1acPlan: The United States federal government should make Cuban nationals eligible to play organized baseball in the United States

relations advantage

Scenario one is Cuba - The plan restores US-Cuban relations –forced defection prevents mutual trust Greller 2k (Matthew, JD from the American University Washington College of Law, “Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fastball Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: n1 How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League Baseball and United States-Cuba Relations,” 14 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1647, Lexis)

[*1685] III. BASEBALL AND UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS A. Early Baseball Diplomacy

Almost a century before Fidel Castro took power, the relationship between the United States and Cuba bonded through baseball when American-educated Cuban students and United States Marines brought baseball equipment to Cuba. n158 Since those first games in Cuba, baseball became a common ground that continues to connect the Cuban and American people. n159 Despite this common ground, however, rancorous political differences continue to stymie United States-Cuban relations, n160 and keep the populations of the two nations apart. This enmity arose in early 1960, when the Cuban government nationalized all United States business and commercial properties in Cuba. n161 That same year, the Castro government banned Cuban ath [*1686] letes from competing in professional sports, n162 which effectively ended the prominence of new Cuban-trained talent in MLB n163 until Arocha's defection.

n164 Before Arocha's defection, however, the United States made several attempts in the 1970s to improve relations with Cuba through baseball. n165 These attempts revealed the internal divisions and political differences within both MLB and the U nited S tates government, which ultimately caused early Baseball Diplomacy efforts to fail . n166 [*1687] Prior to issuing the 1977 Directive that forbids scouting Cuban baseball players, former MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn promoted the idea of Baseball Diplomacy to the State Department. n167 Kuhn's correspondence suggested that the

Cubans desired to compete within MLB, and that baseball could provide the appropriate medium for promoting American values to the Cuban people. n168 Internal State Department memoranda indicated that, much like the 1971 Ping-Pong Diplomacy with China, n169 baseball games with Cuba could [*1688] forge a new relationship with the Cuban people, n170 and remain distinct from the political relations between Washington and Havana. n171 Despite Kuhn's efforts to organize games in Cuba, n172 however, the State Department rejected the Baseball Diplomacy

proposal. n173 Instead of seizing the opportunity in the 1970s to improve United States-Cuba relations through baseball, the high profile defections of Cuban players in the 1990s allowed baseball to embitter bilateral relations . n174 [*1689] B. United States-Cuba Relations After

Arocha Rene Arocha's foray into MLB followed the tenor of existing United States-Cuban relations. n175 The larger forces of Cuba's struggling economy, n176 coupled with the appeal of lucrative MLB salaries, n177 heavily influenced Arocha's defection and the desires of other Cuban baseball players to defect. n178 This rebirth of a Cuban-trained presence in MLB coincided with several external events that drastically affected United States-Cuban relations . n179 Following the arrival of these Cuban players, legislative developments in the United States hastened the collapse of the Cuban econ [*1690] omy, n180 and subsequently encouraged further baseball defections. n181 [*1691] Unlike Jackie Robinson's' pioneering entry into

MLB, that eventually enabled societal changes regarding race relations, n182 the legislative

developments following Arocha's arrival additionally aggravated the relations between the United States and Cuba. n183 Ultimately, by encouraging further defections , this legislation extended animosity to the baseball diamond. n184 C. United States-Cuba Relations and the "El Duque" Model Whether through direct or indirect methods, during the past forty years the United States repeatedly attempted to depose Fidel Castro. n185 By defiantly retaining power, the Castro government infuriates the powerful Cuban-American lobby n186 and the United States government because of its communist ideology, rampant human rights [*1692] abuses, n187

and the visceral issue of confiscated American property. n188 After Arocha's defection, the hostile relations between the United States and Cuba further extended this bilateral animosity to the world of baseball by producing the "El Duque" model . The poor economic conditions within Cuba, exacerbated by the lack of Soviet assistance n189 and the strengthened United States embargo, n190 increased the allure of MLB's skyrocketing salary structure n191 for Cuban baseball players. n192 To immediately obtain these ap [*1693] pealing salaries or play in front of a Cuban-American crowd, n193 however, players must follow the "El Duque" model and defect to a third country. n194 The internal Cuban and MLB policies, which stem from poor bilateral relations, leave defecting Cuban players without any feasible alternatives to this mode of Cuban baseball player immigration. n195

Consequently, the "El Duque" model continues to taint the common ground between the U nited S tates and Cuba because of its circuitous path around the laws that compelled its creation. n196

Instead of continuing to allow this method of immigration to make baseball yet another area that fuels the burning animosity between the United States and Cuba, implementing significant changes regarding the "El Duque" model can allow baseball to bring the two nations closer together . n197 Recent developments indicate a willingness to utilize baseball in this direction. n198 [*1694] D. A New Hope: United States-Cuba Relations The Oriole Way In addition to other efforts that increased contacts with the Cuban people, n199 the exhibition games between the Orioles and the Cuban National team illustrated baseball's power to bring the Cuban and

American people closer together. n200 Although both nations asserted that the games only represented people-to-people contacts, and not an attempt to normalize relations, n201 the potential exists for baseball to forge closer ties between the two nations without abandoning their principles. n202 For such an effective Baseball Diplomacy to occur, [*1695] however, MLB, the United States, and Cuba must eliminate the problematic "El Duque" model that exacerbates existing problems within MLB n203 and United States-Cuba relations. n204

Cuba will co-op – defection is THE issue preventing baseball diplomacyGreller 2k (Matthew, JD from the American University Washington College of Law, “Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fastball Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: n1 How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League Baseball and United States-Cuba Relations,” 14 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1647, Lexis)

IV. EFFECTIVE BASEBALL DIPLOMACY: A DOUBLE PLAY FOR MLB AND UNITED STATES-CUBA

RELATIONS The drain of talent from Cuba to MLB provides a source of international embarrassment to Cuban President, and baseball fan, Fidel

Castro. n205 Castro's distaste for these defections embitters United [*1696] States-Cuba relations , and is strikingly similar to many MLB teams' distaste for the departure of free agent players to rival teams. n206 While the original

defectors did not represent Cuba's best talent, n207 the subsequent defections of pitchers Osvaldo Fernandez and the Hernandez brothers illustrated that the top-tier players also desired to leave Cuba for MLB. n208 To prevent further defections, the touring National Team suspended several players suspected of defecting, and shuffled its roster to exclude some of the best players. n209 Many baseball scouts [*1697] claim that this drastic rearrangement represents the beginning of Castro's effort to prevent further baseball defections to America. n210 Rather than witness these players defect to the United States, several scouts believe that Castro will sell the rights n211 to the players

cleared for the 2000 Olympics to the Japanese League. n212 Preventing talented

Cuban baseball players from competing on the National Team , or sending them to Japan, only balks at the possibility to improve the relations between the United States and Cuba through Baseball Diplomacy. n213 The recent changes in the embargo against Cuba indicate the United States' willingness to seek greater contacts between the people of these two nations. n214 Moreover, Fidel Castro's recent international agreements recognize the importance of [*1698] forging political and economic ties to ease Cuba's economic crisis. n215 Consequently, changes regarding Cuban

baseball immigration can provide the impetus for creating the

greater contacts and economic ties desired by both nations . n216

Thus, the incentive exists for Castro to permit Cubans to compete in

MLB if such a policy could both rectify the deteriorating

conditions of Cuban baseball , n217 and enable the peo [*1699]

ple-to-people contacts needed to energize the relationship

between the United States and Cuba. n218 Recent statements from Cuban officials indicate a willingness by Cuba to allow its players to compete in MLB, provided that any new arrangement respects Cuban

socialist sports. n219 Continued adherence to the "El Duque" model will only serve to intensify the many problems that stem from this model. n220 Adhering to a four-step process, however, can alleviate these problems, and create an effective Baseball Diplomacy to improve the quality of MLB and United States-Cuba relations.

Sports diplomacy is key for an effectiveness of Cuba relationsGoldberg 2k (The Washington Quarterly. Sporting Diplomacy. http://www.twq.com/autumn00/goldberg.pdf)

No doubt there are other efforts to bring the United States closer to “states of concern.” Iranian president Mohammad Khatami called for a “crack in this wall of mistrust” by urging a dialogue among

academics, writers, artists, journalists, and tourists. The United States is also pushing for more “people-to-people” contacts with Cuba, such as air

links and ex- changes of scholars and artists. Notwithstanding the value that academic, scientific, artistic, and even military-to-military exchanges have in bringing about cultural understanding among participants, it is sport that receives the mass media coverage and involve the broader public— a precondition to broader policy changes (i.e., engagement) with “states of concern.” Business exchanges may be laden with

implications of economic reform, sports are not perceived as a threat to the structure of society itself . The exposure of secrets is not feared as

it might be in military exchanges. Sports are a low risk testing ground for gauging the public’s reaction to another country and , ultimately, for moving toward rapprochement . The most prominent example of the role that sports can play in break ing down barriers is the visit of the U.S. table tennis team to the PRC in 1971. Ping Pong diplomacy, followed a year later by the visit of a U.S. basketball team, laid the groundwork for President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and the eventual normalization of relations. The

sports exchanges helped to challenge stereotypes about Americans and Chinese and to open a new dialogue for understanding, such as encouraging further people-to people contacts . The role that sports played in evolving the U.S. relationship with China suggests that it can also play a role in reaching out to today’s rogue states.

Drilling and spills are inevitable in Cuba – US-Cuba relations solve disaster response and clean-up Pinon & Muse 10 (Jorge and Robert, Visiting Research Fellow in the Cuba Research Institute at Florida International University and Attorney with substantial experience in US-Cuba legal matters, "Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why US-Cuba Environmental Cooperation is Critical," The Brookings Institute, Cuba Issue Briefing No. 2, May, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0518_oil_spill_cuba_pinon/0518_oil_spill_cuba_pinon.pdf)

While the quest for deepwater drilling of oil and gas may slow as a result of the latest calamity, it is un- likely to stop . it came as little surprise, for example, that Repsol recently announced plans to move for- ward with exploratory oil

drilling in Cuban territo- rial waters later this year.1 As Cuba continues to develop its deepwater oil and natural gas reserves , the consequence to the United states of a similar mishap occurring in Cuban waters moves from the theoretical to the actual . The sober- ing fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of miles of American coastline and do profound harm to important marine habitats demands cooperative and proactive planning by Washington and havana to minimize or avoid such a calamity . Also important is the planning necessary to prevent and, if necessary, respond to incidents arising froam this country’s oil industry that, through the action of currents and wind, threaten Cuban waters and shorelines. While Washington is working to prevent future di- sasters in U.s. waters like the Deepwater Horizon, its current policies foreclose the ability to respond effectively to future oil disasters—whether that disaster is caused by companies at work in Cuban waters, or is the result of companies operating in U.s. waters. Context in April 2009, the Brookings institution released a comprehensive report on United states—Cuba rela- tions Cuba: a new Policy of Critical of Critical and Constructive engagement timed to serve as a resource for policymakers in the new Administration. The report, which reflected consensus among a diverse group of experts on U.s.-Cuba relations, was notable for its menu of executive Branch actions that could, over time, facilitate the restoration of normal rela- tions between the United states and Cuba through a series of confidence-building exercises in areas of clear mutual interest. The emphasis was on identify- ing unobjectionable, practical and realizable areas of cooperation between the two countries. Among the initiatives recommended to the new obama Administration were: • “Open a dialogue between the United States and Cuba, particularly on issues of mutual concern, including migration, counter-nar- cotics, environment, health, and security.• Develop agreements and assistance with the government of Cuba for disaster relief and en- vironmental stewardship.” Shortly after releasing its report, Brookings and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) co-hosted a new era for U.S.-Cuba Relations on Marine and Coastal Resources Conservation, a conference high- lighting the importance and value of environmental cooperation between Cuba and the United states. EDF has particular expertise in this area because it has been working with Cuban scientists and envi-

ronmental officials for over a decade to protect coral reefs, marine life and coastal areas in their country. The joint Brookings/EDF conference identified areas of potential bilateral collaboration aimed at protect- ing shared marine and coastal ecosystems in the gulf of Mexico, Caribbean sea and

the Atlantic ocean. The importance of cooperation on environmental is- sues stressed at the conference is particularly relevant now in light of events like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the basic facts of geography and their rela- tion to threats to contiguous U.s. and Cuban marine areas. Cuba sits at the intersection of the Atlantic ocean, Caribbean sea and gulf of Mexico and thus shares marine waters with the United states, areas where oil and gas deposits are about to be explored . Preserving that country’s marine biodiversity is critically important because it constitutes the nat- ural heritage of the Cuban people. The health of Cuba’s ocean environment is likewise important to the economies of coastal communities in the United states where significant numbers of fish species that spawn in Cuban waters are carried by prevailing currents into U.s. waters and caught by commercial and recreational fishermen. florida and the southeastern United states are situated in the downstream of those currents, which bring snapper, grouper, tuna, swordfish (as well as manatee and sea turtles) to U.S. waters, but can serve equally as vec- tors of Cuban spilled oil. The United states geological survey estimates that Cuba’s Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), which includes the gulf of Mexico north Cuba fold and Thrust Belt, has over five billion barrels of oil and 8.6 billion cubic feet of natural gas undiscovered reserves.2 Like the United states, the size of Cuba’s oil and gas reserves is both economically fortuitous and a measure of the threat it poses to the marine environment in addition to spain’s Repsol, over the next few years international oil companies such as norway’s statoil-hydro, Brazil’s Petrobras and others will be conducting exploratory work off Cuba’s north coast. it is only a matter of time before production begins in

earnest and the environmental risks rise exponentially. To respond effectively to an oil-related marine acci- dent, any company operating in or near Cuban ter- ritorial waters will require immediate access to the expertise and equipment of U.s. oil companies and their suppliers. They are best positioned to provide immediately the technology and know-how needed to halt and limit the damage to the marine envi- ronment. obviously, the establishment of working relations between the United states and Cuba to fa- cilitate marine environmental protection is the first step in the contingency planning and cooperation that will be necessary to an effective response and early end to an oil spill.

