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Vietnam’s Defence Policy and its

Impact on Foreign Relations

Professor Carlyle A. Thayer

Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor of

Southeast Asian Studies, Center of International Studies, Ohio University, Athens

Paper for EuroViet 6, Asien-Afrika Institut, Universitat Hamburg,

Hamburg, Germany, June 6-8, 2008

1. Introduction

This paper seeks to explore a largely neglected aspect of Vietnam‘s ‗multidirectional

foreign policy‘, defence diplomacy, and its impact on foreign policy. Foreign policy in

Vietnam has always been the preserve of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bo Ngoai

Giao) whose minister generally holds a seat on the Political Bureau. When this has

not been the case, a senior member of the Political Bureau takes responsibility for

foreign policy oversight. In contrast, the Minister of National Defence (Bo Quoc

Phong) has always been a member of the Political Bureau. Up until about 1992 there

was no apparent joint coordinating mechanism for these two ministries outside of

the Political Bureau. In 1992 a National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) was

created which includes among its members the ministers of foreign affairs, national

defence and public security. It is doubtful that the NDSC performs a strong

coordinating role. In short, Vietnam‘s defence diplomacy, while following general

guidelines issued by the Political Bureau and party Central Committee, is largely a

product of the Ministry of National Defence.

Since the end of the Cold War the strategic context for Vietnam‘s foreign and defence

policies has changed enormously. Changes first began to emerge in the mid to late-

1980s. At least two major factors influenced this development. The first factor

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concerned Vietnam‘s domestic circumstances arising from the socio-economic crisis

that confronted Vietnam at that time. The second factor was external and arose from

the ‗new political thinking‘ emanating from the Soviet Union under the leadership of

Mikhail Gorbachev. Due to the confluence of domestic and external influences

Vietnam turned from a foreign policy structured by ideological considerations to a

foreign policy framework that placed greater emphasis on national interest and

pragmatic diplomacy. Vietnamese analysts now stressed global economic forces and

the impact of the revolution in science and technology as key determinants of global

order (Nguyen Manh Cam, 1995:223-230 and Vu Khoan, 1995:71-76). This evolution

took place gradually (Palmujoki: 2004) and the ideological framework of the past

was not jettisoned entirely, residues of the past can still be found today.

In December 1986, at the sixth national congress of Vietnam Communist Party (VCP),

Vietnam adopted the policy of doi moi (renovation). This policy was mainly

concerned with overcoming the domestic economic crisis by the adoption of socio-

economic reforms and opening Vietnam to foreign investment. In order to achieve

these objectives Vietnam first had to liquidate the Cambodian problem. In 1987, the

Politburo met and secretly approved Resolution No. 2 that set out a major strategic

readjustment in Vietnam‘s defence policy – ‗people‘s war and all-people‘s national

defence‘. Vietnam‘s new strategic policy resulted in the withdrawal of all combat

forces from Laos and Cambodia and the massive demobilization of regulars. The

Vietnamese military was promised funding to support these measures. Vietnam‘s

major strategic readjustment set the context for further dramatic changes in foreign

policy.

In May 1988, Vietnamese party leaders agreed on a new codification of foreign policy

objectives. This took the form of Politburo Resolution No. 13 which called for a

‗multi-directional foreign policy‘ orientation (Chu Van Chuc 2004:4-7). The new

emphasis was ‗to maintain peace, take advantage of favorable world conditions‘ in

order to stabilize the domestic situation and set the base for economic development

over the next ten to fifteen years. This resolution is now recognized as a major

landmark in Vietnam‘s external relations. The next important elaboration of

Vietnam‘s ‗multi-directional foreign policy‘ occurred at the seventh national party

congress in June 1991 (Vu Khoan 1995:75). Policy documents adopted at this

congress declared that Vietnam would ‗diversify and multilateralise economic

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relations with all countries and economic organizations…‘ In short, Vietnam now

sought ‗to be friends with all countries‘.

In September 1989, Vietnam unilaterally withdrew its armed forces from Cambodia.

The Vietnam People‘s Army (VPA), which numbered 1.2 million in 1987, was reduced

in size with the demobilization of 700,000 troops over the next five years. In October

1991, Vietnam was a signatory to the comprehensive political settlement that brought

an end to the Cambodian conflict. Vietnam was no longer an international pariah

state subject to an aid and trade boycott. In sum, the settlement of the Cambodian

conflict resulted in the transformation of regional relations from confrontation

between two blocs to cooperation among the states of Southeast Asia.

In July 1992 Vietnam attended the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as an

observer for the first time. Vietnam acceded to the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation at this meeting. By so doing Vietnam renounced the use of force or the

threat to use force in foreign relations and committed itself to the non-violent

resolution of any conflict that might arise. Two years later, at the 1994 ASEAN

Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, Vietnam was invited to join ASEAN. It also became

a founding member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) at this time. Vietnam‘s

application for ASEAN membership was formally approved late that year and in July

1995 Vietnam became ASEAN‘s seventh member.

Since the 1991 seventh party congress, Vietnam succeeded in diversifying its foreign

relations. Seven developments are particularly notable: normalization of relations

with China (November 1991), the restoration of official development assistance by

Japan (November 1992), normalization of relations with the United States (July

1995), membership in ASEAN (July 1995), the signing of a Framework Cooperation

Agreement with the European Union (July 17, 1995), membership in the World

Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 2007 and non-permanent membership on the

United Nations Security Council (January 2008). For the first time, Vietnam had

diplomatic relations with all five permanent members of the United Nations Security

Council and, equally importantly, with the world‘s three major economic centers:

Europe, North America and East Asia. In 1989, Vietnam had diplomatic relations

with only twenty-three non-communist states. A year after Vietnam joined ASEAN,

Vietnam expanded its external relations to 163 countries.

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2. Vietnam’s Defence Diplomacy, 1991-2004

During the Cold War Vietnam maintained defence relations with a handful of

countries; China, the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact featured

prominently. (2) Chinese military assistance fell off after the signing of the 1973 Paris

Peace Agreement and was terminated in 1978-79 when the two fell out over

Cambodia. China and Vietnam fought a border war in February-March 1979 and only

normalized relations in November 1991. During the Cold War Vietnam also

maintained defence relations and/or contacts with a small number of other friendly

states including Laos, Cuba, India, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia. By

2004, according to Vietnam‘s Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam, had

established defence relations with more than sixty countries (Quan Doi Nhan Dan,

December 22, 2003). A total of thirty-four defence attaches were accredited to

Vietnam, while Vietnam posted twenty-four defence attaches abroad (Vietnam News

Agency, November 29, 2004). (3)

For purposes of this paper ‗military diplomacy‘ refers to official defence relations

between Vietnam‘s Ministry of National Defence and its overseas counterparts, such

as the U.S. Department of Defense. (4) Military diplomacy is conducted by means of

the exchange of delegations, accrediting of defence attaches, defence cooperation

programs, and equipment and arms sales and servicing agreements. In the period

from January 1990 to December 2006, Vietnam exchanged 364 high-level defence

delegations with forty-two countries. (5) For purposes of analysis, these delegations

may be divided into five major categories: ministerial (MND), Chief of the General

Staff or equivalent (CGS), head of the General Political Department (GPD), head of

the General Logistics Department or equivalent (GLD), and Service Chief (SC) for

army, navy and air force (see Chart 1). In addition to these high-level delegations, in

the period 1990-2004 Vietnam hosted at least thirty-one delegations representing

foreign staff colleges and defence institutes from nine countries. (6) Between 1990

and July 2007, Vietnam hosted fifty-eight separate naval ship visits from sixteen

countries.

Of the 364 high-level exchange visits, Vietnam received 207 delegations and sent 157

delegations abroad. When the frequency of high-level exchanges is calculated (total

of delegations received and sent up to the end of 2004), three countries account for

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nearly a third of all delegations: Laos (40 exchanges), China (33 exchanges) and

Thailand (26 exchanges). The next tier includes: Cambodia (20), India (16);

Philippines and Russia (13 each); and the United States (11); France Indonesia and

Singapore (10 each); Cuba and Japan (7) (9 each); Australia (8), North Korea. South

Korea and Malaysia (7 exchanges each); Italy, Myanmar and Ukraine (6 exchanges

each); and Poland and Slovakia (4 exchanges each).

Between 1990-04, Vietnam hosted thirty-four ministerial-level delegations from 16

countries. Toping the list of visitors to Vietnam are the defence ministers from Laos

(7 visits), Thailand (5 visits), and Cambodia (3 visits). Vietnam‘s defence minister

made 40 official overseas trips to 29 countries during this same period. Vietnam‘s

defence minister most frequently visited Laos (5 visits) and China (4 visits). Prior to

Vietnam‘s membership in ASEAN, Hanoi hosted visits by defence ministers from

Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and the Slovak Republic. At the same time, Vietnam‘s

defence minister visited China, Indonesia, North Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar

and the Philippines.

The period after the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia witnessed a major

expansion in ministerial-level contacts. Vietnam resuscitated defence contacts with

former ‗traditional allies‘ such as the Russian Federation, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech

Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic and the Ukraine. In Northeast Asia Vietnam

exchanged ministerial level delegations with China, Japan, and South Korea. Most

notable has been the exchange of delegations with so-called western countries:

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the

United States. In addition to long-standing relations with Cuba and India, Vietnam

has also developed ministerial level contacts in Africa (Algeria and South Africa) and

Latin America (Brazil).

When the data on high-level exchanges is viewed on a time scale (see Chart 2), it is

evident that the year 1994 marks the real beginning of defence diplomacy. The

general trend since then has been a steady rise in the number of high-level defence

delegations coming to Vietnam with a peaks in 2001 and 2003. There was a

noticeable drop in the exchange of delegations between 1995-2000 perhaps

reflecting Vietnam‘s difficult economic conditions, followed by the Asian financial

crisis that resulted in a decline in defence cooperation activities across the region

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generally. The number of Vietnamese delegations sent abroad has mirrored but

trailed the generally rising trend of high-level delegations received.

It should be noted that the exchange of delegations representing the General Political

Department (GPD) takes place only among socialist states. The highest number of

exchanges of GPD delegations has been with Laos (44% of the total) and China (29%).

The category Logistics is a catch-all for a variety of delegations at deputy ministerial

level. This category reflects Vietnamese organizational practice whereby the head of

the General Logistics Department (GLD) is also a deputy minister of national defence.

Foreign delegations that are received by the head of the VPA General Logistics

Department have been placed in this category. The category Logistics also includes

exchanges between the external relations department (ERD) of defence ministries

and other groups such cryptology (Laos) and military education (Russia).

The fifth category of high-level delegations comprises the service chiefs (army, navy

and air). Once again, it should be noted, defence forces are not structured in the

same way. The United States, for example, has a number of combatant commanders

in charge of geographical areas of responsibility, such as the Pacific Command

(PACOM). The U.S. PACOM Commander (formerly CINCPAC) is included in the

Service Chiefs category as are the commanders of the Russian and French Pacific

fleets. The data indicates a marked imbalance in the number of reciprocal exchanges.

Between 1990 and 2004, Vietnam received forty delegations in the Service Chiefs

category while sending only nine abroad.

The exchange of high-level defence delegations serves a number of purposes

including goodwill, protocol visits for newly appointed officials, strategic dialogue,

and a variety of practical defence cooperation activities between ministries, armed

services and defence industries. This section will review some of Vietnam ‗s most

significant defence cooperation relations starting with the three countries with whom

Vietnam has exchanged the most high-level delegations.

