media.8kun.top · M u h a M M a d I s l a M ’ s F I r s t G r e at G e n e r a l r I c h a r d a . G a b r I e l M u h a M M a d I s l a M ’ s F I r s t G r e at G e n e r a l

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that Muhammad succeeded

as a prophet is undeniable; a

prominent military historian now

suggests that he might not have done so

had he not also been a great soldier.

Best known as the founder of a major

religion, Muhammad was also a military

leader—Islam’s first great general. While

there have been numerous accounts of

Muhammad the Prophet, this is the first

military biography of the man.

In Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General,

Richard A. Gabriel shows us a type of

warrior never before seen in antiquity—a

leader of an all-new religious movement

who in a single decade fought eight

major battles, led eighteen raids, and

planned thirty-eight other military

operations. Offering more detailed

descriptions of battles than those found

in other accounts, Gabriel’s study

portrays Muhammad as a revolutionary

who introduced military innovations

that transformed armies and warfare

throughout the Arab world.

Gabriel analyzes the social, economic,

and cultural environment in which

Muhammad lived and the religion he

inspired as they relate to his military

achievements. Gabriel explains how

Muhammad changed the social

composition of Arab armies by replacing

the traditional way of fighting—as

individuals and clans—with a new

command structure. He also relates

Muhammad’s masterful use of

nonmilitary methods—bribery, alliance

building, and political assassination—to

strengthen his long-term position, even

at the expense of short-term military

considerations.

Muhammad’s transformation of Arab

warfare enabled his successors to defeat

the armies of Persia and Byzantium and

establish the core of the Islamic empire—

an accomplishment that, Gabriel argues,

would have been militarily impossible

without Muhammad’s innovations.

Richard A. Gabriel challenges existing

scholarship on Muhammad’s place

in history and offers a viewpoint not

previously attempted.

Volume 11 in the Campaigns and

Commanders series.

riChard a. gabriel is a military

historian and Distinguished Adjunct

Professor in the Department of History

and War Studies at the Royal Military

College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario.

He is a retired U.S. Army officer and the

author of forty books.

(continued on back flap)

Jacket design by Tony Roberts

“To think of Muhammad as a military man will come as something of a new

experience to many. And yet Muhammad was truly a great general. . . . He was

a military theorist, organizational reformer, strategic thinker, operational-level

combat commander, political and military leader, heroic soldier, revolutionary, and

inventor of the theory of insurgency. . . . It was Muhammad who forged the military

instrument of the Arab conquests that began within two years of his death by

bringing into being a completely new kind of army not seen before in Arabia.”

F r o m t h e I n t r o d u c t I o n

Muhammad

CAMPAIGNS AND COMMANDERS

General Editor

Gregory J. W. Urwin, Temple University, Philadelphia,Pennsylvania

Advisory Board

Lawrence E. Babits, East Carolina University, GreenvilleJames C. Bradford, Texas A & M University, College StationRobert M. Epstein, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies,

Fort Leavenworth, KansasDavid M. Glantz, Carlisle, PennsylvaniaJerome A. Greene, National Park ServiceVictor Davis Hanson, California State University, FresnoHerman Hattaway, University of Missouri, Kansas CityEugenia C. Kiesling, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New YorkTimothy K. Nenninger, National Archives, Washington, D.C.Bruce Vandervort, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington

MuhammadIslam’s First Great General

Richard A. Gabriel

University of Oklahoma Press : Norman

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gabriel, Richard A.Muhammad : Islam’s first great general / Richard A. Gabriel.

p. cm. — (Campaigns and commanders ; v. 11)Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN–13: 978-0-8061-3860-2 (hardcover : alk. paper)1. Muhammad, Prophet, d. 632—Military leadership. I. Title. II. Series.

BP77.7.G34 2007297.6'3—dc22

2007000690

Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General is Volume 11 in the Campaigns andCommanders series.

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability ofthe Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Councilon Library Resources, Inc. ∞

Copyright © 2007 by Richard A. Gabriel. Published by the University of Okla-homa Press, Norman, Publishing Division of the University. All rights reserved.Manufactured in the U.S.A.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

For pretty Susan,the one who sees the dream

and whom I love beyond all measure

and

In memoriam

Professor John Daniel Windhausen(1932–2006)

“Here is your servant John . . .Take him, Lord.

But never take him lightly.”

All well-armed prophets have conquered andthe unarmed failed.

Machiavelli, The Prince

The number of combatants in Muhammad’sbattles never exceeded a few thousand, but inimportance they rank among the world’s mostdecisive battles.

Alfred Guillaume, Islam

No great man lives in vain. The history of theworld is but the biography of great men.

Carlyle, On Heroes

Contents

List of Maps xiImportant Dates xiiiAcknowledgments xvIntroduction xvii1. The Land of Arabia 32. The Strategic Setting 113. Arab Warfare 234. Muhammad 535. Insurgency 676. Battle of Badr 867. Battle of Uhud 1088. Battle of the Ditch 1319. Battles of Kheibar and Mu’ta 152

10. Conquest of Mecca 16611. Battle of Hunayn 17812. The Tabuk Expedition and the Death of Muhammad 19113. Muhammad’s Military Legacy 205Notes 221Bibliography 241Index 245

ix

Maps

1. Important Places in Muhammad’s Arabia 22. Arabia: The Land 43. Strategic Setting during Muhammad’s Life,

570–632 c.e. 164. Arab Conquests after Muhammad’s Death,

632–652 c.e. 205. Muhammad’s Raids, 623 c.e. 786. Battle of Badr, 624 c.e. 947. Battle of Uhud, 625 c.e. 1128. The Battlefield of Uhud 1169. Battle of the Ditch, 627 c.e. 134

10. The Conquest of Mecca, 630 c.e. 17411. Battle of Wadi Hunayn, 630 c.e. 18312. Military Campaigns of the Riddah, 632–633 c.e. 209

xi

Important Dates

570 Birth of Muhammad610 First Revelation613 Muhammad’s Ministry Begins621 First Pledge of Aqaba622 Second Pledge of AqabaJune 622 Muhammad Arrives in MedinaJanuary 623 First Muslim Raids against Meccan CaravansFebruary 623 Raid near RabighJune 623 Beni Dhamra RaidJune–October 623 Other Muslim RaidsOctober 623 First Break with Jewish TribesNovember 623 Nakhla RaidMarch 15, 624 Battle of BadrApril 624 Attack on Beni Qaynuqa Jewish TribeApril 624 Abu Sufyan’s “Porridge Raid”June 624 Raid of Dhu AmrAugust 624 Bahran RaidSeptember 624 Capture of Meccan Caravan at QardaMarch 625 Battle of UhudMay 625 Incident at al-RajiJune 625 Massacre of Muslims at Bir Maoona

xiii

August–September 625 Siege and Exile of Beni an-NadirMarch 626 Second Battle of BadrJune 626 Dhat al Riqa RaidAugust 626 Dumat al-Jandal RaidMarch–April 627 Siege of MedinaApril 627 Extermination of Beni QurayzahJanuary 628 Beni Lihyan RaidMarch 628 The Truce of HudaibiyaSeptember 628 Conquest of KheibarSeptember 629 Battle of Mu’taFebruary 629 Muhammad’s Omra Pilgrimage to MeccaJanuary 630 Capture of MeccaFebruary 630 Battle of HunaynFebruary–March 630 Siege of Ta’ifSeptember–October 630 Expedition to Tabuk631 Year of Deputations632 Muhammad’s Farewell PilgrimageJune 632 Death of Muhammad632–633 The Riddah

xiv IMPORTANT DATES

Acknowledgments

Iam indebted and deeply grateful to the following individuals whogave graciously of their time and expertise in reading the manu-

script and offering their advice and criticism. Joe Spoerl, professor ofphilosophy at St. Anselm College and an expert on Muslim religionand philosophy, deserves a special note of thanks for his efforts on mybehalf. It was he who first suggested the idea for a military biographyof Muhammad. His substantive comments were indispensable to myunderstanding of the currents of Muslim religious and philosophicalthought that provided the larger context against which the militaryevents of Muhammad’s life must be understood. Jim Coyle, my oldfriend and colleague from our days together at the U.S. Army WarCollege, was invaluable in making certain that I was attentive to thesensitivities of Muslims in the manner in which I addressed certaincontroversial aspects of Muhammad’s life. Before assuming his posi-tion at Chapman College in California, Jim spent more than twentyyears as an analyst for one of the country’s premier intelligence agen-cies. He is fluent in Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu, and a student of Araband Muslim history for more than thirty years. Joel Klein, who holdsa doctorate in ancient languages and also is fluent in Arabic andHebrew, helped me improve the accuracy of the Arabic terms containedherein. David Lufkin, a professional writer and author, did much to

xv

tighten and focus the manuscript making it accessible to both aca-demic and general readers. Steve Weingartner, military history editorfor Greenwood-Praeger and a fine writer in his own right, also read andedited the manuscript. I am especially grateful to Salem Jubran, aChristian Arab living in Nazareth, and to Col. Salim Al-Salmy of theArmy of Oman, a devout Muslim, for their valuable advice and insightinto the complexities of Arab and Muslim culture and psychology.While this book could never have been written without the aid andcomfort of all these fine people, responsibility for any errors rests withme alone.

xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Introduction

It is always difficult to be objective about the life of the founder of agreat religion. His personality is blurred by an aura of the miracu-

lous, enhanced almost inevitably by the needs of his believers tobelieve. The earliest biographers, those closest to his lifetime, areoften preoccupied not with historical fact, but with glorifying in everyway the memory of one they believe to have been the Messenger of God or even God himself. The result is a rich accretion of myth and miracle, mysterious portents and heavenly signs, of residues fromother religions and traditions. The biographies of saviors and messiahscannot usually pass as history; they are rather the propaganda of anexpanding faith.1 It is the task of the historian to locate and explicatethe truth that lies behind the myth. At the root of the effort rests thehistorian’s faith that the task can be accomplished at all.

This book is about the military life of Muhammad, the founder of the great world religion of Islam. Any work about Muhammad con-fronts all of the problems noted above. Despite Muhammad’s outstandingmilitary accomplishments, there is no biography of this great man thatexamines his military life in detail. Extant biographies of Muhammadhave focused on his role as a great seer who founded the religion ofIslam, or his achievements as a social revolutionary, or his abilities asa statesman and administrator who created new institutions to govern

xvii

the peoples of Arabia.2 There is no biography written from the per-spective of Muhammad’s role as Islam’s first great general and leader ofa successful insurgency.

Those biographies that do treat of Muhammad’s military achieve-ments do so mostly in passing so that his role as a competent militarycommander has been largely overlooked, or treated as a matter of sec-ondary importance, or, as with some biographies written by Muslimscholars, even attributed to miracle and divine guidance.3 This is acurious state of affairs in light of the fact that had Muhammad notsucceeded as a military commander Islam might have remained butone of a number of interesting religious sects relegated to a geographicbackwater, and the conquest of the Byzantine and Persian Empires byArab armies might never have occurred. Samuel P. Huntington hasremarked in this regard that Muhammad is the only founder of agreat religion who was also a military commander. Previous genera-tions of Western scholars often took note that Muhammad was amilitary man. James L. Payne, writing in 1899, said that “Muhammadis remembered as a hard fighter and skillful military commander.”4

This memory persists in the minds of modern jihadis. This book is thefirst military biography of Muhammad and has as its goal a detailedtreatment of Muhammad’s military life and accomplishments thattransformed the armies and society of the Arabs. This transformationmade possible the conquest of two of the greatest empires of theancient world by the armies of Islam in the space of only a few years.

While this book is a military biography, the social, economic, andcultural environments in which Muhammad lived are also addressedinsofar as they had an important influence on his military life. This, ofcourse, includes Muhammad’s religious experience. But this, too, isaddressed only when it is relevant to military history. Muhammad’sreform of the marriage laws, for example, permitting each man fourwives was, at least in part, motivated by the need to find husbands tocare for the widows and orphans of his troops killed at the Battle ofBadr.5 The book is careful to avoid religious analysis or conclusions,elements that have sometimes made biographies of the Prophet partisanand unreliable.

To think of Muhammad as a military man will come as somethingof a new experience to many. And yet Muhammad was truly a greatgeneral. In the space of a single decade he fought eight major battles, led

xviii INTRODUCTION

eighteen raids, and planned thirty-eight other military operations whereothers were in command but operating under his orders and strategicdirection. He was wounded twice, suffered defeats, and twice had hispositions overrun by superior forces before rallying his troops to vic-tory. But Muhammad was more than a great field general and tactician.He was a military theorist, organizational reformer, strategic thinker,operational level combat commander, political and military leader,heroic soldier, revolutionary, and inventor of the theory of insurgencyand history’s first successful practitioner. Like some other great com-manders in history—Moses, Subotai, and Vo Nguyen Giap—Muhammadhad no military training before actually commanding an army in thefield. As an orphan he had no opportunity to learn military skills at thehands of an Arab father, the usual means of acquiring military trainingamong the Arabs in his day. His only early exposure to warfare came atthe age of fourteen when he witnessed a skirmish between two clansin which he retrieved arrows for his uncle. Yet, Muhammad became anexcellent field commander and tactician and an even more astutepolitical and military strategist.

Muhammad proved to be a master of intelligence in war, and hisintelligence service eventually came to rival that of Rome and Persia,especially in the area of political intelligence. He often spent hoursdevising tactical and political stratagems and once remarked that “allwar is cunning,” reminding us of Sun Tzu’s dictum that “all war isdeception.” In his thinking and application of force Muhammad was acombination of Clausewitz and Machiavelli for he always employedforce in the service of political goals. He was an astute grand strategistwhose use of nonmilitary methods (alliance building, political assas-sination, bribery, religious appeals, mercy, and calculated butchery)always resulted in strengthening his long-term strategic position,sometimes at the expense of short-term military considerations.

Muhammad’s unshakable belief in Islam and in his role as theMessenger of God revolutionized warfare in Arabia in many respectsand created the first army in the ancient world motivated by a coherentsystem of ideological belief. The ideology of holy war (jihad) andmartyrdom (shahada) for the faith was transmitted to the West duringthe wars between Muslims and Christians in Spain and France, whereit changed traditional Christian pacifistic thinking on war, brought intobeing a coterie of Christian warrior saints, and provided the Catholic

INTRODUCTION xix

Church with its ideological justification for the Crusades.6 Ideology ofthe religious or secular variety has remained a primary element ofmilitary adventure ever since.

It was Muhammad who forged the military instrument of the Arabconquests that began within two years of his death by bringing intobeing a completely new kind of army not seen before in Arabia. As amilitary innovator Muhammad introduced no fewer than eight majormilitary reforms that transformed the armies and conduct of war inArabia. Just as Philip of Macedon transformed the armies of Greece sothat his successor, Alexander, could employ them as instruments ofconquest and empire, so Muhammad transformed the armies of Arabiaso his successors could use them to defeat the armies of the Persianand Byzantine Empires and establish the core of the Empire of Islam.Had Muhammad not transformed the armies, the Arab conquestswould likely have remained a military impossibility.

Muhammad the Insurgent

Although his reforms and military achievements give him much incommon with the greatest generals in antiquity, Muhammad was nota conventional field general. He was, instead, a new type of warrior,one never before seen in antiquity. Muhammad was first and foremosta revolutionary, a fiery religious guerrilla leader who created and ledthe first genuine national insurgency in antiquity that is comprehen-sible in modern terms, a fact not lost on the jihadis of the present daywho often cite the Quran and Muhammad’s use of violence as justifi-cation for their own. Unlike conventional generals Muhammad’s goalwas not the defeat of a foreign enemy or invader but the replacementof the existing Arabian social order with a new one based on a radicallydifferent ideological view of the world. To achieve his revolutionarygoals Muhammad utilized all the means recognized by modern analystsas characteristic of and necessary to a successful insurgency. AlthoughMuhammad began his struggle for a new order with a small guerrillacadre capable of undertaking only limited hit-and-run raids, by the timehe was ready to attack Mecca a decade later that small guerrilla forcehad grown into a large conventional armed force with integrated cavalryand infantry units capable of conducting large-scale combat opera-tions. It was this conventional military instrument that Muhammad’s

xx INTRODUCTION

successors used to forge a great empire. It was the first truly nationalmilitary force in Arab history.

Beginning with a small band of believers, Muhammad undertook aguerrilla war in which he waged a campaign of ambushes and raids toerode the economic and political base of his enemy’s power. He intro-duced new social programs and a politico-religious ideology thatattracted others to his cause, expanding his base of military manpowerand making it possible to recruit and deploy larger military forces.After years of guerrilla war Muhammad finally defeated his enemiesby drawing them into a series of set-piece battles, eventually capturingMecca itself. Supporting the military effort was the political dimen-sion of the insurgency that used political alliances to deprive hisenemy of a source of military manpower and to erode the enemy’spopular base of support. Political maneuver and negotiation, intelli-gence, propaganda, and the judicious use of terror and assassinationwere employed to wage a psychological warfare campaign againstthose potential sources of opposition that could not yet be won over bycalculations of self-interest or ideology.

Muhammad’s rise to power was a textbook example of a successfulinsurgency, indeed the first such example in history of which I amaware.7 Modern insurgents like Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, JomoKenyatta, Fidel Castro, and perhaps, George Washington would easilyhave recognized Muhammad’s strategy and methods in their own revolutionary struggles. The West has been accustomed to thinking ofthe Arab conquests that followed Muhammad in purely conventionalmilitary terms. But the armies that achieved those conquests did notexist in Arabia before Muhammad. It was Muhammad’s successfulunconventional guerrilla operations, his successful insurgency, thatbrought those armies into existence. Thus, the later Arab conquests, asregards both strategic concept and the new armies as instruments ofmilitary method, were the consequences of Muhammad’s prior mili-tary success as the leader of an insurgency.

This aspect of Muhammad’s military life as a guerrilla insurgent islikely to strike the reader as curious and, as such, is worth exploring insome detail. If the means and methods used by modern military ana-lysts to characterize insurgency warfare are employed as categories ofanalysis, it is clear that Muhammad’s campaign to spread Islamthroughout Arabia fulfilled each of the analytical criteria. The first

INTRODUCTION xxi

requirement for an insurgency to succeed is a determined leader whosefollowers regard him as special in some way and worthy of their fol-lowing him. In Muhammad’s case his own charismatic personality wasenhanced by his deeply held belief that he was indeed God’s Messen-ger, and that to follow Muhammad was to obey the dictates of Godhimself. Insurgencies also require a messianic ideology, one thatespouses a coherent creed or plan to replace the existing social, political,and economic order, usually seen as unjust, with a new order that isbetter, more just, or ordained by history or even by God. Muhammadused the new religious creed of Islam to challenge central traditionalArab social institutions and values as oppressive and unholy and worthyof replacement. To this end he created the ummah, or community ofbelievers, God’s community on earth, to serve as a messianic replace-ment for the clans and tribes that were the basis of traditional Arabsociety. One of Muhammad’s most important achievements was theestablishment of new social institutions that greatly altered and insome cases completely replaced those of the old Arab social order.

Successful insurgencies also require a disciplined cadre of truebelievers to do the work of organizing and recruiting new members.Muhammad’s revolutionary cadre consisted of the small group of orig-inal converts he attracted in Mecca and took with him to Medina.These were the muhajirun, or Emigrants. The first converts among theclans of Medina, the ansar, or Helpers, also filled the ranks. Within thisrevolutionary cadre was an inner circle of talented men, some of themmuch later converts. Some, like Abdullah Ibn Ubay and Khalid al-Walid,were experienced field commanders and provided a much neededsource of military expertise. Muhammad’s inner circle advised himand saw to it that his directives were carried out. Not surprisingly,some of his advisers came to hold key positions during the Prophet’slifetime and fought among themselves for power after his death.

Once Muhammad had created his cadre of revolutionaries, heestablished a base from which to undertake military operations againsthis adversaries. These operations initially took the form of ambushesand raids aimed at isolating Mecca, the enemy’s main city, and othertrading towns that opposed him. Only one in six Arabs lived in a cityor town at this time; the others resided in the “countryside” or desertliving as enclosed pastoral nomads.8 Muhammad chose Medina as hisbase of operations. Medina was strategically located in that it was ashort distance from the main caravan route from Mecca to Syria that

xxii INTRODUCTION

constituted the economic lifeline of Mecca and other oases and townsthat depended on the caravan trade for their economic survival. Medinawas also sufficiently distant from Mecca to permit Muhammad a rela-tively free hand in his efforts to convert the bedouin clans living alongthe caravan route. Muhammad understood that conversions and politicalalliances with the bedouins, not military engagements with the Meccans,were the keys to initial success.

Insurgencies require an armed force and the manpower to sustainthem. It was from the original small cadre of guerrillas that the largerconventional army could be grown that would ultimately permit theinsurgency to engage its enemies in set-piece battles when the timeand political conditions were right. Muhammad may have been thefirst commander in history to understand and implement the doctrinethat General Vo Nguyen Giap of North Vietnam later referred to as“people’s war, people’s army.”9 Muhammad established the idea amonghis followers that God had commandeered all Muslims’ purposes andproperty and that all Muslims had a responsibility to fight for thefaith. Everyone—men, women, and even children—had an obligationfor military service in defense of the faith and the ummah that was thecommunity of God’s chosen people on earth. If this is not properly under-stood, then it will be difficult to grasp that it was the attraction of theideology of Islam more than anything else that drew together the man-power that permitted Muhammad’s small revolutionary cadre to growinto a conventional armed force capable of large-scale engagements.

The growth of Muhammad’s insurgent army is evident from thefollowing figures. At the Battle of Badr (624 c.e.) Muhammad could putonly 314 men in the field. Two years later at Second Badr (626 c.e.),1,500 Muslims took the field. At Kheibar in 628 c.e., the Muslim armyhad grown to 2,000 combatants. When Muhammad mounted hisassault on Mecca (630 C.E.) he did so with 10,000 men. And at the Battleof Hunayn a few months later the army numbered 12,000. Somesources record that Muhammad’s expedition to Tabuk later the sameyear comprised 30,000 men and 10,000 cavalry, but this is probably anexaggeration.10 What is evident from the figures, however, is thatMuhammad’s insurgency grew very quickly in terms of its ability torecruit military manpower.

Like all insurgent armies, Muhammad’s forces initially acquiredweapons by stripping them from prisoners and the enemy dead. Weapons,helmets, and armor were expensive items in relatively impoverished

INTRODUCTION xxiii

Arabia, and the early Muslim converts—drawn mostly from amongthe poor, orphaned, widowed, and otherwise socially marginal—couldill afford them. At the Battle of Badr, the first major engagement withan enemy army, the dead were stripped of their swords and other militaryequipment, establishing a practice that became common. Muhammadalso required prisoners to provide weapons and equipment instead ofmoney to purchase their freedom. One prisoner taken at Badr was anarms merchant and was required to provide the insurgents with athousand spears as the price of his freedom.11 In the early days at Med-ina Muhammad purchased what arms he could from one of the Jewishtribes in the city that were armorers. Later, when he drove this tribefrom the city, he was careful to require that they leave behind theirmetalworking tools so that the Muslims could now manufactureweapons for themselves. Muhammad was eventually able to supplyweapons, helmets, shields, and armor for an army of ten thousand forhis march on Mecca.

Muhammad’s ability to obtain sufficient weapons and equipmenthad another important advantage. Many of the insurgency’s convertscame from the poorest elements of the bedouin clans, people too impov-erished to afford weapons and armor. Muhammad often supplied theseconverts with expensive military equipment, immediately raisingtheir status within the clan and guaranteeing their loyalty to him, ifnot always to the creed of Islam. In negotiations with bedouin chiefsMuhammad made them gifts of expensive weaponry. Several paganclans were won over to Muhammad’s insurgency in this manner,although they did not convert to Islam. Horses and camels were equallyimportant military assets, for without them raids and the conduct ofoperations over distances were not possible. Muhammad obtained hisanimals in much the same manner as he did his weapons and withequal success. At Badr the insurgents had only two horses. Six yearslater at Hunayn Muhammad’s cavalry squadrons numbered eight hun-dred horses and cavalrymen.12

An insurgency must also be able to sustain the popular base thatsupports the fighting elements. To accomplish this Muhammad changedthe ancient customs regarding the sharing of booty taken in raids. Thechief of a clan or tribe traditionally took one-fourth of the booty forhimself. Muhammad decreed that he receive only one-fifth, and eventhis he took not for himself but in the name of the ummah. Under the oldways individuals kept whatever booty they had captured. Muhammad

xxiv INTRODUCTION

required that all booty be turned in to the common pool where it wasshared equally among all combatants who had participated in the raid.Most importantly, Muhammad established that the first claimants onthe booty that had been taken in the name of the ummah were thepoor and the widows and orphans of the soldiers killed in battle. Healso used the promise of a larger share of booty to strike alliances withbedouin clans, some of whom remained both loyal and pagan to the endfighting for loot instead of Islam. Muhammad’s later military successesagainst towns, oases, and caravans provided an important source ofwealth to supply the insurgent popular base with the necessities of life.