Cuba is a hotspot - relations are necessary for solving global environmental collapseCouncil on Hemispheric Affairs 9 ("The US and Cuba: an Environmental Duo," Scoop World, June 15, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0906/S00198.htm)The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be an Environmental Duo?

With the support of the U.S., Cuba could become a model for sustainable preservation and environmental protection on a global scale Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource . The United States should capitalize on its proximity to this resource-rich island nation by moving to normalize relations and establishing a framework for environmental cooperation and joint

initiatives throughout the Americas. Cuba is the most biologically diverse of all the Caribbean Island s. Since it lies just 90 miles south of the Florida Keys, where the Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico intersect, the U.S. could play a key role in environmental conservation as well as the

region in general. However, when it comes to environmental preservation, the Obama administration is obstructing progress and hindering any meaningful cooperation with its current U.S.- Cuba policy.

Climate change and environmental degradation are two of the most pressing contemporary issues. If President Obama is sincerely committed to environmental sustainability, he must forge international partnership s to implement this objective. Where better to begin than in the U.S.’s own backyard, where Cuba has a huge presence. Only then can Cuba and the United States move forward to find joint solutions to environmental challenges. Environmental Riches and Implications Cuba’s glittering white sand beaches, extensive coral reefs, endemic fauna and diverse populations of fish compose the Caribbean’s most biologically diverse

island. Based on a per hectare sampling when compared to the U.S. plus Canada, Cuba has 12 times more mammal species, 29 times as many amphibian and reptile species, 39 times more bird species, and 27 times as many vascular plant species. Equally important, adjacent ocean currents and the island nation’s close proximity, carry fish larvae into U.S. waters, making protection of Cuba’s coastal ecosystems vital to replenishing the U.S.’s ailing fisheries. Therefore, preserving the marine resources of Cuba is critical to the economic health of North America’s Atlantic coastal communities. The U.S. and Cuba also share an ancient deepwater coral system that stretches up to North Carolina. The island’s 4,200 islets and keys support important commercial reef fish species such as snapper and grouper as well as

other marine life including sea turtles, dolphins and manatees in both countries. Fifty percent of its flora and 41 percent of its fauna are endemic , signifying the importance of protecting the island’s resources in order to safeguard the paradisiacal vision that Christopher Columbus observed when landing on the island in 1492. Oro Negro and Dinero The recent discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the Florida straits in Cuban waters has attracted foreign oil exploration from China and India, both eager to begin extraction. Offshore oil and gas development could threaten Cuba’s and Florida’s

environmental riches. Together, Cuba and the U.S. can develop policies to combat the negative results coming from the exploitation of these resources. The increased extraction and refining of oil in Cuba could have detrimental effects on the environment. Offshore drilling is likely to increase with the discovery of petroleum deposits in the Bay of Cárdenas and related areas.

Excavation increases the possibility of oil spills , which would in turn destroy the surrounding ecosystem , including fisheries and coral reef formations. The amount of pollutants released into the air from refining crude oil and the amount of wayward oil residuals would also increase with drilling and extraction. Those conversant with the very sensitive habitat issues are calling for immediate consultations aimed at anticipating what should be done. However the U.S.’s enormous oil usage and its development requirements will

cultivate economic growth on the island. Washington must work with Cuba to create an ecological protection plan not only to establish an environmentally friendly public image, but to make it a reality as well. Degradation of the environment will deprive Cuba, in the long run, of one of its most important sources of present and future revenue: tourism. Consequently, it is in the mutual interests of the U.S. and Cuba to develop a cooperative relationship that will foster tourism and growth in a sustainable manner. Sustainability through Collaboration In many parts of the country communism has inadequately acted as a seal to preserve elements of Cuba’s past as the centralized government prohibited private development by not giving special permission. A number of tourist resorts already dot the island, but Cuba has been largely exempt from mass tourist exploitation due to frozen relations with the U.S. Although the island remains underdeveloped, Fidel Castro has used his unchecked power to back policies, which have been heedless to environmental considerations, thus damaging some of the island’s pristine ecosystem that once defined the island. Roughly the size of

Pennsylvania, Cuba is the largest Caribbean island, and if preservation and conservation measures are planned and carried out in a cognizant manner, it could become a paradigm for sustainable development at the global level. The Obama administration’s recent easing of travel restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting relatives on the island could be of immense importance not only to Cuban

families, but also to the preservation of Cuba’s unique and increasingly threatened coastal and marine environments. Such a concession on Washington’s part would mark a small, but still significant stride in U.S.-Cuba relations, yet the travel restrictions still remain inherently discriminatory. The preposterous regulations that allow only a certain category of Americans into Cuba signify only a meager shift in U.S. policy towards Cuba. The 50-year-old U.S. embargo against the island has resoundingly failed to achieve its purpose. Obama’s modifications fall short of what it will take to reestablish a constructive U.S.-Cuba relationship. Cuba’s tropical forests, soils, and maritime areas have suffered degradation as a result of harmful policies stemming from a Soviet-style economic system. Cuba’s economy could be reinvigorated through expanded tourism, development initiatives and an expansion of commodity exports, including sugarcane for ethanol. U.S. policy toward Cuba should encourage environmental factors, thereby strengthening U.S. credibility throughout the

hemisphere. An environmental partnership between the U.S. and Cuba is not only possible, but could result in development models that could serve as an example for environmental strategies throughout the Americas. The U.S. has the economic resources necessary to aid Cuba in developing effective policy, while the island provides the space where sustainable systems can be implemented initially instead of being applied after the fact. Cuba’s extreme lack of development provides an unspoiled arena for the execution of exemplary sustainable environmental protection practices . Waste Not, Want Not Although the government of Cuba has established state-based agencies to develop sustainable environmental practices, the island’s resources are left to be used at the government’s discretion. It is estimated that throughout Cuba, about 113.5 billion gallons of water contaminated with agricultural, industrial and urban wastes are dumped into the sea annually and more than 3.27 billion gallons find their way into its rivers. As direct dumping of untreated industrial waste into rivers, aquifers, and the sea is the norm, Cuban scientists estimate that this volume of industrial liquid waste pollutes roughly 486 gallons of clean water per year. The majority of this contamination stems from four industries, all state owned and operated, nickel excavation, sugar refineries, oil refineries, and rice farms. A 1994 Cuban press release disclosed that the Soto Alba nickel plant on the Moa Bay dumped more than 3.17 billion gallons of untreated liquid waste into the sea every day. The waste contained 72 tons of aluminum, 48 tons of chromium, 15 tons of magnesium, and 30 tons of sulfuric acid. By way of comparison, the treatment standards for wastewater in the U.S. limit the concentration of chromium to a maximum of 0.32 milligrams per liter, 12 times less than the daily dumping into the Moa Bay by only one of the three nickel plants operating in the area. In the sugar industry, more than 15.85 billion gallons of liquid waste are dumped into caves by the 151 operating sugar mills on the island creating the most enduring environmental problem. These alarming figures highlight the precipitous position of Cuba’s environment. While Cuban citizens increasingly are aware of the importance of environmental conservation, the government continues to exploit the island’s resources for state use without hindrance of being environmentally sound. Environmentalists maintain that the Cuban government must take responsibility for enforcing the environmental laws it has enacted and agreements it has signed. For Cubans and foreigners alike, the beaches of Cuba constitute the principle tourist attraction in the country, but even these have not escaped wasteful government exploitation. The famous beaches east of Havana have been the victims of sand removal for use by the Cuban government in the construction industry. In addition to coastal destruction, like many of its Caribbean neighbors, Cuba faces deforestation, over-cultivation of land and compaction of soils due to the use of heavy farm machinery and strip mining. These practices have resulted in high salinity in soils and heavy land erosion. Furthermore, poor water quality in freshwater streams has affected the wildlife habitat, which is in turn influenced by runoff from agricultural practices, erosion due to deforestation, and sedimentation of freshwater streams. Cuba must act in a responsible manner to stop environmental degradation and preserve its tourist industry as an early step to salvage its inert economy. Beginning Concerns The environmental degradation that began during the colonial era has transcended time as a result of Castro’s political and economic paradigm. Only in the last 40 years, with the development of the Commission for the Protection of the Environment and the Conservation of Natural Resources (COMARNA), has Cuba begun to address growing environmental concerns. COMARNA consolidated all of the agencies with environmental responsibilities, as a step towards giving them the power to influence all environmental issues. Although COMARNA was all-inclusive, it lacked independent authority, so its activities achieved few tangible results. The sad fact was that the centralized agency only succeeded in aiding the state in squandering resources. In reality, establishing the agency was a modest concession to ease environmental concerns, but the truth lingered that Cuba’s wealth of natural resources remained under the auspices of the government. COMARNA acknowledged the appeals for conservation by the international community, yet it allowed for the misuse of natural resources by the State. By way of example, the centralized Cuban agency built thousands of miles of roads for the development of non-existent state agricultural enterprises and dams where there was hardly any water to contain. In 1981, Cuba enacted Law 33 in an attempt to legitimize their environmental laws and regulations, yet Law 33 played only a miniscule role in guiding the extraction of natural resources and the conservation of ecological life on the island. Lauded as a law ahead of its time, Law 33 purportedly covers all the regulations concerning the environment and the protection and use of Cuban national resources, even though it produced few results. The statute includes a section comparing the “wise use of natural resources by communist countries versus the indiscriminate use of natural resources by the capitalistic world.” In this regard, the document is more a piece of political propaganda than a law meant to be rigorously enforced. Moreover it palls in comparison to international environmental protection guidelines and has relatively limited significance within the country since the Cuban government is responsible for the operation of the bulk of the industries and is therefore the principal polluter and consumer of natural resources. Thus Law 33 exonerates the Cuban government from enforcing stricter conservation standards by making a system that looks efficient, but in reality may not be so. A closer analysis on Law 33 exposes its inherent lack of efficacy and applicability. Attempts to Move Forward In 1994, Cuba developed the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (CITMA) in order to absorb the tasks of the unproductive COMARNA. CITMA attempts to steer the implementation of environmental policy, the rational use of natural resources, and the adoption of sustainable development programs. Law 81 developed out of the necessity to give the Ministry a more sharply defined role in the government by replacing the outdated Law 33. Law 81, the Law of the Environment, was enacted in 1997 and presents a comprehensive framework law that covers all aspects of the environment ranging from air, water and waste, to historic preservation and coastal zone management. Although it details inspections and an enforcement plan, the law is ultimately ineffective due to its overarching nature, which makes it difficult to enforce. Law 81 may replace a necessary revision of Law 33; however, it remains vague in its enforcement procedures. For example, Law 81, Article 81 states that national resources will be used in accordance with the provisions that “their rational use will be assured, for which their quantitative and qualitative continuity will be preserved, recycling and recovery systems will be developed, and the ecosystems to which they belong safeguarded.” This portion of the provision elucidates the ambiguous nature of the law, as it continues to delineate objectives without coming up with specific implementation strategies. In 1997, the Earth Summit, a conference sponsored by the United Nations aimed at aiding governments in rethinking economic development and finding ways to halt the destruction of irreplaceable natural resources and pollution of the planet was held in New York. At the Summit, Cuban officials were refreshingly blunt in acknowledging the environmental degradation present on their island. In a pamphlet distributed at the conference, the Havana government stated that “there have been mistakes and shortcomings, due mainly to insufficient environmental awareness, knowledge and education, the lack of a higher management demand, limited introduction and generalization of scientific and technological achievements, as well as the still insufficient incorporation of environmental dimensions in its policies. The authorities also pointed to the insufficient development plans and programs and the absence of a sufficiently integrative and coherent judicial system,” to enforce

environmental regulations. After the Earth Summit, Cuba designed and implemented a variety of programs, administrative structures, and public awareness initiatives to promote sound environmental management and sustainable development. Although the conference spurred motivation in environmental matters, Cuba still lacked the economic resources needed to support its share of environmental protection responsibilities due to the loss of its financial ties with the former Soviet Union. The Earth Summit came after the fall of the Soviet Union and the tightening of the U.S. blockade against Cuba in 1992, which resulted in a 35% retrenchment of the Cuban GDP. The Special Period, referring to the cut off of economic subsidies that had regularly come from the former Soviet Union, witnessed a decrease in many environmentally damaging activities both by choice and by necessity. The end of aid from the Russia also resulted in many decisions aimed at resuscitating the Cuban economy. The economic crisis increased pressure to sacrifice environmental protection for economic output. Although development slowed due to economic concerns, the island’s forests were particularly overworked for firewood and finished wood exports. However, the crisis also provided the impetus for pursuing sustainable development strategies. The principle motivating such change has been a realization that if Cuba does not preserve its environment, it will, at the very least, lose its attraction to tourists. Diverging Views Unlike the U.S., which still has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, Cuba signed the document in 1997, which calls for the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the global climate system. This legally binding international agreement attempts to tackle the issue of global warming and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S., although a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol, has neither ratified nor withdrawn from the Protocol. The signature alone is merely symbolic, as the Kyoto Protocol is non-binding on the United States unless ratified. Although in 2005 the United States was the largest per capita emitter of carbon dioxide from the burning

of fossil fuels, it experienced only a modest decline of 2.8 percent from 2007 to 2008. This decline demonstrates that the U.S. has the framework to reverse Cuba’s substandard environmental track record. By aiding Havana , Washington would be able to brand itself as an active conservationist. Such a label would enable the U.S. to create a valuable ecological public image in the international arena.

Cuban polyculture solves extinction Coyne & Hoekstra 7 (Jerry, professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago & Hopi, Associate Professor in the Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University. The New Republic, “The Greatest Dying,” 9/24, http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatest-dying) But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world

over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and

accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into

monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically

homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields . Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced

forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water ; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster . In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while

polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion. In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of

all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber. Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace. Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who really cares

if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those who suffer from cardiovascular disease. The recent discovery of a rare South American leech has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots. And it's not just this one species of worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin (a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and

ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin (another anticoagulant). Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin.

