Rethinking Indo-pakistani Nuclear Relations

8/2/2019 Rethinking Indo-pakistani Nuclear Relations

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Rethinking Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations: Condemned to Nuclear Confrontation?Author(s): Mario E. CarranzaReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 6 (Jun., 1996), pp. 561-573Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645791 .

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RETHINKINGNDO-PAKISTANINUCLEARRELATIONSCondemnedoNuclearConfrontation?Mario . CarranzaOnAugust 3, 1994, peakingt a rally nthePakistani-heldpart fKashmir,ormerrimeMinister awaz Sharif aid: "I can con-firm akistan ossessestheatomicbomb," dding hat n Indian ttack nPakistan ould triggera nuclear olocausts both ountriesossessatomicbombs."'Althoughharif's tatementasquickly enied yhimselfndthePakistani overnment,he ncident ighlightedhedangers f thepresentIndo-Pakistaniuclearmpasse.Can Indiaand Pakistan emain ndeclarednuclearpowers ndefinitely?oes thenew internationaltrategic nviron-mentmake ndian nd Pakistani roliferationecisionsnevitable,ron the

contrary,oes itcreate hepossibilityfa peaceful ndenduring esolutionof theirdispute?Can an Indo-Pakistaniuclear rms control egimebedecoupled romhe ssueofKashmir? nsweringhese uestionss impor-tant odesign soundnonproliferationtrategyoward outhAsia.Both ndia nd Pakistanre believed o have the apabilityoproduce nddeliver uclearweapons nshort otice.2Accordingoa recent eport,heyare in theprocess fminiaturizingheir uclearwarheads o make them itMario E. Carranza s a Political Scientist pecializingn nuclearproliferationnd regionalecuritynSouthAsiaand LatinAmerica.Thisarticles a revised ndupdated ersion f a paperpresentedt thepanel, RecentResearchn Nationalism,oreignPolicy, ndPublicOpinion," 3rdAnnual onferencen SouthAsia,Universityf Wisconsin-Madison,November 994. The author sgratefuloLloyd . Rudolph,MarvinG. Weinbaum,andSteveJackson orhelpfulommentsn an earlier raft.

? 1996byThe Regents f theUniversityfCalifornia1. See "Pakistanis Rebuked n A-BombRemark," ew York imes, 5 August 994,p.A7.2. It s estimatedhat y the nd of 1995 ndiahad 425 kg of weapons radeplutoniumree

fromnon-proliferationontrols, noughfor 85 nuclearweapons.See David Albright,ransBerkhout,nd WilliamWalker,WorldnventoryfPlutoniumnd Highly nrichedUranium1992 Oxford: IPRI and Oxford niversityress, 993),pp. 160-61. On the ther and, aki-stan sbelieved o have ufficientighlynriched raniumoproduce etween 5 and 25 nuclearweapons ina relativelyhort imeframe."ee Leonard . Spector nd MarkG. McDonough,561


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562 ASIAN URVEY,VOL. XXXVI, O. 6, JUNE 996into heir allisticmissiles.3f currentrends ontinue,n the absence of ameaningful ilateral r regionalnon-proliferationegime, he next ndo-Pakistani risismaywell escalate o the nuclearevel, withdevastatingf-fects n both ountries' opulations,onsideringheproximityf both oun-tries'major ities o thecommon order.This essay arguesthat he changes n the internationalystem roughtaboutby the nd of theCold War willeventuallyompel ndiaand Pakistanin the direction f a nuclear ettlementnd that hey an achieveprogresstowarddenuclearizationven without comprehensiveesolution f theKashmir ispute. he article onsists f three ections. he first onsidersboth ountries' ncentivesnd disincentiveso "go nuclear" fter he ColdWar. The second sectiondiscusses he conventional isdomon the ndo-Pakistani uclear ompetitionnd theKashmir ispute nd argues hat re-gional nuclear rmscontrol egime an be decoupledfrom he atter. hefinal ection uts ll the pieces together,nd considershe mplicationsfbreaking he link betweenKashmir nd the nuclear ssue forU.S. non-proliferationolicy oward outhAsia.

Incentivesnd Disincentivesto "Go Nuclear"Countriesmake hedecision o"gonuclear"whenmotivationsonvergewithcapabilities,nd ncentivesutweigh isincentives.he end oftheCold Warhas affectedhe econd quation. n some cases (e.g., SouthAfrica), here-gional threats o national ecurity ave disappeared,hus hanging hebal-ance between ncentivesnddisincentivesnd eading countryoforgo henuclearweaponoption. n thecase of SouthAsia, theregional ourcesofinsecurityemain, utthedramatic hanges n thetransregionalndglobal

strategicnvironmentsince he ndoftheColdWar are more ropitiousora peaceful nd enduring esolutionf the ndo-Pakistaniivalryhan n thepast.Both theU.S. and Russia have disengagedhemselves rom outhAsia.Sino-Russian,.S.-Russian,nd Sino-U.S.relationsrepredominantlyoop-erative, o the"bigthree" re not ikely o riskrenewed onfrontationoprotectheir ormerouthAsian allies andthe atter an no longer layoffonesuperpowergainst he ther. mericannd Russian trategicistancingfrom heregionmake tmoredifficultor he maller tates o seek outsidesupportgainstndia, hus eprivingew Delhi of theCold War rgumentowithEvan S. Medeiros, racking uclearProliferation: Guide n Maps and Charts, 995(Washington,.C.: Carnegie ndowmentor nternationaleace, 1995), p. 97.3. Leonard pector, ersonal ommunication.