The leader of an insurgency must take great care to guard hispower from challenges, including those that come from within themovement itself. Muhammad had many enemies, and he was alwayson guard against an attempt on his life. Like other insurgent leaders,Muhammad surrounded himself with a loyal group of men who wouldact as his bodyguard and carry out his orders without question.Muhammad created the suffah precisely for this purpose. The suffahwas a small cadre who lived in the mosque next to Muhammad’shouse. They were recruited from among the most pious, enthusiastic,and fanatical followers, and were generally from impoverished back-grounds with no other way to make a living. The members of the suf-fah spent their time studying Islam and leading a life of spiritualavocation. They were devoted to Muhammad and served not only as his life guard but as a secret police that could be called on at amoment’s notice to carry out whatever task Muhammad set for them.These tasks included assassination and terror.

No insurgency can survive without an effective intelligence appara-tus, and the Muslim insurgency was no exception. As early as whenMuhammad left Mecca he left behind a trusted agent, his uncle Abbas,who continued to send him reports on the situation there. Abbas servedas an agent-in-place for more than a decade until Mecca itself fell toMuhammad. In the beginning Muhammad’s operations suffered from alack of tactical intelligence. His followers were mostly townspeopleand had no experience in desert travel. On some of the early opera-tions Muhammad had to hire bedouin guides to show him the way towhere he wanted to go. As the insurgency grew, however, Muhammad’sintelligence service became more organized and sophisticated, usingagents-in-place, commercial spies, debriefing of prisoners, combat patrols,and reconnaissance in force as methods of intelligence collection.

INTRODUCTION xxv

Muhammad himself seems to have possessed a detailed knowledgeof clan loyalties and politics within the insurgency’s area of operationsand used this knowledge to good effect when negotiating allianceswith the bedouins. Muhammad often conducted an advance recon-naissance of the battlefields upon which he fought, and only once inten years of military operations was he taken by surprise. In mostcases Muhammad’s intelligence service was able to provide him withsufficient information as to the enemy’s location and intentions inadvance of any military engagement. We have no knowledge of howMuhammad’s intelligence service was organized or where it was located.That it was part of the suffah seems a reasonable guess.

Insurgencies succeed or fail to the degree that they are able to winthe allegiance of the great numbers of the uncommitted to support theinsurgents’ goals. Muhammad understood the role of propaganda inthe struggle for the hearts and minds of the uncommitted and went togreat lengths to make his message public and widely known. In anArab society that was largely illiterate, the poet served as the chiefconveyor of political propaganda. Muhammad hired the best poetsmoney could buy to sing his praises and denigrate his opponents. Hepublicly issued proclamations regarding the revelations he received asthe Messenger of God, and remained always in public view to keep thevision of the new order and the promise of a heavenly paradise con-stantly before his followers and those he hoped to convert. He sent“missionaries” to other clans and tribes to instruct the pagans in thenew faith, sometimes teaching the pagans to read and write in theprocess. Muhammad understood that the conflict was between theexisting social order and its manifest injustices and his vision of thefuture, and he surpassed his adversaries in spreading his vision to winthe struggle for the loyalty and support of the Arab population.

The use of terror seems to be an indispensable element of a success-ful insurgency, and no less so in Muhammad’s case. Muhammad usedterror in two basic ways. First, to keep discipline among his followersby making public examples of traitors or backsliders. It is sometimesforgotten that in Muhammad’s day the penalty for apostasy in Islamwas death. Muhammad also ordered the assassination of some of hispolitical enemies, including poets and singers who had publiclyridiculed him. Never one to forget a slight, when his armies marchedinto Mecca Muhammad’s suffah set about hunting down a list of oldenemies marked for execution. Muhammad also used terror to strike

xxvi INTRODUCTION

fear into the minds of his enemies on a large scale. In the case of theJewish tribes of Medina, Muhammad seems to have ordered the deathof the entire Beni Qaynuqa tribe and the selling of their women andchildren into slavery before being talked out of it by the chief of one ofhis allies. On another occasion, again against a Jewish tribe of Medina,he ordered all the tribe’s adult males—some nine hundred—beheadedin a city square, the women and children sold into slavery, and theirproperty distributed among his Muslim followers. Shortly after theconquest of Mecca, Muhammad declared “war to the knife” against allthose who remained idolaters, instructing his followers to kill anypagans they encountered on the spot! Such public displays of ruthless-ness and brutality, as with all insurgencies, strengthened Muhammad’shand when dealing with opponents and allies.

When examined against the criteria used by modern analysts tocharacterize an insurgency, Muhammad’s military campaign to estab-lish Islam in Arabia seems to qualify in all respects. Nothing in thisconclusion detracts from the substance and value of Islam itself as areligion any more than the history of the Israelite military campaign toconquer Canaan detracts from the substance and value of Judaism.Over time the violent origins of a religion are forgotten and only thefaith itself remains, with the result that the founders of creeds come tobe remembered as untinged by the violence of the historical record. InMuhammad’s case the result has been to deemphasize the militaryaspects of his life and his considerable military accomplishments. Onepurpose of this book is to reilluminate the historical record of Muham-mad’s military life. We leave the religious history of Islam’s first greatgeneral to others.

Research Sources

Any attempt to write a military biography of Muhammad is forced torely on only a few reliable sources of information. The first is theQuran itself, that scriptural collection of moral rules, instructions, andinterpretations of events believed by Muslims to have been revealed byGod to Muhammad. Whenever Muhammad experienced a revelationhe would repeat its instructions to his followers who committed themto memory. Some of these listeners may have taken notes, but the lowlevel of literacy and scarcity of writing materials in Arabia at the timewould have made this a rare occurrence. Devout Muslims believe,

INTRODUCTION xxvii

however, that the words of Muhammad were written down immedi-ately after his revelations. The fact that Muhammad’s words wererecorded immediately is taken as proof to Muslims that the Qurancontains the unadulterated word of God. By contrast, the failure ofChristians and Jews to write down God’s revelations immediately isviewed as permitting human experience to corrupt His divine words.For Muslims, belief in the immediate recording of Muhammad’s wordsis a major article of faith. Theology aside, it is likely that the Quran isthe best source of the words spoken by Muhammad himself. But as asource document for the writing of military history, the Quran is onlymarginally useful for the pertinent information it provides. It was notcollated into a single document until some twenty years after Muham-mad’s death and was never intended as a narrative of the Prophet’s life.The Quran is not arranged in chronological order of the occurrence ofthe events recorded within it. It is instead arranged in order of thelength of the discourses themselves, beginning with the longest andending with the shortest. For our purposes its most valuable contributionremains as a source of Muhammad’s words in those instances where theyare relevant to his military life.

The most useful source of information about Muhammad’s life isIbn Ishaq’s great work, The Life of Muhammad, written about ninetyyears after the Prophet’s death, and translated into French and Englishby the great Arabic scholar, Alfred Guillaume, in 1955. Ishaq’s workwas edited later by Ibn Hisham, and it is the edited version that hassurvived. Despite Ibn Hisham’s admission that he has purposely omitted“things which it is disgraceful to discuss” and “matters which woulddistress certain people,” his work has no serious rival as an originalsource of information about Muhammad and the events, especiallythe military events, surrounding his life. Guillaume’s translation isregarded as the “gold standard” of translations of this source. Anyonewriting about Muhammad’s life must rely heavily on Ibn Ishaq or failto do so at great risk.

Ibn Ishaq’s biography of the Prophet was constructed from themaghazi, the earliest accounts of Muhammad’s life written within ahundred years of his death. None of the maghazi has survived inusable form; only a single fragment of one book exists. The maghaziwere based on oral accounts of individuals who knew the Prophet,took part in battles with him, or were close relatives of those who did.These accounts were passed down from one generation to the next in

xxviii INTRODUCTION

the oral tradition typical of Arab culture to this day. Ibn Ishaq is carefulto cite the names of the sources of his accounts for most major eventsin his book, sometimes tracing a source to its previous one and to theone before that. That these oral accounts should have survived foralmost a hundred years before Ibn Ishaq collected them and wrotethem down is not surprising in a culture where the exploits of tribal,clan, and family heroes were memorized, recited, and passed to theyoung as a matter of common practice.

Ibn Ishaq’s biography also includes additional original material inthe form of poems about the raids and battles written shortly after theevents themselves, sometimes by actual participants. Ishaq’s effortsthus preserved another valuable source of oral tradition that other-wise might have been lost. The poems are often excellent sources ofdetail about military equipment and tactical events. Ibn Ishaq’s Life ofMuhammad, whether in Arabic or in Guillaume’s definitive translation,remains the most basic work used by all biographers of Muhammad,including those writing in Arabic.

The academic concern for “original” sources might lead some tocriticize the material on which this study relies as “secondary” sourcesand thus not sufficiently scholarly. If by original sources we at leastmean that the materials ought to have been written as close as possibleto the events they address, then Ibn Ishaq’s work certainly qualifies.He is writing only ninety years after the events he is recording. Com-pared to the “original” sources often cited by ancient historians in theWest, Ibn Ishaq’s work is almost contemporaneous with the eventsthemselves. Plutarch, for example, wrote about events that occurredtwo hundred to six hundred years before he wrote; Arrian’s History ofAlexander was written five hundred years after Alexander’s death;Curtius’s history of Alexander was written between three hundred andfive hundred years after the events it records; and Livy, the old reliable,wrote of events that occurred two centuries before he was born. Onlya few ancient historians—Tacitus, Polybius and Suetonius to name themost obvious—wrote about events that actually took place duringtheir lifetimes. By any fair standard of proximity to events Ibn Ishaqqualifies as an original and reliable source.

A second criticism will likely be that the work relies on transla-tions of its “original” sources and not on the original Arabic versions.13

But only rarely do the language skills of any researcher equal those of ascholarly translator, so that one can be as certain as one can be in

INTRODUCTION xxix

these matters that works by scholarly translators of Guillaume’s stand-ing are more reliable than those produced by a researcher simply becausethe researcher reads Arabic. As regards military history, a knowledge ofthe subject and context of the materials in the target language are moreimportant than linguistic skills in the source language. Otherwise, theliteral use of language will likely mislead the translator. Reading Arabicdoes not make one a translator of Arabic military history. One must bea military historian first. Moreover, modern translations of classicworks are far more likely to be free of the ideological, cultural, and reli-gious bias characteristic of those produced earlier when such prejudicescommanded more attention. Whenever I have used materials from otherWestern or Arabic scholars (Becker, Caetani, Glubb, Hitti, Hourani,Lewis, Lings, Rodinson, Shoufani, Watt, and Wellhausen) I have beencareful to rely on only those who themselves read Arabic and whosepublished works have already been subjected to academic scrutiny andfound acceptable. I have not used scholarly Arabic transliterations forthe various names and places mentioned herein, but have relied on thespellings used by my sources. Wherever applicable I have also noted inthe relevant footnotes the original Arabic sources on which the accountsof these scholars were based.

The Arabic words that appear in the manuscript were taken directlyfrom the academic sources in which they appear. As such, they shouldall be correct. Some people might find fault with the Arabic transliter-ations because they are not expressed in classical Arabic. This is aninevitable risk of reading translations, but hardly a fatal flaw as longas the meaning is not changed by the spelling. These problems havebeen minimized through manuscript review by the four Arabic expertsmentioned in the acknowledgments.

The third source of research material on which this work relies isthe hadith (narrative or account); that is, verbal reports or conversationscomprising the compilations of the “traditions” of Muhammad gatheredsome 120 years after the Prophet’s death. These traditions are extrapo-lations of various “sayings, words, deeds, and tacit approvals” of theProphet accompanied by interpretations by lawyers, religious author-ities, and others, including political factionaries with influence at anygiven time. The hadith represents the sunna, or tradition—the customsand practices attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. As a historical sourcethis compilation can at best be regarded as repetitious of those accountswithin Ibn Ishaq’s work or at worst as misleading and inaccurate

xxx INTRODUCTION

because of the bias of the extrapolators themselves who interpret thereports. A major difficulty in using works published in Arabic after IbnIshaq’s work is that Muhammad’s utterances and oral accounts ofevents surrounding his life quickly became thickly entangled in thevarious interpretations of Quranic law that were used as propagan-distic weapons in theological and political disputes by various factionsto favor themselves and discredit their opponents. As Guillaume hasnoted in this regard, “Apostolic tradition in Islam is the battlefield ofwarring sects striving for the mastery of men’s minds and the controlof their behavior with all the weight that Muhammad’s presumed orfabricated example could bring to bear. The earlier the tradition . . . theless this tendency is in evidence.”14 Much of what was written aboutMuhammad in Arabic in later periods following Ibn Ishaq’s work isoften so culturally, ideologically, legalistically, or theologically partisanas to be useless as reliable research material. In any case precious littleof it addresses Muhammad’s military exploits.

This book is the first military biography of Muhammad in Englishwritten by a military historian. It is free from the religious and politicalbias often found in previous Muslim biographies. The conclusion thatMuhammad was a military reformer is new to Muhammad scholar-ship, as is the conclusion that he shaped the rise of a new kind of armyand style of warfare in Arabia. Had these military reforms not broughtinto being a new military instrument, it is unlikely that the Muslimconquests would have been militarily possible. Of great significance isthat Muhammad was the inventor of the methodology of insurgencyand that he was its first successful practitioner. I have tried to makethe descriptions of Muhammad’s battles more complete and empiri-cally detailed than previous efforts have made them, with the hopethat scholars will have to reexamine their assumptions about howthese battles were fought and what their effects were. Finally, becauseof all these conclusions I have tried to place the life of Muhammad ina completely new context. That Muhammad succeeded as a Prophet isundeniable, but I suggest he might not have done so had he not been agreat soldier first. This presents a new challenge to the extant scholar-ship in interpreting Muhammad’s life and place in history.

INTRODUCTION xxxi

Muhammad

Map 1. Important Places in Muhammad’s Arabia

1

The Land of Arabia

The Arabs call their land Jazirat al-Arab, the “island of the Arabs,”and it is indeed an island surrounded by water on three sides and

by sand on the fourth. The land is harsh, and until modern times whenarmies could take advantage of motorized transport, history knew of noinvader who had succeeded in penetrating the country’s sandy barriersto establish a permanent presence in the land. Arabia comprises theArabian Peninsula and its northern extension, the Syrian Desert, a vastlandmass that encompasses almost 1.5 million square miles, an areaslightly larger than all of western Europe including Scandinavia.1 Theground itself is made up of a single uniform block of ancient rock calledthe Arabian Shield and consists mostly of desert and steppe. The climateis uniformly hot, dry, and harsh, except for Yemen, which is blessed bymonsoon rains and is fertile. The rest of the country is almost com-pletely barren, receiving on average only six inches of rain per year.

Arabia is divided into four geographic regions. One is Al Hijaz(Hejaz), consisting of the western highlands that parallel the coast ofthe Red Sea. The mountains themselves reach as high as four thousandfeet and separate the narrow coastal plain from the steppe land of theinterior. A number of valley passes make it possible to travel from theinterior to the coastal strip with only little difficulty. But the passes arefew and of some distance between, making the mountains a formidable

3

4

Map 2. Arabia: The Land

obstacle to military passage. Running sometimes along the coast andsometimes on the interior side of the mountains is the famous Arabianspice road, the route connecting the ports at the southern tip of thepeninsula with the road to the north and the former Byzantine borderprovinces, including Palestine and Egypt. Ships from India and Africaunloaded their cargoes in these ports, where they were transferred tocamel caravan trains and carried northward to Mecca, the commercialcenter located halfway between the ports and the markets farthernorth. This road was the commercial lifeline of Mecca and the entirewesternmost area of the country.

The second geographic zone is the interior, largely stony, sandywastes and desert. The Rub’ al-Khali, or Empty Quarter, is a vast desertin the south that has large sand dunes sometimes reaching more than ahundred feet high and running on for miles at a stretch. In the center ofArabia are the Nafud and Dahna Deserts, which constitute formidablebarriers to west–east travel. In the north lies the great Syrian Desert andthe smaller wastes of Hisma and Hamad. The routes used by the Meccancaravan trains skirted these desolate areas; it was impossible for man orbeast to attempt a crossing and survive. The third zone lies far to theeast and comprises the hot and humid coastal lands of the Persian Gulfwhere agriculture is possible due to abundant groundwater.

Far to the south is Yemen, the fourth zone, the famous land ofantiquity from which the prized aromatic plants that produced frankin-cense and myrrh were found. Yemen is a land of towering mountains,fertile valleys, and coastal plains. The monsoon rains make the groundfertile and well suited to agriculture. The people of Yemen were mostlysettled rather than nomadic and were skilled in the building of damsand irrigation systems that made large-scale agriculture feasible. Oneof these dams, at Marib, was said to have made possible the cultivationof more than twenty thousand square acres of land. So large was thepopulation supported by these lands that when the dam broke some-time near the beginning of the second century c.e., a great number ofpeople were forced to migrate to the north.

There are no permanent rivers anywhere in Arabia, and rainfall issparse and limited to certain times of the year. In the south the rainscome in the spring and summer; in the north winter and spring are therainy seasons. The rains can be heavy at times and are often accompa-nied by gale-force winds that can turn the wadi beds into raging torrentsthat wreak havoc on the mud-brick houses and walled gardens. Driving

THE LAND OF ARABIA 5

rains have been known to turn mud-brick walls into mud, sweepingaway the liquid mass in a localized flood.2

During Muhammad’s time five-sixths of the population of Arabiawas bedouin and permanent settlements were few.3 Ptolemy, writingin his Geography sometime around 150 c.e., listed only 218 settle-ments in Arabia, of which more than 150 were small villages. Only six“cities” were listed, and all of these were in Yemen where the landwas sufficiently fertile to sustain large populations.4 Most of these“cities” were relatively small in both area and population, and onlytwo were surrounded by walls of mud-brick and stone. The length ofthe walls permit a rough estimate of the size of the populations. Thewalls of Qarnaw were 1,150 meters in length, and those of Timna were1,850 meters long.5 Walls of this size can enclose, on average, abouteight to nine acres of land.6 Using Yigael Yadin’s estimate of approxi-mately 240 persons per urban acre as the average population densityfor cities of the Middle East in antiquity, one might reasonably guess thatthe size of these cities was around two thousand souls.7 The language ofArabia itself reflects the lack of urbanization in the land, for there isno word for city in classical Arabic. The most commonly used termin this context is hagar, a word that connotes the fortified assemblyplace or compound of a tribe where its clans are brought together forwar or other purposes.

Muhammad spent most of his life in the Hejaz. With the exceptionof the mountains, the land of the Hejaz consists of desert and steppe.The steppe (darah) forms itself into vast circular plains lying betweenhills covered with sand. Large tracts of the steppeland are covered byfissured fields of hardened lava overlying sandstone. These lava fieldsare important barriers to military and commercial movement sinceneither horse nor camel can negotiate them without great risk of theanimal’s falling and breaking its limbs or falling on its rider. There arefew trees, and only the acacia and the tamarisk seem to thrive. TheHejaz is a rocky and harsh place given to drought, with the land oftengoing without rain for three years at a time. Deeply dug wells and cisterns are the main means of water supply. Cisterns are cavelikeholes dug in the ground, the walls of which are sealed with stucco andinto which water is diverted or caught from rainstorms. The cistern isthen sealed until its contents are needed. It is an old yayyuin customto construct cisterns along a planned route of march so that the clancan be supplied with water as it moves over the desert. It was not

6 MUHAMMAD

unusual for bedouin raiders to construct and fill a cistern in some des-olate location from which they could undertake raids against caravans.Without a source of water themselves, the caravan guards were unableto pursue the raiders.

In a few places groundwater seeps to the surface forming a fetid,swamplike area called an oasis. Most of the oases in the Hejaz are locatednorth of Medina, itself the largest oasis in the region. The second-largestoasis in the Hejaz is only ten square miles in area. Although malaria isendemic, the oases are valuable for their water supply and their abilityto sustain substantial agriculture. Agriculture was probably introducedto the area sometime around the first century c.e.,most probably by theJewish tribes. The origins of the Jewish tribes in the Hejaz are obscure.One possibility is that the Jews that settled there were refugees fromRoman suppression of the Bar Kokhba Revolt in Israel in the early 130sc.e. or from the prior Jewish War. Another is that the Jews migratedfrom Yemen after the destruction of the great dam at Marib about ahundred years later. By Muhammad’s time the Jewish tribes of the areawere indistinguishable from the Arab tribes in structure, ethos, andbehavior. Only their religious observance distinguished them fromother Arab clans.

Barley and millet were the major grain crops grown in the oasesand were used to make small breadlike cakes for human consumption.Among the animals only horses were sometimes fed on grain as asupplement to their grazing. Grapes were introduced sometime duringthe fourth century c.e.; the olive tree was unknown. The Jews andNabataeans were likely responsible for the importation of fruit trees tothe area, and apples, oranges, lemons, watermelons, pomegranates, andbananas were cultivated.8 The most important of all Arabian crops wasthe date palm. It is likely that the date palm was introduced fromMesopotamia during very ancient times. The fruit of the date palm(tamr), together with the milk of camels and goats, is the chief food ofthe bedouin. The date is often mixed with flour or roasted barley ormillet and washed down with milk or water. It is the wish of everybedouin to have “the two black ones,” that is, plenty of dates to eatand water or camel milk to drink. Except for the flesh of a camelslaughtered for food when its useful life was at an end, the date fruitwas the bedouin’s only solid food.9 Muhammad took note of the impor-tance of the date to the Arab way of life when he said, “Honor youraunt, the palm, which is made of the same clay as Adam.”10


In the harsh land of the Hejaz only the bedouin was truly at home.Those who lived in the oases or the few towns often had to hirebedouin guides to travel from one place to another or hire them aspersonal and caravan guards to ensure a safe journey. The heat, track-less roads, lack of food, scarcity of water, and the general discomfort oflife in the desert, while problematic during times of peace, became theallies of the bedouin in times of war. His daily ration of dates andwater would bring any other army to its knees in a few days; but thebedouin could subsist on this diet forever. Living on dates, water, andthe very camels that carried them, Arab armies were far more mobilethan those of their adversaries. During the first battles of the Arab con-quests Arab armies chose battlefields that were close to the desert sothat in the event of a defeat they could retreat into the desert wherethe enemy could not follow. Perhaps it was this capability that KingFaisal of Saudi Arabia had in mind when he responded to Secretary ofState Henry Kissinger’s threat that the U.S. Army might be forced toseize the Saudi oil fields if the Saudis did not bring down the price ofOPEC oil to ease the energy crisis of 1973. Confronted with Kissinger’sthreat, Faisal is said to have smiled and replied, “We are Arabs. Wewill return to the desert and live on camel milk and dates . . . and fightyou from there forever.”

The Arabs of Muhammad’s day wore clothing that was well suitedto the harsh Arabian environment. Men wore a long shirt called athawb tied with a belt around the waist. A long flowing robelike gar-ment that reached almost to the ground called an ’aba was worn overthe thawb. The head was covered with a kind of shawl called a kufiyahheld in place with a cord or iqal. Trousers were not usually worn, andmost people went barefoot, although the later use of stirrups may haverequired sandals or some other form of footwear when riding. Arabclothing made an ideal military uniform given the climatic conditions.The loose-fitting garments provided adequate protection against thesun and helped to hold in the body’s moisture. Tents and blanketsmade of goat’s or camel’s hair afforded excellent protection against thecold of the desert night. The military kit of the Arab made it possiblefor Arab armies to move unencumbered by heavy baggage trains andgave the armies of the later Arab conquests a mobility, speed, and rangeunmatched by their enemies.

The bedouin nomads of the Hejaz moved with their flocks on aregular basis searching for pasture and water for their animals. These

8 MUHAMMAD

Arab nomads usually practiced a form of enclosed nomadism, that is,movement in a regular pattern that brought them close to settlementsand towns where they could trade or purchase goods with the few meagerresources that they possessed. The relationship between nomads andthe settled populations was genuinely symbiotic in that neither couldsurvive without the products of the other. The grain and dates thatwere staples of the nomads’ diets were obtained in the oases where theygrew; saddles, weapons, cloth, and other goods were manufactured inthe towns. In return the nomad provided the town dweller with goats,sheep, and camels as well as the materials from which tents and blan-kets might be woven. Most bedouins were desperately poor and werealmost always on the brink of malnutrition. Among bedouins intimes of drought or starvation, it was a not uncommon practice tobury their female babies alive in order to free up resources for the sur-viving adults and male infants. Moreover, spending long days watchinganimals graze made for stultifying boredom. It is not surprising thatthe ghazw, or raid, became a way of bedouin life.