More than a quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that saved the life of one of our friends. Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been

screened for pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what life-saving drugs remain to be discovered? Given current extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years. Our arguments so far have tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans. That is why conservationists always base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures? And what could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins, and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship and common origin of all species is a spiritual experience - not necessarily religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul. But, whether or not one is

moved by such concerns, it is certain that our future is bleak if we do nothing to stem this sixth extinction . We are creating a world in which exotic diseases flourish but natural medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste accumulates while food sources dwindle ; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and impure water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not immune to extinction. Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching out a grubby existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when humanity finally faces the consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them all.

Keystone species solve extinctionMittermeier ’11 (et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in Biological Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He has conducted fieldwork for over 30 years on three continents and in more than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations. He is the President of Conservation International and he is considered an expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally discovered several monkey species. From Chapter One of the book Biodiversity Hotspots – F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-20992-5_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. This evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a very famous British environmentalist specialising in biodiversity. available at: http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global_biodiversity_conservation_the_critical_role_of_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis , since it is ¶ irreversible. Human activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a ¶ thousand or more times the natural background rate

(Pimm et al. 1995). What are the¶ consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity¶ for future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earth’s species¶ (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer¶ (Novotny et al. 2002).

As species vanish, so too does the health security of every ¶ human.

Earth’s species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for¶ cancer, malaria,

or the next new pathogen – cures waiting to be discovered.¶ Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all¶ commercial medicines – even more in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein¶ 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and

inspiration¶ for a growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and¶ other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared¶ to burning down the world’s libraries

without knowing the content of 90% or¶ more of the books. With loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of our crops¶ and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for¶ manufactured products, and the basis of the

structure and function of the ecosystems ¶ that support humans and all life on

Earth (McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond¶ material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity

contributes to security, resiliency,¶ and freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).¶ Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs¶ inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake,¶ and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the world’s cultures¶ (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earth’s natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earth’s climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009).¶ In many respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these ecosystems the most – and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve their living

resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities? Extinction is a global phenomenon , with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget – perhaps 90% – originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally flexible funds available – in the hundreds of millions annually – be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss.¶ The establishment of priorities for

biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where should action toward reducing the loss of biodiversity be implemented first ? The field of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves around a

framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk to the species present in a region – if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact.¶ Myers’ seminal paper (Myers1988) was the first application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide

conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described ten tropical forest “hotspots” on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of “hotspot” status. A subsequent analysis added eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a first systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics (¶ >¶ 0.5% of the world’s total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat

cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive global review (Mittermeier et

al.1999) and scientific publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots

on the basis of both the better-defined criteria and new data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redefined several hotspots, such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added

several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufficient data either did not exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region – the East Melanesian Islands – which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region that failed to meet the “less than 30% of original vegetation remaining” criterion to a genuine hotspot.

Scenario two is Hemispheric Co-op -

US-Cuba relations dictate hemispheric policy – the status quo undermines co-opBrookings 8 (The Brookings Institution. November. Rethinking. U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership.aspx)

U.S.-Cuban relations have disproportionately dominate d U.S. policy toward the LAC region for years. Tensions generated by U.S. policies toward Cuba have affected the United States’ image in the region and have hindered Washington’s ability to work constructively with other countries . For this reason, addressing U.S. policy toward Cuba has implications that go beyond the bilateral relationship and affect U.S. relations with the rest of the LAC region more generally. Political change in Washington , combined with recent demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community and recent leadership changes in Cuba itself, offer a valuable opportunity to change course . Though the reforms enacted recently in Cuba have thus far been mostly cosmetic, they could create openings for grassroots political and economic activity. The removal of restrictions on access to tourist facilities and on the purchase of mobile telephones and computers may have an important psychological impact and increase contact with the outside world. Also, the Cuban government has recently lifted all wage caps, started to allow performance bonuses for certain salaried professions, liberalized the sale of farming equipment, and begun to lease idle state lands to increase agricultural output. These reforms may improve labor incentives, purchasing power, and productivity. Economic developments in Cuba will affect U.S.-Cuban relations. Today, the United States is Cuba’s fourth-largest trading partner; in 2007, it sold the island $582 million worth of goods (including shipping costs). Cuba is currently exploring its prospects for energy production in both sugarcane-based ethanol and offsh ore oil. Spanish, Canadian, Norwegian, Brazilian, Indian, and other international oil companies have secured contracts to explore drilling possibilities off the Cuban coast. If the ethanol and oil industries become fully operational in five to seven years, revenues of $3 billion to $5 billion annually could significantly strengthen the Cuban economy and reduce the government’s vulnerability to external political pressure. With stable inflows of hard currency from oil sales, the Cuban government would have more funds to use at its discretion, further eroding the effects of the U.S.

embargo on trade with Cuba. Demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community in the United States add to the prospects for reorienting U.S.-Cuban relations. The Cuban American population is getting younger demographically, and its priorities regarding Cuba have shifted from a traditional hard line to a focus on the day-to-day existence of those living on the island.

According to 2007 polls by Florida International University, Cuban Americans are increasingly opposed to current U.S. policy, particularly restrictions on family travel, caps on remittances, and limitations on the sale of medical and other vital supplies to Cuba; 64 percent of those polled support a return to the more liberal policies of 2003. The Cuban American community has historically played a central role in U.S. domestic politics, with strong influence in the

state of Florida. This shift in public opinion may ease the path toward

reorientation for policymakers in Washington. The view of this Commission is that U.S. policy should be reframed to enable legitimate Cuban voices to shape a representative, accountable, and sustainable transition to democracy. The Cuban people should be empowered to drive sustainable change from within by facilitating the free flow of information and expanding diplomatic networks to support human rights and democratic governance.

Cuba is a low-hanging fruit – it’s a prerequisite to hemispheric relationsDoherty 8 (Patrick, "An Obama Policy for Cuba," McClathy Newspapers, December 12,cuba.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/obama_policy_cuba_9301)

With his national security team in place, President-elect Barack Obama's foreign policy principals will be immediately struck by how many complex and expensive challenges they will face. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine and Russia, will all require enormous energy, all the tools in our foreign policy toolbox, and will all take years to resolve, if they can be resolved.

None of these crises will allow President Obama to signal swiftly to the world the kind of changes he proposes in American foreign policy. In contrast, U.S.-Cuba policy is low-hanging fruit : though of

marginal importance domestically, it could be changed immediately at little cost. At present, that policy is a major black spot on America's international

reputation . For the rest of the world, our failed , obsolete and 50- year old policy toward Cuba goes against everything that Obama campaigned for, and the recent 185-3 U.N. vote to condemn the

centerpiece of that policy , the embargo – the 16th such vote in as many years –

makes that clear. The entire world believes our policy is wrong . And

the world is right. The fact is that since Cuba stopped exporting revolution and started exporting doctors and nurses, it ceased being a national security concern for the United States. And yet we restrict travel to the island - unconstitutionally - and constrain Cuban-Americans in the amount of money they can send to their families on the island. Moreover, the economic embargo hurts the

Cuban people more than the Cuban leadership, and our Helms-Burton legislation imposes Washington's will on foreign businesses who wish to trade with Cuba, creating ill will in business communities from Canada to Brazil. Our Cuba policy is also an obstacle to striking a new relationship with the nations of Latin America. Any 21st-century policy toward Latin America will have to shift from the Cold War-era emphasis

on right-wing governments and top-down economic adjustment to creating a hemispheric partnership to address many critical issues: the revival of militant leftism, the twin challenges of sustainability and inclusive economic growth, and the rising hemispheric influence of Russia and China. But until Washington ends the extraordinary sanctions that comprise the Cuba embargo, Latin America will remain at arms-length , and the problems in our backyard - Hugo Chavez, drugs, immigration, energy insecurity - will simply fester .

Hemispheric relations curb organized crimeBrookings 8 (The Brookings Institution. November. Rethinking. U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership.aspx)

Crime and insecurity are growing scourges in the Western Hemisphere. The LAC region has only 9 percent of the world’s population, yet it has 27 percent of global homicides—about 140,000 a year. Crime, especially organized crime, poses a serious threat to public security and undermines public

institutions and the legitimate business sector. Organized crime in the hemisphere today encompasses a variety of criminal enterprises, including narcotics trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping, and arms and counterfeit goods smuggling. The United States stands at the crossroads of many of these illicit flows. Violent youth gangs, such as the Mara Salvatrucha, have a presence in the United States. Some 2,000 guns cross the United States–Mexico border from north to south every day, helping to fuel violence among drug cartels and with the army and police. About 17,500 persons are smuggled into the United States annually as trafficking victims, and another 500,000 come as illegal immigrants. The United States remains both a leading consuming country across the full range of illicit narcotics and a country with major domestic production of methamphetamines, cannabis, and

other synthetic narcotics. The nations of the Western Hemisphere have adopted a variety of international instruments to tackle organized crime. Virtually every country in the Americas has ratified the 2000 UN Convention against

Transnational Organized Crime. Most of the hemisphere’s countries have also signed and ratified international agreements that deal with the trafficking of persons, the smuggling of migrants, illicit firearms trafficking, and the illicit drug trade. Yet a significant reduction in crime in the hemisphere remains elusive . The narcotics trade remains at the core of organized crime in the hemisphere. This is by far the most lucrative of illegal trades, generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year. Its immense cash flow, vast employment opportunities, and sophisticated networks feed other kinds of criminal activity and allow drug traffickers to adapt with extraordinary speed to governments’ counternarcotics efforts. The drug trade is also singularly adept at corrupting judicial, political, and law enforcement institutions. In Mexico, open war between the cartels and all levels of government has killed 4,000 people so far in 2008 alone—about as many casualties as the United States has sustained in almost six years of war in Iraq. This violence already threatens to spill into the United States and to destabilize Mexico’s political institutions. Because it lies at the core of regional criminal activity, this section focuses on

the illegal drug trade. A hemisphere-wide counternarcotics strategy encompassing consuming, producing, and transshipment countries is required to combat not only the illegal drug trade but also other forms of crime .

Latin America is a critical element of supporting Russian organized crimeBagley 1 (Bruce, “GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: THE RUSSIAN MAFIA IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,” School of International Studies at the University of Miami Coral Gables, November 15, http://www.as.miami.edu/international-studies/pdf/Bagley%20GLOBALIZATION%202.pdf)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the scope and impact of the post-Cold War wave of Russian transnational

organized crime in one region of the global system: Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the evidence

currently available in the public realm is primarily journalistic and often anecdotal, it is, despite these limitations,

sufficient to support the conclusion that the linkages or “strategic alliances” between various Russian organized crime groups and major transnational criminal organizations in Latin America and the

Caribbean in 2001 were already substantial and expanding rapidly . Moreover, it raises the specter that, at least in some key countries in the region (e.g., Colombia, Mexico and Brazil),

the alliances between home-grown and Russian criminal organizations may provide domestic criminal and/or guerrilla groups

with access to the illicit international markets, money-laundering facilities and illegal arms sources that could convert them into major impediments to economic growth and serious threats to democratic consolidation and long-run stability at home. Organized crime1 flourishes best in the contexts provided by weak states.2 In the wake of the complete collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991, the new Russian state that assumed power in Moscow was from the outset a weak state and its institutional weakness led Russia, along with most of the other 14 independent states that emerged out of the former Soviet Union (e.g., the Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan), to become hotbeds of

organized crime over the decade of the 1990s.3 The longstanding institutional weaknesses of most states in Latin America and the Caribbean, in combination with the existence of a highly lucrative underground drug trade in the Western hemisphere , made the countries in that

corner of the world system especially attractive targets for Russian

transnational criminal enterprises . The lack of transparency and effective state monitoring in

the banking systems of many Latin American and Caribbean nations left them particularly vulnerable to penetration by

Russian money launderers. Their corrupt and ineffective law enforcement institutions and judicial systems allowed Russian crime groups to operate outside of the law with virtual impunity . Indeed, the dubious practice of a number of the states in the region (e.g., Dominica, Panama, Uruguay and Paraguay) of “selling” citizenship literally provided an open invitation to Russian crime groups to establish themselves in the hemisphere. As Tom Farer notes, when states are weak, but act as if they were strong “...spewing out laws and regulations purporting to regulate, inhibit, and tax private activity...” without the will or capacity to enforce the law, they inevitably create spaces or niches between reality and legality that can be and frequently are exploited by organized crime.4

Russian organized crime causes a Russian economic and political collapseCSIS 98 (Center for Strategic and international Studies [William Webster, Arnaud De Borchgrave, Robert Kupperman, Erik Peterson, Gerard Burke, Frank Cilluffo, Robert Johnston], “Russian Organized Crime,” Global Organized Crime Project, www.russianlaw.org/roc_csis.pd)

If Russian Organized Crime (ROC) is left unchecked, Russia is in danger of evolving into a criminal-syndicalist state —a troika comprised of gangsters, corrupt gov- ernment bureaucrats, and certain crooked and sometimes prominent businessmen who continue to accumulate vast amounts of wealth by promoting and exploiting corruption

and the vulnerabilities inherent in a society in transition. Expanding at a dizzying pace, ROC is a major force in shaping the post-Soviet political, eco - nomic, and social development of Russia . Virtually no sector of Russian society is immune from the effects of ROC . r Government:Despite the turbulent electoral cycles of

Russian politics, ROC has been a constant force in shaping Russian politics in two major ways. First, the inability of the Russian government to combat ROC groups effectively is leading to a crisis of confidence in the political institutions that presently govern the Russian state . Second, corrupt government leaders are themselves frequently integral components of ROC groups. Collectively, these developments weaken support for the democratic experiment in Russia . r Economy: The market liberalization experiment in Russia has been under- mined by the activities of ROC. Large quantities of Russia’s natural resources are sold abroad by ROC groups,

generating little return for the Russian public. ROC groups also deprive the state of much-needed tax revenue . Moreover, the violent and illicit extortion and intimidation tactics of ROC groups are a major deterrent to urgently needed foreign investment. Due in large part to the ROC phenomenon, foreign investment

in China ($176 billion) has outstripped that in Russia 20:1.5 These problems seriously jeopardize the privatization and liberalization of Russia’s economy . r

Banks:Further complicating the economic experiment in Russia is the sys- tematic corruption within the financial community. Major Aleksandr

Gro- mov of the Russian tax police told a September 1994 conference of the Financial Crimes

Enforcement Network (FINCEN) that “almost all Russian banks are corrupt.” 6 Banks are central components of ROC activity both as a primary target for extortion and as the main vehicle for extensive money laundering. These activities are initiated on a transnational basis as evi- denced by the appearance of ROC activity in Cyprus, the Caribbean islands, and other offshore banking centers the world over.