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MARIO . CARRANZA563legitimizets militaryredominancever the region nd creating goldenopportunityor ndia tomendfenceswith ts smaller eighbors.As Sino-Indian elationsmproven the 1990s, ndia's argumentsorre-jecting n Indo-Pakistaniuclear rms ontrol egime ecome ess convinc-ing. India and China signed four significantonfidence-buildingorderagreementsnSeptember 993 andChina upportshe outhAsianAssocia-tion orRegionalCooperationSAARC). If bilateralelationsontinue o m-prove,China's negative ecurity ssurances o members f a prospectivenuclearweapon-freeone in SouthAsia might ecome credible or ndia,particularlyfChinawithdraws uclearweaponsfrom ibet and suspendsmilitaryid to Pakistan,hus ncreasingheprospectsor definiteettlementof theSino-Indianorder ispute nd a nuclear rms ontrol egime n SouthAsia. As China becomesmore ngaged n a globalcooperative ecurity e-gime e.g., f t oins theMissileTechnology ontrol egime) t will have toimpose imits n thesale of advancedmilitaryechnologyo Pakistan.nspite f ts ambivalent oreign olicybehavioradopting ggressive olicieswhilediplomaticallyngagingts neighbors), hina s arguablymore nter-ested nconsolidatingts "economicmiracle" han npursuing xpansionistgoals initssurroundingreas.AlthoughheTaiwan ssue remains nsolved,Chinahasagreed o begin dialoguewith everalASEAN countriesver hedisputed pratlyslandsnthe outhChinaSea, and snegotiatinghereduc-tionofmilitaryorces ndconfidence-buildingeasuresn its border reaswith the Russian Federation, azakhstan, yrgystan,nd Tajikistan.AsChinabecomes full ialogue artnerfASEAN,itcould ign imilaronfi-dence-buildinggreements ith ts Southeast sianneighbors.4In thebroader sianpicture, apan, ussia,China, nd theU.S. agreed oparticipaten a multilateralialogueon militaryecurityssues withtheASEAN states. he first eetingf theASEAN Regional orumARF) tookplace nBangkokn July 994andmaypavethewayfor cooperativeecur-ityregimenEast Asia andSoutheast sia. The October1994 U.S.-NorthKorean Agreed ramework" aywell resultn thedenuclearizationf theKoreanPeninsula.As progress oward egionalnon-proliferationnd de-nuclearizations made n NortheastndSoutheast sia (theSoutheast siaNuclear-Weapon-Freeonetreaty as signednBangkok n December15,1995), nternationalressuresor he ettlementf the ndo-Pakistanionflictwill ncrease, articularlyfArabs nd Israelis each n agreement anningweapons fmassdestructionn theMiddleEast.

4. China's applicationo become a fulldialoguepartner f ASEAN, approved y seniorASEAN officials nApril 0, 1996, s subject ofull pproval y ASEAN leaders tan nformalsummitue to be held n Jakartan December. ee "RegionalBriefing,"ar Eastern conomicReview, 5 April1996,p. 13.


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564 ASIAN URVEY, OL.XXXVI, O. 6, JUNE 996These changeshelp explainwhydespite he Kashmir onflict,nd otherunresolved ilateral isputes, eitherndianorPakistan as declarednuclearweapon tatus o cope with ecurityhreatsnd/or o deal with ach other.