Raiding the camps and flocks of other bedouin or the outskirts ofthe towns where the horses and camels were usually set to grazingserved two important functions. First, it provided a needed form ofsocial stimulation, the only way in which the bedouin could practicethe manly virtues of the warrior. For the most part these raids weremore a rough sport than real conflicts. Pitched battles were usuallyavoided and casualties few. Raids sometimes resulted in individualcombats between chiefs, but even these rarely resulted in death. Theobject of a raid, after all, was to steal the flocks. The second functionof the raid was to act as a form of redistributing the wealth, a means ofobtaining goods that would otherwise be unattainable by somebedouin families. In a poor country like Arabia where malnutritionwas endemic, raiding was often the only way a man could improve hislot in life. Finally, the competition for water and grazing often led toskirmishes between bedouin clans. In difficult climatic times theseskirmishes could become very intense since to be defeated meant to bedriven from the water and grass and risked the destruction of theflocks. Still, it is hard to escape the impression that raiding was more asocial enterprise than either a military or an economic one. Arabsoften explain raiding in the following terms. “Our business is to makeraids on the enemy, on our neighbor, and on our brother, in case wefind nobody to raid but our brother.”11


The basis of bedouin society was the clan. Every tent represented afamily; an encampment of tents was a yay. The members of an hayymade up a qawm, or clan. A number of clans related by blood and kinformed a qabilah, or tribe. All members of the same clan consideredthemselves as of one blood and submitted to the authority of a singlechief called a sheikh, whose power to command was limited by the factthat all males in the tribe were considered equals who might reason-ably disagree and even resist the sheikh in important matters. As an oldArab proverb put it, “A man’s clan are his claws.” Loyalty to one’s clanwas unconditional. Anyone committing a crime inside the clan was eitherbanished or killed by the clan members themselves. The murder of aclan member by someone outside the clan required all males to avengethe crime in any manner possible, the usual rules of chivalry andcombat being ignored in favor of treachery and ambush. This was theasabiyah, or blood loyalty, that rendered anyone outside the clan devoidof any moral standing that might place limits on revenge. DuringMuhammad’s day the clan was the center of the Arab’s moral universe.Only members of the clan had any claim to ethical treatment, and eventhis bound only fellow members of the clan. Those outside the clanlacked any moral standing and were treated accordingly.

The Arabs of Muhammad’s time lived in a harsh society in a harshland. There were few laws and no institutions to afford justice or restrainviolence. Only the blood feud and its threat of retaliation against awrongdoer provided a rough balance of power to limit violence. Bloodfeuds were not to be taken lightly since the feud did not end until thewrongdoer was dead or some member of his tribe had been killed ascompensation. Later, it became a common practice to limit the feudby paying the blood-wit (diya), financial compensation usually in theform of a number of camels, to the person or clan against whom thewrong had been committed. This aside, anyone outside the clanremained without moral standing. When Muhammad divided the eth-ical world between believers and unbelievers in which the lattermight rightly be enslaved or even killed by the former, he was onlyextending the morality of the blood feud to religion. The religiouscommunity of believers to which absolute loyalty was owed and out-side of which there were no obligations simply replaced the old clancommunity of blood and kin.

10 MUHAMMAD

2

The Strategic Setting

Luck and timing often determine the success or failure of greatcauses. So it seems to have been in the case of Muhammad and

the new religion of Islam. The initial success and survival of bothdepended on a favorable array of strategic circumstances that occurredfar from Mecca and Medina and were quite beyond the control ofMuhammad himself. Muhammad (570–632 c.e.) lived when politicaland social circumstances inside and outside Arabia were creating adynamic that favored the religious and military success of Islam. It ispointless to question whether success would have been possible underanother set of counterfactual circumstances. What is important is tounderstand the circumstances within the Arabian strategic environ-ment that influenced the outcome of Muhammad’s life and how thesecircumstances contributed to his military success and the establish-ment of Islam.

Much is sometimes made of the isolation enforced by Arabia’sdeserts and the remoteness of places like Mecca and Medina. Suchportrayals are accurate only in a geographic sense. In the broader socialand political sense, however, Arabia during Muhammad’s day was notisolated from the geopolitical and strategic forces that were influencingthe great Byzantine and Persian Empires that bordered Arabia. By thetime of Muhammad’s birth, Arabia was being strongly influenced by

11

and entangled in Byzantine and Persian politics. The Arabian merchantclass enjoyed frequent contact with both empires and had visited thetowns and courts of the great powers in pursuit of their economicinterests. The caravans that left Mecca for Damascus or Aila on the Gulfof Aqaba, the latter ultimately bound for Gaza and Egypt, or travelednortheast across the desert to Hira in Iraq and the towns along thePersian Gulf brought the traders of Mecca into direct contact with theByzantine and Persian officials. Mecca sent at least two large caravansa year to the imperial markets, and many smaller ones traveled theremore frequently. Imperial influences in the form of religious and politicalideas were everywhere in evidence in Arabian trading towns duringMuhammad’s lifetime. There is no reason to assume that Muhammadwas any less aware of them than were other members of the merchantclass to which he came to belong. Even the idea that a new prophetwas about to appear somewhere in Arabia was perpetrated by variousChristian sects in both the Byzantine and Persian Empires. The nativeArabian religion of the day consisted mostly of idol worship, and it islikely although not certain that one of the idols, Hubal, worshipped for atleast a century at the sacred ka’ba (Kaaba) in Mecca before Muhammadwas born, had been purchased by Meccan merchants and brought to thecity by an Arab caravan returning from Nabataea, where the idol waswidely worshipped.1

The Arabian merchant class was also aware of the interests andmachinations of the imperial powers as they pertained to Arabia. Bothsecurity and economic concerns compelled the imperial powers tolook to their interests there. The farms and towns of both empiresbordering Arabia had long been raided by bedouin tribesmen who struckquickly and retreated into the desert wastes where neither Persian norByzantine troops could follow. Both powers were deeply involved inthe tribal politics of their respective border zones in the search forreliable Arab allies that could be used to patrol and defend the imperialborders against these desert raiders. Imperial ambitions ran further thanborder security, however. Persia had frequently encouraged the preten-sions of some Arab tribes deep in the interior as a way of increasing itsown influence in the rich spice trade. Persian ambitions were mostlyfocused in the south, in Yemen, where Persia sponsored unrest aimedat establishing a friendly regime there. The Byzantines countered theseambitions by using Abyssinia as a strategic platform from which tolaunch allied armies into Arabia to counter Persian influence.

12 MUHAMMAD

With Byzantine support an Abyssinian army invaded Arabia andattacked Mecca in 570 c.e., the year of Muhammad’s birth. This eventwas recorded in Arab memory as “The Year of the Elephant.” NoMeccan had ever seen an elephant, and the appearance of one at thehead of an invading army stunned the Meccans. There was no Meccanforce capable of resistance, and defeat seemed certain. What happenednext is unclear. Arab texts tell the tale of a great flock of birds thatblackened the sky flying over the enemy dropping stones in their facesas the soldiers looked up. These pebbles struck with such force as toleave pockmarks. Wounded and bleeding, the Abyssinian army with-drew and Mecca was saved.2 Instead of a miracle, it is more likely thatthe invaders suffered an outbreak of disease, perhaps smallpox, thatdevastated the Abyssinian army and forced it to withdraw.

The central players in the great game of power politics in Arabiaand elsewhere at the beginning of the seventh century c.e. were theByzantine and Persian Empires. For more than five hundred yearsthese two powerful states shared a common border creating problemsof imperial security that were mirror images of one another. Anincrease in the strength of one was necessarily perceived as a threat tothe other, and one’s weakness often proved an irresistible temptationto the predations of the other. This proximity produced continuouspolitical, commercial, and military rivalry that resulted in wars andmilitary clashes of considerable magnitude. Despite more than a halfmillennium of rivalry and war, the frontier between the two greatpowers had remained almost unchanged, neither side gaining morethan a short-term tactical advantage for its efforts.

The collapse of the Roman Empire in the West at the hands ofbarbarian invaders had resulted in the loss of imperial control in thewestern provinces of Italy, Gaul, Spain, Britain, and much of what isnow eastern Europe to. The center of imperial government shifted tothe eastern Roman capital of Constantinople. Despite the devastatingblow to the western empire, Rome lived on at Constantinople foranother thousand years until it finally met its end by military defeatat the hands of the Ottomans in 1453.3 At the time of Muhammad’sbirth the Eastern Roman Empire was still a great power comprisingGreece, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. It included substantial territoryalong the North African littoral as well. These provinces formed acontinuous defensive arc bordering the eastern Mediterranean Sea,which was controlled by the Byzantine navy. Directly to the south lay

THE STRATEGIC SETTING 13

the desert of Arabia. The border raids to which the southern frontier hadbeen subjected for centuries were more of a nuisance than a strategicthreat. The most serious threat to Byzantine security came from whenceit had always come, from Persia to the east.

The loss of the Roman West paralyzed the emperors of Constan-tinople into inaction for more than fifty years during which no sub-stantive attempt was made to reestablish Roman control over the lostprovinces. When Emperor Justinian (527–565 c.e.) rose to the purple heset about changing Roman policy and undertook a military campaign torecover the western lands. Led by the great field commander Belisarius,the eastern Romans managed to reestablish control over large tracts ofNorth Africa and parts of Italy. The difficulty was that the balance ofmilitary power on the Perso-Roman frontier had always been precariousat best, the advantage of manpower and internal lines resting usuallywith the Persians. To wage his campaign in the West Justinian had tostrip the Persian border defenses of much of their manpower andresources leaving the border open to Persian attack. The temptationproved too much for the Persians, and a series of large-scale militaryclashes took place along the border. Justinian, always the strategicrealist, recognized the danger of a Persian invasion and moved to fore-stall it through negotiation and concession. He negotiated a peacewith the Persians to remove the invasion threat. While there is nodoubt that the treaty was seen as temporary by both sides, the Romanssurrendered some border towns and lands and promised to makefinancial payments to keep the Persians at bay. In exchange, the Persianarmies stood down.

The Persian Empire was enormous, stretching from Afghanistan tothe Oxus River to the far reaches of the modern region of Kurdistan. Itwas governed by a Sassanid dynasty whose capital lay at the narrowingof the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates at Ctesiphon, south of modern Bagh-dad. Constantinople’s uneasy peace with Persia held until Justinian’sdeath in 565. The empire then fell into a period of crisis brought onby a series of weak rulers that led to a military revolt in 602 thatproduced more confusion and weakness. The Persian emperor, ChosroesII, had never taken his eyes off the rich Roman cities, and in that sameyear he launched an invasion of the Roman territories. In 613 Persianarmies captured Damascus, and a year later Jerusalem fell. The TrueCross, Christendom’s holiest relic, was carried off by the Persians,themselves Nestorian Christians. In 616 Persian armies occupied

14 MUHAMMAD

Egypt and substantial parts of Asia Minor. The Byzantine Empireseemed on the verge of collapse and occupation, unable to reverse itsmilitary defeats.

This serious set of circumstances caused elements of the Romanarmy in the East to rebel against the capital’s corrupt rulers, a rebellionthat proved ultimately to be Rome’s salvation. One of the leaders of therebellion, Heraclius (575–641 c.e.), would become one of the empire’sgreatest emperors. Heraclius had deposed the Byzantine emperor, Phocas,and assumed power in 610. By now almost all of the eastern provinceswere in Persian hands. Heraclius set out to recapture the occupied landsand destroy the Persian armies. In four major battles—Issus (622), theHalys River (623), the River Sarus (625), and Nineveh (627)—Heracliuscut off the Persian armies, invaded Persia itself, and destroyed whatwas left of Persian military might, a series of defeats that ended the war.4

In 628 Chosroes was assassinated and the Persian Empire collapsedinto anarchy and dynastic struggle. Chosroes’s successor, Kavadh II,made peace with the Romans. The war had gone on for twenty-sixyears and exhausted both imperial powers. The boundaries agreed to inthe peace treaty were essentially the same as had separated the twopowers before the war began.

The exhaustion of the major powers coincided with the period inwhich Muhammad undertook his insurgency. The significance of thiscoincidence lies in the limitations the weakness of the imperial powersplaced on their ability to influence events in neighboring Arabia. Bothpowers had pursued their interests in Arabia for centuries. At timesthese efforts were pursued by proxy wars using rival coalitions ofArab tribes; at other times, by outright invasion. By the time Muham-mad began his insurgency, all these efforts had come to nothing. Theability of the great powers themselves and what few of their proxiesremained to influence events in Arabia was seriously diminished. Theimportant consequence was that there was no one in a position tooppose Muhammad’s insurgency.

The ties between the great powers and their proxies were stronglyrooted in religious affiliation. This was especially so within the Byzan-tine realm where the Orthodox faith was the official religion of thestate and where persecution of heretical Christian sects had reachedalarming proportions. The Persians had adopted Nestorian Christianityafter it had been declared a heresy by Byzantine emperors, and its persecuted adherents had taken refuge in Persia. Syrians, Palestinians,


16

Map 3. Strategic Setting during Muhammad’s Life, 570–632 c.e.

and Egyptians were mostly Monophysite Christians, another sect con-sidered heretical by the Byzantine rulers. All these sects were associatedin one way or another with imperial ambitions. Christianity had madesome limited inroads in Arabia, the tribal clans often adopting the creedof their imperial allies. By Muhammad’s time the weakness of theimperial powers had also loosened their ties with their respective Araballies with the result that whatever religious influence had once beenpresent was almost completely lost as the tribes reverted to their tradi-tional idol worship. Without imperial support none of Christian sects ortheir allies in Arabia had the power or inclination to see Muhammad’sreligious movement as another dangerous heretical sect that had to besuppressed. There was no organized religious opposition from anywherein Arabia to Muhammad’s new creed. Had Muhammad attempted toestablish Islam within the borders of either imperial realm, he wouldhave encountered strong opposition from the sacerdotal classes and theirallies that might have resulted in the suppression of the new religionand the execution or imprisonment of its messianic leader.

Arab allies were an important element in the strategy of the greatpowers to protect their borders from bedouin raids. Both empires createdstrong coalitions of Arab tribes led by powerful chiefs to protect theimperial borders. These chiefs were paid and given lavish gifts andofficial titles to increase their standing with their clan chiefs who, inturn, depended on them for the patronage required to keep their ownclans loyal. Had the imperial powers been able or inclined to opposeMuhammad as a threat to Christianity, they could have used thesetribal allies to do so. Many of the Arab allies had become Christiansthemselves and could have been employed to crush Muhammad andhis insurgency on the grounds of heresy. They might have done so withcomparative ease.

The Arab Beni Ghassan family, or Ghassanids, served in the pay ofthe Romans to protect the southern border of Syria and Jordan fromthe bedouins. The Ghassanids were Monophysites, a fact convenientlyignored by the Orthodox rulers of Constantinople who required theirservices as border guards. To the east the Persians pursued the samepolicy of hiring Arab allies to protect their border with Arabia. TheNestorian Christian Lakhmid tribes were Persian allies. So long asthese tribal coalitions remained loyal to their respective clients, thedesert frontiers were relatively safe from Arab raiders. These loyalArab tribes were also the first line of strategic defense against any


large-scale invasion attempted from the desert, an invasion that Muslimarmies successfully carried out shortly after Muhammad’s death. Theseimperial alliances with the Arab tribal coalitions had been the suc-cessful basis of imperial border defense for more than a hundred yearsbefore Muhammad’s birth.

For reasons that are unclear, both great powers committed thesame strategic mistake that resulted in each exposing their desertflanks to the same invader. In 581 the chief of the Ghassanids wasarrested and imprisoned as a Monophysite heretic. This resulted in anopen revolt by the Ghassanids who now became raiders themselves. In605 the Persian emperor quarreled with the chief of the Lakhmids andrescinded the chief’s payments, position, and privileges. The Lakhmidswent over to revolt and began sacking the towns along the Persian-Arabian border. The consequence of these short-sighted actions wasto strip the imperial borders of both great powers of their respectiveprotective military forces and expose them to Arab attack.

The strategic danger was not immediately obvious, however.Muhammad was in the midst of his insurgency, and Islam was still inits infancy. There was as yet no Arab army capable of attacking thegreat powers. For the foreseeable future the problem of border securityremained one of defending against small-scale, sporadic bedouin raids.By the time of Muhammad’s death in 632, however, the strategic situ-ation had changed considerably. One of Muhammad’s greatest legacieswas a large, trained, and well-led military force motivated by religiouszeal and ready to exploit the only source of pillage and loot available toArabs whose new religion forbade attacks on one another. Islam’sarmies were ready to reach beyond the borders of Arabia, bringing thenew Islamic faith to the East and West in their wake. Exhausted andbankrupt by years of pointless warfare, the Persians and Byzantinesfound themselves suddenly confronted with a grave military threatfrom Arabia itself.

It was these circumstances of the larger strategic, religious, and socialsituation that formed the backdrop for Muhammad’s life and prophet-hood and increased his prospects for success. The movement towardChristian monotheism within the Byzantine and Persian Empires hadpenetrated Arabia long before Muhammad was born. The idea of a singleGod and even the coming of a new prophet were widely held at thetime of Muhammad’s insurgency. The religious persecution fiercely

18 MUHAMMAD

practiced by the Byzantines but less so by Persians against so-calledheretical sects, and sometimes against their own Arab allies, made itimpossible for the great powers to project force against the new creedof Islam, thus permitting Muhammad a free hand to begin his insur-gency and establish the new religion free from outside interference. Atthe same time regular commercial contacts between Arab merchantsand imperial markets spread tales of the great wealth of the twoempires making the towns and cities of the empires tempting targetsfor looting when the time was right. The traditional raids against fellowArabs that had provided Arabs with loot and stimulation for centurieswere now forbidden by the Islamic creed. United, the Arab armiesturned outward against the Byzantines and Persians for new outlets forthe manly practice of war and needed sources of booty.

The armies of Islam attacked the border provinces of the ByzantineEmpire in the winter of 633–634. Three columns staging from Medinainvaded Palestine and Syria, taking the small Byzantine border gar-risons by surprise and overrunning them. At the same time anotherArab army struck at Damascus. A Byzantine relief force coming to theaid of the city was engaged and forced to withdraw. All Palestine wasleft defenseless to Arab raids, and a year later Damascus fell to theArabs. To the east, in Iraq, the Lakhmid tribes moved up the RiverEuphrates and seized the important commercial town of Hira. OnAugust 26, 636, the last remaining Byzantine force in Syria suffered acrushing defeat on the banks of the Yarmuk River, and all Syria to theTaurus Mountains fell to the Arab invaders. Two years after the battleof the Yarmuk River, Jerusalem and Caesarea surrendered to the Arabs.In 640 Arab armies attacked Egypt and defeated the Byzantines again.By September 642 the occupation of Egypt was complete. By 646 thelast vestiges of Byzantine rule in what had been Roman Mesopotamiawere eradicated, destroying the unity of the ancient Mediterraneanworld forever.

To the east a series of Arab victories spelled the end of the PersianSassanid Empire. The Persians were brought under attack in 634, andwithin three years Arab armies had pushed to the edge of Iraq. ThePersians withdrew beyond the Zagros Mountains leaving the dooropen to Iraq. A year later, in February 637, a large Persian army wasdestroyed south of Hira at Qadasiya. Within a few months all of Iraqhad fallen to the Arabs including the imperial capital at Ctesiphon. In


20

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that same year a Persian army was destroyed at Nehawand. By 642 anew Arab advance across the River Tigris was under way, and withineight years all of Persia was under Arab rule. The Arab armies preparedto push farther east across the Oxus River, reaching ultimately toIndia. Far to the west, Alexandria in Egypt became a major Arab navalbase, extending the influence of Islam to the Mediterranean Sea. In 661with the rise of the Umayyads the Arab assault turned west again,occupying Tunisia and the coast of Morocco. At the end of the seventhcentury Arab armies crossed into Spain. In less than forty years Arabarmies had grown from little more than tribal coalitions to masters ofan extensive empire.

Within Arabia itself the traditional religion of idol worship hadnever produced a sacerdotal class and state institutions that might havedefended the old religion against the challenge of Islam. Had there beensome form of religious institutional resistance as was faced by theheretical Christian sects of the imperial realms, often with murderousconsequences, it is unlikely that Islam would have succeeded as readilyas it did within Arabia. The inability of religious sects outside Arabiato project their influence and oppose Muhammad further facilitatedthe success of Islam. Other circumstances contributed as well. Thesocial unrest within Medina provided the opportunity for Muhammadto move there and quickly become an influential figure, somethingthat would never have happened in the normal course of tribal customhad the weariness and fear of continual warfare not been so overpow-ering in the city at that time. Muhammad preached the need for anew community, the ummah, at a time in Arabian history when thesystem of tribal obligations and protection was breaking down. Thewealth and economic competition of the rising mercantile societywere eroding the traditional bases of social status and obligation. Itwas no accident that many of Muhammad’s early followers were thosewho had been dispossessed or oppressed by the new conditions.

The emphasis placed here on the larger forces shaping Arabia at thetime of Muhammad’s insurgency ought not to be taken to suggest thatMuhammad’s success was inevitable or that anyone but Muhammadcould have achieved it. Nothing in this analysis detracts from Muham-mad’s brilliance in recognizing these forces and using them to hisadvantage. The ultimate compliment to be paid to the successful revo-lutionary is that he was able to recognize the tide of history building toits crest and ride that wave until it carried him and his cause to victory.


As the following analysis will demonstrate, Muhammad was no “acci-dental” prophet. He was a brilliant revolutionary fighter who under-stood the nature of the environment in which he fought and used it tohis advantage at every turn.

22 MUHAMMAD

3

Arab Warfare

The conduct of war usually reflects a society’s values at least as muchas the capabilities of its military technologies. History is full of

examples where the killing power of weaponry has been either limited orhas permitted its full range of lethality depending on what values thesociety used to guide its conduct of war. The armies of ancient India weregoverned by scores of specific rules forbidding the killing of prisoners andrequiring humane treatment of civilians that served to limit the bru-tality of war.1 The Japanese ordered the firearms imported by the Jesuitsdestroyed and forbade the manufacture of guns to preserve the traditionalrole of the bushi warrior in war.2 The Swiss armies of the fourteenth cen-tury, on the other hand, made it a common practice to take no prisoners,killing even the wounded—practices that convinced the pope to hireSwiss mercenaries as his personal bodyguard.3 The Israelite armies of theOld Testament were instructed to “leave nothing that breathes alive” intheir attacks on the settlements of Canaan.4 It is often a society’s valuesmore than its killing technologies per se that govern its conduct of war.

The Moral Basis of Arab Warfare

This was no less true of the Arab society into which Muhammad wasborn. Being a brave warrior had always been a central virtue in the

23

Arabs’ idea of what constituted a good man. This warrior ethos wasexpressed in the Arabic terms muruah and ird. Ird is understood ashonor, and honor was closely tied to the obligations to avenge anywrong done to a man personally, to any others to whom he had extendedhis protection, or to his clan. Muruah literally means virility or man-hood. While hospitality, generosity, and protection of the weak wereall important Arab virtues as well, no virtue was held in higher regardthan a man’s courage in war.5

An Arab injured or insulted was not expected to forgo revenge but toextract either blood or compensatory payment. Failure to do so exposedhim to charges of weakness, contempt, and dishonor, perceptions thatexposed him to further insult and attack. The notion that one ought toforgo revenge or that revenge itself is unethical per se is an idea thatcomes mostly from Christianity. The Arab view of revenge was morelike that of the ancient Greeks for whom it was the duty of a good man“to be sweet to friends and bitter to enemies; honorable to the first andterrible to the latter.”6 One’s honor backed by the readiness to resort toindividual combat in its defense or to redress a wrong was the centralmilitary virtue of Arab men. Every male was given military training inweapons and combat from an early age and instructed in the moral codeof the warrior. This code of military prowess in defense of a warrior’shonor was passed to the West during the Arab wars with the Franks andlater became part of the chivalric code of the medieval knight.7

The Arab emphasis on warrior virtues sometimes led to the mis-perception that Arabia was a bloodthirsty land where war and conflictwere endemic, and that the brutality sometimes shown by the armiesof the Arab conquests was but a natural extension of these violentconditions. This is an erroneous view, probably the result of Westernpropaganda generated by almost four hundred years of war during whichWestern armies fought the armies of Islam. Any reasonable examina-tion of the conduct of Western and Arab armies during the Crusadeswould likely conclude that the brutality of the Western armies was byany measure at least equal to that of their Arab adversaries and, perhaps,even more brutal. Richard the Lion Hearted, to take but one example,routinely slaughtered Muslim prisoners, women, and children, andhad the unnerving habit of riding around with the decaying severedheads of Arab victims tied to his saddle. Saladin, the great Muslimgeneral, was appalled at the behavior of the Christian knights afterRichard killed twenty-two hundred Muslim prisoners at Acre.8 The

24 MUHAMMAD

truth is that Arabia before Muhammad’s time was a land neither tornby warfare nor populated by warriors accustomed to killing one anotheron the slightest pretext.

