Thayer China's Defence Cooperation With Southeast Asia

8/14/2019 Thayer China's Defence Cooperation With Southeast Asia

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Chinas International Security Cooperation Diplomacy

and Southeast Asia

Carlyle A Thayer

Professor of Politics and

Director UNSW Defence Studies Forum

The University of New South Wales at

the Australian Defence Force Academy

[email protected]

Paper to panel on

Southeast Asia and China:

A North-South Relationship of a New Kind

47th International Studies Association Annual Convention

Town & Country Resort & Convention Center

San Diego, California

March 25, 2006


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Chinas International Security Cooperation Diplomacy

and Southeast Asia

Carlyle A. Thayer

Abstract

This paper provides an overview of Chinas international security cooperation diplomacy withthe states of Southeast Asia. China has pursued international security cooperation bothmultilaterally and bilaterally.

In March 1997, China broached for the first time what it termed its New Concept of Security at

a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). In 2003, in amajor development, China and ASEAN reached agreement on a Strategic Partnership for Peaceand Prosperity that included cooperation in security matters.

Between 1999 and 2000, China negotiated long-term cooperative framework agreements with tenof the regions states (East Timor excepted). Six of these agreements included a clause coveringsecurity cooperation. The six signatories included: Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines,Singapore, and Thailand. China already had long-standing defense links with Myanmar. Inaddition, China developed security cooperation ties with, Cambodia, Vietnam and Indonesia.

The paper reviews the nature and scope of Chinas bilateral international security cooperation inthe period after 2002 when China revised this concept and began a renewed effort to promotesecurity cooperation on a multilateral basis within the ARF.

Chinas New Security Concept

In the 1990s, China began to develop and articulate a new concept of security.The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War altered the contextof Chinese security thinking. According to Wu Baiyi, Deputy Director of theResearch Department, China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies,starting from 1993, policy planners and academics began quietly to amend thecountrys security strategy. After years of work, a renewed security concept cameinto being.1 This concept expanded the definition of security to include political,defense, diplomatic and above all economic considerations. According to Wu:

[w]hat China pursues now is a security of sustained development. Thechange is a landmark The nature of its security policy, therefore, isaccommodative, rather than confrontational Compared to past policies, the

1Wu Baiyi, The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution,Journal of ContemporaryChina,10(27), 2001, 278.


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current concept signifies two major changes For the first time economicsecurity is treated as equally important with those of high politics. Second, itfocuses more on the interrelationship between external and internal securitychallenges.

Other specialists point to the catalytic events of 1996 as having a major impact inshaping Chinas new security concept. For example, Chu Shulong, Senior Fellowat the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, argues:

[s]ince the early 1970s till the middle of the 1990s, China actually liked to seeAmerica remaining [sic] its military presence and alliance system in Asia as auseful counter force against the Soviet threat. That position changed since1996 when the U.S. and Japan started to negotiate the new guideline for theirsecurity cooperation. The Chinese feel offended and threatened by theenlarging area of American-Japanese security cooperation from defendingJapan to dealing with events in the areas of surrounding Japan Since then,

in the public statements, Chinese position has been strongly against U.S.-Japan security alliance and no longer welcome American military presence inthe region.2

Chu also noted, however, that the real Chinese position is complicated andflexible. It opposes U.S.-Japan security alliance but does not challenge U.S.-Korean alliance in Northeast Asia.

Banning Garret and Bonnie Glaser, two American China specialists, argue alongsimilar lines. They claim that Chinas paradigm shift was not only a reaction tothe revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, but also due to the dispatch twocarrier groups to the Taiwan Straits in March 1996 as a response to Chinese

military threats against Taiwan.3 These twin developments led Chinese militaryand civilian leaders to re-evaluate whether the U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S.forward deployed forces were a strategic benefit or a greater threat to Chinesesecurity. According to Garret and Glaser: this strategic conundrum has ledBeijing to search for a means to counterbalance the strengthening of the U.S.- Japan alliance and bolster Chinese leverage over Washington while notforeclosing the possibility of improving relations with the United States.4

2Chu Shulong, The Chinese Thinking on Asia-Pacific Regional Security Order, Paper deliveredto a seminar at the East-West Center, Honolulu, May 2001, 1.

3Banning Garrett, and Bonnie Glaser, 1997. China Works on its Design for a New AsianSecurity Structure, International Herald Tribune, June 28-29, 1997, 44.

4Ibid.


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Chinas New Security Concept and Southeast Asia

How does Chinas new security concept relate to Chinas relations withSoutheast Asia? Significantly, the new security concept was first introduced byChinese officials at the ASEAN Regional Forum conference on confidence

building measures held in Beijing in March 1997. In July of that year, ChineseForeign Minister Qian Qichen discussed the new security concept in his addressto the 4th ARF meeting in Malaysia. An authoritative elaboration of the newsecurity concept on Chinas relations with Southeast Asia appeared in ChinasNational Defense, a White Paper released in July 1998.5 This document stressedChinas support for regional-security dialogue and cooperation at differentlevels, through various channels and in different forms, including the ASEANRegional Forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific(CSCAP). The Chinese White Paper also endorsed the ARFs creativeexplorations for the promotion of confidence-building measures in such areas asmilitary medicine, military law, and multilateral cooperation on conversion ofmilitary technologies and facilities for civilian use.

A subsequent Defense White Paper, Chinas Defense in 2000, added additionalcommentary on the role of preventive diplomacy.6 It stated:

China holds that the ARF should continue to focus on confidence-buildingmeasures, explore new security concepts and methods, and discuss thequestion of preventive diplomacy. At the same time, it believes that theparties concerned should have a full discussion first on the concept,definition, principles and scope of preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacificregion and reach consensus in this regard.

According to China analyst, Ronald Montaperto, two of the defining features ofthat document [the 2000 Defense White Paper] were the emphasis on thedominance of peace and development as forces driving global development anda corollary imperative toward implementing external policies based uponmultilateral cooperative approaches.7

5Peoples Republic of China, State Council, Information Office, Chinas National Defense, Full Textof the White Paper on Chinas National Defense, Xinhua News Agency [Beijing], July 27, 1998.

6Peoples Republic of China, State Council, Information Office, Chinas National Defense in 2000,Text of PRC White Paper on National Defense in 2000, Xinhua Domestic Service [Beijing],October 16, 2001.

7Ronald Montaperto, Thinking Globally, Acting Reginally, Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 6(4), 4th Quarter, October-December 2004.


