Thayer Vietnam: Defence and Foreign Policy 2008

8/14/2019 Thayer Vietnam: Defence and Foreign Policy 2008

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Vietnams Defence Policy and its Impact on

Foreign Relations

Professor Carlyle A. Thayer

Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller DistinguishedVisiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, Center of

International Studies, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio

Paper for EuroViet 6, Asien-Afrika Institut, Universitat Hamburg,

Hamburg, Germany, June 6-8, 2008


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Vietnam s Defence Diplomacy and Its Impact on Foreign Policy

Carlyle A. Thayer 1

1. Introduction

This paper seeks to explore a largely neglected aspect of Vietnamsmultidirectional foreign policy, defence diplomacy, and its impact on foreignpolicy. Foreign policy in Vietnam has always been the preserve of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bo Ngoai Giao) whose minister generally holds a seat on thePolitical Bureau. When this has not been the case, a senior member of thePolitical Bureau takes responsibility for foreign policy oversight. In contrast, theMinister of National Defence (Bo Quoc Phong) has always been a member of thePolitical Bureau. Up until about 1992 there was no apparent joint coordinatingmechanism for these two ministries outside of the Political Bureau. In 1992 aNational Defence and Security Council (NDSC) was created which includesamong its members the ministers of foreign affairs, national defence and publicsecurity. It is doubtful that the NDSC performs a strong coordinating role. Inshort, Vietnams defence diplomacy, while following general guidelines issued by the Political Bureau and party Central Committee, is largely a product of theMinistry of National Defence.Since the end of the Cold War the strategic context for Vietnams foreign anddefence policies has changed enormously. Changes first began to emerge in themid to late-1980s. At least two major factors influenced this development. Thefirst factor concerned Vietnams domestic circumstances arising from the socio-economic crisis that confronted Vietnam at that time. The second factor was

external and arose from the new political thinking emanating from the SovietUnion under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. Due to the confluence of domestic and external influences Vietnam turned from a foreign policystructured by ideological considerations to a foreign policy framework thatplaced greater emphasis on national interest and pragmatic diplomacy.Vietnamese analysts now stressed global economic forces and the impact of therevolution in science and technology as key determinants of global order(Nguyen Manh Cam, 1995:223-230 and Vu Khoan, 1995:71-76). This evolutiontook place gradually (Palmujoki: 2004) and the ideological framework of the pastwas not jettisoned entirely, residues of the past can still be found today.In December 1986, at the sixth national congress of Vietnam Communist Party

(VCP), Vietnam adopted the policy of doi moi(renovation). This policy wasmainly concerned with overcoming the domestic economic crisis by the adoption

1Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor , Center of Southeast AsianStudies, Ohio University, Paper to EuroViet 6, Asien-Afrika Institut, Universitat Hamburg,Hamburg, Germany, June 5-7, 2008.


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of socio-economic reforms and opening Vietnam to foreign investment. In orderto achieve these objectives Vietnam first had to liquidate the Cambodianproblem. In 1987, the Politburo met and secretly approved Resolution No. 2 thatset out a major strategic readjustment in Vietnams defence policy peopleswar and all-peoples national defence. Vietnams new strategic policy resulted inthe withdrawal of all combat forces from Laos and Cambodia and the massivedemobilization of regulars. The Vietnamese military was promised funding tosupport these measures. Vietnams major strategic readjustment set the contextfor further dramatic changes in foreign policy.In May 1988, Vietnamese party leaders agreed on a new codification of foreignpolicy objectives. This took the form of Politburo Resolution No. 13 which calledfor a multi-directional foreign policy orientation (Chu Van Chuc 2004:4-7). Thenew emphasis was to maintain peace, take advantage of favorable worldconditions in order to stabilize the domestic situation and set the base foreconomic development over the next ten to fifteen years. This resolution is nowrecognized as a major landmark in Vietnams external relations. The nextimportant elaboration of Vietnams multi-directional foreign policy occurred atthe seventh national party congress in June 1991 (Vu Khoan 1995:75). Policydocuments adopted at this congress declared that Vietnam would diversify andmultilateralise economic relations with all countries and economicorganizations... In short, Vietnam now sought to be friends with all countries.In September 1989, Vietnam unilaterally withdrew its armed forces fromCambodia. The Vietnam Peoples Army (VPA), which numbered 1.2 million in1987, was reduced in size with the demobilization of 700,000 troops over the nextfive years. In October 1991, Vietnam was a signatory to the comprehensivepolitical settlement that brought an end to the Cambodian conflict. Vietnam wasno longer an international pariah state subject to an aid and trade boycott. Insum, the settlement of the Cambodian conflict resulted in the transformation of regional relations from confrontation between two blocs to cooperation amongthe states of Southeast Asia.In July 1992 Vietnam attended the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as anobserver for the first time. Vietnam acceded to the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amityand Cooperation at this meeting. By so doing Vietnam renounced the use of forceor the threat to use force in foreign relations and committed itself to the non-violent resolution of any conflict that might arise. Two years later, at the 1994ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, Vietnam was invited to join ASEAN. Italso became a founding member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) at thistime. Vietnams application for ASEAN membership was formally approved latethat year and in July 1995 Vietnam became ASEANs seventh member.Since the 1991 seventh party congress, Vietnam succeeded in diversifying itsforeign relations. Seven developments are particularly notable: normalization of relations with China (November 1991), the restoration of official developmentassistance by Japan (November 1992), normalization of relations with the UnitedStates (July 1995), membership in ASEAN (July 1995), the signing of aFramework Cooperation Agreement with the European Union (July 17, 1995),membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 2007 and non-permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council (January 2008).


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For the first time, Vietnam had diplomatic relations with all five permanentmembers of the United Nations Security Council and, equally importantly, withthe worlds three major economic centers: Europe, North America and East Asia.In 1989, Vietnam had diplomatic relations with only twenty-three non-communist states. A year after Vietnam joined ASEAN, Vietnam expanded itsexternal relations to 163 countries.

2. Vietnam s Defence Diplomacy, 1991-2004

During the Cold War Vietnam maintained defence relations with a handful of countries; China, the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pactfeatured prominently.2 Chinese military assistance fell off after the signing of the1973 Paris Peace Agreement and was terminated in 1978-79 when the two fell outover Cambodia. China and Vietnam fought a border war in February-March 1979and only normalized relations in November 1991. During the Cold War Vietnamalso maintained defence relations and/or contacts with a small number of otherfriendly states including Laos, Cuba, India, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, andYugoslavia. By 2004, according to Vietnams Ministry of National Defence,Vietnam, had established defence relations with more than sixty countries (QuanDoi Nhan Dan , December 22, 2003). A total of thirty-four defence attaches wereaccredited to Vietnam, while Vietnam posted twenty-four defence attachesabroad (Vietnam News Agency, November 29, 2004).3 For purposes of this paper military diplomacy refers to official defence relations between Vietnams Ministry of National Defence and its overseas counterparts,such as the U.S. Department of Defense.4 Military diplomacy is conducted bymeans of the exchange of delegations, accrediting of defence attaches, defencecooperation programs, and equipment and arms sales and servicing agreements.In the period from January 1990 to December 2006, Vietnam exchanged 364 high-level defence delegations with forty-two countries.5 For purposes of analysis,these delegations may be divided into five major categories: ministerial (MND),

2The Warsaw Pact was formed in 1955 and comprised seven members: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR . It was officially disbanded in 1991.3Several of the defence attaches accredited to Vietnam are non-resident. For example, Britainsdefence representative is permanently based in Kuala Lumpur.4This paper omits discussion of the exchange of legislative committees that have responsibilityfor defence and security matters. For example, Vietnam has received delegations from FrancesNational Defence Commission (January 1992), the Military Council of Thailands Lower House,the Russian Federations Duma (February 1997), the Lao National Assemblys National Defenceand Security Committee (April 1999), and the Belgian Parliaments Defence Committee(November 2004).5Based on information received up to and including December 30, 2006. Data was collected fromQuan Doi Nhan Dan , the army newspaper, and Vietnamese radio and press reports included inthe monitoring reports issued by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the BritishBroadcasting Corporation; also included are news items found on the websites of the VietnamNews Agency, Radio Voice of Vietnam and Viet Nam News. This material has beensupplemented by reporting taken from the regional and international media as well as othersources.


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Chief of the General Staff or equivalent (CGS), head of the General PoliticalDepartment (GPD), head of the General Logistics Department or equivalent(GLD), and Service Chief (SC) for army, navy and air force (see Chart 1). Inaddition to these high-level delegations, in the period 1990-2004 Vietnam hostedat least thirty-one delegations representing foreign staff colleges and defenceinstitutes from nine countries.6 Between 1990 and July 2007, Vietnam hostedfifty-eight separate naval ship visits from sixteen countries.