The Arab warrior’s courage and honor were most commonlydemonstrated by his performance in the ghazw, or raid, in which agroup of bedouins would attack another clan to steal their flocks,camels, or women. This was not “war” in any real sense of the wordsince the object of the raid was to steal and not kill. The raid usuallyended quickly enough once the alarm was sounded and the warriorsrushed to protect their flocks. Often the two sides would merely shoutobscenities at one another. Given the distances over which Arabbedouins roamed, these raids were usually infrequent, involved only afew men on each side, and the shedding of blood, to say nothing ofactual killing, was rare. Given the terrain of the desert and the generalscarcity of goods to be had by even a successful raid, these Arab “wars”were more entertainment and rough sport than genuine combat. Theywere not unlike the “wars” fought among Native American tribes inwhich the idea was to steal the enemy’s horses, goods, and women.

In those instances where Arab clans actually fought one another insome numbers, neither the term “war” nor “army” would be appropriate.If by armies one means some form of standing organization with aformal command structure that fought as a unit and was capable oftactical application, there were no armies as such. Arab “armies” werecollections of individual warriors fighting for their own honor andopportunity to acquire loot. In this regard they were not unlike thegatherings of warrior knights that comprised the armies of medievalEurope. Arab clan battles were usually fought on some agreed-uponground. Both sides formed up on the open field. Rival champions salliedforth and challenged the champions of the other side to individualcombat. Often the death of a chief or even a few lesser men was sufficientto call off the fight, with the side suffering the casualties withdrawingfrom the field without being pursued. The formal nature of Arab battleswas also evident in the practice of taking the clan women along to playinstruments and sing songs encouraging their men to fight. Occasionally,of course, things got out of hand and a general melee might result thatlasted until one side had had enough and withdrew. In most cases,however, casualties were likely to be light.

The Arab “wars” of the pre-Islamic period seldom lasted long andwere never fought for what we would call today strategic objectives,

ARAB WARFARE 25

such as the enslavement or destruction of a rival tribe or the occupationof their lands, which, in any case, would have been meaningless in anomadic society where the value of the land shifted with the climate.Arab wars were primitive by the standards of warfare practiced at thetime by almost any society outside Arabia itself, and were so in termsof scale, tactics, logistics, and level of casualties. These “battles” weretactical engagements only. There were no larger purposes to war otherthan to demonstrate honor and courage. No attempt was made toachieve strategic victory. Arab wars of the pre-Islamic period werehighly ritualized and symbolic affairs and lacked any ideological, reli-gious, ethnic, or strategic dimension.

The Arab reputation for bloody warfare even in the pre-Islamicperiod stems from the confusion of Arab warfare per se with the conductassociated with and morally permitted when two clans engaged in ablood feud. A person killed or done serious harm or insult by a memberof another clan had to be avenged by a member of the tribe to which theharm was done. It must be remembered that in Arabia before Muham-mad there were no state or civic institutions, law, police forces, or courtsto protect the weak or render justice for harm suffered. The Arab reliedsolely on his kin, clan, and tribe to protect him; thus, the old Arabproverb that “a man’s clan are his claws.” The clans were democratic inthat all members were equally part of the clan and enjoyed its protec-tion. The strong protected the weak, and once separated from the clan ortribe the individual was at great risk indeed. If the blood feud did notexist, there would have been no social mechanism to bring even a roughjustice to the Arabs’ world. The weak or helpless would have been easilykilled or enslaved. The blood feud acted as a check against this behaviorby entitling any kin or clan member of the victim to strike down thekiller or any member of the killer’s family. The blood feud ended whenthe victim’s family agreed to accept financial compensation for its loss,often a number of camels or other goods. If no agreement could be con-cluded, the feud went on if need be until the perpetrator himself waskilled. In this way a rough justice was brought to Arab conflicts in theabsence of any other social institution to protect the weak. The bloodfeud was a deadly serious affair. It put everyone on both sides at risk, andcould go on for a very long time, sometimes even generations. One hadto think long and hard before killing a man since the consequencescould be deadly for everyone involved.

26 MUHAMMAD

In Arab warfare other than the blood feud, then, there were rules ofchivalry in which one’s opponent possessed equal moral standing andworth. A warrior did not slay the wounded or kill cruelly or unneces-sarily. The long Arab tradition of ransoming prisoners also limited thekilling as the victorious warrior had much to gain by treating thewounded well and keeping them alive to be sold back for ransom. Theresult of these values was that Arab warfare in the pre-Islamic era waslimited in scope, scale, frequency, and brutality. The blood feud, by con-trast, knew no such rules or limitations. No restrictions were placed onhow and when a man might be killed—in his sleep, by treachery, poison,or betrayal. In a blood feud no moral standing was granted one’s enemy,and torture, cruelty, and brutality were often inflicted. Even underthese conditions the blood feud was aimed at the individual wrongdoer.There was no thought of attempting to kill the whole clan or even largesegments of it, an attempt that would certainly have created a newblood feud with the former victims and aggressors trading places. Theblood feud aimed at the proportional response of “an eye for an eye,”and not at a disproportionate response to a wrong.

Had the moral basis of Arab warfare remained unchanged, it isunlikely that Arabia would ever have produced the large, disciplined,and highly motivated armies that it did in the Islamic era with theconsequence that the Muslim conquest of much of the ancient worldwould probably never have occurred. It was Muhammad who changedthe traditional moral basis of Arab warfare, removing the traditionalrestraints on killing and bringing to Arabia a truly modern method andmoral perception of war.

Unlike the old clan warriors, Muslim warriors were not primarilymotivated by clan rivalries or the desire for loot, although both surelyplayed a role. Muhammad’s objective was to destroy the old Arabsocial order based on clan and kin and replace it with a new type ofsociety, the ummah, made up of a community of believers. The modelfor the new community was not the clan per se, but the clan as itoperated when engaged in a blood feud. Any rules of ethical behaviorapplied only to the community of believers; those outside the ummahwere held to possess no moral standing and could be killed or enslavedwithout moral consequences. In the community of believers Muslimwarriors fought because God had commanded them to do so or haddelegated them to fight and destroy His enemies. Whereas the blood

ARAB WARFARE 27

feud had proposed a life taken for a life lost, Muhammad redefinedmoral killing as a life taken for political purposes. The idea of extermi-nating an entire town or a tribe was beyond the imagination of thoseengaged in a blood feud. Under Muhammad it became a commonpractice. Even murder became acceptable under the new rules, pro-viding the victim was either a nonbeliever or an enemy of the faith.Murder had, of course, occurred in Arabia before Muhammad, but not for ideological, religious, or other reasons of state; in short, assas-sination and massacre were not the usual tools of Arab political conflict.The difference between the traditional Arab view of killing and thenew Islamic view is clear insofar as in all the accounts of the Prophet’slife there is no mention of anyone else besides Muhammad sendingsomeone to murder anyone.9 On the other hand, “Muhammad had athis disposal a number of fanatical young henchmen who were virtuallyprepared to strike down any opposition whenever necessary.”10

The new moral basis of war led to a more violent form of war-fare—political/ideological warfare—conducted on a larger scale withever increasing casualties and consuming far more innocents than tra-ditional Arab warfare had consumed. At times war attempted andachieved the wholesale destruction of rival clans and tribes, as whenMuhammad destroyed one of the Jewish tribes of Medina to a man. Itwas Muhammad who introduced the connection between tactics andstrategy to Arab warfare; that is, the connection between the use ofviolence as a means to the achievement of larger politico-religiousobjectives. Muhammad sought nothing less than the subordination ofthe traditional clan-based society that Arabs had known since timeimmemorial and its replacement by a new society based on religiousbelief in which the moral relationship of the individual to the tribeand clan was radically changed. These strategic objectives dictatedthe violent tactics used by Muhammad’s insurgency and then adoptedby Arab armies after his death.

Muhammad’s adoption of the code of the blood feud as the basisof the new morality of war was a momentous decision that justifiedthe use of violence against nonbelievers on a scale and frequency thathad never before been seen in Arab warfare or social life. It also castIslamic forces as inhumane in their conduct of war, something theenemies of Islam in the West were quick to capitalize on to portrayMuslims as bloodthirsty barbarians.11 But Muhammad’s adoption ofthe code of the blood feud becomes understandable when we realize

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that he never saw himself as a conventional general commanding aconventional army. Muhammad was first and foremost a religious rev-olutionary, the commander of an insurgency that had yet to create amilitary force that could bring his new social order into being. The oldrules of war had to be changed because they were ineffective in achievingthe revolutionary goals that Muhammad had set for himself. If he wasto achieve his end of creating a new society governed by new ethicalprecepts, then a new military mechanism was required, one that servedhis strategic ends by expanding its repertoire of military capabilities.This required a complete change in the traditional values that had gov-erned Arab warfare.

Weapons and Equipment

The Arab society of Muhammad’s day was a warrior society in whichall males were armed and trained to fight. Weapons were highly valued,and soldiers took great pride in keeping their weapons in fighting con-dition. Clans that settled in towns and oases usually lived in fortifiedcompounds within which the clan’s arsenal of weapons was kept inthe care of the clan chief. Often these arsenals were located in stonetowers or brick keeps that also served as the last defensive position inthe event of attack. Weapons were acquired either through local manu-facture, taken as booty or tribute, or purchased. Prior to the rise ofIslam, Syria and India were the most common external sources of Arabweaponry. Local manufacture was mostly confined to those weaponsthat required little technical skill to make, and included slings, hideshields, short spears, javelins, and the bow and arrow. Weapons thatrequired metalworking to manufacture—swords, helmets, metal shields,lance and spear heads, and chain mail—were almost always imported.It was in the towns and settlements that the local armorers practicedtheir skills. Medina, for example, was famous for its arrows, and oneof the Jewish tribes there specialized in the making of metal weapons.12

Iron arrowheads were being manufactured in Arabia as early as Hel-lenistic times, and some bronze manufacture seems to have been usedin swords as early as the first millennium b.c.e.13 Metalworking inArabia seems to have lagged considerably behind its developmentelsewhere, however. Locally manufactured steel weapons seem tohave been completely absent during Muhammad’s day. Only after theArabs had conquered the Persian and Byzantine Empires, where steel

ARAB WARFARE 29

weapons were in common use, did “Arab” weapons made of steelbegin to become famous for their quality.14

The basic infantry weapons of the Arab warrior were the bow andarrow, sword, sling, and harbah, or thrown javelin, this latter probablyintroduced either by black mercenaries or slaves from Abyssinia.15 Thechief weapons of the cavalry were the sword and the long lance, orrumh, and the short, stabbing spear similar to the javelin carried byAlexander’s cavalry. The stabbing spear was five cubits in length (acubit is the length of a forearm), or about six feet long. The rumh wasabout eleven feet long.16 The shafts of the cavalry lances are referred to in Arabic literature as khatti, named after the al-Khatt, the coast ofal-Bahrayn where the bamboo was grown to make the shafts of thelance. By Muhammad’s day most of the bamboo was imported fromIndia, but the old source of the materials lingered in Arab memory.17

Arab cavalry also carried the sword for close combat. Thus, “I thrusthim with my spear, then came on top of him with a trenchant Indianblade,” is an accurate description of a cavalryman in the attack.18

Examples of Arab bows that have survived indicate that someprobably were recurved bows similar to those of Persian design. If thistype of bow was typical, then it was probably manufactured outside ofArabia since there is very little wood of the kind required for this typeof bow in Arabia. It would also have been very expensive. Along withthe sword, the bow and arrow were the national weapons of Arabia,something we would not expect to find if the bow was of foreignmanufacture and considerable expense. The simple bow, on the otherhand, could easily have been made locally out of palm or acacia wood,varieties native to Arabia. The simple bow would have had a morelimited range and less direct penetrating power than the recurved bow,but given the manner in which the Arabs employed the bow in battle,usually firing it in volleys and not at individual targets, the simplebow would have served adequately. After the Arab conquests the bowand the manner of its use in battle initially followed Byzantine practice.Over time, however, the Arabs adopted the Persian recurved bow andlearned the skill of firing the bow from horseback.19

The Arab warrior’s most prized possession was his sword. Thesword was regarded as the most noble of the warrior’s weapons, andprowess with it in hand-to-hand combat was the highest military skill.Because the sword was also used for slaughtering animals to host adinner for valued guests, the weapon became associated with the other

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Arab moral virtues of generosity and hospitality. Archaeological evi-dence suggests that the sword made its appearance sometime in thesecond millennium b.c.e. when it was a long, two-piece weapon (handleand blade were separate) fashioned of bronze. By the first millenniumb.c.e. it had become a short straight sword of bronze cast in a singlepiece. By the Roman and Persian periods the typical Arab sword hadbecome a long straight heavy weapon made of iron.20 By Muhammad’sday these clumsy weapons had given way to the Indian swords, thefamous hindi, made of excellent steel and imported from India.21 Indianswords were also called Muhannad and were distinguished from theMashrafiya swords manufactured in Syria.22 The Indian sword was abouta meter in length and straight with a double edge. After the Arab con-quests, the sword began to acquire a slight curve to become the curvedscimitar, still in use today. This change in design probably occurred as aresult of the influence of the horsemen of Central Asia who harassed theborders of the new empire. The Arab sword was carried in a scabbardslung over the right shoulder in the manner of a baldric.23

A poem describes the defensive armament of the Arab warrior in thefollowing terms. “We wore helmets and Yemeni leather shields . . . andglittering coats of mail having visible folds about the belt.”24 The helmetswere fabricated of hammered iron or cast bronze and were of eitherByzantine or Persian design; they were no doubt imported. Metal helmetswere very expensive and were affordable only by the wealthy. Those oflesser standing usually had only a thick cloth turban for head protec-tion. Later it became the Arab habit to wrap a cloth turban around themetal helmet worn underneath. Muhammad himself always seems tohave worn a helmet in battle. Shields were made mostly of leatherstretched over a wooden frame and were carried by both infantry andcavalry. Poor soldiers often had shields made of camel leather. Arabshields were small, round, light, and easy to maneuver. In hand-to-hand combat they were used mostly to block and parry sword thrustswhile the other arm wielded the sword.

The most important defensive equipment was the armor coat ofchain mail made of individual metal rings set closely together andbound with nails so as to make the chain mail almost impenetrable tomissile or assault. Arab mail coats were wide and loose fitting andoften longer than those found on Byzantine or Persian soldiers. Later,when the horse became a basic instrument of Arab warfare, shortermail coats were the style. The shorter coat made mounting and riding

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the animal easier. Chain mail was most effective against the Arab simplebow with arrows tipped with iron. The Byzantine or Persian compoundor recurved bow firing steel-tipped arrows was far more powerful andmuch more likely to pierce chain armor. Arab armor was primarilyeffective against sword cuts and thrusts, thrown javelins, and glancingspear or lance thrusts, weaponry used most commonly in Arab warsuntil the time of Muhammad’s death. Arab poets referred to a warrior’schain mail as “made of David’s weave,” a reference to a legend alsofound in the Quran that King David of Israel was once an armorer. Awell-made coat of mail “will seem to shimmer and ripple like a silverypool blown by the wind and glitter like lightning.”25

Tactics

The tactics of pre-Islamic armies were primitive at best. Each clan’swarriors usually formed up opposite one another. Judging from the fewreliable accounts of these engagements, there does not appear to havebeen any standard formation. One text describes the formation as “acompact array,” but there is no evidence either of the tightly packedspear phalanx typical of armies in antiquity or of the open flexiblesword infantry formation of the Romans. The long Arab sword wouldhave made it difficult for any sword formation to be closely packed.Unlike the Roman gladius, which was shorter and wielded as a stabbingweapon—a design that permitted each Roman legionnaire to occupyfive square meters of ground within the quincunx formation—thelength of the Arab weapon and its employment as a slashing weaponwould have required a much looser formation for it to be used effec-tively. Most likely, then, these early Arab infantry formations wereopen and loosely packed and permitted little tactical relationshipbetween individual swordsmen. One text describes an infantry engage-ment: “When the ranks stand apart from us we thrust with spears, andwe strike with swords when they are upon us.”26

Arab battles began with each side sending forth its champions tofight with the best warriors of the other side. These champions wereoften chiefs or other high-ranking persons. Once a few of these warriorshad been killed, wounded, or captured, it was not unusual for the“battle” to end and one side to withdraw. Other times one side soughtto take advantage of its superior position and went over to the attack.

32 MUHAMMAD

The result was a general melee among individual soldiers with nothingin the way of tactics evident.

Muhammad may have recognized the weakness of the traditionalArab infantry and organized his infantry differently. His armies foughtin disciplined groups of sword infantry, perhaps organized around theclan or subclan or even individual family members.27 This organizationwould have greatly increased unit cohesion, morale, and the generalsense of sharing a common fate within the unit. The formation wouldalso possess greater bulk, making it more difficult for the enemy topenetrate. Muhammad also formed up his infantry in ranks committingthem on command in contrast to the general melee that was the usualArab form of fighting. Muhammad’s infantry became famous for itsdiscipline and ability to outfight its enemies man for man. On morethan one occasion Muhammad’s infantry appeared defeated only tofall back, rally, and reenter the fight.

Cavalry was the combat arm of the wealthy town dwellers orbedouins because of the expense of purchasing and maintaining horses.Horses were so expensive and prized that warriors were loath to riskthem in close combat, especially against archers who could easily killor wound the animal with their arrows. There is little evidence of anytactical integration between cavalry and infantry until Muhammadattempted it with some success. The evidence from pre-Islamic accountssuggests that cavalrymen fought as individual champions ramblingabout the battlefield spearing or striking down soldiers who had becomeseparated from their units rather than in units acting in concert. Aswith cavalry everywhere in the ancient world at this time, the lack ofa proper high-backed saddle and stirrups made fighting from horsebackdifficult, especially with the lance whose impact with the victim couldunseat the rider from his saddle. As far as we are able to determine, thestirrup did not become a standard piece of Arab military equipmentuntil well after Muhammad’s death. It was probably during the wars ofthe Arab conquests that the stirrup was adopted from the Persians.Even then Arab poets denigrated the stirrup as encouraging effemi-nacy in the soldier since it seemed to diminish the traditional Arabpractice of mounting the horse from the back or side with a singlebound!28 These conditions left the cavalry with little role to play onthe battlefield so long as the infantry retained its cohesion. There areno Arab accounts of cavalry attacking a fixed infantry formation in

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the pre-Islamic period or even during Muhammad’s lifetime. Cavalrycould be used for reconnaissance, to attack stray soldiers, or in thepursuit once the opposing infantry had abandoned its formations andtaken to rout, but for little else.

Every Arab warrior was skilled with the bow as well as the sword,and archers often played an important role in the battle. Archers some-times acted as skirmishers deploying in front of the main battle line toshoot and harass the enemy before the main engagement began. Javelinthrowers also performed as light infantry skirmishers. The more com-mon role for archers was to protect against cavalry and to deny an axis ofadvance to the enemy. An Arab poem describes archery performing thistactical role: “now my horse darts forth for the lance-thrusting / nowretreats to the great host of archers.”29 At the Battle of Uhud Muham-mad positioned his archers on a hill controlling a critical axis of advanceto his rear with the instructions that they were to use arrow fire toclose off this avenue. The archers left their post to sack the Meccancamp, and the Meccan cavalry attacked along the open road takingMuhammad’s army from the rear and almost killing Muhammad in theprocess. Probably the most valued quality of the bow, however, was thatit was able to kill from a distance without much risk to its user.

Pre-Islamic armies were composed of clans and tribes, each of whichfought under the command of its own leaders and flew its own banner.These banners were attached to a lance and carried by one of the clan’sbravest warriors, a circumstance that made him a marked man on thebattlefield! The clan and tribal organization continued under Muham-mad, but in a much different manner. For the first time Muhammad’sarmy had a single commander who could enforce his authority on hissubordinate commanders. The old habits of clans refusing to meet themuster, deserting on the eve of battle, and even fleeing in battle at theorder of their clan chief came to an end under Muhammad. Muhammadretained the old organizational form of the pre-Islamic army, however.Arab armies were divided into a center, two wings, a vanguard, and therear guard. This organization was used by the Yemenis long beforeMuhammad’s day and may be attributed to Persian influence. In Arabicthis formation was known as khamis, or five.30

The following poem offers an account of a typical Arab fightbetween two clans. It also provides an accurate portrayal of some basicmilitary practices other than warfare itself commonly used by Arabarmies of the period.

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We led the horses alongside (while riding our camels)from the sand-hills of Ghamra and of Lubna . . . Then when the hills of Qanan and Sara came into sightand we were in the neighborhood of the highland to the east of Salma,We made the camels lie down and offered the horses theremains which were in the water skins,some drinking, others not at allThey were compelled to have the bit of the bridle put into their mouth(their necks outstretched) like a palm-trunk having its toploped off,And the grooms made the saddles firm; then they werehanded to the men armed for war, accustomed to making raidsin the morning.Those on lookout do not see them till they are uponthem in a wadi bordered by acacia, into whichstreams drain . . . Our infantry shot from maskikhi-bows,the best that can be bought in Yathrib . . . When the supply of arrows in the quivers was exhausted,they took to sword-play on shieldsmade from the hides of well-bred camels

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Note, for example, that the horses are not ridden to the battlefield butare led tethered behind the camels, which are ridden. Note, too, thatwater is precious on campaign and it is offered to the horses first,showing the value placed by the Arabs on a good horse. The raid is carriedout in the morning. The heat of the desert day often made travelingduring daylight hours impossible. Arab raiders usually traveled by night,moving into position close to the enemy camp under cover of darknessand attacking just before sunrise. The raiders move into position along awadi, a depressed dry streambed bordered by acacia trees, to hide theirapproach from the enemy. The bows come from Yathrib, the originalname of Medina, famous for the manufacture of bows and arrows. Thearrow fire is launched from a distance and in volleys in the hope that itwill be sufficient to get the enemy to flee. Only when the “quivers wereexhausted” did an attack with swords begin. In typical Arab fashion,

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the raid is about obtaining flocks or loot left behind by the fleeingenemy rather than about killing. Finally, camel hide was cheap and theraiders carried leather shields made from camel hide, indicating theywere not wealthy. The claim that the leather shields were made from“the hides of well-bred camels” may be the poet’s attempt to concealthe low status of the raiders.

Military Transport

Camel

The camel and the horse were the two major means of military trans-port in Arabia, the camel being by far the more important. The camelwas probably introduced from Arabia into the Middle East sometimearound the second millennium b.c.e. There it was caught in the wild,domesticated into herds, and used primarily for food. By 1000 b.c.e. itwas trained for use as a transport animal and beast of burden.32 Theanimal was probably introduced to Palestine and Syria around thesame time during the Midianite invasions of 1200–1100 b.c.e. The firstrecorded instance of the camel being used in war dates from this time.The Old Testament tells of Joshua’s battle with the Amalekites atRephidim. The Amalekites were nomads who rode the camel andattacked from camelback with bows and arrows. The biblical story ofGideon also tells of his battles against the Midianites and their camelswhen they invaded Israel during the Period of the Judges (1150–1050b.c.e.).33 The first instance of camels used in war recorded in an officialdocument was in 825 b.c.e. when Gingibu the Arab is described inAssyrian records as providing one thousand camels and riders to theAssyrian army at the Battle of Karkar.34

Without the camel life in the desert would be impossible, for thecamel nourishes the Arab in many ways. It is his primary means oftransport, often where the horse and donkey cannot go, and hismedium of exchange; wives and blood-wits are calculated in camels.The milk of the camel is the staple liquid food of the bedouin; themeat of the animal is consumed as well. One camel can provide meatfor ninety to one hundred people.35 Arab clothes were often made ofcamel hair, as were blankets and the all-important tents to shelter thebedouin from the heat and cold of the desert. The dung of the camelwas a common fuel in a land where wood is scarce, and even its urine

36 MUHAMMAD

was used for medicine.36 Little wonder that the Arabs came to call thecamel “the gift from Allah.”

The Arabian camel is a one-humped dromedary, not to be confusedwith the two humped Bactrian camel native to the Central Asiansteppes. A camel can consume 106 quarts of water in ten minutesand stores the water in its stomach, not its hump as is sometimesbelieved.37 The camel’s hump is made of stored fat, on which the animaldraws for nourishment during times when food is scarce. Relative toother animals the camel loses comparatively little water through skinevaporation, perspiration, and urination, permitting it to travel longdistances between waterings.38 Its short hair, padded feet, and highratio of skin surface to body mass contribute to the animal’s ability tofunction in the high-temperature, low-humidity environment of theArabian desert. The camel can travel twenty days without water in120˚F. temperatures before being exhausted.39 The animal can eat anddigest almost anything, including thorny plants like the acacia and drygrasses that other animals, especially horses and mules, cannot digest.Bedouin camels were rarely fed, relying almost completely on naturalgrazing for food. In years of drought when fodder was scarce, camelsand horses often became useless for military purposes because theywere not strong enough to undertake rigorous journeys.40 In towns andoases camels were sometimes fed on grain during harsh times. In oaseswhere the date palm was cultivated, the pits of the dates were crushedto make food for the camels. A bedouin could tell if a camel belongedto a bedouin or an oasis dweller by examining the animal’s dung todetermine if it contained date pits.

