Thayer China's Naval Modernization and U.S. Strategic Rebalancing: Implications for Stability in the South China Sea

7/30/2019 Thayer China's Naval Modernization and U.S. Strategic Rebalancing: Implications for Stability in the South China S

1/32

Chinas Naval Modernization and

U.S. Rebalancing: Implications for

Stability in the South China SeaCarlyle A. Thayer

PLAN Luyang II-class Missile Destroyer Haikou 171 South Sea

Paper to Panel on Militarization and Its Implications4th International Workshop on the South China Sea

cosponsored by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the

Vietnam Lawyers Association, Ho Chi Minh City

November 1821, 2012


2/32

2

Chinas Naval Modernization and U.S. Strategic Rebalancing:

Implications for Stability in the South China Sea

Carlyle A. Thayer*

Introduction

This paper examines whether or not Chinas naval modernization and U.S. strategic

rebalancing in East Asia will lead to conflict in the South China Sea. This paper is divided into

six parts. Part 1 discusses Chinas maritime objectives. Part 2 analyses Chinas force

capability development with a specific focus on the South Sea Fleet and the development of

military infrastructure on Hainan Island and the Paracel and Spratly islands. Part 3 discusses

the U.S. strategy of rebalancing its military forces in the AsiaPacific. Part 4 focuses on

specific U.S. initiatives with Southeast Asias maritime states including the Philippines and

Vietnam. Part five offers a net assessment of future force modernization trends and their

impact on regional stability. Part 6, the conclusion, evaluates the prospects for maritime

cooperation for regional security by reviewing (a) ChinaU.S. bilateral strategic dialogues

and (b) current multilateral initiatives by the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence

Ministers Meeting Plus, ASEAN Maritime Forum and the East Asia Summit.

Part 1 Chinas Maritime Objectives

Chinas 2010 Defence White Paper enumerated four national defence objectives: (1)

safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; (2)

maintaining social harmony and stability; (3) accelerating the modernization of national

defence and the armed forces; and (4) maintaining world peace and stability.1

Chinas military strategy to achieve these objectives is encapsulated in National Military

Strategic Guidelines for the New Period that propounds an operational doctrine termed

Active Defence.2

Chinas Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is tasked with three

*Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force

Academy, Canberra. Email: [email protected] .

1The Peoples Republic of China, State Council, Information Office, Chinas National Defense in 2010 (Beijing:

March 2011).

2Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of

China 2011, A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000(Washington, D.C. 2012).


3/32

3

essential missions: defeating invasion from the sea, defending territorial sovereignty, and

protecting maritime rights. It primary area of operations are focused on the socalled first

and second island chains. The first island chain refers to the line of islands that runs north

south from the Kuriles, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia.The second island chain extends further east of Chinas coast and includes a line running

northsouth from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and

Indonesia.

With respect to Chinas maritime domain, China pursues a defence doctrine known as

Offshore Defence or Near Seas Defence.3

The Near Seas include the Yellow Sea, East

China Sea and South China Sea and are a PLAN priority.

The PLAN is tasked with developing the capability to conduct six offensive/defensive

maritime campaigns: blockade, antisea line of communication (SLOC), maritimeland

attack, antiship, protection of maritime transportation, and naval base defence.

Chinas phenomenal economic growth has been driven by exportorientated trade. This has

increased Chinas dependency on maritime routes to export goods and to import natural

resources. As a consequence, China has an interest in protecting vital trade routes or SLOCs.

Chinese defence analysts have expressed concern about what has been termed the

Malacca dilemma the threat to Chinas national security by the closure of narrow straits

or choke points in Southeast Asia.4

Chinas phenomenal economic growth also fueled a rising demand for resources and energy.

China claims most of the South China Sea on the basis of historic rights. Chinese officials

claim the fish and other aquatic resources, minerals on the deep seabed and hydrocarbons

(oil and natural gas).

Five points may be drawn from the above discussion:

3Nan Li, The Evolution of Chinas Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From Near Coast and Near Seas to Far

Seas, in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew NienDzu Yang, eds., The

Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press,

2011), 109140.

4Thomas M. Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power(London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2002), 127128.


4/32

4

First, Chinas spectacular economic rise has provided the basis for increased defence

spending that in turn has led to the transformation and modernization of all military

services, including the PLAN (see below).5

In many respects this is a normal development.

Second, China places highest priority on Taiwan and national reunification. After the Taiwan

Straits crisis of 199596, when Chinese attempts to intimidate Taiwan resulted in U.S. naval

intervention, China has sought to forestall future intervention by U.S. carrier forces by

extending its naval reach beyond the first to the second island chain by developing what the

Pentagon terms antiaccess/areadenial capabilities.

Third, Chinas rise has raised the salience of protecting its major SLOCs from the Gulf of

Arabia through the South China Sea to its eastern seaboard.

Fourth, Chinese resource nationalism has raised the importance of the South China Sea with

respect to oil, gas and mineral resources and sovereignty claims. Increasingly PLAN

operations have extended into the far seas including the South China Sea with a particular

focus on the waters adjacent to the Philippines.

Fifth, as China becomes a global power with widespread economic and political interests, it

will develop a blue water navy to protect its interests much further afield.

Part 2 Chinas Force Capability Development

There are nine main elements to Chinas naval modernization program: antiship ballistic

missiles, antiship cruise missiles, submarines (conventional and nuclear), air craft carriers,

surface combatants, amphibious ships, landbased aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles,

nuclear and electromagnetic pulse weapons and maritime surveillance and targeting

systems.6

Five elements of PLAN modernization are of particular significance to the South

Sea Fleet: submarines, aircraft carrier, surface combatants, amphibious ships and maritime

5For a discussion of Chinas defence spending consult: Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Hermann and Sneha

Raghavan, Asian Defense Spending, 20002011: A Report of the CSIS DefenseIndustrial Initiatives Group

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, October 2012), 811.

6Ronald ORourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Background and Issues

for Congress, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 31, 2012), 834.

See also: Ronald ORourke, PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, Aircraft, in Phillip C. Saunders,

Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew NienDzu Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding

Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 141174 and Anthony

H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: A WesternPerspective. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 30, 2012, 104130.


5/32


6/32

6

powered ballistic missile (SSBN); Shang class or Type 093 nuclear powered (SSN); Yuan class

or Type 041 (or Type 039A) SS; and the Song class or Type 039/039G SS.9

These submarines

are armed with one or more weapons systems including antiship cruise missiles (ASCM),

wireguided and wakehoming torpedoes and mines. The Kiloclass subs are armed with theSN27 Sizzler ASCM. By the end of 2010 the PLAN had 31 relatively new modern attack

submarines in commission. Given current production rates and life expectancy the PLAN

could have a force of 75 modern submarines by 202024.10 China has accorded the South

Sea Fleet new priority. The PLAN has redeployed its newest attack SSNs and SSBNs from

their traditional port of Qingdao to Hainan Island.

The PLAN also deploys five new classes of indigenously build guided missile destroyers

(DDG) in addition to the Russian Sovremennyclass: Luhu (Type 052), Luhai (Type 051B),

Luyang (Type 052B), Luyang II (Type 052C) and Louzhou (Type 051C). As of 2012, the PLAN

had fourteen of these destroyers under commission; an additional six Luyang II destroyers

are currently under construction. Eight destroyers are currently deployed with the South

Sea Fleet including the Luyang and Luyang IIclass.11

The PLAN deploys four classes of indigenously build frigates: Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G),

Jiangei II (Type 053H3), Jiangkai I (Type 054) and Jiangkai II (Type 054A).12 The PLAN

currently has 28 of these frigates under commission. Fortyfour frigates of all types are

currently deployed with the East Sea and South Sea Fleets.13

Of Chinas twentyeight

amphibious ships, 26 are currently deployed with the East Sea and South Sea Fleets. The

South Sea Fleet also is home of the largest marine battalion, amphibious platforms and

Chinas largest hospital ship. According to a recent study:

Somewhat surprisingly, as this text has shown, many of the newest DDGs, frigates, andsubmarines tend to be based in the South China Sea. This configuration does not necessarily

support a Taiwan conflict, but does match a future mission of escorting oil convoys to the Middle

East, or asserting greater sovereignty over Chinese claims to the South China Sea. The Luyang

9ORourke, China Naval Modernization, 1015.