3. Defence Relations with the ASEAN States

Bilateral. Vietnam has conducted relatively intense high-level defence exchanges

with six of ASEAN‘s ten members. In addition to Laos and Cambodia, this list

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includes Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore. Vietnam‘s defence

relations with Brunei, Malaysia and Myanmar do not involve substantial defence

interaction.

The relative intensity of high-level defence exchanges between Thailand and Vietnam

should be noted. The main content of defence relations are protocol exchange visits,

exchanges by staff colleges and defence institutes, and maritime security. (8) However

more practical matters were also included. For example, in January 2007, the

Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Boonsrang

Niumpradit, held discussions with the VPA Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen.

Nguyen Khac Vien on cooperation in training, sea patrols, search and rescue of

fishermen, sports competition and ‗other issues of common concern.‘ In December

2007, General Anupong Pachinda, Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army

visited Hanoi and held discussions with Lt. Gen. Nguyen Huu Kham, Deputy Chief of

the General Staff. The Thai visitor also held working sessions with ‗organs‘ of the

Vietam People‘s Army.

The intensity of high-level defence contacts between the Philippines and Vietnam

ranks second after Thai-Vietnamese relations. High-level defence visits since 1994

have generally focused on security issues in the South China Sea and occasional

incidents involving the encroachment by Vietnamese and Filipino fishermen into

maritime waters claimed by the other side. (9) As early as April 1994, President Fidel

Ramos, while on an official visit to Vietnam, offered to make available ten places for

Vietnamese cadets at the Philippine Military Academy. He further proposed

‗exchanges of visits by senior military officials, study tours for officers and defence

instructors and joint ventures in reconditioning of equipment, including aircraft, for

re-export‘. Little of substance appears to have taken place. After the visit of President

Ramos, Vietnamese military officials visited Subic Bay to study its conversion to

commercial use in order to draw lessons for the possible commercialization of Cam

Ranh Bay.

One of the earliest indications that Vietnam was interested in obtaining technical

assistance in the repair and maintenance of military equipment from outside the

Warsaw Pact came in late 1991 during the visit to Vietnam by Lt. General Teddy

Rusdy, the Assistant Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces. In

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discussions with officials at the VPA‘s Defence Industry and Technology General

Department, General Rusdy received a request for technical assistance in the repair

and maintenance of military equipment. Indonesia agreed to conduct a detailed

study of the matter; but there have been no further reports of any action taken.

In 1993 the Indonesian and Vietnamese defence ministers paid reciprocal visits.

General Doan Khue, the Vietamese minister of national defence, showed particular

interest in naval shipbuilding and was taken to Surabaya to observe first hand. This

was an indication that Vietnam was investigating the possibility of enlisting foreign

partners in ship construction in Vietnam. In 1995, a delegation representing

Indonesia‘s state aircraft manufacturing corporation went to Vietnam to explore the

possibility of starting operations there. Once again nothing eventuated from these

exploratory contacts.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis and its impact on Indonesia hobbled Indonesia‘s

capacity to cooperate with Vietnam in the defence area. There was an apparent

revivial of Indonesian interest in early 2002 when Lt. General Johny Lumintang,

Secretary General of Ministry of Defence and Security held working sessions in

Hanoi with the VPA‘s General Logistics Department and General Defence Industry

Department. More recent high-level visits appear of a protocol nature., such as the

August 2007 visit by the Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff.

Defence relations between Singapore and Vietnam were initiated in March 1995 with

the visit to Singapore by Vietnam‘s Defence Minister, General Doan Khue. The two

countries have since exchanged eleven high-level delegations (to August 2005). The

pattern indicates interest and possible cooperation between defence industries. In

November 1995, for example, the head of the VPA‘s General Department of

Technology, led a ten-member delegation on an visit that included a tour of local

defence industries. Late the following year, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence

Minister Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam visited Vietnam. After discussions with his

Vietnamese counterpart, it was agreed that Vietnam would send a delegation to

Singapore to study its experiences in refurbishing and upgrading weapons systems

(Vietnam News Agency, November 27, 1996). In March 1999, Lt General Le Van

Dung, Chief of the General Staff, paid a visit to Singapore and called in at the

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Industrial Technologies Group for a briefing. In 2002 it was reported that Singapore

and Vietnam had reached agreement ‗in principle‘ to hold joint naval exercises.

Hanoi reportedly sought Singapore Automotive Engineering‘s (now the ST Kinetics

division of ST Engineering) assistance in upgrading its Vietnam War era M113 APCs.

Basic overhaul of 50 M113‘s is now under way at a military base in Ho Chi Minh City.

Parts have been obtained through commercial sources and weapon systems will be

installed from captured stocks, with the APCs eventually due to be deployed with a

southern-based armoured division.

In September 2007, Singapore‘s Defence Miniser, Teo Chee Hean, visited Hanoi on

an official visit for talks with his counterpart General Phung Quang Thanh. Press

reports indicated that the two ministers exchanged experiences in army building,

counter terrorism, humanitarian assistance and natural disaster relief and

peacekeeping. They agree to continue to exchange delegations. In November 2007,

General Thanh paid a three-day official reciprocal visit to Singapore and called in at

air force and navy bases in the Lion City. In March 2008, Singapore‘s Air Force chief

Maj. Gen. Ng Chee Khern visied Hanoi to discuss on-going cooperation in search and

rescue missions, human resource development and language training. General Khern

also held working visits with officers from the Air Defence and Air Force. Most

recently, the Chief of Singapore‘s Defence Force, Desmond Kuek, visited Hanoi in

April 2008 where he held discussions with the VPA Chief of the General Staff, Lt.

Gen. Nguyen Khac Nghien. Agreement was reached to focus defence cooperation on

training, medical corps and humanitarian aid.

Defence contacts between Malaysia and Vietnam date to 1992 but did not reach

senior level until October-November 1994 when General Doan Khue, Vietnam‘s

defence minister, paid an official visit to Kuala Lumpur. Khue‘s itinerary included

visits to the staff institute of the Malaysian Armed Forces, Syarikat Malaysia

Explosives Technologies, Airod Sdn Bhd, the Udang Special War Training Centre and

the Lumut Naval Base. According to Malaysia‘s Defence Minister Datuk Seri Najib

Tun Razak, ‗We agreed to develop some form of defence cooperation and

collaboration, but we didn‘t go into specifics. I prefer them to look at our industry

first‘. Although no MOU was signed the two sides agreed to enhance defence

cooperation in exchange visits, training and cooperation in defence industries.

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Despite subsequent high-level exchanges there have been no public reports of

substantial defence industry cooperation.

Multilaterally. ASEAN eschewed multilateral defence activities for most of its

existence. Prior to 2003 cooperative military activities by ASEAN states have been

extremely modest: army football and volleyball tournaments, rifle shooting contests,

(10) and biennial meetings of war veterans. (11) It was only in 2003 with the adoption

of the Bali Concord II that ASEAN set itself the goal of becoming a security

community by 2015. The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action comprises six

components: political development, shaping and sharing of norms, conflict

prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building, and implementing

mechanisms.

In May 2004, the Working Group on Security Cooperation of ASEAN Special Senior

Officials Meeting requested the ASEAN Secretariat to draft a concept paper for

ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM). The concept paper specified that the

ADMM would be an integral part of ASEAN and report directly to the ASEAN

Summit. It was specifically tasked with four areas of responsibility: (1) promote

peace and stability via dialogue and cooperation; (2) give guidance to senior

defence/mililitary officials dialogue; (3) promote mutual trust and confidence,

transparency; and (4) contribute to the establishment of the ASEAN Security

Community.

The ADMM was to meet annually and be ‗open, flexible, outward looking‘ and to

complement other regional efforts to promote security dialogue and cooperation

including confidence building measures and tangible cooperation within the ASEAN

framework. The ADMM was given oversight of the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Force

Informal Meeting, ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting, ASEAN Air Force

Chiefs Conference, ASEAN Navy Interaction, ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal

Meeting. The ADMM was to engage with ASEAN‘s friends and dialogue partners.

The adoption of the ASEAN Security Community proposal gave cover for multilateral

activities to take place. The first meeting of ASEAN Air Force Commanders was

hosted by Thailand in March 2004. (12) This meeting approved plans to establish

direct communications channels to promote coordination. The ASEAN Annual

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Ministerial Meeting held in Jakarta in June 2004 endorsed plans to hold military

training exercises especially with a counter-terrorism focus. But plans so far are

modest and only include bilateral activities.

More significantly, the Fifth ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting held in

West Java in September 2004 gave a positive nod to a proposal to intensify

cooperation against terrorism through the exchange of intelligence and joint

exercises. The army chiefs agreed to set up a working group to draw up a detailed

program. Vietnam‘s representative, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major General

Nguyen Nang Nguyen, was quoted as stating that the VPA will boost cooperation

with other ASEAN armies ‗to fight terror and contribute to building an ASEAN of

peace, stability, prosperity and protection of national independence and sovereignty‘.

In November 2007, ASEAN adopted a protocol to the Concept Paper and gave

approval for the ADMM to expanded its contacts through a mechanism known as

ADMM Plus. A Joint Declaration was issued at this time endorsing a three-year work

program of defence dialogues and cooperation.

4. Defence Procurements and Defence Industry Cooperation

Over the period 1990-04, Vietnam exchanged high-level defence delegations with

forty-two countries. Press reports indicated that discussions on some aspect of

defence procurements, defence industry cooperation, research and development, and

technical training featured in discussions with at least twenty-three states. This

section reviews Vietnamese expression of interest in and purchase of weapons,

platforms and other military equipment; arms servicing agreements and defence

industry cooperation.

Vietnam has limited resources to devote to its defence establishment. The Vietnam

People‘s Army has traditionally supplemented its budget through domestic economic

and commercial activities; since the adoption of doi moi military-owned enterprises

have entered into joint venture agreements with foreign partners in order to earn

hard currency. The financial position of the VPA became particularly parlous in the

period immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Figures compiled by the

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reveal a sharp drop in arms imports

from U.S. $1.1 billion in 1991 to U.S. $10 million in 1992 and U.S. $10 million in 1993,

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before rising to U.S. $90 million in 1994. In 1992, Vietnam managed to off-set the

costs of imports by exporting U.S. $10 million in arms sales. These were the first

reported arms exports since 1988. (13)

Chart 3 below sets out nominal government defence spending in terms of the dong,

Vietnam‘s unit of currency, as a percentage of total government expenditure for the

period 1993-03. (14) Defence spending hovered at just under thirty percent with a

slight decline in recent years. Chart 4 displays Vietnam‘s official defence funding in

real U.S. dollars for the same period. Defence funding doubled between 1993-97 to

U.S. $2 billion, declined during the two years following the Asian financial crisis, and

has since risen steadily.

Vietnam‘s defence budget is a state secret. Vietnam only rarely provides information

on arms procurements, servicing agreements and defence industry cooperation. For

example, Vietnam has submitted reports on arms imports and exports for inclusion

on the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons annually since 1994.

During this period Vietnam reported arms imports for only four years, 1995, 1997,

2004 and 2005. Vietnam submitted ‗nil‘ reports for all the other years. These reports

are not complete. The Ukraine reported sales to Vietnam in 1995, 1996, 2002 and

2003 that are not included in Vietnam‘s reports for these years (see Table 1).