The Arabic language is said to include some one thousand namesfor the camel, its breeds, functions, and stages of growth, a numberrivaled only by the number of synonyms for the sword.41 The generalword for camel is ba’ir (a noun of feminine gender). Other descriptionsinclude those for a transport camel (rikab), a camel used to draw water(nadih), and a riding camel (dhalul).42 The camel’s importance to Arablife is evident in the fact that distances among the Arabs are reckonedin camel travel days, not travel by foot, which, in any case, would beimpossible. The range and speed of a camel depends on how the ani-mal is encumbered. A transport camel, for example, can carry betweenfour hundred and six hundred pounds packed in panniers. More baggagecould be placed between the panniers if necessary.43 If well fed andwatered, a camel carrying this load could still make sixty miles a day.44

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The terrain also influences range. Camels have soft feet and do nottravel well over rocky ground; they are almost useless in mountains.The lava plains characteristic of the Hejaz serve as effective barriers tocamel travel.

Camels ridden by Arab couriers carrying messages could makeseventy miles a day for a short journey. Over a week they could travelsixty miles a day, and average fifty miles a day over two weeks, providingthe animal was fed and watered reasonably.45 The camel is also anemergency water reservoir. The animal carries water in its stomach. Inan emergency an old camel that has been watered within the last threedays can be killed, its stomach slit open, and the water used for humanconsumption or to water the horses. Another technique is to thrust astick down the camel’s throat to force it to vomit the water in itsstomach. One source says, “if the camel has been watered within a dayor two, the liquid is tolerably drinkable.”46 It is important to remember,however, that practical rates of movement by camel were far slowerthan those noted above. Arab clans and armies often moved with theirpossessions, wives, children, flocks, and horses. Any advance over along distance had to be made in stages in order to sufficiently feed andwater the animals as well as the humans. The major logistics problemwas keeping the animals alive, not feeding the soldiers. The horse inparticular was a considerable drag on military movement in Arabia. Itdid not have the speed, range, endurance, or the ability to feed on fodderpossessed by the camel. Fodder for the horses had to be carried by thecamels. Rates of movement were reduced accordingly.

The camel’s use as an animal of war was primarily as a transporterof troops and supplies. While it is recorded that the standard bearer ofthe Hawazin tribe at the Battle of Hunayn fought with a lance fromcamelback, this was probably a rare occurrence. The lack of a properhigh-backed saddle and stirrups and the height of the animal fromground would have made the effective use of the long lance impossible.Had the rider managed to strike his target, the momentum of the strikewould likely have unseated him. So, too, the bow, which could only befired effectively while standing in stirrups and holding the body abovethe moving animal. The camel’s primary value was to move mountedinfantry quickly into position permitting warriors to occupy favorableterrain and go into the defense before the enemy could react. This per-mitted the Arab armies of the conquest period to establish positionswith narrow fronts and strong natural obstacles on both sides protecting

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the flanks, forcing the enemy to attack the strongest defense and withonly those troops that the terrain and narrow front could accommodate.It also permitted Arab commanders to choose battlefields close to thedesert frontier into which their troops could flee on camelback unpur-sued by enemy infantry and cavalry, neither of which could endure thedesert heat for very long. The ability to move mounted infantry quicklyover long distances permitted Arab armies to ambush the enemy almostanywhere in its area of operations. The camel made possible lightningstrikes against towns and supply depots deep in the enemy’s interior.

The camel’s ability to carry much heavier loads than a donkey,mule, or horse and to do so rapidly and for long distances made it anexcellent logistics animal. The simple Arab diet of dates, water, andcamel milk could be easily transported in quantities that could sustainarmies on the march for months. The camel itself could be eaten. Thewater carried in the camel’s stomach could be used to water the horseswhose inability to withstand the desert heat and thirst often madethem a military liability. Used properly, the camel was a mobile logisticsdepot that provided Arab armies with a rapid and flexible line of com-munication and supply that permitted the armies to move quicklyover long distances across hostile terrain where neither Persian norByzantine armies could follow.

Horse

The horse was probably introduced to Arabia from Syria sometimeduring the first century c.e. As an instrument of war the horse had beenassociated with the chariot in Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, and Mesopotamiasince at least 1700 b.c.e. It did not become a cavalry mount, however,until the Assyrians first used it in this manner in the seventh centuryb.c.e.47 The lack of sufficient pasture due to desert climate, the cost offeeding the horse on domestic grains, and the general expense of theanimal within Arabia served to limit the horse’s role in war until theArab conquests. Only the wealthiest town dwellers, merchants, orbedouin chiefs could afford to maintain these animals, and their primarymilitary use was in carrying out small-scale raids. Mecca, one of thelargest and wealthiest towns in Arabia, could put only two hundredmounted men in the field in its battles with Muhammad.48

The horse was not ridden to the battlefield, but led by a tether tiedto the camel carrying its owner. This practice was probably adoptedfrom the Nabataeans, who, as allies of Rome, are recorded as having

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led their horses into battle when they attacked Jerusalem in 67 c.e.49

The natural fragility of the animal and the desert heat considerablyreduced the horse’s endurance, and every effort was made to save itsenergy for the battle itself. The water and food requirements of thehorse were much more demanding than those of the camel, and thehorse’s poor endurance slowed the rate of military movement consid-erably. A horse requires twelve to sixteen pounds of green fodder (grassor other natural pasturage) and another fourteen to sixteen pounds ofhard fodder (grain) a day. Horses quickly become adapted to certainkinds of green fodder and fall ill if their diet is changed. Under normalclimatic conditions a horse will consume fifteen to thirty liters ofwater each day, more in hot and dry conditions.50 Feeding horses ongrass only would require 2.47 acres of grassland per day to feed 130horses.51 Unlike camels, horses have no stored nutritional reserve.Failure to feed and water the animal adequately will quickly result inits death or debilitation.

As an instrument of war the horse was always a poor choice. Itwould have been far more efficient for armies of antiquity to outfitthemselves with the hardier and more intelligent mule.52 Despite itslimitations the horse remained a primary instrument of warfare fromat least 1800 b.c.e. until World War I. Why was this the case? Thehorse was probably introduced to the Middle East around 2000 b.c.e.(and possibly earlier) as part of the Indo-European dispersion thatbrought these people into the region at about that time. From that timeforward the horse became identified with military status and conquest.The Assyrians were the first to use horse cavalry in their campaigns,followed by the Persians and Alexander the Great. The infantry armiesof Rome were overrun by barbarian horsemen, leading the Byzantinesto develop and use heavy cavalry on a large scale. The Sassanid Persianswere also horse warriors, as were the Franks, medieval knights andCrusaders, and Turks. The mounted knight dominated European battle-fields for almost a millennium until brought down by the resurrectionof disciplined infantry by the Swiss. And so it continued with evenmodern nation-states equipping their armies with large contingents ofcavalry in the face of gunpowder weapons.53 It was culture, the associa-tion of the horse with military power and conquest over more than twothousand years, rather than the military capabilities of the animal itselfthat prompted armies to continue using the horse when their ownexperience with it should have prompted its replacement by the mule.

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The horse came into its own in Arab armies once the lands beyondArabia itself had been conquered. Some of the conquered lands raisedhorses in large numbers, something not possible in Arabia, so thatlarge contingents of Arab soldiers could be provided with mounts forthe first time. The conquered lands possessed large tracts of naturalfoliage and were agriculturally cultivated on a large scale so as to beable to produce sufficient feed for the animals. The climate in thesenewly acquired lands was less harsh than in Arabia, allowing the animalmore endurance than in the desert, thereby increasing its militaryusefulness. During the period of the conquests Arab cavalry had beendivided into armored and unarmored, or heavy and light, with heavycavalry comprising only a small number of units used as shock troops,a lesson learned from the Byzantines. Light cavalry, when not used toskirmish and reconnoiter, was used mostly to complete the destruc-tion of already disorganized or broken units. During the Umayyadperiod (661–750 c.e.) the bulk of Arab cavalry became armored in atransition toward the Byzantine model in mounts, armor, and weapons.Arab cavalry was trained in the old Arabic tradition of fighting firstfrom horseback and then dismounting to fight on foot.54 Cavalry didnot become the decisive arm in Arab armies until much later, theheavy infantry long remaining the most important combat arm. Arabcavalry deployed safely behind the infantry, sallying forth as opportunitypermitted to attack the enemy and then retreat behind its own infantryfor protection. The use of cavalry against cavalry in open combat wasunknown to Arab commanders.

In Muhammad’s day the horse was not a decisive presence on thefield of battle. As Muhammad’s insurgency succeeded, the number ofhorse warriors he was able to put in the field increased dramatically.While the infantry remained the decisive arm, the increased visibilityof the horse in Muhammad’s armies lent his forces prestige and accus-tomed the town and oasis dwellers to the animal on the battlefield,preparing the way for the emergence of large horse cavalry contingentsin the armies of conquest that followed Muhammad’s death. Althoughcamels greatly outnumbered horses in the experience of most Arabs,so revered was the horse in Arab thinking that there are more refer-ences to horses in Arabic texts than to camels.55 In Arabic a horse iscalled faras (a noun of female gender) and the rider faris.56

The organization of Muhammad’s cavalry is reflected in the Arabicterms in use at that time. The general name for cavalry in Arabic is

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khayl, generally used to describe horse combat formations. Katiba is acavalry squadron that was subdivided into kurdus, perhaps equivalentto a platoon. A tali’a was a small mounted reconnaissance patrol com-prising one to ten men; it is also associated with a raiding party. Thesariya was a small unit sent out for forage. A jarida was a horse troopof moderate size operating independently of the main body perhaps forlong-range reconnaissance or raiding. Cavalry could also be used as arabita, a mounted garrison employed as a mobile guard force before anenemy fortification or town to keep the enemy penned within it andunable to mount forays.57 It was probably used in conjunction withsiege operations. It is probable that Muhammad’s cavalry units wereorganized along similar lines and performed similar roles, even thoughcavalry never became a decisive combat arm of Muhammad’s armies.

The tactical and strategic mobility of both horse and camel werelimited by the terrain in which they were expected to operate. Whenthe Arab armies moved beyond the Persian borders during the con-quest period, they were required to abandon the horse and replace itwith the mule because of the mountainous terrain. The vast opendeserts of rolling hills and stony steppes in which Muhammad’s armyusually operated were more like the deserts of Arizona and New Mexicothan the Sahara and its sand dunes and presented serious obstacles tomilitary movement. The great lava fields (harrah) of fissured stonecould easily make a horse or camel lose its footing and break a leg.The desert has many ravines (shi’b) and ditches, and the wadis, oftenused as highways around difficult terrain, can become impassableafter rain has softened the ground. Wadis are also subject to flashfloods. The desert itself is a fierce environment of heat and cold thatcan sap the strength of even the strongest animal or soldier. Finally,human-made obstacles in the form of fortified compounds, walledgardens, towers, and irrigation canals frequently served to hinder theability of an army to maneuver.

Muhammad’s Military Revolution

Muhammad brought about a revolution in the manner in which Arabsfor generations had fought wars, transforming their armies into genuineinstruments of large-scale combat operations capable of achieving stra-tegic objectives instead of small-scale, clan, tribe, or personal objectives.In doing so he created both the means and historical circumstances that

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transformed the fragmented Arab clans into a genuine national entityconscious of its own unique identity. Under these conditions Arab mili-tary brilliance thrived, with the result that the greatest commanders ofthe early Arab conquests were identified and developed by Muham-mad. Had Muhammad not brought about a military revolution in Arabwarfare, it is possible that Islam might not have survived in Arabia.Within a year of Muhammad’s death many of the clans that had swornallegiance to Islam recanted, resulting in the War of the Apostates. Itwas the military brilliance of Muhammad’s generals and the superiorcombat capabilities of his new army that made it possible for Islam todefeat the apostates and force them back into the religious fold. It wasthese same generals commanding the new Arab armies that madepossible the Arab conquests of the Persian and Byzantine Empires. Theold Arab way of war would have had no chance to win against thearmies of either of these powers. In this sense, Muhammad’s militaryrevolution was an event that shook the ancient world and changed itshistory by creating the means that made the Arab conquests possible.

Muhammad’s successful transformation of Arab warfare marks himas one of the great military reformers of the ancient world. Muhammadstands in good company with those whose military reforms madepossible the creation of empires by their successors. Kamose of Egyptled the fight against the Hyksos occupiers reforming in the process theEgyptian army and making it possible for Thutmose III, the Napoléonof Egypt, to create the Egyptian empire of the New Kingdom. Philip IIof Macedon completely changed the manner of classical Greek warfareforging a military instrument with which he united all Greece andwhich his son, Alexander the Great, used to create the empire of theHellenes. The reforms of Augustus Caesar created the professionalRoman army making possible the expansion of the Roman Empire toits greatest geographic extent. And it was Muhammad who reformedArab warfare and fashioned the military instrument his successorsused to establish the great Empire of Islam.

Social Composition

Muhammad changed the social composition of Arab armies from acollection of clans, tribes, and blood kin loyal only to themselves intoa national army loyal to a national social entity called the ummah, orcommunity of believers in God. The ummah was not a nation or astate in the modern sense, but a body of religious believers under the

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unified command and governance of Muhammad. It was a locus ofloyalty that transcended the clans and tribes and permitted Muhammadto forge a common identity, national in scope, among the Arabs for thefirst time. It was leadership of this national entity that Muhammadclaimed, not of any clan or tribe. Loyalty to the ummah permitted thenational army to unify the two traditional combat arms of infantry andcavalry into a genuine combined military force. Historically, bedouinand town dweller had viewed one another with considerable suspicion,each living a very different way of life and fighting very different typesof battles. Arab infantry had traditionally been drawn from the peopleliving in the towns, settlements, and oases of Arabia. While the largertowns often had a sufficient number of wealthy men who could affordhorses, these cavalry units were generally small and ineffective. Arabcavalry was traditionally drawn from bedouin clans whose nomadicwarriors excelled at speed, surprise attack, and elusive retreat, skillshoned to a fine edge over generations of raiding.58

These two different kinds of soldiers came from different socio-economic backgrounds and each possessed only limited experiencein fighting alongside the other. Bound by clan loyalties and living insettlements, Arab infantry was steadfast and cohesive and could usuallybe relied on to hold its ground, especially in the defense. The infantryconstituted the core of Muhammad’s army throughout his life andremained so in the armies of the Arab conquest. Arab cavalry wasunreliable in a fight against infantry, often breaking off the fight toescape damage to their precious mounts or make off with whateverbooty they had seized. Bedouin cavalry was, however, proficient at thesurprise attack, protecting the flanks, and pursuing ill-disciplinedinfantry. Each arm lacked the strengths of the other. Muhammad wasthe first commander of an Arab army to join successfully both combatarms into a national Arab army and to use them in concert in battle.This was more than a mere technical reform. The ability to combineboth combat arms was the result of Muhammad’s creation of a newtype of community that made it possible to submerge the clan andblood loyalties of traditional Arab society into the larger religiouscommunity of believers, the ummah, and combine the two primaryelements of traditional Arab society, town dwellers and bedouin tribes,into a single Arab national identity. The change in the social composi-tion of Arab armies under Muhammad was preceded by a change inthe social composition of Arab society.

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Unity of Command

Before Muhammad Arab military contingents fought under the com-mand of their own clan or tribal leaders, sometimes assembled incoalition with other clans or tribes. While the authority of these clanchiefs was recognized by their own clan, every clan chief consideredhimself the equal of any other with the result that there was no overallcommander whose authority could compel the obedience or tacticaldirection of the army as a whole. Clan warriors fought for their owninterests, often only for loot, and did not feel obligated to pursue thelarger objectives of the army as a whole. They often failed to report tothe battlefield, arrived late, or simply left the fight once they had cap-tured sufficient loot. Warriors and horses were precious, and clan leadersoften resisted any higher tactical direction that might place their menand animals in danger. Under these conditions Arab battles oftenresembled little more than disorganized brawls lasting but a short timeand producing no decisive outcome.

To correct these deficiencies Muhammad established a unifiedcommand for his armies: Command was centered in his hands alone.Within the ummah there was no distinction between the citizen and thesoldier, at least if the battle was considered defensive. All members ofthe community had an obligation to defend the clan and participate inits battles. The community of believers was truly a nation at arms,and all believers followed the commands of Muhammad, God’s Mes-senger. As commander in chief Muhammad established the principleof unified command by appointing a single commander with overallauthority to carry out military operations. Sometimes a second in com-mand was appointed as well. Muhammad often commanded his troopsin the field himself. All other commanders were appointed by him andoperated under his authority. As Muslims all members of the armywere equally bound by the same laws, and all clan members and theirchiefs were subject to the same discipline and punishments as all Mus-lims. When operating with clans who were not Muslims, Muhammadalways extracted an honor oath from their chiefs to obey his ordersduring the battle. The establishment of a unified military commandgave Muhammad’s armies greater reliability in planning and in battle.Unified command also permitted a greater degree of coordination amongthe various combat elements of the army and the use of more sophisti-cated tactical designs that could be implemented with more certainty,

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thereby greatly increasing the army’s combat power. For the first timeArab forces became an instrument of their commander’s tactical will.

After Muhammad’s death and during the Riddah (civil war),Muhammad’s successor, Abu Bakr, replaced many of the old generalswho had fought under Muhammad with new officers selected mostlyfrom among the generals of Mecca. Unity of command extends not onlyto the strategic level, but to the operational and tactical levels as well.The fact that the old commanders could be replaced and the troops,tribes, and clans under them would obey Meccan commanders who,after all, had been their former enemies, is testimony to Muhammad’ssuccess in establishing unity of command as a major institutional reformin Arab armies.

Combat Unit Cohesion

The moral basis of traditional Arab warfare placed an emphasis on thecourageous performance of individual warriors in battle. While everywarrior recognized that he was part of a larger kin group, Arab warfareplaced no emphasis on the ability of the clan to fight as a unit. TheArab warrior fought for his own honor and social prestige within the kin group, not for the clan per se. One consequence was that Arabarmies and the clan units within them did not usually reflect a highdegree of combat unit cohesion, the ability of the group to remainintact and fight together under the stress of battle. Muhammad’sarmies, by contrast, were highly cohesive. These armies usually heldtogether even when they fought outnumbered or were overrun.Muhammad did not just strengthen the blood and kin ties of the traditional Arab clan. He went far beyond that in creating the ummahas a higher locus of the soldier’s loyalty that transcended the clan. Itis important to remember that many of Muhammad’s early convertshad left their families and clans to follow the Prophet. It was a commonoccurrence to find members of the same clan and family, and evenfathers and sons, fighting on opposite sides during Muhammad’s earlybattles. Religion turned out to be a greater source of unit cohesionthan blood and clan ties, the obligations of faith replacing and over-riding the obligations of tradition and even family. Muhammad’s soldiersquickly gained a reputation for their discipline and ferocity in battle,soldiers who cared for each other as brothers, which under the preceptsof Islam they were.

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Motivation

Muhammad’s armies demonstrated a higher degree of military motiva-tion than traditional Arab armies. Being a good warrior had alwaysbeen the central core of Arab military values. Muhammad raised thestatus of the warrior to an even greater degree. It was a common sayingamong Muslims that “the soldier is not only the noblest and mostpleasing profession in the sight of Allah, but also the most profitable.”59

Muhammad’s soldiers were always guaranteed a share in the booty.Instead of the usual one-fourth, Muhammad himself took one-fifth ofthe booty in the name of the ummah, leaving more booty to be dis-tributed to the soldiers. Under these arrangements Muhammad’s soldierswere actually paid better than Persian or Byzantine soldiers.60

But better pay was only a small part of the motivation of the soldiersof Islam. The idea of a soldier motivated by religion in the certaintythat he was doing God’s work on earth seems to have been one ofMuhammad’s most important military innovations. There were, ofcourse, Christian soldiers who must have felt that they were doingtheir religious duty even when they attacked their fellow Christiansdenounced as heretics. But no army before Muhammad ever placedreligion at the center of military motivation and defined the soldierprimarily as an instrument of God’s will on earth. The soldiers ofIslam were usually extremely religious and saw themselves as fightingunder God’s instructions. The result, often still seen in Islamic societies,was a soldier who enjoyed much higher social status and respect thansoldiers in armies of the West.

A central part of the motivation of the Islamic soldier was theteaching of his faith that death was not something to be feared, but tobe sought. Muhammad’s pronouncement that those killed in battlewould be welcomed immediately into a paradise of pleasure and eternallife because they died fulfilling the command of God was a powerfulinducement to perform well on the field of battle. To die fighting indefense of the faith (jihad) was to become a martyr. Life itself was sub-ordinate to the needs of the faith; to die a martyr was to fulfill God’swill. Muslim soldiers killed in battle were accorded the highest respecton the Arab scale of values. While those who died in battle had beentraditionally celebrated as examples of courage and selflessness, it wasnever suggested that death was to be welcomed or even required to be

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a good soldier. Muhammad’s religious pronouncements changed thetraditional Arab view of military sacrifice and produced a far morededicated soldier than Arab armies had ever witnessed before.

Strategic War

Arab warfare prior to Muhammad’s reforms involved clans and tribesfighting for honor or loot. No commander aimed at the enslavementor extermination of the enemy, nor the occupation of its lands. Arabwarfare was tactical warfare, nothing more. There was no sense ofstrategic war in which long-term, grand-scale strategic objectives weresought and toward which the tactical application of force was directed.Muhammad was the first to introduce the notion of war for strategicgoals to the Arabs. Muhammad’s ultimate goal, the transformation ofArab society through the spread of a new religion, was strategic inconcept. His application of force and violence, whether unconventionalor conventional, was always directed at the strategic goal. AlthoughMuhammad began as an insurgent, he was always Clausewitzian inhis thinking in that the use of force was seen not as an end in itself butas a tactical means to the achievement of strategic objectives. Muham-mad was the first Arab commander to use military force within astrategic context. Had he not introduced this new way of thinking toArab warfare, the use of later Arab armies to forge a world empirewould have been not only impossible, but unthinkable.

Once war was harnessed to strategic objectives, it became possibleto expand its application to introduce tactical dimensions that werecompletely new to traditional Arab warfare. Muhammad used his armiesin completely new ways: He attacked tribes, towns, and garrisons beforethey could form hostile coalitions; he isolated his enemy by severingtheir economic lifelines and disrupting their lines of communication.He was a master at political negotiation, forming alliances with pagantribes when it served his interests. He laid siege to cities and towns.Muhammad also introduced the new dimension of psychological war-fare, employing terror and even massacre as means to weaken the willof his enemies. Various texts mention Muhammad’s use of the catapult(manjaniq) and movable covered car (dabbabah) in siege warfare.61

Most likely these siege devices were acquired in Yemen where Persiangarrisons had been located on and off over the centuries. Muhammadseems to have been the first Arab commander to use them in the

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north. Where once Arab warfare had been a completely tactical affair,Muhammad’s introduction of strategic war permitted the use of tacticsin the proper manner, as means to greater strategic ends. War, after all, isnever an end in itself. It is, as Clausewitz reminds us, always a method,never a goal.

Experienced Combat Officer Corps

As an orphan Muhammad lacked even the most rudimentary militarytraining provided by an Arab father. Perhaps to compensate for this defi-ciency, he surrounded himself with other men who were experiencedwarriors. He constantly asked questions of these more experiencedsoldiers and frequently took their advice. He frequently appointed thebest warriors of his former enemies to positions of command once theyhad converted to Islam. As commander in chief Muhammad sought to identify and develop good officers wherever he found them. Youngmen were appointed to carry out small-scale raids in order to give themcombat experience. He sometimes selected an officer from a town tocommand a bedouin raid in order to broaden his experience in the useof cavalry.62 Muhammad always selected his military commanders onthe basis of their proven experience and ability, and never for theirasceticism or religious devotion.63 He was the first to institutionalizemilitary excellence in the development of an Arab officer corps of professional quality. It was from Muhammad’s corps of trained and expe-rienced field commanders that the generals who commanded the armiesof the conquests were drawn. Khalid al-Walid (The Sword of Allah) andAmr ibn al-A’as were both former Meccan enemy commanders whoconverted to Islam and served as field commanders in Muhammad’sarmies. Both became great generals during the Arab conquests.

Training and Discipline

We have only scant references to how Muhammad trained his soldiers;that he did so is almost a certainty. There are clear references to requiredtraining in swimming, running, and wrestling. The early soldiers ofIslam had left their clan and family loyalties behind in order to jointhe ummah. The clan-based military units typical of Arab warfare wouldhave been impossible to re-create within the ummah-based armies.Muhammad’s converts had to be socialized to a new basis of militaryloyalty, the faith, and new military units would have had to be created

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that contained soldiers from many clans. References in various textssuggest that Muhammad trained these units in rank and drill, sometimespersonally formed them up and addressed them before a battle, anddeployed them to fight in disciplined units, not as individuals as wasthe common practice. These disciplined “artificial clan” units couldthen be trained to use a wider array of tactical designs than was hereto-fore possible. Muhammad’s use of cavalry and archers in concert withhis infantry was one result. While Arab fathers continued to train theirsons in warfare long after Muhammad’s death, the armies of the Arabconquests and later those of the Muslim Empire, instituted formalmilitary training for recruits.