Of the 364 high-level exchange visits, Vietnam received 207 delegations and sent157 delegations abroad. When the frequency of high-level exchanges is calculated(total of delegations received and sent up to the end of 2004), three countriesaccount for nearly a third of all delegations: Laos (40 exchanges), China (33exchanges) and Thailand (26 exchanges). The next tier includes: Cambodia (20),India (16); Philippines and Russia (13 each); and the United States (11); FranceIndonesia and Singapore (10 each); Cuba and Japan7 (9 each); Australia (8),

6This data is undoubtedly incomplete due to the generally unpublicized nature of these relativelylow-level visits.7In October 2006, Vietnam and Japan adopted an Joint Statement Toward a Strategic Partnershipfor Peace and Prosperity in Asia, during the course of a visit by Prime Minister Nguyen TanDung to Tokyo. The fourth Japan-Vietnam politico-military dialogue was held in Hanoi onDecember 13, 2007. Japan was represented by the Deputy Director-General, Southeast andSouthwest Asian Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Director of theInternational Policy Division, Ministry of Defense.


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North Korea. South Korea and Malaysia (7 exchanges each); Italy, Myanmar andUkraine (6 exchanges each); and Poland and Slovakia (4 exchanges each).Between 1990-04, Vietnam hosted thirty-four ministerial-level delegations from16 countries. Toping the list of visitors to Vietnam are the defence ministers fromLaos (7 visits), Thailand (5 visits), and Cambodia (3 visits). Vietnams defence

minister made 40 official overseas trips to 29 countries during this same period.Vietnams defence minister most frequently visited Laos (5 visits) and China (4visits). Prior to Vietnams membership in ASEAN, Hanoi hosted visits bydefence ministers from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and the Slovak Republic. Atthe same time, Vietnams defence minister visited China, Indonesia, NorthKorea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and the Philippines.The period after the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia witnessed a majorexpansion in ministerial-level contacts. Vietnam resuscitated defence contactswith former traditional allies such as the Russian Federation, Belarus, Bulgaria,Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic and the Ukraine. In Northeast AsiaVietnam exchanged ministerial level delegations with China, Japan, and South

Korea. Most notable has been the exchange of delegations with so-called westerncountries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,Switzerland and the United States. In addition to long-standing relations withCuba and India, Vietnam has also developed ministerial level contacts in Africa(Algeria and South Africa) and Latin America (Brazil).When the data on high-level exchanges is viewed on a time scale (see Chart 2), itis evident that the year 1994 marks the real beginning of defence diplomacy. Thegeneral trend since then has been a steady rise in the number of high-leveldefence delegations coming to Vietnam with a peaks in 2001 and 2003. There wasa noticeable drop in the exchange of delegations between 1995-2000 perhapsreflecting Vietnams difficult economic conditions, followed by the Asian

financial crisis that resulted in a decline in defence cooperation activities acrossthe region generally. The number of Vietnamese delegations sent abroad hasmirrored but trailed the generally rising trend of high-level delegations received.It should be noted that the exchange of delegations representing the GeneralPolitical Department (GPD) takes place only among socialist states. The highestnumber of exchanges of GPD delegations has been with Laos (44% of the total)and China (29%).The category Logistics is a catch-all for a variety of delegations at deputyministerial level. This category reflects Vietnamese organizational practicewhereby the head of the General Logistics Department (GLD) is also a deputyminister of national defence. Foreign delegations that are received by the head of the VPA General Logistics Department have been placed in this category. Thecategory Logistics also includes exchanges between the external relationsdepartment (ERD) of defence ministries and other groups such cryptology (Laos)and military education (Russia).The fifth category of high-level delegations comprises the service chiefs (army,navy and air). Once again, it should be noted, defence forces are not structured inthe same way. The United States, for example, has a number of combatantcommanders in charge of geographical areas of responsibility, such as the Pacific


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Command (PACOM). The U.S. PACOM Commander (formerly CINCPAC) isincluded in the Service Chiefs category as are the commanders of the Russianand French Pacific fleets. The data indicates a marked imbalance in the numberof reciprocal exchanges. Between 1990 and 2004, Vietnam received fortydelegations in the Service Chiefs category while sending only nine abroad.

The exchange of high-level defence delegations serves a number of purposesincluding goodwill, protocol visits for newly appointed officials, strategicdialogue, and a variety of practical defence cooperation activities betweenministries, armed services and defence industries. This section will review someof Vietnam s most significant defence cooperation relations starting with thethree countries with whom Vietnam has exchanged the most high-leveldelegations.

Defence Relations with the ASEAN States

Bilateral.Vietnam has conducted relatively intense high-level defence exchangeswith six of ASEANs ten members. In addition to Laos and Cambodia, this listincludes Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore. Vietnams defencerelations with Brunei, Malaysia and Myanmar do not involve substantial defenceinteraction.

The relative intensity of high-level defence exchanges between Thailand andVietnam should be noted. The main content of defence relations are protocolexchange visits, exchanges by staff colleges and defence institutes, and maritimesecurity.8 However more practical matters were also included. For example, in

8In January 1992, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, visited Vietnam and offeredto barter spares from Thailands stock of Chinese-manufactured T-69 tanks for U.S. F-5 jet partswhich Vietnam captured in 1975 and still held in storage. This offer apparently was not taken up.


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January 2007, the Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, GeneralBoonsrang Niumpradit, held discussions with the VPA Chief of the GeneralStaff, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khac Vien on cooperation in training, sea patrols, searchand rescue of fishermen, sports competition and other issues of commonconcern. In December 2007, General Anupong Pachinda, Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army visited Hanoi and held discussions with Lt. Gen. NguyenHuu Kham, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The Thai visitor also heldworking sessions with organs of the Vietam Peoples Army.The intensity of high-level defence contacts between the Philippines andVietnam ranks second after Thai-Vietnamese relations. High-level defence visitssince 1994 have generally focused on security issues in the South China Sea andoccasional incidents involving the encroachment by Vietnamese and Filipinofishermen into maritime waters claimed by the other side.9 As early as April1994, President Fidel Ramos, while on an official visit to Vietnam, offered tomake available ten places for Vietnamese cadets at the Philippine MilitaryAcademy. He further proposed exchanges of visits by senior military officials,study tours for officers and defence instructors and joint ventures inreconditioning of equipment, including aircraft, for re-export. Little of substanceappears to have taken place. After the visit of President Ramos, Vietnamesemilitary officials visited Subic Bay to study its conversion to commercial use inorder to draw lessons for the possible commercialization of Cam Ranh Bay.One of the earliest indications that Vietnam was interested in obtaining technicalassistance in the repair and maintenance of military equipment from outside theWarsaw Pact came in late 1991 during the visit to Vietnam by Lt. General TeddyRusdy, the Assistant Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Indiscussions with officials at the VPAs Defence Industry and Technology GeneralDepartment, General Rusdy received a request for technical assistance in therepair and maintenance of military equipment. Indonesia agreed to conduct adetailed study of the matter; but there have been no further reports of any actiontaken.In 1993 the Indonesian and Vietnamese defence ministers paid reciprocal visits.General Doan Khue, the Vietamese minister of national defence, showedparticular interest in naval shipbuilding and was taken to Surabaya to observefirst hand. This was an indication that Vietnam was investigating the possibilityof enlisting foreign partners in ship construction in Vietnam. In 1995, adelegation representing Indonesias state aircraft manufacturing corporationwent to Vietnam to explore the possibility of starting operations there. Onceagain nothing eventuated from these exploratory contacts.The 1997 Asian financial crisis and its impact on Indonesia hobbled Indonesiascapacity to cooperate with Vietnam in the defence area. There was an apparentrevivial of Indonesian interest in early 2002 when Lt. General Johny Lumintang,Secretary General of Ministry of Defence and Security held working sessions inHanoi with the VPAs General Logistics Department and General Defence

9In January 1998, Vietnamese troops fired on Filipino fishermen in the vicinity of Tenant Reef.