Moreover, oth ountries'ndebtednessndtheir ependence n nternationalfinancialnstitutionsive theWest particularlyheU.S.) more everage oobtain oncessions romndia ndPakistan n thenuclearssue, ven f hereare still bstaclessuch s India'sconcernboutChinesenuclearweapons) oestablish permanent on-proliferationegime n South Asia. During heColdWar nthe arly1980s, ncentiveslearly utweighed isincentivesorboth ountrieso "go nuclear." he "Indian hreat" asPakistan's aramountsecurityoncern; lthough akistan id notpursue nuclearweapon apabil-ityuntil fter eingdefeated y ndia n theDecember 971 war. For ndia,theprimarymotivation as the conventionalnd nuclearmilitary hreatposed by China after he 1962 Sino-Indiawar, oupledwith he "latent u-clearthreat"osed byPakistan incetheearly1980s.Although hesemotivationstill xist fterheCold War, hefear f trig-gering full-fledgeduclearweapon rogramn the ther idehas becomesignificantisincentiveorndia nd Pakistanoproceed ullywith heir u-clearweaponsprograms.roliferationisincentivesutweighncentivesnthecase of India and canceleachother ff nthecase of Pakistan.Because of the greaterweight f internationalorms,nternationalon-straintsn nuclear ecisionmakingnIndia and Pakistan ave ncreasednthe arly1990s.Forthefirstimendecadesboth ountries avecutdefensespending,nder ressurerom reditorations. fterheColdWar, moreassertiveAEA andUnitedNations ecurityouncilmay hreatenconomic,political,nd evenmilitaryanctionsgainst otential roliferators,ith hepossibilityfenforcinghem,fter heprecedentftheUnitedNations pe-cial Commission n Iraq.This is a deterrentor hresholdountries o de-velop openly nuclearweapons, s shownby NorthKorea's decisiontonegotiatehescalingdown of its nuclearweapon option n exchangeforWestern iplomatic ecognition,nvestments,rade,nd nuclear echnology.IndiaandPakistan re n a strongerosition onegotiate ith heWest,buttheNorthKorean ase is part f a globalpost-ColdWar trendoward on-proliferationnitiativesndagreements.On the otherhand, nternationaltatus/prestiges no longer he kindofincentive t was during he Cold War; as non-proliferationorms arestrengthened,henegative onsequenceshatmayfollowfromdoptingnambiguous uclear osture r deploying uclearweaponscancel off, ndcould outweighhestatus/prestigencentive,ven in the case of regionalhegemonswith lobalstatus retensions,uch as India or Brazil. The newinternationalituations slowly onstraininghe nuclear iplomacy f bothIndia ndPakistan,makinghemmore ensitiveooutside ressuresormili-


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MARIO . CARRANZA565tary estraintnd regional rms ontrol. orexample, lthoughndia s stillan NPT hold-out,n 1991-92 for hefirstimet seriouslyonsideredoiningtheTreaty, nder ignificant.S. pressure.

The possibilityf a regional on-proliferationegimen SouthAsia is con-firmed y Pakistan's and to a lesser xtent,ndia's) conciliatoryuclear i-plomacy is-a-visheU.S. Pakistan nnouncedn 1993 that t had "capped,"and "frozen"ts nuclear rogram;ndia continuesxpressingtrong upportforglobal denuclearizationffortsincluding cut off n theproductionffissilematerial) n a non-discriminatoryasis.5As progresss madetowardthe liminationfnuclearweapons t theglobal evel, ndia s in theuncom-fortable osition f claiming hat nly globalapproach o nonproliferationmakes ense whilerejecting akistan's egional on-proliferationroposalswhich ncreasinglyppear s necessary o bolsterheglobalprocess.6The indefinitextension f the Non-Proliferationreaty NPT) in May1995 and the ngoing egotiationsn a comprehensiveest an CTB) treatyin 1996put dditionalnternationalressuresn India, akistan,nd srael orefrain rom eclaring uclearweapon tatus nd eventuallyign both rea-ties,oradopt quivalent on-proliferationommitments.akistan's fficialpolicyhas alwaysbeen hatt would ign heNPT shortlyfterndiasigns t.During heCold War,Pakistan's old non-proliferationroposalswere ost-freebecause Pakistan new hat ndia wouldreject hem. his is no longernecessarilyhe ase. Now, ndiacanaccept omemodified ersion fanyofthePakistani roposals;t could evensigna reinvigoratedPT, e.g., ifthefivedeclared uclearweapon tates ign CTB treatyt the51st U.N. Gen-eralAssemblynSeptember996.7On the ther and, akistan anplaythesamegameand oin theNPT firsto isolate ndiapoliticallynddiplomati-cally. The Kashmirssue and Indo-Pakistani

NuclearArmsControlDespite the new internationaltmospheref "competitiveisarmament"(U.S.-Russian reatiesSTART I andII] toreduce heir uclear rsenals y5. For Pakistan,eePPNNNewsbrief,o. 24. Fourth uarter 993,pp. 19-20. For ndia, eetheoint tatementetween rimeMinister ao andPresident linton,n PPNNNewsbrief,o.26, 2nd Quarter 994,p. 18.6. Pakistan's egional on-proliferationroposalsnclude fferso: 1) sign heNuclearNon-Proliferationreatyf ndia does; (2) place its nuclear acilitiesnder ull-scopeafeguardsf

India lso doesso; (3) create regime fmutualnspectionsf each other's uclear nstallations;(4) negotiatehe stablishmentf a SouthAsia nuclearweapons-freeone, nd 5) a five-nationregional uclear onproliferationonferenceonsistingf theUnited tates,Russia,China, n-dia, and PakistantheSharif roposal).7. Indiacould oin theNPT makingt clearthatt would xercise ts overeignight owith-drawunder rticle if heres no progressntheglobaldisarmamentgenda n a certaineriodof time e.g.,fiveyears).


