T3 B5 Analysis 1 of 2 Fdr- Emails and Memos Re Policy Recommendations and Withdrawal Notice Re Policy Findings 012

8/14/2019 T3 B5 Analysis 1 of 2 Fdr- Emails and Memos Re Policy Recommendations and Withdrawal Notice Re Policy Findin

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Mike HurleyFrom:Sent:To:Subject:

Daniel BymanSunday, February 15, 2004 4:19 PMMike HurleyPolicy recommendations

Policymmendation ThougMike ,I've tried to do some hard "big" thinking and have come up with a few thoughts (attached).Even the better ideas are rough, some are just placeholders, and I'm sure a few are wrong.That said, I've tried to grab on to some of the more interesting things we've talkedabout. I tried to group it by different headings, so we can put some of our better smallideas under a bigger framework.I wasn't sure if you wanted this shared with the team, or if you wanted to get a bunch ofideas together and take your own cut. Happy to discuss or discard or expand ... let meknow, and I'll go to whatever next step you want.Dan


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Unclassified: Commission SensitiveSome Policy Recommendations ... Again (Byman)

Al-Qa'ida and other radical Islamist groups pose a long-term challenge to U.S.security, even if many of the current cadre are killed, arrested, or otherwise disrupted inthe coming years. To meet this challenge, the United States needs to take on terrorism aswell as terrorists, fundamentally reorient its foreign policy, change governmentinstitutions, and improve domestic capabilities. A proper comparison is the remaking ofU.S. institutions and foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War, as the UnitedStates adjusted to meet the Soviet struggle.Combating the sources of terrorism

Combating the sources of terrorism, as opposed to disrupting existing cells, isoften seen as unrealistic or as someone else's job. However, long-term success requiresdecreasing the number of terrorist recruits as well as stopping existing cells.

One essential effort is to "drain the swamps" where terrorists breed. This shouldhave both an economic and a coercive component. Although the relationship betweenterrorism andpoverty maybe inverse, terrorism overall - particularly Islamist radicalism- appears at least somewhat correlated with poor governance. True reform, includingpolitical reform aswell as economic changes, are essential. Successful political reform,however, requires developing the rule of law, building social and legal institutions,fostering education, and otherwise creating a society where democracy can flourish otherwise elections will fail or produce illiberal results. So far, U.S. spending treats theseissues as an afterthought, a process that can be prodded but not driven. Massive increasesin spending would make this far more possible.

The war of ideas is also vital. As has been recently noted, U.S. public diplomacyis poor. However, the effort must not simply be to portray the United States as friendlyto Islam. It must also directly engage in the battle of ideas, seizing on many aspects ofthe Islamist agenda that are highly unpopular. Publicizing the misrule of the Taliban isone obvious place to begin.Much of this influence campaign should also be covert. The United States shouldcovertly fund anti-Islamist voices, particularly in the Muslim religious establishment, andbuild up secular educational institutions. Open U.S. support would discredit theseinitiatives.

Draining the swamp also has a strong coercive element. The United States shoulddevelop its own special operations forces and improve its counterinsurgency capability.Much of al-Qa'ida's rule is serving as a quartermaster for Islamist insurgencies. Endingal-Qa'ida and similar groups requires stopping these movements. This involves both astrong U.S. capability and, perhaps more important, helping allies build their capability.Bringing Policy Back In

The creation of specialized counterterrorism shops with all governmentdepartments and agencies was valuable when terrorism was a relatively minor concern.Even after September 11, many policy decisions are made by policymakers focusinglargely on a geographic region with little concern for terrorism. Several steps would helpreintegrate foreign policy back into counterterrorism deliberations:

Unclassified: Commission Sensitive


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Every Assistant Secretary in the State Department and every combatantcommander should have counterterrorism be an express responsibility. Whendecisions are made over important regional issues (e.g. military basing in Iraq orArab-Israeli peace talks) the counterterrorism perspective must be present withinthe regional bureaus as well as from the more technical counterterrorism shops,such as S/CT at State or SOLIC at the Pentagon.

