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The recent USA Freedom Act, did not reform the NSA’s the mass collection of

domestic communication under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.

Goitein 15, Elizabeth, Co-Director of the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program, 6-5-

2015, "Who really wins from NSA reform?," MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/freedom-act-who-really-wins-nsa-reform

The USA Freedom Act will end the bulk collection of phone metadata and prohibit similar programs for any

type of business records under foreign intelligence collection authorities. For phone records, the government may

obtain metadata on an ongoing basis only for suspected terrorists and those in contact with them. For other types of records, the government

must tie its request for records to a “specific selection term,” such as a person, address, or account. Given the surge in surveillance since 9/11,

the USA Freedom Act’s imposition of constraints on collection is historic. Indeed, the USA Freedom Act is the most significant limitation on

foreign intelligence surveillance since the 1970s. If faithfully implemented – a critical caveat, to be sure – the law will meaningfully curtail the

overbroad collection of business records. Even under USA Freedom, however, the government is still able to pull(s) in a

great deal of information about innocent Americans . Needless to say, not everyone in contact with a suspected terrorist is

guilty of a crime; even terrorists call for pizza delivery. Intelligence officials also may need to obtain records – like flight manifests – that include

information about multiple people, most of whom have nothing to do with terrorism. Some of this “overcollection” may be inevitable, but its

effects could be mitigated. For instance, agencies could be given a short period of time to identify information relevant to actual suspects, after

which they would have to destroy any remaining information. USA Freedom fails to impose such limits. More fundamentally, bulk collection of

business records is only one of the many intelligence activities that abandoned the individualized suspicion approach after 9/11. Until a few

years ago, if the NSA, acting within the United States, wished to obtain communications between

Americans and foreigners, it had to convince the FISA Court that the individual target was a foreign

power or its agent. Today, under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA may target any

foreigner overseas and collect his or her communications with Americans without obtaining any

individualized court order. Under Executive Order 12333, which governs the NSA’s activities when it conducts surveillance overseas,

the standards are even more lax. The result is mass surveillance programs that make the phone metadata

program seem dainty in comparison. Even though these programs are nominally targeted at foreigners,

they “incidentally” sweep in massive amounts of Americans’ data, including the content of calls, e-mails,

text messages, and video chats. Limits on keeping and using such information are weak and riddled with exceptions. Moreover,

foreign targets are not limited to suspected terrorists or even agents of foreign powers. As the Obama

administration recently acknowledged, foreigners have privacy rights too , and the ability to eavesdrop on anyforeigner overseas is an indefensible violation of those rights. Intelligence officials almost certainly supported USA Freedom because they

hoped it would relieve the post-Snowden pressure for reform. Their likely long-term goal is to avoid changes to Section 702, Executive Order

12333, and the many other authorities that permit intelligence collection without any individualized showing of wrongdoing. Privacy

advocates who supported USA Freedom did so because they saw it as the first skirmish in a long battle

to rein in surveillance authorities. Their eye is on the prize: a return to the principle of individualized

suspicion as the basis for surveillance. If intelligence officials are correct in their calculus, USA Freedom may prove to be a Pyrrhic

victory. But if the law clears the way for further reforms across the full range of surveillance programs, history will vindicate the privacy

advocates who supported it. The answer to what USA Freedom means for our liberties lies, not in the text of the

law, but in the unwritten story of what happens next.

And, the NSA has massively expanded its surveillance since 2008, American internet

communication have been intercepted by NSA surveillance operations far more oftenthan the intended surveillance targets.

Gellman, 2014

Barton Gellman, Washington Post national staff. Contributed to three Pulitzer Prizes for The Washington

Post, 7-5-2014, "In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far outnumber the foreigners who are,"

Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-

those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/

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Ordinary Internet users, American and non-American alike, far outnumber legally targeted foreigners in

the communications intercepted by the National Security Agency from U.S. digital networks , according to a

four-month investigation by The Washington Post. Nine of 10 account holders found in a large cache of intercepted

conversations, which former NSA contractor Edward Snowden provided in full to The Post, were not the intended surveillance

targets but were caught in a net the agency had cast for somebody else. Many of them were Americans. Nearly half

of the surveillance files, a strikingly high proportion, contained names, e-mail addresses or other details

that the NSA marked as belonging to U.S. citizens or residents. NSA analysts masked, or “minimized,” more than 65,000 such

references to protect Americans’ privacy, but The Post found nearly 900 additional e-mail addresses, unmasked in the files, that could be strongly linked to U.S.

citizens or U.S.residents. The surveillance files highlight a policy dilemma that has been aired only abstractly in

public. There are discoveries of considerable intelligence value in the intercepted messages — and collateral harm

to privacy on a scale that the Obama administration has not been willing to address. Among the most valuable

contents — which The Post will not describe in detail, to avoid inte rfering with ongoing operations — are fresh revelations about a secret overseas nuclear project,

double-dealing by an ostensible ally, a military calamity that befell an unfriendly power, and the identities of aggressive intruders into U.S. computer networks.

Months of tracking communications across more than 50 alias accounts, the files show, led directly to the 2011 capture in Abbottabad of Muhammad Tahir

Shahzad, a Pakistan-based bomb builder, and Umar Patek, a suspect in a 2002 terrorist bombing on the I ndonesian island of Bali. At the request of CIA officials, The

Post is withholding other examples that officials said would compromise ongoing operations. Many other files, described as useless by the

analysts but nonetheless retained, have a startlingly intimate, even voyeuristic quality. They tell stories of love and

heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons, mental-health crises, political and religious conversions, financial anxieties and disappointed hopes. The daily lives of more than

10,000 account holders who were not targeted are catalogued and recorded nevertheless. I n order to allow time for analysis and outside reporting, neither

Snowden nor The Post has disclosed until now that he obtained and shared the content of intercepted communications. The cache Snowden

provided came from domestic NSA operations under the broad authority granted by Congress in 2008

with amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. FISA content is generally stored in closely controlled data

repositories, and for more than a year, senior government officials have depicted it as beyond Snowden’s reach.The Post reviewed roughly 160,000 intercepted e-

mail and instant-message conversations, some of them hundreds of pages long, and 7,900 documents taken from more than 11,000 online accounts. The material

spans President Obama’s first term, from 2009 to 2012, a period of exponential growth for the NSA’s domestic collection. Taken together, the files offer an

unprecedented vantage point on the changes wrought by Section 702 of the FISA amendments, which

enabled the NSA to make freer use of methods that for 30 years had required probable cause and a

warrant from a judge. One program, code-named PRISM, extracts content stored in user accounts at Yahoo,

Microsoft, Facebook, Google and five other leading Internet companies. Another, known inside the NSA as Upstream, intercepts

data on the move as it crosses the U.S. junctions of global voice and data networks. No government

oversight body, including the Justice Department, the Fore ign Intelligence Surveillance Court, intelligence committees in Congress or the presiden t’s Privacy

and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, has delved into a comparably large sample of what the NSA actually collects —

not only from its targets but also from people who may cross a target’s path.

