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Index

Index ......................................................................................................................... 1***1AC*** ............................................................................................................... 2South Korea 1ACInherency [1/2] ......................................................................... 3South Korea 1ACInherency [2/2] ......................................................................... 4South Korea 1ACNorth Korea [1/6] ..................................................................... 5South Korea 1ACNorth Korea [2/6] ..................................................................... 6South Korea 1ACNorth Korea [3/6] ..................................................................... 7South Korea 1ACNorth Korea [4/6] ..................................................................... 8South Korea 1ACNorth Korea [5/6] ..................................................................... 9South Korea 1ACNorth Korea [6/6] ................................................................... 10South Korea 1ACPlan Text [1/1] ........................................................................ 11South Korea 1ACRegionalism [1/6] ................................................................... 12South Korea 1ACRegionalism [2/6] ................................................................... 13South Korea 1ACRegionalism [3/6] ................................................................... 14South Korea 1ACRegionalism [4/6] ................................................................... 15South Korea 1ACRegionalism [5/6] ................................................................... 16South Korea 1ACRegionalism [6/6] ................................................................... 17South Korea 1ACSolvency [1/4] ........................................................................ 18South Korea 1ACSolvency [2/4] ........................................................................ 19South Korea 1ACSolvency [3/4] ........................................................................ 20South Korea 1ACSolvency [4/4] ........................................................................ 21


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South Korea 1AC Inherency [1/2]

Contention OneInherency

The United States has 28,500 troops in South Korea, and Obama is

committed to keeping the military presence there.

AP 5/24/10, U.S. backs South Korea in punishing North, MSNBC,http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37309788/

The Obama administration endorsed Lee's demand that "North Koreaimmediately apologize and punish those responsible for the attack, and, mostimportantly, stop its belligerent and threatening behavior." Seoul can continueto count on the full backing of the United States, it said. "U.S. support for South Korea'sdefense is unequivocal, and the president has directed his military commanders to coordinate closely with their

Republic of Korea counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression," the White House said. Pentagonspokesman Bryan Whitman did not give a date for the exercises but said they will be in the "near future." TheU.S. has 28,500 troops in South Koreaa major sore point for the North aswell as 47,000 troops in Japan.

Recent North Korean attacks show the instability and willingness to start

conflict.

Scott Snyderis Director of The Asia Foundations Center for US-Korea Policy,Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korean Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations,and author of Chinas Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economic, Security.June2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22363/cheonan_reckoning.html#)

The verdict by an international team of investigators that it was a

North Korean torpedo that sank South Koreas corvette, the Cheonan, on March

26 in waters near South Koreas Northern Limit Line (NLL ) has become the catalyst for a

worrisome near-term escalation of inter-Korean tensions, and has stimulatedcloser international scrutiny regarding North Koreas internal stability. It has also become a litmus test of Chinese

policy that will require a judgment at the UN Security Council. The initial announcement of the

investigation result triggered a rhetorical spiral that rolled back almost

every reconciliatory measure that had taken place during ten years of

inter-Korean rapprochement, with the notable exception of the Kaesong Industrial Zone, a zone

in North Korea that hosts South Korean manufacturing plants and employees. A spokesman for

North Koreas National Defense Commission (NDC) immediately and

strongly denied any culpability, offering to send its own investigation team to review theevidence, and threatening all out war in response to unspecified retaliatory measures by South Korea.

Seouls response South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak announced on

May 24 a wide range of countermeasures, including: the curtailment of

inter-Korean trade and exchanges; resumption of anti-North Korea

propaganda activities along the DMZ (demilitarized zone); a halt to the transit

of North Korean ships through South Korean waters that had been allowed foralmost a decade as part of the Sunshine Policy of previous South Korean administrations; pledges to pursueproactive deterrence in response to future North Korean provocations; and, an effort to obtain the censure of
http://www.cfr.org/publication/22363/cheonan_reckoning.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/22363/cheonan_reckoning.html


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South Korea 1AC Inherency [2/2]

North Korea at the UN Security Council. The North Korean counter- response

branded Lee a traitor and criticized him for undermining the inter-

Korean summit agreements made under former South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung and RohMoo-hyun. The North also threatened to shoot at South Korean loudspeakers and kicked out eight South Koreanofficials resident at the Kaesong Industrial Zone. Inter-Korean relations are now back to where they stood in themid-1990s prior to the initiation of Kim Dae Jungs Sunshine Policy, wi th the ironic exception of the KaesongIndustrial Zone. The establishment of the Kaesong Industrial Zone had been a target of criticism among someSouth Koreans on the grounds that it provided the regime cash. Ironically, these critiques also explain Kaesongssurvival to date: North Korea needs the estimated $30-40 million per year that it earns from a 40,000 personworkforce for which there are no equivalent replacement jobs in the North, while the South Korea would have to

pay out millions of dollars in damages to South Korean companies in the event of closure. These factors

raise the cost to both sides of further escalatory measures involving

Kaesong, including the possibility that the North might close the zone

and hold hundreds of South Korean managers there hostage. The next testwill be if North Korea follows through on threats to close down the complex if South Korea resumes transmission

of propaganda via loudspeakers along the DMZ. The effects of the escalatory measures

taken thus far are equivalent to the removal of the guardrails from atwisting mountain highway: the road itself is actually no more

dangerous than before (i.e., both Koreas are equally committed to avoiding a full-scale militaryconflict, since North Korea knows that full-scale escalation would be suicidal while South Korea cannot afford the

devastation), but the probability and potential costs that might occur in the

event of miscalculation or risk-taking are considerably higher. Is thePyongyang regime stable? The incident has fed a steady stream of speculation regarding North Koreas internalstability and the potential internal challenges to managing a leadership succession from Kim Jong-Il to his thirdson, Kim Jung-Un. It is plausible to imagine a link between the sinking of the Cheonan and the succession, butsuch a connection will be impossible to prove given the limits of our knowledge of Pyongyangs court politics.More importantly, the Cheonan incident provides an opportunity for deeper evaluation of North Koreas

increasingly bleak mid-to-long-term prospects. The near-universal perception of Kim

