Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict Global Implications of a Regional Power

8/6/2019 Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict Global Implications of a Regional Power

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Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Global Implications of a Regional PowerCycleAuthor(s): Daniel S. GellerSource: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.24, No. 1, Power Cycle Theory and Global Politics. Cycle de pouvoir et politique mondiale(Jan., 2003), pp. 137-150Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601335

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InternationalPolitical ScienceReview 2003), Vol 24, No. 1, 137-150

I P SER| Ri SPNuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict:Global Implications of a Regional Power Cycle

DANIEL S. GELLER

ABSTRACr.his articleexaminesthe implicationsof possessionof nuclearweaponsfor war between India and Pakistan.Existing iteraturederivedfromus-Soviet interactionduringthe Cold Warmayhave little relevanceto conflicts between developing nations with small and vulnerablenuclear arsenals.Applyingpower cycletheorywithin a regionalcontext,this study explores possible global ramifications of a South Asian nucleararms race. Power cycle theory suggests that Indo-Pakistani militarycompetition may accelerate shifts in the relative power trendsthroughout Asia, causing abrupt changes in future foreign policyexpectations and security that could ultimately affect the nuclearprograms of both Russia and the United States.Keywords: Indo-Pakistani conflict * Nuclear weapons * Power cycletheory * War

There is an extensive but largely speculative literature dealing with the effects ofnuclear weapons possession on the escalation of international conflict. However,most of this derives from us-Soviet interaction during the Cold War and may havelittle relevance to conflicts between developing nations with small and vulnerablenuclear arsenals. With a common border, extremely short aircraft or missile flighttimes, and a simmering territorial dispute, the incentives for preemptive nuclearattack or escalation from conventional to nuclear war suggest that the us-Sovietexperience with successful deterrence may not be replicated by India and Pakistan.In addition, power cycle theory (Doran, 1971, 1991) has recently been appliedin a regional context (see the studies by Parasilitiand by Kumar,this issue). Althoughthis theory was originally designed to explain and predict the war behavior ofmajor powers at the apex of the global hierarchy, its potential relevance inregional dynamics may help account for conflict among states at lower levels ofinternational status, wealth, and material capabilities.0192-5121 (2003/01) 24:1, 137-150; 028622 ? 2003 International Political Science AssociationSAGEPublications (London, Thousand Oaks, CAand New Delhi)


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International oliticalScienceReview 4(1)Power cycle theory strongly emphasizes a system-wideperspective. Each statecompares itself to its principal rivals collectively and simultaneously. India, in itsentanglement with Pakistan, for example, is also preoccupied with China.Pakistan, in dealing with India, seeks continual support from China. China, indealing with India, uses Pakistan as its "securityprot6g6"and ally.The dyadic Indo-Pakistani military competition, according to power cycle theory, cannot findresolution but in the dynamic systemic equilibrium among China, India, andPakistan.Structural change within the South Asian region is important not only topolitical stabilitywithin the region but globally as well. Power cycle theory assertsthat structural change at the regional level is almost alwaysmore volatile than atthe global level (as confirmed empirically by Kumar and by Parasiliti). If thisvolatility occurs in the context of a highly militarized setting featuring a nuclear

arms race between Pakistan and India, the region will have difficulty adapting tothis structural change peacefully, with consequences that go beyond South Asia.Hence, regional structural volatility can be as damaging to the dynamic globalequilibrium as abrupt, unanticipated structural change within the centralinternational systemitself.Nuclear Proliferation and World Order