The CSG or a similar body should have a subgroup that meets on foreign policy,discussing such key issues as Arab-Israeli tensions, Kashmir, policy towardIndonesia, and so on. These issues are often seen independently of their impacton terrorism.Counterterrorism policy must also take on issues beyond its traditional confines.

One example is helping combat the sources of terrorism. Supporting peace in Algeria,for example, was long considered a strategically irrelevant (if rather sweet) U.S. policyinitiative. Given the large (and perhaps increasing) number of Algeria jihadists joiningal-Qa'ida, reducing their anger is vital.

Counterterrorism policy may also involve changing what we demand of allies.For example, many radicals in Europe appear to be motivated by a lack of assimilationand economic opportunities. Thus, how European states treat their Muslim minorities isa U.S. national security problem, and demands U.S. attention.

Counterterrorism policy may also require changing the relative importance ofvarious allies. Although NATO allies remain essential for some aspects of U.S. security,new allies such as Jordan or Kenya may prove even more important in the war onterrorism. Similarly, the battlegrounds may be Indonesia, Nigeria, or other places wherethe U.S. government is not currently well-postured for the struggle.New and Stronger Capabilities Abroad

Several U.S. institutions, notably the U.S. military and the State Department, arenot well-positioned for a long-term struggle against terrorism.

Currently, defense officials are debating whether special operations forces shouldbe "doorkickers"(i.e. direct action units), as reportedly favored by SecretaryRumsfeld, or should serve their original role as liaison forces to help othergovernments fight terrorism and insurgency while collecting additionalintelligence. This is a false choice. Both functions are vital for effectivecounterterrorism, and far more attention is needed to given special operationsforces additional personnel and capabilities.

The State Department also is in catch-up mode. Wemust revive U.S. Embassies(and Stations, and so on) in countries that are less vital for standard U.S. foreignpolicy concerns but essential for counterterrorism. Africa is an important, butoften neglected, terrorist nexus. A greater presence in potential hubs such asNigeria and Indonesia is also vital.



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A Deeper Domestic PoolThe United States has a wealth of untapped resources that would be highly useful

in the struggle against terrorism. Most important, as a nation of immigrants, the UnitedStates has numerous citizens and residents who speak the world's languages and know itscultures. Individuals from countries where terrorism is a problem should be aggressivelyrecruited into intelligence and law enforcement circles.

The United States should also seek to use its universities and other institutions todevelop a broader pool of knowledge. Academia neglects both terrorism and area studiesof countries where terrorism is prevalent (e.g. Asia outside of Japan and China, Pakistan,Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and others), and September 11 did little to shake this. Money togive students incentives to take language classes and learn more about the politics andcultures of these countries would help expand overall knowledge. A similar effort wasdone for the study of Russian and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Budgeting for terrorism also should change. Current procedures make it difficultto determine how much is being spent on terrorism overall and what that money is usedfor. A detailed terrorism "crosscut" - one that every agency must take seriously - is anobvious first step. Once weknow how much is being spent, we need to fundamentallychange how we budget for terrorism:

Fighting the war on terrorism through supplementals carries a host of problems.Long-term training and staffing are hard to plan when the money is given throughemergency a supplemental, making it difficult to build capacity.

Government spending on counterterrorism should also gobeyond the one-yearbudget cycle. Again, government agencies must plan years ahead to develop thenecessary capabilities, building systems and training personnel for contingenciesthat may occur a decade from now or more.

Long-Term Bureaucratic ReformsMeeting the Soviet threat required creating new institutions such as the CIA and

revamping bureaucratic procedures to change how government agencies coordinate theiractivities. Terrorism poses a radically different challenge, requiring similar sweepingchanges. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, small changes to increase CIA-FBI integration (e.g. the creation of TTIC). Far more along these lines needs to be done.Examples include:

Better integration between CIAparamilitary units and U.S. special operationsforces. Improved FBI-CIA integration, making TTIC far stronger and able to collectinformation on its own and task other collectors. The creation of a "terrorism shop" in every embassy that tries to collect on and

analyze the terrorism problem in that country and serves as a focal point fo r thisissue.



