and develops through keendifferentiations within the real and the ontological, and notthrough logical distinctions between genus and species. Man at-tains to reflection and knowledge through the ingenious distinc-tion. Gracian explains how ingenium is able to "build a concept":"The wise man constructs a concept with everything, and therewhere profundity and doubts occur, he digs with difference, andthinks that perhaps there is more than he first assumes; in such afashion that the reflection arrives at a place where perceptiondoes not.'"" Accordingly, neither a superficial understanding ofthe external nor a rational abstraction of being is satisfactory.What is needed is a searching penetration and those distinctiveproperties of the ingenious "subtlety of thought."

Before we turn to the investigation of value and the meaning of"correspondence" in the artistic doctrine of ingenium, it will beuseful to take note of the difference between the rational conceptand the ingenious concept. We have seen how the Aristotelianconcept (horos) is based on demonstration and the rational affir-mation of being. Its content was abstract, since it was concernedwith an indirect predication of logically divided being, which mendivide up into essenses, genera, and species. The Aristotelianmethod of proof made necessary a strength, which could makepossible the "intellectual possession of the universal." Traditionallogic recognized in "ratio" only its own mode of uniting conceptsand of constructing alternating forms, in order to draw conse-quences from them for a new concept which, indeed, was alreadypresupposed in the true, affirmative premises.

In contrast, the Gracian concept is not demonstrative. Thelogic of the ingenious concept cannot be formal or rational. Itsconcepts cannot express logical relationships, but always onlynew, real relationships, which constitute the unique essence ofthings. Gracian attempts to show, not to demonstrate. Conceptstherefore must be a re-representation of reality, in which theassociations of the relative in the individual being are respected.

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Such concepts must be expressed; they need their own lan-guage, whose nature is similar to the ability to produce suchconcepts. Aristotelian perception of reality, or the vision of itscontent, was essentially ratioeal, and as such required a logicalstructure and the language of substantial logic.

The subtle vision of ingenium is not satisfied with the idea, orwith the essential justification of things, but is rather a directview and a subtle apprehension of correspondences, relationshipsof similarity, dissimilarities, proportion, and the like. The authorof the Criticon believes that only imaginative language can repre-sent and squeeze out the truth of the unique individual. If inreality things exist bound up with each other and thus can havemeaning and importance only in their "being-with" other beings,then the appropriate expression for such relationships is the meta-phor and the ingenious expression. By means ofthe metaphor weare enabled to place individual things under the light of others;by the transference of images of the best-known things one canexpress the less well-known things. The code and the power ofthe image and the metaphor are in the ability to take account ofthe "relativity" of the object treated. In contrast, we observe inAristotle that reason, the rational concept, and axiomatic lan-guage establish only abstraction and the predication of the uni-versal. For the affirmation of its concepts reason needs premissesand formulations derived a priori.

In the Criticon Gracian contends that the purpose of language,of the spoken or written concept, and of conversation is to pro-duce "conceptual images of themselves in the spirit of thelistener.'"*^ Imaginative language is the most suitable form bywhich to communicate reality in a symbolical form. Ingenium, bydrawing out relationships, creates conceptual images which are aconcretion of being in the word. In this sense the ingenious imageis a "proper name" for the truth of things. Gracian speaks of themetaphor as "the normal workshop of conversation" in which arefound "extr,aordinary concepts for the marvelous correspondenceand comparison.'"'' With this "metaphorical comparison" inge-nium counterposes two separate things over against each otherand with images objectifies relationships or similarities betweenthem which already are present.

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3. The Concept or the Ingenious Expression ofCorrespondence.