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Vice President Hu Jintao elaborated on Chinas new security concept andSoutheast Asia in July 2000 during the course of a visit to Indonesia. In a majorspeech delivered to the Indonesian Council on World Affairs. According to Hu:

a new security concept that embraces the principles of equality, dialogue,trust and cooperation, and a new security order should be established toensure genuine mutual respect, mutual cooperation, consensus throughconsultation and peaceful settlement of disputes, rather than bullying,confrontation, and imposition of ones own will upon others. Only in thatway can countries coexist in amity and secure their development.8

Two close observers of Southeast Asias security scene analyzed Hus visit inthese terms:

China [through Hu Jintao] has made it official policy to gain influence inSoutheast Asia by contrasting its behaviour in the region with that of the U.S.The implication was clear: Not only can China be a good neighbour, but

Southeast Asia would benefit from partnering with Beijing rather than theU.S., which typically sees political and economic reform as prerequisites foramicable relations. While China has long inferred as much, Hus speechmarked the first time that the message was framed as a formal policy.9

In 2002, after failing to gain much traction, China launched a high-profilereiteration of its new concept of security to the mid-year meeting of ARFministers. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan asserted that Chinas new securityconcept should supplant Cold War bilateral alliances as the new basis of regionalsecurity practice.10

Chinas 2004 Defense White Paper sets forth Chinas approach to internationalsecurity cooperation in detail. In chapter seven, for example, China spells out itspolicy on international cooperation in the area of defense-related science,technology and industry including the export of military products and relatedtechnologies. Exports in this sensitive area are governed by three principles: Itshould only serve the purpose of helping the recipient state enhance itscapability for legitimate self-defense; it must not impair peace, security and

8Quoted in Carlyle A. Thayer, Chinas New Security Concept and ASEAN, ComparativeConnections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 2(3), 3rdQuarter, October 2000, 65-75.

9Mark Mitchell and Michael Vatikiotis, China Steps in Where U.S. Fails, Far Eastern EconomicReview, November 23, 2000, 20-22.

10Lyall Breckon, Beijing Pushes Asia for the Asians, ComparativeConnections: An E-Journal onEast Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 4(3), 3rd Quarter, July-September2002.


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stability of the relevant region and the world as a whole; and it must not be usedto interfere in the recipient states internal affairs.11

Chapter nine of the 2004 White Paper deals with international securitycooperation in five main areas: strategic consultation and dialogue; regionalsecurity cooperation; cooperation in non-traditional security fields, participatingin UN peacekeeping operations; and military exchanges. Chapter nine clearlystresses the importance China places on its interaction with ASEAN and theASEAN Regional Forum (see discussion below).

The following section will review briefly the structure of China-ASEAN relationsand Chinas bilateral relations with Southeast Asian states.

Chinas Multilateral Relations with Southeast Asia

ASEAN

Ten of Southeast Asias eleven countries are members of ASEAN (East Timor isthe exception). Chinas relations with Southeast Asia are structured on amultilateral basis with ASEAN and bilaterally with each of its individualmembers. Formal linkages between China and ASEAN date to 1991 whenChinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attended the 24th ASEAN MinisterialMeeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur as a guest of the Malaysian government. Qianexpressed Chinas interest in developing cooperation with ASEAN in the field ofscience and technology. ASEAN responded positively. In September 1993,ASEAN Secretary General Dato Ajit Singh led a delegation to China for talkswith Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan that led in July 1994 to formalagreement to establish two joint committees one on science and technology

cooperation and the other on economic and trade cooperation. Also in July 1994,China and ASEAN agreed to open consultations on political and security issuesat the senior official level. The first ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting(SOM) was held in Hangzhou in April 1995.

China spelled out its view of relations with ASEAN during the course of a visitto Thailand by President Jiang Zemin in September 1999. In a major speech Jiangargued:

Hegemonism and power politics still exist and have even developed in theinternational political, economic and security fields. The new Gunboat

Policy and the economic neo-colonialism pursued by some big powers haveseverely undermined the sovereign independence and the development

11Peoples Republic of China, State Council, Information Office Chinas National Defense in 2004(Beijing: December 27, 2004).


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interests of many small- and medium-sized countries, and have threatenedworld peace and international security.12

In 1996, China was accorded dialogue partner status by ASEAN and in February1997 ASEAN and China formalized their cooperation by establishing theASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC). The ACJCC first met inBeijing where it was decided that the ACJCC would act as the coordinator forall the ASEAN-China mechanisms at the working level.13 As a dialogue partner,China regularly participates in the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference(PMC) consultation process. This takes the form of a meeting between ASEANand its ten dialogue partners (ASEAN Ten Plus Ten), and a meeting between allASEAN members and each of its dialogue partners (ASEAN Ten Plus One).

China-ASEAN relations advanced in November 2002 with the signing of threemajor documents: Framework Agreement on Comprehensive EconomicCooperation Between ASEAN Nations and the Peoples Republic of China, Joint

Declaration between China and ASEAN on Cooperation in Non-TraditionalSecurity Fields, and Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea(DOC). The first agreement set the scene for the China-ASEAN Free TradeAgreement. The joint declaration on non-traditional security was formalized in aMemorandum of Understanding in January 2004. The MOU followed a specialmeeting held in Bangkok in April 2003 to discuss joint action to deal with theSevere Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic.14 In early 2004, China andASEAN agreed to set up a Joint Working Group to implement the thirdagreement, the DOC. The first meeting of this group was held in the Philippinesthe following year.

In September 2003, Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of theNational Peoples Congress, proposed joint oil exploration and development inareas of overlapping claims in the South China Sea. This proposal was reiteratedat the 8th China-ASEAN Summit in November 2004 by Premier Wen Jiabao whostated that China is willing to shelve disputes while going for jointdevelopment. In March 2005, in a major break through, the national oilcompanies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed a landmark agreementto conduct joint prospecting for oil and gas in the South China Sea. The followingmonth, President Hu Jintao repeated Chinas call to shelve disputes and engage

12Xinhua News Agency, September 3, 1999.

13 Joint Press Release, The First ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting, Beijing,February 26-28 ,1997.

14In September 2003, Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House, proposed that the Philippines shouldform an anti-terror alliance with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the members of the ShanghaiCooperation Organization (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).


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in joint development in the South China Sea during the course of state visits toBrunei, Indonesia and the Philippines.15

Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity

In October 2003 Chinas relations with ASEAN moved to a new plane with

Beijings accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and thedeclaration of a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity by the heads ofgovernment.16 This latter document was given flesh in December 2004 with theadoption of a five-year Plan of Action (2005-2010). Included in this plan, inter alia,was a commitment to increase regular high-level bilateral visits, cooperation inthe field of non-traditional security, security dialogue and military exchangesand cooperation. The Plan of Action set out the following:

Promote mutual confidence and trust in defense and military fields with aview to maintaining peace and stability in the region;

Conduct dialogues, consultations and seminars on security and defenseissues;

Strengthen cooperation on military personnel training; Consider observing each others military exercises and explore the

possibility of conducting bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises;and

Explore and enhance cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.The China-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace andProsperity is the first formal agreement of this type between China and a

regional organization, as well as a first for ASEAN itself. The joint declarationitself is wide ranging and includes a provision for the initiation of a new securitydialogue as well as general cooperation in political matters. China raised theprospect of enhanced strategic relations with ASEAN in discussions betweenState Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong inBeijing in July 2004.

But ASEAN has been shy of advancing too quickly. In May 2004, during thecourse of a visit to Beijing by Malaysias new prime minister, Abdullah Badawi,his Chinese counterpart, Premier Wen Jiabao, suggested they consider a jointundertaking to maintain the security of sea lines of communication through the

Malacca Strait. The following month, the deputy director of Chinas National

15Xinhuanet, Beijing, July 19, 2005 in Peoples Liberation Army Daily, July 20, 2005.

16Lyall Breckon, A New Strategic Partnership is Declared, ComparativeConnections: An E-Journalon East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 5(4), 4th Quarter, October-December 2003.


