T3 B5 Congressional Involvement Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Memos- Notes- Withdrawal Notices- Toensing Article (for Reference- Fair Use) 020

8/14/2019 T3 B5 Congressional Involvement Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Memos- Notes- Withdrawal Notices- Toensing Articl

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Mike HurleyFrom: Warren BassSent: Friday, June 25, 2004 9:24 AMTo: Caroline BarnesCc: Team 3Subject: RE: HELP w /Congress portion of report

This is sort of a strange passageand not terribly accurate. I don't k now how you'd sourcenor whether it's right.The list in the first sentence is seriously off; it omits Kosovo (remember, we fought a war there...), Somalia(another significant U.S. intervention), an d Iraq (Desert Storm was fought in the decade before 9/11, after all), tosay nothing of democratization in the former Soviet sp here, interna tional financial crises, major trade dealsincluding NAFTA, globalization, and serious Indo-Pakistani tensions that almost reached nuclear war.Moreover, the second sentence is inaccurate. It's fine to say terrorism infrequen tly took center stage; it's wron g tosay it was always raised in the context of the C B R N threat.I'd rather do something empirical. Why not say something about ho w terrorism was handled in the parties'platforms, or in the 2000 campaign? A t a minimum, we should be fixing this passage up a bit.

Original MessageFrom: Caroline BarnesSent: Thursday, June 24, 2004 10:14 PMTo: Warren BassSubject: HELP w/Congress portion of reportI think the below is pretty m uch common knowledge, but any thoughts on sources? Need anything you'vegot by 10 am omorrow (Friday) - THX.In the decade before 9/11 other issuesHaiti, Bosnia, Russia, China, Kosovo, NATOenlargement, the Middle East peace process, missile defensewere the leading issues forPresidential discussion and Congressional and public attention on foreign affairs and nationalsecurity. Terrorism infrequently took center stage, and when it did, it was in the context of thechemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat.

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Mike HurleyFrom: Caroline BarnesSent: Thursday, June 24, 2004 12:55 PMTo: Team 5; Team 7; Team 3Subject: Help w/sourcesImportance: High

Hi, all-1need you to point me in the right direction (today, if possible b/c this chapter needs to get tocommissioners tomorrow) to sources for the following paragraph re: Congress. - I'm hoping there are acouple of MFRs (or testimony before the commission) we could cite. The MFRs mentioned in thefootnote appear to support only the last sentence of the paragraph.Thanks!!!

"Fifth, on certain issues actions, or inaction, pointed Congress in a direction that was unhelpful inmeeting threats as they emerged after 9/11. Committees with oversight responsibility for aviationfocused overwhelmingly on airport congestion and economic health of the airlines, not aviation security.[need source from Team 7] Committees with responsibility for INS and the Border Patrol focused onthe southwest border, not on terrorists, [need source from Team 5] Committees responsible fo r SouthAsia spent the decade of the 1990s imposing sanctions on Pakistan, leaving Presidents with littleleverage to alter Pakistan's policies before 9/11. [Team 3?] Committees with responsibility for theDefense Department did not focus on developing military responses to terrorism. [Team 3] AllCommittees found themselves swamped in the minutiae of the budget process, with little time fo rconsideration of longer-term questions, or what many Members past and present told us was the proper

mconduct of oversight. "

[ilHamilton, p. 112; Nunn, Rockefeller memoranda

6/24/2004


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Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Monday, June 14, 2004 1:05 PMTo: Front OfficeCc: Team 3Subject: Please Check your classified email for Team 3's contribution to Congress's role on CT policy

To: Front OfficePlease check your classified email. Team 3 has forwarded to you,attached to a classified email, a memo/compilation of what we'velearned about Congress's involvement with CT policy, inparticular how Congress responded to the al Qaeda threat.Mike

6/14/2004


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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Mem orial Comm issionsSERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Com mission

N N D PROJECT NUM BER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUM BER: 31107WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 42 DO C ID: 31207930COPIES: 1 PAGES: 6

ACCESS RESTjaCI^)_The item iden tified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Congressional Involvement in CT Policy & ...DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2004 DOCUM ENT TYPE: Briefing PaperFROM:TO:SUBJECT: Congressional Involvement in CT Policy