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Industry Department. More recent high-level visits appear of a protocol nature.,such as the August 2007 visit by the Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff.Defence relations between Singapore and Vietnam were initiated in March 1995with the visit to Singapore by Vietnams Defence Minister, General Doan Khue.The two countries have since exchanged eleven high-level delegations (to August

2005). The pattern indicates interest and possible cooperation between defenceindustries. In November 1995, for example, the head of the VPAs GeneralDepartment of Technology, led a ten-member delegation on an visit thatincluded a tour of local defence industries. Late the following year, DeputyPrime Minister and Defence Minister Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam visited Vietnam.After discussions with his Vietnamese counterpart, it was agreed that Vietnamwould send a delegation to Singapore to study its experiences in refurbishingand upgrading weapons systems (Vietnam News Agency, November 27, 1996).In March 1999, Lt General Le Van Dung, Chief of the General Staff, paid a visit toSingapore and called in at the Industrial Technologies Group for a briefing. In2002 it was reported that Singapore and Vietnam had reached agreement inprinciple to hold joint naval exercises.Hanoi reportedly sought Singapore Automotive Engineerings (now the STKinetics division of ST Engineering) assistance in upgrading its Vietnam War eraM113 APCs. Basic overhaul of 50 M113s is now under way at a military base inHo Chi Minh City. Parts have been obtained through commercial sources andweapon systems will be installed from captured stocks, with the APCseventually due to be deployed with a southern-based armoured division.In September 2007, Singapores Defence Miniser, Teo Chee Hean, visited Hanoion an official visit for talks with his counterpart General Phung Quang Thanh.Press reports indicated that the two ministers exchanged experiences in army building, counter terrorism, humanitarian assistance and natural disaster relief

and peacekeeping. They agree to continue to exchange delegations. InNovember 2007, General Thanh paid a three-day official reciprocal visit toSingapore and called in at air force and navy bases in the Lion City. In March2008, Singapores Air Force chief Maj. Gen. Ng Chee Khern visied Hanoi todiscuss on-going cooperation in search and rescue missions, human resourcedevelopment and language training. General Khern also held working visits withofficers from the Air Defence and Air Force. Most recently, the Chief of Singapores Defence Force, Desmond Kuek, visited Hanoi in April 2008 where heheld discussions with the VPA Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Nguyen KhacNghien. Agreement was reached to focus defence cooperation on training,medical corps and humanitarian aid.Defence contacts between Malaysia and Vietnam date to 1992 but did not reachsenior level until October-November 1994 when General Doan Khue, Vietnamsdefence minister, paid an official visit to Kuala Lumpur. Khues itineraryincluded visits to the staff institute of the Malaysian Armed Forces, SyarikatMalaysia Explosives Technologies, Airod Sdn Bhd, the Udang Special WarTraining Centre and the Lumut Naval Base. According to Malaysias DefenceMinister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, We agreed to develop some form of defence cooperation and collaboration, but we didnt go into specifics. I preferthem to look at our industry first. Although no MOU was signed the two sides


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agreed to enhance defence cooperation in exchange visits, training andcooperation in defence industries. Despite subsequent high-level exchanges therehave been no public reports of substantial defence industry cooperation. Multilaterally.ASEAN eschewed multilateral defence activities for most of itsexistence. Prior to 2003 cooperative military activities by ASEAN states have

been extremely modest: army football and volleyball tournaments, rifle shootingcontests,10 and biennial meetings of war veterans.11 It was only in 2003 with theadoption of the Bali Concord II that ASEAN set itself the goal of becoming asecurity community by 2015. The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Actioncomprises six components: political development, shaping and sharing of norms,conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building, andimplementing mechanisms.In May 2004, the Working Group on Security Cooperation of ASEAN SpecialSenior Officials Meeting requested the ASEAN Secretariat to draft a conceptpaper for ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM). The concept paperspecified that the ADMM would be an integral part of ASEAN and report

directly to the ASEAN Summit. It was specifically tasked with four areas of responsibility: (1) promote peace and stability via dialogue and cooperation; (2)give guidance to senior defence/mililitary officials dialogue; (3) promote mutualtrust and confidence, transparency; and (4) contribute to the establishment of theASEAN Security Community.The ADMM was to meet annually and be open, flexible, outward looking andto complement other regional efforts to promote security dialogue andcooperation including confidence building measures and tangible cooperationwithin the ASEAN framework. The ADMM was given oversight of the ASEANChiefs of Defence Force Informal Meeting, ASEAN Chiefs of Army MultilateralMeeting, ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference, ASEAN Navy Interaction,

ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting. The ADMM was to engage withASEANs friends and dialogue partners.The adoption of the ASEAN Security Community proposal gave cover formultilateral activities to take place. The first meeting of ASEAN Air ForceCommanders was hosted by Thailand in March 2004.12 This meeting approvedplans to establish direct communications channels to promote coordination. TheASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting held in Jakarta in June 2004 endorsed plansto hold military training exercises especially with a counter-terrorism focus. Butplans so far are modest and only include bilateral activities.More significantly, the Fifth ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting held inWest Java in September 2004 gave a positive nod to a proposal to intensifycooperation against terrorism through the exchange of intelligence and joint

10Vietnam hosted the 16th ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet in November 2006.11The tenth meeting of the Association of War Veterans of ASEAN was held in Brunei in October2003. The fourteenth ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet was hosted by Indonesia in September 2004.12Vietnam was represented by Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Than, commander of VPA Air Force.


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exercises. The army chiefs agreed to set up a working group to draw up adetailed program. Vietnams representative, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major General Nguyen Nang Nguyen, was quoted as stating that the VPA will boost cooperation with other ASEAN armies to fight terror and contribute to building an ASEAN of peace, stability, prosperity and protection of nationalindependence and sovereignty.In November 2007, ASEAN adopted a protocol to the Concept Paper and gaveapproval for the ADMM to expanded its contacts through a mechanism knownas ADMM Plus. A Joint Declaration was issued at this time endorsing a three-year work program of defence dialogues and cooperation.

3. Defence Procurements and Defence Industry Cooperation

Over the period 1990-04, Vietnam exchanged high-level defence delegations withforty-two countries. Press reports indicated that discussions on some aspect of defence procurements, defence industry cooperation, research and development,and technical training featured in discussions with at least twenty-three states.

This section reviews Vietnamese expression of interest in and purchase of weapons, platforms and other military equipment; arms servicing agreementsand defence industry cooperation.Vietnam has limited resources to devote to its defence establishment. TheVietnam Peoples Army has traditionally supplemented its budget throughdomestic economic and commercial activities; since the adoption of doi moi military-owned enterprises have entered into joint venture agreements withforeign partners in order to earn hard currency. The financial position of the VPA became particularly parlous in the period immediately after the collapse of theSoviet Union. Figures compiled by the U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency reveal a sharp drop in arms imports from U.S. $1.1 billion in 1991 to U.S.

$10 million in 1992 and U.S. $10 million in 1993, before rising to U.S. $90 millionin 1994. In 1992, Vietnam managed to off-set the costs of imports by exportingU.S. $10 million in arms sales. These were the first reported arms exports since1988.13 Chart 3 below sets out nominal government defence spending in terms of thedong , Vietnams unit of currency, as a percentage of total governmentexpenditure for the period 1993-03.14 Defence spending hovered at just underthirty percent with a slight decline in recent years. Chart 4 displays Vietnamsofficial defence funding in real U.S. dollars for the same period. Defence fundingdoubled between 1993-97 to U.S. $2 billion, declined during the two yearsfollowing the Asian financial crisis, and has since risen steadily.

13While no details are available, it is known that Vietnam previously sold rifles, mortars androcket launchers to rebels in El Salvador and M-113 APCs to Iran. Information on Vietnamesearms sales is particularly scarce. In 2001 it was reported that Myanmar took delivery of twoconsignments of mortar shells produced in Vietnam. But, according to reports, the deal may have been arranged through arms dealers possibly without Hanoi knowing its final destination ( JanesDefence Weekly,March 21, 2001; and Robert Karinol, Janes Defence Weekly , July 25, 2001).14Source: Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation.


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Chart 3

Vietnams defence budget is a state secret. Vietnam only rarely providesinformation on arms procurements, servicing agreements and defence industrycooperation. For example, Vietnam has submitted reports on arms imports andexports for inclusion on the United Nations Register of Conventional Weaponsannually since 1994. During this period Vietnam reported arms imports for onlyfour years, 1995, 1997, 2004 and 2005. Vietnam submitted nil reports for all theother years. These reports are not complete. The Ukraine reported sales toVietnam in 1995, 1996, 2002 and 2003 that are not included in Vietnams reportsfor these years (see Table 1).Until November 1998 Vietnam was constrained in its arms and equipmentpurchases by United States national security legislation that prevented the sale of military equipment to Vietnam that incorporated U.S. technology. Until the U.S. ban was lifted, Vietnam was basically forced to look to those countries that hadcompatible Soviet-made equipment. That did not prevent Vietnam, however,from testing the market. Cost and compatibility have governed Vietnams armsand military equipment purchases.


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Chart 4


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Table 1

Reports to United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 1

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

ExportsReportedtoVietnam

nil 4 L-39combataircraft2

6 L-39combataircraft2

4 combataircraft, 20missilesandmissilelaunchers3

3 Su-222

5 Su-22UM34

5 Su-22combataircraft2

2 LAVarmouredcombatvehicles5

ImportsReported byVietnam

nil nil nil 4 combataircraft, 20missilesandmissilelaunchers

12 missilelaunchers,62 S-300missiles6

nil

Notes1The UN Conventional Register of Conventional Arms records data provided bycountries that export and import weapons in seven general categories; battle

tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft,attack helicopters and missiles and missile launchers.These tables were constructed using the annual reports filed by Belarus, Bulgaria,Czech Republic, Finland, India, Israel, Republic of Korea, Poland, the RussianFederation, Singapore, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Ukraine andVietnam for the period 1992-2006 (when available).2Report by the Ukraine.3Report by the Russian Federation.4Report by the Czech Republic.5Report by Israel.6Imported from the Russian Federation.