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Plan: The United States federal government should limit the scope of its domestic surveillance under

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to communications whose sender or recipient

is a valid intelligence target and whose targets pose a tangible threat to national security.

First, surveillance under Section 702 is a substantial invasive of privacy because of the

broad targeting guidelines in the FISA Amendments Act.Laperruque, 2014,

Jake, Center for Democracy and Tehcnology Fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security. Previously

served as a law clerk for Senator Al Franken on the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law,

and as a policy fellow for Senator Robert Menendez. "Why Average Internet Users Should Demand

Significant Section 702 Reform," Center For Democracy & Technology., 7-22-2014,

https://cdt.org/blog/why-average-internet-users-should-demand-significant-section-702-reform/

Section 702 Surveillance Is Fundamentally More InvasiveWhile incidental collection of the communications of a person who communicates with a target is an inevitable feature of communications

surveillance, it is tolerated when the reason for the surveillance is compelling and adequate procedural checks are in place. In other

instances of communications surveillance conducted in the US, surveillance required court approval of a

target, and that target must be a suspected wrongdoer or spy, a terrorist, or another agent of a foreign

power. Section 702 requires neither of these elements.

Under Section 702, targeting can occur for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information

even though there is no court review of any particular target . Instead, the super secret FISA court merely determines

whether the guidelines under which the surveillance is conducted are reasonably designed to result in the targeting of non-Americans abroad

and that “minimization guidelines” are reasonable. This means incidental surveillance may occur purely because

someone communicated with an individual engaged in activities that may have broadly defined “foreign

intelligence” value. For example, the communications of someone who communicates with a person abroad

whose activities might relate to the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs can be collected, absent any

independent assessment of necessity or accuracy.

As another example, under traditional FISA – for intelligence surveillance in the U.S. of people in the U.S. – your communications could be

incidentally collected only if you were in direct contact with a suspected agent of a foreign power, and additionally if the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court had affirmed this suspicion based on probable cause. Under Section 702, your personal informationcould be scooped up by the NSA simply because your attorney, doctor, lover, or accountant was a

person abroad who engaged in peaceful political activity such as protesting a G8 summit.

And, indiscriminate wide-scale NSA Surveillance erodes privacy rights and violates the

constitution

Sinha, 2014G. Alex Sinha is an Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human

Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union, July 2014 “With Liberty to Monitor All How Large -

Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy” Human Rights Watch,

http://www.hrw.org/node/127364

The United States government today is implementing a wide variety of surveillance programs that, thanks to

developments in its technological capacity, allow it to scoop up personal information and the content of personal

communications on an unprecedented scale. Media reports based on revelations by former National Security

Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden have recently shed light on many of these programs. They have revealed,

for example, that the US collects vast quantities of information—known as “metadata”—about phone calls made to, from, and within the US.

It also routinely collects the content of international chats, emails, and voice calls. It has engaged in the large-

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scale collection of massive amounts of cell phone location data. Reports have also revealed a since-discontinued effort to track internet usage

and email patterns in the US; the comprehensive interception of all of phone calls made within, into, and out of Afghanistan and the Bahamas;

the daily collection of millions of images so the NSA can run facial recognition programs; the acquisition of hundreds of millions of email and

chat contact lists around the world; and the NSA’s deliberate weakening of global encryption standards. In response to public

concern over the programs’ intrusion on the privacy of millions of people in the US and around the world, the US

government has at times acknowledged the need for reform. However, it has taken few meaningful

steps in that direction. On the contrary, the US—particularly the intelligence community—has forcefully defended the surveillanceprograms as essential to protecting US national security. In a world of constantly shifting global threats, officials argue that the US simply

cannot know in advance which global communications may be relevant to its intelligence activities, and that as a result, it needs the authority

to collect and monitor a broad swath of communications. In our interviews with them, US officials argued that the programs are effective,

plugging operational gaps that used to exist, and providing the US with valuable intelligence. They also insisted the programs are lawful and

subject to rigorous and multi-layered oversight, as well as rules about how the information obtained through them is used. The government has

emphasized that it does not use the information gleaned from these programs for illegitimate purposes, such as persecuting political

opponents. The questions raised by surveillance are complex. The government has an obligation to protect

national security, and in some cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end.

At the same time, international human rights and constitutional law set limits on the state’s authority to engage in

activities like surveillance, which have the potential to undermine so many other rights. The current,

large-scale, often indiscriminate US approach to surveillance carries enormous costs. It erodes global

digital privacy and sets a terrible example for other countries like India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and othersthat are in the process of expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages US credibility in advocating internationally for internet

freedom, which the US has listed as an important foreign policy objective since at least 2010.As this report documents, US surveillance

programs are also doing damage to some of the values the United States claims to hold most dear.

These include freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, and the right to counsel, which

are all protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.

And, these privacy violations are more dangerous than any risk of terrorism, which is

magnified by the fact that surveillance fails to prevent attacks.