We must now briefly analyze the mechanism or the artifice,by means of which ingenium fashions truth in the concept. Truthand fruitfulness of each concept depend not only on the gradeof correspondence which ingenium has perceived or observed inthe objects, but also on the skillfulness by which ingeniumgrasps and fixes in language the relationships stated. That thecorrespondence precedes the concept and the ingenious art isindisputable. This correspondence, which ingenium has dis-covered, will become the expressive basis of the concept; thecorrespondence is primarily the necessary conformity and themutual ootological relationship between the things. As root, ba-sis, and norm of the ontological, correspondence becomes theessential law of the cognitive ability of the ingenious artifice."This artifice of ingenium [artificio del ingenioj," Gracianwrites, "consists in a harmonic correlation between two or threeoutwardly recognizable objects; this reciprocal relationship is ex-pressed by an act of understanding."**

Respect for the correspondence or the genuine relationshipbetween things is the cardinal principle of the logic of ingenium.The successive gradation of perceptions and truths (or of con-crete correspondences) is the result of immediate and subtle intu-itions, "first glance," or sudden rays of ingenium. Without suchexperienced relationships, accessible only to ingenium, neitherreason nor judgment would find a stable foundation on which tobuild, on which reflection aod decision would be possible. Truthdoes not emerge from equating (adaequare) nor from the confor-mation of the intellect to the thing or vice-versa. It is not acoincidence (adaequatio) between intelligence and things. Thistruth appeairs and reveals itself by proceeding from the differ-ences and similarities of objects. It is perceived by ingenium andexpressed in the concept.

Correspondence, concordance, or correlation are not exclu-sively properties of being. Ingenium, as human capability withits origin in nature, cannot remain separated from reality. Andbetween it (ingenium) and the concepts arises a mutual affinity

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and relationship. "This accord or sympathy between the con-cepts and ingenium is based on another perfection, in a mostsubtle artifice. It is the basic cause, in which agudeza is rooted,and the cause also, of its differing so much from the reason[ratio] which is its opposite; that constitutes the concept.'"*^ This"subtle artifice of ingenium" the cause of the agudeza andfundamental part of the conceptis nothing other than a carefuldifferentation of objects or the subtle perception of correspon-dences. Gracian writes, "All intentional capabilities of the soul Irefer to those which can perceive objects, make use of someartifice in them; the proportion between the parts of the visibleis beauty, between sounds is harmony. . . . Understanding (in-genium) as primary capability, arises with the triumph of arti-fice, with the marvelous masterpiece, in each of the differencesof the objects."*''

The only possible manner in which to approach being cogni-tively and to reach truth in the concept is in differentiating artifi-cially between objects, to the end of perceiving and expressingwith precision the correspondences in the ingenious act of placingin relationship and comparing. That implies that the highest goalof ingenium is to attain truth by proceeding from the correspon-dence, the context. Thus the concept, the agudeza, the "Gracianconceptismo,'^ and ingenium are neither literary nor aesthetic,but primarly acts, method, and possibility of perception.

Agudeza and subtlety are powers created by ingenium, whichare expressed in the concept and reveal the correspondence andthe relationships which ingenium is able to perceive in objects. Inthis fashion ingenium engenders concepts and on the basis of theexpressed correspondence, truth, agudeza, and subtlety becomeevident and objective for us. Gracian confirnsis this in the contin-uation of his definition of the concept: "The same consonance orexpressed artificial correlation is the objective subtlety, as seenand admired in the well-known sonnet which Luis de Gongora, incompetition with many others, wrote on the rose."*^ This pas-sage, in which Graci,an speaks of "objective subtlety" (sutilezaobjetiva) we can equally correctly read or interpret as objectivetruth or objective agudeza. From this correspondence, whichthrough ingenium is objectified in the concept and which is an

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imaginative and metaphorical representation of the correspon-dence or correlation between the individual beings, is broughtout the philosophical truth of its objects.

For example, let us turn now to Gongora's sonnet, Vana Rosa("The Vaio Rose") to see how truth, expressed in a beautifulform, appears in practice in the correlation which the ingeniouspoet is able to detect and fashion between the considered object(the rose), its environs, and the existential situation of the objectsto which the rose stands in relationship. The complete truth ofthis work, the truth of the rose, the object of Gongora's inge-nium, comes out of the totality of concepts and objective subtle-ties in the sonnet. If the correspondences and correlations ex-pressed in the concepts conform to reality, then the degree oftruth about the rose achieved by Gongora is proportional to thesum of the relationships he has grasped and has expressed in apoetic and imaginative way by means of ingenium.