Until November 1998 Vietnam was constrained in its arms and equipment purchases

by United States national security legislation that prevented the sale of military

equipment to Vietnam that incorporated U.S. technology. Until the U.S. ban was

lifted, Vietnam was basically forced to look to those countries that had compatible

Soviet-made equipment. That did not prevent Vietnam, however, from testing the

market. Cost and compatibility have governed Vietnam‘s arms and military

equipment purchases.

Table 1

Reports to United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 1

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Exports Reported to Vietnam nil nil nil 4 combat aircraft, 20 missiles

and missile launchers 2

5 Su-22 UM3 3

3Su-22 4

nil

Imports Reported by Vietnam nil nil nil 4 combat aircraft, 20 missiles

and missile launchers

12 missile launchers,

62 S-300 missiles nil

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Notes

1 The UN Conventional Register of Conventional Arms records data provided by countries that export and import weapons in

seven general categories; battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack

helicopters and missiles and missile launchers.

2 Report by the Russian Federation for calendar year 2004.

3 Report by the Czech Republic for calendar year 2005.

4 Report by Ukraine for calendar year 2005.

Russian Federation. In mid-1992 Russia executed a volte face in its policy on

withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay and entered into a protracted series of negotiations

with Vietnam on the terms and conditions of remaining there. The two sides failed to

reach agreement and in May 2002 the Russians withdrew completely. In June 1994,

Russia and Vietnam signed a friendship treaty that replaced the 1978 Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation. In August 1998, Vietnam and the Russian Federation

declared a ‗new strategic partnership,‘ and two years later both sides finally reached

an agreement on the settlement of outstanding debts.

The Russian Federation continues to remain Vietnam‘s main source of military

weapons and equipment, but there are indications that cost considerations have led

Vietnam to diversify its imports. In 1994, Vietnam and Russia signed three major

arms procurement contracts. (15) The first covered the sale of six Sukhoi Su-27

fighter-bombers, a flight simulator and a training package for pilots and

maintenance personnel. Reports submitted by Russia and Vietnam for inclusion on

the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons confirmed the delivery of five

Su-27 SKs and one Su-27 UBK combat aircraft to Vietnam in 1995. Vietnam followed

up on its initial procurements by purchasing an additional six Su-27s. (16) The second

contract involved the sale of two Type 1241RA fast attack craft (FAC); while the third

contract involved the sale of four air defence radar systems.

In 1996, Russia and Vietnam established a joint venture to co-produce KBO 2000

and BPS 500-type vessels at the Ba Son naval dockyard in Ho Chi Minh City. The

former is roughly equivalent to a corvette, while the latter is a much smaller fast

attack craft armed with surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). Vietnam also proposed

the co-production of air defence radars and surface-to-surface missiles. Subsequently,

Vietnam purchased four additional Type 1241RA fast attack craft and SSMs. (17)

Between 1996 and 1998, Russia upgraded 32 single-seat Su-22M4 and two twin-seat

Su-22UM3 ground attack aircraft.

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In 1997, Russian defence industry sources reported the sale of a number of BP-3A

battlefield vehicles and T-8 OU tanks to Vietnam. Russia‘s Almaz Central Marine

Design Bureau delivered two Type 14310 Svetlyak class patrol boats in December

2002 for use by the Coast Guard service.

The defence relationship between the two countries was further strengthened during

the February/March 2001 visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Vietnam.

During his stay, the two countries agreed to ―strengthen their co-operation in

military supplies to meet Vietnam‘s security demands‖. In 2002, the Russian

Federation listed the sale of eight missiles and missile launchers to Vietnam on its

annual report to the U.N. Register of Conventional Weapons. (18) In 2003, Russia and

Vietnam reached agreement on three major weapons purchases: four Su-30 MKKs

(with an option for eight more); two Molnya 1241.8 type missile boats (Ho-A Class in

Vietnam), with a further eight to be assembled in Vietnam (19), and two batteries (12

launchers each) of S-300PMU1 surface-to-air missile systems in a contract valued at

U.S. $200 million. The deal, for 12 systems has a potential value of U.S. $300 million

if all options are exercised. The combined arms purchases for 2003 totaled an

estimated U.S. $480 million.

The four Su-30 aircraft were delivered at the end of 2004. However, purchase of the

remaining eight aircraft has proven too costly for Vietnam. Vietnam‘s SU-27s and Su-

30s are expected to require an upgrade in order to operate with a range of air-to-air,

air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles, most notably the R-77 beyond-visual-range

AAM. The first S-300PMU1 battery was delivered in August 2005.

In March 2005 it was reported that Vietnam may require a further eight to 10 fighter

aircraft, with the Su-27 or Su-30MK the preferred choice. Insufficient funding may

well prove to be an insurmountable stumbling block and could be a factor in the

apparent decision of that year to acquire 40 second-hand Sukhoi Su-22 attack

aircraft. The Project 2100 programme to locally assemble a Russian-built corvette

appears to have been abandoned. It was always doubtful whether Vietnam possessed

the indigenous technical capability to assemble such a relatively sophisticated vessel

In addition to these ‗big ticket‘ items, Russia provides Vietnam with spare parts and

assistance in the maintenance and modernization of military equipment. Vietnamese

military personnel continue to study at Russian academies and military schools.

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In December 2007, Russia and Vietnam convened the annual meeting of the Inter-

government Committee for Military Technical Cooperation. The Russian delegation

was led by the director of its Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation.

Vietnam is believed to be in the process of negotiating with Russia for the purchase

of an additional six ‗Tarantul 3‘ corvettes. The Type 3s are armed with the SS-N-22

Sunburn missile – as on China‘s ‗Sovremmeny‘ class destroyers. Vietnam retains an

interest in obtaining full-size submarines from Russia, probably beginning with two

or three platforms. No contract has been signed or appears imminent.

Ukraine. The Ukraine probably ranks second to the Russian Federation as a

provider of military equipment and technical training to Vietnam. Defence

cooperation between Vietnam and the Ukraine was initiated in March 1994 when the

VPA chief of the general staff paid a visit to Kiev. The VPA deputy chief of the general

staff accompanied his prime minister on a visit in June that year. It was subsequently

reported that the Ukraine sold Vietnam fourteen R27R1 (470-1) missiles and missile

launchers in 1995 and six MiG-21 UM training aircraft in 1996. The chief of the

general staff of the Ukraine armed forces paid a return visit in September 1997 and

discussed cooperation in equipment sales, technology and personnel training.

As a result of the visit of the Vietnamese defence minister in May 2002, Vietnam and

the Ukraine reached agreement on a significant program of far reaching military-

technical cooperation up to 2005. Under the terms of this agreement the Ukraine will

provide major assistance to Vietnam to upgrade its air defence (radar,

communications and surface-to-air missiles), combat air, naval and armour and

artillery forces. Specifically, Ukrainian specialists have drawn up plans to modernize

the Vietnamese navy and air defence force. These plans call for substantial Ukrainian

involvement across a number of areas including the renovation of the Ba Son

dockyard in Ho Chi Minh City; developing naval test facilities; arms co-production;

mid-level officer exchanges; and repairing, upgrading and supply of all types of

equipment and weapons. The Ukraine will train thirty to forty senior VPA officers up

to the rank of general at its military academies. According to reports submitted by

the Ukraine to the United Nations, it sold ten L-39 combat training aircraft to

Vietnam in 2002-03. In 2005, Vietnam acquired three ‗Fitter‘ aircraft of an unknown

version from the Ukraine.

16

India. In 1994, India and Vietnam signed a protocol on defence cooperation

covering training slots for Vietnamese officers at India‘s defence academy, servicing

of Vietnamese military hardware, and continued regular discussions between the two

defence ministries. An Indian official described the protocol as a low-key framework

agreement, while Vietnam‘s defence attaché was quoted as stating, ‗We need India‘s

help very badly in training our defence personnel, which is our first priority. India‘s

assistance in military hardware will be a long-term cooperative agreement and we

are still working on the [details]‘. Shortly after, Vietnam reached agreement with

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) to overhaul and service eight to ten MiG-21

engines and to provide continued technical support.

Vietnam has shown a keen interest in developing defence industry cooperation. In

May 1995, for example, a Vietnamese military delegation led by the VPA chief of the

general staff, visited India. The delegation toured Hyderabad, Dindigul, Madras,

Bangalore, Goa, Nasik and Pune to study military training and defence industries,

including the operations of such companies as HAL, Ordnance Factories Board,

Bharat Earth Movers Limited, and Goa Shippers Limited.

Later, India agreed to assist Vietnam in setting up defence industry to manufacture

small and medium weapons and other ordnance products (The Times of India,

March 29, 2000). Possible future arms sales include India‘s multi-role advanced

light helicopter, warships and anti-ship and air-defence missiles.

In 2000, India and Vietnam signed a wide-ranging defence protocol agreement. (20)

This document lays the foundation for substantially increased defence cooperation,

and the raising of relations to periodic meetings between defence ministers and the

exchange of strategic perceptions and intelligence sharing. Under the 2000

agreement, India will assist in repairing and overhauling Vietnam‘s fleet of one

hundred and twenty MiG-21s and train Vietnamese fighter pilots and technicians.

The Indian Navy will help repair, upgrade and build fast patrol craft for the

Vietnamese navy and offer training to its technical personnel (The Hindu, March 28,

2000). The protocol also included bilateral naval exercises and coordinated patrols

involving the Vietnamese Marine Police and the Indian Coast Guard.

17

In October 2002 Vietnam asked India to provide submarine training but it remains

unclear whether the move was linked to its 1997 acquisition of two small platforms

from North Korea or to a new programme. Whichever is the case, this request

represented the first phase in implementing Vietnam‘s long-standing interest in

developing an undersea-warfare capability. The following year (2003), Vietnam

provided guerilla warfare training to the Indian armed forces.. In May 2003, India

and Vietnam signed a ‗Joint Declaration on Framework of Comprehensive

Cooperation‘ that included: regular high-level meetings, close cooperation in the

United Nations and other international fora, assistance with respect to safeguarding

mutual interests, and gradual steps to expand cooperation in the security and

defence fields.

In 2007, in a major development, India and Vietnam declared the establishment of a

―strategic partnership‖ during the visit by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. In

November, India and Vietnam held their third Security Dialogue in New Delhi where

it was decided to step up cooperation in training of junior level officers, to conduct a

security dialogue annually, to share expertise on issues of common concern such as

maritime security, border management and counter insurgency, training in UN

peacekeeping operations, and invite Vietnamese observers to attend Indian military

exercises. In December, India‘s Defence Minister A. K. Anthony visited Hanoi

accompanied by the Vice Chief of Army Staff and senior air force and navy officers.

Agreement was reached for India to supply Vietnam with 5,000 essential spares for

its Petya-class anti-submarine ships in order to make them operational. Additionally,

India agreed to dispatch a four-member army team to Vietnam during the first half

of 2008 to conduct training on UN peacekeeping operations. Finally, the two sides

agreed to set up a Joint Working Group to facilitate the signing of a Memorandum of

Understading on defence cooperation (including cooperation on national defence,

navy, air defence and personnel training). The Indian delegation also visited defence

industries in Ho Chi Minh City.

Vietnam‘s Defence Minister sought Indian assistance in training of defence

personnel, (21) enhancing the exchanges of delegations, expanding training

cooperation, cooperation between national defence industries, an increase in the

frequency of goodwill visits by naval ships, application of information technology and

e-technology, and technical support for the Vietnamese navy.