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Defense University, reiterated this proposal at a China-ASEAN forum inSingapore. The proposal was received coolly and with considerable skepticismby the audience.17 However, in October 2005 during the course of SingaporePrime Minister Lee Hsien Loongs visit to China, he and Premier Wen Jiabaoagreed to work closely to meet the threat of terrorism and piracy in the Straits of

Malacca.18 At the end of the year, a joint communiqu issued after the China-Malaysia summit in Kuala Lumpur, welcomed Chinas role in enhancing thesecurity of the Straits of Malacca.

ASEAN Regional Forum

China was also admitted into the ASEAN Regional Forum where it has givencautious endorsement to multilateral security activities. The ARF meets annuallyin conjunction with the AMM and PMC. Generally, the ARF considers regionalsecurity and political matters, while the ASEAN PMC considers economic anddevelopment cooperation and other international issues that do not fall within

the purview of the ARF.In June 2003, China launched a major initiative at furthering its new concept ofsecurity. At the annual ARF ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh, China proposedthe creation of a new Security Policy Conference comprised of senior (viceminister level) military and civilian officials drawn from all ARF members.19 Theobjective of this new policy conference would be to draft a new security treaty topromote peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Chinese officials said thenew treaty would give equal attention to the concerns of all ARF members andguarantee security through united action rather than seeking absolute securityfor oneself and threaten[ing] other parties security. China agreed to draft and

circulate a concept paper.China has taken an active role in the ARFs inter-sessional work program relatedto confidence building measures. In September 2000, it hosted the 4th ARFmeeting of the Heads of Defense Colleges. The meeting was opened by ChiHaotian, Chinas Defense Minister, who argued in his address that the ARFsstress on dialog and consultation represented a new security concept and thetrend of multi-polarization in the region. Chi noted that regional flash pointsstill exist, hegemonism and power politics have shown new traces ofdevelopment and democracy and human rights were being used as excuses

17Ronald Montaperto, Smoothing the Wrinkles, Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on EastAsian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 6(2), 2nd Quarter, April-June 2004.

18China to work with Singapore and region to fight terror & sea piracy, Channel News Asia,October 25, 2005.

19Lyall Breckon, SARS and a New Security Initiative from China, ComparativeConnections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 5(2), 2nd Quarter, April-June 2003.


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for intervention, and separatism was gaining ground. All these will endanger orjeopardize the security and stability of the region. Thats why we advocate thatall countries adopt the new security concept built upon equality, dialogue,mutual confidence and cooperation.20

China hosted the first ARF Security Policy Conference in November 2004.21China and Myanmar co-hosted two inter-sessional meetings on confidencebuilding measures, one held in Beijing and the other in Yangoon. At the 11thARF Meeting in 2004, China tabled a series of proposals for the futuredevelopment of the ARF. These were summarized in the 2004 White Paper asfollows:

To maintain its forum nature and adhere to the basic principles of decision-making through consensus, taking an incremental approach, and moving at apace comfortable to all member so as to encourage the initiative and activeparticipation of all members; to continuously strengthen and consolidate

confidence-building measures (CBMs) while actively addressing the issue ofpreventive diplomacy, so as to gradually find out cooperative methods andapproaches for preventive diplomacy that are suitable to the region andfitting the current needs; to increase participation of defence officials,promote exchanges and cooperation among militaries of the countriesconcerned and give full play to the important role of the militaries inenhancing mutual trust; to highlight cooperation in non-traditional securityfields such as counter-terrorism and combating transnational crimes.22

In March 2005, China hosted an ARF Seminar on enhancing cooperation in thefield of non-traditional security issues on Hainan Island.

Long-Term Bilateral Cooperation Framework Agreements

Between February 1999 and December 2000, the Peoples Republic of China(PRC) negotiated long-term cooperative framework arrangements with all tenASEAN members: Vietnam, Thailand, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,the Philippines, Burma, Laos and Cambodia.23 Generally these took the form of joint statements signed by foreign ministers or vice premiers. In the case ofVietnam an additional agreement was signed between the secretary-generals ofthe Chinese and Vietnamese communist parties.

20Xinhua News Agency, September 6, 2000.

21The second ARF Security Policy Conference was held in Vientiane, Laos in May 2005. InSeptember 2004, China hosted ARF Workshop on Drug-Substitute Alternative Development.

22Peoples Republic of China, Chinas National Defense in 2004, chapter nine.

23The terms framework agreement framework document and joint statement will be usedinterchangeably.


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Each of the ten cooperative arrangements varies by title. The PRC-Thailanddocument, a Plan of Action for the 21st Century, is the most formal. Three ofthe bilateral agreements use the term framework in their titles. The PRC-Philippines statement is described as a framework for bilateral cooperation in the21st Century. The PRC-Burma agreement is described as a framework of future

bilateral relations and cooperation, while the PRC-Cambodia document istermed a joint statement on the framework of bilateral cooperation. Theremaining six joint statements omit the term framework. The PRC-Indonesiadocument is called a joint statement on the future directions of bilateralcooperation, while the PRC-Malaysia document is called a twelve-point jointstatement on future bilateral cooperation. The PRC-Laos and PRC-Singaporedocuments are described merely as a joint statement on bilateral cooperation.The PRC-Vietnam document is described as a joint statement, while the PRC-Brunei document is termed a joint communiqu. A subsequent PRC-Vietnamagreement was titled a joint statement for comprehensive cooperation in the

new century.Generally, these joint statements affirm that bilateral relations will be based onthe basic norms found in the UN Charter, Five Principles of PeacefulCoexistence, ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and recognizedprinciples found in international law. The China-Vietnam joint statement of1999 omits these references and refers only to previous communiqus signed in1991, 1994 and 1995 as the basis for bilateral relations. The PRC-Vietnam jointstatement of 2000, however, does mention the UN Charter and the FivePrinciples of Peaceful Coexistence but not the ASEAN TAC. The PRC-Singaporestatement omits reference to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the basic

norms of international law; while the PRC-Indonesia statement includes areference to the ten principles adopted by the 1955 Bandung Conference.

All framework documents, while reflecting the specific nature of bilateralrelations, also contain several areas of similarity. For example, all joint statementscall for frequent high-level exchanges and regular consultations. The PRC-Thailand, PRC-Malaysia, PRC-Brunei, PRC-Singapore, PRC-Philippines, PRC-Laos, and PRC-Cambodia statements make provision for annual consultationsbetween foreign ministries. The PRC-Indonesia joint statement calls for regularconsultations between foreign ministers. The PRC-Burma joint statement is lessspecific. Nine of the ten joint statements call for high-level exchanges (Brunei,

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Laos) or exchanges by top leaders (Thailand,Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, and Cambodia). The PRC-Vietnam 1999 jointstatement calls for contact between the party, government departments, massorganizations, and localities of the two countries

All ten joint statements contain a paragraph acknowledging support for a oneChina policy including recognition that Taiwan is part of China (or an integralpart of Chinese territory). The wording in each statement varies slightly. For


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example, the PRC-Indonesia statement reads: The Indonesian side reiterates itscontinuing adherence to the One China policy and its recognition that theGovernment of the Peoples Republic of China is the sole legal governmentrepresenting the entire Chinese people and that Taiwan is an inalienable part ofChina and supports the process of peaceful reunification of China. The PRC-

Cambodia statement also includes support for the peaceful reunification ofChina. The PRC-Laos joint statement declares: the Lao side stands firmlyagainst any attempt to create two Chinas or a China and a Taiwan.