Ayer naciste, y irtoriras m,anana;para tan breve ser, ^quieti te did vida?para vivir tan poco, estas lucida,y para nada ser, estas lozana.Si tu hermosura te engaiio mas v,ana,bien presto la veras desvanedda,porque en esa hermostira esta escondidala ocasion de morir muerte temprana.Cuando te corte ia robusta mano,ley de la agricultura perrnitida,grosero ,aliento acabara tti suerte.No saigas, que te aguarda algun tirarto,dilata tu nacer para tu vida,que anticipas tu ser para tu mtierte.

Born yesterday, you will die tomorrowTo live so little you are splendidAnd to be nothing, you are luxuriant.If your beauty tempts yo to more vanityYou will see it soon destroyedFor in this beauty is hiddenThe possibility of dying an early death.

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And if a harsh hand plucks you.The norm of usual gardening,A coarse breath completes your fate.Do not come otit, some tyrant awaitsDelay birth life-longFor your being anticipates your death.'"*

Gongora intends to show the fragile vanity of the rose. To thispurpose he contrasts the short time of its existence with itsbeauty. The relationship achieved in the concept results from thenon-conformity or the antagonism between the objects. "Bornyesterday, you will die tomorrow." In these first lines of thesonnet Gongora has expressed briefly and ingeniously the tem-poral-existential relationship of the rose. He has used six termsto achieve this concept of the shortness of life of the observedobject. Four of them, yesterday, being born, tomorrow, dying,are stated explicitly. The other twoliving, todayalthough theyare already implied, appear spontaneously from the contrast be-tween the first four. The rose lives today, and this is the momentin which Gongora directs to it his imaginative word. From thecorrespondence between the temporal terms, "yesterday," "to-day," "tomorrow," which are connected respectively with thethree situations of life, "being born," "living," "dying," originatehere the concept and the truth about the shortness of the rose'slife.

To this short existence of the opulent growth is contrasted itselegance, qualities which pertain to the rose's beauty. "To live solittle, you are splendid/ And to be nothing, you are luxuriant."The poet is grasping for the comparison between contraries, be-tween brevity, a negative aspect and beauty, a positive aspect.He succeeds in constructing a concept (hacer concepto) by meansof which he is able to express the truth of an object from a newperspective. The correspondence which we perceive in theseverses Graciao calls "contraposition" or "dissonance." Thus hegives to the being of the rose its own plastic and ingenious formby counterposing its evanescence to its beauty. In his contraposi-tion of imaginative concepts and his agudeza Gongora achievesthe truth of being.

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In Gracian one senses a special revereoce for Horace, Mar-tial, Gongora, Marino, etc. Whence this inclination? They werefor him "philosophers in verse." In their verses Gracian dis-covers the ingenious method of searching out truth and corre-spondence by the use of images. In the metaphorical languageof the poem Gracian finds the best means of philosophizing andlearning. He says, "A good method of learning consists in thecombining the useful (truth) with the sweet (beauty). Otherworks of poetry only entertain, but leave the spirit and the soulempty."*' The metaphorical and ingenious expression of corre-spondences is not merely empty or beautiful representation, butprimarily an affirmation of the truth of being. Gracian writes onGongora: "This educated poet was in concentos like a swan, inconcepts like an eagle; outstanding in every kind of agudeza,but in this kind of contraposition consists the triumph of hisgreat ingenium."^" Concento or harmonious music is the termfor the harmonic song of several voices; and if it can be saidthat pleasant harmony is produced through the combination ofsounds in accord, then Gongora can be said to sing io a philo-sophical fashion, the harmonic agreement between the objectsachieved with the assistance of the concepts of his ingenium.Contrast is for Gongora a clear perception and a philosophicalcomparison; he compares an object with its contrary, as we haveseen in his sonnet oo the rose. The manner in which this rela-tionship and the contrast is expressed is at the same time philo-sophical and aesthetic.