What will be the effect of a nuclear weapons capability (Ahmed, 1999; Ganguly,1999) on the probability of future conflict between India and Pakistan? Thesestates have fought multiple warsin their brief post-colonial historysince 1947, andtheir relations have been punctuated by sporadic, low-levelviolent interactions. InMayof 1998, India detonated five underground nuclear explosions (adding to theone it set off in 1974). Within a matter of days, Pakistanresponded with six of itsown underground nuclear tests (Diamond, 1998: 22; Synnott, 1999: 54-56). Bothstates have nuclear-capable strike aircraft and ballistic missiles with rangesencompassing virtuallyall of the opposing state's territory.Will the possession ofnuclear weapons inhibit military engagement between these enduring rivals, orwill they be employed in a catastrophic conflict producing effects not witnessedsince the end of World WarII? This question as well as other issues related to theMay1998 nuclear tests are explored in this study.There is a belief that, since 1945, nuclear weapons have been the principalfactor determining both the distribution of power and the dynamics of conflictinteraction in the international system. Others believe that power is quiteindependent of nuclear capability and is more accurately identified witheconomics and conventional military capability. It is generally assumed thatnuclear weaponry provides a militaryand psychological advantage in some conflictsituations. Unarguably, nuclear technology has produced remarkable extensionsin the destructive power of modern weapons, and methods for their delivery totargets have improved over the last six decades with regard to speed, range, andaccuracy. Snyder and Diesing (1977: 450), however, maintain that the primaryeffect of the possession of nuclear weapons on the behavior of Cold War nuclearadversaries was to create new constraints on the ultimate range of their coercivetactics-a result of the extraordinaryincrease in the interval between the value ofthe interests at stake in a conflict and the potential costs of war. Before the adventof nuclear weapons, this interval was comparativelysmall and states could morereadily accept the risk of war or engage in war to avoid the loss of a contested

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GELLER:NuclearWeapons& theIndo-PakistaniConflictvalue. In contrast, for states with even small numbers of nuclear weapons, it is farmore difficult to conceive of an issue worth incurring a high risk of nuclear war,much less the cost of actually fighting one.Most theories of war and lesser forms of international conflict rest on rationalchoice. To cite but a few, Morgenthau ([1948], 1967), Blainey (1973), Waltz(1979), Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and Gilpin (1981) argue that rationalcalculations guide decisions of war and peace. Power cycle theory (Doran, 1991,2000b) holds that foreign policy-making is rational most of the time, but that atcritical points in a state's history important elements of nonrationality may disturbthe international political equilibrium. As Geller and Singer (1998: 31) explain,"Nonrational models, whether focusing on psychological variables ororganizational interests and routines, maintain that decisions are frequentlydistorted by systematic perceptual, cognitive, or bureaucratic biases." War betweennuclear powers may yield outcomes that were rational for neither winner nor loser.For two decades, Kenneth Waltz (1981, 1990, 1993, 1995) has argued that thegradual spread of nuclear weapons will promote peace and reinforce internationalstability.Using the same logic, Osgood and Tucker (1967: 125) suggest that it wasprecisely the magnitude of the consequences associated with nuclear war thataccount for the two most notable aspects of Cold War superpower disputeinteraction: the confinement of warfare to localized, non-nuclear forms ofcombat; and the development, diffusion, and exploitation of tactics involvingforce short of war.In serious international disputes, states generally are confronted with theproblem of winning the dispute (or settling it acceptably) while avoiding war.AsSnyder and Diesing (1977: 450-451) argue, bargaining in interstate crises usuallyentails an explicit or implicit threat (war) to destroy the common interest (peace)so as to coerce an opponent and win the contested value. Simultaneously, thereare constraints on the reckless or extreme use of coercive tactics: decision-makersare aware of the dual risks-that the momentum of events may take the disputebeyond control, or that in the coercive maneuvering both sides may irrevocablycommit to an unwanted war. If confrontations of this type involve two or morenuclear-armed states, the potential costs of miscalculation rise sharply.As an example of those costs, crude estimates of the effects of various nuclearexchanges between India and Pakistan were calculated some years ago. Bracken(1976: 3-4)-using 1985 population projections-calculates 850,000 promptfatalities and 2.65 million total fatalities (within one month) from blast, untreatedthermal injuries, radiation, and lack of food and shelter (out of a total populationof 8,175,000) following an attack on Karachi, Pakistan with four 20-kiloton fissionweapons airburst at optimum altitudes. The result of a single one-megatonairburst over the same city would produce approximately 1.6 million promptfatalities. Bracken's calculations also show that airbursts of four 20-kiloton fissionweapons over Calcutta, India (total population [1985 est.] 13,450,000) wouldproduce roughly 1,000,000 prompt fatalities.In another study, Naim (1987) examines possible effects of different types ofnuclear strikes in an Indo-Pakistani war inclusive of: limited attacks on militarycenters; simultaneous strikes against military and economic targets; counter-citystrikes; and symbolic attacks. Using population projections (1990 estimates) forLahore (4,599,900) and Delhi (9,118,600), Naim calculates the long-term fatalitiesfrom single one-megaton airbursts over these cities as 4,500,000 and 9,100,000respectively-close to the entire populations of both urban centers.