10ORourke, China Naval Modernization, 15.

11Andrew S. Erickson, Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities, in Ashley J. Tellis and

Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 201213: Chinas Military Challenge (Seattle and Washington: National

Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 99.

12

ORourke, China Naval Modernization, 2526.13

Erickson, Chinas Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities, 99.


7/32

7

DDGs 168 and 169 and the Luyang DDGs 170 and 171 form the core of two battle group

formations based at Yulin for distant operations.14

China commissioned the Varyag aircraft carrier this year.15

The Varyag is an old ship and will

be used primarily for training purposes. China has begun training flight crews to take off and

land on a carrier using a shore based mock up. The Varyag uses a sky jump to assist take

offs. This limits the kinds of aircraft and payloads that can be launched. The Varyag can

easily embark helicopters. China is also designing and constructing a special aircraft for the

carrier, the J15. Even when it is operational it will only have limited capacities. If the Varyag

carrier is based at Yulin Naval Base, as is expected, it could be used to exert sea control over

the South China Sea. It is unlikely the Varyag will be fully operational until after 2015 with

many analysts saying it will take longer.

The South Sea Fleet headquarters at Zhanjing, Guangdong province, forms the central hub

of a major complex of strategic space and tactical longrange radars and communications to

support operations in the South China Sea. These electronic systems link Woody Island,

Fiery Cross Reef and other Chineseoccupied features with local and fleet commanders.

Also, they are augmented by the combat and other electronic systems of PLAN warships,

aircraft and paramilitary vessels. Zhanjiang and other ports on China southern coast are

equipped with navigation aids as radio beacon navigation differential global positioning

system (RBNDGPS). The South Sea Fleet HQ at Zhanjiang also maintains a radar and

computer vessel traffic service (VTS).

Hainan Island

Since the 1980s, China has maintained RBN aids at Haikou, Haifou and Sanya on Hainan

Island. In 1999, three new RBNDGPS systems were activated at Baohujiao, Yangpu and Yulin

Naval Base at Yalong Bay near Sanya. In addition, facilities at Dongfang and Haikou also

operate radar and computer vessel traffic services (VTS). In 1965, China constructed its first

highpowered low frequency (LF) station on Hainan to support submarine operations. One

of China very first highpowered very low frequency (VLF) stations was built at Yulin Naval

Base to communicate with submarine and surface ships. Hainan houses several electronic

14James C. Bussert and Bruce A. Elleman, Peoples Liberation Army Navy: Combat Systems Technology, 1949

2000 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 189. A picture of the Luyang DDG 171 is featured on the cover of

this paper.15

ORourke, China Naval Modernization, 1718


8/32

8

intelligence (ELINT) stations, including one on a mountaintop in the southwest directed at

Vietnam.16

The PLAs Lingshui Air Base on the southeast coast also operates an ELINT station

with an estimated 1,000 signal analysts.

The facilities at Yulin Naval Base include piers, docks and underground submarine pens. 17

The PLAN stations several major surface combatants, amphibious landing craft, and

conventional and nuclear submarines at Yulin. Continued construction indicates that Yalong

will be able to accommodate larger advanced surface combatants such as assault ships,

attack and ballistic missile submarines, and eventually one or more aircraft carriers. The

South Sea Fleet has the important mission of securing the Strait of Qiongzhou to protect

southern China and Hainan Island. From this perspective, the development of a naval base

at Yalong may be seen as defensive in motivation.

However, as two American naval analysts have concluded:

By homeporting new vessels in southern Hainan, China appears to be carrying out a naval

strategy in the South China Sea of exerting regional maritime control incrementally.

Extrapolating from the rapid growth of its communications, intelligence gathering, and naval

supply structure on Hainan and its island bases in the South China Sea, China appears to have

linked these bases with a modern electronic communications network. Many of the islands and

reefs occupied in the SCS have a few buildings and a few antennas with a rudimentary pier. The

only allpurpose base including aircraft shelters and support is located on Woody Island.

Although crude, such outposts are being improved, if space is available, and could add to thePLANs overall mobility and ability to outmaneuver any regional competitors.18

The development of the Yulin Naval Base raises important questions about Chinas strategic

intent. Continued construction at Yulin Naval Base suggest that it will be a major military

base that will provide China with the capacity to surge expeditionary forces into the South

China Sea and beyond. The Yulin base will also provide China with a forward presence to

protect its SLOCs through the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

NuclearPowered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)

The development of a naval base in Yalong Bay has strategic implications for the balance of

power in the AsiaPacific. Analysis of construction activities indicates Yulin Naval Base will be

capable of housing nuclear submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic

16Bussert and Elleman, Peoples Liberation Army Navy, 142.

17Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of

China 2011, A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000

(Washington, D.C. 2012).18

Bussert and Elleman, Peoples Liberation Army Navy, 180.


9/32

9

missiles. Portions of the base are being built underground to provide facilities that cannot

be easily monitored. The hardened underground tunnels, for example, can protect vessels

ranging from SSNs up to Luyangclass DDGs. When these facilities are completed they will

provide China with the potential capability to station a substantial proportion of itssubmarinebased nuclear deterrent force there. The deployment of nuclear submarines,

including ballistic missile submarines, will introduce a new geostrategic dimension to the

regional balance of power. Chinese nuclear submarine deployments will attract the

continuing attention of the U.S. Navy in conducting military survey/intelligence gathering in

the waters off Hainan.

Satellite imagery has confirmed the presence of a single Chinese Type 094 Jinclass nuclear

submarine at Yalong since late 2007. The Type094 is a secondgeneration nuclear powered

ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and represents Chinas most lethal naval strike weapon.

This marks the first permanent deployment on an SSBN to Chinas South Sea Fleet. Five

more Chinese Jinclass SSBNs are expected to become operational in coming years and Yulin

is expected to become their home base.

Chinas most modern strategic nuclear submarine is not yet fully operational but when it is

the submarine is expected to carry twelve Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles. This class of

submarine will be even more potent if China succeeds in equipping the missiles with

multiple warheads. Chinese nuclear subs will be able to patrol and fire from concealed

positions in deep waters off Hainan island if China can develop the necessary operational

skills.

Naval Exercises

China regularly conducts major naval exercises to showcase the growing prowess of the

PLAN. In 2010 China conducted three major naval exercises. The first exercise was held in

early April 2010 and involved the longrange deployment of sixteen warships from the PLAN

drawn from the North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets. The PLAN flotilla conducted live

firing exercises north of the Philippines before steaming toward the Malacca Straits. Up until

this exercise Chinas South Sea Fleet was the only fleet to operate in the South China Sea.

The second naval exercise was conducted in late July 2010. It was the largest of its kind and

involved twelve of Chinas most modern warships from each of its fleets. This exercise was


10/32

10

notable for the Chinese media coverage of live missile firings and the presence of senior

commanders from the Central Military Commission and the PLA Chief of Staff, General Chen

Bingde.19

In November 2010 the PLA Marine Corps held the third major exercise in the

South China Sea involving more than 100 ships, submarines and aircraft and 1,800 marines.