Jong Il as representing an unstable, unpredictable, financially-

troubled leadership focused short-term survival measures further tiltsthe focus of discussion toward crisis management and away from

diplomacy, despite the reluctance of Beijing in particular to take up instability issues as an agenda item forofficial discussion with the US, Japan and South Korea. The gap between simple leadership succession difficultiesand a full-scale collapse of the North Korean system may be bigger than many analysts have anticipated. Thetemporary uncertainties surrounding succession are difficult to differentiate from early signs of instability thatmight affect regime viability. More importantly,North Koreas neighbors are likely to have differing views

regarding regime stability and the potential thresholds for intervention to stabilize the situation. For

instance, if one views signs of instability in the context of a leadership

succession as temporary and manageable, one might be more likely to

emphasize a passive response, but signs of a prolonged and contested

leadership succession might suggest to some the need for proactive

efforts to restore stability or to actively pursue Korean reunification.


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South Korea 1AC North Korea [1/6]

Contention TwoNorth Korea

The status quo in the Korean peninsula is inherently unstablethe

region is on the brink of war.

Doug Bandow, 4/6/10 senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former specialassistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America'sNew Global Empire (Doug,An Unstable Rogue,http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144)In late March an explosion sunk a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea.After his government downplayed the likelihood of North Korean involvement, the Souths defense minister nowsays a mine or torpedo might have been involved. A torpedo would mean a North Korean submarine activelytargeted Seouls aging corvette. The Republic of Koreas president, Lee Myung-bak, has attempted to dampen

speculation by announcing his intention to look into the case in a calm manner. But the possibility thatPyongyang committed a flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremorsthrough the ROK. Seoul could ill afford not to react strongly, both to protect its international reputationand prevent a domestic political upheaval. All economic aid to and investment in the North would end.Diplomatic talks would be halted. Prospects for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear. Moreover,

Seoul might feel the need to respond with force. Even ifjustified, such actionwould risk a retaliatory spiral. Where it would end no one could say. No one wants to play out thatscenario to its ugly conclusion. The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact thatNorth Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Koreanpeninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROKs SunshinePolicywhich essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyangs behavior. Nevertheless,the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished overthe last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations, the

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and theUnited States. Now we are no longer sure. Even if the DPRK was not involved in thesinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from engaging inarmed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of aleadership transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear,different family members could reach for power, and the military mightbecome the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the Northand spilling outward seems real. Such an outcome would be in no ones interest, including that ofChina. So far the Peoples Republic of China ha s taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Beijing haspushed the DPRK to negotiate and backed limited United Nations sanctions. But the PRC has refused to support apotentially economy-wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea. There areseveral reasons for Chinas stance. At base, Beijing is happier with the status quo than with risking North Koreaseconomic stability or the two nations political relationship. Washington doesnt like that judgment. However,

changing the PRCs policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest differently. The Yellow Sea incidentcould help. Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. Speculation is rife about thereason: to request more food aid, promote investment in the North, respond to Beijings insistence that the DPRKrejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else? South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. Theforeign ministers of both nations met in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of theSix-Party Talks. But the ROK should press further, backed by the United States. Despite Chinas preference for

avoiding controversy,the status quo is inherently unstable. Doing nothing is worsethan attempting to force a change in the Norths nuclear policies or rulingelites. Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea.


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Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions butdifferent family members. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over powerto his youngest son, as he apparently desires. Although the DPRKs governing

structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient,its impossible to ignore the possibility ofan implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Koreacontinues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equallyexplosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions bySouth Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response.

War is coming nowthere have been two violent exchanges within a week

the North is increasing provocations.

Burton 11/4/10, Benjamin S., Increasing Tension on the KoreanPeninsula, AllVoices, Nov. 3, 2010,http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/7222538-increasing-tensions-on-the-korean-peninsula

Nerves are on edge as reports are coming in ofa violent exchange betweenthe two rival nations, the second in less than a week. The South Koreanmilitary has reportedly fired on a North Korean fishing vessel that crossed theNorthern Limit Line, prompting S. Korean state officials to tighten security inSeoul. This incident, unlike the previous engagement, involved anapparently civilian N. Korean vessel. S. Korean officials report that the N. Korean boat wasmost likely in the area fishing for crab and other seafood mainstays in the regions abundantly populated westernwaters. An unnamed S. Korean military official says that 10 shots were fired at the fishing boat in the earlymorning hours on Wednesday; none intended to harm the ships crew. According to the same official, the shots

were fired only after repeated warnings via loudspeaker were ignored. There is understandableconcern from both the United States as well as South Korea in terms of theexchange, as the G20 summit, to be held in Seoul, is less than a week away.S. Korean President Lee Myung-bak addressed the state press briefly, in an attempt to assuagegrowing anxieties. "I don't think the North will try to do anything when leaders ofthe international community are meeting to discuss the world economy," hesaid. "I trust the North won't do anything but still we are fully prepared." The President said Wednesday.Expert on North Korean affairs at Seouls Dongguk Univeristy, Kim Yong-hyun, seesthings slightly differently. "The North wants to show the world that militarytension grips the Korean peninsula," he said in response to questions aboutthe reportedly accidental exchange of land fire at the Demilitarized Zonelast week. There is merit to what Yong-hyun says, as the land exchange was the first of its kind in nearlyfour years. The sea exchange marked the first time in nearly a decade that the South has fired on a North Korean

maritime vessel.Relations have been cool at best in recent months, hinderedgreatly by the Souths accusation that the North is responsible for thesinking of the Cheonan, a military vessel on patrol in the Korean sea, in mid-March. The North deniesresponsibility for the attack and the deaths of the 46 sailors on board.The North has accused theSouth of psychological warfare, a claim made in response to the thousandsof pamphlets pushed across the border aimed at destabilizing the communistregime by persuading the people of the North to overthrow perennial Glorious Leader, Kim Jong-Il.