Russian economic collapse triggers and accesses every scenario for conflict. Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2 (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, “Assessing Russia’s Decline,” 2002, www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1442/)

The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russia’s decline affects that country and may

evolve into challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of decline may make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest . Together and

separately, they increase the risk of conflict and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization, particularly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions, combined with the politicization of regional economic and military

interests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying point for internal conflict is low at present, but these factors have the potential to feed into

precisely the cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to

democracy more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil, which further increases the risk of international conflict , for instance if Moscow seeks to united a divided nation and/or

demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given Russia’s conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use , and Russia’s demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia’s civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of Russia’s nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security

interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict—internal or otherwise—and the general deterioration that Russia has in common with “failing” states raises serious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging

crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition,

could be asked to send military forces to the area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russia’s decline. A notional list includes: Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russia troops in trouble-prone

Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. Border clashes with China in the Russian Far East or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. Nuclear-armed terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the United States . Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sites for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and

humanitarian disaster . A nuclear accident at a power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Rusisa

and neighboring states. Ethnic pogrom in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and gas pipelines in the region. A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness and death across borders. An increasingly criminalized Russian economy could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups . From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. Accelerated Russian weapons and technology sales or unauthorized diversion could foster the proliferation of weapons and weapon materials to rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war .

Organized crime is the lifeblood of terrorismZaitseva 7 (Lyudmila, Center for International Security and Cooperation Visting Fellow, "Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking," Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 5, August, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2007/Aug/zaitsevaAug07.html)

The merging of international terrorist organizations with transnational organized crime is one of the most serious threat s that our society faces today. The debate about these emerging alliances has been ongoing for some time now.[1] Experts agree that there are clear overlaps between international terrorist and organized crime networks. In her Congressional Testimony delivered in September 2005, Glenn E. Schweitzer stated

that organized crime had ‘entered a new phase of complicity’ with terrorist networks: Terrorist and criminal organizations rely on the same global transportation , communication, and financial infrastructures for illegal ploys. They take advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and enforcement in states under siege. They both seek increasing shares of the fortunes generated from narco-trafficking and other crimes.[2] The most obvious example of such linkages is narcotics smuggling

operations in Central and South America and Asia, where drug

proceeds are used to finance terrorist activities . The overlap between drug

industry and terrorism, widely known as narcoterrorism, is most pronounced in Colombia, where two major terrorist groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia (AUC)—receive more than half of their operational funding through cocaine production, taxation and distribution.[3] The former Taleban regime in Afghanistan, which was providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda, had also profited from the local opium and heroin trade. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines have both been involved in drug trafficking.[4] Weapons smuggling, kidnappings and financial crime have also been widely used by these and other terrorist groups to raise proceeds for their activities.

This internal link has evaded our security measures – hemispheric co-op key Zaitseva 7 (Lyudmila, Center for International Security and Cooperation Visting Fellow, "Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking," Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 5, August, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2007/Aug/zaitsevaAug07.html)

The involvement of organized crime in the trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material has been a subject of concern ever since the problem of nuclear smuggling came to light in the early 1990s.

There are many reasons to fear such a connection , ranging from the financial means available to organized crime syndicates and their capabilities to move almost any illegal product across multiple international borders undetected , to their growing links with terrorist networks. Indeed, resourceful criminal organizations with well- established trafficking channels and infrastructures seem to be ideally suited for either delivering nuclear fissile and other radioactive material to the customer or trafficking weapons built with these materials to their final destination. For example, since September 11, the U.S. authorities discover each year more than ten underground tunnels used for smuggling narcotics and illegal immigrants into the United States from both Mexico and Canada.[18] Some of the immigrants reportedly come from as far as Pakistan. Such underground tunnels have also been used for smuggling

people into the European Union. There is nothing to stop terrorists from

exploiting this kind of vulnerabilities in border control in pursuit of

their causes. In case of nuclear smuggling, no sophisticated

radiation detection equipment installed at official border crossings

would prevent them from entering a country together with their

dangerous materials or weapons, if they chose to do so through an

underground tunnel. Given the enormous profits organized crime makes from their

traditional criminal activities, such as narcotics or people smuggling, nuclear trafficking may not be its

first choice.[19] Nevertheless, it can be tried as a sideline activity, if the criminals believe it can be profitable. Today organized crime does not limit itself to single forms of illegal activity, but engages in multi-crime and deals in anything and everything that can bring profit. Besides, criminal networks can resort to nuclear trafficking upon a specific order by a potential buyer. It is the latter scenario that raises the biggest concern among international experts due

to its high plausibility and low chances of detection. First of all, a serious potential customer approaching a criminal network with a demand for specific radioactive substances is likely to be either a state with a clandestine nuclear program or a terrorist organization bent on acquiring or building a nuclear weapon or a far less devastating, but much easier to make, radiological dispersal device (RDD).

Second, such customers typically have already established links to organized crime and trafficking networks, stemming from their other illicit activities, such as weapons deliveries and drug smuggling. They also have sufficient financial resources to pay the supplie r. Such a sophisticated demand-driven smuggling model, which includes a network of front companies, corrupt officials in nuclear and law-enforcement establishments, and professional smuggling networks, has been

described in detail by Rensselaer Lee.[20] The expert notes that the existing U.S. counter- proliferation efforts in Russia and other affected states are ‘not designed to counter such operations , which in any case are likely to be well- concealed’ . Just how well one can conceal such clandestine

efforts, was demonstrated by the A. Q. Khan network discovered in 2004, which had organized supply of nuclear technologies and fissile material to several countries through a number of players and front companies in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Middle East.[21] This example makes it imperative to continue studying the involvement of organized crime in the nuclear black market.

Nuclear weapons are easy to use – makes nuclear terrorism most likely scenario for mass destructionTRAC, 13 – Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (“Nuclear Terrorism,” http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/nuclear-terrorism)//SY

With the advent of WMD, the basic understanding of terrorism as a phenomenon has moved from a political and psychological level to a real threat of mass destruction and disruption. The news of terrorists searching for nuclear weapons in Russia and Afghanistan coupled the

threat emanating from groups such as Al Qaeda and other groups has brought this threat to the forefront of analyst’s attention . However, while there is a clear consensus about an increased threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism in the post 9/11 period, there are also others who have tagged this threat as ‘overrated nightmare’ since using and acquiring nuclear capability may well be

beyond the purview of a terrorist group. At a global level, any form of nuclear terrorism could have a devastating effect when it leads to war or armed conflict between two countries or among a group of nuclear powers. The impact of a nuclear-terrorist act would be far greater when it would be misconstrued as an attack by the enemy country . ¶ TYPES OF GROUPS LIKELY TO TRY WMDS¶ Scholars have broadly categorized non state terrorists as actors who can resort to a nuclear strike against a national state. For example, Charles Ferguson and W C Potter have clubbed them into four groups:¶ Apocalyptic groups (e.g Aum Shinrikyo),¶ Politico-Religious Terrorist groups (e.g, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba)¶ Nationalist and Separatists groups (e.g. LTTE, Baloch Rebel

group), and¶ Single issue Terrorist (e.g eco-terrorist). ¶ OBTAINING WMDS¶ There are two imaginable ways for terrorists to get nuclear explosives. They could build a radiological bomb or an improvised nuclear device or they could seek to steal or buy a miniaturized nuclear weapon. Before dealing with the kind of threat our civil society could face in a nuclear catastrophe triggered by terrorists, it would be useful to discuss and understand various types and effects

of nuclear weapon and material used in it, on the human environment. A terrorist group or an individual ‘lone-wolf’ terrorist would not face serious technical barriers in creating a basic or a crude nuclear device. With some degree of technical sophistication it would be easier to build weapons which could maximize the damage on any given environment, both civil and military.

baseball diplomacy advantage

Status quo visa policy destroys baseball diplomacyStephens 5 (Sarah, Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, "A Swing and a Miss: Why Bush Won't Play Ball with Cuba," The Huffington Post, December 17, www.huffingtonpost.com/sarah-stephens/a-swing-and-a-miss-why-bu_b_12457.html)

Not that it isn’t a wonderful idea; it is. But Cuba’s participation in the tournament depended on the Bush Treasury Department’s willingness to grant the players visas to enter the United States. And the chances of Team Bush granting the visas were somewhere between negligible and nil. The Treasury spokeswoman, Molly Millerwise, stepped right up to the plate. She told The New York Times in an e-mail message that any "activities or contracts that could result in financial flows" to Fidel Castro and his regime "would effectively work against the objective of the sanctions and be inconsistent with current U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba." The amen corner of the Congress–the Florida representatives who represent the ever-shrinking population of wildly conservative Cuban exiles–pushed the Treasury hard to throw the Cubans out of the game before they ever got a chance to hear the National Anthem over the P.A. system. Major League baseball promises to push back, but if experience is any guide, the Bush administration is shameless in its role as couturier to the political whims of the Miami Cubans. It’s hard to imagine the Cuban baseball team ever taking the field. There are larger lessons here worth remembering. First, our sanctions–meant to isolate Cuba, economically and diplomatically–are unilateral, and in a globalized economy that means they cannot work. Excluding Cuban baseball players would never have brought the Castro regime to its knees in 1959, and that is significantly less likely now. I just returned from Cuba and what most Americans don’t know is how deeply invested other nations are in Cuba; they are busy doing business in Cuba and making contacts with average Cubans. The Spanish, the Canadians, and the Chinese are drilling for oil off Cuba’s coast, and paying the government millions of dollars in fees for the right to enter into joint ventures. A Spanish firm I visited at the Port of Havana is working with Cuba to build an enlarged container facility–and committing $140 million in private capital–betting on greater and greater growth in the Cuban economy over the next decade. Venezuela is providing Cuba with 80,000 barrels of oil each day, with unusually favorable financing arrangements, which keeps the Cuban economy going during these days of high oil prices. Canada and China are paying big bucks to participate in joint ventures for the extraction of nickel. Israel is involved–in agriculture and hotels –and the list goes on and on. All we are doing with our unilateral sanctions against Cuba is punishing Americans and average Cubans–punishing Cuban-American families who are denied the right to visit their kin on the island, punishing American companies who are forbidden to participate in Cuba’s recapitalization, and punishing American values. It was, after all, our contacts, our visitors, our goods, and our influence which are credited with helping win the day in

Eastern Europe when the wall came down and those newly independent societies had to choose a future path for their governance and their people. The Bush

administration preaches the faith of economic engagement

everywhere else on the planet. Cuba is the only exception. The world is

there, and average Cubans appreciate the economic stimulus and the opportunity to meet new people

traveling to their island. Second, this decision on baseball neglects the universally recognized healing power of sport . Thirty years ago, when Richard Nixon sought to open China to the west, he capitalized on a development called “Ping Pong Diplomacy.” As the

Smithsonian says, “Blending statecraft and sport, table tennis matches between American and Chinese athletes set the stage of Nixon’s breakthrough with the People’s Republic.” In the 2004 Summer Games, North and South Korean athletes marched together into the Olympic Stadium behind a common flag at the opening ceremony in Athens. Cuban athletes deserve similar recognition , and our

nation and Cuba would benefit a great deal from being able to

pursue peaceful competition on the baseball field. Sport has a

unique capacity to do this. You’d think the former owner of the Texas Rangers would

understand this as well as anyone. But President Bush prefers “ boomerang diplomacy ” to “ping-pong diplomacy.” He would much rather stop Cuban and U.S. athletes from playing baseball together to keep

the archaic and ineffective embargo against Cuba intact, than risk

exposing our fellow citizens to an aspect of Cuba they would never

otherwise get a chance to see . America gets nothing from

punishing Cuba; the administration simply makes Castro’s

ideological case against us: we end up isolated and looking

unsportsmanlike all at the same time.