Schneier, 2014Bruce Schneier a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a board

member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy

Information Center, and the CTO at Resilient Systems, Inc.,1-6-2014, "Essays: How the NSA Threatens

National Security," Schneier On Security,

https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/01/how_the_nsa_threaten.html

We have no evidence that any of this surveillance makes us safer. NSA Director General Keith Alexander responded to

these stories in June by claiming that he disrupted 54 terrorist plots. In October, he revised that number downward to 13, and then to "one or

two." At this point, the only "plot" prevented was that of a San Diego man sending $8,500 to support a

Somali militant group. We have been repeatedly told that these surveillance programs would have been able to stop 9/11, yet the

NSA didn't detect the Boston bombings—even though one of the two terrorists was on the watch list and the other had a sloppy

social media trail. Bulk collection of data and metadata is an ineffective counterterrorism tool. Not only isubiquitous surveillance ineffective, it is extraordinarily costly. I don't mean just the budgets, which will continue to

skyrocket. Or the diplomatic costs, as country after country learns of our surveillance programs against their citizens. I'm also talking about the

cost to our society. It breaks so much of what our society has built. It breaks our political systems, as Congress is

unable to provide any meaningful oversight and citizens are kept in the dark about what government does. It breaks our legal systems, as laws

are ignored or reinterpreted, and people are unable to challenge government actions in court. It breaks our commercial

systems, as U.S. computer products and services are no longer trusted worldwide. It breaks our technical systems, as the very protocols of the

Internet become untrusted. And it breaks our social systems; the loss of privacy, freedom, and liberty is much

more damaging to our society than the occasional act of random violence. And finally, these systems are

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susceptible to abuse. This is not just a hypothetical problem. Recent history illustrates many episodes where this information was, or

would have been, abused: Hoover and his FBI spying, McCarthy, Martin Luther King Jr. and the civil rights movement, anti-war Vietnam

protesters, and—more recently—the Occupy movement. Outside the U.S., there are even more extreme examples. Building the

surveillance state makes it too easy for people and organizations to slip over the line into abuse.

The First impact is the loss of personal autonomy and agency. Privacy is a gateway

right, it enables all of our other freedoms.

PoKempne 2014, Dinah, General Counsel at Human Rights Watch, “The Right Whose Time Has Come (Again): Privacy in

the Age of Surveillance” 1/21/14 http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/essays/privacy-in-age-of-

surveillance

Technology has invaded the sacred precincts of private life, and unwarranted exposure has imperiled

our security, dignity, and most basic values. The law must rise to the occasion and protect our rights.

Does this sound familiar? So argued Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their 1890 Harvard Law Review

article announcing “The Right to Privacy.” We are again at such a juncture. The technological developments they

saw as menacing—photography and the rise of the mass circulation press—appear rather quaint to us now. But the harms to emotional,

psychological, and even physical security from unwanted exposure seem just as vivid in our digital age.Our renewed sense of

vulnerability comes as almost all aspects of daily social life migrate online. At the same time, corporations and

governments have acquired frightening abilities to amass and search these endless digital records, giving them the power to “know” us in

extraordinary detail.

In a world where we share our lives on social media and trade immense amounts of personal information for the ease and

convenience of online living, some have questioned whether privacy is a relevant concept. It is not just relevant,

but crucial.

Indeed, privacy is a gateway right that affects our ability to exercise almost every other right, not least

our freedom to speak and associate with those we choose, make political choices, practice our religious

beliefs, seek medical help, access education, figure out whom we love, and create our family life. It is

nothing less than the shelter in which we work out what we think and who we are; a fulcrum of ourautonomy as individuals.

The importance of privacy, a right we often take for granted, was thrown into sharp relief in 2013 by the steady stream

of revelations from United States government files released by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden,

and published in the Guardian and other major newspapers around the world. These revelations, supported by highly classified

documents, showed the US, the UK, and other governments engaged in global indiscriminate data

interception, largely unchecked by any meaningful legal constraint or oversight, without regard for the

rights of millions of people who were not suspected of wrongdoing.

The Second impact is Totalitarianism; the loss of autonomy due to surveillanceenables “turnkey totalitarianism,” destroying democracy.

Haggerty, 2015

Kevin D. Professor of Criminology and Sociology at the University of Alberta, “What’s Wrong with Privacy

Protections?” in A World Without Privacy: What Law Can and Should Do? Edited by Austin Sarat p. 230

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Still others will say I am being alarmist. My emphasis on the threat of authoritarian forms of rule inherent in populations

open to detailed institutional scrutiny will be portrayed as overblown and over dramatic, suggesting I veer towards the

lunatic fringe of unhinged conspiracy theorists.66 But one does not have to believe secret forces are operating behind

the scenes to recognize that our declining private realm presents alarming dangers. Someone as conservative and

deeply embedded in the security establishment as William Binney – a former NSA senior executive – says the security

surveillance infrastructure he helped build now puts us on the verge of “turnkey totalitarianism.”67 The

contemporary expansion of surveillance, where monitoring becomes an ever-more routine part of our lives, represents a

tremendous shift in the balance of power between citizens and organizations. Perhaps the greatest danger

of this situation is how our existing surveillance practices can be turned to oppressive uses. From this point forward our

expanding surveillance infrastructure stands as a resource to be inherited by future generations of

politicians, corporate actors, or even messianic leaders. Given sufficient political will this surveillance infrastructure

can be re-purposed to monitor – in unparalleled detail – people who some might see as undesirable due to their

political opinions, religion, skin color, gender, birthplace, physical abilities, medical history, or any

number of an almost limitless list of factors used to pit people against one another. The twentieth century

provides notorious examples of such repressive uses of surveillance. Crucially, those tyrannical states

exercised fine-grained political control by relying on surveillance infrastructures that today seem laughably

rudimentary, comprised as they were of paper files, index cards, and elementary telephone tapping.68 It is no more alarmist to

acknowledge such risks are germane to our own societies than it is to recognize the future will see wars,terrorist attacks, or environmental disasters – events that could themselves prompt surveillance structures to be

re-calibrated towards more coercive ends. Those who think this massive surveillance infrastructure will

not, in the fullness of time, be turned to repressive purposes are either innocent as to the realities of power, or whistling

past a graveyard. But one does not have to dwell on the most extreme possibilities to be unnerved by how enhanced surveillance

capabilities invest tremendous powers in organizations. Surveillance capacity gives organizations unprecedented

abilities to manipulate human behaviors, desires, and subjectivities towards organizational ends – ends

that are too often focused on profit, personal aggrandizement, and institutional self-interest rather than human

betterment.