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Although the North has a history of petty instances of provocation duringtimes of global and/or regional paradigm shifts, these most recent incidentsare particularly concerning. Only a few months ago, in an apparent show offorce, both the US and South Korean navies conducted war games exercisesin the Korean Sea. The North is also a known ally of Iran, and provided nuclear material along withRussia, to aid in Irans nuclear ambitions.

North Korea will continue provocations, with the US being drawn into

a nuclear wardeterrence fails.

Hayes 06, Peter, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University,Melbourne; and Director, Nautilus Institute, San Francisco, 10/4, TheStalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American NuclearHegemony http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0682Hayes.htmlIf as I have suggested, the DPRK has become a nuclear stalker state that seeks to redress past wrongs and usenuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in a less hostile and more respectful manner, then the UnitedStates will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely, or less so, toameliorate stalking behaviours in time of crisis, when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Like a repeat

offender,the DPRK is likely to continue to use nuclear threat to stalk the United

States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift in

Washingtons attitude. Unlike an individual who stalks, there is no simple way to lock up a state thatstalks another with nuclear threat. Currently, the United States has no common language for discussing nuclearweapons with the North Korean military in the context of the insecurities that bind the two sides together at the

Demilitarized Zone.Continued rebuffing of Pyongyangs overtures may lead tomore nuclear stalkingthat is, the development of creative andunanticipated ways of using nuclear threats, deployments, and actual use intimes of crisis or war. There are no grounds to believe that the DPRK willemploy a US or Western conceptual framework of nuclear deterrence and

crisis management in developing its own nuclear doctrine and use options.Indeed,US efforts to use clear and classical deterrent threats to communicateto North Koreans that if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will beunusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliterationas Condoleezza Rice put it in her Foreign Affairs essay in 2000serve to incite the DPRK toexploit this very threat as a way to engage the U nited States, with terrible risksof miscalculation and first-use on both sides.

The sub incident proves that hardliners are in the drivers seat of North

Koreas power transition this crisis uniquely risks nuclear conflict

hardliners cannot be deterred.

Chung Chong Wook, Prof at the S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalStudies, 6-1-2010, The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0582010.pdf

Sharply rising military tensions following the sinking of a South Koreannaval corvette are creating a crisis in the Korean peninsula. It is not the first timethat the Korean peninsula is engulfed in a crisis, but this one isdifferent. There are goodreasons to view the current crisis with grave concern. One is the nature of the crisis.


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The current imbroglio is not an unintended consequence of an accident. Norwas it an act of terrorism. It was what could be a carefully planned and well-executed actof warwhere a 1,200-tonne naval ship, the Cheonan, was blown into half, killing 46 soldiersat least thatis the conclusion in South Korea. The Nuclear Factor After a month-long investigation, theSeoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. Theevidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship

sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demand the Norths apology, announced a series ofmeasures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area.North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost allland, airand sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealtwith by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. The twoKoreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation. Anotherfactor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capabilityof the North. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs.

Its two nuclear testsso far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons. The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, butNorth Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may notnecessarily hold. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinksmanship tactics often defythe strategic calculus of its neighbors. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of howthe situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is notadvisable. The China Factor The key in assessing the security dynamics in the Korean peninsula is China whosepolicy has consistently been to avoid any serious military conflict there. What China fears is the prospect ofserious social and political upheavals, even short of an open war between the two Koreas which could trigger amassive inflow of refugees, mostly poor and potentially violent, into Chinas northeastern territory. Such acontingency might not only disrupt Chinas economic growth but could result in the emergence of a unified Koreaunder the auspices of the South and the expansion of the military presence of its ally, the United States, right onits border. This strategic value of North Korea as a buffer as well as the political and economic consequences ofthe loss of this buffer has been at the heart of the Chinese strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula.Recently the Chinese government has accorded an even higher priority to this strategy as the political and

economic situation in North Korea seemed to be headed toward a critical point. Kim Jong-Ils bout with a strokelast August and his poor health since then led to the abrupt efforts in Pyongyang to arrange power succession byhis third son, Kim Jong-un, who at 27 years old, has little experience in running the country. The timing could nothave been worse. A series of economic mismanagement including the failure of the currency reform lastNovember made the government lose control over the market. This rising inflation led to incidences of open

revolts. Power Struggle? Experts in Seoul now pay close attention to signs of powerstruggle in Pyongyang that is usual during a power transition and extremeeconomic deprivation. They are very sensitive to the report that the military, particularlythe hardlinersin it, have gained a predominant position and are pushing for aconfrontational policy toward the South. Many of them speculate that these hardliners werebehind the Cheonan incident as they had been behind the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. They point out to therecent reshuffle in the Norths military leadership which removed the moderateslike Kim Il-Chul and promoted the hawkish generals. One of them was in charge of the navalfleet that the South believed was responsible for the torpedo attack on the Cheonan.

North Korean nuclear use triggers every impactit destroys the ozone

layer, global agriculture, the economy, and the global nonproliferation

regime.

Peter Hayes and Michael Green, 10 - *Victoria University AND**Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute , -The Path Not Taken, the


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Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,1/5/10, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Koreadevelopments, and related political and economic issues,are serious, not only for the Northeast Asianregion but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclearattack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading tothe resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key populationcentres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Koreanmissile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million,

and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in aholocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not bethe only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in theregion would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than globalwarming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchangeinvolving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the UnitedStates currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a

range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the firesproduced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degreesCelsius for a period of6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global winter, but the nucleardarkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during thelast 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the globalaverage. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of nuclear darkness will cause

much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds ofmillions of people will die from hunger...To make matters even worse,such amountsof smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in theEarths protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also betargeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left

by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and thefollow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and foodinsecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale bycomparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such acrisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use,could make orbreak the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could bemany unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5,with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, includingpossible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos ofnuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potentialproliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one thatwarrants priority consideration from the international community.