This kind of ingenium, of contrasting the unique and the real,contradicts "ratio" and the rational method. "Ratio" neglectscomparison of things; it affirms and establishes them in deriving aconclusion, a logical concept, or a definition of being generallyfrom premisses. In the sonnet we have seen that the rose is noisolated object aod does oot appear so. Gongora captures therelationship which obtains between the rose aod the man andcalls attention to it. The short life and the death of the rose aredependent not only oo its natural constitution. Its fate is alsosubordinated to the human will. The beauty of the rose seducesthe man to curiosity and attention. He can pluck it and own it;and in this sense it is precisely the rose's beauty which can hasten

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its death; it becomes the cause of the shortness of its life. In thetercets Gongora pursues this relationship. Being boro presup-poses a real contradictioodying. To prefer its being, its life,means for the rose to hasten its non-being, its death.

If we were to define the rose rationally as Aristotle does incalling man a "rational being," we would have to say that "therose is a dicotyledonary plant." Our formulation is abstract; iri ageneral fashion we express the genus and the species of the rose.The concept "plant" can be applied indifferently to "everythingthat lives and which is bound by roots to the earth." In this sense,bamboo and soybeans are plants, though they are not roses. Butif we add the word, "dicotyledonary," the rational and specificscientific differentiation of the rose, we are still not outside theterrain of the general, since strawberries, almood trees, and peartrees are also dicotyledonary. Also dicotyledoo,ary are the variouskinds of roses.^' How can we find a suitable way to express theessence of the rose, aod from it to build a concept? Will it benecessary to reach for the syllogism to express the truth of theobject? Which method and language must be used to recognizeand to express the truth of being? Is it possible to reduceknowledge to the definition? Is there another kind of concept,which is not rational and is yet philosophical?

The language of the syllogism for Aristotle is an expression anda relationship of logical concepts with universal validity. Accord-ing to the Greek philosopher at least one premiss must be generalin order that a conclusion can be drawn (Prim. AnaL 41b, 8).The objects are grasped by understanding in their totality, ab-stracted iotellectually according to a priori schemata and unprov-able principles. This language, which canoot be an expression forthe unique aod the relative, blocks the possibility of any unifica-tion and relationship among real objects. Otherwise than in thevalue judgment of Maier^' we recognize in neither the syllogismnor the logical, rational language the power on which objectiveprogress which recognizes the human factor can be based.

In contrast, for Gracian, the metaphor, the image, and the inge-nious concepts are re-expressions of the related, the individual,the relative, aod the coocrete. Ingenium comprehends that whichrationality rejects or which evades its laws. In the language of

260 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INGENIUM

ingenium the conceptual images are results and living visions ofsimilarities. The metaphorical transference of the normal sense ofwords into another, figurative one has, io Gracian, an aim which atthe same time is practical, illuminating, plastic, cognitive, andaesthetic. The Gracian researchers (critics) affirm only the aes-thetic aspect of the Graciao concepto and correspondences, ex-pressed through ingenium. We have seen that the chief character-istic of the imaginative concept and of ingenium is something else.According to Graciao both achieve a philosophical dimension. Heaffirms in his work, Agudeza y arte de ingenio, that "All wise menhave aimed for one and the same goal of philosophical truth, albeitin different ways, of discovery and agudeza.''^^

The metaphor aod the concepto of Gracian seek and ioform thesense and make the truth of being perceptible "in a pathetic way"through the correspondences between objects. Gracian'^ s idea oftruth, thus, is not rational or logical, but imaginative and inge-nious. Ooly ingenium is able, through images, to perceive and torepresent the most varied and distant relationships between indi-vidual beings. Pierre Reverdy affirms that "the more distant andfitting are the relationships between two realities we approach,the stronger the image will be, and the more it will possess pow-erful feelings and poetic reahty."'''