Letting Cuban players in is key to the success of baseball diplomacy – key legitimacy test – solves international perceptionCentre for US Foreign Policy 7 (The Backyard Blogspot is the official blog for Libertas: The Centre for US Foreign Policy,"Iron Man Diplomacy," November, thebackyardblog.blogspot.com/2007/11/iron-man-diplomacy.html)

The U.S. finally defeated Cuba this week! Do not panic – you have not missed a major event in international relations. Team U.S.A. beat Cuba in the final of the 37th World Baseball Cup this Sunday to record their first win since 1974. At first glance, baseball’s significance to U.S. foreign policy and inter-American relations may not be that evident, particularly for many of us on this side of the

Atlantic. A closer look reveals that sports play a basic part in U.S. cultural diplomacy and an introduction to baseball has been used as a means to generate cultural ties with other regions and reduce negative stereotyping of the U.S . In the Western Hemisphere. however, where there is a shared love for America’s national game, béisbol diplomacy reveals a different undertone to U.S. policy . Cultural diplomacy has aimed not only at mutual exchange and understanding, but also to project a positive and superior image of the American way of life. Attempts to demonstrate the universal appeal of the American way are obfuscated by concurrent efforts to portray the exceptional nature of the U.S. and its people. This familiar tension between American universalism and exceptionalism has found its way into baseball . In August, the State Department named the former Baltimore Orioles star, Cal Ripken, Jr. as their new public diplomacy envoy. In her introduction of the appointment, the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy (now working through her notice), Karen Hughes, explained the role that Ripken would play in U.S. policy:

“Through their personal examples, our public diplomacy envoys become leaders in America's effort to engage in a positive and constructive dialogue with the world.” Condoleeza Rice also added her support for the personal contribution that Ripken could make to cultural diplomacy: “He truly exemplifies America at its best, our aspirations to be a better nation and to help build a better world.” Ripken has, since retirement, established business and philanthropic efforts to spread the global appeal of baseball. His personal

qualities were not the only draw for the State Department though. “Baseball is America’s national pastime,” Hughes added, “a sport that truly defines American culture. It is only fitting that the face of our national pastime would be one of the faces that America shows the world as our next public diplomacy envoy.” Ripken was also convinced of the role that he and his sport

could play in representing the U.S.: “I happen to think that sport – baseball, in particular – is very magical . It can go across cultural lines . In the first few months if his new

post, Ripken has already begun efforts in China to build a bridge across such cultural lines. After bringing a Chinese delegation to his Baseball Academy in Maryland, Ripken visited China earlier this month to introduce the game to young people across the

country . Such ‘people-to-people’ connections were stressed as

important to the future peace and security of the world . Similar

sporting links to China have already proven to be important. The

Nixon administration used ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ as an opening to establish normal relations with China. Mao’s offer for the U.S. table tennis team to tour China would inevitably prove a success for Chinese propaganda and cultural diplomacy, but Nixon’s priority of rapprochement led him to accept this opportunity to ease hostilities. Now, as the U.S. seeks to spread the influence and appeal of its way of life among the Chinese people, the Bush administration has turned to its own main sport. Opportunities to take a similar approach to easing tensions with Cuba have always existed . The support for a hard-line approach to Castro has

perhaps been more prevalent than it has with Communist China ,

but there have been a number of prominent Americans that have sought engagement with Castro and the Cuban people. The differences between the U.S. and Cuba have been stressed by the leaders of

both countries, but their shared passion for baseball invites a ‘people to people’ approach . In 1975, after the normalisation of relations with China and Team U.S.A.’s last baseball World Cup victory, the U.S. baseball commissioner, Bowie Kuhn attempted to set up a goodwill game between teams from the U.S. and Cuba. In his efforts to persuade Henry Kissinger to endorse this fixture, he preempted Ripken in asserting baseball’s “magic value in projecting a positive

image of the U.S.” Kissinger’s aides noted that a baseball game could “break the

ice” as it had done with ‘ping- pong diplomacy .’ The positive domestic and international response to Kissinger’s moves in China would be evoked in a similar symbolic act that could herald constructive engagement with Cuba. In the end however, Kissinger was not interested in bridging the gap with Castro and Kuhn was forced to recognise that the Secretary of State had problems “larger than baseball.” It was not until March 1999, that Major League Baseball finally made it to Cuba. Despite much criticism, Ripken’s Orioles played a Cuban All-Star team in Havana and Baltimore, although the ‘Iron Man’ himself was absent due to the death of his father (also

an Orioles’ legend – Cal Ripken, Sr.). The lead-up to the historic occasion brought much media attention, but as one Orioles’ fan site noted - it built only to the anti-climax that “it all came down to a baseball game.” The games, it added, were far from an international arms-deal. In the end, the

Clinton administration was not prepared to radically alter the

framework of U.S.-Cuban relations and the people-to-people

program was never fully developed. Small-scale private sports exchanges have

continued to some degree, but in reality , any major breakthrough in cultural

engagement with Cuba will require U.S. government involvement.

The ‘larger problems’ will certainly deter many U.S. politicians

from baseball diplomacy, but there will always be those that opt

for small steps to increase U.S. influence. Major League Baseball is still eager,

but this is probably due more to the pool of talent on the island that is currently unavailable. For his part, José Serrano, a Democrat Congressman from New York, has also introduced the Baseball Diplomacy Act to every Congress since the 104th. The bills, which have sought to waive prohibitions on Cuban nationals playing professional baseball in the U.S. and returning with their salaries, have all failed to make it out of committee and the current attempt in the 110th Congress, House Resolution 216, looks doomed to a similar fate. In the White House, President

Bush, as former owner of the Texas Rangers, certainly shares Castro’s passion for the game. “I never dreamed about being President,” he once said, “I wanted to be Willie Mays.” Bush has also remarked

on the positive effect of foreign-born players in the Major League that helped the U.S. understand people with different cultures. Cal Ripken has already expressed openness to further assignments from Karen Hughes’ successor, but it

is unlikely that Bush will be sanctioning any baseball diplomacy with Cuba in his final year. The Bush administration has clearly laid out its intentions to engage China, whilst isolating Cuba, but the absence of sports diplomacy in Cuba may also be explained, in part, by the interest in baseball itself. The intrinsic tension in international relations between the universalism of shared humanity and the particularism of national identities is also powerful in international sports. Through sports individuals can share a common interest and culture, but on the other hand, there is also a tendency towards tribalism and competition along national boundaries. In China, Ripken has been busy attempting to foster common human ties through a new sporting interest across traditional cultural boundaries. “Public diplomacy cannot be an American monologue;” Condoleeza Rice expressed,

“it must be a dialogue with people from around the world.” Despite this, the baseball initiative in China is clearly a monologue. Not only does the Bush administration seek to promote a common culture based upon the American way of life, but it also endeavours to portray the U.S. as a proud sporting nation that is exceptionally successful. As baseball already transcends the divide with Cuba there exists only a rivalry that every sports fan has experience of.

The problem then lies in that since Team U.S.A.’s 1974 victory, Cuba has dominated baseball. During this period they have won all but one World Cup and have taken gold in all of the Pan-American Games and 3 of the 4 Olympic finals (baseball only became an official sport in 1992). The American partisan will undoubtedly emphasise the college and minor league composition of Team U.S.A., but Cubans will also stress that their national system has been amateur since 1961. It was only the introduction of the World Baseball Classic last year that offered the prospect of both

countries’ best teams playing each other. Successive Cold War administrations understood the psychological importance of demonstrating the superiority of the capitalist system over the socialist system in every aspect. The symbolic importance of a clash between a top U.S. and Cuban side had not been lost on Castro either. "One day,” he declared, “when the Yankees accept peaceful coexistence with our country, we shall beat them at baseball too and then the advantages of revolutionary over capitalist sport will be clear to all." As a

national game imbedded in American culture, baseball commands more

importance in victory and defeat than the foreign games of ‘ping-

pong’ and ‘soccer’ that have little domestic following. Perhaps it

was this thought that pushed the Bush administration into

initially refusing to grant the leading Cuban team visa s to play in the

World Baseball Classic tournament. The public backlash eventually encouraged them to make an about face, but they were saved from any direct clash when Team U.S.A. failed to get out of the 2nd round. With the Olympics in Beijing next year and another Baseball World Classic scheduled for 2009, there may be a widespread feeling in the U.S. that their World Cup victory has marked a turn around. It was the supremacy of the U.S. team that actually encouraged proponents of béisbol diplomacy in the Ford administration. Playing a game that they were likely to win would, they believed, “go well with Americans who are depressed by the regimented victories of the Communists in Olympic games.” A consolidation of Team U.S.A.’s supremacy may prompt the next administration to adopt baseball diplomacy in the region. The common theme of shared hemispheric experience and way of life expounded by successive U.S. administrations has been drowned out in recent years by the rallying cries of an alternative in Latin America. Aspirations of baseball glory are shared by Latin

American people and leaders alike and diplomacy will only be successful if there is a genuine dialogue with both. The next U.S. administration could foster pan-Americanism through a genuinely mutual

baseball initiative that engages adversarial governments in the

region . The reputation of the U.S. has only suffered from the Bush

administration’s policies of isolation and division . Baseball is no arms

agreement – or more importantly in the Western Hemisphere – it is no development agreement.

However, if the U.S. cannot even encourage interests and passions

with Latin America that they genuinely hold in common, it has no

chance in persuading the leaders and people of the region that it

shares their aspirations for a significant improvement in their

standard of living .

Inaction on Cuba is the largest threat to US leadershipFrench 10 (Anya, Director of the US-Cuba Policy Institute, "Stiffing Havana," New America Foundation, October 20, cuba.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/stiffing_havana_38758)

In the high-stakes world of international diplomacy, bluffing is a

seldom-seen practice -- the stakes are simply too high to risk

getting called out. But, that's precisely what seems to have

happened with the Obama administration's stated policy of détente

toward Cuba. Havana is making concessions , but Washington seems

incapable of responding in kind. The U nited S tates may be fumbling

away its best chance at influencing Cuba in the way that it has claimed to have

wanted for decades. It was nearly one year ago that President Barack Obama delivered a message to President Raúl Castro via Spain's prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero: "We understand that change can't happen overnight, but down the road, when we look back at this time, it should be clear that now is when those changes began," Obama said. "We're taking steps, but if they don't take steps too, it's going to be very hard for us to continue." If Cuba proved willing to improve relations with the United

States, Obama seemed willing to reciprocate. Obama's conciliatory message may have been on Castro's mind as the Cuban government began making improvements to its much maligned human rights record this summer. More than 40 Cuban political prisoners have been released from jail in recent months. Dozens more might soon follow as part of the government's unprecedented human rights dialogue with the Cuban Catholic Church; it's the first such dialogue of its kind for the church, an institution that previously had been treated with suspicion, if not hostility, by the Cuban government. The political changes have been paired with sweeping labor and economic reforms that have, however belatedly, begun to liberalize the moribund economy: 10 percent of Cuba's workforce will shift into the private

sector by next year. The ball , clearly, is now in the U nited S tates' court . But so far, the Obama administration has failed to respond to the very concessions Washington has long demanded, and very recently promised to reward. Rather than greet the changes, Obama has replied with mild skepticism. "I think that any release of political prisoners, any economic liberalization that takes place in Cuba is positive, positive for Cuban people, but we've not yet seen the full results of these promises," Obama told Hispanic media at the

White House Tuesday. Washington and Havana remain locked in their 50-

year dispute. The U.S. trade and travel embargoes have only gotten

tighter over the decades ; under President George W. Bush, tensions

threatened to reach a tipping point . Obama has called the inherited status quo a failure, but most of the Bush policies remain in place today. (Some in Washington argue that Obama has already made significant gestures to Havana by easing restrictions on Cuban-American families' travel and remittances to the island last year. But that change was more a gesture to Cuban-Americans in Miami -- where he campaigned on a promise to ease Bush's harsher restrictions on Cuban immigrant families -- than it was any significant political concession to Havana.) The Obama administration should instead be honoring the changes in Cuba by taking

considerable steps of its own: A bold response by Washington will put the spotlight back on Havana to continue with its reforms. Obama's choice isn't between the status quo and a wholesale abandonment of the embargoes: There are many ways to craft a foreign policy that could help spur the economic growth needed to support the half-million new workers in Cuba's fledging private sector. Only Congress can lift the Cuban travel ban entirely, but the president possesses broad authority to allow some Americans to travel freely to the island. Cultural and academic trips to Cuba by Americans are currently permitted

under U.S. law, at the discretion of the federal government; the Obama administration could easily broaden the definition of such " people-to-people" trips . That policy would trace its roots to the successful citizen diplomacy with the Soviet Union that President Ronald Reagan championed during the Cold War. President Bill Clinton successfully enacted such a policy toward Cuba during his time in office, but it was rolled back by Bush. But what if Obama chooses to do nothing or dithers so long that this historic opportunity to influence Cuban reforms passes?

If the president fails to move now , after Cuba has apparently acted

in good faith to the offer of an outstretched hand, his

administration will lose credibility --not just in Havana, but among

global allies that will see the president's reversal as a sign of

weakness, incoherence, and even dishonesty . No one can say for sure, of course,

where Cuba's reforms will lead. But it's clear -- even to Fidel Castro in his most unguarded moments -- that the old model just doesn't work anymore. Raúl Castro's reforms, deeper and broader than the limited

Cuban reforms of the 1990s, signal that Havana is in search of a new system. It may or may not

be the model America would choose, but if Washington wants to

have any influence at this pivotal moment, the time to engage Cuba

is now.

Decline is inevitable – reorientation of baseball diplomacy is key to a smooth transition that restores American diplomatic influenceElias 10 (Robert, Professor of Law and Politics at the University of San Francisco, “The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold US Foreign Policy and Promoted the American Way Abroad,” p283-5)Nevertheless, in 2007, foreign correspondent Stephen Kinzer worried about the future:A seemingly invulnerable power that overreaches and suddenly suffers defeat that expose its weakness and threaten its hegemony —that is the story of the US as this fifth summer of [the Iraq] war begins. It is also...the story of America’s most successful sports team, the New York Yankees. What is happening to them is also happening to President Bush, the Republican Party, and the US itself. Each swaggered into the twenty-first-century with a triumphant air…rich and secure, looking forward to [long-term] dominance.

Overconfidence lulled them into a false sense of security. Now…they

are facing undreamed-of troubles…Both need to set a different course or risk seeing their power slip away. As we consider these observations, now two years later, does the apparent resurgence of the Yankees belie Kinzer’s concerns? We’ll see, but

not likely. For nearly two hundred years, baseball has instead aligned itself with conservative America and with an increasingly aggressive US foreign, military, and globalization policy . It has helped America prepare for battle and conduct wars and interventions, and it has assorted underlings in the foreign policy establishment. Baseball has promoted patriotism, masculinity, nationalism, and Americanism at home and helped “manage” the nation’s internal, often race-based, colonization. Sometimes backed by an arrogant “muscular Christianity,” baseball engaged in a “civilizing mission” abroad, “enlightening”the natives, and selling the American dream. Strategically combining softball and hardball politics, baseball diplomacy helped drag

other nations into the globalized world. Through these means, organized baseball has served the nation while also advancing its own fortunes. The relationship has brought baseball many benefits. It has been regarded as the national game for most of American history. And many have gained financially from baseball’s strong performance, especially team owners, who have profited from the game’s special status—a monopoly exempt from antitrust regulations. Abroad, baseball has had the protection of America’s armed forces, which have also helped

to institutionalize the game in foreign lands. Even so, the alliance between baseball and America’s foreign policy establishment has produced a “national pastime trade-off” that has jeopardized the sport’s independence and integrity. While we’d hardly expect it to be purposely unpatriotic, MLB has instead gone to the opposite extreme, adopting an often militaristic and jingoistic nationalism that sometimes makes baseball

into merely an expansion of the government armed forces. This blind patriotism has linked baseball with policies that have put the game in a bad light. Aside from handcuffing the sport, it may have implication for baseball fans. As David Voight has suggested, “Baseball leaders have either willingnly accepted or being forced into a garrison-state mentality—

forevor having to defend their claim to be ‘the’ American sport. If [this] requires baseball officials to stand by while politicians exploit the game to support military policies, surely this must alienate fans who see this as pandering to superpatriots and warmongers . Baseball has always prided itself on reflected the best of American values, but the “national pastime trade-off” may be preventing it from

doing so. As handmaiden of US foreign policy, baseball can claim many successes. Like America’s own empire, MLB has become a dynasty as well. The U nited S tates has become the sole superpower , uncontested in military strength. It has transplanted its values, culture, and products across the globe. As the saying goes, when America’s economy sneezes, the rest of the world catches cold.