The plan will give US leverage to force Chinese engagement.

Emilson M, Espiritu. Commander, United States Navy, 3/15/2006, THEEAGLE HEADS HOME: RETHINKING NATIONAL SECURITYPOLICY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, submitted in partialfulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree


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One of the challenges the current Administration faces according to Park, is thelack of strong policy coordination with China, in jointly leading themultinational diplomatic effort38 The U.S. might use their withdrawalfrom South Korea as leverage for China to pursue a more strategic role inthe Asia Pacific theater. According to the 2006 QDR, the U.S. is in a favor of China playing a morestrategic role in the Asia-Pacific Theater. For China, The United States remains focused on encouraging China toplay a constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region and to serve as partner in addressing common securitychallenges, including terrorism, proliferation, narcotics and piracy. 39

China is uniquely key to North Korean denuclearization.

Michael E. Hanlon, Senior Fellow at Brookings, and Stephen J. Solarz, Former Congressman, New

York, 6/24/09 (A New North Korea Strategy,http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0624_north_korea_ohanlon.aspx

If there is hope ofa more effective strategy, it must center on China, NorthKorea's only ally by treaty. Beijing has also become Pyongyang's majoreconomic partner, accounting for three-quarters of trade with theimpoverished country and providing its main supplies of petroleum. Chinaenjoys unrivaled leverage in pressuring North Korea to desist from its recent provocations. But howto rein in Pyongyang? It's a question that has bedeviled Presidents Clinton, Bush and now Obama. We have afundamental problem. Like us, China is worried about a nuclear North Korea, concerned about the leadershipsuccession process there and unhappy with the provocative actions of its troublesome ally. But it probably worrieseven more about the potential for North Korean collapse. It much prefers a buffer between its borders andAmerican allies as well as U.S. mili tary forces. And it abhors the idea of regional instability. North Korea's choic

The only real hope of getting North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weaponsis to apply such significant economic pressure that the regime is forced tomake a choice between economic collapse and the verifiable dismantling ofits nuclear weapons and facilities. Such pressure would need to be accompanied by an offer of full

political and economic normalization if Pyongyang agreed to abandon its nuclear program. The onlycountry capable of applying such pressure is China.


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South Korea 1AC Plan Text [1/1]

Thus, the plan: the United States federal government should remove all its

ground troops from South Korea.


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South Korea 1AC Regionalism [1/6]

Contention ThreeRegionalism

US bilateral alliances are unsustainableAsian multilateralism is

critical to regional stability

Francis 06, Neil, former Australian Ambassador to Croatia and fellow atthe Weatherhead Center for International AffairsHarvard University from05-06, Fall 2006, Harvard International Review, For an East Asian Union:Rethinking Asia's Cold War Alliances,http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1586

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States established bilateralmilitary alliances in the Asia-Pacific intended to contain Soviet and Chinesecommunist expansion in the region. US security strategy now focuses largely on

combating terrorism and denying weapons of mass destruction to so-calledrogue states. It is a strategy that cannot be implemented with geographicmutual defense treaties formed to address conventional military threats.Furthermore, the United States has demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq that it isprepared to pursue its global security interests unilaterally, even at the riskof its political relations with traditional alliance partners. What happenedover Iraq between the United States and its European allies could equallyhappen between the United States and its Asian allies over Taiwan or NorthKorea with serious consequences for the interests of countries in that region.East Asianpowers need to develop a collective security strategy for the region thatdoes not rely on the United States participation. Prudence suggests that East Asian

countries need to take the opportunity offered by the recently inaugurated East Asian Summit(EAS) to begin the process of developing an East Asian community as thefirst step toward the realization of an East Asian Union. This will occur only if led bya strong, proactive Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).China is now the worlds second-largest economy, almost two-thirds as large as the United States in terms ofdomestic purchasing power. In 2005 China overtook Japan to become the worlds third-largest exporter of goodsand services. In 2004 it was the third-largest trading partner with ASEAN; the second largest with Japan,Australia, and India; and the largest with the Republic of Korea. The Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute (SIPRI) has estimated that in 2004, in purchasingpower parity dollar terms, Chinas military expenditurewas US$161.1 billion, the second highest in the world. The Pentagon has estimated that in 2005 Chinas militaryexpenditure was two to three times larger than its official figure of US$29.9 billion.Chinas growing economic and military strength along with the United States preoccupation with its new security

agenda has made some East Asian countries increasingly apprehensive. Particularly since September11, bilateral military alliances have become less relevant to US security

interests, and the United States will likely reduce its military presence in theEast Asian region. Parts of Asia believe that Chinese hegemonic aspirations for East Asia could emergeif the United States were to disengage from the region. Fear of China and the possibility that it harborshegemonic aspirations were among the factors that led to the creation of ASEAN in 1967 and theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. Engaging China in an East Asian union in the