Russian Federation. In mid-1992 Russia executed avolte facein its policy onwithdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay and entered into a protracted series of negotiations with Vietnam on the terms and conditions of remaining there. Thetwo sides failed to reach agreement and in May 2002 the Russians withdrew


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completely. In June 1994, Russia and Vietnam signed a friendship treaty thatreplaced the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In August 1998,Vietnam and the Russian Federation declared a new strategic partnership, andtwo years later both sides finally reached an agreement on the settlement of outstanding debts.

The Russian Federation continues to remain Vietnams main source of militaryweapons and equipment, but there are indications that cost considerations haveled Vietnam to diversify its imports. In 1994, Vietnam and Russia signed threemajor arms procurement contracts.15 The first covered the sale of six Sukhoi Su-27 fighter-bombers, a flight simulator and a training package for pilots andmaintenance personnel. Reports submitted by Russia and Vietnam for inclusionon the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons confirmed the deliveryof five Su-27 SKs and one Su-27 UBK combat aircraft to Vietnam in 1995.Vietnam followed up on its initial procurements by purchasing an additional sixSu-27s.16 The second contract involved the sale of two Type 1241RA fast attack craft (FAC); while the third contract involved the sale of four air defence radarsystems.In 1996, Russia and Vietnam established a joint venture to co-produce KBO 2000and BPS 500-type vessels at the Ba Son naval dockyard in Ho Chi Minh City. Theformer is roughly equivalent to a corvette, while the latter is a much smaller fastattack craft armed with surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). Vietnam alsoproposed the co-production of air defence radars and surface-to-surface missiles.Subsequently, Vietnam purchased four additional Type 1241RA fast attack craftand SSMs.17 Between 1996 and 1998, Russia upgraded 32 single-seat Su-22M4and two twin-seat Su-22UM3 ground attack aircraft.In 1997, Russian defence industry sources reported the sale of a number of BP-3A battlefield vehicles and T-8 OU tanks to Vietnam. Russia's Almaz Central Marine

Design Bureau delivered two Type 14310 Svetlyak class patrol boats in December2002 for use by the Coast Guard service.The defence relationship between the two countries was further strengthenedduring the February/March 2001 visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin toVietnam. During his stay, the two countries agreed to strengthen their co-operation in military supplies to meet Vietnam's security demands. In 2002, theRussian Federation listed the sale of eight missiles and missile launchers to

15This sale was valued at U.S. $180 million with eighty-five percent of the payment in hardcurrency and the remainder in agricultural produce.16The U.N. Register of Conventional Weapons lists the sale of two Su-27s to Vietnam in 1997.Russian press reports in 1997 indicated Vietnam had placed an order for a total of twenty-fourSu-27s in a deal valued at U.S. $500 million. The International Institute of Strategic Studies,The Military Balance 2004/05,lists a total of twelve Su-27s (7-SK and 5-UBK models) in Vietnamsinventory.17Reportedly the Mosquitoanti-ship missile.


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Vietnam on its annual report to the U.N. Register of Conventional Weapons.18 In2003, Russia and Vietnam reached agreement on three major weapons purchases:four Su-30 MKKs (with an option for eight more); two Molnya 1241.8 typemissile boats (Ho-A Class in Vietnam), with a further eight to be assembled inVietnam19 , and two batteries (12 launchers each) of S-300PMU1 surface-to-airmissile systems in a contract valued at U.S. $200 million. The deal, for 12 systemshas a potential value of U.S. $300 million if all options are exercised. Thecombined arms purchases for 2003 totaled an estimated U.S. $480 million.The four Su-30 aircraft were delivered at the end of 2004. However, purchase of the remaining eight aircraft has proven too costly for Vietnam. Vietnams SU-27sand Su-30s are expected to require an upgrade in order to operate with a range of air-to-air, air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles, most notably the R-77 beyond-visual-range AAM. The first S-300PMU1 battery was delivered in August 2005.In March 2005 it was reported that Vietnam may require a further eight to 10fighter aircraft, with the Su-27 or Su-30MK the preferred choice. Insufficientfunding may well prove to be an insurmountable stumbling block and could be a

factor in the apparent decision of that year to acquire 40 second-hand Sukhoi Su-22 attack aircraft. The Project 2100 programme to locally assemble a Russian-builtcorvette appears to have been abandoned. It was always doubtful whetherVietnam possessed the indigenous technical capability to assemble such arelatively sophisticated vessel In addition to these big ticket items, Russiaprovides Vietnam with spare parts and assistance in the maintenance andmodernization of military equipment. Vietnamese military personnel continue tostudy at Russian academies and military schools.In December 2007, Russia and Vietnam convened the annual meeting of theInter-government Committee for Military Technical Cooperation. The Russiandelegation was led by the director of its Federal Service for Military and

Technical Cooperation. Vietnam is believed to be in the process of negotiatingwith Russia for the purchase of an additional six Tarantul 3 corvettes. The Type3s are armed with the SS-N-22 Sunburn missile as on China's Sovremmenyclass destroyers. Vietnam retains an interest in obtaining full-size submarinesfrom Russia, probably beginning with two or three platforms. No contract has been signed or appears imminent.Ukraine.The Ukraine probably ranks second to the Russian Federation as aprovider of military equipment and technical training to Vietnam. Defencecooperation between Vietnam and the Ukraine was initiated in March 1994 whenthe VPA chief of the general staff paid a visit to Kiev. The VPA deputy chief of the general staff accompanied his prime minister on a visit in June that year. It

was subsequently reported that the Ukraine sold Vietnam fourteen R27R1 (470-1)missiles and missile launchers in 1995 and six MiG-21 UM training aircraft in1996. The chief of the general staff of the Ukraine armed forces paid a return visit

18According to press reports, Vietnam took delivery of fifty portable SA-18 SAMs in 2002 in acontract valued at U.S. $643 million.19Other sources report the sale of twelve Project 1241RA FACs.


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in September 1997 and discussed cooperation in equipment sales, technology andpersonnel training.As a result of the visit of the Vietnamese defence minister in May 2002, Vietnamand the Ukraine reached agreement on a significant program of far reachingmilitary-technical cooperation up to 2005. Under the terms of this agreement the

Ukraine will provide major assistance to Vietnam to upgrade its air defence(radar, communications and surface-to-air missiles), combat air, naval andarmour and artillery forces. Specifically, Ukrainian specialists have drawn upplans to modernize the Vietnamese navy and air defence force. These plans callfor substantial Ukrainian involvement across a number of areas including therenovation of the Ba Son dockyard in Ho Chi Minh City; developing naval testfacilities; arms co-production; mid-level officer exchanges; and repairing,upgrading and supply of all types of equipment and weapons. The Ukraine willtrain thirty to forty senior VPA officers up to the rank of general at its militaryacademies. According to reports submitted by the Ukraine to the United Nations,it sold ten L-39 combat training aircraft to Vietnam in 2002-03. In 2005, Vietnamacquired three Fitter aircraft of an unknown version from the Ukraine.India. In 1994, India and Vietnam signed a protocol on defence cooperationcovering training slots for Vietnamese officers at Indias defence academy,servicing of Vietnamese military hardware, and continued regular discussions between the two defence ministries. An Indian official described the protocol as alow-key framework agreement, while Vietnams defence attach was quoted asstating, We need Indias help very badly in training our defence personnel,which is our first priority. Indias assistance in military hardware will be a long-term cooperative agreement and we are still working on the [details]. Shortlyafter, Vietnam reached agreement with Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) tooverhaul and service eight to ten MiG-21 engines and to provide continuedtechnical support.Vietnam has shown a keen interest in developing defence industry cooperation.In May 1995, for example, a Vietnamese military delegation led by the VPA chief of the general staff, visited India. The delegation toured Hyderabad, Dindigul,Madras, Bangalore, Goa, Nasik and Pune to study military training and defenceindustries, including the operations of such companies as HAL, OrdnanceFactories Board, Bharat Earth Movers Limited, and Goa Shippers Limited.Later, India agreed to assist Vietnam in setting up defence industry tomanufacture small and medium weapons and other ordnance products (TheTimes of India , March 29, 2000). Possible future arms sales include Indias multi-role advanced light helicopter, warships and anti-ship and air-defence missiles.

In 2000, India and Vietnam signed a wide-ranging defence protocol agreement.20 This document lays the foundation for substantially increased defencecooperation, and the raising of relations to periodic meetings between defence

20Subhash Kapila, India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Convergence of Interests, SouthAsia Analysis Group, Paper No. 177,http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper1777.htm .