The 1999 PRC-Vietnam joint statement contains a more detailed elaboration onrelations with Taiwan than found in the other statements. This joint statementdeclares: Vietnam maintains only nonofficial economic and trade contacts withTaiwan and will never develop any official relationship with Taiwan. TheChinese side reaffirms that the Taiwan issue is purely that of Chinas internalaffairs. It resolutely opposes the establishment of any form of official relationshipor any contact of an official nature with Taiwan by any country that has

established diplomatic relations with China.

Eight of the joint statements contain a specific pledge by China to respect theindependence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other party. Thiscommitment is omitted from the PRC-Brunei and PRC-Vietnam documents. ThePRC-Indonesia joint statement contains the further elaboration, The Chineseside holds that Indonesias stability, integrity and prosperity are conducive topeace and development in the region, and supports the Indonesian Governmentin its efforts to maintain national unity and territorial integrity and to facilitateethnic reconciliation and promote harmony in the country on the basis ofequality.

The PRC-Vietnam 1999 joint statement contains the mutual pledge to reachagreement on their land border by the end of the year, to demarcate maritimeareas in the Gulf of Tonkin by the end of 2000, and to continue to maintain theexisting mechanism for talks on the offshore problem A land border treatywas signed in 1999 and an agreement on demarcation of maritime areas in theGulf of Tonkin was signed the following year.

With the exception of the PRC-Vietnam and PRC-Thailand statements, all other joint statements include the pledge to consult and cooperate in variousmultilateral forums including the United Nations, ASEAN, and ASEAN Plus

Three (or some form of wording in support of East Asian cooperation). Seven joint statements also include the ASEAN Regional Forum (Vietnam, Thailandand Cambodia excepted). Five joint statements include APEC and AESM (PRC-Malaysia, PRC-Brunei, PRC-Indonesia, PRC-Singapore, and PRC-Myanmar).Four joint statements also included the WTO (PRC-Malaysia, PRC-Indonesia,PRC-Singapore, and PRC-Myanmar). Only the PRC-Indonesia joint statementincludes a reference to the Non-Aligned Movement.


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Joint statements between China and Laos, Myanmar and Thailand pledgedsupport for Quadrangle Economic Cooperation and for the Mekong Sub-region,the China-Cambodia joint statement mentioned support for the Mekong Sub-Region only. These references do not appear in the PRC-Vietnam joint statement.

Bilateral Defense CooperationSix of Chinas bilateral long-term cooperative framework agreements makereference to various forms of defense cooperation. The PRC-Thailand, PRC-Malaysia, PRC-Singapore, and PRC-Philippines joint statements include a majorparagraph on defense cooperation. The PRC-Thailand statement reads: The twosides agree to strengthen security cooperation through confidence-buildingmeasures. This will include enhanced cooperation between their strategic andsecurity research institutes, strengthened consultations between their militarypersonnel and diplomatic officials on security issues, exchange between theirarmed forces of experience in humanitarian rescue and assistance and disaster

reduction and exchanges of military science and technology as well asinformation of all kinds.

The relevant paragraph of the PRC-Malaysia joint statement states: To promotedefense cooperation by facilitating the exchange of visits at various levels,including study visits, ship visits, training, exchange of information/intelligence,organizing seminars, and undertaking mutual/beneficial research anddevelopment besides exchange of high ranking military officers. In the area ofdefense industry, both sides will encourage reciprocal visits by officials of thedefense industry companies and organize exhibitions, seminars and workshopsto explore the possibility of identifying joint or co-production projects.

The PRC-Singapore document states: Both sides will promote securitycooperation by facilitating exchange of high-level visits, dialogue betweendefense institutions, cooperation between their strategic security researchinstitutes, exchanges between professional groups of their armed forces andexchange of port calls. The PRC-Philippines joint statement declares: The twosides agree to make further exchanges and cooperation in the defense andmilitary fields, strengthen consultations between their military and defensepersonnel and diplomatic officials on security issues, to include exchangesbetween their military establishments on matters relating to humanitarian rescueand assistance, disaster relief and mitigation, and enhance cooperation betweentheir respective strategic and security research institutes.

The PRC-Laos joint statement pledged that both sides would further strengthenthe friendly exchange and cooperation between the defense institutions andarmed forces of the two countries through maintaining high-level exchange ofvisits and expanding exchanges of experts. The PRC-Brunei joint statement


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merely expressed their mutual interest in exploring possible cooperation inscience and technology and defense.

Chinas International Security Cooperation with Southeast Asia

Military Exchanges Between China and Southeast Asia

Table 1 sets out that data on high-level bilateral military exchanges betweenChina and the ten members of ASEAN from 2002 until March 2006. Particularlynoticeable are the regular exchanges at ministerial level and the frequency ofother high-level contacts. These high-level of exchanges have involved not onlyan exchange of views on global and regional strategic matters but have resultedin various forms of tangible activities by the armed forces concerned. These aredepicted in the tables below.

Table 1

Military Exchanges Between China and Southeast Asia, 2002-06

Country Activity

Brunei 2002 June Commander Royal Brunei Armed Forces visits Beijing

2003 September PLA Chief of General Staff visits Brunei

2003 November two PLAN ships pay port visit

2004 September Commander of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces visits Beijing

2004 November PLA Commander, Shenyang Military Area Command, visitsBrunei

Cambodia 2002 September Cambodias Co-Ministers of Defense visit

2002 October senior Cambodian army commanders visit

2003 November Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Deputy Commander-in-Chiefand concurrently Army Commander visits

2004 May-June Director, General Bureau of Logistics and Finance, CambodianMinistry of Defense, visits Beijing

2004 October Commander-in-Chief Royal Cambodian Armed Forces visits Beijing

2005 May the Secretary of Cambodias Ministry of National Defense visits Beijing

Indonesia 2002 January Indonesias Navy Chief of Staff pays visit

2002 September Chinas Defense Minister pays visit


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2003 September Secretary General of Indonesias Department of Defense visitsBeijing

2003 November Indonesias Army Chief of Staff visits

2004 February Indonesias Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and SecurityAffairs visits Beijing and meets with PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff

2004 May Indonesian naval ship visit to Shanghai

Laos 2002 February Lao Minister of Defense pays visit

2002 July senior Lao Peoples Army delegation visits

2004 June Chief, General Political Department, Lao Peoples Army, visits Beijing

2004 December PLA Deputy Director of the General Political Department paysvisit

Malaysia 2002 August Malaysian naval ship makes goodwill visit

2003 September PLA Chief of General Staff visits Malaysia

2005 September Malaysias Deputy Prime Minister meets in Beijing with ChinasDefense Minister and agree on bilateral strategic cooperation

2005 September Secretary General of Malaysias Defense Ministry visits Beijing tosign MOU on defense cooperation

Myanmar 2002 December Myanmars Army Chief of Staff visits

2003 January Senior General Than Shwe, SPDC chairman and General KhinNyunt, SPDC Secretary 1 visit Beijing

2003 August Senior General Maung Aye, Deputy Commander-in-Chief ofDefense Services and Army Commander-in-Chief visits Beijing