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140 International oliticalScienceReview 4(1)Crisiscase studies have shown that, in the extreme tension of a dispute betweennuclear powers, decision-makers tend toward vacillation in both strategy andtactics as they attempt to contend with the contrary pressures of gaining orprotecting contested values while simultaneously avoiding war (e.g., Betts, 1987:19-20). The desire to win the dispute requires a demonstration of resolve and awillingness to fight, whereas the fear of war demands caution in the creation ofcommitments and the use of coercive tactics.Obviously, n confrontations betweennuclear states, the strain of blending these conflicting objectives is considerable(e.g., Bundy and Blight, 1987/88).Because nuclear weapons have not altered the values at stake in interstatedisputes (or the desire to avoid political loss) but rather have increased theimmediate costs of war, then in a severe conflict between nuclear powers thedecision-maker's dilemma is to construct a strategy to secure political interests

through coercive actions that raise the possibility of war without pushing the riskto an extreme level. Some analysts argue that the solutions to this problem entail:(1) a more cautious approach toward nuclear rivals (a reluctance among nuclear-armed states to challenge one another even in areas of ambiguous interest)because of the potential costs of miscalculation; and (2) an increase in the"threshold of provocation" providing greater area of coercive maneuver in thethreat, display, and limited use of force (Osgood and Tucker, 1967: 144-145;Snyder and Diesing, 1977: 451).Krepon (1998) draws precisely this conclusion with regard to recent eventsinvolving India and Pakistanover Kashmir:WhenIndiaandPakistan arriedout nuclear ests astMay,hawkishtrategistsin both countriespronounced hatovert,offsettingnuclearcapabilitieswouldhelp stabilize their troubled relationship. Across . . . [the] terrain dividingKashmir,owever,he dividends f nucleardeterrenceare hardto find:DuringJuly and August-peak infiltration season-Pakistani and Indian troopsexchangedmore fire thanduringtheirlast two warscombined.Nucleartestshavegivenfreerrein to unconventionalmilitary ptions (Krepon,1998:A23).

According to this thesis, hostile interaction between nuclear powers under thishigher provocation threshold can range from verbal threats and warnings, tomilitary deployments and displays, to the use of force short of war.If this logic iscorrect, then despite the history of military interaction between India andPakistanand their ongoing territorialdispute over Kashmir,the introduction of anuclear capabilityon both sides may serve to prevent another war for this dyad. Infact, Rosen (1977), Feldman (1982) and van Creveld (1993) make similararguments regarding nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, although Sagan(1995: 48) describes this as the "proliferation optimist" position derived from thelogic of rational deterrence theory.Alternatively, escalatory processes from low-level conflict or incentives fornuclear preemption in a severe crisis might lead these states into a nuclearexchange. Conflict escalation tendencies are prominent in this dyad.For example,Leng (2000: 256-257) produces evidence on conflict interaction across four Indo-Pakistaniconfrontations which indicates that "each successive crisis escalated to amore violent conclusion than the one that preceded it." Along similar lines,Kupchan (1998: 75) notes that: "The proliferation of weapons technology is alsoraising the stakes of instability in developing regions. The recent nuclear tests inIndia and Pakistan underscore the potential for dangerous arms racing among


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GELLER:NuclearWeapons& theIndo-PakistaniConflictdeveloping states." Glaser and Kaufmann (1998/99: 205, fn.12) assert that smallnuclear forces are vulnerable to first strikesby nuclear opponents and thereby mayprovide incentives for war initiation and undermine deterrence.