18

Most recently, Lt. Gen. Truong Quang Khanh, head of General Department of

Defence Industry, Ministry of National Defence, attended an international defence

exposition, DEFEXPO-2008, in New Delhi in February 2008. That same month

Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chief of the Army Staff Committee, visited Hanoi where he

met with Deputy Defence Minister Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khac Vien. Admiral

Mehta inspected the Hong Ha Shipbuilding Company and also visited Ho Chi Minh

City before departing. Finally, in April the Flag Officer Commander in Chief of the

Indian Eastern Naval Command, Vice Admiral R. P. Suthan led two warships on a

port call to Hanoi. He held discussions with VPA Vice Chief of the General Staff, Tran

Quang Khue.

Europe. In addition to its substantial arms purchasing arrangements with Russia

and the Ukraine, Vietnam has also explored the possibilities of defence procurements

and military assistance with several states in Europe, particularly former members of

the Warsaw Pact.

In the early 1990s, Vietnam purchased nine Aero L-39 Albatross jet trainers from the

former Czech and Slovak Republic, and later sought assistance in their maintenance

and repair. In 1995 Vietnam reached agreement with Omnipol for the purchase of

technology and equipment to produce Grad multiple tube launched rockets in

Vietnam. In May 2000, Vietnam‘s defence minister visited the Czech Republic where

he sought cooperation in arms manufacturing and repair and officer training. In May

2003, the Czech foreign minister visited Hanoi and offered assistance to upgrade

Vietnam‘s T-72 battle tank. The minister also offered to sell anti-chemical warfare

uniforms and equipment. At least five former Czech Su-22UM3 two-seaters are

known to have been delivered to Vietnam in 2005 and it is possible that up to 25

other surplus Czech Su-22M4s could also have found their way to Vietnam (for

Polish deliveries see below).

In July 1994, the prime minister of Slovakia visited Vietnam accompanied by his

defence minister and a number of representatives of the arms industry. While in

Hanoi they picked up expressions of Vietnamese interest in purchasing T-72 Ms

tanks and artillery. The following month Vietnam‘s president paid a visit to Slovakia

where he proposed cooperation between defence industries, including the

construction of coastal defence vessels. In May 2002, Vietnam‘s defence minister

19

Pham Van Tra visited the Slovak Republic. Tra sounded out his counterpart on

possible defence industry cooperation and the modernization of military equipment

to be undertaken in Slovak factories. Specifically, Tra expressed an interest in the

Brams mobile anti-aircraft complex, and the Aligator light armoured vehicle. Tra

returned to Hanoi with a proposal from Slovak defence manufactures.

Bulgaria and Vietnam extended their defence cooperation agreement in 1997 during

the course of the visit by the Vietnamese defence minister. Reportedly this agreement

included cooperation in such areas as the supply of spare parts for MiG-21 aircraft,

military equipment repair, military science and medicine, and personnel exchange.

In October 2007, the Bulgarian Defence Minister visited Vietnam to discuss military

cooperation in language training, culture, sports and, more significantly, military

technology.

In December 1998, the Polish deputy defence minister visited Vietnam to initiate

discussions on cooperation in shipbuilding and arms sales (including MiG-21s and

infantry weapons). Poland provided Vietnam with a grant of U.S. $70 million to

assist in naval construction. In May 2000, Vietnam‘s defence minister visited Poland

where he expressed an interest in purchasing Anaconda helicopters and Bryza

aircraft. Both sides discussed possible future cooperation in such areas as upgrading

battle tanks (with new fire control systems), co-production of ammunition and

officer training.

In October 2003, Vietnam signed an agreement to buy up to 10 Polskie Zaklady

Lotnicze (PZL) M28 Skytruck short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft configured

for maritime surveillance and border-control missions from Poland in a deal valued

at around U.S. $40 million. Two aircraft were delivered in December 2004 and a

further two were reportedly handed over in mid-2005. The aircraft are likely to be

operated by the air force. In early March 2005 it was reported that Poland would

supply T-72 MBTs together with training and basic maintenance equipment, as well

as ammunition. The shipment of 150 second-hand tanks, probably from Poland‘s

surplus stocks, was due to begin in the third quarter of 2005. Also in 2005, Vietnam

acquired forty Su-22Ms ground attack aircraft from a Polish source.

20

The VPA Chief of General Staff, General Nguyen Khac Vien, visited Belarus from

June 21-23, 2007 where he held discussions with Minister of Defence Colonel

General Leonid Maltsev and the First Deputy Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Sergei

Gurulev. A year later (January 2008) the First Vice President of the Belarus State

Defence Industry Committee visited Hanoi for talks with Defence Minister General

Phung Quang Thanh.

In addition to former members of the Warsaw Pact, Vietnam has explored possible

arms procurements and defence cooperation with a number of other European states.

In 1997 it was reported that Vietnam had taken delivery of French armoured vehicles

within the ‗past two years‘. In mid-1997, Vietnam opened discussions with Serbia-

Montenegro for the purchase of the locally upgraded T-55 main battle tank. The next

year Finland proposed selling Vietnam spare parts from its mothballed fleet of MiG-

21s. In February 2005 it was reported that the Finnish Defence Forces were planning

to sell a fleet of up to 70 Soviet-era T-54 and T-55 Main Battle Tanks (MBT) to

Vietnam.

In June 1997, the United Kingdom used a port call by HMS Beaver to promote the

sale of defence equipment to Vietnam. In March 1999, Prince Andrew led a

delegation of eleven firms to Ho Chi Minh City to showcase British defence

equipment. The Prince‘s visit coincided with the port call by HMS Boxer. Finally, in

1999 Vietnam expressed an interest in acquiring its first military communications

satellite. Vietnamese officials approached Acatel, a French company, as well as Matra

Marconi Space, a joint British-French company (Hanoi also approached American

firms Lockheed Martin and Loral Space).

In 2005, Austria agreed to fund the development of vocational schools linked to

Vietnam‘s Ministry of National Defence. On January 15, 2008 Austria agreed to

extend this program into a third phase to 15 million. In December 2007, Lt. Gen.

Gianni Botondi, 2009 valued at Italy‘s Secretary General for Defence and National

Armaments made an official visit to Vietnam to discuss the structue of national

defence industry. Italy and Vietnam agreed to set up a working group to promote

bilateral cooperation. In May 2008, Deputy Minister of Defence, Senior Lt. Gen.

Nguyen Huy Hieu paid a working visit to Switzerland for discussions with the Chief

21

of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports on boosting

defence cooperation. General Hieu visited some Swiss industrial establishments.

Other Suppliers. There are only three other countries that feature in Vietnam‘s

arms procurement and military modernization efforts: Israel, North Korea and South

Korea. In 1993 Israeli defence firms approached Vietnam with an offer to upgrade its

fleet of Soviet manufactured jet aircraft, armour and artillery. In January 1994,

officials from Vietnam‘s Defence Ministry‘s Defence Industry and General

Technology Department made a visit to Israel to assess possible Israeli assistance in

upgrading the VPA‘s communications capability. The following year an Israeli firm

was awarded a contract to upgrade Vietnam‘s military communications network. In

1999, Israeli firms were unsuccessful in bidding for the contract to refurbish

Vietnam‘s fleet of MiG aircraft. During the course of the visit by Deputy Prime

Minister Nguyen Cong Tan in November 1999, it was revealed that Israeli defence

industries have begun contracts with Vietnam on defence exports. No other details

were provided.

The 1994, Vietnam and the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea exchanged visits

by their respective defence ministers. The two sides agreed to a barter deal under

which Vietnam would supply rice in exchange for weapons parts and ammunition. In

December 1996, Vietnam‘s Deputy Minister of Defense, General Nguyen Thoi Bung,

visited North Korea and signed a defense package deal worth US $100 million

reportedly involving the sale of Igla (SA-16 Gimlet) portable air defense missiles and

Scud short-range ballistic missiles. The following year it was reported that Vietnam

had taken delivery of two North Korean Yugo class mini-submarines and was

refurbishing them at Cam Ranh Bay (Robert Karniol, Jane‘s Defense Weekly,

December 9, 1998). In April 1999, it was reported that Vietnam had acquired a

quantity of Scud C surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 550 kilometres (with a

payload of 770 kilograms). In 2003 there were further reports that North Korea had

sold unspecified military technology to Vietnam (Far Eastern Economic Review,

February 13, 2003).

In 1994, two years after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Vietnam

and South Korea, Vietnam reportedly approached the Huyndai Corporation to

purchase three 80-ton fast boats for coastal patrol. Hyundai officials did not deny

22

these reports but claimed they had not applied for an exit permit. In April 1995, the

two foreign ministers agreed, among other things, to exchange defence industrial

materials. In October of that same year, South Korea posted its first defence attaché

to Hanoi.

The two countries exchanged visits by their respective defence ministers in late 2000

and early 2001. In the course of the visit of the South Korean defence minister, the

agenda included consideration of exchanges on defence technology and related

industries. During the return visit by Vietnam‘s defence minister, two memoranda of

understanding were reached; the first dealt with cooperation in defence industry and

logistics, while the second covered exchanges in military education. Vietnam‘s

defence minister visited several South Korean defence firms and arms manufacturers.

It was reported at this time that Daewoo Heavy Industries and Machinery was

considering a joint venture with Vietnam to refurbish its stock of American-

manufactured armoured personnel vehicles. In November 2001, South Korea hosted

an exhibition of military and electronics products during the port call by three of its

naval ships. In September 2007, the two South Korean naval ships (a destroyer and

logistics ship) called in at the port of Ho Chi Minh City. In January 2008, Vietnam‘s

naval commander, Vice Admiral Nguyen Van Hien, made a rare five-day overseas

visit to Seoul to discuss expanding ties between the two navies. Admiral Hien met

and had discussions with the South Korean Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Song

Young-moo. The two admirals discussed the enhancement of cooperation in the

defence industry sector.

5. The Structure of Vietnam-China Relations, 1991-2007

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Vietnam‘s relations with

China are structured on both a multilateral basis through membership in ASEAN, the

ASEAN Regional Forum and other multilateral bodies, and bilaterally, through a

long-term cooperative framework agreement. When Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995

it assumed responsibility for participating in all multilateral arrangements entered

into by ASEAN and China.

In July 1994 ASEAN and China reached formal agreement to establish two joint

committees — one on science and technology cooperation and the other on economic

23

and trade cooperation. ASEAN and China also agreed to open consultations on

political and security issues at the senior official level. The first China-ASEAN Senior

Officials Meeting was held in Hangzhou in April 1995.

In 1996, China was accorded official dialogue partner status by ASEAN, and in

February the following year, ASEAN and China formalized their cooperation by

establishing the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC). The ACJCC

first met in Beijing where it was agreed that it would ‗act as the coordinator for all the

ASEAN-China mechanisms at the working level‘. (22) As an ASEAN dialogue partner,

China regularly participates in the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference

consultation process. This takes the form of a meeting between ASEAN and its ten

dialogue partners (ASEAN Ten Plus Ten), and a separate meeting between ASEAN

members and each of its dialogue partners (ASEAN Ten Plus One).