The Normalization of Government and Militant Surveillance Under Section 702

Perpetuates Totalitarian Violence

Giroux, 14-Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished

Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, February 10,

2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

The revelations of whistle-blowers such as Chelsea Manning, Jeremy Hammond and Edward Snowden about government

lawlessness and corporate spying provide a new meaning if not a revitalized urgency and relevance to

George Orwell's dystopian fable 1984. Orwell offered his readers an image of the modern state that had become dystopian - one in which

privacy as a civil virtue and a crucial right was no longer valued as a measure of the robust strength of a healthy and thriving democracy. Orwell

was clear that the right to privacy had come under egregious assault. But the right to privacy pointed to something more

sinister than the violation of individual rights. When ruthlessly transgressed, the issue of privacy

became a moral and political principle by which to assess the nature, power and severity of anemerging totalitarian state. As important as Orwell's warning was in shedding light on the horrors of mid-20th century

totalitarianism and the endless regimes of state spying imposed on citizens, the text serves as a brilliant but limited

metaphor for mapping the expansive trajectory of global surveillance and authoritarianism now

characteristic of the first decades of the new millennium. As Marjorie Cohn has indicated, "Orwell never could

have imagined that the National Security Agency (NSA) would amass metadata on billions of our phone calls and 200 million of our

text messages every day. Orwell could not have foreseen that our government would read the content of our emails, file transfers, and live

chats from the social media we use."1

http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state



http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state#a01

http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state#a01


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The Third Impact is Bare Life; The sovereign’s use of surveillance under Section 702

renders the entire populace bare lifeDouglas, independent scholar, 2009 – (Jeremy, “Disappearing Citizenship: surveillance and the state of

exception”, published in Surveillance & Society Vol 6, No 1, p. 37

http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3402/3365)//roetlin

Electronic and biometric surveillance are the tactics through which the government is creating a space

in which the exception is routine practice. The biopolitical implication of surveillance [under Section

702] is the universalization of bare life : “History teaches us how practices first reserved for foreigners find themselves

applied later to the rest of the citizenry” (ibid). These new control measures have created a situation in which not only is there no

clear distinction between private and political life, but there is no fundamental claim, or right, to a

political life as such – not even for citizens from birth; thus, the originary biopolitical act that inscribes life as political from

birth is more and more a potential depoliticization and ban from the political realm. We are all exposed to the stateless

potentiality of a bare life excluded from the political realm, but not outside the violence of the law (and

therefore still included): “states, which should constitute the precise space of political life, have made the person the idealsuspect, to the point that it's humanity itself that has become the dangerous class ” (ibid). Making people

suspects is equivalent to making people bare life – it is the governmental (a Foucauldian governmentality rather

than an Agambenian sovereignty I would argue) production of a life exposed to the pure potentiality of the state of

exception: “the sovereign ban, which applies to the exception in no longer applying, corresponds to the structure of potentiality, which

maintains itself in relation to actuality precisely through its ability not to be” (Agamben 1994, 46). Surveillance [under Section 702]

is the technique that opens up this potentiality, which allows for the normalization of the

exception. In this particular instance – i.e. biometric data collection and surveillance in the US – the state of exception as a permanent

form of governmentality and the universalization of homines sacri has been brought into existence though the USA Patriot Act2 and the Patriot

Act II3.

Freedom and dignity are ethically prior to security.

Cohen, 2014

Elliot D. Ph.D., ethicist and political analyst. He is the editor in chief of the International Journal of

Applied Philosophy, Technology of Oppression: Preserving Freedom and Dignity in an Age of Mass,

Warrantless Surveillance.. DOI: 10.1057/9781137408211.0011.

The threat posed by mass, warrantless surveillance technologies

Presently, such a threat to human freedom and dignity lies in the technological erosion of human

privacy through the ever-evolving development and deployment of a global, government system of

mass, warrantless surveillance. Taken to its logical conclusion, this is a systematic means of spying on, and

ultimately manipulating and controlling, virtually every aspect of everybody's private life—a thoroughgoing,

global dissolution of personal space, which is supposed to be legally protected. In such a governmental state of "total (or virtually

total) information awareness," the potential for government control and manipulation of the people's

deepest and most personal beliefs, feelings, and values can transform into an Orwellian reality—and nightmare. As

will be discussed in Chapter 6, the technology that has the potential to remove such scenarios from the realm of science fiction to that of true

science is currently being developed. This is not to deny the legitimate government interest in "national security"; however, the

exceptional disruption of privacy for legitimate state reasons cannot and should not be mistaken for a

usual and customary rule of mass invasion of people's private lives without their informed consent.

Benjamin Franklin wisely and succinctly expressed the point: "Those who surrender freedom for security

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will not have, nor do they deserve, either one." In relinquishing our privacy to government, we also lose

the freedom to control, and act on, our personal information, which is what defines us individually, and

collectively, as free agents and a free nation. In a world devoid of freedom to control who we are,

proclaiming that we are "secure" is an empty platitude.

Right before Christmas break, our school faced serious bomb threats. An unnamed, armed individualsend a threat to our school administrators. School was cancelled because the perpetrator could not be

identified and neutralized before the following school day. My sister and I were home alone when we

received the news. My sister picked up the phone. “Armed threat…. Apparently someone threatened us,

so there’s no school tomorrow” said my sister. I was just confused. I assumed it was probably just

another stupid kid who didn’t want to take his/her exams. I texted my mom, fully expecting her to freak

out about the threat….. but she didn’t. Do you know what she DID freak out about??? The fact that we

were texting people about what was going on. “Stop right now. Don’t say anything to anyone. You know

the government tracks this and your name is suspicious. I don’t want you to get caught.” My mom’s

statement made me so angry. Why am I suspicious? I’ve never done anything that would warrant this

treatment! I mean, my skin is dark and my name isn’t American. I felt like crying and screaming at the

same time. This is not ok. I AM AMERICAN. I was born and raised here. I don’t deserve to be held to aseparate set of standards. MY government is taking away MY rights. I will not stand for this, and neither

should you judge. Do not stand for this extreme discrimination.

NSA surveillance has put the US ecomony and competive advantage at risk because of

losses in the technology sector. The USA freedom act won’t solve the problem.

Mindock 2015Clark Mindock - Reporting Fellow at International Business Times – Internally quoting The Information

Technology and Innovation Foundation. ITIF is a non-partisan research and educational institute – a

think tank “NSA Surveillance Could Cost Billions For US Internet Companies After Edward Snowden

Revelations” - International Business Times - June 10 2015 http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-surveillance-

could-cost-billions-us-internet-companies-after-edward-snowden-1959737

Failure to reform National Security Administration spying programs revealed by Edward Snowden could be more

economically taxing than previously thought, says a new study published by the Information Technology and Innovation

Foundation Tuesday. The study suggests the programs could be affecting the technology sector as a whole,

not just the cloud-computing sector, and that the costs could soar much higher than previously

expected. Even modest declines in cloud computing revenues from the revealed surveillance programs, according to a

previous report, would cost between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016. New estimates show that the toll “will likely far exceed ITIF’s

initial $35 billion estimate.” “The U.S. government’s failure to reform many of the NSA’s surveillance programs

has damaged the competitiveness of the U.S. tech sector and cost it a portion of the global market

share,” a summary of the report said. Revelations by defense contractor Snowden in June 2013 exposed massive U.S. government

surveillance capabilities and showed the NSA collected American phone records in bulk, and without a warrant. The bulk phone-record

revelations, and many others in the same vein, including the required complacency of American telecom and Internet companies in

providing the data, raised questions about the transparency of American surveillance programs and

prompted outrage from privacy advocates. The study, published this week, argues that unless the American government

can vigorously reform how NSA surveillance is regulated and overseen, U.S. companies will lose contracts

and, ultimately, their competitive edge in a global market as consumers around the world choose cloud

computing and technology options that do not have potential ties to American surveillance programs.