As Huth and Russett (1988: 34) emphasize, the literature about whethernuclear weapons have enhanced or diminished the likelihood of conflict in thecontemporary world is both "vast and largely speculative." Quester (1977), Waltz(1981, 1990, 1993, 1995), Intriligator and Brito (1981), Bueno de Mesquita andRiker (1982), and Mearsheimer (1990) have argued that the spread of secure,second-strike nuclear capabilities may reduce the utility of war-bothconventional and nuclear-as an instrument of foreign policy and therebyminimize if not eliminate the probability of war between nuclear powers. Theempirical validity of this proposition remains to be established. Moreover, Indiaand Pakistan have small nuclear forces that do not satisfy the assumption of"secure, second-strike nuclear capabilities," and they have not yet elaborated adeterrence doctrine in part because China's nuclear status and foreign policyrelationships both within and outside the region have greatly complicated thestrategic equation.

The Nuclear Capabilities of India and PakistanOpen source estimates of the size of the current Indian and Pakistani nuclearweapons inventories vary enormously. In a sophisticated analysis, Jones (2001:8-13) states that India easily could have accumulated enough plutonium (Pu)from dedicated facilities (the CIRUSnd Dhruva reactors) for the construction ofabout 133 nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The projected annual rate ofincrease from these facilities is about seven weapons annually.Jones also estimatesthat Pakistan may have constructed about 43 nuclear weapons by 2000, primarilyusing highly enriched uranium (HEU) from its gas centrifuge enrichment facilities.Combining the fissile material (plutonium) from the Khushab heavy waterreactor that began operation in 1998, Pakistan's projected annual rate of nuclearweapons production, using both uranium and plutonium, is also aboutseven weapons per year. Given probable supplies of weapons-grade materials (year2000) of 485 kilograms of plutonium for India and 830 kilograms of highlyenriched uranium for Pakistan, these nuclear arsenal numbers are roughly withinthe boundaries of estimated requirements-4.5 kilograms of Pu and 18 kilogramsof HEU-for the production of a 20-kiloton fission weapon at low levels oftechnology.Both India and Pakistan have aircraft and ballistic missiles for nuclear weaponsdelivery capable of reaching virtually all of the opposing nation's territory. Indiapossesses 16 Sukhoi 30K/MK multirole fighters (combat radius of 1,500kilometers), 63 MiG-29fighters (combat radius of 630 kilometers), 84Jaguar S(I)deep-penetration strike aircraft (combat radius with external fuel tanks of 1,408kilometers), 135 MiG-27 ground attack aircraft (combat radius with external fueltanks of 540 kilometers), and 40 Mirage 2000H fighters (combat radius withexternal fuel tanks of 1,852 kilometers)-all of which are nuclear-capable. Theseaircraft have the range to effectively cover Pakistan. Pakistani nuclear-capableaircraft are limited to 32 F-16A/B fighters (combat radius with external fuel tanksof 1,371 kilometers), although 122 Mirage fighter-bombers (combat radius of 500kilometers) could be adapted to nuclear missions (IIss, 2001: 164, 168; Sidhu,1998: 23-24, 26).

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International oliticalScienceReview 4(1)The only nuclear-capable ballistic missile in the current Indian arsenal is thePrithvi,a single-stage, liquid-propellant, mobile, short-rangemissile. There are twooperational versions of the Prithvi, an SS-150 (single warhead 1,000 kilogrampayload) ballistic missile with a range of 150 kilometers and an SS-250 (singlewarhead 500 kilogram payload) ballistic missile with a 250 kilometer range. Athird version (SS-350) with a range of 350 kilometers is in development. Thecurrent size of the Prithvi force is estimated to be about 100 missiles. In addition,India has under development (since 1979) intermediate-range, surface-based,solid- and liquid-propellant, single warhead ballistic missiles called Agnis. TheAgni II (or Agni-plus) is a two-stage missile using solid fuel in both stages. It isbelieved that the warhead section carries a 1,000 kilogram payload. The range ofthe Agni II is estimated to be between 2,000 and 2,500 kilometers. An Agni III,which has not yet been tested, is a three-stage missile using solid fuel in the first