The axiomatic language of premisses, a blank form for "ra-tio" and the demonstrative science, is, to the extent that it isrational and logical, opposed to the language of ingenium. Theformer is cold, intellectual, rigorous, and sterile; aod, to theextent that it is concerned with an outmoded language, foreignand conventional.'^

The imaginative and metaphorical language proceeds from thefertility of ingenium and is dynamic, suggestive, aod plastic. Itdirectly stimulates the wheels of imagination and creativity in thehuman spirit.''

Translated by Oliver Olson

Herzog August BibliothekWolfenbuttel, West Germany

EMILIO HIDALGO SERNA 261

NOTES

'Cl Emilio Hidalgo Sern,a, Filosofia del ingenio y del concepto en BaltasarGracian (Rome, 1976).^M. Menendez y Pelayo, "Poetica conceptista: Baltasar Gracian." Obras comple-

tas, Historia de las ideas esteticas en Espana, Vol. 2. (Madrid, 1950), p. 355.^B, Croce, "I trattatisti italiani del Concettismo e Baltasar Gracian." Problemi di

Estetica e contributi alia storia dell'estetica itatiana (B,ari, 1940), p. 313.'R. Verneaux, Les sources cartesiermes et kantiennes de ridealisme Frangais

(Paris, 1936), p. 19.*C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Vol, 1 (Graz, 1955), p. 135.'"Dass hier (im Begriff) das logische und das ontologisehe Moment zusammen-

treffen. , . . So muss unsere Untersuchung iiber die aristotelische Lehre vomBegriffe. . . . Notweodig auch die metaphysische Geltung des, begrifflichen Denk-ens in sich eioschliessen." C, Prantl, ibid., pp, 210-11.'Thus at the beginning of the Prior Analytics when Aristotle sets his goals he is

flrst forced to make precise definitions of the concept, premisses, and the s,yllo-gism: "Our first duty is to state the scope of our inquiry, aod to what science itpertains: that it is concerned with demonstration, and pertains to a demonstrativescience. Next-we must define the meaning of 'premiss' and 'term' and 'syllogism'and distinguish between a perfect and an imperfect syllogism," Aristotle, PriorAnalytics, 24 a 10-13.%id., 24b 16-18.'Horn is justifiably disturbed by the secondary position of the concept in tradi-

tional logic: "In der traditionelien Logik erscheint der Begriff zumeist als eineinfaches Gebilde. So wurde er zum Stiefkind der Logik, das sich in den logischenSystemen eine sehr untergeordnete Behandlung gegeniiber dem Urteil, demSchluss Oder der Methodenlehre gef alien lassen muj3te." J .H. Horn, Widerspie-gelung und Begriff. Eine togisch-erkenntnistheoretisehe Untersuchung (Berlin.1958), p. 13,'"Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 24a 12; 24b 16,22,26; 25a 6; 25b 32; 26a 8,12, 14,15,17,21,35,38; 26b 7,12,17,19,25,28."Aristotle, Metaphysics, 989b 18; 1000a 2; 1008a 34; 1009a 5; In these four placesMoerbeke translates horizo by determino. In 1017b 17 and 1033b 22 he expressesthe same verbal form with the Latin termino. In 987a 21; 1002a 6 and 10! Ib 25Moerbeke translates horizomai as definio."Ibid., 980a 21."Ibid., 981a 24-25.'Ibid., 981a 15-16."Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b 9-12."Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982a 1-2,"Ibid,, 992b ,30-33 and Posterior Analytics, 71a 1-2."Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 24a 16-17,"Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1005b 33-34."Ibid., 1031b 20-21."Ibid., 1028b 34-35.^'Ibid., 10i86b33.'^ftid., 1060b 31-32."^"Die Bedeutung der aristotelischen Logik liegt weder in ihrer AUgemeinheit