China-ASEAN relations advanced in November 2002 with the signing of three major

documents: Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation

Between ASEAN Nations and the People‘s Republic of China, Joint Declaration

between China and ASEAN on Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security Fields, and

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The first

agreement laid the foundations for the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. The joint

declaration on non-traditional security was formalized in a Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) in January 2004. The MOU followed a special meeting held

in Bangkok in April 2003 to discuss joint action to deal with the Severe Acute

Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic. (23) A major advance towards the free trade

area was taken in January 2007 when China and ASEAN signed the Agreement on

Trade in Services at their tenth summit in Cebu, the Philippines.

Originally, ASEAN sought to negotiate a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.

China resisted ASEAN diplomatic pressure to agree to a formal legally-binding code.

Nevertheless, China and ASEAN were able to develop unprecedented cooperation

under the umbrella of the DOC . In September 2003, Wu Bangguo, chairman of the

Standing Committee of the National People‘s Congress, proposed joint oil

exploration and development in areas of overlapping claims in the South China Sea

(see discussion below). Early in 2004, ASEAN and China agreed to set up a Joint

Working Group to implement the DOC.

24

Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. In October 2003, China‘s

zone of interaction with ASEAN was enhanced when China acceded to the ASEAN

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and China issued a joint declaration with ASEAN

establishing a strategic partnership. (24) The joint declaration was the first formal

agreement of this type between China and a regional organization, as well as a first

for ASEAN itself. The joint declaration was wide-ranging and included a provision

for the initiation of a new security dialogue as well as general cooperation in political

matters. (25)

In July the following year, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan raised the prospect of

developing ‗enhanced strategic relations‘ with ASEAN in his discussions with

Secretary General Ong Keng Yong in Beijing. As a result, China and ASEAN drafted a

five-year Plan of Action (2005-2010) in late 2004. This plan included, inter alia, a

joint commitment to increase regular high-level bilateral visits, cooperation in the

field of non-traditional security, security dialogue and military exchanges and

cooperation. (26) The Plan of Action set out the following objectives:

Promote mutual confidence and trust in defense and military fields with a

view to maintaining peace and stability in the region;

Conduct dialogues, consultations and seminars on security and defense issues;

Strengthen cooperation on military personnel training;

Consider observing each other‘s military exercises and explore the possibility

of conducting bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises; and

Explore and enhance cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.

ASEAN has been reluctant to advance military cooperation with China too quickly. In

May 2004, during the course of a visit to Beijing by Malaysia‘s new prime minister,

Abdullah Badawi, his Chinese counterpart, Premier Wen Jiabao, suggested they

consider a joint undertaking to maintain the security of sea lines of communication

through the Malacca Strait. This proposal was pressed the following month by Senior

Colonel Wang Zhongchun, deputy director of China‘s National Defense University. In

a paper presented to the China-ASEAN forum in Singapore, Wang proposed joint

naval exercises and patrols (as well as intelligence exchanges on terrorism).

According to one analyst, Wang‘s proposal was received coolly and with considerable

skepticism by the audience. (27) Three years later, however, Indonesia proposed

25

seeking technical assistance from both China and Japan on an ASEAN-wide and

bilateral basis to build up the capacity of the littoral states. (28)

In November 2004, at the 8th China-ASEAN Summit, Premier Wen Jiabao once

again raised China‘s proposal to shelve disputes in the South China Sea ‗while going

for joint development.‘ This led to a major break through in March the following year

when the national oil companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed an

agreement to conduct joint seismic testing in the South China Sea. (29)

In July 2005, President Hu Jintao reiterated China‘s call for joint development

during the course of state visits to Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines. (30) That

month, China and ASEAN set up the Joint Working Group on the Declaration on the

Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and charged it with recommending

measures to implement the agreement. The Working Group held its second meeting

in Hainan in February 2006. In light of deadly pirate attacks on Chinese fishing

vessels in May 2006, China, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed to strengthen

security cooperation in the South China Sea. (31)

The ASEAN-China strategic partnership was consolidated with the holding of the

first workshop on regional security between defence department officials in Beijing

in July 2006. ASEAN and China also held a heads of government Commemorative

Summit in Nanning to mark the fifteenth anniversary of China‘s status as a dialogue

partner. By the end of 2006, ASEAN and China had concluded twenty-eight

‗cooperation framework mechanisms,‘ including regular consultations between

senior officials on strategic and political security cooperation, a yearly conference of

foreign ministers, and an annual summit meeting of government leaders. (32) These

developments provided a firm foundation for the development of security and

defense cooperation in the future.

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Vietnam was a founding member of the ASEAN

Regional Forum in 1994. Membership in the ARF provides a multilateral framework

for Vietnam‘s defence-security relations and interaction with China.

When China first joined the ASEAN Regional Forum it was highly suspicious about

multilateral activities that might curtail its national sovereignty. Over time, however,

China has come to embrace multilateral security cooperation under the auspices of

26

the ARF. (33) China has taken a particularly active role in the ARF‘s inter-sessional

work program related to confidence building measures. In March 1997, for example,

China hosted the Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures, and did

so again in November 2003.

In 1997, China sent representatives to the ARF meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges

and hosted the 4th ARF meeting of the Heads of Defense Colleges in September

2000. The meeting was opened by Defence Minister Chi Haotian, who argued that

the ARF‘s stress on dialog and consultation represented a ‗new security concept‘ and

the trend of ‗multi-polarization‘ in the region. Chi noted that regional flash points

still existed, ‗hegemonism and power politics have shown new traces of development‘

and ‗democracy and human rights‘ were being used as excuses for intervention, and

‗separatism was gaining ground. All these will endanger or jeopardize the security

and stability of the region. That‘s why we advocate that all countries adopt the new

security concept built upon equality, dialogue, mutual confidence and cooperation.‘

(34) In 2000, China also contributed for the first time to the ARF‘s Annual Security

Outlook and began providing voluntary briefings on regional security.

While China‘s participation in the ARF‘s program of confidence building measures

has evolved over time, China‘s endorsement of preventive diplomacy has been more

circumscribed. In a Defence White Paper issued in late 2000, China provided this

cautious assessment:

China holds that the ARF should continue to focus on confidence-building measures,

explore new security concepts and methods, and discuss the question of preventive

diplomacy. At the same time, it believes that the parties concerned should have a full

discussion first on the concept, definition, principles and scope of preventive

diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region and reach consensus in this regard. (35)

According to one China analyst ‗two of the defining features of that document [the

2000 Defence White Paper] were the emphasis on the dominance of peace and

development as forces driving global development and a corollary imperative toward

implementing external policies based upon multilateral cooperative approaches.‘ (36)

Since 2000, China has consistently promoted its new security concept as the

preferred framework for multilateral cooperation. For example, in July 2002 China

27

outlined its new security concept in a position paper presented to the annual ARF

ministerial meeting.

In 2003, China launched a major initiative to further its new concept of security. At

the annual ARF ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh, China proposed the creation of

a Security Policy Conference comprised of senior military and civilian officials (vice

minister level) drawn from all ARF members. The objective of this new security

mechanism would be to draft a security treaty to promote ‗peace, stability and

prosperity‘ in the region. Chinese officials said the new treaty would give equal

attention to the concerns of all ARF members and guarantee security through united

action rather than seeking ‗absolute security for oneself and threaten[ing] other

parties‘ security.‘ (37) China drafted and circulated a concept paper prior to hosting

the first ARF Security Policy Conference in November 2004. (38)

At the 11th ARF Ministerial Meeting in 2004, China tabled a series of proposals for

the future development of the ARF. These were later summarized as follows:

To maintain its forum nature and adhere to the basic principles of decision-making

through consensus, taking an incremental approach, and moving at a pace

comfortable to all member so as to encourage the initiative and active participation

of all members; to continuously strengthen and consolidate confidence-building

measures (CBMs) while actively addressing the issue of preventive diplomacy, so as

to gradually find out cooperative methods and approaches for preventive diplomacy

that are suitable to the region and fitting the current needs; to increase participation

of defense officials, promote exchanges and cooperation among militaries of the

countries concerned and give full play to the important role of the militaries in

enhancing mutual trust; to highlight cooperation in non-traditional security fields

such as counter-terrorism and combating transnational crimes. (39)

China‘s 2004 Defense White Paper identified five main areas of international

security cooperation: strategic consultation and dialogue; regional security

cooperation; cooperation in non-traditional security fields, participating in United

Nations peacekeeping operations; and military exchanges. Chapter nine highlighted

the importance China placed on its interaction with ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional

Forum.

28

The Defense White Paper also set out Beijing‘s policy on international cooperation in

the area of defense-related science, technology and industry including the export of

military products and related technologies. According to this document, China‘s

exports in this sensitive area were governed by three principles: ‗It should only serve

the purpose of helping the recipient state enhance its capability for legitimate self-

defense; it must not impair peace, security and stability of the relevant region and the

world as a whole; and it must not be used to interfere in the recipient state‘s internal

affairs.‘ (40)

Bilateral. After a decade-long estrangement during the Cambodian conflict, leaders

from Hanoi and Beijing met in secret in southern China in September 1990 and

agreed to normalize bilateral relations. China and Vietnam resumed high-level

political contact in November 1991, pointedly only after Vietnam had agreed to a

comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. Bilateral political relations between

Vietnam and China were codified by party leaders who met in Beijing in early 1999

(Xinhua Domestic Service, February 27, 1999). Late the following year the two sides

signed a ‗Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century

between the People‘s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam‘

(Vietnam News Agency, December 25, 2000).

It is notable that between February 1999 and December 2000, the People‘s Republic

of China (PRC) negotiated long-term cooperative framework arrangements with all

ten ASEAN members. (41) Generally these took the form of joint statements signed by

foreign ministers or vice premiers. Six of China‘s long-term cooperative framework

agreements included a reference to security cooperation (Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei,

Singapore, the Philippines, and Laos). Subsequently, several of these long-term

cooperative framework agreements have been enhanced through additional joint

declarations and/or memoranda of understanding.

It is notable that no defence clause was included in the Sino-Vietnamese agreement,

perhaps because of the contentious nature of unresolved territorial disputes in the

South China Sea. According to the joint statement, ‗[b]oth sides will refrain from

taking any action that might complicate and escalate disputes, resorting to force or

making threats with force‘. Defence contacts were first opened with the exchange of

delegations from the Vietnamese and Chinese defence ministries‘ External Relations

29

Departments in February and May 1992, respectively. Data for the period 2002-06

reveals there is a marked imbalance in the exchange of delegations at the ministerial

level. Vietnam‘s defence minister has visited China four times, while China‘s defence

minister has made only one visit to Hanoi. The exchanges at the level of Chief of the

General Staff, General Political Department and General Logistics Department are

more balanced. Contact at the level of service chiefs has been confined to one visit by

the PLA Navy Air Force in 1997.

China and ASEAN members carried out seventy-one high-level defence visits in the

period from 2002 to 2006. Sixteen were ministerial level visits. Reciprocal visits by

defence ministers were conducted by China with five countries including Malaysia,

the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Vietnam and China exchanged

nine high-level delegations during this period. In the period between 2001-2006,

China and Southeast Asia conducted eleven naval goodwill visits involving seven

regional states. Chinese warships visited Vietnam, Singapore (twice), Thailand and

Brunei. In November 2001, PLAN Jiangwei-II guided missile frigate visits Ho Chi

Minh City. The Vietnamese navy has yet to make a return visit.

Defence relations between China and Vietnam appear almost entirely focused on

exchanges of views on regional security and ideological matters and border security

issues. Table 2 sets out data on the exchange of delegations at the Military Region

level between 1996 and 2003. Since the normalization of relations both China and

Vietnam have undertaken to demine and to dispose of unexploded ordnance in their

frontier area. Since the signing of a treaty on their common border in December 1999,

both sides have begun to physically demarcate this area. This process is expected to

be completed in June 2008.