In July 2011, China conducted antisubmarine exercises off Hainan involving surface

combatants and landing craft.20 In November 2011, China conducted naval exercises in the

Western Pacific.21

In May 2012, the PLAN conducted tactical formation exercises and

helicopter training missions involving two destroyers, two frigates and a Landing Platform

Dock (LPD). The Type 071 LPD is one of the largest combat vessels in the PLAN and can

embark a reinforced battalion of marines as well as landing craft and medium helicopters.

The exercises was held about midway between Taiwans southeast coast and Luzon in the

northern Philippines.22

Chinese naval exercises in the East China Sea in October 2012 involved PLAN warships

exercising with the paramilitary vessels from the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) and the

Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC). A total of eleven ships and eight aircraft took

part.23 A statement issued by the PLAN East Sea Fleet noted, This exercise will simulate a

situation where foreign law enforcement vessels obstruct and interfere with our maritime

surveillance and fisheries administration vessels on a mission to safeguard maritime rights

and enforce the law. In this exercise the East Sea Fleet responded by dispatching a frigate,

hospital ship, tugboat and advanced fighters and helicopters for support, cover and

emergency rescue.24

Although this particular exercise was held in the shadow of dispute

over Senkaku Island it holds implications for the Philippines and Vietnam as well.

PLAN exercises can be viewed as a demonstration by China that it is now capable of

deploying beyond the first island chain to the second. The implications are clear: China is

19Xinhua, 29 July 2010.

20China: naval exercises in South China Sea, All Voices, June 17, 2011.

21The Economic Times, November 23, 2011.

22J. Michael Cole, Taiwan monitors Chinese naval moves, Taipei Times, May 10, 2012.

23East China Sea tension: China conducts naval exercises, BBC News Asia, October 19, 2012.

24 Ariel Zirulnick, Chinas naval exercises in East China Sea send warning to regional rivals, The ChristianScience Monitor, October 19, 2012.


11/32

11

developing the capacity to sustain larger naval deployments in the Spratly archipelago and

further south for longer periods.

Combat Ready Patrols

On June 28, 2012, Geng Yangsheng, a spokesperson for Chinas Ministry of Defence,

revealed that China had commenced combatready patrols in disputed waters in the South

China Sea. In reply to a question about Vietnams recent air patrols over the Spratly islands,

Geng stated the Chinese military has already set up a normal, combatready patrol system

in seas under our control to protect national sovereignty and our security and development

interests.25

In an embarrassing incident for China, one of its frigates on routine patrol ran

aground near Half Moon Shoal near Palawan island on July 11, 2012.26

The frigate

reportedly had been intimidating Philippine fishing craft found in the area. Six PLAN ships

and smaller utility boats came to the frigates rescue and refloated it four days later. The

frigate left the area.27

This is a significant development because up to now the PLAN has played a relatively low

key behindthescenes role in South China Sea incidents. Chinas surveillance patrols have

been mainly conducted by ships belonging to the CMS force or the FLEC.

Paracel Islands

Developments on Hainan have been paralleled by Chinas construction activities in the

Paracel islands. In 1990, China constructed 1,200 foot runway on Woody island that has

been extended twice to it present length of 7,874 feet. The airstrip on Woody Island can

accommodate fighter aircraft such as the Su27 and Su30MKKs, H6 bombers and large

supply transport aircraft. The facilities adjacent to the runway include four hangers. Air

traffic is controlled by a Type 791 Xband precisionapproach radar. Other military

infrastructure on Woody Island includes naval docks capable of accommodating frigates and

25Quoted in Zhao Shengnan and Zhang Yunbi, China Pledges to protect maritime sovereignty, China Daily,

June 29, 2012 and Sutirtho Patranobis, China to set up new military base in south China sea, Hindustan

Times, June 28, 2012.

26Agence FrancePresse,China navy ship stranded in disputed waters, July 13, 2012.

27Manuel Mogato and Ben Blanchard, China frigate heads home, averts S. China Sea standoff, Reuters, July

15, 2012; Jim Gomez, Associated Press, China removes grounded warship, easing sea tensions, The Christian

Science Monitor, July 15, 2012; and Edward Wong, Freed From Shoals, Warship Heads Back to China, TheNew York Times, July 16, 2012.


12/32

12

destroyers and a fuel depot. PLA soldiers are based on Woody island to protect the runway

and other military facilities.

China has also built militaryrelated facilities elsewhere in the Paracels. A weather station

has been built on Pattle Island, while Robert Island houses a radio beacon, the only beacon

south of Hainan. The docks on Duncan Island are being expanded. A Signals Intelligence

(SIGINT) station has been operating on Rocky Island, the highest premonitory, since 1995. 28

This station could provide air or surface warning and support air missions or ship targeting.

Open sources report that China may have stationed the HY2 antiship cruise missile on

Woody Island.29

On July 19, 2012, Chinas Central Military Commission officially decided to establish a

military command in Sansha City after its elevation to prefecturelevel administrative status.

The garrison was placed under the PLA Hainan provincial subcommand within the

Guangzhou Military Command. The Sansha military garrison has been assigned

responsibility for national defence mobilization, military operations and reserves. According

to Defence Ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng, China may set up local military

command organs in the city [Sansha] according to relevant regulations.30 Senior Colonel Cai

Xihong was appointed commander of the Sansha garrison and Senior Colonel Liao Chaoyi

was named Political Commissar.31

According to a Japanese source, Chinas decision to establish a security area in Sansha is

considered preparation for fullscale military action in the South China Sea.32 This view is

disputed by retired U.S. Rear Admiral Mike McDevitt who argues that a military garrison in

Sansha will not affect the military balance or signal imminent hostilities. McDevitt points out

that any major military operations in the South China Sea would be mounted from Hainan

where the PLA has major bases. According to McDevitt, putting garrisons on Woody Island

28J. Michael Cole, China Deploying Military Garrison; to South China Sea?, The Diplomat, July 23, 2012

29Bill Geertz, Woody Island Missiles, The Washington Times, June 15, 2001.

30Xinhua, Chinese military may establish presence in Sansha: defense spokesperson, Ministry of National

Defence of the Peoples Republic of China, June 28, 2012. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2012

06/29/content_4381230.htm.

31

China steps up claims over worlds most disputed waters, National Post, July 27, 2012.32

Chinas hardline stance cause for grave concern, The Yomiuri Shimbun, July 26, 2012.


13/32

13

or elsewhere in the Paracels would effectively maroon these guys, so the only advantage

would be just showing the flag to say, We are serious.33

According to regional security specialists, the standing up of a military garrison command on

Woody Island does not represent an attempt to build a base for forward deployment into

the South China Sea.34

In their view, the Sansha military garrison is merely an administrative

response to the upgrading of Sansha to a prefecturelevel city. Military garrisons do not

command PLA main force combat units, PLA Navy for PLA Air Force units.

South China Sea

China has also consolidated its military presence in the South China Sea by construction on

several of the features it currently occupies.35

China occupied Mischief Reef in 1995 and

built its first structures in the South China Sea. These were expanded in October 1998 with

the addition of three octagonshaped wooden structures and two twostory concrete

towers one at each end. The towers bristle with SATCOMM and HF antennae for

communications. The towers are thought to house ELINT and radars. The facilities on

Mischief Reef has since been upgraded with the construction of two new piers, a helicopter

pad, a navy navigation radar, several antiaircraft guns and an antiship cruise missile system

(either the HY2 or C801).

A 200foot long concrete building was constructed on Fiery Cross Reef. It houses a naval

High Frequency (HF) yagi radar antenna (Bean Sticks), two Electronic Counter Measures

(ECM) radomes, and several whip communication and mast antennas. The various antenna

support different requirements, such as radio signal surveillance and Long Range (LR)

communications. The facilities on Fiery Cross Reef also include satellite communication

(SATCOMM) and meteorological dishes.