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Mike HurleyFrom: Philip ZelikowSent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 9:33 PMTo: Team 3Cc: Chris Kojm; ChairsSubject: Policy Recommendations

In thinking about recommendations, on e theme that Lee, Chris, and I have been mentioning is to thinkabout bringing foreign policy back into the war on terror. Though written from the perspective of theDemocratic party's dilemmas, George Packer has an ably written and suggestive article in the current(Feb 16-23) issue of The New Yorker, on page 100.Philip

2/13/2004


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Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 5:09 PMTo: Team 3; Bonnie JenkinsCc: Chris Kojm; Dan MarcusSubject: Recommendations

TeamSmates: In our meeting with the front office yesterday, Philip critiqued therecommendations we sent forward. I think his criticism on a number of our proposals was valid. In particular, we proposed establishing a couple of commissions toimplement or follow through on some of our proposals. Suchsuggestions won't fly. Our task is to come upwith stronger recommendations. In that regard, Philip offered a few points to consider in thinkingabout recommendations:

* Ingeneral, weshould "think big."* What does the government really need to do that it's not doingnow?* Do we have a government that hasadapted to the new world?(that has adapted to the post-Cold War world?)

Please try to come upwith some newrecommendations with theabove guidance in mind. We don't need a boatload ofrecommendations, just a couple. Please send me your thoughtswithin the next few days.

Mike

2/12/2004


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Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 12:37PMTo: Daniel BymanCc: Mike HurleySubject: From Mike Hurley

Hi Dan:Philip went over staff statement guidance with us yesterday.Gave us some decent direction.He also looked at the recommendations we sent forward andshredded them. Did the demolition job in his usual "genial"style. Though his critique was probably valid.I'd like to speak to you about how we can comeup with strongerrecommendations. Philip's commentswere pretty good but weneed to build on them. Basically, hewants us to "think bigger" interms of what we recommend.Mike

2/12/2004


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Mike HurleyFrom: Chris KojmSent: Friday, February 06, 2004 1:21 PMTo: Team LeadersCc: Front OfficeSubject: Recommendations

To All - Just a reminder. As Philip mentioned at last week's staff meeting, we do want to get from youyour best shot at the 3 top policy issues in your respective areas. Please ge t those to the front office byOOB Wednesday, February 11th.Also, below, on a related topic is the Homeland Security Committee's Minority Report (by Rep. JimTurner, a report criticized, in turn, by Chairman Chris Cox.) The report is mostly a checklist ofrecommendations. Basically, the purpose here is to m ake sure you are up to speed on some of the keypoints of policy discussion in your respective areas. Whether the report is helpful with respect to yourthinking in response to the paragraph above ~ that's your call.

America at Risk: The State of Homeland Security [PDF]

2/6/2004


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Mike HurleyFrom: Mike HurleySent: Tuesday, February 10, 2004 6:41 PMTo: Front OfficeCc: Team 3Subject: Team 3 Policy Recommendations

Philip,Per your request, please find Team 3's top three policy recommendationsat attachment.Mike

2/10/2004


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Top Policy RecommendationsTeamsCounterterrorism Policy9/11 Commission

Our most important and urgent policy recommendationsare:i. Overhaulthe current national security structure to better fight thethreat of transnational terrorism, both at home and abroad.

Eliminate the Office of Homeland Security within the White House androll its responsibilities into the National Security Council, which has beentasked with handling domestic defenses as far back as 1947. Thedistinction between the HSC and the NSC is artificial when al-Qa'idatargets us both overseas and at home. Our national security structureshould recognize this and place one person in charge of coordinating bothoffensive and defensive counterterrorist measures.