In October 2005, the Chinese and Vietnamese defence ministers tentatively

discussed cooperation between their nation defense industries. China‘s state-owned

armed supplier, NORINCO, was reported to be providing Vietnam with ammunition

for small arms and artillery, military vehicles and assisting in co-production of

ammunition and heavy machine guns. (42)

Table 2

Exchanges at Military Region Level between China and Vietnam, 1996-2003

30

To Vietnam From Vietnam

1996 January Guangzhou Military Region 1997 April Military Region 2

1997 February Jinan Military Region 1999 November Military Region 3

1997 June Chengdu Military Region

1998 July Chengdu Military Region

2000 January Jinan Military Region

2000 July Chengdu Military Region

2002 April Guangzhou Military Region

2003 January Chengdu Military Region

In a new development, in April 2006, China and Vietnam commenced joint naval

patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. This was a first for the Chinese navy. In August 2006,

after the two party leaders, Nong Duc Manh and Hu Jintao, met in Beijing, they

issued a joint communiqué that noted ‗both sides spoke positively of… the joint

patrol conducted by the navies of the two countries in the Tonkin Gulf‘. (43) The

second China-Vietnam joint patrol was conducted in late December 2006. A month

earlier Vietnam Petroleum Corporation (PetroVietnam) and the China National

Offshore Oil Corporation reached agreement to conduct joint exploration in the Gulf

of Tonkin. On January 5, 2007, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung gave his approval

for joint oil exploration to commence.

In April 2005, China and Vietnam commenced extremely low-key ‗consultations on

defensive security‘ in Beijing. China had already initiated defence security

consultations with Thailand, and the Philippines.

6. Impact of Defence on Foreign Policy

The above sections have traced Vietnam‘s growing defence-security ties with China

within both multilateral and bilateral settings. The growth of this relationships

appears in accord with the broad tenets of Vietnamese foreign policy – to

multilateralise and diversify foreign relations, to be a reliable partner with all

countries, and to develop strategic partnerships with the major powers. According to

Alexander Vuving, there are at least major identifiable leadership groupings in

Vietnam, the ‗anti-imperialists‘ and the ‗integrationists‘. (44) The former still harbour

suspicion about U.S. intentions, while the later seek to integrate Vietnam into the

global economy including gaining access to the U.S. market.

31

During 2007 events in the South China Sea produced serious friction in Sino-

Vietnamese relations. Vietnam has chosen to censor any and all public reporting on

these developments. However in late 2007 there was an outpouring of nationalism

on the part of Vietnamese students who mounted unprecedented public protests

against Chinese actions in the South China Sea. This section will review these events.

Just after Vietnam was admitted into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the

Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee held its fourth plenary session from

January 15-24, 2007. This meeting took the decision to order the party, the army,

police and regime-approved mass organizations to divest themselves of their

commercial enterprises. Ownership will reportedly be transferred to a jolding

company which will make a determination about which enterprises will be equitised

and sold to private investors.

The Vietnam People‘s Army, for example, currently runs 140 enterprises and hold

shares in another twenty companies. These enterprises are engaged in an incredibly

diverse range of economic activities from coffee production, coal mining, garment

manufacture, stock broking, and telecommunications to health services. In 2006,

army-run enterprises earned US $2 billion in revenue or 3 percent of Vietnam‘s

Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Divestiture will touch on sensitive sources of funding

for the military at a time when developments in the South China Sea seemingly

demand an increase in defence expendutire.

In 2006, the the 10th National Party Congress adopted a resolution decreeing that

Vietnam‘s maritime economy should be strongly developed with a focus on sectors

that have comparative advantages in order to develop a strong maritime economy,

maintain national defence and security in a spirit of international cooperation. This

matter was considered by the fourth plenum of VCP Central Committee that met in

January 2007. Reports submitted to this meeting noted that there was no coherent

plan to integrate the economic development of coastal areas with the exploitation of

marine resources in Vietnam‘s territorial waters. Economists estimated that by 2020,

the marine economy would contribute up to 55 percent of GDP and between 55-60

percent of exports.

32

The fourth plenum directed that a national ‗Maritime Strategy Towards the Year

2020′ be drawn up to integrate economic development with environmental

protection and national defence and security. The Vietnam People‘s Army was tasked

with ‗defending territorial waters and safeguarding national sovereignty.‘ The

maritime strategy was completed by the end of the year but has not yet been released

publicly. Chinese officials reportedly acquired a classified copy and noted that

Vietnam‘s plans included developing areas over which China has territorial claims.

China then began to apply pressure of foreign firms that were likely to be involved in

developing Vietnam‘s maritime sector, warning them that their commercial

operations in China might suffer if they became involved in developing areas claimed

by China.

China‘s behind-the-scenes actions were accompanied by greater diplomatic and

military assertiveness. For example, Vietnam lodged a protest when China implanted

boundary markers on the Xisha (Paracel) Islands, claiming these violated

Vietnamese sovereignty. On January 4, 2007, Liu Jianchao, spokesperson for the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dismissed this protest declaring: ‗China has indisputable

sovereignty over the Xisha, Nansha Islands and adjacent islands. And we have all

historical and legal evidences needed to prove this‘. Liu also noted that the erection

of structures marking the base points of China‘s territorial sea is a question of

Chinese sovereignty and other countries have no right to intervene. Liu noted that

based on the United Nations Convention on Law of he Sea and China‘s Law on the

Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. China issued base points on Xisha Islands as

early as 1996 (Press Trust of India, Beijing, January 4, 2007).

It was in this context that China and Vietnam held their 13th round of discussions on

border and territorial issues in Nanning from January 19-20, 2007. This meeting

canvassed land and maritime issues. Regarding the South China Sea, the Vietnam

News Agency reported: ‗Regarding marine issues, on the basis of common perception

and the agreement already reached between leaders of the two countries, both sides

discussed in depth measures to maintain peace and stability in the East Sea, without

any action to complicate or widen disputes. They agreed to continue the negotiation

mechanism in order to seek a basic and long-term solution that is acceptable to both

sides and in line with international laws and practices, particularly the United

33

Nations Convention on the 1982 Law of the Sea and Declaration on Conduct of

Parties in the East Sea (DOC).‘ (45)

In March, it was announced that British Petroleum (BP) and its partners had

submitted plans to the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry for an investment of US $2

billion in a major expansion in gas and power development over the next decade.

These plans included installing at least two natural gas pipelines connecting off shore

deposits in two new gas fields, Moc Tinh and Hai Thach, in the Nam Con Son basin

in the South China Sea. BP‘s plans also included the construction of a power plant in

Nhon Trach in Dong Nai province. (46) BP currently maintains the only operational

pipeline which connects the Lan Tay-Lan Do gas field in the Nam Con Son basin to

the Phu My power complex in Ba Ria-Vung Tau. The new fields to be connected to

the proposed pipeline are adjacent to the fields from which BP operates a pipeline.

The question of BP‘s future operations quickly became a contentious issue in Sino-

Vietnamese relations. On April 9, 2007, Wu Bangguo, chairman of the National

People‘s Congress, met with his Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyen Phu Trong. Wu

stated that the two countries should tackle boundary issues appropriately in an effort

to maintain stability in the South China Sea. Wu also said, ‗The two countries should

enhance political mutual trust, appropriately deal with the boundary issue and

implement related agreements.‘ (47) On the same day, President Hu Jintao told Trong,

‗China is ready to work with Vietnam to appropriately deal with the issue of land and

maritime borders to jointly maintain peace in the border area.‘ (48)

On April 10, Qin Gang, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

was directly asked by a reporter from the state-run media about BP‘s proposed

pipeline and Vietnam‘s plan to hold voting for the National Assembly on its

possessions in the South China Sea. Qin replied, ‗China has indisputable [irrefutable]

sovereignty over the Nansha Islands [Spratly Islands] and their adjacent waters and

neighbouring marine areas… [With everyone‘s hard work, at present the situation in

the South China Sea is stable]…Vietnam‘s new actions, which infringe on China‘s

sovereignty, sovereign rights [power] and administrative rights on the Nansha

Islands, go against the important consensus reached by leaders of the two countries

on the maritime issue and are not beneficial to stability of the South China Sea area.‘

(49) Qin observed that any one-sided action taken by any country in the South China

34

Sea are ‗illegal and invalid‘ constituting as encroachment upon Chinese territorial

sovereignty. (50) Qin was also quoted as sating: ‗It is not beneficial to stability in the

South China Sea area. The Chinese side is paying close attention and we have already

made serious representations to the Vietnamese side.‘ (51)

By way of response, on April 11, Le Dzung, a spokesperson for Vietnam‘s Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, noted that Vietnam has sufficient historical evidence and legal basis

to confirm its sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly)

Islands. Dzung said Vietnam‘s operations conducted on its islands and territorial

waters, including plot divisions, exploration and exploitation of oil and gas were

‗completely normal‘. They were, he said, ‗in line with Vietnamese law as well as

international laws and practices, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention of

the Law of the Sea and the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the East

Sea.‘ (52) Dzung also noted that Vietnam‘s partnership with BP dated to 2000 and ‗is

within Vietnam‘s exclusive economic area and continental shelf, and is within

Vietnam‘s sovereignty.‘ (53) The Lan Tay-Lan Do field has been producing natural gas

for power generation since 2002. (54)

In April 2007, during the exchange of claims and counter-claims, Chinese naval

vessels detained four Vietnamese fishing boats near Spratly islands. And, as a result

of Chinese pressure, in June BP announced it was halting seismic work off southern

Vietnam until Sino-Vietnamese tensions subsided. Events took a turn for the worse

on July 9, 2007 when an incident occurred between a People‘s Liberation Army-Navy

vessel and Vietnamese fishing boats near the Paracels resulting in the sinking of one

Vietnamese boat and the death of one Vietnamese fisherman. (55) Vietnam kept silent

on this issue and put a lid on news reporting. News of this clash was broadcast by

Radio Free Asia.

At the end of the year, PLAN exercises in the Paracel Islands from November 16-23,

2007 provoked Vietnamese protests. But no action was more inflammatory than the

reported decision of the National People‘s Congress to create the Sansha county level

town in Hainan province with administrative responsibility over three archipelagoes

in the South China Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly islands. News of the NPC‘s

reported actions provoked anti-China student demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi

Minh City on 9th and 16th December 2007. China immediately protested these

35

demonstrations. After the protests subsided, the Vietnam‘s Ministry of Foreign

Affairs called in all the ASEAN ambassadors to inform them that the protests were

spontaneous and not approved. (56) It appears likely that the student demonstrations

were carefully staged political theatre. In effect, Vietnam took a leaf out of China‘s

play book and staged ‗spontaneous‘ public demonstrations to signal its displeasure

over Chinese actions in the South China Sea. In other words, the student protests

were a subtle carefully orchestrated move that conveyed what government officials

were thinking in private but could not say in public.

Vietnamese officials were put between a rock and a hard place. In terms of public

diplomacy, China repeatedly offered to settle outstanding matters peacefully. Yet in

private China was exerting diplomatic and military pressure on Vietnam. Wu

Bangguo, whose remarks were noted above, heads the same National People‘s

Congress that reportedly created the Sansha administrative district which provoked

Vietnamese student protests.