This document has been w ithdrawn for the follow ing reason(s):9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


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Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Monday, June 14, 2004 1:47 PMTo: FrontJDffice; Team 3Subject: Team 3 Memo on Congressional Involvement with CT Policy

Chris,At the attachment, please find Team 3's contribution to the FinalReport section you're drafting on Congress's role in respondingto the al Qaeda threat.We drew these points from our interviews of NSC, DoD, and Stateofficials, as well as directly from docum ents.Mike

6/14/2004


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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Expo sition, Anniversary, and M emorial Com missionsSERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission

NND PROJECT NUM BER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 43 DOC ID: 31207931COPIES: 1 PAGES: 1

RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been w ithdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Congressional Involvement in CT Policy & ...DOCUMENT DA TE: 01/01/2004 DO CUM ENT TYPE: Briefing PaperFROM:TO:SUBJECT: NSC Roadmap Items: Congressional Oversight

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


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MEMORAMDUM

TO: Mike HurleyFROM : Bonnie D. JenkinsDATE: June 14, 2004RE: References to Congress

Form er Secretary o f Defense William Cohen told the commission during both hisinterview and at the hearings, that there was never a mom ent in his entire four years asSecDef that he saw any indication that the President let his personal problems interferewith his decision-making. Immediately after Operation Desert Fox was launched in Iraqon December 15th and 16th 1998, he received a call from Congressman Newt Gingrichwho said the hill was "on fire" and he made reference to "wag the dog." Cohen went to ajoint session of the House and Senate that was closed to the press. Shelton and Tenetwere there as we ll. Cohen spoke for three hours and he said there was no political factorinvolved in the decision to conduct D esert Fox, and that he would put his entirereputation on the line in suppo rt of that position. The action was based on a previousthreat made to Saddam Hussein that if he did not comply with the inspections of hisWM D facilities, the U .S. would conduct strikes.1Former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre told the Commission during hisinterview that approximately 90 minutes before the missiles were to be launched onAugust 20 , 1998, he received a call from Secretary Cohen inform ing him of the imminentstrikes. Ham re had one hou r to place calls to the Majority and Minority leaders in theHouse and Senate, and to the Speaker of the House. H amre relayed the message toCongressional m embers. H e was able to place calls to Senators Lott and Daschle, andCongressman Gingrich. However, Congressman Gephart would not take the call (noreason was given by Hamre).2The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict leda pro gram of training first responders. This program was developed from the 1996 Nun n-Lugar Amendment, titled the "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction." This wasan effort by Senators Nunn during his last 18 months in office to bring the burgeoningW MD domestic threat to the attention to the government, the press, and the people of theUnited States. It was a tremendous drive. The 120 cities initiative was instrumental inkicking off the U.S. domestic preparedness efforts.3

1 Commission interview with William S. Cohen, W ashington, DC, February 5, 2004.2 Commission interview w ith John Hamre, Washington, DC, December 9, 2003 .3 Commission interview with H enry Allen Holmes, Washington DC, November 10, 2003; Comm issioninterview w ith Tom Kuster, Washington, DC, December 9, 2001.


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Afte r th e attack of the USS Cole, Gene ral A nthony Zinni (retired) was called by SenatorJohn Warner, who said he wanted Zinni to testify at the Senate Arms Services Committeeon the incident, and that Warner had asked both Cohen and Franks to also testify, bu tthey would not. Warne r told Zinni the Am erican people ne eded to hear w hat he had tosay and it had to be done imm ediately, bu t that he would be testifying alone and it wouldbe tough. Zinni said, "Fine, I'll do it."4