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566 ASIAN URVEY,VOL. XXXVI, O. 6, JUNE 996two-thirds;ossibilityf a comprehensiveuclear est an n 1996 or 1997),the revalentnterpretations that he ndof theColdWarhas had ittle r noimpact n the ndo-Pakistaniilateral isputes nd a negligiblempact n theIndo-Pakistaniuclear ompetition.8hisargumentinges n the omplexity(intra-statend interstate)f ethnic eparatismnd conflict long the ndo-Pakistani order nd the unyielding ature f theKashmir onflict, ith tsethnic, eligious, ationalist,erritorial,nd symbolic spects.The fact hatKashmir as becomea symbol f both ountries' ational dentities ouldcreate omestic onstraints, aking ifficultnycompromisen thepart fIndia or Pakistan.The origins ndevolution f theKashmir ispute re well covered n anumberfworks. akistan uestions he egality f the ccession f Kashmirto ndiaafterhepartitionfthe ubcontinentn 1947, ccusingndiaof notimplementing U.N. resolution allingfor a plebiscite o determine hewishes f theKashmiris.ndiaclaims hat he ccession f Kashmir o ndiain 1947 was legal,andbecame final nd irrevocable"fterheConstituentAssemblyfKashmir eclarednNovember 956that he tate is andshallbe an integral art ftheUnion f ndia."9 Theconventional isdom s thatPakistanwill "never" iveupon Kashmir ecause twouldbe tantamountoabjuringts raison d'etreas thehomeland f the Muslims. ndia would"never"~ive up either, ecause t already ontrols wo-thirdsf the erritoryunder ispute,ndanyofthe lternativesould hallengendia's secularistideologywhile eading o other ecessionistnitiativeslsewherenthe n-dian Union.10

8. See among thers, owherRizvi, Arms ontrol nd ndo-Pakistanielations,"nG. Se-gal, ed., ArmsControl n Asia (London:MacmillanPress,1987), pp. 116-43; Raju G. C.Thomas, India ndtheNPT AfterheCold War,"nJoseph . Pilat ndRobert . Pendley,ds.,1995: A New Beginningor theNPT? (New York: Plenum ress, 1995); Nazir Kamal,"TheFuture fNuclearWeapons:Proliferationn SouthAsia," nP. J.Garritynd S. A. Maaranen,eds., NuclearWeaponsn theChangingWorldNew York:Plenum ress,1992), pp. 181-98.9. Pervaiz qbal Cheema, "Pakistan,ndia,and Kashmir:A HistoricalReview," n RajuThomas, d., Perspectivesn Kashmir: he Rootsof Conflictn SouthAsia,p. 101.

10. Theelection nMay 1996 oftheminorityindunationalistovernmentfPrimeMinisterAtalBihariVajpayee n ndiareinforcedhe onventionalisdom hat ndiawill never" iveupon Kashmir. he newDefenseminister,ramodMahajan, assaid thatmilitarypending illbeincreasednd that ndia's350,000-memberorcenIndian-heldashmirwill be given properpowers" o deal with heKashmiriMuslim nsurgency.ee John . Bums, Indian eadersTryto Calm Fearsof a Pakistani lash," New YorkTimes,18 May 1996,p. 3. PrimeMinisterVajpayee, moderatemember f theBharatiya anata artyBJP), eemed o accept he onsti-tutionalrinciplef secularism henhe declared hat ll Indian itizenswillbe treatedon anequal footing,nd therewillbe nodiscriminationn thebasisof religion, egion,lass orcaste."John . Bums, Hindu arty ead Chosen or ostof ndia'sPremier," ew York imes, 6 May1996,p. A6.


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MARIO . CARRANZA567The Kashmir ispute s generally onsidered heprimarymotivation e-hind he ndo-Pakistaniuclear ompetition.ince there s no resolutionnsight or heKashmir roblem, hedominantnterpretations that t is "too

late"to rollbackboth ountries' uclearweapons rograms. he more essi-mist cholars laim that ndo-Pakistaniull nd open nuclearization ill beinevitable,nd that iscussions n nuclear rms ontrol nd disarmamentnSouthAsia are a waste f time nd can evenbe counterproductive,nless hepolitical oots ftheconflictre eliminated.Althought s often rgued hatKashmir nd thenuclear ssue are nextri-cably inked, he inkages re not lways learly pelt ut.Some argue hatcrisisnKashmir ouldtrigger fourthndo-Pakistaniar hatmight scalateto thenuclear evel.' Others laimthat decision o assemble nd stockpilenuclearweapons y either ide could heightenensions, rovoking crisis nKashmir hatmight ise to a conventionaland eventually uclear)militaryconfrontation.If Pakistan eclaresnuclearweapon tatus n order o blackmail ndia ontheKashmirssue, ndiawillprobably ollow uit, esting secondnucleardevice or ust declaring hatt hasnuclearweapons. Both ncipient uclearforceswoldbe vulnerableopreemptivettacks.Mutualfears f counter-force trikes ould ead bothparties o increase he ize and "survivability"of their uclear orces.The nuclear rmsrace thatwouldprobably ollowwouldbe unfavorableor akistan ecause ndiawouldbe temptedo engageinaggression ith onventional eapons nce a "stable"nuclear eterrencesituation rises,the veryresult hatthePakistaninucleardeterrent asdesigned o avert.12 romndia'smilitary-stragegictandpoint,he inks e-tweenKashmir nd the nuclearssueareatbest enuousnthepresentitua-tion of mutual nuclear ambiguity, lthough ndia's potentialnuclearsuperiorityertainlyeinforceshedeterrentffectf itsconventional ili-tary dvantage verPakistan.Yet, neitherndianorPakistan ecided ohave a nuclearweaponoptionbecauseofthe onflictn Kashmir.ndia'sdecision opursue nuclearweap-onsoptionhadnothingo do withKashmirnd wasbasically response oChina's first uclear est n 1964, followingndia'shumiliatingefeatn aborderwarwith hina n1962.Althoughndiabegan eprocessinglutoniumatTrombayn1966, nd nspite fhaving oughthreewarswithndia, wo