Likewise, American baseball—and MLB in particular—dominates other baseball playing peoples nations abroad , substantially controlling ballplayers and institutions in other lands. By these measures, America and MLB have both hit home

runs. Yet others have assessed the US and major-league empires quite differently. Historians tell us the fall of Rome followed a general malaise and structural weakness that grew over time. According to sociologist Morris Berman, this describes contemporary America, where religion and plutocracy are defeating reason

and democracy. In his Dark Ages America, Berman diagnoses large-scale processes of national collapse, such as an overextended self-destructive US foreign and military policy, which

mirrors the deterioration of everyday American lives —driven by “infantile needs and impulses” fueled by schools that don’t teach. News media that don’t inform, obsessive shopping, mindless television, knee-jerk reactionaries, religious zealots, the frenzied acceleration of work, and the erosion of community. As the corporate consumerist juggernaut rolls on, robbing meaning from our lives, the factors that once propelled the growth of the US empire—extreme individualism and

inequality, territorial economic expansion, and the pursuit of material wealth—are now becoming the nails in America’s collective coffin. It’s a Darwinian society that

doesn’t believe in Darwinism and an empire that’s weaker than Americans might think. Much of the world dislikes a United States, and most Americans don’t know or care. Berman predicts that within a short time the nation will be marginalized , its global hegemony replaced by that of China or the Europeans. Other social critics have reached similar conclusions. They describe a state of affairs (irrespective of political party) with post-World War II origins (at the latest), characterized by the

creation of a US “national security state” in pursuit of foreign resources, with commitments that would almost inevitably bring the nation to the breaking point. History teaches us that if nations act soon enough, they have a choice. They can loosen their grip on empire to save themselves, or they can hang on till the bitter end. Rome made the wrong choice and perished.

Britain chose more wisely and survived. What will the United States do? Will the new administration of President Barack Obama make any difference? Even if only a fraction of the alarming signs of dynasty declines are true, then rather than hitting a home run, America’s empire instead seems on the brink of striking out. How then, must we asses an institution—Major League Baseball—whose well-being has relied so long on its ties to the American empire, to whose existence the sport has made no small contribution? According to anthropologist Alan

Klein it could go either way: “MLB is poised at a crossroads which invites interpretations of empire both aging and rekindled with vigor. There are those who view MLB as a colonizer, exploiting foreign players, selling itself around the world, busily generating new markets, with little or no concern for local interests. This is classic dependency theory in

a baseball jersey.” But as Klein also observes, “The contrasting model… has MLB leading [baseball’s] internationalization, with other countries increasingly sharing power and finding ways to push their own national agendas.” In his book Growing the Game, Klein roots for the latter approach, offering some cautions but mainly showing how MLB can and will maintain its domain. According to Klein, the “hyper-globalization” or “testicular globalization” advocated by boosters such as Thomas Friedman seeks only to increase America’s economic dominance over other nations. Klein contrasts that with “tough love globalization,” which avoids colonization and focuses on rewarding merit wherever it emerges.

Endorsing the latter course for MLB, Klein says organized baseball must “take a global view in which [it] grows by reducing its globalization unselfishly, baseball’s globalization can take a more benign direction: “It must [pursue] stewardship, not empire. In the long run, imperial notions fail, because the center cannot hold . Klein sees progressive possibilities, praising the Dodgers organization, for example, for being moral and not

merely greedy: “The racial integration of baseball was built upon the same principles [as] globalization: expansion of baseball was built upon the same principles [as] globalization: expansion of boundaries, a relatively high degree of merit, and social openness.” Klein traces this from Branch Rickey through the O’Malleys, and their forays first into new racial and ethnic communities at

home and then abroad to the Carribean, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Operating overseas, according to Klein, is a matter of branding and getting a product to mesh with another culture’s myths. It’s a matter of “how does it fit into the foreign culture?” not “play this game because we’re superior to you.” Klein believes MLB should market the sport more in the developing world (where people are still hungry for it) than in developed nations. Globalization would best be promoted by adding major-league franchises abroad, and realigning MLB to create a Pan American or Pacific Rim division.

The plan re-orients baseball diplomacy – the prevents all conflict escalation Elias 10 (Robert, Professor of Law and Politics at the University of San Francisco, “The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold US Foreign Policy and Promoted the American Way Abroad,” p282-283)

If some success has been achieved in “growing the game,” then what does that mean? MLB has expanded and profited, yet the sport of baseball has largely stagnated in the United States and abroad. Americans are no longer the world’s best baseball players, and baseball has not become the world’s game. Baseball’s export abroad has brought the American dream to the few, but an American nightmare for others. And arguably, baseball hasn’t even remained a national pastime in America. In the best case, MLB has prevailed but only along a very narrow dimension and quite likely only tentatively. In the worst case, assessed by more meaningful measures, the MLB empire has struck out or at least has two strikes against it. Can we begin seeing baseball without looking through the dominant lens of the major leagues?

Can organized baseball reevaluate what’s at stake and refocus itself toward the value of the game instead of merely the value of its portfolio? MLB’s current direction might be serving its own interests far less than its leaders might imagine. Is being the loyal servant of US foreign and military policy good for organized baseball? As we’ve seen, MLB has pursued this alliance throughout its history, but isn’t it possible that the “national pastime trade-off” has outlived its usefulness? Was it perhaps overrated in the first place? Albert Camus once wrote, “The true patriot is one who gives his highest loyalty not to his country as it is, but to what it can and ought to be.” That’s a distinction that may be worth emphasizing at this point in American

history. The U nited S tates now faces not merely the usual internal conflicts over the state of the nation and its role in the world . It also encourages a world, including its closest allies, that largely rejects its foreign, military, and globalization policies—not to mention the fact that those policies undermine the fundamental principles of American democracy and the US constitution. Isn’t it perhaps time for MLB (and all of us) to reassess what constitutes a patriotic response to these circumstances? Even from the practical perspective of merely salvaging America from the worst

consequences (for itself) of its overextended empire , a reorientation might be

appropriate . Does MLB really want to be viewed as the “ugly

American ” and remain linked with what’s often regarded as a rogue

nation , whose policies and government are widely hated around the

world ? Perhaps MLB has more of a sense of this than we think. While its deviations

from American policy have been rare, two have occurred recently,

and both involved in Cuba. In 1998, MLB challenged America’s Cuba

policy and the Clinton White House when it arranged a baseball

series between the Baltimore Orioles and the Cuban national team.

Then in 2005, MLB confronted that policy (and this time the Bush White House)

again, when it sought US entry for the Cuban team to play in the World Baseball Classic.

Conforming to outdated Cold War politics wasn’t in the best interest

of MLB , and it might begin to se this in other contexts too . What else

could baseball do differently? It depends, in part, on whether organized baseball will take the lead or will have to pushed in a new direction. All baseball fans have a stake in resisting the game’s further commodification. Baseball’s meaning has increasingly been contrived from above and cynically foisted on a passive public, rather than reflecting people’s lived experience and their interest in engaging with the sport rather than being its passive spectators. Mike Marqusee holds out hope: “the colonization of sport, like the corporate appropriation of the Third World gene bank, can be challenged. But only if sports fans emerge from their nationalistic cocoons and begin making links across borders of all kinds.” And if organized baseball shuns these overtures? Perhaps we should heed former big-league pitcher Bill Lee, who argued that fans “have to storm the commissioner’s office as the peasants stormed the Bastille during the French Revolution. They

have to take control. Ralph Nader had it right: sports and not religion is now the opiate of the masses. We

have to shake ourselves out of that opiate-induced state and return the game to what it used to be. As with US-Cuba relations, MLB might see reasons to challenge other parts of conventional US foreign policy . It might recognized the value of using baseball to try to rehabilitate the world’s negative view of America, but such effort can succeed only where baseball is used for positive ends not for social

control. Will MLB remain part of the problem of American empire and

of US foreign and military policy, or will it become part of the

solution ? How about promoting genuine baseball diplomacy rather

than thinly disguised gestures of self-interest? And why not

reconsider baseball’s longstanding association with war and

militarism ? Byron Price points out that baseball can serve “as a

balance to reprieve from the adrenaline of warfare , rather than its

intensification.” Merritt Clifton agrees: “At some point, baseball

rivalry might help replace war …[ and] nationalism , with new

recognition of ourselves as members of a common species. MLB might

reconsider its hoarding of the sport and try instead to genuinely spread the game. Doing so would reap financial rewards in the long run, but in the short term it might be better offered as a gift: “Here’s what baseball has given us. We hope you like it. It’s part of America and its free.” If MLB and the United States are serious about exporting the American dream, then it should be made a common reality, not merely a

rare jackpot for the few. Roberto Gonzales Echevarria has written that “baseball contains

within it forces that oppose the advance of American-style

capitalism…[and] the magic of the ritual of baseball prevents the

game from being appropriated by one culture of nation. Baseball

is…human and universal …and now b elongs to countries and

cultures that are not American . It could belong to many more. Organized baseball might work to preserve and promote (rather than weaken and undermine) foreign leagues in the Caribean, East Asia, and elsewhere, which would allow for other nations to build up their baseball without having their players and fans lured away. As Peter Bjarkman has argued, “baseball’s salvation depends on the continued existence of alternative baseball worlds—independent entities that can focus exclusively on their own grown and health as vibrant national cultural institutions.” Accordingly, if the United States isn’t weakening clubs in other nations, then it becomes more legitimate to patriotically support America’s teams. And domestically, MLB could begin to take more seriously its revival as the national pastime. Rather than conceding to competing sports, it could more earnestly win back those athletes (especially African Americans) and fans it has lost—offering a new and more

progressive vision of itself in American society. Sports sociologists have shown that a nation’s dominant games reflect the society that supports them. Football first challenged baseball as the national game during the late-nineteenth-century rise of American imperialism. Baseball survived this and subsequent threats but eventually lost ground, especially in the Vietnam War era. Arguably, America has become a “football society” over the last thirty years. Football’s violence and other machismo may best describe the culture America has become and the way it projects itself into the world. It may be the genuine sport of the American Empire. Does baseball really want to reclaim that distinction? In the house of American sports, baseball has found itself in an unfamiliar position: looking in, instead of looking out. It still labors, however, to hold on to the “national pastime” label. Should it continue to do so, and if so, how? In the early twenty-first century,

performance-enhancing drugs might seem like baseball’s greatest challenge. Yet MLB reaction to America’s performance enhanced foreign policies may matter as well. John Thorn has observed that “sometimes baseball…serves as a beacon,

revealing a path through the wilderness .” And Tim Wendel writes about how

baseball offers “ an alternative, a way out of all this madness .” Perhaps

so. Ironically, for all that baseball has done, historically, to parrot the sport redouble its efforts with a new dose of flag-waving patriotism? Should baseball compte in that way with football to regain its status as the genuine national pastime? Or should it instead recognize what it has lost, over the years, by playing that game? Of course there are limits to how a sport can shape a nation. Even so, what kind of

society does baseball really want to reflect? It might do better by letting football

beat the war drums while baseball instead pushes the nation to live

up its deals.

Re-oriented diplomacy prevents great power warsJervis 09 (professor of international politics at Columbia University. (Robert, Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective, World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009)

To say that the system is unipolar is not to argue that the unipole can get everything it wants or that it has no need for others. American power is very great, but it is still subject to two familiar limitations: it is harder to build than to destroy, and success usually depends on others’ decisions. This is particularly true of the current system because of what the U.S. wants. If Hitler had won World War II, he might have been able to maintain his system for some period of time with little cooperation from others because “all” he wanted was to establish the supremacy of the Aryan

race. The U.S. wants not only to prevent the rise of a peer competitor but also to stamp out terrorism, maintain an open international economic system, spread democracy throughout the world, and establish a high degree of cooperation among countries that remain juridically equal. Even in the military arena, the U.S. cannot act completely alone. Bases and overflight rights are always needed, and support from allies, especially Great Britain, is important to validate military action in the eyes of the American public. When one matches American forces, not against those of an adversary but against the tasks at hand, they often fall short. Against terrorism, force is ineffective without excellent intelligence. Given the international nature of the threat and the difficulties of gaining information about it, international

cooperation is the only route to success. The maintenance of international prosperity also requires joint efforts, even leaving aside the danger that other countries could trigger a run on the dollar by cashing in their holdings. Despite its lack of political unity, Europe is in many respects an economic unit, and one with a greater   GDP  than that of the U.S. Especially because of the growing Chinese economy, economic power is spread around the world much more equally than is military power, and the open economic system   could easily disintegrate despite continued unipolarity. In parallel, on a whole host of problems such as   AIDS, poverty, and international crime (even leaving aside climate change), the unipole can lead and exert pressure but cannot dictate . Joint actions may be necessary to apply sanctions to various unpleasant and recalcitrant regimes; proliferation can be stopped only if all the major states (and many minor ones) work to this end; unipolarity did not automatically enable the U.S. to maintain the coalition against Iraq after the first Gulf War; close ties within the West are needed to reduce the ability of China, Russia, and other states to play one Western country off against the others . But in comparison with the cold war era, there are fewer incentives today for allies to cooperate with the U.S. During the earlier period unity and close coordination not only permitted military efficiencies but, more importantly, gave credibility to the American nuclear umbrella that protected the allies. Serious

splits were dangerous because they entailed the risk that the Soviet Union would be emboldened. This reason for avoiding squabbles disappeared along with the USSR, and the point is likely to generalize to other unipolar systems if they involve a

decrease of threats that call for maintaining good relations with the superpower . This does not mean that even in this particular unipolar system the superpower is like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians. In some areas opposition can be self-defeating. Thus for any country to undermine American leadership of the international economy would be to put its own economy at risk , even if the U.S. did not retaliate, and for a country to sell a large proportion of its dollar holding would be to depress the value of the dollar, thereby diminishing the worth of the country’s remaining stock of this currency. Furthermore, cooperation often follows strong and essentially unilateral action. Without the war in Iraq it is not likely that we would have seen the degree of cooperation that the U.S. obtained from Europe in combating the Iranian nuclear program and from Japan and the PRC in containing North Korea. Nevertheless, many of the American goals depend on persuading others, not coercing them. Although incentives and even force are not irrelevant to spreading democracy and the free market, at bottom this requires people to embrace a set of institutions and

values. Building the world that the U.S. seeks is a political, social, and even psychological task for which unilateral measures are likely to be unsuited and for which American military and economic strength can at best play a supporting role. Success requires that others share the American vision and believe that its leadership is benign.