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ministers and the exchange of strategic perceptions and intelligence sharing.Under the 2000 agreement, India will assist in repairing and overhaulingVietnams fleet of one hundred and twenty MiG-21s and train Vietnamese fighterpilots and technicians. The Indian Navy will help repair, upgrade and build fastpatrol craft for the Vietnamese navy and offer training to its technical personnel(The Hindu , March 28, 2000). The protocol also included bilateral naval exercisesand coordinated patrols involving the Vietnamese Marine Police and the IndianCoast Guard.In October 2002 Vietnam asked India to provide submarine training but itremains unclear whether the move was linked to its 1997 acquisition of two smallplatforms from North Korea or to a new programme. Whichever is the case, thisrequest represented the first phase in implementing Vietnam's long-standinginterest in developing an undersea-warfare capability. The following year (2003),Vietnam provided guerilla warfare training to the Indian armed forces.. In May2003, India and Vietnam signed a Joint Declaration on Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation that included: regular high-level meetings, closecooperation in the United Nations and other international fora, assistance withrespect to safeguarding mutual interests, and gradual steps to expandcooperation in the security and defence fields.In 2007, in a major development, India and Vietnam declared the establishmentof a strategic partnership during the visit by Prime Minister Nguyen TanDung. In November, India and Vietnam held their third Security Dialogue inNew Delhi where it was decided to step up cooperation in training of junior levelofficers, to conduct a security dialogue annually, to share expertise on issues of common concern such as maritime security, border management and counterinsurgency, training in UN peacekeeping operations, and invite Vietnameseobservers to attend Indian military exercises. In December, Indias DefenceMinister A. K. Anthony visited Hanoi accompanied by the Vice Chief of ArmyStaff and senior air force and navy officers. Agreement was reached for India tosupply Vietnam with 5,000 essential spares for itsPetya-class anti-submarineships in order to make them operational. Additionally, India agreed to dispatch afour-member army team to Vietnam during the first half of 2008 to conducttraining on UN peacekeeping operations. Finally, the two sides agreed to set up a Joint Working Group to facilitate the signing of a Memorandum of Understadingon defence cooperation (including cooperation on national defence, navy, airdefence and personnel training). The Indian delegation also visited defenceindustries in Ho Chi Minh City.Vietnams Defence Minister sought Indian assistance in training of defencepersonnel,21 enhancing the exchanges of delegations, expanding trainingcooperation, cooperation between national defence industries, an increase in thefrequency of goodwill visits by naval ships, application of informationtechnology and e-technology, and technical support for the Vietnamese navy.

21As of the time of Anthonys visit, 49 VPA officers attended various army and navy course sinIndia and a further 64 attended English language courses.


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Most recently, Lt. Gen. Truong Quang Khanh, head of General Department of Defence Industry, Ministry of National Defence, attended an internationaldefence exposition, DEFEXPO-2008, in New Delhi in February 2008. That samemonth Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chief of the Army Staff Committee, visitedHanoi where he met with Deputy Defence Minister Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyen KhacVien. Admiral Mehta inspected the Hong Ha Shipbuilding Company and alsovisited Ho Chi Minh City before departing. Finally, in April the Flag OfficerCommander in Chief of the Indian Eastern Naval Command, Vice Admiral R. P.Suthan led two warships on a port call to Hanoi. He held discussions with VPAVice Chief of the General Staff, Tran Quang Khue.Europe. In addition to its substantial arms purchasing arrangements with Russiaand the Ukraine, Vietnam has also explored the possibilities of defenceprocurements and military assistance with several states in Europe, particularlyformer members of the Warsaw Pact.In the early 1990s, Vietnam purchased nine Aero L-39 Albatross jet trainers fromthe former Czech and Slovak Republic, and later sought assistance in their

maintenance and repair. In 1995 Vietnam reached agreement with Omnipol forthe purchase of technology and equipment to produce Grad multiple tubelaunched rockets in Vietnam. In May 2000, Vietnams defence minister visitedthe Czech Republic where he sought cooperation in arms manufacturing andrepair and officer training. In May 2003, the Czech foreign minister visited Hanoiand offered assistance to upgrade Vietnams T-72 battle tank. The minister alsooffered to sell anti-chemical warfare uniforms and equipment. At least fiveformer Czech Su-22UM3 two-seaters are known to have been delivered toVietnam in 2005 and it is possible that up to 25 other surplus Czech Su-22M4scould also have found their way to Vietnam (for Polish deliveries see below).In July 1994, the prime minister of Slovakia visited Vietnam accompanied by his

defence minister and a number of representatives of the arms industry. While inHanoi they picked up expressions of Vietnamese interest in purchasing T-72 Mstanks and artillery. The following month Vietnams president paid a visit toSlovakia where he proposed cooperation between defence industries, includingthe construction of coastal defence vessels. In May 2002, Vietnams defenceminister Pham Van Tra visited the Slovak Republic. Tra sounded out hiscounterpart on possible defence industry cooperation and the modernization of military equipment to be undertaken in Slovak factories. Specifically, Traexpressed an interest in the Brams mobile anti-aircraft complex, and the Aligatorlight armoured vehicle. Tra returned to Hanoi with a proposal from Slovak defence manufactures.Bulgaria and Vietnam extended their defence cooperation agreement in 1997during the course of the visit by the Vietnamese defence minister. Reportedlythis agreement included cooperation in such areas as the supply of spare partsfor MiG-21 aircraft, military equipment repair, military science and medicine,and personnel exchange. In October 2007, the Bulgarian Defence Minister visitedVietnam to discuss military cooperation in language training, culture, sports and,more significantly, military technology.


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In December 1998, the Polish deputy defence minister visited Vietnam to initiatediscussions on cooperation in shipbuilding and arms sales (including MiG-21sand infantry weapons). Poland provided Vietnam with a grant of U.S. $70million to assist in naval construction. In May 2000, Vietnams defence ministervisited Poland where he expressed an interest in purchasing Anacondahelicopters and Bryza aircraft. Both sides discussed possible future cooperationin such areas as upgrading battle tanks (with new fire control systems), co-production of ammunition and officer training.In October 2003, Vietnam signed an agreement to buy up to 10 Polskie ZakladyLotnicze (PZL) M28 Skytruck short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraftconfigured for maritime surveillance and border-control missions from Poland ina deal valued at around U.S. $40 million. Two aircraft were delivered inDecember 2004 and a further two were reportedly handed over in mid-2005. Theaircraft are likely to be operated by the air force. In early March 2005 it wasreported that Poland would supply T-72 MBTs together with training and basicmaintenance equipment, as well as ammunition. The shipment of 150 second-hand tanks, probably from Poland's surplus stocks, was due to begin in the thirdquarter of 2005. Also in 2005, Vietnam acquired forty Su-22Ms ground attack aircraft from a Polish source.The VPA Chief of General Staff, General Nguyen Khac Vien, visited Belarus from June 21-23, 2007 where he held discussions with Minister of Defence ColonelGeneral Leonid Maltsev and the First Deputy Defence Minister Lt. Gen. SergeiGurulev. A year later (January 2008) the First Vice President of the Belarus StateDefence Industry Committee visited Hanoi for talks with Defence MinisterGeneral Phung Quang Thanh.In addition to former members of the Warsaw Pact, Vietnam has exploredpossible arms procurements and defence cooperation with a number of other

European states. In 1997 it was reported that Vietnam had taken delivery of French armoured vehicles within the past two years. In mid-1997, Vietnamopened discussions with Serbia-Montenegro for the purchase of the locallyupgraded T-55 main battle tank. The next year Finland proposed selling Vietnamspare parts from its mothballed fleet of MiG-21s. In February 2005 it wasreported that the Finnish Defence Forces were planning to sell a fleet of up to 70Soviet-era T-54 and T-55 Main Battle Tanks (MBT) to Vietnam. In June 1997, the United Kingdom used a port call by HMSBeaverto promote thesale of defence equipment to Vietnam. In March 1999, Prince Andrew led adelegation of eleven firms to Ho Chi Minh City to showcase British defenceequipment. The Princes visit coincided with the port call by HMSBoxer. Finally,in 1999 Vietnam expressed an interest in acquiring its first militarycommunications satellite. Vietnamese officials approached Acatel, a Frenchcompany, as well as Matra Marconi Space, a joint British-French company (Hanoialso approached American firms Lockheed Martin and Loral Space).In 2005, Austria agreed to fund the development of vocational schools linked toVietnams Ministry of National Defence. On January 15, 2008 Austria agreed toextend this program into a third phase to 2009 valued at 15 million. InDecember 2007, Lt. Gen. Gianni Botondi, Italys Secretary General for Defence