two stages and liquid fuel in the third stage. It is projected to have a range of 3,000to 3,500 kilometers and to carry a 500 kilogram payload. India is working on atleast two indigenously produced variants of a submarine-launched missile, theDanush, a naval version of the Prithvi ballistic missile, and the Sagarika, asubmarine-launched short-rangecruise missile. India is also readyto introduce theshort-range Russian Klub cruise missile to its new Kilo-class submarines (ane's1997, 1998; Sidhu, 1998: 24, 27; IIss, 2000: 158;Jones, 2001: 18-23).Pakistan has a number of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in its inventory. Forbattlefield use, Pakistan has developed the Hatf-1 (500 kilogram payload with a100 kilometer range) and Hatf-2 (500 kilogram payload with a 300 kilometerrange). In the late 1980s, China transferred M-ll (CSS-7/DF-11) short-range,road-mobile, solid-propellant, single warhead (800 kilogram payload) ballisticmissiles to Pakistan. The Hatf-2 is believed to be based on the Chinese M-ll. In1997, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf-3, a missile with a 500 kilogram payload and arange of 800 kilometers. The Hatf-3 can reach important strategic installationsand militarytargets in western and central India. Pakistan also has nuclear-capableballistic missiles with North Korean lineage. In April 1998, Pakistan conducted atest of a ballistic missile that Pakistani authorities called the Ghauri;however, it isbelieved that the missile is actuallya North Korean Nodong-2. The Nodong-2 is anintermediate-range, ground-mobile, liquid-propellant, single warhead (700kilogram payload) ballistic missile that can cover a distance of roughly 1,500kilometers. This missile can reach all major Indian cities, nuclear facilities, andstrategic installations. Pakistan is also reported to be working on derivatives of theNorth Korean Taepodong 1 (2,000 kilometer range) and Taepodong 2 (3,000kilometer range) ballistic missiles, both with 1,000 kilogram payloads. The size ofthe Pakistani missile force is estimated at approximately 12 Ghauris, a combinednumber of 18 Hatf-ls and Hatf-2s, and 30 Hatf-3s (Jane's, 1997, 1998; Cheema,2000: 167-168; IIss,2000: 158;Jones, 2001: 18-23).W.P.S.Sidhu (2000) describes India's nuclear use doctrine as follows:

India developed a de facto doctrine of deterrence ... based on the premisethat Indiawouldfirstuse itsconventional apabilityo countermilitaryhreatsfrom either China or Pakistan. f these countries threatenedor launchedanuclearattack,however,ndiawouldrespondwith tsownnuclearweapons n asecond strike .... This doctrine evolved in the absence of clear instructionsfrom political leaders regarding India's nuclear arsenal and against thebackdrop of a series of nuclear crises between India and Pakistan in the 1980s.

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GELLER:uclearWeapons& theIndo-PakistaniConflictConsequently, like most professional militaries, the Indian military took theinitiative in the early 1980s to develop options to deal with a nuclear scenario.These options included plans for a conventional preventive war that wouldtarget the adversary'snuclear weapon capability. India's own nuclear weaponcapability, which was in place by the late 1980s, was not, however, fullyintegrated into conventional war plans because civilian leaders and nucleartechnocrats opposed giving control of nuclear weapons to the armed forces.The resultant no-first-use doctrine reflects these command and controlarrangements (Sidhu, 2000: 157).

In a speech delivered to the Indian Parliament on December 15, 1998, PrimeMinister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared that his government "will maintain thedeployment of nuclear weapons, continue development of ballistic missiles andreserve the right to produce more bomb-grade material." This declaration markedthe first public statement that India may have deployed nuclear weapons. ThePrime Minister noted that he was asserting India's sovereign rights in rejecting anyexternally proposed restraints on weapons deployment, missile development, andproduction of weapons-grade fissile material, and that such strategic defensedecisions are not subjects open to negotiation. A senior Indian officialcommenting on the remarks by the Prime Minister stated that "India's short-rangePrithvi missile ... [is] a battlefield weapon ready for nuclear duty" (Cooper, 1998:A37).Cheema (2000) discusses Pakistan's nuclear doctrine of use as follows:

Pakistan has not formally announced a nuclear doctrine. In practice, however,it is pursuing a doctrine of minimum deterrence and conventional defense.Pakistan's plans to miniaturize nuclear warheads, develop several types ofballistic missiles, assemble a small nuclear force, and address the asymmetricstrategic equilibrium with India by relying on nuclear weapons, suggest theoutline of an emerging nuclear doctrine .... Pakistaniofficials have not statedexplicitly whether nuclear weapons would be used to deter a conventionalmilitary attack by India, to overcome early setbacks in a conventional war, tocounteract an emerging strategic disadvantage, or as weapons of last resort.Pakistan's rejection of India's suggested bilateral "no-nuclear-first-use"pledgesuggests, however, that nuclear weapons are integral to its defense anddeterrent doctrine .... Pakistan'spolitical and militaryleaders are increasinglymindful of the need to maintain a constant vigil to ward off preemptive air ormissile attacks by India either to decapitate Pakistan's command and controlsystems or to destroy its nuclear forces .... The proximity of potentialcombatants, little early warning time, and a lack of strategic depth mightinduce Pakistan to alert its nuclear forces to prevent their destruction if a crisisdevelops. The situation injects an element of instability in the deterrentrelationship between India and Pakistan .... Pakistan's political and militaryleaders might opt for preemption rather than be the victims of an Indianpreemptive attack (Cheema, 2000: 175-178).

Estimated flight times from Indian and Pakistani missile launch sites to Islamabadand New Delhi are about 4-5 minutes.There exist a number of speculative but plausible avenues along which anuclear war between India and Pakistan might begin. For example, one scenarioinvolves escalation, beginning with the use of conventional military forces in a

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International oliticalScienceReview 4(1)struggle over Kashmir. Such a military engagement could escalate to the nuclearlevel if one side found itself losing the war on the conventional battlefield. Theintroduction of battlefield nuclear weapons could be a tactic for manipulating riskor be pursued as a last, desperate means of avoiding defeat. A second possibilityinvolves crisis-generated preemption. In the case of a crisis, one side, fearing afirst-strikeby the other during the confrontation, launches a preemptive nuclearattack on its opponent's nuclear forces thereby hoping to minimize damage toitself. A third scenario involves preventivewar.A "bolt out of the blue" attackcouldbe initiated by either side not as the result of some provocation or crisis,but ratheras the outcome of an expectation that war will inevitably occur at some futuredate, and, given a calculation that war now-under current circumstances-ispreferable to war later under circumstances which may be less favorable, adecision is made to strikeagainst the opponent's ungenerated forces.

It should be noted that all of these war scenarios (escalation, crisis-generatedpreemptive attack, and preventive war) were considered plausible, to varyingdegrees, by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War.Moreover,neither India nor Pakistan has yet instituted secure command and control systemsfor their nuclear forces. Under such conditions, the possibilityof the accidental orunauthorized use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.Of course, these are merely possibilities. However, Sagan (1995) notes areported incident in 1990 that is strikingly similar to the outlines suggested inthese scenarios:[I]t has been widelyreportedthat us intelligenceagenciesbelieved Pakistanassembled its nuclearweaponsand began to load them onto alertedF-16aircraftduring the 1990 crisis over Kashmir;Soviet intelligence agenciesreportedly lsopickedup similarsignalsof initialIndiannuclearweaponsalertactivities uring hatcrisis(Sagan,1995:122).

Sagan also discusses preventivewarin the context of India and Pakistan:The "betternow than later"ogicof preventivewar s likely o be under seriousconsiderationwheneveran existingnuclearpowersees a rivaldevelopinganuclear arsenal .... [R]apid development of a Pakistani operational nucleararsenal could create a temporary nuclear superiority over India .... Militarybiasesin favor of preventivewarhave been highlyinfluential n the past inPakistan1995:62-63).

(For the power cycle theory position against preventive war,see Doran's article inthis issue.)Whether the joint nuclear capability possessed by India and Pakistan serves todeter conventional and nuclear conflicts between these states-or if it onlyincreases the amount of destruction in a future war to unprecedented levels-remains to be determined.The Power Cycle and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict

As Doran (this issue) argues, "whethera state has yet to develop economically or isalready developed, whether a state is an importer of security or a great power,whether a state primarilyviews the system through a regional or a global lens, ...it is traversing a 'cycle of relative power and role' vis-a-visa system of states,both regionally and globally." Moreover, according to power cycle theory, a

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GELLER:uclearWeapons& theIndo-PakistaniConflictstate's "expectations and anxieties regarding its future security and foreignpolicy role" are based on the future trend of change (tangent) on its powercycle in that system or subsystem. But there are four critical points of non-linearityon the cycle, representing abrupt and massive structural change in the system,where the state must suddenly confront an altered perception of futuresecurity and foreign policy expectations. Power cycle theory argues further thatthese critical points represent times when the probability of the state'sinvolvement in major war is greatest (Doran, 1971, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1991; Doranand Parsons, 1980). Kumar's empirical study in this issue traces the power cycletrajectories of India and Pakistan in the South Asian regional subsystem(including China), and his findings show a remarkable association between theoccurrence of critical points and the onset of major war among the members ofthe system.