The report comes amid a debate in Congress on what to do with the Patriot Act, the law that provides much of the

authority for the surveillance programs. As of June 1, authority to collect American phone data en masse expired,

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though questions remain as to whether letting that authority expire is enough to protect privacy. Supporters of the

programs argue that they provide the country with necessary capabilities to fight terrorism abroad. A further reform made the

phone records collection process illegal for the government, and instead gave that responsibility to the

telecom companies.

Reform is necessary to regain US leadership in the global marketplace.

Castro and Mcquinn 2015 Daniel Castro is the Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation and

Director of the Center for Data Innovation; Alan McQuinn is a Research Assistant with The Information

Technology and Innovation Foundation. Prior to joining ITIF, he was a telecommunications fellow for

Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, an Honorary Co-Chair of ITIF, 6/9/15, “Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How

U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness” “Information Technology & Innovation

Foundation” http://www.itif.org/publications/2015/06/09/beyond-usa-freedom-act-how-us-

surveillance-still-subverts-us-competitiveness

When historians write about this period in U.S. history it could very well be that one of the themes will be how theUnited States lost its global technology leadership to other nations. And clearly one of the factors they

would point to is the long-standing privileging of U.S. national security interests over U.S. industrial and

commercial interests when it comes to U.S. foreign policy. This has occurred over the last few years as the U.S. government

has done relatively little to address the rising commercial challenge to U.S. technology companies, all the

while putting intelligence gathering first and foremost. Indeed, policy decisions by the U.S. intelligence

community have reverberated throughout the global economy. If the U.S. tech industry is to remain the

leader in the global marketplace, then the U.S. government will need to set a new course that balances

economic interests with national security interests. The cost of inaction is not only short-term economic

losses for U.S. companies, but a wave of protectionist policies that will systematically weaken U.S.

technology competiveness in years to come, with impacts on economic growth, jobs, trade balance, and

national security through a weakened industrial base. Only by taking decisive steps to reform its digitalsurveillance activities, the U.S. government will enable its tech industry to effectively compete in the

global market.

The US is the driving force behind global economic recovery

Economist 2015“American shopper,” 2-14, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643188-world-once-again-

relying-too-much-american-consumers-power-growth-american-shopper

A Global economy running on a single engine is better than one that needs jump leads. The American

economy is motoring again, to the relief of exporters from Hamburg to Hangzhou . Firms added more than 1m

net new jobs in the past three months, the best showing since 1997 (see article). Buoyed up by cheap petrol, Americans are spending; in

January consumer sentiment jumped to its highest in more than a decade. The IMF reckons that American growth will hit

3.6% in 2015, faster than the world economy as a whole. All this is good. But growing dependence on the American

economy—and on consumers in particular—has unwelcome echoes. A decade ago American consumers borrowed heavily and recklessly. They

filled their ever-larger houses with goods from China; they fuelled gas-guzzling cars with imported oil. Big exporters recycled their earnings back

to America, pushing down interest rates which in turn helped to feed further borrowing. Europe was not that different. There, frugal Germans

financed debt binges around the euro area’s periphery.After the financial crisis, the hope was of an end to these imbalances. Debt-addicted

Americans and Spaniards would chip away at their obligations; thrifty German and Chinese consumers would start to enjoy life for once. At

http://www.itif.org/publications/2015/06/09/beyond-usa-freedom-act-how-us-surveillance-still-subverts-us-competitiveness





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first, this seemed to be happening. America’s trade deficit, which was about 6% of GDP in 2006, had more than halved by 2009. But now

the world is slipping back into some nasty habits. Hair grows faster than the euro zone, and what growth

there is depends heavily on exports. The countries of the single currency are running a current-account

surplus of about 2.6% of GDP, thanks largely to exports to America. At 7.4% of GDP, Germany’s trade

surplus is as large as it has ever been. China’s growth, meanwhile, is slowing—and once again relying

heavily on spending elsewhere. It notched up its own record trade surplus in January. China’s exports have actually begun to drop,

but imports are down by more. And over the past year the renminbi, which rose by more than 10% against the dollar in 2010-13, has begun

slipping again, to the annoyance of American politicians. America’s economy is warping as a result. Consumption’s

contribution to growth in the fourth quarter of 2014 was the largest since 2006. The trade deficit is widening.

Strip out oil, and America’s trade deficit grew to more than 3% of GDP in 2014, and is approaching its pre-recession peak of about 4%. The

world’s reliance on America is likely to deepen. Germans are more interested in shipping savings abroad than investing at

home (see article). Households and firms in Europe’s periphery are overburdened with debt, workers’ wages squeezed and banks in no mood to

lend. Like Germany, Europe as a whole is relying on exports. China is rebalancing, but not fast enough: services have yet to account for more

than half of annual Chinese output.

Additionally, NSA surveillance has created a global move towards “data

nationalisation” which threatens to fragment the internet.