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future would ensure it will pay a high price in loss of trade and investmentif it acts against the interests of the unions other members.Prospects for an East Asian CommunityIn December 2005 ASEAN hosted an inaugural East Asian Su mmit in Kuala Lumpur. The summit involved the10 ASEAN countries; the ASEAN+3 countries o f China, Japan, and South Korea; as well as Australia, New Zealand, and India. The summit declarationof December 14, 2005, described the meeting as a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concernwith the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia. The declaration also noted that t he summit could play a sign ificantrole in community building in this region.ASEAN would work in partnership with the other participants of the East Asian Summit, but ASEAN wasto retain leadership, preventing control of East Asian community building by either the ASEAN+3 countries, which China could dominate, or the 16EAS countries, which some felt could steer the EAS toward what would be an unwe lcome Western agenda.It remains to be seen whether an East Asian community can emerge under ASEAN leadership. ASEAN is an association: it is not a strong regionalinstitution with common interests and objectives. It reflects the diversity of its membership, which has traditionally preferred an unstructuredorganization, a consensus approach to decision making, and avoidance of controversial issues or intervention in the affairs of its members.The ASEANWay under ChallengeASEANs ways, however, may be changing. Since the late 1990s ASEANs non-intervention principle has come under challenge.In 1997 ASEAN was faced with an As ian economic crisis triggered by currency speculators and in 1997 to 1998 with a regional pollution haze pro blemcaused by illegal land-clearance fires in Indonesia. ASEANs ineffectiveness in these crises brought internal scrutiny to bear on ASEANs policy o fnon-intervention in domestic affairs. As a result, since 1999 ASEAN foreign ministers have discussed t hese and other transnational problemsillegalmigration, terrorism, and the drug tradethat call for collective responses. They have also considered allowing ASEAN to oversee electoral andgovernance processes within member states.In 1999 a number of ASEAN countries defied the long-standing ASEAN position that East Timor was aninternal matter for Indonesia and sent peace-keeping forces to the island to help que ll the violence instigated th ere by anti-independence militia backedby Indonesian armed forces. In 2005 ASEAN placed public pressure on the government of Myanmar to allow an ASEAN delegation to visit Myanmarand assess what progress had been made in human rights and democratization. With the aid of the United States and European Union, ASEAN alsopersuaded Myanmar to relinquish its role as ASEAN chair. ASEANs actions in the 1990s suggest increased sensitivity to the negative effects ofindividual member nations on the organizations international standing as well as t he beginning of openness toward intervention in the domestic affairsof its members.Toward RealizationAt its December 2005 summit, ASEAN agreed to institute an ASEAN Charter by 2020 to provide what MalaysianPrime Minister Badawi has called a mini-constitution, a document that will establish an institutional framework for ASEAN as well as a legal identityrecognized by the United Nations. The o lder membersBrunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapor e, and ThailandwantASEAN to become something more than an association. Inst itutionally strong and mostly democratic, t hey might more readily welcome a rules-governed organization similar to the Europ ean Union. Others with institutionally weak, authoritarian governments, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,and Vietnam, are wary of placing their domestic po licies under greater international scrutiny and favor the st atus quo. If th e former nations prevail it

will augur well for the realization of an East Asian community with the potential to evolve into an East Asian Union.An East Asiancommunity composed of the 16 EAS participants would represent more than 60 percent of the worldspopulation and possess a combined GDP greater than the European Union. It could providesignificantly increased trade benefits to its members, help dampen Sino-Japanese rivalry, ease the present tensions in the region over Japans PacificWar, encourage more cooperative attitudes toward the issue of naturalresource exploitation in East Asia, promote engagement over containment,and prevent domination of the region by any major power. The determiningfactor will be ASEANs ability to provide the leadership necessary to create a strong,independent East Asian Union.

Regionalism is low now because countries rely on the USonly a

decisive U.S. withdrawal can motivate sustainable regional security

cooperation.

Carpenter and Bandow 4 - * Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the CatoInstitute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum:Americas Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 160 -161)DR

The security treaties with the United States and the U.S. troop presenceallow the diversion of financial resources to domestic priorities. And relyingon the United States for security avoids painful debates about what kind ofpolicy those countries need to pursue. The U.S. security blanket is entirely too comfortable

for Washingtons clients. Without a decisive move by the United States to takeaway that security blanket by a certain date, changes in the security postureof South Korea and Japan will be very slow to occur. Second, the United Statesshould encourage the various nations of East Asia to take greaterresponsibility for the security and stability of their region. In limited and attimes hesitant ways that process is taking place even without U.S.encouragement. ASEAN has begun to address security issues, most notably takingan interest in the disorders in Indonesia that threatened to spiral out of control in the late 1990s and that continue


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to pose a problem. Australia assumed a leadership role in helping to resolve the East Timor crisis. It was revealingthat Canberra became more proactive after the United States declined to send peacekeeping troops or otherwise

become deeply involved in that situation. 37 According to the conventional wisdom that

U.S. leadership is imperative lest allies and client states despair and fail todeal with regional security problems, Australias actions suggest just theopposite. When countries in a region facing a security problem cannotoffload that problem onto the United States, they take action to contain acrisis and defend their own interests. More recently, Australia has developed a more definedand robust regional strategy. In a June 2003 speech, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated that Australiawould not necessarily turn to the United Nations before acting in crises that could affect its security. Instead,Canberra was prepared to joinand sometimes even leadcoalitions of the willing to address urgent regionalchallenges. Downer spoke as Australia prepared to send 2,000 police officers and supporting military personnel tothe Solomon Islands, which had experienced such an epidemic of violence and corruption that it verged on being afailed state. Earlier, Prime Minister John Howard had told Australian lawmakers that having failed states in itsneighborhood threatened Australias interests, because such states could become havens for criminals and politicalextremists. 38 Perhaps most revealing, the Australian government plans to double its defense spending over thenext three years with the intent of becoming a much more serious military player. 39 Third, Washington shouldindicate to Tokyo that it no longer objects to Japans assuming a more active political and military posture in EastAsia. Quite the contrary, U.S. officials ought to adopt the position that, as the principal indigenous great power,Japan will be expected to help stabilize East Asia, contribute to the resolution of disputes, and contain disruptiveor expansionist threats that might emerge. Washington also should use its diplomatic influence to encourage

political and security cooperation between Japan and its neighbors, but U.S. policymakers must notlet East Asian apprehension about a more assertive Japan dictate Americanpolicy and keep the United States in its role as regional policeman. It isreasonable to explore with Tokyo avenues of cooperation in those areaswhere there is a sufficient convergence of interests . That cooperation should not,however, take the form of a new alliance. Proposals to reform and strengthen the allianceare unwise. 40 They will perpetuate Japans unhealthy dependence on theUnited States even as they arouse Chinas suspicions of a U.S.Japaneseattempt to contain the Peoples Republic. An ongoing security dialogue and occasional jointmilitary exercises would be more appropriate than a formal alliance for East Asias security needs in the twenty -first century. Elaborate, formal treaty commitments are a bad idea in general. They are excessively rigid and canlock the United States into commitments that may make sense under one set of conditions but become ill-advisedor even counterproductive when conditions change. Beyond that general objection, a U.S.Japanese alliancewould be likely to create special problems in the future. Such an alliance would provide tangible evidence to thosein the Peoples Republic who contend that Washington is intent on adopting a containment policy directed against

China. 41 The United States should retain the ability to work with Japan andother powers if Beijings ambitions threaten to lead to Chinese dominanceof the region, but Washington must be wary of creating a self-fulfillingprophecy. An informal security relationship with Japan would preserve theflexibility to block Chinas hegemony, if that danger emerges, withoutneedlessly antagonizing Beijing. America still can have a potent powerprojection capability with a reduced military presence based in Guam and

other U.S. territories in the central and west-central Pacific.