2003 November-December PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff visits

2004 July Myanmars Chief of the Air Defense Forces visits Beijing

2004 December PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff visits

2005 December PLA delegations visits Yangoon both sides pledge to developfriendly ties between the two armed forces

Philippines 2002 April Secretary of Defense visits Beijing

2002 June Commander of the Philippines Air Force visits

2002 June first visit by Philippine navy ships to Shanghai

2002 September Chinas Defense Ministers pays visit2002 China offered five places in Chinese military courses, and invited thePhilippines to participate in joint naval exercises

2003 November-December Commander Jinan Military Area Command visits

2004 April Philippines Air Force Commander visits

2004 September Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines visits Beijing


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2004 November Philippines Defense Secretary visits Beijing

2005 May PLA Deputy chief of Staff visits the Philippines

Singapore 1997 Singapores Defense Minister visits Beijing

1998 Chinas Defense Minister visits Singapore

1998 November RSS Intrepid visit s Shanghai and Qindao

2002 May two PLAN ships visit Changi naval base

2003 November two PLAN ships Changi naval base

2003 November PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff visits

2004 February Director of the Singapore Armed Forces Joint IntelligenceDirectorate visits

? Singapore hosts a fourteen-nation sea exercise that included most of the ASEANstates and China

2005 November Singapores Defense Minister visits Beijing [last visit in 1997]

2006 March RSS Endurance pays port visit to China

Thailand 2002 June Supreme Commander Royal Thai Armed Forces pays visit to Beijing

2003 September Defense Minister, National Security Adviser and the three servicechiefs join the Thai Prime Minister on an official visit to Beijing

2003 September Undersecretary of Thai Ministry of Defense visits Beijing toattend 2nd defense security consultation

2003 November Commander of the Royal Thai Army visits

2003 November-December Commander Jinan Military Area Command visits

2004 March-April Chinas Defense Minister visits Bangkok2004 August Director of the Office of Strategic Research, Thai National DefenseResearch Institute visits Beijing

2004 August two Royal Thai Navy frigates visit Shanghai

2004 October PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff visits

2004 December Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department paysvisit

2005 June Chinas Defense Minister meets the Thai Army Commander-in-Chief

2005 July Thai Minister of Defense visits Beijing

2005 December PLAN Shenzhen destroyer and supply ship make port visits andhold joint search and rescue exercise with the Royal Thai Navy in Gulf ofThailand

2006 January Thai Defense Minister visits Beijing

2006 February Delegation from the Thai National College and National DefenseStudies Institute visits Beijing


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Vietnam 2001 November PLANJiangwei-II guided missile frigate makes port call in Ho ChiMinh City

2002 October Chief of the General Political Department of the Vietnam PeoplesArmy (VPA) visits Beijing

2003 January the Commander of the Chengdu Military Region visits Vietnam

2003 September Delegation of young PLA service personnel visits Vietnam

2003 October-November VPA Chief of General Staff visits Beijing

2004 February-March PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff visits

2004 December PLA Deputy Director of the General Political Department paysvisit

2005 October Defense Minister visits Beijing and reaches agreement on joint navalpatrols in Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu); the defense Ministers also discussed defenseindustry cooperation

Strategic Cooperation and DialogueTable 2 lists the formal security dialogues that China has initiated with SoutheastAsia. Chinas initiated its first bilateral security consultation with Thailand. In2005 it held security dialogues for the first time with the Philippines and Vietnamand reached agreements with Indonesia and Singapore to do so in future.

Table 2

Chinas Security Dialogues with Southeast Asia, 2002-06

Country Activity Involving China

ASEAN 2003 October China and ASEAN issue a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnershipfor Peace and Prosperity that includes, inter alia, a new security dialogue

2005 July ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Declaration on the Conductof Parties in the South China Sea set up to recommend measures to implement theagreement

Indonesia 2005 April President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Chinas President HuJintao sign a joint declaration on strategic partnership

2005 July President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visits Beijing and signs an

agreement on defense cooperation

Malaysia 2005 September Defense Ministers from China and Malaysia sign MOU ondefense cooperation which sets out a framework for bilateral defense activities

2005 December China-Malaysia Summit issues joint communiqu on expandingstrategic cooperation which, inter alia, promotes exchange of information in non-traditional security areas and consultation and cooperation in defense andsecurity areas, and military exchanges between the two countries


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Philippines 2004 November the Philippines Secretary of Defense and Chinas Minister ofDefense sign a MOU on defense cooperation with a provision for annual defensetalks

2005 May first dialogue on defense and security

Singapore 2005 November Defense Ministers meet in Beijing and agree to hold an annualdefense policy dialogue at permanent secretary level

Thailand 2003 September 2nd defense security consultation held in Beijing

2004 October 3rd defense security consultation

2004 October Chinas State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and Thai Prime MinisterThaksin discuss bilateral strategic cooperation

2004 December Chinas Vice Premier Hui Liangyu and Thai Deputy PrimeMinister Chaturon Chaisaeng meet to promote their strategic partner relationship

2005 June-July Thai Prime Minister Thaksin meets Premier Wen Jiabao in Beijing

to discuss ways to enrich their strategic partnership.

Vietnam 2005 April China and Vietnam hold their first consultations on defensive securityin Beijing

Chinese Military Sales to Southeast Asia

Table 3 lists recently announced military sales and co-productions arrangementswith regional states.

Table 3

Chinese Military Sales to Southeast Asia, 2002-06

Country Activity

Cambodia 2003 November China and Cambodia sign an agreement on militarytraining and equipment

2005 September China donates six patrol boats for use in maritime securityoperations

Indonesia 2002 Indonesias Defense Minister announces he is considering buyingmilitary equipment from China

2003 Indonesian defense delegation visits Beijing to discuss the purchase ofmilitary equipment and future cooperation in research and production ofmilitary systems

2004 November Indonesias Defense Minister announces that Indonesiawill enter into military cooperation with China

2005 April President Hu Jintao pays state visit, China will provide technicalassistance to Indonesias state-owned defense industries


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2005 May Indonesia announces it will cooperate with China in thedevelopment of short to medium range missiles

2005 July China and Indonesia sign a MOU on cooperation in defensetechnology under which China will provide technical assistance toIndonesias aircraft and ship building defense industries and engage in co-

production of ammunition, arms and locally produced missiles

Malaysia 2004 July Malaysia and China sign a technology transfer agreement whichmay include Malaysias procurement of Chinese medium-range surface-to-air missiles

2005 September China and Malaysia sign MOU on defense cooperationcovering training, information exchange and a framework for bilateraldefense activities including a framework for bilateral defense activities

Philippines 2002 China offers the Philippines US$3 million in military assistance toestablish as Chinese-language program for Filipino military personnel anddonate engineering equipment

2005 March China pledges US$1.2 million in military assistance includingengineering equipment (six bulldozers and six graders)

Thailand 2003 September China offers a $600 million loan for the purchase ofweapons and spare parts

2005 May China and Thailand sign a MOU outlining a barter exchange ofThai dried fruit for 96 Chinese armored vehicles (Type WMZ 551B). Thethree-year contract will commence in August 2006.