Omtzigt 15,

Pieter Herman Omtzigt is a Dutch politician. As a member of the Christian Democratic Appeal he was an

MP from June 3, 2003 to June 17, 2010 and is currently an MP since October 26, 2010. He focuses on

matters of taxes, pensions and additions. “Explanatory memorandum by Mr Pieter Omtzigt, rapporteur”

Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Mass surveillance Report, 1/26/2015, http://website-

pace.net/documents/19838/1085720/20150126-MassSurveillance-EN.pdf

108. In response to growing discontent with US surveillance, one political response has been to push for more

“technological sovereignty” and “data nationalisation”. The Snowden disclosures have therefore had

serious implications on the development of the Internet and hastened trends to “balkanize” the Internet

to the detriment of the development of a wide, vast and easily accessible online network. The Internet aswe knew it, or believed we knew it, is a global platform for exchange of information, open and free debate,

and commerce. But Brazil and the European Union, for example, announced plans to lay a $185 million

undersea fibre-optic cable between them to thwart US surveillance. German politicians also called for the

development of a “German internet” for German customers’ data to circumvent foreign servers and the inf ormation to stay on networks that

would fully be under Germany’s control. 159 Russia passed a law obliging internet companies to store the data of

Russian users on servers in Russia.160 After a six-month inquiry following the Snowden disclosures, the European Parliament

adopted a report on the NSA surveillance programme in February 2014 161, which argues that the EU should suspend bank data and ‘Safe

Harbour’ agreements on data privacy (voluntary data protection standards for non-EU companies transferring EU citizens’ personal data to the

US) with the United States. MEPs added that the European Parliament should only give its consent to the EU-US free trade deal (TTIP) that is

being negotiated, if the US fully respects EU citizens’ fundamental rights. The European Parliament seeks tough new data

protection rules that would place US companies in the difficult situation of having to check with EU

authorities before complying with mandatory requests made by US authorities . The European Parliament’s LIBE

Committee also advocated the creation of a “European data cloud” that would require all data from European consumers to be stored or

processed within Europe, or even within the individual country of the consumer concerned. Some nations, such as Australia,

France, South Korea, and India, have already implemented a patchwork of data-localisation

requirements according to two legal scholars.162

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This regional fragmentation of the internet would collapse the global economy and

create the necessary conditions for global instability.

Jardine, 2014

Eric CIGI Research Fellow, Global Security & Politics, 9-19-2014, "Should the Average Internet User in a

Liberal Democracy Care About Internet Fragmentation? ," Cigi,

https://www.cigionline.org/blogs/reimagining-internet/should-average-internet-user-liberal-democracy-care-about-internet-fragmeEven though your average liberal democratic Internet user wouldn’t see it, at least at the content level, the fragmentation of the Internet would

matter a great deal. If the Internet was to break apart into regional or even national blocks, there would be

large economic costs in terms of lost future potential for global GDP growth . As a recent McKinsey & Company

report illustrates, upwards of 15 to 25 percent of Global GDP is currently determined by the movement of

goods, money, people and data. These global flows (which admittedly include more than just data flows) contribute yearly between

250 to 400 billion dollars to global GDP growth. The contribution of global flows to global GDP growth is only likely to

grow in the future, provided that the Internet remains a functionally universal system that works

extraordinarily well as a platform for e-commerce. Missing out on lost GDP growth harms people economically in liberal democratic countries

and elsewhere. Average users in the liberal democracies should care, therefore, about the fragmentation of the broader Internet because it will

cost them dollars and cents, even if the fragmentation of the Internet would not really affect the content that they themselves

access.Additionally, the same Mckinsey & Company report notes that countries that are well connected to the global system have GDP growth

that is up to 40 percent higher than those countries that have fewer connections to the wider world. Like interest rates, annual GDP growth

compounds itself, meaning that early gains grow exponentially. If the non-Western portions of the Internet wall

themselves off from the rest (or even if parts of what we could call the liberal democratic Internet do the same), the result over

the long term will be slower growth and a smaller GDP per capita in less well-connected nations. Some

people might look at this s ituation and be convinced that excluding people in non-liberal democracies from the economic potential of the

Internet is not right. In normative terms, these people might deserve to be connected, at the very least so that they can benefit from the same

economic boon as those in more well connected advanced liberal democracies. In other words, average Internet users in liberal democracies

should care about Internet fragmentation because it is essentially an issue of equality of opportunity.Other people might only be convinced by

the idea that poverty, inequality, and relative deprivation, while by no means sufficient causes of terrorism,

insurgency, aggression and unrest, are likely to contribute to the potential for an increasingly conflictual

world. Most average Internet users in Liberal democracies would likely agree that preventing flashes of unrest (like the current ISIL conflict in

Iraq and Syria) is better than having to expend blood and treasure to try and fix them after they have broken out. Preventive measures

can include ensuring solid GDP growth through global interconnection in every country, even if this is not, as I

mentioned before, going to be enough to fix every problem every time. Overall, the dangers of a fragmented Internet are realand the average user in liberal democracies should care. With truly global forces at play, it is daunting to think of what the average user might

do to combat fragmentation. Really only one step is realistic. Users need to recognize that the system works best and contributes most to the

content and material well-being of all Internet users when it approaches its ideal technical design of universal interoperability. Societies will

rightly determine that some things need to be walled off, blocked or filtered because this digital content has physical world implications that

are not acceptable (child pornography, vitriolic hate speech, death threats, underage bullying on social media, etc.). However, in general,

citizens should resist Internet fragmentation efforts in any form by putting pressure on their national

politicians, Internet Service Providers, and content intermediaries, like Google, to respect the fundamental (and

fundamentally beneficial) universally interoperable structure of the Internet. To do otherwise is to

accept the loss of potential future global prosperity and to encourage a world that is unequal and prone

to conflict and hardship.

The impact of economic decline is great power war.

James, 2014Harold, Princeton history professor,“Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?”, 7 -2,

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-

war/article19325504/

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/




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Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world are now re-emerging. Then an economically

declining power, Britain, wanted to use finance as a weapon against its larger and faster growing

competitors, Germany and the United States. Now America is in turn obsessed by being overtaken by China –

according to some calculations, set to become the world’s largest economy in 2014. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial

crisis, financial institutions appear both as dangerous weapons of mass destruction, but also as potential

instruments for the application of national power. In managing the 2008 crisis, the dependence of foreign banks on U.S. dollar funding

constituted a major weakness, and required the provision of large swap lines by the Federal Reserve. The United States provided that supportto some countries, but not others, on the basis of an explicitly political logic, as Eswar Prasad demonstrates in his new book on the “Dollar

Trap.” Geo-politics is intruding into banking practice elsewhere. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russian banks were trying to

acquire assets in Central and Eastern Europe. European and U.S. banks are playing a much reduced role in Asian trade finance. Chinese banks

are being pushed to expand their role in global commerce. After the financial crisis, China started to build up the renminbi as a major

international currency. Russia and China have just proposed to create a new credit rating agency to avoid what they regard as the political bias

of the existing (American-based) agencies. The next stage in this logic is to think about how financial power can be

directed to national advantage in the case of a diplomatic tussle. Sanctions are a routine (and not terribly successful)

part of the pressure applied to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. But financial pressure can be much more powerfully applied to

countries that are deeply embedded in the world economy. The test is in the Western imposition of sanctions after the Russian annexation of