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American forces based in South Korea mean the US will always control

South Korean foreign policythat makes regionalism impossible.

Bandow and Carpenter 2004*JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant toReagan, writes for Fortune, National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vicepresident for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board ofthe Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, The Korean conundrum, Google Books, page 135, WEA)

So long as American forces are based in the South, Washington will seek todominate and control the alliance. And for good reason: the United States has never and shouldnever promise to go to war on someone elses terms. If South Korea wants Americas aid, it must accept t he

conditions under which such assistance is offered. Real equality is simply impossible. Moreover, Seoulcannot escape being tied to U.S. policy even if it is carried out beyond theSouths borders. Imagine the imposition of sanctions, enforcement of ablockade, or military strikes on the Northconducted by American forces

located beyond South Koreas borders and acting outside of South Koreasborders over the objections of the ROK. North Korea is unlikely todistinguish the positions of the two members of the mutual defense pactand is likely to view the South as an appropriate target of retaliation.

Specially, withdrawal will reduce Koreas veto of multilateral security

mechanismsyielding a peace system on the peninsula that prevents

great power war.

Lee, 09Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, The Nexus between Koreas Regional SecurityOptions and Domestic Politics,www.cfr.org, JMP)

Koreas Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia

The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. Since 1988, Korea hasadvocated regional security cooperation, and in 1994, Korea officiallyproposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ASEANRegional Forum (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia startedin 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six PartyTalks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have graduallyrealized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identicalinterests in such a mechanism.6From Koreas perspective, a semi-regional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits.7First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia,North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at theSix Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamentalproblems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the

problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements.Second, a

multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally aglobal security arrangement, as it includes all the global powers except the

European Union. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic

superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. The high concentration ofsuperpowers in Northeast Asia poses a threat to Korea because an outbreakof great-power conflict in the region will definitely devastate Korea, if notthe world. Therefore, Korea has reason to promote a multilateral securitymechanism that increases transparency among global powers and functions
http://www.cfr.org/http://www.cfr.org/http://www.cfr.org/


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as a confidence-building measure. Third, voluntary or involuntary betrayal by

theUnited States has preoccupied many Koreans and security experts. SomeKoreans felt betrayed when the United States agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula. The Park Chung-hee

government felt abandoned when the United States withdrew a significant portion of U.S. soldiers from Korea,and was taken aback by rapprochement between the United States and China. Many Koreans got upset when theUnited States supported the authoritarian Korean government and kept silent during the Kwangju massacre in1980. They again felt betrayed when it was rumored that the Clinton administration planned air strikes againstNorth Korea without informing South Korea. And they were upset with the unilateral foreign policy s tance of the

George W. Bush administration, including its decision to pull the second infantry division out of Korea. Amultilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia will mitigate the

security concern of Korea when theUnited States either voluntarily orinvoluntarily defects from its commitment to Korea.Fourth, multilateralsecurity cooperation in Northeast Asia is necessary to establish a peacesystem on the Korean peninsula and ultimately unify Korea. Many Korean peopledoubt that the major powers, including the United States, want the unification of the Korean peninsula. Korea

wants to deal with these powers transparently through a multilateral securitycooperation mechanism.Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, manyKoreans recognize the need to adjust Koreas external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. Making

exclusive ties with theUnited States may be a high-risk investment in a pasthegemon, while exclusive ties with China would be a high-risk investment in an uncertain future. In thistransitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is anattractive partial exit option for Korea. A multilateral security mechanism inNortheast Asia appeals to Korea, so if voice and loyalty in the U.S.-Korearelationship do not reveal positive correlations, then Korea will pay moreattention to multilateral regional options. Moreover, if the U.S. capability andcredibility in delivering its security promises to alliance partners are

questioned, there will be fewer veto powers in Korean politics against amultilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, particularly when suchan option still maintains a loose form of the U.S.-Korea alliance.

Asian instability causes global nuclear war

Landay 2k, Jonathan S., National Security and Intelligence Correspondent,Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, 3-10, Lexis

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, orIndia and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation byany of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start anuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North

Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiationsand diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for fivedecades in Cold War Europe. Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as highand relationships so fragile, said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asianpolicy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. Wesee the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingeringconfrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. Thereare elements for potential disaster.In an effort to cool the regions tempers, President Clinton,


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Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asiascapitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia

committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly

become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Koreaattacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments toeither India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the globaltaboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shakyinternational nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made astable Asia, with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources, indispensable to theU.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled$600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

Strengthening the East Asian regional security architectureis key to

solve terrorism, territorial disputes, disease, environmental

degradation, and maritime security

Nanto, 08Specialist in Industry and Trade Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for CongressionalResearch Services (1/4, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S.Policy, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33653.pdf)

A stronger regional security organization in East Asia could play a role in

quelling terrorism by violent extremists. Since terrorism is a transnational problem, theUnited States

relies on international cooperation to counter it. Without close multilateralcooperation, there are simply too many nooks and crannies for violentextremists to exploit.101 Currently, most of that cooperation is bilateral or between the United Statesand its traditional allies. While the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3, for example, have addressed theissue of terrorism, neither has conducted joint counter-terrorism exercises as has the Shanghai CooperationOrganization. Neither organization as a group, moreover, has joined U.S. initiatives aimed at North Koreannuclear weapons (e.g., the Proliferation Security Initiative).