In order to diffuse growing tensions, a meeting of the China-Vietnam Steering

Committee on Cooperation was held in Beijing on January 23, 2008. The Vietnamese

delegation included Deputy Minister of Defence Nguyen Huy Hieu who met

separately with members of the Committee of Science, Technology and Industry,

Ministry of Defence. (57) At the Steering Committee meeting both sides agreed to

‗properly handle problems in bilateral relations‘ through ‗dialogue and

consultations.‘ Yet later that month China accused Vietnamese fishermen of

attacking Chinese trawlers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Vietnam dismissed this charge and

argued that the nets of the fishing boats had become entangled.

The extreme delicacy of the Vietnamese position was revealed in a curious incident

involving the cancellation of an official visit to Hanoi by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of

State John Negroponte in late January 2008. The State Department made an official

announcement of the trip and both Chinese and Vietnamese state media reported

that the visit would occur. Negroponte was scheduled to fly from Beijing directly to

Hanoi where a program had been arranged and confirmed. Yet foreign journalists in

Hanoi were told at short notice that the trip was cancelled ostensibly because of bad

weather. But when reporters checked they discovered that commercial flights in and

out of Beijing were unaffected. Vietnamese officials, speaking off the record, offered

36

the following explanation: Negroponte‘s visit was cancelled as a result of Chinese

diplomatic pressure not to become involved in a bilateral matter. Chinese officials

claimed that the Vietnamese officials would ask Negroponte for U.S. assistance in

dealing with China over South China Sea issues. Vietnamese officials also claimed

that China threatened to cancel the scheduled visit of Foreign Minister Pham Gia

Khiem to Beijing if Hanoi received Negroponte.

The growing friction between China and was addressed by a ‗summit meeting‘

communist parties leaders who met in Beijing from May 30-June 2, 2008. A joint

statement issued after official talks between General Secretary Hu Jintao and

Secretary General Nong Duc Manh revealed that China and Vietnam had agreed to

raise relations to the level of a strategic partnership. (58) The issue of the South China

Sea was barely mentioned in official media reporting of this event but what

references that did appear were revealing. Some news reporting mentioned

‗problems left over from history‘ without further elaboration. A commentary in Nhan

Dan on May 30th mentioned in passing the ‗maintenance of stability in the East Sea‘.

When Hu ‗suggested a proper solution to existing issues between the countries on the

basis of friendly consultations and mutual benefit‘, Manh replied that he shared Hu‘s

views and that ‗the two countries should communicate promptly about their

concerns.‘ The two leaders agreed to ‗foster an effective cooperation mechanism

between the foreign ministries and defence, public and security agencies.‘ The two

party leaders also agreed that the most appropriate mechanism to handle their

relations was the bilateral Steering Committee. Hu also pressed his Vietnamese

counterpart to agree on a five-year blueprint on trade cooperation.

Immediately prior to Manh‘s visit to Beijing commercial satellite imagery was

released to the public confirming that China was constructing a major naval base on

Hainan Island and that major surface combatants as well as a single nuclear

submarine were stationed there. In order to fully comprehend the strategic

importance of the construction of naval base facilities at Sanya on Hainan island, it is

necessary to understand both Chinese intentions and capabilities. China has so far

refrained from providing any insights into the former.

As for capabilities, the construction of piers and docks at the base indicates that the

Sanya Naval Base is being built to accommodate large surface combatants including

37

assault ships and eventually aircraft carriers (China does not have carriers at

present). Construction at Hainan is being paralleled by China‘s construction of an

airfield at Woody Island in the Paracel islands and consolidation of facilities at Fiery

Cross Reef and the maintenance of a continuing naval presence at Mischief Reef both

in the Spratly archipelago. China will therefore have an enhanced capability to

exercise its sovereignty claims over the South China Sea and protect its vital Sea

Lines of Communication (SLOC) through the Malacca and Singapore Straits through

which much of its energy resources flow. By extension, China will also have the

capacity to threaten these same SLOCs on which Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are

dependent. China will acquire a capacity to surge expeditionary forces into the South

China Sea and its logistics support lines will be greatly shortened.

Other construction indicate that the Sanya naval base will have strategic implications

for the balance of power in the region. Portions of the base are being constructed

underground to provide facilities that cannot be easily monitored. Satellite imagery

has confirmed the presence of a Chinese Type 094 Jin-class submarine since late

2007. The Type-094 submarine is a second-generation nuclear vessel and represents

China‘s most lethal naval strike weapon. Five more SSBNs could become operational

by 2010 according to the U.S. Defense Department.

An analysis of construction activities that can be viewed from satellites indicate that

this base will be capable of housing nuclear submarines capable of launching inter

continental ballistic missiles. When these facilities are completed they will provide

China with the potential capability to station a substantial proportion of its

submarine-based nuclear deterrence capabilities there. China‘s most modern

strategic nuclear submarine is not yet fully operational but when it is the submarine

is expected to carry twelve Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles. This class of submarine

will be even more potent it China succeeds in equipping the missiles with multiple

warheads. Chinese nuclear subs will be able to patrol and fire from concealed

positions in deep waters off Hainan island if China can develop the necessary

operational skills. It is as yet unclear how many of its five nuclear submarines China

will base at the Sanya facility.

China‘s naval modernization represents a challenge and potential threat to all of

Southeast Asia and especially Vietnam. China is the dominant regional power when

38

compared not only to the navies of ASEAN states but India and Australia as well.

Although China is developing niche capabilities to challenge the U.S. Navy in

contingencies involving Taiwan, the PLA-N is no match now or in the future to the

might of the U.S. 7th Fleet. China will pose a growing challenge but for the next

decade and longer the U.S. Navy will rule the waves.

7. Conclusion

This paper has traced the evolution of Vietnam‘s defence policy after the settlement

of the Cambodian conflict and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present. In

this period Vietnam expanded its defence doctrine from protection of national

sovereignty to embrace comprehensive security. Economics has taken pride of place

and Vietnam‘ armed forces have been pared down and starved of funds. Vietnamese

foreign policy was captured in such catchy slogans as ‗multidirectional foreign policy‘

and ‗making friends with all countries.‘ Vietnam achieved success after success in is

quest to integrate its economy with the global economy.

The analysis in this paper has attempted to make four major points. First, the

collapse of the Soviet Union severely undermined Vietnam‘s defence preparedness

and posed a serious challenge to its leaders. Second, the end of the Cambodian

conflict ushered in a new era of regional cooperation and opened up a major new

opportunity for Vietnam in its external relations. Third, the changed strategic context

opened the door for Vietnam to engage in defence diplomacy and enter into military

cooperation programs with a diverse number of new partners. Fourth, as a result of

extensive defence diplomacy, Vietnam has been able to initiate a limited but highly

specific force modernization program with an emphasis on system upgrades and new

procurements.

Vietnam‘s defence capabilties came under severe threat with the collapse of socialism

in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-91. Quite suddenly and

unexpectedly there was a sharp decline and then termination of Soviet military

assistance. To add to Vietnam‘s difficulties, the Russian Federation moved to put

military sales on a commercial basis with payment in hard currency. At the same

time, Vietnam ‗s domestic economic circumstances resulted in less budgetary

funding for the Vietnam People‘s Army than the military expected.

39

Vietnam therefore confronted an immediate strategic dilemma. If it did not act

quickly, its existing stocks of military weapons and equipment would continue to

deteriorate. Vietnam was particularly concerned about the mainstay of its air force,

the MiG-21, its air defence systems and its ability to project naval forces into the

South China Sea. Without access to new weapons platforms and systems Vietnam

would not be able to continue modernizing its forces. Vietnamese military leaders

closely followed the first Gulf War in 1990-91 and drew the conclusion that they had

no choice but to modernize. In 1992, Chinese occupation of features in the South Sea

set off a ‗scramble for the Spratlys‘ and opened a new maritime dimension for

Vietnamese military planners.

Given these circumstances, Vietnamese political and military leaders gave priority to

preventing the further deterioration of its stock of military weapons and equipment.

Vietnam sought out sources of spare parts and foreign assistance to maintain,

refurbish and upgrade its defence equipment inventory. According to one foreign

observer, between sixty to seventy percent of Vietnam‘s military stocks were obsolete

at that time. As a second priority, Vietnam sought access to relevant modern military

technology and its transfer to Vietnam‘s own national defence industry through joint

ventures and co-production. In trying to attain these twin objectives – maintenance

and modernization – Vietnam was constrained by cost, compatibility and U.S.

national security trade restrictions.

Because Vietnam‘s military was equipped with Soviet-designed equipment, Vietnam

first had to negotiate affordable commercial contracts with Russian state arms

manufacturers. The break up of the Soviet Union opened up alternate sources of

Soviet-era equipment. Due to continual pricing difficulties with Russian authorities,

Vietnam turned to the Ukraine and established strong defence industry and arms

procurement relations. The Ukraine perhaps has emerged as the major competitor to

the Russian Federation for arms sales to Vietnam. Additionally, Vietnam sought out

opportunities among the states of the former Warsaw Pact, most notably Belarus,

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.

The strategic dimension of Vietnam‘s defence diplomacy improved dramatically

following Vietnam‘s military withdrawal from Cambodia and the political settlement

of the conflict in 1991. Vietnam now became a more ‗normal‘ state in international

40

relations. These changed strategic circumstances enabled Vietnam to extend its quest

for military modernization to Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Europe and beyond.

But cost always remained the constraining factor.

Vietnam‘s military diplomacy serves multiple purposes but its primary objective is to

enhance the national security of the state. In addition to arms sales and servicing

agreements, Vietnam has sought to enhance its national security by: exchanges of

high-level delegations, goodwill and protocol visits, strategic dialogue, joint naval

patrols and exercises, and a variety of defence cooperation activities (military

training and education, language instruction, technology transfer, medical research,

de-mining and ordnance disposal, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief).

It is notable that the greatest density of Vietnam‘s defence relationships are with its

immediate neighbours – Laos, China, Thailand, the Philippines Cambodia and

Indonesia. Vietnam first had to normalize its relations with former adversaries

during the Cambodian conflict. Both sides had to build a measure of confidence if not

trust in order to move from confrontation to cooperation. The opening of regional

defence contacts, especially in the yearly 1990s, pre-dated Vietnam‘s official

membership in ASEAN. The year 1994 marks the real commencement of defence

diplomacy by Vietnam.

Defence diplomacy resulted in enhanced border security on land and in maritime

areas where there are overlapping territorial claims. Defence cooperation with Laos

and Cambodia has also focused on the repatriation of the remains of Vietnamese

soldiers who died during the Indochina wars. China and Vietnam have cooperated in

removing mines from their frontier and are now in the process of completing the

physical demarcation of the borderline. India represents something of a special case

because of its direct experience with Soviet–era weapons and technology of relevance

to Vietnam.

A close look at Vietnamese arms procurements, especially its purchase of Su-27 and

Su-30 fighter-bomber aircraft and fast attack craft armed with surface-to-surface

missiles, reveals a major concern over contingencies in the South China Sea related

to China‘s naval presence. The development of defence relations with India and the

41

United States reinforces the perception among some strategic analysts that Vietnam

may be trying to balance against a rising China.