Logistics and Force Projection

Muhammad seems to have had the caravanner’s concern for logisticsand planning, an expertise that permitted him to project force andcarry out operations over long distances across inhospitable terrain.Muhammad had been an organizer of caravans for twenty-five yearsbefore he began his insurgency. During that time he made several tripsto the north along the spice road. He gained a reputation for honestyand as an excellent administrator and organizer of caravans. Planning acaravan required extensive attention to detail and knowledge of routes,rates of march, distances between stops, water and feeding of animals,location of wells, weather, places of ambush, and so on, knowledge thatserved him well as a military commander. Unlike some other armiesthat he fought, Muhammad never seems to have had to change orabandon his plans due to logistical difficulties. Muhammad’s armiescould project force over hundreds of miles. In 630 he led an army oftwenty thousand to thirty thousand men (the sources disagree) over a250-mile march from Medina to Tabuk lasting eighteen to twenty daysacross the desert during the hottest season of the year. By traditionalArab standards Muhammad’s ability to project forces of such size overthese distances was nothing short of astounding. Without this capa-bility the Arab conquests that followed Muhammad’s death wouldhave been impossible.

Muhammad’s concern for logistics extended to making certain hissoldiers were adequately supplied with the best weapons, horses, camels,and armor that he could obtain by purchase, seizure as loot or tribute,or manufacture. In the early years Muhammad’s troops were fre-

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quently short of everything from weapons to transport. At the Battle ofBadr he had only seventy camels and two horses to transport 314 menmore than eighty miles to the battlefield. The men took turns ridingthe camels and arrived at Badr exhausted from the trek. Often his soldiershad no armor or helmets and were sometimes short of weapons. Muham-mad placed great emphasis on having enough camels, for they were thekey to the mobility and endurance of his army. All distances in thedesert are reckoned by the time it takes a camel to cover it. Movementon foot is simply not possible for any distance. According to the textualaccounts, when Muhammad moved against Mecca every man in hisarmy was fully equipped with weapons, armor, helmets, shields, andeither a horse or a camel. For an army of ten thousand men this wasno small achievement by a leader who a decade earlier had had onlyfour disciples. It was Muhammad who taught the Arab armies how tosupply themselves for long periods in the field and to ensure themselvesof adequate weapons and equipment. Once again, had he not accom-plished this, Arab armies would have remained militarily incapable offorging an empire.

Conclusion

What emerges from the analysis presented here is that Muhammadrevolutionized the conduct of Arab warfare in ways that made possiblethe transformation of Arab armies from entities fit only for tacticalengagements to forces capable of waging war on a strategic level wherethey could engage and defeat the major armies of their day. This militarytransformation was preceded by a revolution in the manner in whichArabs thought about war, what I have called the moral basis of war.The old chivalric code that limited the bloodletting was abandoned byMuhammad and replaced with an ethos less conducive to restraint inwar, the blood feud. Extending the ethos of the blood feud beyond theties of kin and blood to include members of the new community ofMuslim believers inevitably worked to make Arab warfare moreencompassing and bloody than it had been.

Supporting all these changes was a change in the psychology ofwar introduced by Muhammad’s teaching that soldiers fighting indefense of Islam were doing no less than God’s work on earth, and thatto die in carrying out His will earned the soldier eternal life in para-dise. The usual sense of risk to one’s life that tempers the violence of

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the battlefield was abandoned, replaced by a psychological doctrinethat “war to the knife,” or fighting until one kills the enemy or is slainoneself, became the ideal in the conduct of war. In every respectMuhammad’s military revolution increased the scale and violence ofthe military engagements that Arab armies were now capable of fighting.

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4

Muhammad

Muhammad was born on August 20, 570 c.e., in the town ofMecca. The original inhabitants of Mecca were the Jerhum tribe,

who, according to legend, were related to the Amalekites of the OldTestament. At some point the Khuza’a tribe migrating north from Yemendrove the original occupants from the town and took up residencethere. About a century before Muhammad’s birth the Quraish tribe,led by one Qusai, drove the Khuza’a from Mecca and settled his peoplethere. The Khuza’a had not lived in houses, but in tents surrounded byshallow walls to break the wind and driven sand. Qusai is said to haveconvinced his people to give up their previous bedouin ways and tobuild houses. These houses were little more than hovels made fromrough stones held in place with mud mortar and roofed with palm logsor brushwood that offered some protection from the sun. Some of thetribe lived in the town while other clans, the Quraish of the Hollow,lived outside its confines. Muhammad was a member of the Quraishresiding in Mecca. By the time of Muhammad’s birth, Mecca’s strategiclocation as a key stopping and transfer point for the north–south traderoute between Marib and Gaza had led to the growth of a merchantclass. Mecca became an urban society consisting of many groups oftraders and artisans. While the Quraish dominated Mecca’s affairs,they were not the only ones whose interests had to be considered.

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Mecca lay forty-eight miles inland from the Red Sea in a barren rockvalley six hundred yards wide and a mile and one-half long squeezedamong stony mountains. It is described in the Quran as “unfit for culti-vation.”1 The name of the town in Arabic was originally Makkah,derived from the ancient Sabean word mukuraba, which means “sanc-tuary.”2 From time immemorial Mecca had possessed a shrine (ka’ba)where Arabs had come to worship idols kept there. It is not knownwhich idol had first been worshipped there, but for at least a centurybefore Muhammad’s birth the main idol worshipped in Mecca wasHubal. Although Christianity and Judaism had made some small inroadsin Arabia, most Arabs remained idol worshippers until their conversionto Islam. Other towns and settlements had their own shrines and idols.Tradition credits Qusai, the chief of the Quraish, with organizing thefirst annual pilgrimage to worship Hubal at the Kaaba.3

Once a year Arabs came from all over Arabia to worship at theKaaba in Mecca. Providing services to these pilgrims was a lucrativebusiness, and the Quraish profited handsomely. The pilgrimage itselflasted only three days. In the weeks before the pilgrimage, however,a number of trading fairs grew up around Mecca that offered rich com-mercial opportunities for trade to the Meccan merchants. All violencewas banned during these fairs. There was a large sacred territory, theharam, that surrounded the Kaaba and within which fighting and the car-rying of arms was prohibited. Peace was good business. By Muhammad’stime Mecca had established itself as the most important commercial andreligious center in Arabia, and the Quraish controlled the Kaaba andmuch of the city’s commerce.

One of Qusai’s great-grandsons, Abdul Muttalib (b. ca. 497), wasthe grandfather of Muhammad. He was the head of the Hashim clanand in charge of the wells around the Kaaba that provided water to thepilgrims. As a clan chief he was a man of considerable influence.Abdul Muttalib had five sons, one of which, Abdullah, was Muham-mad’s father. Abdullah died in 570 leaving his wife pregnant. The childshe was carrying was Muhammad, who was born in August 570 c.e. Itwas the custom among Arab town dwellers to place their new babiesin the care of a wet nurse of a bedouin tribe to care for the child as itsfoster mother. The child mortality rate from disease and malnutritionin Arab settlements was horrendously high, and it was believed thatsending the child into the healthier environment of the desertincreased the child’s chances of survival.4 Because Muhammad had no

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father, it was difficult to find a wet nurse willing to take him. A poororphan with no family offered few opportunities to the woman forfavors or money. Eventually, however, Muhammad was accepted by awoman of the Beni Saad tribe living outside Mecca. Muhammad spenttwo years with his foster mother before being returned to his motherin Mecca, where he lived with her for four years until she died.Muhammad was six when he was orphaned. His grandfather tookhim, and he was looked after by a slave girl in his grandfather’s house-hold. Two years later, when Muhammad was eight, his grandfatherdied, and he was placed in the charge of his uncle Abu Talib, the newhead of the Hashim clan.

At the age of twelve Muhammad accompanied his uncle on a cara-van journey to Damascus. The fortunes of the Hashim clan were indecline, and Muhammad continued to live in poverty. As an orphan hehad no one to protect him, educate him, or supply him with money andcontacts to make his way in business. Muhammad sometimes workedas a shepherd and spent considerable time alone. He became a fixturearound the Kaaba, where he sometimes helped provide water to thepilgrims and other worshippers. When Muhammad was about fourteena tribal war broke out between the Quraish and the Hawazin that lastedfor five years. In one of the earliest battles of this war Muhammad wentalong with his uncles to retrieve arrows so they could be shot back atthe enemy. As far as the texts tell us, this was Muhammad’s only mili-tary experience prior to commanding his own troops in the later warwith the Quraish. Military training was provided to Arab males by theirfathers or uncles as a matter of course, and the fact that Muhammadreceived no military training is curious. All the more so since one of hisuncles, Hamza, was already a renowned warrior when Muhammadwas a boy. Perhaps because Muhammad was a quiet boy who kept tohimself spending long hours tending flocks or at the Kaaba, his unclesmay have concluded that he lacked the necessary aptitude for fighting.If so, they could hardly have been more mistaken.

Over the next decade Muhammad tried his hand at commercewith no noticeable success. Lacking money and social contacts, itwould have been a surprise if he had succeeded. He did, however,acquire a reputation for honesty and may have acquired the nickname“the trustworthy,” but we cannot be certain of this.5 When he wastwenty-five his uncle secured a place for him in another caravan toSyria. His reputation for honesty served him well, and he was made

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responsible for the sale of some of the goods as well as the purchase ofsome return goods. The caravan belonged to a rich widow of theQuraish tribe named Khadijah. The death rate among Arab men fromdisease, injury, and blood feuds left Mecca with a considerable numberof widows, among whom a few, like Khadijah, had property and con-siderable wealth. Khadijah’s assignment of her caravan to Muhammadwas apparently a testament to his merchant skill and honesty.

Upon Muhammad’s return to Mecca, Khadijah proposed marriage.Muhammad was twenty-five. Khadijah was already twice widowedand said to have been about forty years old, but may have been some-what younger since she bore him several children, four girls and twoboys, although some sources (Seyyid Hossein Nasr) say Muhammadhad only one son.6 The marriage provided Muhammad with consider-able commercial opportunities, and he succeeded very well. Moreimportant was his relationship with Khadijah. She became his truelove and confidante. He trusted her in all things, and she supportedhim when he began to have his revelations. It was Khadijah’s cousin,Waraqah, a Christian, who also supported Muhammad on Khadijah’sword that his revelatory experiences were the signs of genuine prophet-hood. Muhammad loved Khadijah until the day she died, and while shelived Muhammad never loved another woman.

The next fifteen years, 595 to 610, are the “hidden years” in whichthe texts are mostly silent about Muhammad’s life. He seems to havehad a modestly successful business career, and as an organizer of largecaravans he gained experience as both an administrator and logistician.For some reason, however, perhaps because he began life as an orphan,he was excluded from the inner circle of the more powerful Meccanmerchants. Muhammad must have traveled with the caravans severaltimes, and the texts tell us of his encounters with Christian monksliving in caves along the caravan route. We may disregard the accountsof the miraculous happenings and prophecies of the monks as non-historical; nor can we discern what effect, if any, the religion of thesemonks may have had on Muhammad’s thinking. It was during thisperiod that Muhammad’s infant son or sons died. He adopted hiscousin, Ali, the son of his uncle Abu Talib, who had looked after him.Abu Talib was growing old and falling on harsh economic times.Muhammad also took in Zayd, a Christian slave boy given to him byhis wife’s nephew while on a trip to Syria. Both Ali and Zayd lookedon Muhammad as their father and were among his earliest converts.

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Sometime during this period Muhammad developed the habit ofgoing off by himself, often taking refuge in a cave for days at a time tomeditate. Certainly his financial condition was such that he wouldhave been able to make time for meditation and thinking. It is note-worthy that other Arabs would not have found Muhammad’s habitan unusual occurrence. Even the idolaters of Mecca sometimes turnedto this form of desert asceticism. In Arabic the practice is known astahannuth and was something like a modern retreat, a temporarywithdrawal from worldly affairs for the purpose of religious medita-tion.7 Tradition holds that Muhammad’s grandfather, Abdul Muttalib,was in the habit of spending the entire month of Ramadan each yearin a cave in the mountains around Mecca.8 It is not unreasonable tosuppose that the old man may have introduced the young Muhammadto the practice. It may have been no more than coincidence, however,that Muhammad experienced his first revelation while living in a caveduring the month of Ramadan.

Muhammad continued his practice of retreating into the desertthroughout his life. Aisha, whom he married after the death of hisbeloved Khadijah in 619, recalled that “solitude became dear to himand he would go to a cave on Mount Hira to engage in meditationthere for a number of nights, before returning home for a short timeto procure provisions for another stay.”9 It was during one of theseretreats, during Ramadan in 610, that Muhammad experienced hisfirst revelation. Muhammad interpreted these revelatory experiencesas instructions from God, and they continued for the rest of his life. Hewould repeat the instructions to his followers, who memorized themand/or wrote them down. Sometime later they were collected in whatbecame known as the Quran. The Quran and its moral instructionsbecame the foundation for the new religion of Islam. There is no needto dwell on the instructions contained in the Quran since only a feware relevant to Muhammad’s military life and they will be dealt withlater. It is interesting, however, to examine the physical circumstancesthat Muhammad himself described as accompanying the onset andduration of his revelations insofar as they possibly indicate an identifi-able medical condition that may have accompanied the revelations.

Muhammad’s revelations are interesting. Only two of them, hisfirst call to God’s service and the revelation in which he recountedjourneying from Mecca to Jerusalem in a single night where he metMoses and Jesus, seem to have been visual experiences. This is at least

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a reasonable conclusion judging from the specific details that Muham-mad’s own descriptions of the events include. All other revelationsthat came to him throughout his life seem to have been completelyauditory in nature and not to have included any visual component.10

When Muhammad was asked to describe his revelatory experience, hesaid, “Sometimes it cometh unto me like the reverberations of a bell,and that is the hardest upon me; the reverberations abate when I amaware of their message. And sometimes the Angel taketh the form of aman and speaketh unto me, and I am aware of what he saith.”11 When-ever a revelation was imminent, Muhammad was gripped by a feelingof pain. Even on cold days he would sweat profusely.12 Ibn Ishaq recordsthat the prophet knew when a revelation was about to occur. He wouldlie down and be covered with a cloak or blanket. He would perspireprofusely. At the end of the event Muhammad sat up and repeated themessage he had been given. In only a few instances did the revelationcome upon him when he was riding or at a public gathering.13

The symptoms recorded as accompanying Muhammad’s revela-tions seem strongly similar to those associated with recurrent malaria,a disease whose episodes are often accompanied by vivid visual andauditory hallucinations. Often the first onset of the disease is “acute”;that is, its symptoms are greatly exaggerated and the fever is veryhigh. Ibn Ishaq, in describing the first attacks of “the fever” thatafflicted Muhammad’s followers when they arrived in Medina, seemsto describe an acute onset. He tells us that “[w]hen the Apostle cameto Medina it was the most fever infested land on earth, and his compan-ions suffered severely from it . . . they were delirious and out of theirminds with a high temperature.”14 Malarial infection does not confer“immunity” from further outbreaks but confers only a “resistance” tothe disease so that follow-on episodes are usually not as severe as theinitial bout. And so it was that while Muhammad’s followers arrived inMedina from Mecca and immediately contracted malaria, Ibn Ishaqtells us, “God kept it from his Apostle.”15 This suggests strongly thatMuhammad may have already contracted the disease and was “resis-tant” though not “immune.”

Mecca is a hot and dry place where malaria was not endemic, sothat if Muhammad had malaria, it is unlikely that he first contractedthe disease there. Malaria thrived in places like Medina and otherswampy, humid, and hot oases throughout Arabia. Medina itself had areputation among caravanners as a place where fever was endemic,

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and they sometimes bypassed the town to avoid contracting it. Fourdays travel south of Medina is the village of Mahya’a, where caravanswishing to bypass Medina often stopped, whenever there was an out-break of the disease, thereby depriving Medina of the money to bemade supplying and entertaining the caravanners. During a severeoutbreak of fever in Medina Muhammad is said to have prayed to Godto take the fever out of Medina and “carry it to Mahya’a,” probably asa curse upon the village for its economic competition to Medina.16 Asa caravan organizer Muhammad would likely have stopped at anynumber of oases during his journeys where he might have been exposedto and contracted malaria. Moreover, the symptoms that accompaniedMuhammad’s later revelations are not those of an acute onset, but of anepisodic recurrence. None of this, of course, is meant to bring into ques-tion the legitimacy of Muhammad’s claim that his revelations were ofdivine origin, a question best left to theologians in any case. It is only tosay that Muhammad’s own descriptions of his revelations suggest theywere accompanied by symptoms usually associated with malaria.17

After his first revelation Muhammad had no further revelations forthree years. Then a second revelation commanded him to preach themessage of Allah. Muhammad’s ministry lasted from 610 to his death in632, with the public phase beginning in 613. Although some Meccansfirst thought Muhammad mad, most had no difficulty with his preachingor behavior until he began to denounce their worship of idols. Thisdenunciation of idol worship at the Kaaba generated much ill will sincethe Kaaba was the object of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and thetrade fairs that brought considerable income to the city. The mostobjectionable of all Muhammad’s pronouncements, however, was hisclaim that all those who had not become Muslims before their deathswere suffering in hell. To claim that non-Muslims were in hell was adirect attack on the memory and reputation of one’s ancestors who,after all, had no opportunity to save themselves before Muhammad’sministry. In a society that revered ancestors whose exploits preservedin oral accounts established the ideals of virtuous behavior, Muham-mad’s condemnation was a grievous insult to Arab honor, one thatcould result in a blood feud. Muhammad was treading on dangerousground, and the opposition to him in Mecca grew stronger.

For the next six years Muhammad and his few followers were theobjects of ridicule and persecution. Conversions to Islam cut across tribaland familial lines with the result that Muslim converts were sometimes

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persecuted by their own kin. The most severe persecutions were sufferedby the converts who came from the lower social classes—slaves, widows,orphans, and the poor who had no families or clans to protect them. IbnIshaq tells us that “[t]he Quraish showed their enmity to all those whofollowed the Apostle; every clan which contained Muslims attackedthem, imprisoning them, and beating them, allowing them no food ordrink, and exposing them to the burning heat of Mecca, so as to seducethem from their religion.”18 Muhammad never forgot the persecutioninflicted on his early followers, and when the time came he took hisrevenge in blood.

In 619 Muhammad’s beloved Khadijah died. Abu Talib, Muham-mad’s uncle, clan chief, and Muhammad’s protector in Mecca, diedshortly afterward. Muhammad was now alone with no clan relativesto protect him from violence. The Meccans continued their ridiculeand harassment, but stopped short of any violence directed againstMuhammad himself. It was becoming clear, however, that life inMecca was becoming dangerous and that sooner or later someonewould try to kill him. To avert this fate, he journeyed to Ta’if, a smalltrading town fifty miles east of Mecca, to see if their chiefs mightpermit him and his followers to emigrate to the town. He was metwith ridicule and rejection, and Muhammad returned to Mecca evenmore afraid for his life. Desperate for someone to protect him, heapproached three clan chiefs in Mecca to ask for their protection. Tworefused, but one, al-Mut’im bin ’Adiy, chief of the Nofal clan of theQuraish, agreed to take Muhammad under his protection for reasonsthat are not entirely clear.19 The next day, he and his sons appearedunder arms in the public square of the Kaaba to announce that Muham-mad was under their protection.20 Now at least Muhammad could notbe slain without consequences.

Even with al-Mut’im’s protection, Muhammad was still in dangerif he continued to preach among the Meccans who regarded his preachingas both insulting to their family lineages and dangerous to their com-mercial interests. Muhammad ceased his efforts in Mecca itself andbegan to preach to the pilgrims and traders who came to the trade fairsand encamped on the outskirts of Mecca. In 620 Muhammad preachedto a group of seven pilgrims from the oasis of Yathrib (Medina). Thenext year these seven returned bringing with them five more to hearhis message. Muhammad met with the group in a little valley in themountains outside Mecca at a place known to the locals as Aqaba.

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Here the pilgrims from Yathrib were converted to Islam. Along with anumber of moral maxims that they agreed to obey, the new convertspledged to obey Muhammad and recognized him as the Messenger ofGod. In the history of Islam this pledge is called the First Pledge ofAqaba. It is also called the Pledge of Women because the pilgrims didnot undertake any obligation to take up arms in defense of Islam or touse force to protect Muhammad himself.

The following year, 621, a larger group of seventy-three men andtwo women pilgrims from Medina arrived and met with Muhammadat Aqaba and converted to Islam. This is called the Second Pledge ofAqaba, and it is a very important event in the history of Islam. Unlikethe First Pledge, the converts swore an oath to protect Muhammad asthey would their own family members by force if necessary. The leaderof the group, Al-Bara, swore that “we will protect you as we protect ourwomen. We give our allegiance and we are men of war possessing armswhich have been passed from father to son.”21 Muhammad replied, “Iam of you and you are of me. I will war against them that war againstyou and be at peace with those at peace with you.”22 The pledge atAqaba was a traditional Arab oath of mutual obligation requiringmutual armed assistance. But Muhammad promised the new converts,known now as the ansar, or Helpers, something that no traditionalclan chief could ever have offered: everlasting life in paradise.

The group of pilgrims seems to have come from the Kazrai clan of Medina. By these pledges Muhammad gained two things. First, heexpanded his influence to a clan beyond Mecca and his own Quraishtribe. Here was the embryonic beginning of what became the ummah,the new community of believers whose loyalties transcended the oldclan and kin loyalties but retained the moral exclusiveness of theblood feud. Second, Muhammad gained the protection of a clan livingin Medina. Their guarantee of protection made it possible for Muham-mad and his followers to leave Mecca and emigrate to a less hostileplace where they would be safe from persecution.

Before the Second Pledge of Aqaba Muhammad’s instructionsreceived through his revelations had commanded him only to call mento God. Shortly after the Second Pledge, Muhammad received anotherrevelation that granted permission for him and his followers to fightand shed blood. Ibn Ishaq tells us that the first permission for Muslimsto fight appears in sura 22, verses 39–42, of the Quran, which says,“Permission to fight is given to those who are being killed unjustly

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and God is well able to give victory. Also to those who have beenunjustly turned out of their country, merely because they said, ‘God isour Lord.’ Had God not used some men to resist others, the wickedwould before now have demolished the cloisters, the churches, and theplaces of prayer and worship where the name of God is constantlyremembered would have been destroyed. Assuredly God will helpthose who help Him. God is Almighty.”23 The passage seems to justifyviolence only in self-defense. According to Ibn Ishaq, the resort to violence was expanded by a later revelation: “Then God sent down tohim [Muhammad]: ‘Fight them so that there be no more seduction,’that is, until no believer is seduced from his religion. ‘And the religionis God’s,’ that is, ‘until God alone is worshipped.’”24 The second andlater revelation seems to justify violence beyond self-defense to includepreemptory force to prevent someone from being “seduced” from God’scorrect path. The significance of these passages for the military historianis that Muhammad seems to have anticipated the need for violence inorder for his ministry to survive.

Muhammad must have been a man of some physical strength, whichhe demonstrated through his enjoyment of wrestling and swimming and,on more than one occasion, by throwing his opponents to the groundwhen they angered him. He seems to have exuded physical energy: “Healways walked as if he were rushing downhill, and others had difficultykeeping up with him. When he turned in any direction, he did so with hiswhole body.”25 Martin Lings has put together a convincing physicaldescription of the man from the extant original sources.

He was of medium stature, inclined to slimness, with a largehead, broad shoulders, and the rest of his body perfectly propor-tioned. His hair and beard were thick and black, not altogetherstraight but slightly curled. His hair reached midway betweenthe lobes of his ears and his shoulders, and his beard was of alength to match. He had a noble breadth of forehead and theovals of his large eyes were wide, with exceptionally longlashes and extensive brows, slightly arched but not joined. Inmost of the early descriptions his eyes are said to have beenblack, but according to one or two of these earliest sources theywere brown or even light brown. His nose was aquiline and hismouth was wide and finely shaped, a comeliness always visible

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for although he let his beard grow, he never allowed the hair ofhis moustache to protrude over his upper lip. His skin waswhite, but tanned by the sun.26

Muhammad was handsome by any Arab standard of manliness andbeauty, and women found him very attractive. He once said, “I likewomen and perfume better than anything else, but the apple of my eyeis prayer.”27 Until he was fifty Muhammad had only one wife, hisbeloved Khadijah. After her death at sixty-two he had twelve others. Hehad six children by his first wife, but no children by the twelve whofollowed although all were still of child-bearing age. He did, however,father a son with Mariya, an Egyptian Coptic Christian concubine givenhim as a gift, but who never became his wife.28 Nearly all of Muham-mad’s later wives were widows. Perhaps he preferred the company ofmature women to young girls; perhaps these older women remindedhim of Khadijah or of his own mother, who died when he was six.