Meanwhile, tensions continue across the Taiwan Strait, and disputes overterritory and drilling rights have flared up between China and Japan andbetween Japan and South Korea. (For the United States, there is a growingpossibility of nationalist territorial conflicts between two or more U.S.allies.102) The North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved; North Korea has conducted tests of ballisticmissiles and a nuclear weapon; and the oppressive military rule in Burma/Myanmar continues. Added tothese concerns are several regional issues: diseases (such as avian flu, SARS, and AIDS),environmental degradation, disaster mitigation and prevention, high seaspiracy, and weapons proliferation. Memories of the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis still hauntpolicy makers in Asian countries.#These are some of the major U.S. interests and issues as the United States proceeds with its policy toward a

regional architecture in East Asia. Since this policy is aimed at the long-term structure of East Asian nations, itcan be separated, somewhat, from current pressing problems. A metric by which any architecture can beevaluated, however, is how well it contributes to a resolution of problems as they now exist or will exist in thefuture.


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South Korea 1AC Solvency [1/4]

Contention FourSolvency

South Korea can defend itselfUS troops only act as a tripwire forcing

the US to intervene, triggering nuclear warwithdrawal solves.

Doug Bandow, 1996, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American ConservativeDefense Alliance and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, TRIPWIRE;Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, pg. 8-10)

Military Dangers More important is the military risk of U.S. security ties. Although the Americancommitment probably helps deter North Korean aggression, it ensures that the United Stateswill be involved if hostilities should recur. Indeed, the 37,000 U.S. soldiersare a tripwire that makes intervention automatic. Although the risk of war seems slight atthe momentin late 1995 famine in the North and political scandal in the South did raise tensionsthe

consequences would be horrific. And the possible acquisition by North Korea ofatomic weapons increases the potential costs exponentially. If a conflicterupted, perhaps over the nuclear issue should the current agreement with Pyongyang break down, theAmerican troops would become nuclear hostages. There are obviously times when thenation must risk war. But this is not one. There are no vital American interests at stake that warrant such a risk.The mere fact that the United States fought in Korea nearly 50 years ago does not mean it should prepare to do soagain; the best way of honoring the sacrifice of so many soldiers in that war is to ensure that no Americans will beforced to fight and die in a similar future conflict. That is not to say that Washington has no interests at stake onthe peninsulathe U.S.-South Korean cultural and economic ties are real, though modestbut they do not

warrant a security guarantee and troop presence. In any case, America no longer needs toprovide a military commitment to secure its interests. South Korea is nowfully capable of defending itself. So, why is Washington risking the lives of U.S. soldiers inKorea? Put bluntly, would it dramatically affect American interests if war broke out on the peninsula and

produced the worst-case scenarioa North Korean conquest of the ROK? Since the Korean War killed anestimated 1 million Koreans and Kim Jong Il's regime is the last best replica of Stalinist totalitarianism, such a

conflict and outcome would obviously be tragic.21But tragedy alone is not sufficient towarrant U.S. intervention, otherwise America would have invaded theUSSR and, later, China to stop mass murder greater than that which occurred in Nazi Germany. Americawould also have occupied Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, and a host of other smaller hellholes around

the globe. While moral concerns tug at our hearts, they are not enough towarrant committing 260 million Americans to war, risking unknownamounts of treasure and numbers of lives. In the case of Korea, we should ask, wouldU.S. security be seriously affected by a war (assuming no Americantripwire was present to automatically trigger U.S. involvement)? No Threat toAmerica The answer is no. Kim Jong Il's forces would pose no credible

military threat to the United States. And, unlike the situation in 1950, a successfulNorth Korean attack, highly unlikely given the South's capabilities, would be unconnectedto a larger, hegemonic international threat to America. A united communist Koreawould lack the wherewithal even to threaten its closest neighbors, China and Russia. Given the low quality of theNorth's military, and Pyongyang's economic travails, as well as the intensified international isolation that would

greet the DPRK as a result of renewed aggression, even the unlikely worst-case scenariowould be a tragedy confined to the Korean peninsula. A victorious North Korea wouldface insurmountable difficulty developing the military capability to intervene overseas, against, say, Japan.Pyongyang's possible possession of nuclear weapons would rightly frighten Tokyo, but the lat-ter's developmentof a countervailing weapon, while unsettling to its neighbors, would deter any adventurism.


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Unilateral US withdrawal would reduce tensions with North Korea and

trigger regional cooperation on denuclearization.

David Lai, 2009, Prof of Asian Security Studies at the Strategic StudiesInstitute, Army War College, Obama's Policy Option on North Korea,http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=286President Obama should see that the shortest route to the solution of the North Korean nuclear issue is the directone between Washington and Pyongyang. Yet given the unending confrontations with North Korea, the UnitedStates also has to make a stop in Beijing. In addition, Obama should see that the reasons for the 6-PT still hold,

and it is necessary to get the 6-PT back to work. Finally, the president needs a realistic,workable approach to North Korea. China and Russia have long maintained that the NorthKorea problem is a remnant of the Cold War. They claim that it is a result of North Korea and the United Statesfailing to make timely adjustments in their relations at the end of the Cold War (Russia and China normalizedtheir relations with their Cold War opponent South Korea in 1991 and 1992 respectively). Thus, it follows thatNorth Koreas quest for nuclear weapons is an answer to its perceivedsecurity threat from the United States. Washington holds the key to the North Koreanissue, and it is time the United States stops letting emotions dictate its foreign policy and should deal with NorthKorea pragmatically. That being said, it is unrealistic to propose change to the US approach toward North Koreaat the height of the current confrontation. But the time will come when the United States has to sit down withNorth Korea to find a way out.4 In the next round of negotiations, President Obama should offer North Korea apragmatic approach to get the two nations out of this senseless agony. Here are the key elements of this newpotential approach: First, we know that North Korea wants to settle its problems with the United States directly.However, North Koreas problems are ultimately Northeast Asian regional problems. Thus, the United Statesshould deal with North Korea directly in the context of the 6-PT. That is, much like what former AssistantSecretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill did during the previous 6-PT, the UnitedStates can reach tentative agreements directly with North Korea in separate meetings and then bring in the otherfour parties to endorse these agreements and commit to their respective responsibilities. The United States should alsotake a new action-for-action approach with North Korea. Unlike the previous approach, which required North Korea to freeze its