Designate a deputy national security adviser for both counterterrorismand homeland security. The historical record makes it clear that only theWhite House can coordinate the interagency process. Asimple structureleading up to one accountable and empowered official can harness thework of agencies, rationalize the USG's overall efforts, and make thedifficult trade-offssuch as deciding whether to fund such widely variedprograms as monitoring foreign students, establishing CTICs, orexpanding translation capabilities.The new deputy national security adviser should have the following toolsat his or her disposal:

o operational authorityo a significant and highly skilled staff with a deep policy backgroundo a generous budgeto the rank of assistant to the presidento a chain of command reporting to the national security adviserand,as appropriate, the presidento regular meetings with the president and the ability to walk in onhim or hero a full seat at meetings of the Deputies Committee, PrincipalsCommittee, and National Security Council,as a principal ratherthan a staffero cross-cutting budgetary control over all agencies workingon CT andhomeland security issueso a mandate to strengthen CTcapabilities within federal agencies


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o a mandate to adapt or transform USG institutions to respond to theal-Qa'ida threat, including ensuring long-term investment inlanguage skills, area expertise, consideration of the effect of U.S.diplomacy on anti-Americanism, and the likeo authority to order officials from other agencies to do things, withthe only avenue of appeal for the department's head to go to thepresident.o a standing supplemental fund of several billion dollars that can beimmediately applied to the most pressing CT and homelandsecurity issues, to be overseen by the deputy national securityadviser. (This would avoid the inefficient bureaucratic fighting thattook place over the Predator in spring and summer of 2001.) Thisfund should not be limited by the restrictions placed on normalsupplementals, such as the insistence that such funds cannot beused to hire staff. Create a new position at the NSC: a national coordinator for WMD issues,

empowered with a full DC and PCseat on their issues and the ability to callDCs and PCs. The national coordinator would have a larger staff to matchand the ability to make recommendations to the new deputy nationalsecurity adviser about budget issues. The national coordinator would alsobe charged with integrating counterproliferation efforts abroad with thehomeland security side of W MD terrorism, including radiation screeningat ports, consequence management, and so on. Give the DCI actual strategic management over the IntelligenceCommunity, including the ability to shift funds and resources from onecomponent of the CIA to another, as well as from on e agency in the 1C to

another. Amend the National Security Act of 1947 to make the attorney general, thehomeland security secretary, and the FBIdirector full members of theNational Security Council. Their deputies should also join the Deputies'Committee; if departments feel that is too burdensome, they shouldappoint an additional deputy for counterterrorism and homeland securityaffairs. Task the PFIAB (orestablish a commission oflimited duration) to identifythe "next Afghanistan"that is, focus on which countries are most likely to

become terrorist sanctuaries and recommend steps to buttress them.Particular focus should be given to regions in Africa and Southeast Asiawith large Muslim populations, porous borders, social support systems,and central governments that are weak, inept, or corrupt.


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2. Create, fund, and implement a massive and effective effort to winthe war of ideas against those peddling the fanaticism that underlay9/11.Over the long term, Islamist terrorism of global reach willbe defeated only whenits ideas lose their appeal within the Arab and Muslim worlds. Before 9/11, we letU BL and other fanatics posture as heroes for standing up to America; after 9/11,America's image has been tarnished further still. Toprevail in the battle forhearts and minds, we must counter the moral and ideological support for binLadinism, much as we ultimately defeated Soviet communism by bringingRussians and other Europeans to realize that Marxism itself was bankrupt.Today, rising anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds is not justdisagreeable but dangerous.U BL wants to trigger a clash ofcivilizations; wedare not let him get his wish.Wemust craft our strategy around a sophisticated understanding of al-Qa'ida'sobjectives and philosophy. We must then identify states at risk, bolsterdemocratic and moderate Muslim elements, and work cooperatively with front-line states near terrorist sanctuaries. Moreover, we must ensure that our effortsto support states helping us in the fight against terrorism does not come toovershadow our values-driven quest for democracy, open societies, andprosperity around the globe.The State Department should have the lead on an overt public diplomacy effort;the CIA should reinforced those efforts with a worldwide covert action campaign,using cutting-edge psychological techniques to influence public opinion andutilizing a broad range of media outlets to influence Arabs and Muslims to rejectUBL's vision ofjihad. We should identify voices of moderation in the Muslimworld and support them, and we should give robust financial assistance to foreignintelligence services that assist us.The president, executive-branch principals, and the congressional leadershipmust also engage in ongoing and frank efforts to remind the American public thatwe are engaged in what President Kennedy called "a long twilight struggle"adifficult and protracted campaign that will require steady nerves and sacrifice.Asthe memory of 9/11 fades, our leadership must relentlessly stress the messagethat terrorism ofglobal reach did not emerge overnight and will not disappearovernight. Wemust refuse to take shelter in comforting denial and recognize thatour country will be attacked again. Only candid leadership can sustain publicattention and support for a long-term struggle.Given the importance of the battle of ideas and the excruciating difficulty wehavehad thus far in waging it, we recommend establishing a blue-ribbon commissionwith a six-month mandate to offer urgent recommendations on public diplomacyand covert action to support it.