Muhammad must have been a very psychologically complex person.Whatever glimpses into his psychology that may be gained from histor-ical accounts must be regarded as incomplete and, perhaps, fraught witherror. The preeminent scholar W. Montgomery Watt, drawing on IbnIshaq’s notes, offers the following description of Muhammad’s generalpsychological disposition.

He was given to sadness, and there were long periods of silencewhen he was deep in thought; yet he never rested but wasalways busy with something. . . . He never spoke unnecessarily.What he said was always to the point, and sufficient to makehis meaning clear. He spoke rapidly. Over his feelings he hadfirm control. . . . His time was carefully apportioned accordingto the various demands on him. In his dealings with people hewas above all tactful. He could be severe at times.29

Although capable of ferocious anger, Muhammad seems to have gener-ally been a calm man open to suggestions who regularly sought theadvice of others and he often accepted it. There is no evidence that hisfollowers were afraid to approach him and offer advice. Although heseems to have possessed an innate gift for things military, he oftensought the advice of his more experienced officers before a militaryoperation. He was democratic in the typical manner of Arab clan chiefs,

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and remained accessible to his followers to the end. He was kind to thepoor, widows, and orphans, and greatly loved by his followers and, later,by even some of his former enemies.

There is no doubt that Muhammad believed sincerely and deeplyin his having been called by God and in his mission to spread the newfaith. Yet, he remained psychologically balanced. He always knew thedifference between his own thoughts and those he had received fromhis revelations. When, for example, he was arranging his troops beforethe Battle of Badr, one of his officers thought the disposition a mistake.He asked Muhammad if he was giving his men instructions he hadreceived from God or were they just his own ideas. Muhammad repliedthat the instructions were only his ideas. The officer suggested thatthe dispositions be changed for sound military reasons, and Muham-mad agreed. Although the hadith and oral traditions of Islam are full ofaccounts of Muhammad performing miracles, Muhammad himself neverclaimed to be able to do so, and was well aware of his own mortality.This sense of balance was also reflected in his condemnation of reli-gious asceticism that he had once witnessed among Christian monksliving in the desert. In this regard, he remarked, “God has not orderedus to destroy ourselves.”30 He was scrupulously clean, perhaps evencompulsively so, and often remarked how the presence of food adheringto a man’s moustache disgusted him. He disliked strong smells, andwould not eat anything flavored with onions or garlic.31

None of these dispositions completely overcame Muhammad’sfierce sense of rectitude, anger, and violence, which he could displaywhen he thought it necessary. Like Moses, Christ, and Akhenaton ofEgypt, Muhammad was “a god-intoxicated man.”32 He was also a manof physical courage and never seems to have feared death. Ibn Ishaqrecords an incident in which one Umar bin al-Khattab, one of the chiefpersecutors of the Muslims in Mecca, came to see Muhammad. Hewas armed with his sword, and the Apostle’s bodyguards feared thatUmar might attempt to kill Muhammad. Muhammad ordered hisbodyguards to stand aside and let Umar enter the house. “The Apostlegave the word and he was let in. The Apostle rose and met him in theroom, seized him round the girdle or by the middle of his cloak, anddragged him along violently, saying, ‘What has brought you, son ofKhattab, for by God I do not think you will cease your persecution untilGod brings calamity upon you.’”33 To attack an armed man who isopenly your enemy with your bare hands requires a degree of fearlessness

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that most do not possess. But Muhammad was an Arab chief andcourage was a required trait, especially in a warrior of God.

Muhammad’s sense of divine purpose led him to regard violence asan acceptable means to achieve God’s ends. This tendency revealeditself early, during the period when his few followers were being perse-cuted by the Quraish in Mecca. One day Muhammad was spendingsome time at the Kaaba when he was approached by a small group ofmen who began to insult and harass him. After enduring their tauntsand threats for some time, Muhammad turned to them and said, “Willyou listen to me O Quraish? By Him who holds my life in his hands, Iwill bring you slaughter.”34 For a man of such rectitude, Muhammadseems to have possessed an acute sensitivity to personal ridicule. Hehated poets and singers who were the primary spreaders of politicalpropaganda and unkind portrayals of the enemies of the people whohad hired them. In a society where honor meant as much as life, aman’s reputation was sacred. Hiring a poet to travel about and ridiculea man was serious business indeed. At the same time, the poet was arespected member of Arab society and usually not subject to violence,although the person who hired the poet was. But Muhammad seems tohave had a deep loathing for poets per se. Ibn Ishaq tells us that whenMuhammad experienced his first revelation he was extremely frightened.Muhammad thought he might be possessed or worse, a poet! “Now noneof God’s creatures are more hateful to me than an ecstatic poet or a manpossessed.” Muhammad was so frightened by what was happening tohim that the said, “I will go to the top of the mountain and throw myselfdown that I may kill myself and gain rest.”35 Muhammad’s hatred ofpoets was almost irrational in its intensity. As a poor orphan Muhammadmust have been regularly subject to insults and taunts by others when hewas a child, and it is possible that his hatred of poets was rooted in thisearly childhood experience. Whatever the case, several poets and singerswho had ridiculed him were later murdered on Muhammad’s orders.

Muhammad gave permission for his Meccan followers, the muha-jirun, or Emigrants, to emigrate to Medina shortly after the Second Pledgeof Aqaba. Muhammad and a few of his closest followers remained inMecca waiting for their opportunity to leave. Some Meccan hotheadsgathered and formulated a plot to kill him in his bed. Legend has itthat Muhammad was warned by the angel Gabriel not to sleep in hisbed that night and escaped harm. Muhammad and one of his followershid in a cave near Mecca for three days while the Meccans searched for

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them. The Meccans soon lost interest, and Muhammad left Mecca andmade his way safely to Medina. Ibn Ishaq tells us that “the Apostle onthat day (when he arrived in Medina) was fifty-three years of age, thatbeing thirteen years after God called him.”36 Muhammad’s journey toMedina is known to the Arabs as the Hijra (Hegira), and marks theYear 1 on the Arab calendar from which all subsequent historical eventshave since been measured.

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5

Insurgency

Medina was a very different place than Mecca. The city was located240 miles north of Mecca, about 100 miles inland from the Red

Sea and 80 or so miles distant from the main caravan route linkingMecca with Gaza. A caravan traveling between the two cities tookbetween ten and twelve days to cover the distance; Muhammad madethe journey in nine days when he emigrated from Mecca. Like most Arab“cities” Medina had no walls. It was mostly an open plain comprisingsome thirty-seven square miles.1 Unlike Mecca with its hot and dryclimate, Medina was a well-watered oasis with a swampy atmospherein which malaria and other climate and waterborne diseases flour-ished. Medina was home to two large Arab tribes, the Aws and Kazrai,eight Arab clans, and three Jewish tribes—the an-Nadir, Qurayzah, andQaynuqa. The town was somewhat haphazardly divided into districts inwhich individual clans resided. Each district consisted of houses, clancompounds, farming plots, date palm groves, walled gardens, pastures,wells, and plots of swampy wasteland. The population of Medina at thetime of Muhammad’s arrival was probably close to ten thousand souls.2

An agricultural oasis, Medina was noted for its date palms as wellas camel herding and grain cultivation, enterprises that made its inhab-itants relatively wealthy by Arab standards of the day. The place wasprobably first settled by Jews fleeing the Roman suppression during

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either the Jewish War or the Bar Kokhba Revolt in the first and secondcenturies c.e. It was probably these Jews who introduced agriculture tothe oasis.3 The oasis had been called Yathrib since Sabean times. TheJewish refugees spoke Aramaic and changed the name to the AramaicMedinta, or simply “the town.” It is uncertain when the name waschanged to the Arabic al-Medina, or “the town of the Prophet,” but itwas somewhat later, perhaps even after Muhammad’s death.4 The Jewswere well established in the oasis long before the arrival of the Kazraiand Aws tribes, both of which probably emigrated from Yemen some-time after the destruction of the Marib dam. At first the Arab tribeswere clients of the Jewish tribes. By Muhammad’s day, however, the roleshad been reversed and the Arab tribes were in the dominant positionwith the Jews taking sides in the various clan wars as clients of theArabs. Except for their adherence to the Jewish faith, the Jewish tribesof Medina were indistinguishable in every way from the Arab tribes.The Beni an-Nadir and Beni Qurayzah tribes were agriculturalists, whilethe Beni Qaynuqa were traders, goldsmiths, and armorers.

The inhabitants of Medina lived in houses constructed of mudbricks and placed close together and surrounded by a wall of mud-brick and stone. These qasr, or residential compounds, were still inuse in 1900. The following description of a qasr dates from that latertime though it had remained unchanged in its essentials since thetime of Muhammad.

The high walled qasr . . . was a four-square building in clay, sixtypaces upon a side, with a low corner tower. In the midst is thewell . . . steyned (stuccoed) with dry masonry, a double camel-yard, and stalling for kine and asses; rooms for a slave-womancaretaker and her son, rude store houses in the towers. . . . Anonly gateway into it is closed and barred at nightfall. Suchredoubts are thought to be impregnable in Arabian warfare.5

A strong tower house, the utum, built into the wall served as a keepin which women and children could take refuge and which served asa strong defensive position during an attack. A compound usually hadmore than one well, and at least one was always located within theutum itself. Several families might live in a single compound, andseveral compounds would house a clan. The compounds were oftenclustered near one another and joined by low walls that protected thepaths between the compounds. Nearby, often arranged in a zigzag

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pattern, were the gardens whose walls kept out the wind and blowingsand. This combination of compound walls, path walls, and walledgardens interspersed with date palm groves and patches of swampyground formed a complex maze that created difficulties for the move-ment of troops in any formation but a single file that could be easilyambushed by defenders. These mazes “canalized” the movement ofthe attackers so that superior numbers could not be brought to beareffectively within the city, permitting small numbers of defenders tohold out against much greater numbers of attackers. Until Muhammad’stime Arab armies lacked siege machinery so that even the flimsiestwalls provided the defenders with a considerable advantage. An attackermight hope to starve the defenders into submission and ravage the crops,but little more. Destroying the date palms, however, was considered anatrocity and rarely done. Muhammad ordered date palms destroyed onmore than one occasion, more to make a political than a military point.

Muhammad and his four traveling companions left Mecca in theheat of the summer for Medina, arriving nine days later on September 24,622. The political situation in Medina was tense. The two Arab tribeshad been engaged in a continuing blood feud that had begun in 616.Two of the Jewish tribes had fought with the Aws; the other Jewishtribe sided with the Kazrai. Two years earlier, the rival coalitions hadmet in battle at what came to be known as the Day of Bu’ath. Bothforces were badly mauled, each side losing scores of fighters. The resultwas an uneasy truce. It is likely that the pilgrims that had met withMuhammad at Aqaba were drawn mostly from the lesser clans who hadthe most to lose from a continuing war. They may have been interestedin more than Muhammad’s new religion. Muhammad had earned a repu-tation for honesty and fairness in his business dealings, and it is probablethat the members of the lesser clans were interested in sounding outMuhammad’s willingness to come to Medina to serve as an arbiter in theclan wars. As an outsider he was neutral, had no blood debts, and couldserve as an impartial judge to bring the conflict to an end.6

To emigrate to Medina with only a handful of followers while thetown was simmering from a blood feud was risky business indeed.Muhammad was no fool, and must have surely understood that anyattempt to lay claim to being a judge in a clan war would put him at con-siderable risk. That is why he insisted on the pledge of protection fromthe Medina pilgrims when he met with them at Second Aqaba. Withoutthat pledge it would have been suicide for a foreigner to interfere in a

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blood feud. In this sense, then, the converts at Aqaba who pledged toprotect Muhammad were acting as his bodyguard. Ibn Ishaq recalls anincident soon after Muhammad’s arrival in Medina in which a manattempted to approach Muhammad with a message only to encounterhis bodyguard of ansar cavalry, who beat the man with their spears.7

Muhammad was concerned for his safety from the first day of hisarrival. He entered Medina from the south on the edge of the oasis in adistrict called Quba. At first he thought he might settle there. But itwas too close to the strongholds of the Jewish tribes as well as somestrongholds of the Aws tribe, which had not been party to the agree-ment at Aqaba. Muhammad moved a mile or two to the north to selecta less dangerous place to build a house.

It was probably only a few months after arriving when Muhammaddrew up the Covenant that set out the rules for Muslims to follow indealing with the Jewish tribes and other Medina Arabs who remainedidolaters. Here was the first official formulation of the ummah, Muham-mad’s community of believers whose loyalties transcended all othertraditional clan and family obligations. Central to membership in theummah was the oath that there was only one God, Allah, and thatMuhammad was his Prophet. Muhammad himself was to be obeyedbecause he was the Messenger of God. The ummah constituted thebeginnings of a revolutionary cadre of believers whose task it was tospread the new religion. Their obligations to this cause excluded all othersocial relationships. The Covenant provides the first glimpse of the newsocial order, the community of religious believers and the rules by whichit was to be governed, that Muhammad envisioned for the future.

Muhammad’s dictates governing the relationship of members ofthe ummah to all others outside the community could not have beenclearer. “They [the members of the ummah] are one community to theexclusion of all men.”8 In this instruction Muhammad appears to havedivided the world between members of the community and all othersin much the same way that traditional Arab culture divided the worldbetween clan members and those outside the clan where individualsoutside the clan or tribe have no moral standing. The difference, ofcourse, is one of scope. “Believers are friends to one another to theexclusion of outsiders. No separate peace shall be made when believersare fighting in the way of God.”9 Muhammad replaced the traditionalmoral code that governed the conduct of war among Arab clans withthe notion that war fought over religion was a new type of war, total

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war in which the old limits on violence no longer applied. Only mem-bership in the community offers ethical limits to war; all those outsidethe community lack these protections. Thus, “[a] believer shall not slaya believer for the sake of an unbeliever, nor shall he aid an unbelieveragainst a believer.”10 The role of revenge against outsiders is clearlythat required by the blood feud, not the traditional code of war: “Thebelievers must avenge the blood of another shed in the way of God.”11

The code of the blood feud is also evident in the practice of paying ablood-wit as compensation. “Whoever is convicted of killing a believerwithout good reasons shall be subject to retaliation unless the next ofkin is satisfied with blood money.”12 Finally, the Covenant makesclear that loyalty to the ummah, even among believers themselves,takes precedence over any loyalty to clan or even family. Muhammadinstructs that the believers shall “be against the rebellious or him whoseeks to spread injustice or enmity or corruption among believers; thehand of every man shall be against him even if he be a son of one ofthem.”13 This harsh doctrine applied to the believers themselves. Thelimits that Arab traditions had once placed upon the treatment of one’sown family or clan were now gone. Even a father was required to turnagainst his son and a son against his father in defense of the faith.

The Covenant at Medina created a revolutionary religious com-munity of insiders versus outsiders in which membership was totaland irrevocable. The individual was completely submersed in thecommunity, even to the degree that blood kin and family were subor-dinated to the precepts of the community. As the Messenger of GodMuhammad himself was to be obeyed unconditionally. The traditionaldemocratic aspects of Arab clan and tribal leadership were completelyeliminated, replaced by a sacerdotal authoritarianism that was beyonddisobedience, refusal, or reproach. Whereas previously Arab life hadbeen lived mostly according to moral codes that had, even in war,placed strict limits on violence and revenge, those codes and limitswere now abrogated and replaced by the higher morality of religioussanction. Where once the harsh rules of the blood feud had been onlypart of Arab life and a relatively rare occurrence, the norms of theblood feud were now placed at the center of social life within theummah. The result was the elimination of the practical and ethicallimits to warfare and violence when undertaken against unbelieversin the service of the faith. Muhammad had invented a new kind ofArab community, one in which a revolutionary religious ideology that

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permitted an expanded scope of military and social violence in serviceto the faith was at the center.

As the leader of this new community Muhammad was responsiblefor ensuring that it survived. He and his people were on the brink ofstarvation and living in poverty. During the early days in Medina theysurvived on dates and water, having no money to purchase much else.Muhammad’s Meccan émigrés were urban people, familiar with tradingand commerce, not farmers. There was, in any case, little new land tobe cultivated by the newcomers in the already developed agriculturalcommunity of Medina. The Jewish tribes dominated local commerce,closing off any new business opportunities for the émigrés. To keep hispeople alive Muhammad divided his followers into the muhajirun, orthose émigrés who had followed him from Mecca, and the ansar, alliedconverts from Medina. Each ansar was required to adopt a muhajirunas his “brother,” and to do what he could to feed and find work for him.The single virtue of these difficult times is that the common sufferinghelped bond the new community together and encouraged it to believeeven more strongly in Muhammad’s claim to be God’s Prophet.

It is unclear how large the Muslim community in Medina was at thistime. A tradition from Bukhari suggests that six months after Muham-mad’s arrival the Muslim community numbered around fifteen hundredpeople.14 Some of these followers, the famous “Hypocrites,” had takenthe oath of conversion but supported Muhammad mostly for the oppor-tunity to obtain loot. Nonetheless, they were technically members ofthe Muslim community at the time and counted as such. At the Battleof Badr which took place in March 624, Muhammad put 314 men inthe field. Of these, 83 were emigrants and 231 were Medina ansar. Acommunity that could raise three hundred males of military age for abattle might easily number fifteen hundred souls if one counts wives,children, and elderly relatives of the families of the soldiers. The numberof ansar warriors suggests that Muhammad was having some success inconverting the members of some Arab clans in Medina.

Seven months after arriving in Medina, Muhammad undertook hisfirst military operation by attacking the Meccan caravans. One mustask why he did this. Muhammad and his followers were free from per-secution and danger from the Quraish in Medina. Occasionally a fatheror uncle of a Muslim convert would arrive from Mecca and attempt toconvince the convert to return to his family, usually without success.But this was hardly a danger. With his own people destitute, perhaps

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Muhammad turned to the old Arab practice of raiding to solve theproblem. Although raiding might have been a short-term solution toMuslim poverty, it seems an unlikely solution to the long-term problemfor a number of reasons. First, most Muslims were urban or agricul-tural folk, not bedouins, and knew very little about how to undertakea successful caravan raid. Second, raiding a Meccan caravan was a riskyproposition. Caravans were always accompanied by an armed guard,often experienced bedouin warriors hired for the purpose. Third, manybedouin chiefs made a living providing the caravans with protection,water, camp sites, and other services. The disruption of the Meccancaravans by a religious upstart recently arrived in Medina could hardlyhave been welcomed by these chiefs. The bedouin chiefs commandedretinues of experienced warriors who might easily have been turnedagainst Muhammad and his followers if circumstances warranted. By anystrategic calculation, then, Muhammad’s attacks on Meccan caravans, ifundertaken to alleviate the problem of Muslim poverty, were unwiseand dangerous. When Muhammad decided to take up arms against theMeccans, it must have been for larger strategic objectives.

Muhammad must have known that any attack on the Meccan cara-vans would have been but the opening skirmish in a long campaign inwhich the Meccans would try to exterminate him and his followers. Inthe first place, the decision to raid his own kinsmen was somethingthat would have been unthinkable in pre-Islamic times as an atrocityof the worst kind. There was no greater sin among Arabs than toabandon or abuse one’s own kin. In attacking the Meccans, Muham-mad was turning his back on Arab tradition. It is no wonder, then, thatMuhammad claimed a divine imperative (sura 22:39-40) to justify hisactions. Second, the caravan trade was the major source of wealth forthe Meccan merchants, and they could be expected to protect it withevery resource they possessed. If Muhammad succeeded, the largerstrategic threat to the merchants was that Medina would displaceMecca as the primary commercial center in the Hejaz. Muhammad’ssuccess in attracting converts at Medina cannot have gone unnoticedeither. Any military success by Muhammad would only increase hisprestige and following. In the long run this threatened Mecca’s positionas the preeminent religious center in the region and along with it therich commercial opportunities provided by the pilgrimage and tradingfairs. Finally, the Meccan chiefs could raise significant military forceson their own, including cavalry, and had the money to hire mercenaries

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and bedouin warriors. Muhammad’s forces in Medina were small bycomparison and certainly no match for the Meccans.

Muhammad was too good a strategic thinker not to have beenaware of these realities. And yet, he went ahead with his plans tochallenge the Meccans. There may be two reasons why Muhammaddid so. First and foremost, Muhammad was a “god-intoxicated man,” atrue believer in himself as God’s Messenger tasked by Allah to spreadthe doctrine of Islam to the unbelievers. Muhammad’s revelations hadcondoned the use of violence to accomplish the task that God had setfor him. If the struggle was ordained by God, then its successful out-come must also be ordained. Like later revolutionaries who believed inthe “inevitable forces of history” to guide their actions, Muhammadrelied on his personal relationship with God to guide his. He declaredwar on the Meccan idolaters because it was God’s wish that he do so.The attacks on the Meccan caravans were but the first strike in alarger strategy of conquest and destruction of his enemies. Second, therectitude and certainty that often accompany such thinking some-times have more worldly roots. In this case the insults and tauntsMuhammad had suffered as an orphaned child in Mecca and the cruel,sometimes fatal, persecution laid upon his early followers by theMeccans, as well as his own ridicule at their hands, might easily havepermitted a psychology of personal revenge to influence Muhammad’sthinking. Both influences, a deep belief in God’s will and a searinghatred for his tormenters, may have combined and led Muhammad tobelieve he was capable of overcoming the strategic realities that wouldobviously attend a war with the Meccans. Only someone who believedthat victory was inevitable would have begun such a war.

If the strategic realities were against Muhammad, it was neverthe-less true that his tactical position conferred a number of advantages.Ensconced in Medina, he had a base of operations from which he couldattack the Meccan caravans. Medina itself was no easy position tosubdue if the Meccans responded with a direct attack upon the oasis.Surrounded by lava fields and ravines, Medina allowed of only oneaxis of advance, from the north. The compounds, walled gardens, agri-cultural groves, swamps, and fields provided excellent defensive posi-tions should they be needed to resist a Meccan assault. By striking atthe Meccan caravans Muhammad was striking at the root of Meccaneconomic and military power, the commercial lifeline that sustainedQuraish control of Meccan politics. In the manner of a true insurgency,

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Muhammad intended to isolate and weaken his enemy’s social andeconomic base of power.

Muhammad had already established a revolutionary ideology attrac-tive to that segment of the Arab population that lacked status, wealth,and protection from the harsh life of the poor and weak. The ideologyof Islam served as a means to recruit the manpower and committedfollowers that formed the core of the insurgency’s military arm. Muham-mad’s recruitment efforts were already moderately successful in Medina,attracting several subclans of the Kazrai to his cause. Muhammad hadalready begun to surround himself with a small group of dedicatedadvisers and trusted men on whom he could rely to carry out his everyorder without question. Within a few months he had established thesuffah, a center of religious study in the mosque, from which heselected a group of highly dedicated, ascetic, true believers who couldbe used to discipline those within the ummah who might begin to losefaith in the cause. It was from here that the seeds of a kind of secretpolice and terror arm took root that Muhammad used to terrorize andassassinate some of his opponents. From the beginning Muhammadhad surrounded himself with a personal guard who were drawn fromthe ansar clans in Medina and who had sworn an oath to protect himat Aqaba. All these mechanisms characteristic of an insurgent move-ment were in place to some extent even before Muhammad carried outhis first raid on the Meccans.

Like insurgencies in the modern period, the strength of the move-ment lay mostly in the dedication of its followers and the genius ofits leader. Muhammad’s accomplishments so far were importantadvances but would not in themselves be decisive in any conflictwith the Meccans. Still, in the hands of a talented revolutionary likeMuhammad, it was a very auspicious beginning indeed. Muhammadrealized that his insurgency depended ultimately on a secure basefrom which to operate, and he immediately took steps to protect hisback by neutralizing the potential opposition within Medina itself.The chiefs of the two major Arab tribes still regarded Muhammad andhis movement with suspicion. The Jewish tribes regarded him as a directthreat and regarded his teachings and claims to be insulting to their ownreligion. When Muhammad drew up the Covenant to establish the rulesgoverning the ummah, he had also concluded an agreement of mutualassistance with the Jewish tribes that set out rules for their respectivetreatment at the hands of the other. The pact was a traditional Arab

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pact among tribal chiefs save for the caveat that the obligations of theMuslims toward the Jews “must be carried out except in the case ofholy war.”15 It is unlikely that either party regarded the pact as morethan a temporary arrangement pending future developments. For thetime being, however, Muhammad was free to operate against theMeccans without having to worry about being attacked by the signifi-cant military forces of the non-Muslim tribes within Medina.

Seven months after he arrived in Medina, Muhammad openedhostilities against Mecca by undertaking a series of raids against theMeccan caravans plying the road between Mecca and Gaza. The caravanroute passed about 80 miles to the west of Medina, a relatively shortdistance for Muhammad’s raiders to travel and wait in ambush. Thedistance to Mecca was almost 160 miles, too far for the Meccans torespond in time with a rescue force. To mount any military operationagainst Muhammad would require the Meccans to travel ten to twelvedays before being in a position to bring force to bear, assuming theycould find him. The tactical advantage lay with Muhammad.