nuclear facilities first, the United States should take the initiative and ease North Koreassecurity concerns in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear weapons program. The US initiativesshould include a peace treaty to conclude the Korean War, which would entail the withdrawal

of US combat troops fromSouth Korea and diplomatic recognition as part of normalizingrelations with North Korea. Along with the normalization of relations, the United States should promote full-fledged exchanges with North Korea, most notably, economic trade and development, education and cultural

exchanges. These are not revolutionary ideas. The United States has reassured North Koreamany times, verbally and in written form, in the Agreed Framework of 1994 and the 6-PT statements, thatthe United States respects North Koreas sovereignty, the United States has no intention ofinvading North Korea and the United States will normalize relations with North Korea when the time isright. All of these promises were made on the condition that North Koreaabandoned its nuclear program first. The key this time is for the UnitedStates to be willing to make the first move. The United States should make no secret aboutthis pragmatic approach and what to expect from it. This would be an adjustment based on the reality that the

United States has refused to face for a long time and not another concession. This new approach

wouldfundamentally change the nature of the game and US-North Korea relations. Byextricating itself from direct conflict in Northeast Asia, the United Stateswould expect the nations in this region to take full responsibility in pursuingthe goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The United States would be declaring itscommitment to this goal and working with the involved parties to bring the nuclear weapon issue to a satisfactoryconclusion. The United States came to the Korean Peninsula 60 years ago with the good intention of helping theKoreans; however, the situation has changed over time. The US military presence is now increasingly perceivedas an obstacle to the Korean unification process. The withdrawal of US combat troops from South Korea is meantto remove this obstacle. Although the United States surely wishes the Koreans all the best in their unificationefforts, at the same time, it wants to see this unification take place through peaceful means, not through war.


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Troop pullout is necessary to send a credible signal to the DPRK

KIM JOHNG SOHN, 9.Tongail Korea Net, US Should Terminate MilitaryPresence in S Korea As Early As Possible, 9-8,http://tongilkorea.net/2009/09/08/us-should-terminate-military-presence-in-s-korea-as-early-as-possible/.PyongyangIt has passed 64 years since the U.S. imperialists occupation of south Korea. If the United Statespersistently enforces its policy of military presence in south Korea, lending a deaf ear to the voices of the peoples of Koreaand other countries of the world demanding the earliest withdrawal of the U.S. forces from south Korea, it will face bittererrebuff and denunciation at home and abroad. The U.S. forces landing in south Korea was aimed at keeping it under itsoccupation and turning it into its colony, dividing Korea into two parts and using its southern half as a military appendage

for executing its policy of aggression. The U.S. moves to seek its forces permanent

presence in south Korea and bolster up its combat capability are a challenge

to the demand of the times for the withdrawal of foreign troops and their

trend.The U.S. should pull its forces out of South Korea as early as possible

as demanded by international law and the times. The termination of the U.S.forces presence in South Korea would remove the basic factor of threatening

the peace in Korea and the biggest hurdle lying in the way of national

reunification. The pullback of the U.S. forces from south Korea would resultin eliminating the most dangerous hotbed of war in the world and thus help

create environment favorable for ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the

rest of Asia and the world. How to approach the issue of the U.S. forces withdrawal

from south Korea serves as a barometer judging whether the U.S. has a will

to rectify its hostile policy towards the DPRK or not and whether it wishes to

see Koreas reunification and peace or not. The world is waiting for the U.S. to make aswitchover in its attitude.


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The plan empowers North Korean reformers and makes space for

regionalism and denuclearization.

Yasuhiro Izumikawa, 2004, PhD and candidate for the Keidanren Chair inJapanese Research, Miyazaki International College, Miyazaki, Japan, Fall 2004,The Korean Endgame, Pacific Affairs: Volume 77, No. 3

Among the few Westerners who have visited North Korea, Selig Harrison stands out for his intensivecontacts with North Korean leaders, and he is one of the Western intellectuals mostinformed of the inner workings of North Korean politics. Based on his richexperiences, the author puts forward a provocative argument about how the United States canpromote stability and peace in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Thisbook provides an insightful alternative strategy for US policy toward the region, although his opponents will

remain unconvinced. The authors core argument is straightforward and controversial: the United Statesshouldgradually disengage itself from the Korean Peninsula . According to the author,the current US policy thatis designed to maintain apermanent US military

presence in the Korean Peninsula is counterproductive to the stability ofthe region. Instead, he argues, the US military in South Korea should graduallywithdrawfrom the peninsula in order to promote thereconciliation of the twoKoreas and tosolicit cooperation from the regional powers for the creationof a nuclear-free neutral Korea. The assumption that underlies the authors argument, although itremains implicit, is that domestic politics in North Korea play an equal or moreimportant role in determining its external behaviourthan international environments. Inparticular, he emphasizes the importance of nationalism in both Koreas. He points out that nationalism inNorth Korea remains strong despite economic hardships, and that perceived US militarythreats help North Korean hardliners exploit this nationalism to defendtheir preferred policies. In South Korea, on the other hand, the continuing US military presence is the

source of rising anti-US nationalism, he argues. It follows that US disengagement wouldenable North Korean reformers to pursue more cooperative relations withthe West, while alleviating anti-US sentiment in the South.

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