Here it is asked whether the presence of nuclear weapons in the South Asiansubregion affects the assumptions and applicability of power cycle theory. Doran(1991: 24-25) poses the generic question "Ispower cycle analysis relevant to thenuclear age?" and argues strongly in the affirmative because power cycle theoryidentifies critical intervals when "the structural controls on force use disappear,when the rational becomes the nonrational in foreign policy decision making."Theoretically, then, "because the power cycle explanation for major war deals withthe collapse of structural certainty and inversion of normal force expectations, it isunusually well-placed to account for major war in a world of armed nuclear states."As Doran sees it, "this explanation for how and when the rational can become henonrational is the only circumstance in the modern world where war usingthermonuclear weapons can become thinkable."As already argued here, the presence of nuclear weapons and increasingly long-range and accurate missiles in a setting where most of the players do not havesecond-strike capability against each other means that the incentives for surpriseattack increase. According to power cycle theory, at critical points on the regionalpower cycles of India, China, and Pakistan, the stakes are much higher than in thepast and the cost of political uncertainty in terms of foreign policy decision-making is potentially much more grave. Since, as both the Kumar and Parasilitiarticles demonstrate, the periodicity of the regional power cycles is shorter and theamplitude is higher, military-strategicvolatility is likely to be even greater at theregional level than at the global level. Thus power cycle theory warns that nuclearweapons make adjustment to structural change in the South Asian subsystemmuch more difficult.Will that structural change include India as a new superpower? Tammen et al.(2000: 176, 178) make the case that "India will be a significant factor in theinternational system if its internal growth dynamic continues." India currently hasthe fifth largest economy in the world, and it has not yet experienced acceleratedgrowth rates as in China. But India's middle class is "larger than the entireworking class of the United States,"and "it has more scientists and engineers thanany country but the United States." According to power cycle theory,notwithstanding these aspects of India's internal growth dynamic, its relativepower trajectory (both regionally and in the great power system) will depend aswell on the growth rates of other states (the denominator of the relative powerratio). Moreover, such a structural change involving India's relative power wouldbe accompanied by major structural shifts involving China and other states. Inpower cycle theory, structural change creates expectations, and inverted

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International oliticalScienceReview 4(1)expectations, that will require adjustments by many governments both regionallyand globally (Doran, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2000a).Doran (this issue) contends that, according to power cycle theory, a "dynamicequilibrium" is necessary "to ensure security in the midst of so much structuralchange" and with such lethal weaponry as exists today in the South Asiansubsystem:

This dynamicequilibriumdoes not just relyon the flat "balanceof power"chessboardof alliance behaviorsuch as that betweenPakistanand China orbetween India and Russia.A dynamicequilibrium nternaland external toSouthAsia must take into account the movementup and down the powercyclesof each state and the impactsuch movementhas on the foreign policyrole each government is attempting to play .... While defending territorialsecurity, an ordermanagement nternaland external to South Asiaarrangefor such adjustment nd adaptation n terms of foreign policyrole? (Doran,this issue:44).In the concept of "dynamicequilibrium," the system-widenature of power cycletheory is paramount. In this view, the India-Pakistan dyad achieves its fulleststrategic interpretabilityonly in the context of the inclusion of China. The nucleararms race between Pakistan and India is catalyzed on both sides by therelationship of each country to China.Hence, developments associated with the India-Pakistan dyad are reciprocallyrelated to China. Indeed, power cycle theory suggests that changes in thedistributional shares of the total capability pool among these three states couldhave important consequences for South Asia, Asia, and beyond. For example,China and India have fought one war (in 1962) and are perceived by each other tobe a security threat. Pakistan has received militaryand technological support fromChina in preparation for its conflicts with India. A nuclear arms race betweenIndia and Pakistan leading to an expansion in the Indian nuclear arsenal will beviewed as a major threat to China's security and could result in additionalincrements to the Chinese nuclear stockpile. An expansion in Chinese nuclearcapability would be viewed as undermining Russian security and could wellprovoke a Russianresponse in decisions involving the size of its nuclear arsenal. IfRussia decides to maintain intact a larger proportion of its nuclear stockpile, thiscould have serious negative effects on the United States and its efforts to reducethe numbers of both American and Russian nuclear weapons. Of perhaps equalimportance, an increase in India's share of the Asian capability pool may moveChina to the first inflection point on its power cycle-a point associated withinternational conflict and war.In sum, Indo-Pakistani military competition may produce shifts in thedistribution of capabilities throughout Asia-pushing China through a criticalpoint in its power cycle-and may ultimately affect the nuclear programs of bothRussia and the United States.