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and National Armaments made an official visit to Vietnam to discuss thestructue of national defence industry. Italy and Vietnam agreed to set up aworking group to promote bilateral cooperation. In May 2008, Deputy Ministerof Defence, Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyen Huy Hieu paid a working visit toSwitzerland for discussions with the Chief of the Federal Department of Defence,Civil Protection and Sports on boosting defence cooperation. General Hieuvisited some Swiss industrial establishments.Other Suppliers. There are only three other countries that feature in Vietnamsarms procurement and military modernization efforts: Israel, North Korea andSouth Korea. In 1993 Israeli defence firms approached Vietnam with an offer toupgrade its fleet of Soviet manufactured jet aircraft, armour and artillery. In January 1994, officials from Vietnams Defence Ministrys Defence Industry andGeneral Technology Department made a visit to Israel to assess possible Israeliassistance in upgrading the VPAs communications capability. The followingyear an Israeli firm was awarded a contract to upgrade Vietnams militarycommunications network. In 1999, Israeli firms were unsuccessful in bidding forthe contract to refurbish Vietnams fleet of MiG aircraft. During the course of thevisit by Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Cong Tan in November 1999, it wasrevealed that Israeli defence industries have begun contracts with Vietnam ondefence exports. No other details were provided.The 1994, Vietnam and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea exchangedvisits by their respective defence ministers. The two sides agreed to a barter dealunder which Vietnam would supply rice in exchange for weapons parts andammunition. In December 1996, Vietnams Deputy Minister of Defense, GeneralNguyen Thoi Bung, visited North Korea and signed a defense package dealworth US $100 million reportedly involving the sale of Igla (SA-16Gimlet)portable air defense missiles and Scud short-range ballistic missiles. Thefollowing year it was reported that Vietnam had taken delivery of two NorthKoreanYugoclass mini-submarines and was refurbishing them at Cam Ranh Bay(Robert Karniol, Janes Defense Weekly , December 9, 1998). In April 1999, it wasreported that Vietnam had acquired a quantity of Scud C surface-to-surfacemissiles with a range of 550 kilometres (with a payload of 770 kilograms). In 2003there were further reports that North Korea had sold unspecified militarytechnology to Vietnam (Far Eastern Economic Review , February 13, 2003).In 1994, two years after the establishment of diplomatic relations betweenVietnam and South Korea, Vietnam reportedly approached the HuyndaiCorporation to purchase three 80-ton fast boats for coastal patrol. Hyundaiofficials did not deny these reports but claimed they had not applied for an exitpermit. In April 1995, the two foreign ministers agreed, among other things, toexchange defence industrial materials. In October of that same year, South Koreaposted its first defence attach to Hanoi.The two countries exchanged visits by their respective defence ministers in late2000 and early 2001. In the course of the visit of the South Korean defenceminister, the agenda included consideration of exchanges on defence technologyand related industries. During the return visit by Vietnams defence minister,two memoranda of understanding were reached; the first dealt with cooperationin defence industry and logistics, while the second covered exchanges in military


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education. Vietnams defence minister visited several South Korean defencefirms and arms manufacturers. It was reported at this time that Daewoo HeavyIndustries and Machinery was considering a joint venture with Vietnam torefurbish its stock of American-manufactured armoured personnel vehicles. InNovember 2001, South Korea hosted an exhibition of military and electronicsproducts during the port call by three of its naval ships. In September 2007, thetwo South Korean naval ships (a destroyer and logistics ship) called in at the portof Ho Chi Minh City. In January 2008, Vietnams naval commander, ViceAdmiral Nguyen Van Hien, made a rare five-day overseas visit to Seoul todiscuss expanding ties between the two navies. Admiral Hien met and haddiscussions with the South Korean Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral SongYoung-moo. The two admirals discussed the enhancement of cooperation in thedefence industry sector.

5. The Structure of Vietnam-China Relations, 1991-2007

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).Vietnams relations with Chinaare structured on both a multilateral basis through membership in ASEAN, theASEAN Regional Forum and other multilateral bodies, and bilaterally, through along-term cooperative framework agreement. When Vietnam joined ASEAN in1995 it assumed responsibility for participating in all multilateral arrangementsentered into by ASEAN and China. In July 1994 ASEAN and China reached formal agreement to establish two jointcommittees one on science and technology cooperation and the other oneconomic and trade cooperation. ASEAN and China also agreed to openconsultations on political and security issues at the senior official level. The firstChina-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting was held in Hangzhou in April 1995.In 1996, China was accorded official dialogue partner status by ASEAN, and in

February the following year, ASEAN and China formalized their cooperation byestablishing the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC). TheACJCC first met in Beijing where it was agreed that it would act as thecoordinator for all the ASEAN-China mechanisms at the working level.22 As anASEAN dialogue partner, China regularly participates in the annual ASEANPost-Ministerial Conference consultation process. This takes the form of ameeting between ASEAN and its ten dialogue partners (ASEAN Ten Plus Ten),and a separate meeting between ASEAN members and each of its dialoguepartners (ASEAN Ten Plus One).China-ASEAN relations advanced in November 2002 with the signing of threemajor documents: Framework Agreement on Comprehensive EconomicCooperation Between ASEAN Nations and the Peoples Republic of China, JointDeclaration between China and ASEAN on Cooperation in Non-TraditionalSecurity Fields, and Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea(DOC). The first agreement laid the foundations for the China-ASEAN Free

22 Joint Press Release, The First ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting, Beijing,February 26-28, 1997.


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Trade Area. The joint declaration on non-traditional security was formalized in aMemorandum of Understanding (MOU) in January 2004. The MOU followed aspecial meeting held in Bangkok in April 2003 to discuss joint action to deal withthe Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic.23 A major advancetowards the free trade area was taken in January 2007 when China and ASEANsigned the Agreement on Trade in Services at their tenth summit in Cebu, thePhilippines.Originally, ASEAN sought to negotiate a Code of Conduct for the South ChinaSea. China resisted ASEAN diplomatic pressure to agree to a formal legally- binding code. Nevertheless, China and ASEAN were able to developunprecedented cooperation under the umbrella of the DOC . In September 2003,Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National PeoplesCongress, proposed joint oil exploration and development in areas of overlapping claims in the South China Sea (see discussion below). Early in 2004,ASEAN and China agreed to set up a Joint Working Group to implement theDOC.

Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. In October 2003, Chinas zone of interaction with ASEAN was enhanced when China acceded to the ASEANTreaty of Amity and Cooperation, and China issued a joint declaration withASEAN establishing a strategic partnership.24 The joint declaration was the firstformal agreement of this type between China and a regional organization, aswell as a first for ASEAN itself. The joint declaration was wide-ranging andincluded a provision for the initiation of a new security dialogue as well asgeneral cooperation in political matters.25 In July the following year, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan raised the prospect of developing enhanced strategic relations with ASEAN in his discussions withSecretary General Ong Keng Yong in Beijing. As a result, China and ASEAN

drafted a five-year Plan of Action (2005-2010) in late 2004. This plan included,inter alia , a joint commitment to increase regular high-level bilateral visits,cooperation in the field of non-traditional security, security dialogue and militaryexchanges and cooperation.26The Plan of Action set out the following objectives:

23In September 2004, China hosted ARF Workshop on Drug-Substitute Alternative Developmentand in March 2005, China hosted an ARF seminar on enhancing cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues.24Carlyle A. Thayer, China and Southeast Asia: A Shifting Zone of Interaction, in SeanMcDonald and Bruce Vaughn, eds.,The Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, Terrorism, andGlobalization. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming.25 Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast AsianNations and the Peoples Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity ,October 8, 2003. For an analysis see: Lyall Breckon, A New Strategic Partnership is Declared,Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 5:4, 4th Quarter,October-December 2003.26Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration of ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership forPeace and Prosperity.


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Promote mutual confidence and trust in defense and military fields with aview to maintaining peace and stability in the region;

Conduct dialogues, consultations and seminars on security and defenseissues;

Strengthen cooperation on military personnel training; Consider observing each others military exercises and explore the

possibility of conducting bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises;and

Explore and enhance cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.ASEAN has been reluctant to advance military cooperation with China tooquickly. In May 2004, during the course of a visit to Beijing by Malaysias newprime minister, Abdullah Badawi, his Chinese counterpart, Premier Wen Jiabao,suggested they consider a joint undertaking to maintain the security of sea linesof communication through the Malacca Strait. This proposal was pressed thefollowing month by Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun, deputy director of ChinasNational Defense University. In a paper presented to the China-ASEAN forum inSingapore, Wang proposed joint naval exercises and patrols (as well asintelligence exchanges on terrorism). According to one analyst, Wangs proposalwas received coolly and with considerable skepticism by the audience.27 Threeyears later, however, Indonesia proposed seeking technical assistance from bothChina and Japan on an ASEAN-wide and bilateral basis to build up the capacityof the littoral states.28 In November 2004, at the 8th China-ASEAN Summit, Premier Wen Jiabao onceagain raised Chinas proposal to shelve disputes in the South China Sea whilegoing for joint development. This led to a major break through in March thefollowing year when the national oil companies of China, the Philippines andVietnam signed an agreement to conduct joint seismic testing in the South ChinaSea.29 In July 2005, President Hu Jintao reiterated Chinas call for joint developmentduring the course of state visits to Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines.30 Thatmonth, China and ASEAN set up the Joint Working Group on the Declaration onthe Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and charged it withrecommending measures to implement the agreement. The Working Group held

27Ronald Montaperto, Smoothing the Wrinkles,Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on EastAsian Bilateral Relations , 6:2, 2nd Quarter, April-June 2004.28Shefall Rekhi, Indonesia seeks wider China and Japan role,The Straits Times , June 4, 2007.29Tripartite agreement on joint survey of seismic activity in East Sea signed, Vietnam NewsAgency, March 14, 2005; Ma. Theresa Torres and Niel Villegas Mugas, RP, China, Vietnam toexplore Spratlys,The Manila Times , March 16, 2005; China, Vietnam agree to joint exploration of disputed areas, Xinhua, Beijing, July 4, 2005; and China, Philippines, Vietnam work ondisputed South China Sea area, Xinhua, August 27, 2005.30Xinhuanet, Beijing, July 19, 2005 inPeoples Liberation Army Daily , July 20, 2005.