Crimea. President Vladimir Putin’s calculation in response is that the European Union and the United States cannot possibly be serious about

the financial war. It would turn into a boomerang: Russia would be less affected than the more developed and complex financial markets of

Europe and America. The threat of systemic disruption generates a new sort of uncertainty, one that mirrors

the decisive feature of the crisis of the summer of 1914. At that time, no one could really know whether

clashes would escalate or not. That feature contrasts remarkably with almost the entirety of the Cold War, especially since the

1960s, when the strategic doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction left no doubt that any superpower conflict would inevitably escalate. The

idea of network disruption relies on the ability to achieve advantage by surprise, and to win at no or low

cost. But it is inevitably a gamble, and raises prospect that others might, but also might not be able to,

mount the same sort of operation. Just as in 1914, there is an enhanced temptation to roll the dice,

even though the game may be fatal.

NSA spying has undermined American foreign policy. It undercut any credibility to

push for democratic freedom in repressive regimes, repressive surveillance is growing

worldwide as a result.

Schneier 15

Bruce Schneier a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a board

member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy

Information Center, and the CTO at Resilient Systems, Inc 3/2/15, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles

to Collect Your Data and Control Your World. P. 106

In 2010, then secretary of state Hillary Clinton gave a speech declaring Internet freedom a major US foreign

policy goal. To this end, the US State Department funds and supports a variety of programs worldwide, working to counter censorship,

promote encryption, and enable anonymity, all designed "to ensure that any child, born anywhere in the world, has

access to the global Internet as an open platform on which to innovate, learn, organize, and express

herself free from undue interference or censorship." This agenda has been torpedoed by the awkward

realization that the US and other democratic governments conducted the same types of surveillance they havecriticized in more repressive countries. Those repressive countries are seizing on the opportunity,

pointing to US surveillance as a justification for their own more draconian Internet policies: more

surveillance, more censorship, and a more isolationist Internet that gives individual countries more

control over what their citizens see and say . For example, one of the defenses the government of Egypt

offered for its plans to monitor social media was that "the US listens in to phone calls, and supervises

anyone who could threaten its national security." Indians are worried that their government will cite the US's actions to

justify surveillance in that country. Both China and Russia publicly called out US hypocrisy. This affects Internet freedom

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worldwide. Historically, Internet governance—what little there was—was largely left to the United States,

because everyone more or less believed that we were working for the security of the Internet instead of against it. But now that the US

has lost much of its credibility, Internet governance is in turmoil. Many of the regulatory bodies that influence the

Internet are trying to figure out what sort of leadership model to adopt. Older international standards organizations like the International

Telecommunications Union are trying to increase their influence in Internet governance and develop a more nationalist set of rules. This is

the cyber sovereignty movement, and it threatens to fundamentally fragment the Internet. It's not new,

but it has been given an enormous boost from the revelations of NSA spying. Countries like Russia,China, and Saudi Arabia are pushing for much more autonomous control over the portions of the

Internet within their borders. That, in short, would be a disaster. The Internet is fundamentally a global

platform. While countries continue to censor and control, today people in repressive regimes can still

read information from and exchange ideas with the rest of the world. Internet freedom is a human

rights issue, and one that the US should support.

Further, this hypocrisy has created the conditions that will accelerate the global rise of

authoritarianism.

Chenoweth & Stephan 2015

Erica Chenoweth, political scientist at the University of Denver.& Maria J. Stephan, Senior Policy Fellowat the U.S. Institute of Peace, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.7-7-2015, "How Can States and Non-

State Actors Respond to Authoritarian Resurgence?," Political Violence @ a Glance,

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/07/07/how-can-states-and-non-state-actors-respond-to-

authoritarian-resurgence/

Chenoweth: Why is authoritarianism making a comeback? Stephan: There’s obviously no single answer to this. But part of

the answer is that democracy is losing its allure in parts of the world. When people don’t see the economic and governance

benefits of democratic transitions, they lose hope. Then there’s the compelling “stability first” argument. Regimes around the world,

including China and Russia, have readily cited the “chaos” of the Arab Spring to justify heavy-handed

policies and consolidating their grip on power . The “color revolutions” that toppled autocratic regimes in Serbia, Georgia, and

Ukraine inspired similar dictatorial retrenchment. There is nothing new about authoritarian regimes adapting tochanging circumstances. Their resilience is reinforced by a combination of violent and non-coercive

measures. But authoritarian paranoia seems to have grown more piqued over the past decade. Regimes have

figured out that “people power” endangers their grip on power and they are cracking down. There’s no better evidence of the

effectiveness of civil resistance than the measures that governments take to suppress it—something you detail

in your chapter from my new book. Finally, and importantly, democracy in this country and elsewhere has taken a hit

lately. Authoritarian regimes mockingly cite images of torture, mass surveillance, and the catering to the radical fringes

happening in the US political system to refute pressures to democratize themselves . The financial crisis here and in

Europe did not inspire much confidence in democracy and we are seeing political extremism on the rise in places like Greece and Hungary.

Here in the US we need to get our own house in order if we hope to inspire confidence in democracy

abroad.

American surveillance is the primary driver behind this authoritarianacceleration. The plan is necessary to restore US credibility.

Jackson, 2015

Dean Jackson is an assistant program officer at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. He holds

an M.A. from the University of Chicago’s Committee on International Relations, 7-14-2015, "The

Authoritarian Surge into Cyberspace," International Forum For Democratic Studies,

http://www.resurgentdictatorship.org/the-authoritarian-surge-into-cyberspace/

http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/07/07/how-can-states-and-non-state-actors-respond-to-authoritarian-resurgence/





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This still leaves open the question of what is driving authoritarian innovation in cyberspace. Deibert identifies increased

government emphasis on cybersecurity as one driver: cybercrime and terrorism are serious concerns, and governments

have a legitimate interest in combatting them. Unfortunately, when democratic governments use mass surveillance and

other tools to police cyberspace, it can have the effect of providing cover for authoritarian regimes to

use similar techniques for repressive purposes—especially, as Deibert notes, since former NSA contractor Edward

Snowden’s disclosure of US mass surveillance programs. Second, Deibert observes that authoritarian demand for

cybersecurity technology is often met by private firms based in the democratic world—a group that Reporters

Without Borders (RSF) calls the “Corporate Enemies of the Internet.” Hacking Team, an Italian firm mentioned in the RSF report, is just one

example: The Guardian reports that leaked internal documents suggest Hacking Team’s clients include the governments of “Azerbaijan,

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.” Deibert writes that “in a world where ‘Big

Brother’ and ‘Big Data’ share so many of the same needs, the political economy of cybersecurity must be

singled out as a major driver of resurgent authoritarianism in cyberspace.” Given these powerful forces, it will be

difficult to reverse the authoritarian surge in cyberspace. Deibert offers some possible solutions: for starters, he writes that the “political

economy of cybersecurity” can be altered through stronger export controls, “smart sanctions,” and a monitoring system to detect abuses.