Vietnam Chinas NORINCO has provided Vietnam with ammunition for small armsand artillery and military vehicles and assisted in co-production ofammunition and heavy machine guns ( Janes Defense Weekly, January 4,2006)

China has not been an active arms merchant in Southeast Asia, except for sales toMyanmar and Thailand during the Cambodian Conflict (1978-91). These detailsare not captured in Table 3 above which covers the period from 2002 until thepresent (March 2006). Since 1990, China has provided Myanmar with US $1.6billion in military assistance and trained substantial numbers of its militarypersonnel. In particular. China has assisted with the modernization ofMyanmars navy, the construction of port facilities in Hainggik and Great CocosIslands, and the upgrading of the Mergui naval base.24

In 2005 China reached agreements with Indonesia and Malaysia involvingdefense industry cooperation. In particular, China indicated a willingness to sell

24BruceVaughn,ChinaSoutheastAsiaRelations:Trends,Issues,andImplicationsfortheUnitedStates.CRS Report for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library ofCongress,February8,2005,16.


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short-range air defense and surface-to-surface missiles. As early as 2002, Chinaand Indonesia began to explore cooperation in defense technology transfer. AnIndonesian delegation to Beijing led by the Secretary General of the DefenseDepartment, Air Marshal Suprihadi, met with senior Chinese defense technologyofficials in September 2003 and discussed the sale of military equipment and

future cooperation in research and defense co-production.

The issue of technology transfer was raised by President Susilo BambangYudhoyono with his Chinese counterpart on the sideline of the Asian-AfricanSummit held in Jakarta in April 2005. At that time Indonesia and China signed anunprecedented statement declaring their relationship a strategic partnership.This represented a dramatic U-turn in Indonesias foreign policy from the NewOrder era. At the same time, the two sides agreed to expand two-way annualtrade by fifty percent to US $20 billion by 2008. China also agreed to provide anadditional US $300 million in preferential loan for infrastructure development.

Speaking after the declaration of the strategic partnership, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono revealed that China had been conducting an assessment ofIndonesias defense-industrial enterprises since 2003. But Indonesia had resistedChinas request for access to documentation on defense capability development.The following month, Indonesias State Minister for Research and Technology,Kusmayanto Kadiman, said that China and Indonesia would sign an agreementon the development of short-, medium- and long-range missiles during PresidentYudhoyonos official visit to China in mid-year. According to Kusmayanto, Weare a maritime country, so state defense should start from there the long-rangemissile for example could be stationed on small islands or vessels. The Ministeralso indicated that cooperation would also take the form of technology transferunder which China would provide one of its missiles for research and study inIndonesia.25

In July 2005, during the course of President Yudhoyonos state visit to Beijing,China and Indonesia signed a bilateral MOU on defense technology cooperationunder which China would provide Indonesia with assistance for thedevelopment of locally produced missiles with ranges up to 150 km. Suchcollaboration would provide benefits to Indonesias struggling defense industry.Some analysts saw this development as Jakartas reaction to Australias decisionto acquire long-range air-to-ground missiles. Under the MOU both sides agreed

to further intensify their bilateral cooperation in defense and military fieldsincluding the establishment of a consultative mechanism for defense andsecurity officials as well as defense-industrial collaboration.26

25RI, China to cooperate in rocket development, The Jakarta Post, May 17, 2005.

26Chinese missile aid for Indonesia, IISS Strategic Comments, August 2006, 11 (6).


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Prior to July, Indonesian spokesmen referred to a missile system with a range offrom fifteen to thirty kilometers, thus suggesting either a medium range surface-to-air missile or a short-range anti-ship missile. But Defense Minister Juwonosreference to a missile with a range of up to 150 km suggested to defenseobservers that Indonesia might be seeking a naval cruise missile or a ballistic

missile similar to that which China provided to Pakistan.

In 2004 Malaysia entered the market for Chinese missiles. In July Deputy PrimeMinister Najib Razak announced that Malaysia had agreed in principle topurchase medium-range missiles from China and that China would transfer veryshort-range air defense technology to Malaysia. But, as noted by one observer,years will pass before the medium-range missiles provided by Beijing can beintegrated into Malaysias force structure in a meaningful way. Indeed there isevery possibility that that aspect of the deal may never be actualized.27

The data in the above tables does not capture the breadth of other defense

cooperation activities undertaken by China and regional states. For example,China has initiated joint military activities with the Philippines and Thailand.China also trains ASEAN military officers at PLA military courses and offersChinese language instruction. Singapore, for its part, has offered places in itsmilitary courses for PLA officers. To take another example, in 2005 Chinadispatched a team of PLA landmine clearance specialists to give a six-weektraining course to Thai military personnel and then to jointly work with the Thaimilitary in mine clearance along the Thai-Cambodia border.28

The section below provides a case study of the range of international securitycooperation activities that China undertakes with Vietnam.

Case Study: China and Vietnam

After a decade-long estrangement during the Cambodian conflict (1978-89),leaders from Hanoi and Beijing normalized their bilateral relations at a secretsummit held in southern China in September 1990. China and Vietnam resumedhigh-level political contact in November 1991, pointedly only after Vietnam hadagreed to a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia.

27Ronald Montaperto, Find New Friends, Reward Old Ones, but Keep All in Line, ComparativeConnections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 6(3), 3rdQuarter, July-September 2004. Montaperto also offered this assessment, [t]he agreement onmissile sales and technology transfer also may indicate a new Chinese willingness to adoptpolicies that suggest that the centrality of Singapore to Chinese relations with ASEAN may be inquestion.

28Xinhua, China helps Thailand train landmine clearance personnel, Peoples Daily Online,September 8, 2005.


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Bilateral political relations between Vietnam and China were later codified byparty leaders who met in Beijing in early 1999.29 Late the following year the twosides signed a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the NewCentury between the Peoples Republic of China and the Socialist Republic ofVietnam.30 Although China signed similar long-term cooperative framework

agreements with all the other members of ASEAN, including six agreementswith a defense cooperation clause, it is notable that no such clause was includedin the Sino-Vietnamese agreement, perhaps because of the contentious nature ofunresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea. According to the jointstatement, [b]oth sides will refrain from taking any action that might complicateand escalate disputes, resorting to force or making threats with force.

Defense contacts were first opened with the exchange of delegations from theVietnamese and Chinese defense ministries External Relations Departments inFebruary and May 1992, respectively. There has been a marked imbalance in theexchange of delegations at the ministerial level. Vietnams defense minister has

visited China four times, while Chinas defense minister has made only one visitto Hanoi. The exchanges at the level of Chief of the General Staff, GeneralPolitical Department and General Logistics Department are more balanced.Contact at the level of service chiefs has been confined to one visit by the PLANavy Air Force in 1997. In November 1991, the Chinese Peoples LiberationArmy Navy made its first port visit to Vietnam.

Defense relations between China and Vietnam up to 2005 almost entirely focusedon exchanges of views on regional security, ideological matters and bordersecurity issues. Table 4 above sets out data on the exchange of delegations at theMilitary Region level. Since the normalization of political relations both Chinaand Vietnam have undertaken to de-mine and to dispose of unexplodedordnance in their frontier area. After the signing of a treaty on their commonborder in December 1999, both sides have begun to physically demarcate thisarea.

In April 2005, in a significant development, China and Vietnam held their firstround of consultations on defensive security in Beijing.31 Xiong Guangkai,deputy chief PLA Chief of the General Staff and his counterpart, Nguyen DucSoat, conducted the discussions. According to media reports, the two exchangedviews on international and regional security, defense and army-building and

the relationship between the two nations and the two armed forces.

29Xinhua Domestic Service, February 27, 1999.

30Vietnam News Agency, December 25, 2000.