(denti sie ist eine spezielle Theorie) noch in ihrem philosophischen Tiefsinn (dennsie gerade sorgfaltig vermeidet), noch in ihrer Anwendbarkeit auf konkrete Prob-leme (von der Aristoteles selbst herzlich wenig Gebrauch macht), sondern in ihrer

262 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INGENIUM

beispieihaften Stretige utid logischen Reinheit." G. Patzig, Die aristotelische Syt-logisdk. Logisch-phiMogische Vntersuchungen iiber das Buck a der 'Ersten Ana-lytiken" (Gottingen, 1959), p, 199.^Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 43b 14.^Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1038a 8-9."The object of Gracian's art comes to expression in the complete title of hiswork: Agudeza y arte de ingenio. En que se explkan todos los modos y diferenciasde eonceptos. Cf. Baltasar Gracian, Obras Completas, ed. Arturo del Hoyo (Ma-drid: Aguilar, 1967), p. 236. In the following Gracian is cited only from thisedition.^Ibid., p. 242a.^Gracian, El Heroe, p, 9b.Ibid^'Gracian, Agudeza y arte de ingenio, pp, 238b.^239a.^%id., p.244a.''Ibid."Ibid.''Ibid., p. 241a.*Ibid., p. 237b.''Gracian, El Discreto, p.80b.'"Graciati, El Criticon, Parte I, Crisi III, p. 537a."Gracian, Oraculo manual y arte de prudencia, Nr. 93, p. 179a,*Gracian, El Discreto, p.80b."Gracian, Oraculo mantml y arte de prudencia, Nr. 35, 162b.^ Gracian, Ei Criticon, Parte I, Crisi I, p. 524a.""Gradan, Agudeza y arte de ingenio, p. 467b."Ibid., p. 241b."Ibid., p, 240a.*Ibid., p. 240b."Ibid., p. 240a."'This sonnet, ascribed to Gongora, is cited by Gracian in his Agudeza y arte deingenio, p. 242a.*Ibid., p.434a.*Ibid., p. 257,a."Approximately 3000 varieties of rose are known to botany. Cf. Rororo Pfianzen-lexikon. Vol. 3 (Hambtirg, 1969), p. 687.'^"Er [Aristotle] war der erste, der im Syllogismus die begrundende Kraft desGedankenfoTtschritts erkaunte, sein eigentCimliches Wesen aufsuchte und seineversciiiedenen Formen zusammenstellte." H. Maier, Die Syliogistik des Aristo-teles, Tei! 1, Die logische Theorie des Urteils bei Aristoteles (Tubingen, 1896),p . i ,

Gracian, Agtideza y arte de ingenio, p. 478a.''R, Gomez de la Serna, Greguerias (Madrid, 1972), p. 10.''"But while every sentence has meaning, though not as an instrument of naturebut, as we observed, by convention, not all can be called propositions," Aristotle,De Interpretatione, p, 17a 1-2.*In his Macht des Bildes: Ohnmaeht der rationalen Sprache (Cologne: DuMont,1970) Ernesto Grassi makes ,a clear distinction between the two are,as. Especiallyinteresting is part three of his book, in which he interprets the pathetic, movingpower of the image in Gorgias' Praise of Helena. He then treats ingenium, themetaphor, and the unity of "res" and "verba" in the humanistic tradition, defend-ing the worth of rhetoric. In Marxismus und Humanismm (Hamburg: Rowohit,1973) Grassi brings the philosophical questions of Italian humanism up to date by

EMILIO HIDALGO SERNA 263

criticizing a priori sdence and thought and develops the function of imagination inthought according to Giambattista Vieo out of the confrontation with the Marxistpoint of view. Grassi dedicates another work to the imagination, the language ofimages, and the metaphor: Die Macht der Phantasie. Zur Geschichteabendlandischen Denkens (Konigstein: Athenaum, 1979). fSee review in this is-sue.ED. j