The alternative to multilateralism is unilateral militarism – the plan establishes a model for hemispheric diplomacy that sustains US leadershipGrandin 10 (teaches history at New York University and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Greg, “Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” New Labor Forum, 19:1, Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//SJF

Washington’s relations with Latin America—particularly in terms of the gap between what its policy toward the region is and what it could be—precisely measure the degree to which domestic ideologies, narrow corporate and sectional

interests, and a sclerotic political system are hastening the decline of the United States as a global power. As a result, the U.S. is deepening its dependence on unstable policies in order to leverage its dwindling influence in the hemisphere. It is easy to imagine an improved U.S. diplomacy toward Latin America , designed not to advance a set of altruistic ideals but merely to defend its interests—broadly defined to mean stable politics and economies that are open to U.S. capital and

commodities—and to achieve what those in the liberal wing of the foreign policy establishment have long

advocated: a maximization of U.S. “soft power .” Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye defines

soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion,” through an enhanced understanding and utilization of multilateral institutions, mutually beneficial policies, cultural exchanges, and commercial relations.1 There are no immediate threats to the U.S. in Latin America. A majority of the region’s political elite—even most of its current govern- ing leftists—share many of the same values the United States claims to embody, even more so following the election of the first African-American president, who is wildly

popular in Latin America. As a result, there is no other place in the world that offers U.S. president Barack Obama the opportunity to put into place the kind of intelligent foreign policy that he and his closest advisors, such as United Nations (U.N.) ambassador Susan Rice, believe is

necessary to stop the hemorrhaging of U.S. prestige—one that would both improve Washington’s ability to deploy its many competitive advantages, while removing key points of friction . Here’s what such a policy could look like: Washington would concede to longstanding Brazilian demands by reducing tariffs and subsidies that protect the U.S. agricultural industry, opening its market to Brazilian com- modities, especially soy and sugar, as well as value-added ethanol. It would yield on other issues that have stalled the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), such as a demand for strident intellectual property rights enforcement, which Brazil objects to because it would disadvantage its own pharmaceutical industry and hinder its ability to provide low-cost medicine to those infected with the HIV virus. Such concessions would provide an incentive for Brasilia to take the lead in jumpstarting the FTAA, a treaty that would ultimately benefit U.S. corporations, yet would be meaningless without Brazil, South America’s largest and most dynamic economy. ¶ The U.S. would scale back its military operations in Colombia—including recent con- troversial plans to establish a series of military bases which have raised strong criticisms from the governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—who is entering the last year of his second and last term—has become the spokesperson for the collective discontent, an indication of his country’s regional authority. In exchange for the U.S. dialing down its military presence, a soon-to-be post-Lula Brazil might find it convenient to tilt away from Venezuela and

toward the United States. Washington would also drop the five-decade-old trade embargo on Cuba , thus burying a Cold War relic that continues to tarnish the U.S. image. Normalizing relations with Cuba would create an additional enticement for Brazil to cooperate with the U.S., since its formidable agro-industry is beginning to invest in Cuba and is therefore well-placed to export to the U.S. market. Politically, Washington would formally recommit to a multilateral foreign policy, even as it set up a de facto arrangement with Brazil to administer the region. This would mean demonstrating its willingness to work through the Organization of American States (OAS). More importantly, it would mean leashing the quasi-privatized “democracy promotion” organizations—largely funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Agency for International Development, and run by the International Republican Institute—that have become vectors of trans- national, conservative coalition building throughout the hemisphere. These groups today do overtly what the CIA used to do covertly, as NED's first president, Allen Weinstein, admitted—they fund oppositional “civil soci- ety” groups that use the rhetoric of democracy and human rights to menace Left govern- ments throughout the region, including the promotion of an aborted coup in Venezuela in 2002 and successful ones in Haiti in 2004 and Honduras in 2009.2 Similar destabilization efforts tried to topple Bolivia’s Evo Morales in 2008 but failed, at least partly because Brazil and Chile let it be known that they would not accept those kinds of machinations in their backyards. It would be easy for the Obama administration to rein these groups in, and to agree to Latin American demands to make their funding more transparent and their actions more accountable. Washington would also take a number of other initiatives to modernize hemispheric diplomacy, including deescalating its failed “War on Drugs,” as Latin America’s leading intellectuals and policymakers—including many former presidents—are demanding; in the last few months, both Mexico and Argentina have legalized some drug use and possession, including small quantities of cocaine and heroin.3 The U.S. would renew its assault weapons ban, as Mexico—battered by over five thousand narcotics-related murders a year, many of them committed with smuggled U.S. guns—is begging. It could also pass meaningful immigration reform, providing a path to U.S. citizenship for the millions of undocumented Latin Americans, mostly from Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andes, but also Brazil. Such a move would go a long way toward improving relations with south- ern neighbors. It would also be good domestic politics for the Democrats, guaranteeing the loyalty of the Latino vote in 2012 and moving Texas, by creating millions of new vot- ers, closer to swing-state status. It could also provide progressives and the Democratic Party with a real wedge issue: Catholics, increasingly pulled into the con- servative camp by issues such as abortion and gay rights, overwhelmingly favor immigration reform. Any one of the above steps would go far in reestablishing U.S. legitimacy in Latin America. Taken together they could serve as a diplomatic revolution, one which would not weaken U.S. power but consolidate it much the way the Good Neighbor Policy did, allowing Washington to project its power in the region through stable multilateral mechanisms freed from the burdens of confrontation and militarism. A retooled FTAA, updated for the post-Great Recession world and stripped of the ideologi- cal baggage of failed neoliberal globalization, might provide a blueprint for a sustainable regional economy, one that balances national development and corporate profit.4 And like the Good

Neighbor Policy, a reinvigorated hemispheric diplomacy could serve as a model for the rest of the world, a design for a practical twenty-first century multilateralism, capable of responding to transnational problems — both those that concern liberals, such as climate change, poverty , and migration, and those that concern conservatives, such as crime and terrorism — while respecting, at least rhetorically, the sovereignty of individual nations. In short, the Western Hemisphere offers an unparalleled opportunity to realize the vision of Barack Obama’s September 2009 address to the United Nations—hailed by many as a clarion call for a new internationalism—to, in his words, “embrace a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” It’s not going to happen. Efforts to implement any one of the above policy changes would be blocked by powerful domestic interests. Take biofuels. The idea to liberalize the U.S. agricultural market—and have the rhetoric of free trade somewhat match the reality—is recommended by all mainstream think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, as an important step to win back Brazil. Obama recognizes the importance of Brazil, having nominated George W. Bush’s outgoing assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Shannon—respected in establishment circles as, according to the journal Foreign Policy, “the most talented and successful

individual” to serve as Washington’s envoy to Latin America “in at least two decades”—as its ambassador. Yet Shannon’s confirmation had been threatened by Senator Chuck Grassley, representing the agro-industry state of Iowa, who objected to the then-nominee’s comment during his confirma- tion hearings that removing a fifty-four-cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol would be good for U.S. foreign policy. The White House immediately declared that it had no plans to change tariff policy, and Grassley allowed the confirmation to proceed.5 The White House’s quick buckling probably has to do with its fruitless attempt to win over Grassley for health care reform, a further indicator of how foreign policy is held hostage by domestic politics. Similar obstacles stand in the way of other foreign policy reforms. The Cuban lobby, along with the broader conservative Right, prevents a normalization of relations with Havana. Fear of the National Rifle Association halts a renewal of the assault weapons ban. As to the “War on Drugs,” the Democratic Party is deeply committed to “Plan Colombia,” the centerpiece of that war. It is, after all, a legacy of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, and much of the $6 billion spent to fight it thus far goes directly into the coffers of corporate sponsors of the Democratic Party like Connecticut’s United Technologies and other northeastern defense contractors (it was Bill Clinton who in 1997, acting on behalf of Lockheed Martin, lifted a twenty-year ban on high-tech weapons sales to Latin America, kicking off an arms build-up, in which Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have taken the lead).6 As to immigration reform—also recom- mended by influential establishment groups to improve U.S. standing in Latin America— Obama, in Mexico, said it would have to wait until next year. He has a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a large majority in the House, yet he says there aren’t enough votes and “there is not, by any means, con- sensus across the table.”7 Obama could easily assemble a majority coalition on this issue—comprised of business interests who want cheap labor, Hispanics, progressives, social justice Catholics, and members of the labor movement (who long ago signaled their support for immigration reform)—yet fear of a backlash fueled by a contracting economy has led him to back- burner the issue. The same conditions that make Latin America the best venue in which to modernize U.S. diplomacy—namely that there is no immediate threat emerging from the region, no equivalent of North Korea or Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, no insurgency bogging down U.S. troops as in Afghanistan, and no conflict threatening access to vital resources (Washington’s main antagonist in the region, Venezuela, continues to sell most of its oil to the U.S.)—also mean that there are no real incentives for Obama’s fledgling foreign policy coalition to expend political capital on trying to improve policy there. Analysts of the American empire—from Charles A. Beard in the 1930s to William Appleman Williams in the 1960s and 1970s— have emphasized the U.S.’s unique ability to subsume competing economic, ideological, and sectional interests into a flexible and vital diplomacy in defense of a general “national interest,” which has led America to unprec- edented global power.8 Yet now—confronted with a sustained economic contraction, the fallout from a disastrous overleveraging of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a post-Cold War, post-neoliberal world with multiple power centers—expansion has given way to involution. The U.S. political system seems to be literally devouring itself from within, paralyzing the ability of foreign

policymakers to adjust to a rapidly changing world. Unable to leverage its soft , smart power even in its own hemisphere, Washington is ever

more dependent on the military and corporate mercenary

forces that have transformed Colombia into a citadel of U.S. hard power in the Andes. As a candidate, Obama—referring to Bush’s decision to invade Iraq—said he wasn’t opposed to all wars, just stupid ones. Washington’s “War on Drugs” in Latin America is the stupid- est war one can imagine. As the centerpiece of that war, “Plan Colombia”—a program, established by Bill Clinton and extended by George W. Bush and Barack Obama, that has provided Colombia with billions of dollars of aid, mostly for the military’s counternarcotic and counterinsurgent operations—has served to entrench paramilitary power, enrich pri- vate contractors (such as the Virginia-based DynCorp), and turn more than four million Colombians into refugees.9 It has also fore- closed the possibility of a negotiated, regionally brokered solution to the crisis and inflamed a conflict that has already once spilled beyond national borders—in March 2008, Colombian troops launched a military raid into Ecuador to assassinate members of the insurgent Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. And, while it has not lessened narcotics exports to the United States, the drug war has spread the violence associated with the illegal narcotics trade up through Central America and into Mexico, accounting for the staggeringly high number of homicides in the region. Much like the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Washington’s militarization of the drug problem in Latin America has worsened what it sought to solve, thus pro- viding an excuse for even more militarism. Thus Southcom—which runs the Department of Defense’s South American operations—is expanding its presence in Colombia, recently brokering a deal that will give the U.S. military access to at least seven bases, running from the Caribbean to the Andes. Colombia and the U.S. insist that this expansion is directed to ensure Colombia’s internal security; but Brazil’s military is concerned that the bases give the U.S. the ability to project its power deep into South America. Colombia serves as the anchor of a broader strategic shift on the part of the U.S., one that reflects its position as a declining hegemon. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the U.S.— confident of its ascension as a world power—treated Latin America largely as a unified region, working through inter-American organizations set up via the Good Neighbor Policy and during World War II, such as the OAS and the Rio Pact (a mutual defense treaty that became the model for NATO). When one or another country tried to break out of its dependent relationship with the U.S.—i.e., Cuba in the 1960s, Chile in the early 1970s, or Nicaragua in the 1980s—the U.S. took independent, often covert steps either to isolate it or bring it back into the fold. Yet throughout the Cold War (and for about a decade following the Cold War),

Washington continued to view the region as a single administrative zone. But today, the U.S. is increasingly relying on a strategy of divide and rule. Washington’s relationship with Colombia is the centerpiece of this new approach, and the Andean country functions as something like Latin America’s Israel: a heavily militarized U.S. ally that allows Washington to project its power into a hostile region.