Further, he recommends that cybersecurity trade fairs open their doors to civil society watchdogs who can help hold governments and the

private sector accountable. Similarly, Deibert suggests that opening regional cybersecurity initiatives to civil society part icipation could mitigate

violations of user rights. This might seem unlikely to occur within some authoritarian-led intergovernmental organizations, but setting a

normative expectation of civil society participation might help discredit the efforts of bad actors. Deibert concludes with a final

recommendation that society develop “models of cyberspace security that can show us how to prevent

disruptions or threats to life and property without sacrificing liberties and rights.” This might restore democratic states to the moral high ground and remove oppressive regimes’ rhetorical cover, but

developing such models will require confronting powerful vested interests and seriously examining the tradeoff

between cybersecurity and Internet freedom. Doing so would be worth it: the Internet is far too

important to cede to authoritarian control.

The impact – the failure of global democratic consolidation causes extinction.

Diamond, 1995

Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December,

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist

aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful

international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of

tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source

of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered . Most of these new and unconventional

threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for

legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers

important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one

another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic

governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face

ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not buildweapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and

enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more

environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their

environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes

it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties,

property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of

international security and prosperity can be built.



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The plan solves, limiting the purposes of 702 collection to a “tangible threat to

national security” is critical to solve overcollection.

Sinha, 2014G. Alex Sinha is an Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human

Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union, July 2014 “With Liberty to Monitor All How Large-

Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy” Human Rights Watch,http://www.hrw.org/node/127364

Narrow the purposes for which all foreign intelligence surveillance may be conducted and limit such

surveillance to individuals, groups, or entities who pose a tangible threat to national security or a

comparable state interest. o Among other steps, Congress should pass legislation amending Section 702 of FISA and

related surveillance authorities to narrow the scope of what can be acquired as “foreign intelligence

information,” which is now defined broadly to encompass, among other things, information related to “the

conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.” It should be restricted to what is necessary and proportionate to protect

legitimate aims identified in the ICCPR, such as national security. In practice, this should mean that the government may

acquire information only from individuals, groups, or entities who pose a tangible threat to national

security narrowly defined, or a comparable compelling state interest.

And, this limit solves without damaging counterterrorism.

Laperruque 2014,

Jake, CDT’s Fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security. Previously served as a law clerk for Senator Al

Franken on the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, and as a policy fellow for Senator

Robert Menendez. "Why Average Internet Users Should Demand Significant Section 702 Reform,"

Center For Democracy & Technology., 7-22-2014, https://cdt.org/blog/why-average-internet-

users-should-demand-significant-section-702-reform/

Where Do We Go From Here? There are sensible reforms that can significant limit the collateral damage to

privacy caused by Section 702 without impeding national security. Limiting the purposes for which

Section 702 can be conducted will narrow the degree to which communications are monitored between

individuals not suspected of wrongdoing or connected to national security threats. Closing retention

loopholes present in the Minimization Guidelines governing that surveillance will ensure that when Americans’

communications are incidentally collected, they are not kept absent national security needs. And closing

the backdoor search loophole would ensure that when Americans’ communications are retained

because they communicated with a target of Section 702 surveillance, they couldn’t be searched unless

the standards for domestic surveillance of the American are met.

And, the plan eliminates the collection of communication “about” targets -that solves

upstream collection.Nojeim, 2014Greg, Director, Project on Freedom, Security & Technology Comments To The Privacy And Civil Liberties

Oversight Board Regarding Reforms To Surveillance Conducted Pursuant To Section 702 Of Fisa April 11,

2014 https://d1ovv0c9tw0h0c.cloudfront.net/files/2014/04/CDT_PCLOB-702-Comments_4.11.13.pdf

C. Collection of communications “about” targets that are neither to nor from targets should be

prohibited. The Government takes the position that Section 702 permits it to collect not only communications that are to or from a foreign

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intelligence target, but also communications that are “about” the target because they mention an identifier associated with the target.17 The

practice directs the focus of surveillance away from suspected wrongdoers and permits the NSA to target communications between individuals

with no link to national security investigations. Because this is inconsistent with the legislative history of the statute,

and raises profound constitutional and operational problems, PCLOB should recommend that “about”

collection be ended, and that Section 702 surveillance be limited to communications to and from

targets. Section 702 authorizes the government to target the communications of persons reasonably believed to be abroad, but it never

defines the term “target.” However, throughout Section 702, the term is used to refer to the targeting of an individual rather content of acommunication.18 Further, the entire congressional debate on Section 702 includes no reference to collecting communications “about” a

foreign target, and significant debate about collecting communications to or from a target.19 To collect “about” communications,

the NSA engages in “upstream” surveillance on the Internet backbone,20 meaning “on fiber cables and infrastructure

as data flows past,”21 temporarily copying the content of the entire data stream so it can be searched for the

same “selectors” used for the downstream or “PRISM” surveillance . As a result, the NSA has the capability to search

any Internet communication going into or out of the U.S.22 without particularized intervention by a provider. Direct access creates

direct opportunity for abuse, and should not be permitted to a military intelligence agency. This dragnet

scanning also results in the collection of “multi-communication transactions,” (MCTs) which include tens of thousands wholly domestic

communications each year.23 The FISC required creation of new minimization rules for MCTs in 2011, but did not limit their collection.24 The

mass searching of communications content inside the United States, knowing that it the communications searched include tens of thousands of

wholly domestic communications each year, raises profound constitutional questions. Abandoning collection of

communications “about” targets would remove any justification for upstream collection, eliminate the

serious problems posed by direct government access to the Internet infrastructure, eliminate thecollection of tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications in contravention of the statute, an

make surveillance under Section 702 consistent with the congressional intent.

Documents

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