4 Commission interview with Anthony Zinni, Washington, DC, January 29, 2004.


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Commission Sensitive

Due to the harshness of the sanctions, Con gress decided to grant the White House theability to request waivers for some of the restrictions in hopes of prov iding relief forPakistan policy.10Inderfurth agreed that the Clinton adm inistration now could have requested a waiver ofcertain provisions of the sanctions.11 But with nuclear weapons at issue, it would havebeen an arduous task, Inderfurth said, to approach a pro-India Congress to lift Pakistanisanctions.12 [CK-Let's discuss waiver p rovisions. Th ere are some inconsistencies andI'm interested in your opinion.-SHA]The Bush State Department faced the same obstacle. Both Powell and his deputy,Richard A rmitage, said that to approach Congress on alleviating sanctions, the Pakistaniswould have had to take steps on a number of issues, including pressing the Taliban onBin Ladin, and that the Pakistanis had not done so before 9/11.13Congress and the Northern AllianceAssistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Christina Rocca, then acongressional foreign policy staffer, said that in 2000 and into early 2001 , certainmembers of Congress and their staffers informally debated providing money to theNorthern Alliance, but decided fairly quickly not to. The consensus was that the group'sleader, Ahmad Shah Masoud, was a horrible person involved in drug trafficking an dhuman rights violations, and he was not capable of governing the country. 14

10 Rocca intervie w (January 29, 2004). Tw o pieces of legislation, know n and Brownback I and IIwere passed following the nuclear tests giving the President the authority to waive parts of the Glenn,Symington and Pressler amendm ents.1' Inderfurth interview (February 18, 2004).12 Inderfurth interview (February 18, 2004).13 Powell Interview (January 21,2004). Arm itage interview (January 12 , 2004).14 Rocca interview (January 29,2004).

Com mission Sensitive


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Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Sunday, June 13, 20044:11 PMTo: Team 3Subject: Congressional Oversight

Teammies:Just a reminder: On Monday (June 14) we need to meet to pool what wehave on how Congress played into the CTpolicy story.We promised Chris K. that we'd send him our comments byMondayafternoon.Please review your materials (MFRs, documents, etc.) for anything thatcould shed some light on this. The info wesend to Chris should besourced/footnoted.Thanks,Mike

6/13/2004


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Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Friday, June 11, 2004 1:55 PMTo: Team 3Subject: FW: Congressional Oversight

Teammies:One last word on this. If you have a paragraph or two towrite up, i.e., if you have some information (document,MFR, etc.) that sheds some light on this, please do so, andinclude a footnote or two.We'll pool everything that Team 3 has.That should be of some assistance to Chris.Mike

Original MessageFrom: Mike HurleySent: Friday, June 11, 2004 1:51 PMTo: Team 3Subject: FW: Congressional OversightTeammies:Chris just told me that we could give him what we have on congressionaloversight/involvement on our issues by Monday.He asked that we meet the Monday deadline though. He does not want tolet it slip any further because he has to start drafting something on thisvery soon.Let's meet Monday morning, pool what we know, and then send in a pageor so.Thanks,Mike

Original MessageFrom: Mike HurleySent: Friday, June 11, 2004 1:33 PMTo: Team 3

6/11/2004


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Victor ia Toens ing

Oversee? More Like Overlook"We want to under-stand w hat went wrong,"claims Sept. 11 commis-sion V i c e Chairman L eeH. Hamilton. Really?Then why, after conduct-ing numerous open hear-ings at which its memberssubjected the FBI, theCIA, the State, Justiceand Defense depart-ments, and even the fo r -mer mayor of New Yorkand his lieutenants to public interroga-tions of what each could have doneto prevent the attacks, has the commis-sion failed to call a single member ofCongress to answer those questions inpublic?I know the good and the bad of con-gressional oversight for the intelligencecommunity-I was chief counsel fo r theSenate Select Committee on Intelli-gence under Chairman Barry Goldwa-ter (R-A riz.).I have also, as a lawyer inprivate practice, attempted to get theintelligence committees to addressproblems. Ingeneral, Congress hasper-formed poorly.When I was chief counsel, I was privyto the fact that some of the senatorswho complained the loudest about exec-utive branch conduct were the oneswho had not come to the briefings orbothered to read the materials. Therewas a docket sheet. W e knew who hadentered the secure space to review doc-uments. Times have not changed. ThePost reports that when Congress debat-ed the Iraq war, a 92-page assessmentofthe "alleged weapons of mass destruc-tion" was "available to any member wh oshowed up" in the vault. "[0]nly a fewever did." Forty-six senators forced theCIA to declassify a section of a House-Senate repo rt regarding Saudi A rabia'spossible ties to the events ofSept. 11,but most did not read it. The klieg lightsof TV cameras feel cozier than the dark