Like Israel, its preemptive, unilateral actions are encouraged by Washington in the name of national security. Colombia’s reckless raid into Ecuador in 2008—denounced by every South American country—was endorsed not just by George W. Bush but by then- U.S. presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and Barack Obama. Like Israel, Colombia’s security forces serve as a model and a resource for wars elsewhere. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

has commented that “many of us from all over the world can learn from what has happened with respect to the very successful develop- ments of ‘Plan Colombia,’” and suggested that it be franchised “specifically to Afghanistan.”10 Some of private military contractor Xe’s—née Blackwater—best recruits are retired Colombian soldiers, trained for Middle East operations on Colombian military bases; before taking control of the murderous Iraq Special Operations Forces, U.S. brigadier gen- eral Simeon Trombitas served in Colombia.11 Recently, Colombian paramilitaries have been recruited as mercenaries by Honduran plantation owners, to protect their property in the wake of the crisis unleashed by the coup.12 Colombia also boasts one of the most sophisticated intelligence apparatuses in its region—bolstered by massive infusions of U.S. dollars—capable of carrying out not just widespread surveillance but covert operations, including attempts to destabilize neighboring Venezuela.13 On the diplomatic circuit, an embassy posting in Colombia has become a way station toward a more prominent role in the Great Game. Current ambassadors to Afghanistan and Pakistan—William Wood and Anne Paterson, respectively—previously served as Bush’s envoys to Colombia. Like Israel, Colombia inspires many who see it as an exemplar of how to balance democracy—a place that offers relatively free elections, with three independent (at least in principle) branches of government—and security. “Colombia is what Iraq should eventually look like, in our best dreams,” writes influen- tial Atlantic contributor Robert Kaplan. “Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has fought—and is winning—a counterinsurgency war even as he has liberalized the economy, strengthened institutions, and improved human rights.”14 The Council on Foreign Relations has put aside its earlier strong criticism of “Plan Colombia” and now hails it as a success for having established a state presence in “many regions previously con- trolled by illegal armed groups, reestablishing elected governments, building and rebuilding public infrastructure, and reaffirming the rule of law.” The Council recommends a similar solution for violence-plagued Mexico and Central America.15 Throughout Latin America, a resurgent Right looks to Colombia for inspira- tion and Uribe as its standard bearer, a backstop against Hugo Chávez-style populism. As Forrest Hylton has argued, Uribe’s suc- cess at consolidating power rests on an alliance between death-squad paramilitaries—who have used “Plan Colombia” as a cover to execute an enormous land grab and to establish their rule in the countryside—and drug traffickers who have decided to stop fighting the state and become part of it. Medellín, the showcase city of Latin America’s New Right, has the eighth highest murder rate in the world; Uribe himself has deep ties to both paramilitaries and drug cartels.16 Colombia also serves as an anchor to a new geopolitics, an attempt by Washington to build a “security corridor” running from Mexico, through Central America, and into Colombia. Under the auspices of such programs as the Merida Initiative, “Plan Puebla-Panama,” and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, the objective is to integrate the region’s trans- portation and communications infrastructure, energy production and distribution network, and, most importantly, its military capacities. Call it top-down, transnational state forma- tion, an attempt to coordinate the region’s intelligence agencies, militaries, and police (as well as mercenary corporations like DynCorp), subordinated under the direction of the U.S. military. Thomas Shannon, Bush’s envoy to Latin America and now Obama’s ambassador to Brazil, described it

in a moment of candor as “armoring NAFTA.” In other words, the U.S. is retrenching , pulling back from efforts to preside over the entirety of Latin America, instead consolidating its authority over a circumscribed territory, with a deepening

reliance on applied military power . This shift is significant, and could unleash a period of heightened instability . One consequence of Washington’s past strategy of treating Latin America as a single unit was that inter-state conflicts were contained; since the 1930s, most bloodletting was internally directed, aimed at trade unionists, peasant activists, intellectuals, reformist politicians, and progressive

religious leaders demanding a more equitable share of economic and political power. But now, with a waning superpower banking its authority on “armoring” one region in order to contain another, that might be changing—as evinced by Colombia’s 2008 raid into Ecuador and recent tensions caused by U.S. plans to expand its military footprint in the Andean country. As Adam Isacson, of the Center for International Policy, says of Washington’s new Colombian bases, the U.S. is “creating a new capability in South America, and capabilities often get used.”17 Adding to the potential for instability is the regrouping of the Right. Political scientist Miguel Tinker-Salas notes that “for some time, the Right has been rebuilding in Latin America; hosting conferences, sharing experiences, refining their message, working with the media, and building ties with allies in the United States. This is not the lunatic right-wing fringe, but rather the mainstream Right with powerful allies in the middle-class that used to consider themselves center, but have been frightened by recent Left electoral victories and the rise of social movements.”18 This nascent reaction has been buoyed by the June 2009 Honduran coup, which the right-wing sees as the first successful rollback of populism since the 2004 overthrow of Aristide, as well as by recent victories at the ballot box: in May, a conservative millionaire won the presidency in Panama. In Argentina, Cristina Fernández’s center-left Peronist party has recently suffered a midterm electoral defeat and lost control of Congress. And polls show that presidential elections coming up in Chile and Brazil will be close, possibly dealing further losses to progressives, containing the South American Left to Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and the Central American Left to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Two broad arcs of crises have defined U.S.-Latin American relations. The first began in the early nineteenth century and paralleled the first, youthful phase of U.S. territorial and economic expansion. Latin American intellectuals, politicians, and nationalists reacted with increasing hostility toward not only the growing influence of U.S. capital—which both displaced European economic interests and subordinated aspiring domestic elites—but toward ever more frequent and threatening military interventions: the Mexican-American War; the Spanish-American War; the creation of Panama; and invasions and occupations throughout the Caribbean basin. The second round coincided with the advent of the Cold War and marked the U.S.’s maturity as a global power. It intensified with Eisenhower’s over- throw of Guatemala’s democratically elected government in 1954, and continued with the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the series of right- wing

coups in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating with the violent repression of Central American insurgencies in the 1980s, which paved the way for the neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s. It seems we are entering a third period of conflict—

this time driven less by the tendency toward expansion that marked the U.S.’s global ascension than by a frantic

attempt to hold on to what it has left as it enters its senescence—as domestic ideologues, unchecked corporate power, and political paralysis quicken the U.S.’s fall.

Visa policy already exists – the plan is key to making it less discriminatoryKupfer Schneider 1 (Andrea. Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University. 12 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 473. Baseball Diplomacy)

The second issue raised by the intersection of Cuba, the United States, and baseball is less general in scope and less political in focus, but perhaps far more important to the Cuban baseball community. This issue also deals with the hiring of Cuban defectors and focuses on the MLB rules for hiring individual players from Cuba once they arrive in the United States.  [*480]  While Cuba has had a long history of baseball excellence, n51 the focus on Cuban players

is a relatively recent one. Cuban baseball players, as opposed to other foreign players in the United States , must defect from Cuba in order to play. The politics of defection , let alone the drama that often accompanies the defection, n52 sets these players apart from other players in terms of how MLB treats them and how the United States public views them. In 1977, MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn set forth the Kuhn Directive in which he outlined Major League Baseball's position regarding players from Cuba. n53 The Kuhn Directive provided that United States teams could not recruit from Cuba or negotiate with Cuban players who were in Cuba. The Kuhn Directive was not really implicated until 1991 when a Cuban baseball player defected to the United States for the first time since Fidel Castro took power in Cuba. n54 Over the course of the next decade, player defections would become a regular event. With each defection, MLB's handling of these players has continued to evolve. MLB policy divides players into two groups for the purposes of recruiting them for teams. Under Major League Rule 3, legal residents of the United States or Canada can only enter into employment contracts with a team after being subject to the amateur draft. n55 In other words, a United States resident can be a free agent only if he has been passed

over in the draft. On the other hand, foreign players may sign a contract with a team without ever entering the draft. n56 Cuban players, however, are not treated the same as other foreign players. If a Cuban player is a resident of the United States, he must proceed through the amateur draft and alert all teams as to his presence in the United States . Only those Cuban players who establish residency elsewhere (as in the cases of the two Hernandez brothers discussed below)  [*481]  can become free agents. Furthermore, in order to establish this residency according to MLB rules, the players must leave the United States if they have already arrived here. n57 Renee Arocha, who defected in 1991, started the parade of players to the United States. When Arocha arrived, MLB held a special lottery draft for him. This draft basically gave him free agency status and he was able to negotiate with a variety of teams. n58 In response to Arocha's defection, which apparently was assisted by various sports agents, the Kuhn Directive was strengthened to forbid all major league teams from discussing and negotiating with anyone in Cuba about signing a Cuban baseball player. n59 The next year, three more Cuban players made their way to the United States. Alexis Cabreja, Osmani Estrada, and Ivan Alvarez all defected to Mexico while the Cuban National Team was playing in Mexico and then crossed the United States border illegally. n60 Due to their illegal entry into the United States, the Office of the Commissioner of Major League Baseball declared that the three players would be treated as immigrants arriving without appropriate documentation. n61 The result was that the players would be forced to enter the amateur draft rather than be granted the effective free agency which had been given to Arocha. n62 In 1995, Cuban pitching star Livan Hernandez defected when the Cuban National Team was in Mexico. On the advice of his agent, Joe Cubas, Hernandez flew to Venezuela and then to the Dominican Republic where he was granted political asylum. n63 Because of these geographic and legal maneuvers, Hernandez was not considered a legal resident of the United States. He was, therefore, permitted to enter MLB as a free agent since he did not defect from Cuba directly to the United States. n64 The monetary rewards of free agency were quickly apparent as Livan  [*482]  signed with the Florida Marlins for a four-year contract at close to $ 4.5 million. n65 Two years later, Livan's half-brother, Orlando Hernandez, was able to enter MLB as a free agent through similar maneuvering. Although Orlando's boat of Cuban refugees landed in the Bahamas and all on board were interned, Orlando Hernandez was freed from the refugee camp and permitted to establish residency in Costa Rica with the help of sports agent Joe Cubas. n66 Again, because Orlando was in Costa Rica legally, he was able to enter the United States and MLB as a free agent with the ensuing financial rewards. In 1998, he signed for $ 6.6 million with the New York Yankees. n67 Although this pathway to the United States and to free agency clearly benefited Orlando Hernandez, both the governments of the Bahamas and Costa Rica responded negatively to his and his agent's maneuvers. By 1996, the Bahamian government had already enacted a repatriation agreement with Cuba that stated

Cuba would be notified about any Cuban refugees within seventy-two hours. n68 While Hernandez was freed from the Bahamian detention center, the rest of the Cuban refugees were not; n69 even baseball players were being sent back to Cuba. n70 After the latter Hernandez defection, both the Bahamas and Costa Rica began denying the majority of visa applications from Cuba on the basis that their countries were being used merely as transit points on the way to the United States. n71 The primary development over the course of the 1990s was that the best Cuban players and their agents learned how to circumvent MLB rules placing Cuban defectors in the amateur draft so that these stars could sign as free agents with the team of their choice for far more money. At the same time, MLB was narrowing these loopholes, making it more likely that Cuban players, in general, would face the draft. Early in 2001, sports agent Joe Kehoskie tried to establish Dominican Republic residency for two Cuban players, Mayque Quintero, and Evel  [*483]  Bastida who had also arrived here directly from Cuba. MLB ruled that since the two players lived in Tampa, Florida, they were legal residents subject to the draft. When Kehoskie argued that the players were legally residents of the Dominican Republic, MLB further explained that immigration law and baseball would not necessarily interpret the term "legal resident" in the same way. n72 With this incident as background, Cuban pitcher Rolando Viera defected directly to the United States at the end of April 2001 and was immediately granted refugee status on his visa. Under MLB rules, Viera was subject to the draft. At the end of May, Viera's attorneys filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and emergency injunctive relief, trying to prevent MLB from interfering with Viera's ability to act as a free agent. n73 His attorneys argued that Viera's choice of either entering the draft or leaving the United States in order to establish residency elsewhere (and therefore jeopardizing his United States visa) would cause irreparable harm. Viera had two primary arguments as to why he would suffer irreparable harm. First, forcing him to enter the draft would likely result in him receiving less money than he could receive through free agency. Furthermore, Viera would be tied to a team for a certain amount of time rather than have the ability to negotiate with a team of his choosing. If, in the alternative, he were to leave the United States in order to avoid the draft, Viera would potentially lose his "parolee" status on his visa and have to jump several

immigration hurdles in order to re-enter the United States. n74 The choice presented to Cuban players by MLB, Viera argued , was discrimination on the basis of national origin . n75 No other foreign player faces the choice between directly entering and remaining in the United States, and thus being subjected to the draft, or leaving the [*484]   United States for a third country in order to establish foreign residency, and thus not being subjected to the draft . Major League Baseball filed an opposition to the temporary restraining order, arguing that the standard for injunctive relief had not been met. n76 The court agreed. n77 Both the MLB brief and the Order focused on the technical aspects of the standard for the TRO rather than the broader question of whether MLB is engaged in discrimination. The order denying the TRO stated that Viera should have filed a complaint with the EEOC as required by Title VII. n78 Furthermore, the order agreed with the MLB argument that entering the draft was not irreparable harm because any damage suffered by Viera would be monetary and, therefore, could be remedied at a later date. n79 The choice that Viera had to make between leaving the country or joining the draft, the court held, was "speculative" rather than "actual and imminent." n80 The TRO was denied on these procedural grounds rather than upholding the legitimacy of MLB rules. Viera has since filed for partial summary judgment against MLB. n81 A ruling from the court is pending. The issue of the legality and fairness of the MLB rules is really the far more interesting point that will be dealt with as the case progresses through the courts. Viera's arguments are compelling when compared to the situations of other foreign-born players. None of the recently-arrived Japanese stars signed by MLB teams were forced to go through the draft. n82 These players were free to come to the United States, be scouted, negotiate for

their contracts in the United States, and then reside here. If Cuban players were treated like other foreign players, they would have to apply for special work visas after signing with a team. Because, however, Cubans are immediately granted refugee status, MLB argues that at the moment when Cuban players come to the United States, they [*485]   establish legal residency. n83 The irony is that the same immigration policy which benefits other Cubans by granting them refugee status, harms the Cuban players. MLB argues that it is not discriminating on the basis of national origin - the rules are the same for any player that establishes residency here. However, MLB has not been able to point to any other examples of foreign players facing the same choice as Cuban players. MLB also argues that the Hernandez brothers were able to enter into free agency because they established residency

elsewhere first, apparently endorsing this method of avoiding the draft. Yet, MLB's argument is specious. To treat players differently because of where their boat landed when they defected is the height of arbitrary and disparate treatment. The goal - to live and play in the United States - is the same for all of these Cuban players.