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its second meeting in Hainan in February 2006. In light of deadly pirate attackson Chinese fishing vessels in May 2006, China, the Philippines and Vietnamagreed to strengthen security cooperation in the South China Sea.31 The ASEAN-China strategic partnership was consolidated with the holding of the first workshop on regional security between defence department officials inBeijing in July 2006. ASEAN and China also held a heads of governmentCommemorative Summit in Nanning to mark the fifteenth anniversary of Chinas status as a dialogue partner. By the end of 2006, ASEAN and China hadconcluded twenty-eight cooperation framework mechanisms, including regularconsultations between senior officials on strategic and political securitycooperation, a yearly conference of foreign ministers, and an annual summitmeeting of government leaders.32 These developments provided a firmfoundation for the development of security and defense cooperation in thefuture.ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).Vietnam was a founding member of the ASEANRegional Forum in 1994. Membership in the ARF provides a multilateral

framework for Vietnams defence-security relations and interaction with China.When China first joined the ASEAN Regional Forum it was highly suspiciousabout multilateral activities that might curtail its national sovereignty. Over time,however, China has come to embrace multilateral security cooperation under theauspices of the ARF.33 China has taken a particularly active role in the ARFsinter-sessional work program related to confidence building measures. In March1997, for example, China hosted the Inter-Sessional Group on ConfidenceBuilding Measures, and did so again in November 2003.In 1997, China sent representatives to the ARF meeting of Heads of DefenseColleges and hosted the 4th ARF meeting of the Heads of Defense Colleges inSeptember 2000. The meeting was opened by Defence Minister Chi Haotian, whoargued that the ARFs stress on dialog and consultation represented a newsecurity concept and the trend of multi-polarization in the region. Chi notedthat regional flash points still existed, hegemonism and power politics haveshown new traces of development and democracy and human rights were being used as excuses for intervention, and separatism was gaining ground. Allthese will endanger or jeopardize the security and stability of the region. Thatswhy we advocate that all countries adopt the new security concept built uponequality, dialogue, mutual confidence and cooperation.34 In 2000, China also

31Agence France-Presse, Philippines, China, Vietnam to cooperate in Spratlys security,Channelnewsasia.com, May 19, 2006.32Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, Chinese Diplomacy and Optimism about ASEAN,Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations , 8:3, 3rd Quarter, July-September 2006.33Alice d. Ba, Whos socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino-ASEAN relations,ThePacific Review , 19(2), June 2006, pp. 157-179.34Xinhua News Agency, September 6, 2000.


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contributed for the first time to the ARFsAnnual Security Outlookand beganproviding voluntary briefings on regional security.While Chinas participation in the ARFs program of confidence buildingmeasures has evolved over time, Chinas endorsement of preventive diplomacyhas been more circumscribed. In a Defence White Paper issued in late 2000,

China provided this cautious assessment:China holds that the ARF should continue to focus on confidence-buildingmeasures, explore new security concepts and methods, and discuss thequestion of preventive diplomacy. At the same time, it believes that theparties concerned should have a full discussion first on the concept,definition, principles and scope of preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacificregion and reach consensus in this regard.35

According to one China analyst two of the defining features of that document[the 2000 Defence White Paper] were the emphasis on the dominance of peaceand development as forces driving global development and a corollaryimperative toward implementing external policies based upon multilateralcooperative approaches.36 Since 2000, China has consistently promoted its newsecurity concept as the preferred framework for multilateral cooperation. Forexample, in July 2002 China outlined its new security concept in a position paperpresented to the annual ARF ministerial meeting.In 2003, China launched a major initiative to further its new concept of security.At the annual ARF ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh, China proposed thecreation of a Security Policy Conference comprised of senior military and civilianofficials (vice minister level) drawn from all ARF members. The objective of thisnew security mechanism would be to draft a security treaty to promote peace,stability and prosperity in the region. Chinese officials said the new treatywould give equal attention to the concerns of all ARF members and guaranteesecurity through united action rather than seeking absolute security for oneself and threaten[ing] other parties security.37 China drafted and circulated aconcept paper prior to hosting the first ARF Security Policy Conference inNovember 2004.38 At the 11th ARF Ministerial Meeting in 2004, China tabled a series of proposalsfor the future development of the ARF. These were later summarized as follows:

35Peoples Republic of China, State Council, Information Office, Chinas National Defense in2000, Text of PRC White Paper on National Defense in 2000, Xinhua Domestic Service, Beijing,October 16, 2001.36Ronald Montaperto, Thinking Globally, Acting Regionally,Comparative Connections: An E- Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations , 6:4, 4th Quarter, October-December 2004.37Lyall Breckon, SARS and a New Security Initiative from China,Comparative Connections: AnE-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations , 5:2, 2nd Quarter, April-June 2003.38Dana R. Dillon and John J. Tkacik, Jr., China and ASEAN: Endangered American Primacy inSoutheast Asia, Backgrounder No. 1886. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, October19, 2005, p. 3. The second ARF Security Policy Conference was held in Vientiane in May 2005.


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To maintain its forum nature and adhere to the basic principles of decision-making through consensus, taking an incremental approach, and moving at apace comfortable to all member so as to encourage the initiative and activeparticipation of all members; to continuously strengthen and consolidateconfidence-building measures (CBMs) while actively addressing the issue of preventive diplomacy, so as to gradually find out cooperative methods andapproaches for preventive diplomacy that are suitable to the region andfitting the current needs; to increase participation of defense officials,promote exchanges and cooperation among militaries of the countriesconcerned and give full play to the important role of the militaries inenhancing mutual trust; to highlight cooperation in non-traditional securityfields such as counter-terrorism and combating transnational crimes.39

Chinas 2004 Defense White Paper identified five main areas of internationalsecurity cooperation: strategic consultation and dialogue; regional securitycooperation; cooperation in non-traditional security fields, participating inUnited Nations peacekeeping operations; and military exchanges. Chapter ninehighlighted the importance China placed on its interaction with ASEAN and theASEAN Regional Forum.The Defense White Paper also set out Beijings policy on internationalcooperation in the area of defense-related science, technology and industryincluding the export of military products and related technologies. According tothis document, Chinas exports in this sensitive area were governed by threeprinciples: It should only serve the purpose of helping the recipient stateenhance its capability for legitimate self-defense; it must not impair peace,security and stability of the relevant region and the world as a whole; and it mustnot be used to interfere in the recipient states internal affairs.40 Bilateral. After a decade-long estrangement during the Cambodian conflict,

leaders from Hanoi and Beijing met in secret in southern China in September1990 and agreed to normalize bilateral relations. China and Vietnam resumedhigh-level political contact in November 1991, pointedly only after Vietnam hadagreed to a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. Bilateral politicalrelations between Vietnam and China were codified by party leaders who met inBeijing in early 1999 (Xinhua Domestic Service, February 27, 1999). Late thefollowing year the two sides signed a Joint Statement for ComprehensiveCooperation in the New Century between the Peoples Republic of China and theSocialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam News Agency, December 25, 2000).It is notable that between February 1999 and December 2000, the PeoplesRepublic of China (PRC) negotiated long-term cooperative framework

arrangements with all ten ASEAN members.41

Generally these took the form of

39Peoples Republic of China, State Council,Chinas National Defense in 2004 , Beijing: InformationOffice, December 27, 2004, chapter nine.40Ibid., chapter seven.41These arrangements were variously titled: framework agreement, framework document, jointstatement and joint declaration. For a detailed analysis consult: Thayer, Chinas New Security


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joint statements signed by foreign ministers or vice premiers. Six of Chinaslong-term cooperative framework agreements included a reference to securitycooperation (Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines, and Laos).Subsequently, several of these long-term cooperative framework agreementshave been enhanced through additional joint declarations and/or memoranda of understanding.It is notable that no defence clause was included in the Sino-Vietnameseagreement, perhaps because of the contentious nature of unresolved territorialdisputes in the South China Sea. According to the joint statement, [b]oth sideswill refrain from taking any action that might complicate and escalate disputes,resorting to force or making threats with force. Defence contacts were firstopened with the exchange of delegations from the Vietnamese and Chinesedefence ministries External Relations Departments in February and May 1992,respectively. Data for the period 2002-06 reveals there is a marked imbalance inthe exchange of delegations at the ministerial level. Vietnams defence ministerhas visited China four times, while Chinas defence minister has made only onevisit to Hanoi. The exchanges at the level of Chief of the General Staff, GeneralPolitical Department and General Logistics Department are more balanced.Contact at the level of service chiefs has been confined to one visit by the PLANavy Air Force in 1997.China and ASEAN members carried out seventy-one high-level defence visits inthe period from 2002 to 2006. Sixteen were ministerial level visits. Reciprocalvisits by defence ministers were conducted by China with five countriesincluding Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Vietnamand China exchanged nine high-level delegations during this period. In theperiod between 2001-2006, China and Southeast Asia conducted eleven navalgoodwill visits involving seven regional states. Chinese warships visitedVietnam, Singapore (twice), Thailand and Brunei. In November 2001, PLAN Jiangwei-II guided missile frigate visits Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese navyhas yet to make a return visit.Defence relations between China and Vietnam appear almost entirely focused onexchanges of views on regional security and ideological matters and bordersecurity issues. Table 2 sets out data on the exchange of delegations at theMilitary Region level between 1996 and 2003. Since the normalization of relations both China and Vietnam have undertaken to demine and to dispose of unexploded ordnance in their frontier area. Since the signing of a treaty on theircommon border in December 1999, both sides have begun to physicallydemarcate this area. This process is expected to be completed in June 2008.In October 2005, the Chinese and Vietnamese defence ministers tentativelydiscussed cooperation between their nation defense industries. Chinas state-