31China, Vietnam hold first round of defensive security consultations, Xinhuanet, Beigjing,April 11, 2005.


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Table 4

Exchanges at Military Region Level

Between China and Vietnam, 1996-2003

To Vietnam From Vietnam

1996 January Guangzhou Military Region

1997 February Jinan Military Region

1997 June Chengdu Military Region

1998 July Chengdu Military Region

2000 January Jinan Military Region

2000 July Chengdu Military Region2002 April Guangzhou Military Region

2003 January Chengdu Military Region

1997 April Military Region 2

1999 November Military Region 3

Soat also met with Xu Caihou, vice chairman of the Central Military Commissionand Liang Guanglie, PLA Chief of the General Staff. Xu quoted the famousChinese character depiction of Sino-Vietnamese relations popularized by formerPresident Jiang Zemin who said China pursued a policy toward Vietnam oflooking to the future, boosting good neighborly friendship and exploring theall-around collaboration. Xu offered the view that the PLA was willing to

continuously strengthen the friendly and cooperative ties with the VPA andpromote all-round development of friendly ties.32 In reply Soat stated thatVietnam too hoped to reinforce the cooperation between the two armed forces.This these of future cooperation also featured in the discussions between LiangGuanglie and Nguyen Duc Soat. Liang stressed that China was willing to makejoint efforts with the Vietnamese side to push for new development of friendlyrelations between the two militaries.33

In July 2005, a PLA delegation led by chairman Zhang Yi Min paid a weeklongvisit to Vietnam at invitation of Deputy Minister of National Defense, NguyenHuy Hieu. During the course of his stay, Zhang held talks with the General

Department for National Defense and visited the Z.195 factory and the

32PLA Daily, April 12, 2005.

33Luo Zheng, Liang Guanglie meets Vietnamese guests, PLA Daily, April 12 2004.


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Headquarters of Military Region 7 in the south. 34Zhang was accorded a courtesymeeting with Defense Minister General Pham Van Tra on 4 July.

That same month General Phung Quang Thanh, VPA Chief of the General Staffand member of the Central Military Committee, visited Beijing where he metwith his counterpart, Liang Guanglie.35 Liang virtually repeated verbatim hisearlier comments to Nguyen Duc Soat. For example, on this occasion he stressedthat [t]he PLA will continue its efforts to cement cooperation with theVietnamese Peoples Army so as to further boost the relationship between thetwo countries.36 General Phung replied that Vietnam too attached greatimportance to cooperation with the Chinese armed forces and hoped to furtherenhance mutual trust and deepen cooperation through the current visit.37

In a signal of conciliation towards its northern neighbor, in August 2004 DeputyPrime Minister Vu Khoan requested the Ministry of National Defense to organizesearch and recovery efforts for the remains of PLA soldiers killed in Vietnam

during the Vietnam War. The Defense Ministry was asked to coordinate amongother agencies and localities to specify the number of graves. The ForeignMinistry and National Defense Ministry were instructed to cooperate with theirChinese counterparts in carrying out this task.38 This set the scene for a majoradvancement in Sino-Vietnamese military relations.

In October 2005, Defense Minister Pham Van Tra visited Beijing to createmomentum for cooperation between the nations armies in the future.39 Tra wasreceived by his counterpart Senior Lt. General Cao Gangchuan. According to anauthoritative Vietnamese media account, the visit. is being made at a time whenthe comprehensive cooperation between the two Parties and the two countries is

growing qualitatively and quantitatively. The visit is expected to create amomentum for the two armies cooperation in the future.40 Such was the case;auspiciously the year 2005 marked the 55th anniversary of the establishment ofdiplomatic relations..

34VNA July 4, 2005.

35President Tran Duc Luong paid a five-day state visit to China in July 2005.

36Xinhua, English, July 19, 2005.

37Xinhua, PLA Daily, July 20, 2005.

38Dan Hung, Vietnam to launch search for Chinese soldiers remains, Thanh Nien, August 24,2005.

39Vietnam News Agency, Vietnamese defense minister visits China, Thanh Nien News, October25, 2005.

40Vietnam News Agency, Vietnamese Defense Minister visits China, October 25, 2005. Thisvisit was undertaken in the context of the planned visit by Chinas President and party SecretaryGeneral Hu Jintao Hu visited from October 31-November 2, 2005.


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In the meeting between Generals Cao and Tra, Cao promised that China will join hands with Vietnam to promote the comprehensive development of therelations between the two nations and the two military forces and China hopesthe two sides can have closer military exchanges and greater mutual trustthrough cooperation in wider areas.41 Tra noted in reply, the continuous

consolidation and development of bilateral relations is a common aspiration ofthe two peoples. It is in compliance with their interests and conducive to thepeace and stability of the region and the world at large. Zhang Dinga, memberof the Central Military Commission and Commander of the PLAN, and XiongGuangkai, PLA Deputy Chief of the General Statt, were also present at the talks.Cao, Zhang and Xiong are all members of the Central Military Commissionheaded by Hu Jintao. The two Defense Ministers signed an historic agreement on joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin/Beibu Gulf. In August, the two sidesagreed to speed up demarcation discussions of their border and were expected tocomplete a border treaty that would also include Laos with a years time.42.

Chinas Peaceful Rise and Southeast Asia

There can be no doubt that the most significant development that will reshapethe regional geopolitical landscape over the next two decades is the rise of Chinaand Chinese influence in all spheres economic, political-diplomatic, social-cultural and military. While it is commonplace for security analysts to focus onthe military or hard dimensions of Chinas power, the importance of softpower in the form of Chinas international security cooperation diplomacy isoften overlooked. This paper has tried to address this neglect.

Measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), Chinas economy is already the

second largest in the world after the U.S. At market exchange rates, the Chineseeconomy ranks sixth, after the U.S., Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom andFrance. By 2020, the dollar value of Chinas Gross National Product (GNP) islikely to become the second largest after the United States. China will likelyachieve higher economic growth rates than Japan and Europe. The growth ofChinese manufacturers will pose a competitive challenge across the entirespectrum of industries and technologies and greatly complicate the successfuldevelopment of other regional economies.

Chinas economic growth will spur increased demand for energy resources andother raw materials; this will drive an expansion of Chinese interests from theregional to the global stage. Chinas reliance on imported energy resources willresult in an interest in maintaining political stability in those regions where these

41Xinhuanet, October 26, 2005; and China, Vietnam to further military ties, Xinhuanet, October26, 2005.

42ABC Radio Australia, October 28, 2005.


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resources are found. In addition, China will also have in interest in maintainingthe security of maritime lines of communications, especially through SoutheastAsia and the Malacca Straits. China, India and other growing economies couldbecome competitors for energy resources to fuel their economic growth. BothChina and India are seeking oil from Iran. This factor already may be driving

naval force modernization in these two countries.

Chinas economic rise will impact on Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacificregion. Chinas economic success will create competitive pressures in other statesto reform and open their markets to foreign investment. Chinas peaceful risewill stimulate trade and investment from its neighbors. For example, Chinaseconomic success has contributed to lifting Japan out of recession and keepingthe Philippines from falling into recession. Chinas energy needs have been aboon to Indonesias oil, gas and mining sectors. In short, there are grounds forconcluding that Chinas growing economy will be a catalyst for growth inSoutheast Asia.