This paper also presented a case study of Vietnam‘s relations with China and argued

that there is an emerging contradiction between Vietnam‘s foreign and defence

policies. Vietnam seeks to leverage its external relations with China in order to boost

economic development, yet Vietnamese plans to develop its maritime zone in the

South China Sea has provoked a Chinese counter-reaction designed to scuttle this

initiative. Vietnam now faces a significant challenge to its national sovereignty. This

paper argues there are signs that Vietnam is gradually developing a modest deterrent

capacity in the South China Sea and employing defence diplomacy in order to bolster

its negotiating position vis-à-vis China.

Much writing about Vietnam‘s foreign policy sits uncomfortably with the analysis

presented in this paper because scholars have largely neglected the strategic

dimension of Vietnam‘s defence diplomacy. The Vietnam People‘s Army is a major

constituent in Vietnam‘s political system and is an increasingly prominent

diplomatic actor regionally and globally. The pattern of Vietnam‘s arms

procurements and Vietnamese concern with border security and territorial integrity

– that by their very nature involve realpolitik considerations – cannot be squared

with approaches that stresses cooperative norm building and identity formation.

—————————————-

(1) Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor , Center of

Southeast Asian Studies, Ohio University, Paper to EuroViet 6, Asien-Afrika Institut,

Universitat Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany, June 5-7, 2008.

(2) The Warsaw Pact was formed in 1955 and comprised seven members: Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR . It was

officially disbanded in 1991.

(3) Several of the defence attaches accredited to Vietnam are non-resident. For

example, Britain‘s defence representative is permanently based in Kuala Lumpur.

(4) This paper omits discussion of the exchange of legislative committees that have

responsibility for defence and security matters. For example, Vietnam has received

42

delegations from France‘s National Defence Commission (January 1992), the

Military Council of Thailand‘s Lower House, the Russian Federation‘s Duma

(February 1997), the Lao National Assembly‘s National Defence and Security

Committee (April 1999), and the Belgian Parliament‘s Defence Committee

(November 2004).

(5) Based on information received up to and including December 30, 2006. Data was

collected from Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the army newspaper, and Vietnamese radio and

press reports included in the monitoring reports issued by the U.S. Foreign

Broadcast Information Service and the British Broadcasting Corporation; also

included are news items found on the websites of the Vietnam News Agency, Radio

Voice of Vietnam and Viet Nam News. This material has been supplemented by

reporting taken from the regional and international media as well as other sources.

(6) This data is undoubtedly incomplete due to the generally unpublicized nature of

these relatively low-level visits.

(7) In October 2006, Vietnam and Japan adopted an ‗Joint Statement Toward a

Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia,‘ during the course of a visit by

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to Tokyo. The fourth Japan-Vietnam politico-

military dialogue was held in Hanoi on December 13, 2007. Japan was represented

by the Deputy Director-General, Southeast and Southwest Asian Affairs Department,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the International Policy Division,

Ministry of Defense.

(8) In January 1992, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, visited

Vietnam and offered to barter spares from Thailand‘s stock of Chinese-manufactured

T-69 tanks for U.S. F-5 jet parts which Vietnam captured in 1975 and still held in

storage. This offer apparently was not taken up.

(9) In January 1998, Vietnamese troops fired on Filipino fishermen in the vicinity of

Tenant Reef.

(10) Vietnam hosted the 16th ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet in November 2006.

43

(11) The tenth meeting of the Association of War Veterans of ASEAN was held in

Brunei in October 2003. The fourteenth ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet was hosted by

Indonesia in September 2004.

(12) Vietnam was represented by Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Than, commander of VPA Air

Force.

(13) While no details are available, it is known that Vietnam previously sold rifles,

mortars and rocket launchers to rebels in El Salvador and M-113 APCs to Iran.

Information on Vietnamese arms sales is particularly scarce. In 2001 it was reported

that Myanmar took delivery of two consignments of mortar shells produced in

Vietnam. But, according to reports, the deal may have been arranged through arms

dealers possibly without Hanoi knowing its final destination (Jane‘s Defence Weekly,

March 21, 2001; and Robert Karinol, Jane‘s Defence Weekly, July 25, 2001).

(14) Source: Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation.

(15) This sale was valued at U.S. $180 million with eighty-five percent of the payment

in hard currency and the remainder in agricultural produce.

(16) The U.N. Register of Conventional Weapons lists the sale of two Su-27s to

Vietnam in 1997. Russian press reports in 1997 indicated Vietnam had placed an

order for a total of twenty-four Su-27s in a deal valued at U.S. $500 million. The

International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2004/05, lists a

total of twelve Su-27s (7-SK and 5-UBK models) in Vietnam‘s inventory.

(17) Reportedly the Mosquito anti-ship missile.

(18) According to press reports, Vietnam took delivery of fifty portable SA-18 SAMs

in 2002 in a contract valued at U.S. $643 million.

(19) Other sources report the sale of twelve Project 1241RA FACs

(20) Subhash Kapila, ‗India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Convergence of

Interests,‘ South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 177,

http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper1777.htm .

44

(21) As of the time of Anthony‘s visit, 49 VPA officers attended various army and

navy course sin India and a further 64 attended English language courses.

(22) Joint Press Release, ―The First ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee

Meeting,‖ Beijing, February 26-28, 1997.

(23) In September 2004, China hosted ARF Workshop on Drug-Substitute

Alternative Development and in March 2005, China hosted an ARF seminar on

enhancing cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues.

(24) Carlyle A. Thayer, ‗China and Southeast Asia: A Shifting Zone of Interaction‘, in

Sean McDonald and Bruce Vaughn, eds., The Borderlands of Southeast Asia:

Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield,

forthcoming.

(25) Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations and the People‘s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership

for Peace and Prosperity , October 8, 2003. For an analysis see: Lyall Breckon, ―A

New Strategic Partnership is Declared,‖ Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on

East Asian Bilateral Relations, 5:4, 4th Quarter, October-December 2003.

(26) Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration of ASEAN-China Strategic

Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.

(27) Ronald Montaperto, ―Smoothing the Wrinkles,‖ Comparative Connections: An

E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 6:2, 2nd Quarter, April-June 2004.

(28) Shefall Rekhi, ―Indonesia seeks wider China and Japan role,‖ The Straits Times,

June 4, 2007.

(29) ―Tripartite agreement on joint survey of seismic activity in East Sea signed,‖

Vietnam News Agency, March 14, 2005; Ma. Theresa Torres and Niel Villegas Mugas,

―RP, China, Vietnam to explore Spratlys,‖ The Manila Times, March 16, 2005; ―China,

Vietnam agree to joint exploration of disputed areas,‖ Xinhua, Beijing, July 4, 2005;

and ―China, Philippines, Vietnam work on disputed South China Sea area,‖ Xinhua,

August 27, 2005.

45

(30) Xinhuanet, Beijing, July 19, 2005 in People‘s Liberation Army Daily, July 20,

2005.

(31) Agence France-Presse, ―Philippines, China, Vietnam to cooperate in Spratlys

security,‖ Channelnewsasia.com, May 19, 2006.

(32) Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, ―Chinese Diplomacy and Optimism about

ASEAN,‖ Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations,

8:3, 3rd Quarter, July-September 2006.

(33) Alice d. Ba, ―Who‘s socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino-ASEAN

relations,‖ The Pacific Review, 19(2), June 2006, pp. 157-179.

(34) Xinhua News Agency, September 6, 2000.

(35) People‘s Republic of China, State Council, Information Office, China‘s National

Defense in 2000, Text of PRC White Paper on National Defense in 2000, Xinhua

Domestic Service, Beijing, October 16, 2001.

(36) Ronald Montaperto, ―Thinking Globally, Acting Regionally,‖ Comparative

Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 6:4, 4th Quarter,

October-December 2004.

(37) Lyall Breckon, ―SARS and a New Security Initiative from China,‖ Comparative

Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 5:2, 2nd Quarter,

April-June 2003.

(38) Dana R. Dillon and John J. Tkacik, Jr., ‗China and ASEAN: Endangered

American Primacy in Southeast Asia‘, Backgrounder No. 1886. Washington, D.C.:

The Heritage Foundation, October 19, 2005, p. 3. The second ARF Security Policy

Conference was held in Vientiane in May 2005.

(39) People‘s Republic of China, State Council, China‘s National Defense in 2004,

Beijing: Information Office, December 27, 2004, chapter nine.

(40) Ibid., chapter seven.

46

(41) These arrangements were variously titled: framework agreement, framework

document, joint statement and joint declaration. For a detailed analysis consult:

Thayer, ‗China‘s ―New Security Concept‖ and Southeast Asia‘, pp. 92-95. For a recent

review of China‘s bilateral relations with Southeast Asia see: Jürgen Haacke, ‗The

Significance of Beijing‘s Bilateral Relations: Looking ―Below‖ the Regional Level in

China-ASEAN Ties,‘ in Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku, eds., China and

Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges. Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005, pp. 118-140.

(42) Jane‘s Defense Weekly, 4 January 2006, on line edition.

(43) ‗China-Vietnam Joint Communiqué‘, Beijing, 24 August 2006.

(44) Alexander Vuving, ―Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam‘s China Policy: A

Changing Mixture of Pathways,‖ Asian Survey, 46(6), November 2006.

(45) Vietnam News Agency, Beijing, January 21, 2007; Quan Doi Nhan Dan, January

22, 2007.

(46) Dong Ha, ‗BP, PetroVietnam rearrange gas pipeline overhauls plan‘, Thanh Nien,

March 14, 2007

(47) Xinhua, People‘s Daily Online, April 10, 2007.

(48) Xinhua, Beijing, April 10, 2007.

(49) Xinhua, People‘s Daily Online, April 10, 2007; words in brackets were quoted by

Reuters, ‗Vietnam stirring trouble with gas pipe plan – China‘, April 10, 2007.

(50) Xinhua, People‘s Daily Online, April 10, 2007.

(51) Quoted by Reuters, April 10, 2007. Qin Gang‘s remarks were carried by the

Shanghai Daily and The China Daily on April 11, 2007.

(52) Thong Tan Xa Viet Nam, Thanh Nien, April 12, 2007.

(53) Thanh Nien, April 12, 2007.

47

(54) This area is separate from the area where the national oil companies China, the

Philippines and Vietnam are conducing joint seismic exploration; Voice of Vietnam,

April 12, 2007.

(55) Neither China nor Vietnam has provided a public account of this incident. It is

unlikely that Vietnam People‘s Army naval vessels were involved in this incident. But

it is highly possible that fishing vessels that form part of local security forces could

have been involved. There is a real grey area concerning local self-defence forces and

militia. It is even more likely that armed Vietnamese fishermen were involved. China

typically embellishes incidents to suits its purposes and its use of the expression

‗armed vessels‘ is an example of such calculated ambiguity.

(56) According to an eyewitness, ‗I was at both [demonstrations] and the security

services, if not directly choreographing events, certainly facilitated the protests and

did nothing to stop them for an hour or so‘. If the student protests were spontaneous

then Vietnamese security officials have much to be concerned about. Vietnamese

students independently accessed the web to find information that was not in the state

press. Vietnamese students organized the protests to the extent of getting matching

t-shirts, slogans and then held simultaneous demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi

Minh City. And finally, Vietnamese students contacted the media to garner publicity.

If students can do this on a patriotic issue, what else might they do ?

(57) Hieu expressed an interest in deepening cooperation in personnel training,

frontier and coastal defence and ‗other fields‘.

(58) Vietnam has strategic partnerships with Russia, India and Japan and ‗strategic

relations‘ with France. Vietnam and the United States have both mentioned raising

their bilateral relations to the strategic level.

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