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3. Move with the urgency befitting wartime to control "loose nukes"and inadequately guarded CBRN material, including spendingbillionsof dollars more to bring security procedures in the former SovietUnion andPakistanup to the standards we expect for our ownnuclear materials.4. Produce a comprehensive national strategy for combatingterrorism that inventories every capability that the United States andits allies have, draws on all instruments of national and allied power,anddirects these capabilities in afocused andlong-term approachdesigned to eliminate terrorism as athreat to our democratic way oflife.

Each relevantagency mustdesign a long-termplan to posture themselvesagainst terrorism and present it to the official accountable for the strategy.They should note resource changes, training initiatives,hiring moves, etc.The purposewould be to develop a truly, long-term plan,coordinatedacross agencies, fo r fighting terrorism.


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Mike HurleyFrom: Bonnie JenkinsSent: Monday, February 09, 2004 4:26 PMTo: Warren Bass; Team 3Subject: RE: Anothe r rec?

Warren,I am not a stalwart budget person, but I like the idea and suggested that as one of our policy recom mendations. Iassume this budget would be able to cover a number of different CT related activities (I am unfamiliar with thedetails of Clarke's suggestion). For example, would it include paying for joint CT operations that may not be withinthe existing budget of any of the agencies involved (here I think of the UAVs), or would it be "softer" type CTinstruments, such those that support diplomatic efforts?I think the suggestion deserves som e thought.Best,Bonnie

Original MessageFrom: Warren BassSent: Monday, February 09, 2004 3:51 PMTo: Team 3Subject: Another rec?In session III, Clarke suggested having the Commission endorse an integrated CTbudget with someone incharge of it.Budget stalwartsLen, Mike, Dan, etc.does this make sense?Just a thought,Warren

^

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Second andmost important, the Bush administration should focus m oreon A l Qaeda, the only terrorist group that poses an imminent,undeterrable danger. New instability in Afghanistan and the continuedspread of jihadist ideology in the Islamic world mean that the prospectsfor another 9/11 are growing. America has been fortunate in capturingsome high-ranking terrorists, but we still lack a comprehensive programto deal with a growing global insurgency and the long-term threat ofradical Islam, for which intelligence and law enforcement will notsuffice. Rogu e regimes are bad for the world andworse for the people forced tolive under them. Over time, w e can use diplomacy including coercion

and deterrence to bring abou t change. For now , however, the direstthreat to Am ericans comes not from the mu llahs of Tehran, but from themass-murderers of Al Q aeda.Daniel Benjamin, a fellow at the Center fo r Strategic and International Studies, an d Steven Simo n, ananalyst at the Rand Corporation, are authors of "The Age of Sacred Terror."


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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Mem orial Comm issionsSERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission

N N D PROJECT NUM BER: 52100 FOIA CASE NU MB ER: 31107WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 21 DOC ID: 31207909COPIES: 1 PAGES: 10

The item identified below has been w ithdrawn from this file:FOLDER TITLE: Analysis & Recomm endations [Iof2]DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2004 DOC UM ENT TYPE: Briefing PaperFROM:TO:SUBJECT: Policy Findings

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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T3 B5 Analysis 1 of 2 Fdr- Emails and Memos Re Policy Recommendations and Withdrawal Notice Re Policy Findings 012