33Kirk Spitzer, New Garrison, Old Troubles In The South China Seas, Battlefield, July 26, 2012.

http://battlefield.blogs.time.com/2012/07/26/newgarrisonoldtroublesinthesouthchinasea. Another

analysts argues, the Sansha garrison has minimal operational value barring a significant upgrade in naval and

air infrastructure to enable sustained operations and is mainly an example of Chinese coercive diplomacy.

See: Oriana Skylar Mastro, The Sansha Garrison: Chinas Deliberate Escalation in the South China Sea, Center

for a New American Security, East and South China Sea Bulletin no. 5, September 2012.

34Dennis J. Blasko and M. Taylor Fravel, Much Ado About The Sansha Garrison, The Diplomat, August 23,

2012.

35 John J. Tkacik, Investigating the Chinese Threat, Part One: Military and Economic Aggression, Testimonyfor the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 28, 2012, 1418.


14/32

14

Chinese facilities on Johnson South Reef include four octagonshaped huts and a rectangular

two story building on a concrete base supporting two towers. One SATCOMM and three

mast head antennas are mounted on the roof. Chigua Reef contains an identical building

structure plus a wooden barracks. Subi Reef hosts a wooden barracks, a two story buildingwith a SATCOMM antenna and a helicopter landing pad.

In summary, Chinese facilities in the South China Sea will give the PLAN an enhanced

capability to exercise its sovereignty claims over this area. According to naval specialists,

Although small in size, if necessary these facilities could support future Chinese expansion

throughout the area, and could perhaps even support a limited naval conflict in this

congested region.36

Chinas Paramilitary Fleets

Chinas maritime surveillance fleet is estimated at more than 300 vessels only two of which,

the Haixun 11 and Haixun 31, weighed more than 3,000 tons. In October 2010, China

announced it would build thirtysix new CMS vessels for maritime law enforcement over the

next five years. In May 2011, the CMS announced it would recruit 1,000 more law

enforcement officials, bringing its total to over 10,000 personnel. And in June 2011, China

announced plans to expand its maritime surveillance force to sixteen aircraft and a total of

350 vessels by 2015.

Chinas objective of enforcing its jurisdiction in the South China Sea through an increasingly

modern civilian enforcement fleet was highlighted in late July 2012 with the launching of

the Haixun 01.37

The Haixun 01 weighs in at 5,418 tons and its largest and most capable ship

in Chinas maritime surveillance fleet. It can travel 18,500 km without refuelling and reach a

top speed of 37 km per hour. The Haixun 01 is capable of supporting helicopter operations.

Also, it can berth 200 passengers and comes equipped with an emergency medical surgery.

In sum, China has developed an enhanced capability to exercise its sovereignty claims over

the South China Sea and protect its vital SLOCs through the Malacca and Singapore Straits as

well as the capacity to surge expeditionary forces into the South China Sea from these bases

36Bussert and Elleman, Peoples Liberation Army Navy, 145.

37 China Launches the Countrys Largest and Most Advanced Patrol Vessel, The Maritime Executive, July 30,2012.


15/32

15

with a considerably shortened logistics tail. By extension, China will also have the capacity to

interdict the same SLOCs on which Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are dependent. These

developments portend a greater Chinese capacity to assert regional influence and to

challenge U.S. naval supremacy.

Part 3 U.S. Strategy of Rebalancing

When the Obama Administration took office in 2009, it quickly asserted that the United

States is back in Asia. The United States promptly acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity

and Cooperation, appointed a permanent ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat and revived

the annual ASEANUnited States leaders meeting. When Chinese assertiveness in the South

China Sea raised regional security concerns, both the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary

of Defense used visits to the region to declare that the United States had a national interest

in safety of navigation and over flight in the South China Sea.

In direct response to Chinese naval modernization, the U.S. deployed thirtyone of its fifty

three fast attack submarines to the Pacific and stepped up its antisubmarine warfare

program. Eighteen of the U.S. subs are homeported in Pearl Harbor; the others are based in

Guam.38

In late Juneearly July 2010, in a calculated demonstration of naval power, the USS

Florida, USS Michigan, and USS Ohio submarines, simultaneously surfaced in Diego Garcia

(Indian Ocean), Busan (South Korea) and Subic Bay (the Philippines), respectively.39

Each of

these submarines has been modified to carry 154 conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles.

All of the above development took place before the formal announcement that the United

States would rebalance its forces.

This year the United States announced that with its withdrawal from Iraq and eventual

withdrawal from Afghanistan, it will rebalance its force posture and quarantine defence

cuts in the AsiaPacific. The heightened importance of the AsiaPacific was underscored in

January 2012 with the release of a new national defense strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global

Leadership: Priorities for 21st

Century Defense. This document stated:

U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending

from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia creating a

mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to

38

Navy Times, July 21, 2010.39

The Chosun Ilbo, July 8, 2010 and Time Magazine, July 8, 2010.


16/32

16

contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the AsiaPacific region. Our

relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of

the region. We will emphasize our existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia

Pacific security. We will expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout

the AsiaPacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests

[emphasis in original].40

The United States also is developing an airsea battle concept to counter Chinas

development of areadenial/antiaccess capabilities. The airsea battle concept is being

drawn up to enable the United States to prevail in conflicts where areadenial/antiaccess

capabilities are well developed. According to the new U.S. defense strategy one of the ten

main missions for U.S. armed forces is to project power despite antiaccess/area denial

challenges.41

In response to Chinas use of asymmetric capabilities, including electronic and

cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defences, mining and other

methods, to complicate our operational calculus, the U.S. military

will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in antiaccess and area denial

(A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept,

sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile

defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space

based capabilities [emphasis in original].42

New developments in U.S. military technology will see the introduction of more

sophisticated undersea drones and unmanned systems for intelligence gathering,

reconnaissance and surveillance such as Large Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles

and Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance Systems.43

According to Mark Valencia, the

deployment of these new systems will generate tensions and more frequent crises; they

will produce defensive reactions and escalatory dynamics; and they will lead to less stability

in the most affected regions, especially in Asia.44

40Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21

stCentury Defense (January 2012), 2.

41Ibid., 4.

42Ibid., 45.

43In October 2012, the U.S. Navy successfully fired six Rafael Spike missiles from an unmanned surface

precision module (USV PEM) in the first demonstration of this capability. Navy Demonstrates 1st

launch of

Spike Missiles from Unmanned Surface Vehicles, NAVSEA Office of Corporate Communications, October 26,

2012.

44Mark J. Valencia, The South China Sea, Military Activities and the Law of the Sea, Paper presented to the

International Conference on Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and American

Perspectives, cosponsored by the Institute of European and American Studies and the Center for AsiaPacificStudies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, October 78, 2011.


17/32

17

Part 4 U.S. Initiatives in Southeast Asia

Chinas increased military prowess also has implications for the South China Sea where

Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have conflicting territorial and maritime

disputes with China. Chinas increasing assertiveness has raised regional security concerns

about Chinas strategic intentions and its challenge to U.S. primacy. Several Southeast Asian

states have sought reassurance from the United States that it will continue to remain

engaged in the region. The United States has responded to these concerns by declaring it

has a national interest in the freedom and safety of navigation and over flight in the

maritime commons and unimpeded commerce.

The United States has responded to Chinas naval buildup and development of anti

access/area denial capabilities by strengthening its posture on Guam, stepping up weapons

and equipment sales to the Philippines, negotiating new arrangements with Australia giving

the U.S. greater access to training facilities near Darwin, and basing Combat Littoral Ships in

Singapore.45

The Philippines

Chinese assertiveness in waters claimed by the Philippines led President Benigno Aquino to

take steps to revitalize its alliance with the United States and to seek clarification of whether

or not their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) would apply in the case of conflict with

China in the South China Sea.