11. See, e.g.,former IA Director amesWoolsey's estimonyeforeheSenateCommitteeon Governmentalffairs,ebruary4, 1993 Washington,.C.: U.S. Governmentrintingf-fice,1994).12. Thisseemsto outweighny possiblebenefitsorPakistan rom proliferationecision,except, erhaps,o promptndia o slow down tsnuclearweapons rogram,hile fferingo dolikewise s a preliminarytepfor he stablishmentf a bilateral uclear rms ontrolnd dis-armamentegime.


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568 ASIAN URVEY,VOL. XXXVI,NO. 6, JUNE 996of them 1947-48 and 1965) overtheKashmirssue,Pakistanwas not eri-ously nterestedn matchingndia'snuclearweapons apabilities ntil fterthe 1974 Indiannuclear est. n fact,with hepassingof time particularlyafter akistan cquired nuclearweapons apabilityn theearly1980s), twas moreoften he case that he nuclear ssue vitiatedndo-Pakistaniela-tions, ncludingheKashmir ispute, han heotherway around. imilarlyothe dangerous ndependentynamic f the nuclear rmsrace between hesuperpowers uring he Cold War,nuclear ompetition etween he twoSouthAsian rivalsbecamerelativelyndependentrom hepolitical onflictbetween hem.Some scholars laim hat he urrentituationf mutual uclear mbiguityor"latent" uclearizationringstabilityoSouthAsia,since t creates defacto onventionalndnuclear eterrenceituation etween oth ountries.'3Others isagree, laiming hat the ndia-Pakistanuclear nd conventionalbalances re fundamentallynstablend asymmetrical,"r that neithertateis really repared,echnically,o absorb nuclearweapons nd ballisticmis-siles] and maintain resent evels of stability."'14t is generally onsideredthat hetransitionalhase to nuclear eterrencenThirdWorld cenariosscharacterizedy significanteterrencenstability,ecauseofthe ackof reli-ablecommand,ontrol,ndcommunicationsystemsndstrong emptationstostrike irstnanticipationf preemptionn a crisis.Unlessthese roblemsareovercome,heproductionnddeploymentfnuclearweaponsbyIndiaand/or akistan ouldbe very estabilizing. basictenet fdeterrencehe-ory sthe redibilityfdeterrencehreats,hich anhardly ebelievedfthe"bombs-in-theasement" re not upposed o exist. fanything,ncertaintyabout n adversary'sbility ocarry utdeterrenthreatss a permanentn-centive o launch preemptivettack n it.Uncertaintyoes notenhancedeterrencenless heres aneffectiveerificationegime o ensure hat othsideswillnot ctuallyssemble nddeploynuclearweapons.n the bsenceof sucha regime,hepresentituationf"nonweaponized"r "existential"deterrenceetweenndiaandPakistan oesnotprovide hekind fstabilitythat haracterizedheU.S.-Soviet elationshipuringheCold Warandmaygive a false senseof security,inderingrogress oward comprehensivesettlementf theIndo-Pakistaniisputes.Hence, it is urgent o createastrong uclear rms ontrol egimen SouthAsia.

13. See, e.g.,DevinT. Hagerty,Nuclear eterrencen SouthAsia: The 1990 ndo-PakistaniCrisis,"nternationalecurity,0:3 (Winter 995/96),p. 79-114; Raju G. C. Thomas, Reflec-.tionson theKashmir roblem," n Raju Thomas, d., Perspectivesn Kashmir, p. 28-29;MitchellReiss,BridledAmbitionWashington,.C.: WilsonCenter ress,1995), pp. 184-85.14. The firstuote s fromMohammed yoob,The ThirdWorld ecurityredicamentBoul-der, Colo.: LynneRienner, 995), p. 151; the second,from tephen . Cohen, "A NoteonStabilitynSouthAsia,"Swords ndPloughshares,:1 (Fall 1994),p. 3.