ConclusionThe eleven nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May of 1998demonstrated a nuclear weapons capacityfor two states that have fought multiplewars since 1947. Both nations have nuclear-capable strike aircraft and ballisticmissiles with ranges encompassing virtuallyall of the opposing state's territory.If

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GELLER:uclearWeapons& theIndo-PakistaniConflictthese weapons are used in a future conflict between these countries, they willproduce a level and type of destruction not witnessed since the end of WorldWarII.As Siverson and Miller (1993) note, little systematic quantitative research hasbeen done on the effects of nuclear weapons possession for dyadic-level conflictinteraction. In one of the only large-scale quantitative studies on the subject(Geller, 1990), an analysis conducted on the 393 militarized disputes thatoccurred between 1946 and 1976, utilizing Correlates of War Project data,concluded that conflict escalation probabilities are significantly affected by thedistribution of nuclear capabilities. The findings in that study pertaining toescalation patterns between nuclear states were consistent with the "competitiverisk-taking" theses of Kahn (1962, 1965), Schelling (1960, 1966), Osgood andTucker (1967), and Snyder and Diesing (1977). They indicated an actual increasein the provocation threshold for war and an expansion in the use of coercivetactics-threats, military displays, and force short of war-for achieving politicalobjectives in nuclear disputes.Both the military engagement of May-July 1999 between India and Pakistanover Kashmir and the crisis of December 2001 to June 2002 after the terroristattack on the Indian Parliament mirrored the conflict escalation pattern fornuclear-armed states. Specifically, both sides initiated troop mobilizations andgeneral military alerts, coupled with the evacuation of civilians from border-areavillages. However, the outcome of such confrontations for India and Pakistan maynot follow the pattern established by other nuclear dyads. Factors are present inthis dyad that are largely absent between other nuclear-armed antagonists and thatmake the escalation to war more probable (Geller and Singer, 1998: 27-28).Among these elements are the presence of a contiguous border between Indiaand Pakistan, a history of rivalry including multiple wars, and an ongoingterritorial dispute. Such factors increase the likelihood that a future Indo-Pakistaniconfrontation will turn violent and that the violence will escalate to warirrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons.Moreover, power cycle theory suggests that the implications of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race may transcend the relationship of these two states.Among the possible consequences are a growing mutual security threat betweenIndia and China, the passage of China through a critical point in its power cyclefollowed by an increased probability of international conflict, and cascadingpressure on the size of the Chinese, Russian, and American nuclear arsenals. Insum, Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition is likely to have dangerous ramificationson a global scale.

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150 International oliticalScienceReview 4(1)BiographicalNoteDANIELS. GELLERs Professor of Political Science at the University of Mississippiand a consultant with the us Department of State. He has written on such subjectsas nuclear weapons and the escalation of interstate crises, conventional capabilitybalances and the outbreak of war,and the power status of states and patterns ofinternational conflict. His latest book, coauthored withJ. David Singer, is Nationsat War:A ScientificStudy of International Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 1998).ADDRESS:Department of Political Science, Universityof Mississippi,University,MS38677-1848, USA email: [email protected]].

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Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict Global Implications of a Regional Power