The Philippines policy of revitalizing its alliance with the U.S. has been reinforced by the

Obama Administrations new defence policy of rebalancing towards the AsiaPacific. U.S.

defence officials view support to improve the Philippines maritime capabilities as part of

the strategic rebalancing policy. According to Deputy Secretary for Defense Ashton Carter,We are focused on building the Philippines maritime security presence and capabilities,

and strengthening their maritime domain awareness.46

This has already resulted in a step up in U.S. access to the Philippines. For example, between

May and October 2012, four U.S. Navy nuclear submarines (SSNs) have made port calls: USS

45Craig Whitlock, Navys next stop in Asia will set China on edge, Checkpoint Washington, November 18,

201146

Remarks by Deputy Secretary for Defense [Ashton] Carter at the Woodrow Wilson Center, October 2, 2012.


18/32

18

North Carolina (May), USS Louisville (June), USS Hawaii (September) and USS Olympia

(October).

Vietnam

The United States and Vietnam have stepped up modest defence cooperation activities to

include fly outs to U.S. aircraft carriers transiting the South China Sea, ship repairs, a new

senior leaders dialogue, signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on defence

cooperation and the initiation of lowlevel naval exchange activities.

In 2009, Vietnamese defence officials began making highpublicity fly outs to U.S. aircraft

carriers transiting the South China Sea off Vietnams eastern seaboard. The first took place

in April 2009 when Vietnamese officials landed on the USS John D. Stennis. This was

followed by flyouts to the USS George Washington in August 2010, August 2011 and

October 2012. In addition, in December 2009 Vietnams Defence Minister stopped off in

Hawii enroute to Washington, D.C. He was photographed peering through the periscope of

the USS Florida (SSGN), a nuclear attack submarine. In August 2010, Vietnamese diplomatic

officials visited the newest U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush at Norfolk, to

mark the fifteenth anniversary of diplomatic relations. This visit coincided with the fly out to

the USS George Washington, half a world away.

In 2009, Vietnams Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung dramatically announced that the

commercial repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay would be open to all navies of the world. The

U.S. was the first country to take up the offer. The following year the United States and

Vietnam signed a contract for the minor maintenance and repair of U.S. Navy Maritime

Sealift Command ships. Five ships were subsequently repaired: the USNS Richard E. Byrd

underwent voyage repairs in FebruaryMarch 2010, August 2011, and June 2012; the USNS

Walter S. Diehlin October 2011 and the USNS Rappahannockin February 2012. The three

most recent repairs were carried out at commercial facilities in Cam Ranh Bay.

In August 2010, the USVietnam defense dialogue was upgraded to a Defense Policy

Dialogue between officials at deputy minister level. The first meeting was held in Hanoi.

Vietnam was represented by Deputy Minister of National Defence Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh

and the U.S. was represented by Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for

South and Southeast Asia. The two sides agreed to cooperate in military exchanges and


19/32

19

training and collaboration in search and rescue and humanitarian assistance and disaster

relief.

The U.S. and Vietnam signed their first formal military agreement, a Statement of Intent on

Military Medical Cooperation on August 1, 2011;47 and the Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet

visited Hanoi four days later. These developments took place immediately prior to the 2nd

U.S.Vietnam Defence Policy Dialogue held in Washington on September 19, 2011. Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defence Robert Scher and Vice Minister of National Defence Lt. Gen.

Nguyen Chi Vinh signed the first formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defence

cooperation. The MOU included five priority areas: the establishment of a regular highlevel

dialogue between defence ministries; maritime security; search and rescue; studying and

exchanging experiences on United Nations peacekeeping; and humanitarian assistance and

disaster relief.

In June 2012, Vietnam hosted Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.48

Prior to his arrival in

Hanoi, Secretary Panetta unexpectedly and symbolically stopped in Cam Ranh Bay to

meet with the crew of the USNS Richard E. Byrdundergoing minor voyage repairs. Panettas

visit led to speculation that the United States Navy might return to Cam Ranh. The meeting

between the two defence ministers focused on the implementation of the 2010 MOU.

Vietnams National Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh flagged future

cooperation in addressing nontraditional security issues such as humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief and search and rescue. He also noted a longstanding Vietnamese

concern to elicit further support from the U.S. to address legacies from the Vietnam War

(eg. Agent Orange and unexploded ordnance disposal). He also repeated a request that he

made during his first visit to Washington in December 2009 for the U.S. to lift its restrictions

on military sales to Vietnam

Part 5 Force Modernization Trends: A New Assessment

Chinas military modernisation and transformation, especially naval modernisation, coupled

with increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, has created a security dilemma

47The Statement of Intent to cooperate in health is a precursor for exchanges and research collaboration in

military medicine.

48Carlyle A. Thayer, Hanoi and the Pentagon: A Budding Courtship, U.S. Naval Institute, June 11, 2012.

http://news.usni.org/news-analysis/hanoi-and-pentagon-budding-courtship.


20/32

20

for Southeast Asias states.49

Chinas efforts to safeguard its security by developing what it

considers a reasonable force structure to deter the United States has created insecurity in

several ASEAN states due to Chinas lack of transparency.

ASEAN states have been circumspect in public statements but their concerns can be

discerned by the significant rise in defence expenditures and the kinds of weapon systems

and platforms that they have acquired. Several regional states are developing their own

antiaccess/areadenial capabilities.50 In addition, Southeast Asias arms procurements go

beyond force modernisation and include the introduction of new capabilities that can be

operated at extended ranges. It should be recognized, however, that not all of these new

capabilities have been acquired in response to Chinas military build up. The subsections

below reviews force modernization developments in the Philippines, Vietnam and

elsewhere in the region.

The Philippines

In 2011, in response to Chinese assertiveness in its EEZ and Kalayaan Island Group, the

Philippines drew up a new defence strategy focused on both internal security operations

and external territorial defence. The Aquino Administration allocated P11 billion to support

force modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In March 2011, AFP Chief

of Staff General Eduardo Oban announced plans to upgrade the airfield on PagAsa island.

Two months later a Philippine navy study recommended the acquisition of submarines as a

deterrent against future potential conflicts.51

In September 2011, President Aquino announced that 4.95 billion pesos would be allocated

to top up the defence budget.52

These funds were earmarked for the purchase a naval

patrol vessel, six helicopters and other military equipment in order to secure the

Malampaya oil and gas project. In 2012, the Philippine government began implementation

of a fiveyear modernization program totalling P40 billion. In July 2012, the Philippines

49For a recent appreciation see: Andrew Shearer, Southeast Asia and Australia: Case Studies in Responding to

Chinas Military Power, in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 201213: Chinas Military

Challenge (Seattle and Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 241275.

50Robert Karniol, Vietnam prepares to better protect its S. China Sea claims, The Straits Times, January 10,

2012.

51

Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 17, 2001.52

Agence FrancePresse, September 7, 2011.


21/32

21

announced a U.S. $1.8 billion fund to purchase a refurbished frigate, C130 aircraft, utility

and combat helicopters as well as other defence equipment.53

In 201112, the Philippines took delivery of two former U.S. Coast Guard Weather

Endurance Cutters. The first cutter has been assigned to operate in waters off Palawan in

Western Command with the mission of protecting the Philippines EEZ. The Philippines also

expects to take delivery of three new Taiwanmanufactured MultiPurpose Attack Craft and

procure a third U.S. Coast Guard Hamiltonclass Cutter.54

The Philippines has signed an

agreement with Italys Defence Ministry to acquire military equipment, possibly including

frigates and aircraft.