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MARIO . CARRANZA569Can Indo-Pakistaniuclear rms ontrol e decoupled rom heKashmirproblem? ndia and Pakistanhave foughthreewars two over Kashmir)sincebecomingndependentn 1947 andtheKashmir auldrons a realmen-

ace to regional eace and security ecauseeven f ndia and Pakistanwereable to come up with diplomaticettlementver he overeigntyssue, heactivities f Kashmirimilitant roups, ignificantlyutside he control fbothgovernments,ould stillthreatenhe mplementationf any bilateralagreement.Yet, becauseof the ncreasingnternationalonstraintsn nuclear ecisionmakingmentionedbove, he ndoftheCold Waropensup thepossibilityfdecouplingndo-Pakistaniuclear elations rom heKashmir ssue. n spiteof tsmilitary-strategicredicament,akistan's elative ecurity ainswouldbe greaterhan hose f ndia f mutual uclear nspectionsegime s estab-lished,because ndia has a more dvancednuclear rogram.ndia in turnwould ncrease tsrelative ecurity ainswithChina f the atteroins a nu-clearweapon-freeone nSouthAsia andtheprocess fpartial uclear is-armamentt the global evel continues. y strengtheninghe disincentivesand weakeninghe ncentivesor ndiaand Pakistano"go nuclear,"he ndof theCold War also weakened he inkages etweenKashmir nd thenu-clear ssue. ndia ndPakistanhould ake dvantagefthe ituationo nego-tiate a comprehensiveuclear arms controlregime,with an effectiveverificationystem,ven n the bsence f mmediaterogressoward reso-lution f theKashmir ispute. nuclear ettlement ayeven pave thewayfor erious egotiationsn Kashmir. amnot uggestinghathepredicamentof theKashmir eople hould eforgottenythe nternationalommunity,rthat he risis nKashmir hould rolongtselfndefinitely.et, ack ofpro-gress n ndo-Pakistaniegotiationsn Kashmir houldnotbean obstacle ormaking ains n a separate ialogue nthenuclearssue.Even f heKashmirdisputes completelyolved, herisk fescalation rom conventional arto theuse of nuclearweaponswill still xist s longas both ountrieson-tinue ccusing ach otherf nterferencentheir omesticolitics e.g.,Paki-stan accusing ndia of meddlingn Sindh; India accusingPakistanofinterferencenPunjab) nd thedispute ver heSiachenGlacier nKashmirremains nsolved.A fully mplementeduclear rms ontrol egimewouldeliminatehedanger fnuclearscalation,venwithoutcomprehensiveet-tlementfthese onflicts.

Breakinghe inkbetweenheKashmir onflictndthe nuclearssue hasimportantmplicationsor post-ColdWarstrategyo denuclearize outhAsia. Paradoxically,nspite fthe ackofprogressoward political olutiontothe ndo-Pakistanionflicta significantifferenceith hepeace processintheMiddleEast) theprospectsornuclearrms ontrolookmore romis-ing n SouthAsia than n theMiddleEast.Regional trategicnteractionsre


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570 ASIAN URVEY,VOL. XXXVI, O.6, JUNE 996differentnboth egions.srael'snuclearmonopolyreates more angeroussituationntheMiddleEast because emi-nuclearituationsre alwaysunsta-ble, carryingherisk f escalation nd confrontation.y contrast,n SouthAsia besides theperiodof Indo-Pakistanietente etween1972-79, "tacitbargaining"nd a number f bilateral ffortsn the1980s can be seen aslaying hebasisfor n Indo-Pakistaniecurityegime. he SAARC foundedin 1985, is thebest proof f Indo-Pakistaniontinuingooperative iplo-macy, n spiteof the Kashmir ispute. oth countries ave signed n Is-lamabad-New elhi "hot ine" agreementnd a formalccordnotto attackone another's uclear nstallations.urtheronfidence-buildingeasuresn-clude weeklymilitary-to-militaryalks nd agreementsot to violate achother's irspace nd on advancenotificationf militaryxercises. othrivalscouldstrengthenhe onfidence-buildingrocess y agreeingo placeone ortwo additional uclearfacilitiesn each countrynder AEA safeguards,whilebeginningiscussions or mutual uclearnspectionsegime.To what xtenthese onfidence-buildingeasuresCBMs) couldresultna self-managedilateral r regional ecurity egime s an open question.Building n CBMs willnot be possibleuntilboth ndia and Pakistan ansupersede hedualism f their uclear iplomacy.ndiauses the regional rglobal"dilemmas a pretextornot aking akistan's egional on-prolifera-tion nitiativeseriously. akistantillbelieves hat ndiawillreject tspro-posalsas itdidduringheCold War,partly ecause ndiacontinuests oldCold Warstrategyf isolatings much s possible ndo-Pakistaniegotia-tions rom reat ower ntrusions.akistan,nturn,ndicatests upportorregional on-proliferationegime hatncludesndia,but ontinuesopursueits nuclear olicies.Even worse,nstead f tryingoseparatehenuclear s-sue fromKashmir,he Bhutto overnmentas done exactly heopposite,stirringp fears hat militaryonflictver Kashmirmight scalateto thenuclearevel. Althoughhis sprobably sound trategyrom purelymili-tary-strategicerspective,t s very addiplomacyonsideringhat s of thiswritingthas not ompelledndia o hold erious egotiationsneitherssue.UntilPakistan ecognizeshat t is in its best nteresto break he inkbe-tweenKashmir ndnuclear olicy t will be verydifficulto denuclearizeSouthAsia,even by usingglobal arrangementssuchas a CTB or a fissilematerialutoff)o attractndia to seriousnegotiations.n theother and, fIndiastopsplayingheColdWargameofrejectingvery akistani roposalfornuclear rmscontrol, akistanwill be forced o reconsidertsnucleardiplomacy,nceitrealizes t s no longer ost-free.