Concept and Southeast Asia, pp. 92-95. For a recent review of Chinas bilateral relations withSoutheast Asia see: Jrgen Haacke, The Significance of Beijings Bilateral Relations: LookingBelow the Regional Level in China-ASEAN Ties, in Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku, eds.,China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges. Institute of Southeast AsianStudies, Singapore, 2005, pp. 118-140.


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owned armed supplier, NORINCO, was reported to be providing Vietnam withammunition for small arms and artillery, military vehicles and assisting in co-production of ammunition and heavy machine guns.42

42 Janes Defense Weekly , 4 January 2006, on line edition.


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Table 2 Exchanges at Military Region Level between China and Vietnam, 1996-2003

To Vietnam From Vietnam

1996 January Guangzhou Military Region1997 February Jinan Military Region1997 June Chengdu Military Region1998 July Chengdu Military Region2000 January Jinan Military Region2000 July Chengdu Military Region2002 April Guangzhou Military Region

2003 January Chengdu Military Region

1997 April Military Region 21999 November Military Region 3

In a new development, in April 2006, China and Vietnam commenced joint navalpatrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. This was a first for the Chinese navy. In August2006, after the two party leaders, Nong Duc Manh and Hu Jintao, met in Beijing,they issued a joint communiqu that noted both sides spoke positively of the joint patrol conducted by the navies of the two countries in the Tonkin Gulf.43 The second China-Vietnam joint patrol was conducted in late December 2006. Amonth earlier Vietnam Petroleum Corporation (PetroVietnam) and the ChinaNational Offshore Oil Corporation reached agreement to conduct jointexploration in the Gulf of Tonkin. On January 5, 2007, Prime Minister NguyenTan Dung gave his approval for joint oil exploration to commence.In April 2005, China and Vietnam commenced extremely low-key consultationson defensive security in Beijing. China had already initiated defence securityconsultations with Thailand, and the Philippines.6. Impact of Defence on Foreign Policy

The above sections have traced Vietnams growing defence-security ties withChina within both multilateral and bilateral settings. The growth of thisrelationships appears in accord with the broad tenets of Vietnamese foreignpolicy to multilateralise and diversify foreign relations, to be a reliable partnerwith all countries, and to develop strategic partnerships with the major powers.According to Alexander Vuving, there are at least major identifiable leadershipgroupings in Vietnam, the anti-imperialists and the integrationists.44 The

43China-Vietnam Joint Communiqu, Beijing, 24 August 2006.44Alexander Vuving, Strategy and Evolution of Vietnams China Policy: A Changing Mixture of Pathways,Asian Survey , 46(6), November 2006.


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former still harbour suspicion about U.S. intentions, while the later seek tointegrate Vietnam into the global economy including gaining access to the U.S.market.During 2007 events in the South China Sea produced serious friction in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Vietnam has chosen to censor any and all public reporting

on these developments. However in late 2007 there was an outpouring of nationalism on the part of Vietnamese students who mounted unprecedentedpublic protests against Chinese actions in the South China Sea. This section willreview these events. Just after Vietnam was admitted into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), theVietnam Communist Party Central Committee held its fourth plenary sessionfrom January 15-24, 2007. This meeting took the decision to order the party, thearmy, police and regime-approved mass organizations to divest themselves of their commercial enterprises. Ownership will reportedly be transferred to a jolding company which will make a determination about which enterprises will be equitised and sold to private investors.

The Vietnam People's Army, for example, currently runs 140 enterprises andhold shares in another twenty companies. These enterprises are engaged in anincredibly diverse range of economic activities from coffee production, coalmining, garment manufacture, stock broking, and telecommunications to healthservices. In 2006, army-run enterprises earned US $2 billion in revenue or 3percent of Vietnam's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Divestiture will touch onsensitive sources of funding for the military at a time when developments in theSouth China Sea seemingly demand an increase in defence expendutire.In 2006, the the 10th National Party Congress adopted a resolution decreeing thatVietnams maritime economy should be strongly developed with a focus onsectors that have comparative advantages in order to develop a strong maritimeeconomy, maintain national defence and security in a spirit of internationalcooperation. This matter was considered by the fourth plenum of VCP CentralCommittee that met in January 2007. Reports submitted to this meeting notedthat there was no coherent plan to integrate the economic development of coastalareas with the exploitation of marine resources in Vietnam's territorial waters.Economists estimated that by 2020, the marine economy would contribute up to55 percent of GDP and between 55-60 percent of exports.The fourth plenum directed that a national 'Maritime Strategy Towards the Year2020' be drawn up to integrate economic development with environmentalprotection and national defence and security. The Vietnam Peoples Army wastasked with defending territorial waters and safeguarding national sovereignty.The maritime strategy was completed by the end of the year but has not yet beenreleased publicly. Chinese officials reportedly acquired a classified copy andnoted that Vietnams plans included developing areas over which China hasterritorial claims. China then began to apply pressure of foreign firms that werelikely to be involved in developing Vietnams maritime sector, warning themthat their commercial operations in China might suffer if they became involvedin developing areas claimed by China.


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Chinas behind-the-scenes actions were accompanied by greater diplomatic andmilitary assertiveness. For example, Vietnam lodged a protest when Chinaimplanted boundary markers on the Xisha (Paracel) Islands, claiming theseviolated Vietnamese sovereignty. On January 4, 2007, Liu Jianchao, spokespersonfor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dismissed this protest declaring: China hasindisputable sovereignty over the Xisha, Nansha Islands and adjacent islands.And we have all historical and legal evidences needed to prove this. Liu alsonoted that the erection of structures marking the base points of Chinas territorialsea is a question of Chinese sovereignty and other countries have no right tointervene. Liu noted that based on the United Nations Convention on Law of heSea and Chinas Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. China issued base points on Xisha Islands as early as 1996 (Press Trust of India, Beijing, January 4, 2007).It was in this context that China and Vietnam held their 13th round of discussionson border and territorial issues in Nanning from January 19-20, 2007. Thismeeting canvassed land and maritime issues. Regarding the South China Sea, theVietnam News Agency reported: Regarding marine issues, on the basis of common perception and the agreement already reached between leaders of thetwo countries, both sides discussed in depth measures to maintain peace andstability in the East Sea, without any action to complicate or widen disputes.They agreed to continue the negotiation mechanism in order to seek a basic andlong-term solution that is acceptable to both sides and in line with internationallaws and practices, particularly the United Nations Convention on the 1982 Lawof the Sea and Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC).45 In March, it was announced that British Petroleum (BP) and its partners hadsubmitted plans to the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry for an investment of US$2 billion in a major expansion in gas and power development over the nextdecade. These plans included installing at least two natural gas pipelinesconnecting off shore deposits in two new gas fields, Moc Tinh and Hai Thach, inthe Nam Con Son basin in the South China Sea. BPs plans also included theconstruction of a power plant in Nhon Trach in Dong Nai province.46 BPcurrently maintains the only operational pipeline which connects the Lan Tay-Lan Do gas field in the Nam Con Son basin to the Phu My power complex in BaRia-Vung Tau. The new fields to be connected to the proposed pipeline areadjacent to the fields from which BP operates a pipeline.The question of BPs future operations quickly became a contentious issue inSino-Vietnamese relations. On April 9, 2007, Wu Bangguo, chairman of theNational Peoples Congress, met with his Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyen PhuTrong. Wu stated that the two countries should tackle boundary issuesappropriately in an effort to maintain stability in the South China Sea. Wu alsosaid, The two countries should enhance political mutual trust, appropriately

45Vietnam News Agency, Beijing, January 21, 2007;Quan Doi Nhan Dan , January 22, 2007.46Dong Ha, BP, PetroVietnam rearrange gas pipeline overhauls plan,Thanh Nien , March 14,2007


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deal with the boundary issue and implement related agreements.47 On the sameday, President Hu Jintao told Trong, China is ready to work with Vietnam toappropriately deal with the issue of land and maritime borders to jointlymaintain peace in the border area.

Documents

Thayer Vietnam: Defence and Foreign Policy 2008