The Philippines has presented the Pentagon with a wish list of new equipment including:

coastal radar, longrange patrol aircraft, strategic sea lift vessels, three offshore patrol

boats, two to five naval helicopters, air defence radar, six jet trainers, surface attack aircraft,

antiship missiles, and a submarine.55

The Philippines has also reached out to Japan, South Korea, France and the United Kingdom

for defence acquisitions. In September 2011, during President Aquinos visit to Tokyo, he

and Prime Minister Noda agreed to strengthen maritime security ties by holding frequent

highlevel defence discussions and by stepping up cooperation between their Coast Guards

and defencerelated authorities. Prime Minister Noda agreed to increase the involvement

of Japans Coast Guard in training their Filipino counterparts.56

Following a visit by South

Koreas President Lee Myungbak to Manila in November 2011, President Aquino

announced that the Philippines would purchase military equipment form Seoul. The

Department of National Defense was reported to be drawing up a list including aircraft,

helicopters, boats and other military equipment.

Vietnam

In 2009, in a major development, Vietnam announced that it would procure six conventional

53Manuel Mogato, Philippines Refuses to Budge on South China Sea Row, Reuters, July 23, 2012.

54Reuters, April 13, 2011 and AFP, September 3, 2011.

55 The Philippine Star, August 24, 2011. For a discussion of U.S. arms sales and transfers to the Philippines

consult: Ronald ORourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China:

Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 22,

2012), 4042.56

The Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2011.


22/32

22

diesel powered Kiloclass submarines from Russia. These are scheduled to be delivered in

2014. The Kiloclass submarines are likely to be equipped with seaskimming 3M54 Klub

antiship missiles with a range of 300 kilometres.

In 2011, Vietnam stepped up its force modernization program when it took delivery of four

additional Su30MK2 multirole jet fighters. These are expected to be equipped with the Kh

59MK antiship cruise missile with a range of 115 km. Vietnam currently has on order

sixteen more Su30MK2 jet fighters.57

Also in 2011, Vietnam also took delivery of two

Gephardclass guided missile stealth frigates armed with Kh35E antiship missiles with a

range of 130 km and two Svetlyak class missile Patrol Boats.58

In addition, Vietnam launched

its first indigenously built Ocean Patrol Vessel and troop transport.59

In October, while on a

tour of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung gave his approval for the

purchase of four Sigmaclass corvettes, two of which are slated for construction in

Vietnam.60

In 2011, Vietnam beefed up its coastal defences by acquiring its second Bastion landbased

antiship ballistic missile system. Vietnam reportedly has acquired Israeli Extended Range

Artillery Munitions ballistic missiles effective beyond 150 km. In October 2011, President

Truong Tan Sang made a state visit to India and requested Indian assistance in four areas:

submarine training, conversion training for pilots to fly Sukhoi30s, transfer of medium sized

patrol boats, and modernization of port facilities at Nha Trang.61

The local media reported

that India was considering whether or not to sell Vietnam its BrahMos supersonic cruise

missile.62

In February 2012, Russia announced it will coproduce the Uran antiship missile

(SSN25 Switchblade) with Vietnam.63

In November 2011, Vietnam announced a $3.3 billion defence budget for 2012, a reported

rise of 35% over 2010. According to IHS Janes Vietnams annual naval procurement budget

57Thanh Nien News, July 3, 2011.

58The Voice of Russia, June 22, 2011; BBC Vietnamese Service, August 24, 2011 and October 25, 2011; and

InterfaxAVN, October 11, 2011.

59BBC Vietnamese Service, October 3, 2011.

60BBC Vietnamese Service, October 18, 2011.

61The Hindu, November 9, 2011.

62

Business Insider, September 20, 2011.63

RIA Novosti, February 15, 2012.


23/32

23

has increased by 150% since 2008 to US $276 million in 2011. The naval budget is projected

to rise to $400 million by 2015.64

Vietnam is seeking to develop an antisubmarine warfare

capability by acquiring either the U.S. P3 Orion of the Spanish Airbus Military C295.65

Regional66

According to one noted regional security analyst, naval acquisitions in Asia have become

especially disturbing, with undeniable signs of actionreaction dynamics and Northeast Asia

in particular is witnessing an emerging naval arms race.67 Defence analysts estimate that

86 submarines will be added to the fleets in the AsiaPacific by 2020 of which 30 will be

Chinese.68

China currently has the largest submarine fleet and most extensive plans to

expand its numbers including the Type 095 nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and Type 094

Jinclass SSBN. China is expected to base both attack and ballistic missile submarines at Yulin

Naval Base on Hainan Island. This prospect has led Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore and the United States to step up investment in their antisubmarine warfare

capabilities. Security analysts warn that the proliferation of submarine fleets may be

destabilizing in times of tensions and crises due to the complexities of command and

control.

In Southeast Asia the conventional submarine has become the new hallmark of naval

acquisitions. Vietnams purchase of Kiloclass submarines is part of a regional trend.69

Indonesia, the first country in Southeast Asia to acquire submarines, has indicated it will

replace them with newer South Korean models. Indonesia reportedly will boost defence

spending by 35% in 2012.70

Singapore has upgraded its submarine fleet by taking delivery of

64Quoted in The Economic Times, November 14, 2011.

65

Aviation Week, February 17, 2012.66

Richard A. Bitzinger, Recent Developments in Naval and Maritime Modernization in the AsiaPacific:

Implications for Regional Security, in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew

NienDzu Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, D.C.: National

Defense University Press, 2011), 2340 and Richard A. Bitzinger, Military Modernization in the AsiaPacific:

Assessing New Capabilities, in Strategic Asia 201011: Asias Rising Power and Americas Continued Purpose

(Seattle and Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010), 79111.

67Desmond Ball, Asias Naval Arms Race, Paper presented to the 25

thAsiaPacific Roundtable, ISIS Malaysia,

Kuala Lumpur, 29 May 1 June 2011.

68Business Week, November 25, 2011.

69

Aviation Week, February 17, 2012.70

Al Jazeera.net, November 7, 2011.


24/32

24

two Archerclass submarines in 2011.71

Singapore reportedly is in the market for four or five

P3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft.72

Malaysia has acquired two Scorpeneclass submarines.

Both the Singaporean and Malaysian submarines are equipped with Air Independent

Propulsion systems. Thailand and the Philippines are currently considering acquiring theirown conventional submarines.

Regional force modernization has and will continue to result in the introduction of increased

numbers of warships equipped with new technologies and weapons systems. A recent

review of regional force modernization over the last decade highlights the introduction of

new capabilities such as standoff precisionstrike, longrange airborne and undersea

attack, stealth, mobility and expeditionary warfare and, above all, new capacities when it

comes to greatly improved command, control communications, computing, intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks.73

This review concludes, new types of

armaments promise to significantly upgrade and modernize the manner of war fighting in

the region [and] fundamentally change the concept and conduct of warfare.74

In summary, Southeast Asias arms buying spree, although largely intended for defensive

purposes, may have a destabilising impact on regional security. According to Vice Admiral

Scott Swift, Commander U.S. Seventh Fleet, his prime concern is not the outbreak of a major

conflict but any tactical trigger with strategic implications I do have concerns about a

specific brushup that could result in a tactical miscalculation75

So far there have been few

if any indications that this issue is being effectively addressed by ASEANcentric multilateral

organizations.

Part 6 Prospects for Cooperation for Regional Security

The major challenge to Southeast Asias strategic interests is the potential for great power

rivalry to undermine ASEAN centrality and regional autonomy and contribute to regional

71The Straits Times, December 3, 2011.

72Flight Global, December 15, 2011.

73Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(1), April 2010, 6364.

74Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions, 64.