ConclusionU.S. non-proliferationolicies oward outhAsia have failed o far o elimi-nate hedanger fnuclear roliferationn the ubcontinent.he Clinton d-


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MARIO . CARRANZA571ministrationeems o haveabandonedtsoriginal trategyfrolling ack thenuclearweaponprogramsf ndia and Pakistan or ne ofmerely capping"them, nd themajorityfnon-proliferationcholars eem toagreewith hisapproach.According o SandyGordon, thismaywell nowbe theonlyvia-blewayforward."15et, theprecedentsfArgentina,razil, nd SouthAf-rica how hat "rollback" fthenuclearweapons rogramsnSouthAsia isstill chievable. he Indo-Pakistaniase falls omewherenbetween outhAfrica's urn-aroundaftermanufacturingix nuclear evices) and the Ar-gentine-Brazilianoursereversal efore ctuallymanufacturingny nuclearweapons.TheIndo-Pakistaniase is similar othe attern that ccording omost eportshe outhAsianrivalshavenot ctually ssembled r stockpilednuclearweapons; and yettheyhave gone fartherhead than theirLatinAmerican ounterpartsowardweaponization,angerouslyrossing psy-chological hreshold y declaring hat hey an producenuclearweapons"whenever equired."16I haveargued hat ndia's andPakistan'snuclearweaponsprograms anstillbe rolled ackand that resolutionfthe ndo-Pakistaniuclear ompe-tition oes notdepend n theresolutionfthe mpasse ver Kashmir. heend ofthe Cold Waropens up a realpossibilityor heestablishmentf aregional uclear rms ontrol nd disarmamentegime n SouthAsia: a for-mal verificationegimepatterned n theArgentina-Brazil-IAEArilateralagreement,ut withmore tringentnspectionequirements,ollowingheexperiencef the AEA in SouthAfrica.Whywould ndia andPakistanccept uch regime? lthoughhe ndoftheCold War does not utomaticallyompel ndia and Pakistan ogive uptheirnuclearweaponsoption,t affectsheir ehavior y weakeningheirnuclear ropensity.isincentives illdefinitelyutweighncentivesfthereis real progress oward lobalnuclear isarmamentnd economic onditionscontinueonstrainingtrategichoices n SouthAsia. na worldn which heincreasingignificancef economic trengthhallengesraditionaleopoliti-

15. SandyGordon, Capping outhAsia's NuclearWeapons rograms: Window fOppor-tunity?" sian urvey, uly 994,p. 664. The big shortcomingf the capping" trategys that tis closelyrelated o a global fissilematerial utoff, hich s presentlynvisagedwould egiti-mize thenuclearweaponsprogramsf thede factonuclear-weapontatesIndia,Pakistan, ndIsrael) thusunderminingheNPT regime.Under cut-offonvention,uclearmaterial revi-ouslyproduced ythresholduclear owerswouldnotbesubject o AEA safeguards.ee FransBerkhout t al., "A Cutoffn the Productionf Fissile Material,"nternationalecurity,9:3(Winter 994/95), p. 197-98.16. Indian rimeMinister ajpayee'sdeclarationhat is minorityindunationalistovern-mentwould tick ytheBharatiyaanata arty's ongstandingromiseo declare penly ndianuclearweapons tate hows heurgencyf chieving verifiableuclearrms ontrol egimenSouthAsia,evenbefore comprehensiveesolutionf theKashmir ispute. ee John . Burns,"HinduPartyHead ChosenforPost of India's Premier," . A6.