Chinas economic growth will also provide a firm foundation for its defensemodernization. It is commonly assumed that real Chinese defense expendituresrange between U.S. $31-$38 billion in 2003, well above the official Chinese figureof U.S. $22.3 billion.43 By 2020, China will overtake Russia as the second largestspender on defense after the United States. Chinas projected economic growthindicates that it will be able to spend between 2.3% and 5% of Gross DomesticProduct on defense. By 2025, these figures would result in expenditures in therange of U.S. $185 billion (or 60% of the U.S. defense budget in 2003) and $403billion (or one-third greater than the U.S. defense budget in 2003).

There are two main drivers of Chinas military procurement program (1) theperceived intermediate and long-term challenge posed by the United States and(2) the desire to project power. Specifically, Chinas objective of reassertingcontrol over Taiwan must take into account the possibility of U.S. militaryintervention should a crisis occur. The Peoples Liberation Army has devotedextraordinary efforts to purchase and develop weapons systems to deter theUnited States from intervening in a Taiwan contingency. These capabilities willinevitably extend Chinas military reach in Southeast Asia.

43According to a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Liu Jianchao, Chinas defenseexpenditure in 2004 was U.S. $24 billion. Liu noted that In recent years, in pace with Chinaseconomic development, Chinese defense spending has indeed increased a little. But the bulk ofthe increase is for the improvement of living conditions of the officers and soldiers. China has notthe intention nor the capability to drastically increase its military build-up. Quoted by AgenceFrance-Presse (Beijing), Rumsfelds claims groundless: China, The Straits Times, June 8, 2005.


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Chinas strategic goals may be summarized as follows:

Maintain domestic security; prevent separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang; andthen recover control over Taiwan;

Maintain high levels of economic growth to provide employment, raiseincome levels and prevent domestic disorder;

Promote a stable regional security environment, especially along Chinasperiphery, as the prerequisite for economic growth;

Restore and expand Chinas traditional political and diplomatic influence;and

Promote a multi-polar international order to prevent encirclement orcontainment by the United States.

Projections of Chinas economic and military development over the next twodecades, however, must also take into account various factors that couldconstrain the most optimistic estimates. Constraints on Chinese economic growthinclude: stagnation and eventual decline in its labor force, a fall in domesticsavings as the population ages, a slowdown in the growth of exports andindustrial output because of market saturation, weaknesses in the financial sectorand problems in agriculture in the rural area. The Chinese government also has anumber of contingent liabilities such as unfunded commitments on pensions, theneed to re-capitalize state-owned banks as they write off debt-ridden state-owned enterprises, and interest payments on rising government debt. As theChinese population ages the government will come under pressure to increasespending on pensions, health care, and education. Nevertheless, Chinas

economy will continue to grow. Economists project that Chinas economy willgrow at 7% per year through 2010 and then gradually decline to 3% per yearuntil 2025. Chinas GDP is projected to reach U.S. $9.45 trillion in 2025 (in 2001dollars) or about half the size of the projected U.S. economy at that time.

Southeast Asia is viewed by Beijing as Chinas sphere of influence. China seeksto bolster a stable and secure region in order to gain access to regional energyresources and raw materials, protect maritime trade routes across the region, anddevelop wide-ranging relations for economic and political purposes (includingisolating Taiwan and countering U.S. influence). Chinas peaceful rise has beenaccompanied by a complete turn around in Chinas view of and participation inregional multilateral organizations. Initially, China was skeptical and suspiciousthat multilateral institutions would impinge on national sovereignty. Within theshort space of a few years China has become a strong supporter of themultilateralism and has become an active participant in the ARF process. In late2004, China hosted the first ARF Security Policy Conference as an alternative tothe U.S.-dominated Shangri-La Dialogue.


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China is widely perceived as sympathetic to regional concerns and respectful ofASEAN and the ASEAN Way. At the 7th China-ASEAN Summit in 2003, forexample, China acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation andwon plaudits from ASEAN members. At the same time, China and ASEANsigned the Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.

The ASEAN Plus Three process offers China an opportunity to expand itspolitical influence and its ability to reshape regional order. As Southeast Asianregionalism evolves into a more explicit East Asian economic, political andsecurity community, as evidenced by the first East Asian Summit held inMalaysia in December 2005, China can be expected to play a major role in futuredevelopments. By any measure, Chinas use of soft power has been asimpressive as it has been successful.

In summary, China is now actively promoting multilateral initiatives as the mainchannel for cooperation among the states of Southeast Asia not only in the

economic sphere but also in the political and security spheres as well. However,it is important to end on a cautionary note. Chinas peaceful rise has witnessedimportant changes in how China conducts diplomacy with the less powerfulstates of Southeast Asia. Nowhere is this more evident than in the emergingsphere of international security cooperation. Chinas use of both multilateral andbilateral relations has alleviated the China threat theory of the early to mid-1990s. It has also served to constrain Taiwans economic diplomacy in SoutheastAsia. But Chinas rise has also encouraged hedging behavior by some regionalstates that prefer to see the United States continually engaged in Southeast Asianaffairs rather than displaced. But it is too early to conclude:

China has become an important provider of security assistance, and thepresence of its military far from home is becoming commonplace. If Beijinghas its way and Washington continues to neglect Southeast Asia, Americanmilitary and security guarantees will soon be redundant to the Chinesepresence.44

As noted in a recent study by the U.S. Congressional Research Service:

Although the ASEAN states, share certain common perspectives, each has adifferent relationship with China. Some are more concerned than others thatChinas rise may offer unwanted security or economic challenges. Some mayview Chinas growing regional position as playing a useful balancing rolerelative to the influence of the United States, Japan, or India while others mayreact to the rise of China by seeking to develop closer relations with theUnited States or other regional powers. Generally speaking, ASEAN states

44Dana Dillon and John J. Tkacik, Jr., China and ASEAN: endangered American Primacy inSoutheast Asia, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1886, October 19, 2005, 5.


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appear to be seeking to maximize the benefits of engagement with Chinawhile guarding against the possibility of a more assertive China in the eventthat engagement fails.45

Similar conclusions were reached in two separate studies. One Southeast Asianscholar concluded, for example, Fears of Southeast Asian states that they willhave to bandwagon with China, or a desire to do so, will thus be greatlyconstrained by existing U.S. and future Japanese and Indian roles in theregion.46 Secondly, a summary of discussions by a gathering of scholars fromSoutheast Asia and the United States who met in Washington, D.C. in late 2005concluded

most Southeast Asian governments hold serious reservations about Chinasrole, particularly regarding such security issues as the South China Sea; andthat despite differences with U.S. policy, most Southeast Asian governmentswant the United States to continue to provide a security umbrella for the

region. Long-term reservations over Chinese intentions are seen behind ahedging approach used in various ways by Southeast Asian governmentand by ASEAN as a whole.47

45

Vaughn,China

Southeast

Asia

Relations:

Trends,

Issues,

and

Implications

for

the

United

States,op.

cit.

15.

46Chien-peng chung, Southeast Asia-China Relatons: Dialectics of Hedging and Counter-Hedging, in Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 2004. Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 2004, 51.

47Robert Sutter, Emphasizing the Positive; Continued Wariness, ComparativeConnections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 7(4), 4th Quarter, October-December 2005.

Documents

Thayer China's Defence Cooperation With Southeast Asia