SEPT. 11COMMSSONERSHEAR TESTIMONYMAY 19/BYRCHARDDREW-ASSOCIATEDPRESS

vaults containing crucial informationabout intelligence gathering.Funding for the intelligence comm u-nity was neglected during the 1990s; itsbudget was cut every year from 1990 to1995, then remained flat. Twenty-fivepercent of the CIA's personnel were cut,and fore ign stations were closed as Con-gress spent the "peace dividend" onprojects, which unlike classified spend-ing, could be publicly touted to constitu-ents. As CIA Director George Tenettold the Sept. 11 commission, "[W ]ewere not hiring new analysts, emphasiz-ing the importance of expertise or giv-inganalysts the tools they needed."O n Sept. 11,2001, the FBI's comput-er system used 1980s technology. TheNational Security A dministration, thespying agency that is supposed to behigh-tech because its mission isto "listen in" on private communica-tions worldwide, could no t communi-cate efficiently with its own em ployees.It had 68 separate e-mail systems.W here was congressional oversight fo rthese agencies?A major problem is that congression-al intelligence oversight tends to be pas-sive. The committees hear what theagencies tell them. Rarely do they actaggressively on this volunteered in-formation. A ccording to The Post, eachyear since he became director of centralintelligence in 1997, Tenet had listedOsama bin Laden as one of the "top

three threats facing the United States,"and had briefed the intelligence com-mittees on that threat in detail in closedsessions. Congress did not take the is-sue to the next step, fo r example, de-manding to know whether bin Ladencould attack in the United States, and ifso , how."Reform" also jeopardized effectiveoversight. In an effort to prevent mem -bers from remaining too long on thetwo intelligence committees and thusbecoming tools of the intelligence com-munity, Congress put in place eight-year term limits. Just when a lawmakermastered the tough learning curve re -quired by intelligence committee work,he or she was booted out. But Congressdid not limit what it should have: thenumber of other committees that in-telligence o versight me mbers couldserve on, so they could have time tospend on the varied and intricate issues.Even one of the Sept. 11 commis-sion's own mem bers is aware of Con-gress's failure. Commissioner TimothyRoemer, a former House m ember, hasadmitted that congressional oversight"has almost gone away." He attributedthis lack to Congress being too busywith the "budget and keeping up withdaily events." Four of the 10 commis-sioners have served in Congress. Theyshould not use that relationship toshield former colleagues. If the commis-sion sincerely wants to find out "whatwent wrong," Congress must be a partof that inquiry. The commission hasproclaimed that it isnot a congressionalbody, it should prove the validity of thatstatement. .Bring members of Con-gress's oversight bodies before a publichearing and ask what they could havedone to prevent Sept. 11.T he wr i t e r , a f ound i ng partner o fd iGenova & T o e n s i n g , is a s e n i o rfelloivfor th e Founda t i o n fo r Defen seo f Dem o c r a c i e s .


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Mike HurleyFrom: Chris KojmSent: Thursday, June 10, 2004 6:49 PMTo: Team LeadersCc: Front Office; Kevin Scheid; Gordon LedermanSubject: Congressional Oversight

Team Leaders -I look forward to your short pieces on Congressional o versight w ithin your area of responsibility. Iwelcome your contributions on Congressional activity in the pre-1998 period, after the 1998Embassy bombings, in the Millenium/Cole bombing period, and then the 2001 Summer of Threat.This can be a couple of pages, or even a few paragraphs are welcome. Please try and get me yourcontributions NLT Sunday June 13th.

hearings, including thebalance between CT-related andnon-CT issues, other ways in which oversight was conducted, major legislation passed, major legislation considered, your views on the quality of work produced.

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T3 B5 Congressional Involvement Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Memos- Notes- Withdrawal Notices- Toensing Article (for Reference- Fair Use) 020