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572 ASIAN URVEY,VOL. XXXVI, O. 6, JUNE 996cal definitionsf national ecurityn several egions e.g., MERCOSUR inLatin America, heASEAN Free Trade Area n Southeast sia), India andPakistanmaydecide to follow heglobal trend nd concentraten regionaleconomic ooperation nd integration,peeding p the SAARC process apreferentialariffgreement,APTA, has alreadybeen signed).Domesticpressures or settlementf theKashmir isputemay lowly ncrease s theeconomiccosts of the India-Pakistanonflict ecome difficulto sustainunder conomic estructuring.ven nthe bsence fregional conomic nte-gration,f the rend owardmilitarypending uts n the ubcontinents sus-tained nd mutual onfidence uildingmeasures ontinue, self-managedregional ecurity egime ould emerge y theyear 2000, patternedn theASEAN model.Morecooperative lobal nd transregionaltrategicnviron-ments rguablysolate he ndo-Pakistani ini-ColdWar, nducing he twoSouthAsianrivals o negotiate heestablishmentf a nuclear rms ontrolregimenthe ubcontinent.I haveshown hedangers f relying n "existential"r "nonweaponized"nucleardeterrenceo settle he ndo-Pakistani uclear ompetition.omeanalystshave suggested hat ndia and Pakistan hould declare nuclearweapon tatus o enhance he redibilityf deterrence.17et,the ransitionosecurenuclear orces, ith second-strikeapabilityndadequate ommand,control,ndcommunicationsystems ouldbevery nstable, ith he isk fpreemptivetrikes nd thepossibilityf accident,misunderstanding,r mis-perception. utting he ndian ndPakistani eniesback nto hebottlere-gionalnuclear rms ontrol)within global framework, akesmore ense.Although ertain lobal measures, uchas a comprehensiveuclear estban, could become reality efore heendof thedecade,nuclear isarma-mentnegotiationsmong hefivedeclarednuclearweapon tateshave notevenbegun,whereas heU.S.-Russianuclear isarmamentreatiesSTART Iand II) have a 15-year imeframe.n themeantime,ndia and Pakistanshould ontinuealks o defuse henuclearhreatnthe ubcontinent,ollow-ingupthe onfidenceuildingtructurelreadynplacewith formalgree-mentnotto use nuclearweaponsfirstna futurermed onflict.'8The real challenge s how to make boththeglobaland regional enu-clearizationrocesses onverge t somepoint n the futurey committing

17. See K. Subrahmanyam,An Indo-PakNuclearRestraint egime:Parts1 and 2," Eco-nomicTimes New Delhi), September 0 andOctober1, 1992. The vulnerabilityf incipientsmallnuclear orcesnmost egional ituations as beenmentionedna numberf studies. eee.g., Joseph . Nye,Jr.,NuclearEthics New York: Free Press,1986),p. 88.18. Among set of proposals entby ndiato Pakistan arly n 1994 to ease border ensionswas the assurance hat n the eventof war, ndia would not use nuclearweapons first. eeProgrammeorPromoting uclearNon-Proliferation,PNN Newsbrief, o. 25, FirstQuarter1994,p. 5.


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MARIO . CARRANZA573Chinato both lobalmeasuresa CTB and negative ecurityssurances) ndseriousnegotiationso establish nuclearweapon-freeone nSouthAsia.'9Following heSoviet-Americanxample, ndia and Pakistan ouldagreeonsignificantuts n their allistic nd missile apability venbefore ndingtheir ocal Cold War the 1987 NF Treaty etween heU.S. andtheSovietUnionpreceded he nd of theCold War).Thefuturef ndia-Pakistanelations,ncludinghenuclear ssue,will besubjected o increasingnternationalressures nd greatlynfluencedy theevolution f an internationalnvironmentn whichnuclearweapons re os-ing egitimacys a currencyf powerwhile ssue inkage crossglobal re-gimes s morepronouncedhan n thepast.Violators f globalnorms n thesecurityssue areamay ncreasinglye subjected o pressuren the conomicissue area, thusdiscouragingthreshold"ountries rom xercising henu-clearweaponoption.A CTB treatyn1996or1997andbinding egative ecurityssurancesnthepart fthe bigfive"would ompel oth ndia ndPakistano revise heirnucleardiplomacy. rogress oward global cooperative ecurity egimewould solate ndia and Pakistan ven further,nder he threat fWesternpolitical nd economic eprisalsnd/or ollective ecurityanctions.n themeantimeheymay ome to the onclusionhat igning CTB treatywhichthey ave ong supported)ndparticipatingnother lobalnuclear isarma-ment egotiationss in their est nterest. verifiable utual uclearnspec-tionsregime ould be established t thisstage, taking nto account theasymmetrynnuclear-weaponapabilities etween ndia andPakistan,s afirsttep oward nuclearweapon-freeone nSouthAsia.Even ftheKash-mir onflict emains nresolvedn themedium erm,ucha regimewouldeliminate he hreat fa nuclear xchangenthe ubcontinentith tsdevas-tating onsequences ormillions fpeople nSouthAsia.

19. Althoughhenuclearweapon tates idnotmake oncessionsn a deadline or heprovi-sion of negative ecurityssurances t the 1995 NPT extensiononference,hey id acceptthe1996 ComprehensiveestBan deadline, hus t eastpartlyockingn a Chinese ommitmentoa NWFZ in SouthAsia. In August 995, he ndian overnmentgreed o explore hefeasibilityof a U.S. proposal o establish ucha zone.See PPNN Newsbrief,o. 31, 3rdQuarter 995,p.19.

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Rethinking Indo-pakistani Nuclear Relations