75Quoted by Stephen Coates, US Pacific commander warns of tactical errors, The China Post, November 10,

2011. Admiral Smith also noted that he expected diplomacy to prevail in the event of a brushup andcompromise to prevail.


25/32

25

instability. Major power rivalry could impact directly on regional security in one of three

ways: a conflict between the major powers, a conflict between a major power and a littoral

state, and a conflict between a major power and a littoral state that draws in the other

major power. Major power rivalry could impact indirectly on regional security by spillingover and affecting ASEAN cohesion resulting in individual members calculating whether

alignment with a major power is a better guarantee of their national security than ASEAN

multilateralism. ASEAN states currently prefer a balance among the major powers and do no

want to become involved in a dispute between them or be forced to choose sides.

The subsections below consider whether China and the United States will be able to

manage their relationship peacefully and the prospects for multilateral institutions in

promoting maritime cooperation for regional security

(a) U.S.China Strategic Defence Dialogues

U.S. diplomatic intervention in the South China Sea issue coupled with its newly announced

policy of rebalancing its global force posture has provoked a negative if not hostile reaction

by China. China views the U.S. as an outside power whose intervention will only complicate

matters. At a recent conference hosted by the Australian Chief of Army, PLA Lt. Gen. Ren

Haiquan offered this blunt assessment:

Some countries pursue strategies such as rebalance to the AsiaPacific and looking East and

are increasing their strategic investment. Several countries do not let go the Cold War mentality.

They are consolidating military alliance system in Asia Pacific and strengthening their military

presence and military deterrence capability.76

The United States has repeatedly called on China to be more open about its military

modernization and has repeatedly sought open militarytomilitary defence contacts to

manage their relations. The Obama Administrations new defense strategy states with

respect to China:

Over the long term, Chinas emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the

U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in

peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship.

However, the growth of Chinas military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its

strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region.77

76Quoted by Brendan Nicholson, Chinese top brass bags US influence in the region, The Australian, October

31, 2012.77

Ibid., 2.


26/32

26

The U.S. and China currently have nearly sixty mechanisms for coordination and

collaboration on strategic policy issues. The Obama Administration has sought to manage its

relations with China through new mechanisms such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue

S&ED) and Consultations on AsiaPacific Affairs. Military representatives are included bothas part of the S&ED process and the separate Strategic Security Dialogue within the S&ED.

The Pentagon consistently has sought to keep channels of communication open with China

through various bilateral dialogue mechanisms. A review of three key mechanisms

Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA)

and the Special Policy Dialogue/Defense Policy Coordination Talks (SPD/DPCT)

demonstrates that it has been very difficult to isolate purely militarytomilitary contacts

from their political and strategic settings. For example, continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan

and U.S. intelligence gathering in Chinas EEZ have caused China to suspend scheduled

meetings in protest.

What does a balance sheet on the performance of these multilateral mechanisms tell us

about U.S.China military relations? On the plus side the following accomplishments can be

noted: (1) exchange visits by highlevel defense officials (defense ministers and chiefs of

defense forces); (2) regular Defense Consultation Talks; (3) continuing working level

discussions under the MMCA (4) agreement on the 7point consensus;78

(5) no serious naval

incidents since the 2009 USNS Impeccable affair; (6) continuing exchange visits by senior

officers (7) the initiation of a Strategic Security Dialogue as part of the S&ED process; (8)

agreement to hold meetings between Coast Guards and (9) agreement on a new working

group to draft principles establishing a framework for militarytomilitary cooperation.79

On the negative side it must be noted first that U.S.China militarytomilitary contacts have

gone through cycles of cooperation and suspension. In 2009 a U.S. diplomatic cable

reported a senior PLA official as observing, the defense relationship lags behind other

aspects of the overall bilateral relationship and it is often caught in a vicious cycle of

78The 7 point consensus was reached in October 2009 between Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and by

General Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Committee, in Washington, D.C. in October 2009.

79Carlyle A. Thayer, Enhancing Transparency? U.S.China MilitarytoMilitary Contacts and Strategic

Dialogues, Presentation to International Conference on The U.S. and China in Regional Security: Implications

for Asia and Europe, cosponsored by Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politik and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin,Federal Republic of Germany, June 1819, 2012, 2122.


27/32

27

progress and suspension.80

The senior PLA official noted that with two exceptions all

other suspensions in militarytomilitary relations were the result of U.S. arms sales to

Taiwan. Shirley Kan notes that China promotes repeated cycles of suspending contacts and

then leverages the timing of their resumption.81

U.S. defense officials view this as thepoliticization of militarytomilitary contacts.

Second, since militarytomilitary contacts were first initiated in 1980 until the present, the

U.S. and China have only been able to reach one militarytomilitary agreement, the MMCA.

An evaluation of the health of this agreement is not good. A senior PLA official offered this

evaluation, We signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 1998

but over the past 11 years the mechanism failed to play an effective role.82

A review of the

MMCA written by the U.S. principal negotiator, argued that it remains the only miltomil

agreement between these two nations and is of only limited effectiveness because it is held

hostage by China over U.S. actions in carrying out our stated obligations under the Taiwan

Relations Act.83

Third, there is not much evidence that militarytomilitary contacts and strategic dialogue

have reduced strategic mistrust and raised transparency.84 Chinese officials repeatedly raise

three obstacles to bilateral defence cooperation in their discussions with the United

States: continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. intelligence gathering in Chinas Exclusive

Economic Zone, and FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act restrictions on military

interaction with the PLA. U.S. policy towards the South China Sea policy represents an

addition major irritant.

In weighing up the pluses and negatives in the bilateral relationship the bottom line is that

despite the deficits the United States and China will persist in engaging with each other.

802009 U.S.China Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), Session 1: MilitarytoMilitary Relations, U.S. Embassy,

Beijing, July 1, 2009.

81Shirley A. Kan, U.S.China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research

Service, February 10, 2012, 4.

822009 U.S.China Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) Small Group Session, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, July 1, 2009.

83Bruce Lemkin, U.S.Taiwan Relations Are No Threat to China, Defense News, November 8, 2012. Lemkin

was Deputy Under Secretary of the U.S. Air Force (International Affairs) from 200310

84See the sobering review offered by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.China Strategic

Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series No. 4, Washington, DC: The John L. Thornton ChinaCenter at Brookings, March 2012, 733.


28/32

28

Both sides understand that militarytomilitary contacts are a critical component of bilateral

engagement. Without such interaction there is a risk that mistrust between the two

militaries could spill over and have a major negative impact on bilateral relations in general.

It is likely that strategic mistrust will persist through lack of greater transparency andmilitarytomilitary relations will continue to exhibit elements of cooperation and

contention. When incidents and disputes arise between the two militaries, the civilian

leadership will intervene, as it has in the past, to reset bilateral relations.

(b) Current Multilateral Initiatives

The East Asian security architecture is currently evolving as a result of the expansion of the

East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2011 to include the United States and Russian Federation. At the

2011 EAS informal leaders retreat, sixteen of its eighteen members raised concerns over

maritime security issues. China was the only country to argue that the EAS was not an

appropriate venue for such discussions. Nevertheless, the EAS Chairs concluding summary

noted that maritime security has been established as a legitimate agenda item.

For the new regional security architecture to be effective there must be some streamlining

of policy advice to the EAS from other multilateral arrangements currently considering

maritime security issues. There are a number of overlapping arrangements under the

auspices of ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum charged with maritime security and

South China Sea issues:

ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM). The ASEAN Defence Ministers met for thefirst time in May 2006 and began the process of institutionalizing defence cooperation

on a regional basis. The ASEAN Defence Ministers are now sectoral members of the

ASEAN Political Security Council established under ASEANs Charter. The ADMM brought

under its umbrella what had been separate informal meetings of the ASEAN service

chiefs (army, navy and air and military intelligence) that had been conducted outside the

official ASEAN framework. At the 4th ADMM in May 2010, in a first step to address

maritime security issues, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol

their maritime boundaries.

ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting (ANCM). Maritime security issues fall under the purview ofthe ANCM. The prospect of practical cooperation among ASEAN navies does not appear


29/32

29

good. At the ANCM5 in Vietnam in 2011 there was disagreement over a number of

issues including the formal name of the meeting, how often it should meet, conducting

joint patrols, and a proposal for an ASEAN communications protocol when navy ships

passed each other at sea.

ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). The ADMM was expanded inOctober 2010 to include eight of ASEANs dialogue partners: Australia, China, India,

Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States. At this meeting it was

agreed that the ADMM Plus would meet every three years with the second meeting

scheduled for Brunei in 2013. It has since been decided that the ADMM Plus will now

meet every two years from 2013. The inaugural ADMM Plus meeting set up the ASEAN

Defence Seniors Meeting Plus (ADSOM Plus) and five Expert Working Groups (maritime

security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping, military medicine and

counterterrorism).

ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security (EWG on MS). The EWG on MSis scheduled to meet twice a year and report its deliberations to the ADSOM Plus. The

ADMM Plus EWG on MS is cochaired by Malaysia and Australia. It held its first meeting

in Perth in July 2011 and discussed information sharing. The terms of reference for EWG

on MS were approved in October 2011. In February 2012, Malaysia hosted the second

EWG on MS that focused on specific initiatives for practical cooperation and capacity

building. Malaysia tabled a Concept Paper on establishing a mechanism to support the

work and implement the decisions of the EWG on MS.

ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF). ASEAN established the AMF in 2010 under the terms ofthe ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint.

85The second meeting of the AMF

was held in Thailand in August 2011 and proposed expanding its membership to include

dialogue partners in a separate meeting (AMF Plus). The AMF is focused on a

comprehensive approach to maritime issues and has so far not dealt with South China

Sea issues in detail.86

The AMF held an expanded meeting in 2012 with the inclusion of

the plus eight dialogue partners.

85Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement, May 20, 2010, Point 3.

86Chairs Statement of the 19

thASEAN Summit, Bali, 17 November 2011, Points 1417 (Maritime

Cooperation).


30/32

30

ARF InterSessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on Maritime Security). In2009, the ASEAN Regional Forum established the ARF ISM on MS and later approved its

Work Plan at the at the 44th

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2011.87

The ISM on

Maritime Security focuses on information sharing, capacity building, and training ratherthan practical activities such as South China Sea CBMs.

The evolution of the regional security architecture is at a nascent stage and it is unclear how

an expanded EAS will relate to the already existing multilateral security institutions. On the

one hand, the current evolution of the regional security architecture may be viewed as a

positive development since it brings together all the major actors, including the U.S. and

China at head of state/government level. On the other hand, if China feels that the other

external powers are ganging up on it, the EAS process may become deadlocked. Of the eight

dialogue partners, five are either allies or close strategic partners (U.S., Japan, South Korea,

Australia, New Zealand).

Conclusion

What are the prospects for future cooperation over maritime security and South China Sea

issues? The future security environment of the South China Sea region will be influenced by

five major overlapping trends. These trends contain both stabilizing and destabilizing

elements. The five trends are:

U.S.China strategic rivalry Regional force modernization Increased regional maritime enforcement capabilities Evolution of the regional security architecture ChinaASEAN discussions on the South China Sea

China (and possibly the United States) is undergoing a power shift as a new generation of

leaders takes office. In the shortterm, strategic mistrust will continue to influence their

bilateral relations and any maritime security incident could be viewed as a challenge to the

new leadership. Over the longer term, however, the top leaders of China and the United

87ASEAN Regional Forum, Draft Outline of a Work Plan on Maritime Security: A Template for Discussion, 2

nd

ARF ISM on Maritime Security, Auckland, 2931 March 2010; CoChairs Summary of the Third ARF Inter

Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security, Tokyo, Japan, 1415 February 2011; and 44th AM/PMC/18th ARF,Indonesia 2011, Chairs Statement, 18

thASEAN Regional Forum, 23 July 2011, Bali, Indonesia, Point 41.


31/32

31

States can be expected to meet and set objectives and priorities for their relationship. Major

power relations will continue to reflect contention and cooperation.

Chinese and regional force modernization programs, coupled with the increase in maritime

enforcement capabilities by China and regional states, represent potentially destabilising

trends. Chinas growing naval power will not eliminate Southeast Asias security dilemma.

The most disturbing trend is Chinas increased reliance on citizen fishing fleets and state

paramilitary forces to concentrate in a disputed area in order to assert Chinese jurisdiction.

Recent joint exercises between the PLAN and CMS/FLEC vessels are particularly unsettling.

Chinese assertiveness has provoked the U.S. to rebalance its force posture and increase its

presence in the South China Sea. The South China Seas contested waters will become

increasingly congested raising the possibility of an accidental mishap.

In the shortterm it is unlikely that the evolving regional security architecture will be able to

effectively manage challenges to maritime security. The ASEANcentric regional security

architecture is an inchoate mixture of multilateral mechanisms with overlapping

responsibilities. ASEAN Defence Ministers have not been particularly proactive in addressing

maritime security issues. The ASEAN Regional Forum can only promote confidencebuilding

measures; preventive diplomacy is barely on the horizon. The ADMM Plus process shows

some signs of progress, but it is proceeding at too slow a pace. It remains to be seen how

the defence ministers will respond to proposals from their Expert Working Groups. The

ADMM Plus must meet annually and report to the EAS to be effective. Since the EAS works

on the basis of consensus, it will take some time before agreement is reached on whether or

how to streamline the regions existing multilateral security institutions. Strategic distrust

between China and the United States is likely to hamstring the EAS and prevent it from

taking effective action.

Finally, ASEANChina discussions on a Code of Conduct appear as elusive as ever. ASEAN and

China are presently focused on implementing the DOC Guidelines. They have yet to initiate a

single cooperative project, and even if they do, there is no guarantee that confidence

building measures will spill over an effect practical measures to address maritime security

issues. Rising Chinese domestic nationalism has become particularly jingoistic and is likely to

scuttle any diplomatic effort that is perceived as undermining Chinas indisputable


32/32

32

sovereignty over the South China Sea. Domestic nationalists have a natural ally in the

PLA.88

In sum, Southeast Asia is ripe for rivalry but not armed conflict due to strategic mistrust

between a rising and increasingly militarily powerful China and a United States committed

to maintaining the present balance of power. These two powers will continue both to

cooperate and contend. Tensions in their relations will be transmitted to Southeast Asia and

pose challenges to ASEAN as its seeks to become a more cohesive and unified political

security community.

The security environment in Southeast Asia will continue to be characterised by intractable

sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, rising resource nationalism, and potentiallydestabilizing regional force modernization programs. As a result, regional sea lanes are set

to become more crowded, contested and vulnerable to armed strife. 89

88Willy Lam, Chinas Hawks in Command, The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2012; Michael Sheridan, Control of

PLA at heart of Chinas power struggle, The Australian, July 2, 2012; David Lague, Reuters, Chinas Hawks

Gaining Sway in South China Sea Dispute, Jakarta Globe, July 26, 2012; Yohanes Sulaiman, China Puts On a

Show of Strength, But OneParty System Showing Weaknesses,Jakarta Globe, August 1, 2012; China military

strength put on display, Sky News, August 2, 2012; and Michael Sainsbury, Hu sets in motion train of

succession, The Weekend Australian, August 45, 2012.

89 Rory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs, Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in IndoPacificAsia (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2011), 3.

Documents

Thayer China's Naval Modernization and U.S. Strategic Rebalancing: Implications for Stability in the South China Sea