The caravans usually traveled with an armed guard. Sometimes theguards stayed with the caravan from Mecca to Gaza and back; othertimes, only a token guard stayed with the caravan for the completejourney, augmented by bedouins hired along the way who escortedthe caravan for short distances. From his experience as a caravannerMuhammad knew that the caravan guard contingents were usuallysmall. This meant that Muhammad’s raiders could usually outnumberthe caravan guard even with their own small numbers. Taking thecaravan by surprise attack at the first light of dawn gave Muhammadanother tactical advantage. If Muhammad could raid the caravanssuccessfully, he could provide his followers with a livelihood of sortsand strangle Mecca’s merchant trade.

In Arab society a man’s reputation and honor were one. Havingbeen hounded out of Mecca, Muhammad needed to improve his repu-tation among friend and foe alike if he was to have any chance ofsuccess. In this regard a display of military power would likely impressthe pagan tribes whom he hoped eventually to convert and who werecritical to his strategy of isolating Mecca. To traverse the hostile land-scape of Arabia required caravanners to secure the aid of the numerousbedouin clans who lived along the route. Caravans required water,food, lodging, forage for their animals, and other support services thatthe bedouins and oasis dwellers provided for a fee disguised in the

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form of tolls and taxes. Without these en route services, no caravancould realistically hope to complete the journey on its own. It wasimperative, then, that the Meccan merchants maintain good relationswith the bedouin clans who were in a position to bring the caravans toa stop by simply refusing to provide them with the services theyrequired to complete their journeys. Muhammad knew that he couldnot stop the Meccan caravans with raids alone. The key to his successwas to befriend the bedouins and entice them to change loyalties withpromises of loot, the spiritual enticements of the new religion, anddisplays of military force and prestige to win their respect. From thevery beginning Muhammad’s raids were intended to achieve the polit-ical objective of winning the “hearts and minds” of the bedouins. Themilitary value of the raids was only a means to this end.

Muhammad probably could not muster more than two hundred orso men to participate in the raids. Most of the first raids were carriedout entirely by the Emigrants and involved no more than fifty men ata time, often only ten or twenty. As events progressed Muhammadwas able to convince some of the ansar to take part as well. This wasan important achievement. The ansar had taken an oath to defendMuhammad, not to engage in any other kind of military action. Theirwillingness to participate in the raids greatly increased Muhammad’sresources and probably reflects the fact that most ansar clans hadalready converted to Islam. From time to time, however, Muhammadrecruited raiders from among the pagans of Medina with promises of ashare in the loot. Still, the military force available to Muhammad atthe beginning of the insurgency was quite small, perhaps not morethan 300 to 350 men counting both Emigrants and ansar.

In January 623 Muhammad sent out his first raiding party underthe command of his experienced warrior uncle, Hamza. The party wasmade up of thirty men, all Emigrants.16 Hamza overtook a Meccancaravan near al Ais, which was south of Yanbu on the shore of theRed Sea. Hamza seems to have been taken by surprise by the size of the caravan guard. Ibn Ishaq tells us, “He [Hamza] met Abu Jahal[the caravan commander] with three hundred riders from Mecca on theshore.”17 Had Hamza chosen to engage, it is likely that he and the Mus-lim raiders would have been massacred. Fortunately for them, thelocal chieftain intervened and prevented a fight, “so they separatedwithout fighting.” The size of the caravan guard was unusually largeand consisting entirely of Meccans. That the caravan was returning to

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Map 5. Muhammad’s Raids, 623 c.e.

Mecca when Hamza attempted to stop it suggests that the guards hadtraveled with the caravan from the start of the journey in Mecca. For aguard of this size to do that was unusual and strongly suggests that theMeccans had gotten wind of Muhammad’s plan to begin raiding thecaravans and prepared to protect them.

If the size of the caravan guard had impressed Hamza (as well itshould have!), it did not impress Muhammad. A month later, in February623, Muhammad sent another raiding party of sixty men to intercept aMeccan caravan outside the coastal town of Rabigh. Details of the raidare sketchy, but at the least there must have been a skirmish betweenMuhammad’s men and the caravan guard for it is marked in the historyof Islam that it was during this raid that one Sa’ad ibn Abi Waqqas, aconvert, fired off an entire quiver of arrows at the Meccans.18 Therewere no hits and no combat took place. But the event is rememberedas the first use of war to defend Islam, although no blood was shed oneither side.

Of greater interest, however, are the direction and distance overwhich the raid was carried out. The first raid had attempted to inter-cept a caravan returning to Mecca; the second raid attempted to attacka caravan that was leaving from Mecca. The distance covered in thesecond raid was twice that of the first, and the raiding party was twiceas strong. The texts do not tell us why the second raid failed. Perhapsthe attackers could not get into position to attack before sunrise (thetraditional Arab time of attack), or the caravan guard was too strong, orthe weather intervened. From a political perspective, however, the raiddemonstrated to the bedouin tribes that Muhammad was becoming aforce to be noticed. The first raid had sent this message to the tribesnorth of Medina; the second reached far to the south. Muhammad wasdemonstrating an ability to project force considerably beyond Medina.

It was also likely that these first raids served to train Muhammad’smen in how to conduct operations in the desert environment and togain familiarity with the terrain over which the raiders were requiredto maneuver. It must be remembered that Muhammad and his fol-lowers, both Emigrants and ansar, were townsfolk, not bedouins. Theywere mostly unfamiliar with the desert and how to move and survivewithin it. Even when Muhammad fled Mecca he had to hire a bedouinto guide him over the desert route to Medina. Beyond the need to getto know the desert, there was the issue of military expertise. Muham-mad’s followers would have received basic military training at the

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hands of their fathers, but this was not the same thing as knowing howto plan and conduct a raid on a caravan, especially if it was guarded bybedouins who were known for their skill and ferocity in battle. Allthese factors make it likely that Muhammad saw these initial raids ashaving more political and prestige value than military value.

In May 623 Muhammad sent a party of eight Emigrants to try to intercept a small caravan on the road from Mecca to Syria. Theyarrived a day after the caravan had passed. Several other raids launchedin quick succession also came up empty. It was probably apparent toMuhammad by this time that his lack of an intelligence apparatus wasmaking it almost impossible to determine the location and time of acaravan’s passage. The Emigrant raiders consistently had difficultynavigating in the desert. It was becoming clear that unless Muhammadsecured close relations with the bedouin tribes near the caravan route,all his efforts to strangle the Meccan lifeline would come to naught.The day would come, of course, where nothing moved in the Hejazthat went undetected by Muhammad’s intelligence service. For thetime being, however, he was operating mostly in the dark.

Probably to bolster morale after so many failed raids, Muhammadhimself led a party of raiders out of Medina in June 623 and headedsouth. Muhammad had no greater expertise in navigating the desert orleading men in battle than any of the previous commanders who hadled the Muslim raids. Like his followers, Muhammad had been a towndweller all his life. As a consequence of his experience in organizingcaravans, he was an accomplished administrator and logistician. Buthe was not a field general or combat commander, at least not yet. Forthese reasons it is unlikely that Muhammad set out this time to raidthe Meccan caravans. His journey took him and his party (we have noidea as to the size of the contingent, but it was probably relativelysmall) far to the south of Medina, indeed even south of Mecca, to theterritory of the Beni Kinana tribe. The territory of the Beni Kinana wasclose to the caravan route that led from the southern ports to Mecca.These bedouins were perfectly positioned to observe the traffic on theroad as well as to learn of all comings and goings around Mecca itself,the route to Ta’if, and the major caravan route that ran northeast fromMecca to Hira on the Euphrates. Muhammad’s visit paid significantdividends when he negotiated a treaty of friendship with the BeniDhamra clan of the Beni Kinana. The details of the pact are not recorded;

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it is not unlikely, however, that the Beni Dhamra agreed to report anyMeccan caravan movements to Muhammad.

Between June and October 623 four raids attempting to ambushMeccan caravans were undertaken without success. Muhammad’s fol-lowers in Medina were still living in poverty, and his string of militaryfailures was probably making it more difficult to attract converts; theansar were also losing confidence and were less willing to participate infuture raids. To add to his woes, Muhammad suffered the public insultof having a group of local bedouins make off with some of his camels.He formed a posse of sorts and chased the thieves for three days, but tono avail. Muhammad returned to Medina poorer than when he left. Theprestige of Muhammad and the Muslims of Medina sank.

In September 623 Muhammad led another raiding party of 150 menin an attempt to intercept a large caravan traveling to Damascus. Hechose a place near the town of Yanbu on the coast of the Red Sea, abouteighty miles due west from Medina, to lay his ambush. Once morethere was no caravan! The party spent several days and nights in thearea, and Muhammad used the time to his advantage by negotiating afriendship pact with the Mudlij tribe living near Yanbu. Muhammadnow had a source of intelligence north of Mecca as well as to the south.The pacts with the Beni Dhamra and Mudlij served him well, and theMeccan caravans became more vulnerable to successful attacks.

It must have been apparent to Muhammad by now that his failure tolocate and attack the Meccan caravans was due to more than his ownpoor intelligence. Much of it could be attributed to the ability of theMeccans to learn of Muhammad’s planned attacks well in advance.There was no shortage of enemies in Medina that would have willinglysupplied Meccan agents with knowledge of Muhammad’s movements.The Jewish tribes of the city thought him crazy, blasphemous, and dan-gerous. The chiefs of the Aws had begun to regard him as a potentialcompetitor for power, and many of the Kazrai clans remained uncon-verted to the new faith. Muhammad himself seemed not to understandthe concept of operational security. Whenever he planned a raid hewould go to the mosque and gather any and all around him who mightbe interested in participating. He would answer questions and thenselect his raiding party from among the volunteers. It is likely that everytime Muhammad set out to assemble a raiding party the information waspassed to the Meccans by his enemies. A good riding camel could cover

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sixty-five to seventy miles a day for about a week’s duration, sufficienttime for the Meccans to dispatch a messenger to warn the caravans.19

In November 623 Muhammad gathered a small party of eight underthe command of one Abdullah ibn Jahash to undertake a mission far tothe south near Nakhla, a town that sat astride the eastern caravanroute from Mecca to Hira. This time Muhammad greatly improved hisoperational security. The small number of raiders, all Emigrants, sug-gests that they were selected without the usual public gathering at themosque. In addition, neither the raiders nor their commander was toldthe nature or the objective of the mission. The commander was givena sealed letter containing instructions to be opened two days after the group departed their base. To further conceal the party’s purpose,Muhammad instructed ibn Jahash to march east for two days beforeopening his instructions. Having done this, he opened the letter whichordered him to turn due south over the open desert and make forNakhla. Ibn Ishaq records ibn Jahash’s instructions in the letter. “Whenyou have read this letter of mine proceed until you reach Nakhlabetween Mecca and al Ta’if. Lie in wait there for Quraish and find outfor us what they are doing.”20 Nakhla is fewer than fifty miles east ofMecca along the Hira road and more than two hundred miles fromMedina. It is hardly likely that Muhammad would have taken suchsecurity precautions to send an eight-man team so great a distance onlyto observe the road for caravan traffic.

As luck would have it, though, a small local caravan travelingfrom Ta’if to Mecca carrying wine, raisins, and leather goods camedown the road passing under the observation of the Muslim raiders.More luck. The caravan was escorted by only four men and otherwiseunguarded. Ibn Ishaq tells us that the raiders followed the caravanuntil it made camp for the night. The raiders then moved into positionfor the traditional dawn attack. The difficulty was, however, that itwas the last day of Rejeb, one of the sacred months of truce among theArabs. Any act of violence or bloodshed committed during this timewas a grave sin and an impiety. Worse, the caravan was now very closeto Mecca’s sacred zone, where no violence was permitted. Muham-mad’s letter, at least the version that history has preserved for us, madeno mention of any attack on any caravan. It had instructed the raidersonly to observe the traffic along the road. After some discussion amongthe raiders as to exactly what they were expected to do, the Muslimsattacked the four caravan attendants. One of the attendants, Abdullah

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ibn al Hadhrami, was killed, two were taken prisoner, and one escapedto Mecca to spread the alarm. The raiders returned to Medina withtheir booty and reported to the Prophet.

Both Muslims and pagans in Medina were furious at the news ofthe killing of Hadhrami during the sacred month of Rejeb and atMuhammad, who most assumed had ordered it. There is no evidencethat Muhammad cared particularly for having violated an old paganlaw. Like Moses, who had to use violence on more than one occasionto keep his followers from deserting him,21 Muhammad was probablymost concerned about losing his hold over his followers. At firstMuhammad denied having ordered the attack during the sacred monthand refused to accept his share of the booty from the raid. There followed one of his revelations, which placed the matter in a largerreligious perspective and contained a tacit admission of the order toattack. Ibn Ishaq tells us that the revelation is contained in sura 2,verse 214, of the Quran, which says, “God sent down to the Apostle.They will ask you about the sacred month, and war in it. Say, war istherein a serious matter, but keeping people from the way of God anddisbelieving in Him and in the sacred mosque and driving out his people therefrom is more serious with God. And seduction [i.e., schismin this context] is worse than killing. And they will not cease to fightyou until they turn you back from your religion if they can.”22

The language of Muhammad’s revelation suggests that he was notconcerned with the violation of the old Arab code as much as he wasconcerned with keeping command over his followers. The Quranicverse admits to the violation of the idolaters’ law, something thatMuhammad intended to destroy in any case. Muhammad’s leadershiphad accomplished little for his followers so far, a fact that made himvulnerable to a revolt by his own people. The caravan raids had failedone after another producing no income for his people, most of whomstill lived in poverty without employment and sustained mostly bycharity. Muhammad may have begun to fear that he would be rejectedeven by those who first believed most earnestly in him as God’s Mes-senger. Why else, then, the instruction from God “that schism is moreimportant than killing . . . and that any of you who recant will die apagan,”23 and suffer in hell for eternity. This command seems aimed atsustaining the support of the Muslims more than anything else.

If the analysis is correct, then we might speculate why Muham-mad sent eight men more than two hundred miles to watch the

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Mecca–Hira road in the first place. Surely it could not reasonably havebeen only to observe the caravan traffic, a mission of no political ormilitary value whatsoever. It might have been that Muhammad had infact instructed the commander of the raiders to attack a small caravan atthe first opportunity and, if necessary, to shed blood during the sacredmonth.24 Arab history has accepted God’s instructions to Muhammadas sufficient justification and the raid on the caravan at Nakhla isremembered in Arab history as the first time when Muslims shedblood for their faith. Muhammad surely knew that it was the month ofRejeb and that killing was forbidden. Indeed, an intriguing loophole isprovided in Muhammad’s letter of instruction to the commander ofthe raiders that anyone who did not wish to continue with the missioncould simply return to Medina.25 It is clear from Ibn Ishaq’s accountthat the raiders themselves knew they were violating the sacred monthand had a long conversation among themselves about it.26 But why theexception to take part unless the instructions directed the raiders toattack a caravan and, if necessary, shed blood during the sacred monthin the first place permitting those who objected to the violation of Arablaw to refuse to take part, if Muhammad did not intend all along delib-erately to provoke a violation of the Arab sacred law?

If this was Muhammad’s intention, what did he hope to gain bycommitting such an impiety? Muhammad’s failures were catching up tohim. Perhaps there had already been defections from the movement.Perhaps there had been overt challenges to Muhammad’s claim to be theMessenger of God, perhaps rumors that he was a fraud as many non-Muslims openly thought. Muhammad may have cast about for a meansto bind his followers more closely to him. One way to do that was tocommit an atrocity in their name and require them to choose him overthe outrage of the pagans or recant from Islam, die a pagan, and sufferin hell. Modern revolutionary movements—the Irugun, the Vietcong,the Mau Mau, Mao’s followers, the insurgents in Iraq who behead theircaptives, and even the patriots of the American Revolution who tarred,feathered, hanged, and burned alive their Loyalist enemies—have allused atrocity as a means of strengthening revolutionary loyalty andfervor. Once bound in this way, it becomes very difficult for adherentsto the cause to renounce their loyalties. Modern terrorists have com-mitted atrocities in the name of history, race, and ideology. Muhammadjustified the killings at Nakhla in the name of God.

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This said, Muhammad may have given too little thought to thefierce reaction that the Meccans might have to the killings. The murderof Abdullah ibn al Hadhrami engaged the ancient rules of the bloodfeud. Hadhrami had been under the protection of Utba ibn Rabia, apowerful and respected member of the Meccan community who wasnow bound by the Arab code of honor to avenge the death of his client.If the Meccans had not understood before that Muhammad intended todestroy them, the incident at Nakhla and the revelation excusing thegrave violation of Arab sacred law should have left few in doubt. Theresult was an open state of war between Muhammad and his formerfellow tribesmen, the Quraish of Mecca.

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6

The Battle of BadrMarch 15, 624

Afew weeks after the incident at Nakhla, in the autumn of 623, theannual Quraish caravan to Syria set out from Mecca. It took the

usual route along the coast of the Red Sea passing some eighty mileseast of Medina. There were two large Meccan caravans a year, one in theautumn to Syria and the other in the spring to Iraq. These were majorcommercial events that generated a large part of the annual income ofthe city. Almost everyone in Mecca had some share in the caravans. Thecaravan of autumn 623 comprised a thousand pack camels laden withexpensive trading goods. If the Muslims could capture it, they would gofrom living in poverty to wealthy almost overnight. Muhammad’s shareof the booty would permit him to purchase the arms and weapons hismen sorely lacked. Muhammad’s previous attempts to seize smallerMeccan caravans had put the Meccans on their guard. The caravan wasunder the command of Abu Sufyan ibn Harb, an important merchantwho was one of the leaders of the opposition against Muhammad and anexperienced military officer who commanded the Meccan cavalry. Thecaravan was accompanied by a guard of forty men.

Muhammad did not attempt to attack the caravan on its outboundjourney. This is curious for several reasons. First, the caravan was ladenwith valuable goods; it would also be transporting goods on its returnjourney, but probably not in such quantity or of such value. Second,

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Muhammad had an excellent intelligence source in Mecca. Abbas, oneof Muhammad’s uncles, was an important banker in Mecca. He stayedin regular contact with Muhammad by letter.1 Abbas’s involvement inthe commercial affairs of the city made him an excellent agent-in-placewhen it came to reporting important political and commercial informa-tion to Muhammad. Abbas was in a position to provide the route (notmuch of a secret in any case) and the exact date and time of departure,information that would have allowed Muhammad to move his forcesinto place in plenty of time to ambush the caravan. Instead, Muhammadchose to employ a team of “special spies” to follow in the track of thecaravan and to warn him when it was to undertake its return journey.2

Presumably this would require the spies to track the caravan all theway to Damascus, remain in or near the city for a few months until thecaravan was ready to make its return journey, and then ride ahead towarn Muhammad of its coming.

The plan makes no sense on purely military grounds. Courier ridersatop well-bred riding camels were the only means of conveying messages,and the distances involved were too long to make timely warningpossible. At best Muhammad would have only a few days to plan hisambush and move his troops into position, probably not enough timeand far less than he would have had he tried to attack the caravan onits outbound leg. Later sources tell us that the plan became pointlesswhen Abu Sufyan discovered that he was being observed by Muham-mad’s spies while still in Damascus.3 Muhammad’s plan may have beenforced on him by political circumstances. Perhaps the reaction to thekillings at Nakhla was much worse and took more time and effort tocontain than the sources report. If so, Muhammad may have been unableto rely on sufficient numbers of Muslim followers to undertake an attackon the outbound caravan, forcing him to forgo the better tactical oppor-tunity. In the almost six months that passed while the caravan traveledto Damascus and made its return journey, Muhammad would have hadtime to strengthen his grip on his following and become confident inhis ability to use them in a major military operation.

On March 8, 624, Muhammad set out from Medina with a forceof 314 men—83 Emigrants and 231 ansar. The Muslim force couldmuster only seventy camels and two horses to transport men andsupplies, which suggests that many of the ansar were from the lowesteconomic classes and almost as poor as the Emigrants. One presumesthat Muhammad’s spies had reported that the Meccan caravan had left

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Damascus sometime in January. It must also be assumed that otherspies or scouts had reported that the caravan was drawing near to wherethe route passed to the east of Medina. The sources are silent on thesedetails, however. With only a handful of animals to serve as transport“on which the men rode in turns,”4 much of the journey was coveredon foot, a rare occurrence in Arabia due to the heat and difficult terrain.Muhammad’s column moved mostly during the heat of the day, alsosomething not usually done at this time of year. He ordered that thebells hung around the necks of the camels be removed so as not to giveaway his position when the column moved. This might indicate thatthe column moved during the night at times when the heat of the daybecame too oppressive. The march took place during the month ofRamadan. After the second day on the march Muhammad excused hismen from the required fast so that they could keep up their strength.5

Muhammad’s reaction time was slow compared to the rate of move-ment of Abu Sufyan’s caravan, and he had no opportunity for timelytactical intelligence to reach him. There is no evidence in the sourcesto indicate that Muhammad was informed while on the march of thelocation of the Meccan caravan. This suggests that he had yet to decidewhere to attack the caravan.

Abu Sufyan and his caravan guard were on the alert. The discoveryof the Muslim spies in Damascus had led him to be cautious. Muham-mad’s mobilization of his force in Medina in the usual public mannerhad probably been noted by his enemies in the city who would havebeen only too willing to inform the Meccans. As he approached theHejaz Abu Sufyan sent his scouts forward to reconnoiter the routeahead for any enemy activity. The scouts questioned every person andrider they encountered for news about Muhammad and his men. Atsome point they encountered some bedouin riders who told themMuhammad had left Medina and was somewhere in the area; theyprofessed not to know his exact location.6 We might suppose, althoughthe text is silent, that the reports of Muhammad’s movement werealso accompanied by some estimate as to the size of the Muslim force,which Abu Sufyan, himself an experienced commander, would haveimmediately understood to be much larger than his own caravan guardof forty men. Abu Sufyan decided to send a camel rider on ahead toMecca almost three hundred miles to the south to sound the alarmand request that the Meccans mobilize a large force and proceedquickly up the road toward Medina to forestall Muhammad’s attack. A

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healthy camel and an experienced rider could have covered the distanceto Mecca in just under four days. It would have taken at least severalmore days, perhaps as long as a week, for the Meccans to mobilize aforce of nine hundred to one thousand men. Moving a force of this sizeclose to Medina more than two hundred miles away would have takenanother ten to twelve days. In practical terms Abu Sufyan was on hisown and could not expect help from Mecca to reach him in time.

Muhammad’s route to Badr as described by Ibn Ishaq was circuitousand indirect.7 It is clear from Ishaq’s account that Muhammad wasunfamiliar with the area and seems to have been forced to hire bedouinalong the way to guide him. Perhaps it was these bedouin who told himabout Badr, although Muhammad’s experience as a caravanner mighthave already made him aware of the place. Badr was a good-sized villagewith substantial wells that sat astride the main caravan route. It was aregular halting place for the caravans, so Muhammad had every reason-able expectation that Abu Sufyan’s caravan would stop there. The roadto Badr from Syria entered the ring of mountains that surrounded theplain where the town was located from the northwest. Muhammad hadno knowledge of the location of the Meccans, and as he approachedthe town from the east he sent out two of his men into Badr to scoutthe village and report back to him. The Muslim scouts entered thevillage and stopped to water their camels at one of the wells. Here theyoverheard two local women discussing that the Meccan caravan fromDamascus was expected to arrive the following day. The villagers madea tidy profit providing the passing caravans with services, so it was notunusual that news of the Meccan caravan’s arrival had already reachedBadr. The scouts reported the news to Muhammad.

Muhammad and a small party set out to reconnoiter the area.They encountered an old bedouin who, the text tells us, knew that theMeccans had mobilized and had departed Mecca moving north towardMedina. Muhammad still had not located the caravan and now had tocontend with the approaching Meccan reaction force as well. Hisknowledge of the caravan route and distances involved would havepermitted him to calculate roughly the position and time of arrival ofthe Meccan relief force. He seems to have concluded that he had suffi-cient time to carry out his attack on the caravan before having to dealwith the relief force. A major problem remained, however, and thatwas the willingness of the 231 ansar troops to fight. At Aqaba theansar had pledged to be loyal and to serve as Muhammad’s bodyguard.

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Ibn Ishaq tells us that “in Aqaba they stipulated that they were notresponsible for his safety until he entered their territory, and that whenhe was there they would protect him as they did their wives and children.So the Apostle was afraid that the ansar would not feel obligated tohelp him unless he was attacked by an enemy in Medina.”8 Now thata Meccan relief force was on the way, the issue for Muhammad waswould his bodyguard fight or go home? Muhammad assembled theansar and put the question to them directly. Their leader pledged theloyalty of the group. “We do not dislike the idea of meeting your enemytomorrow. We are experienced in war, trustworthy in combat.”9 Muham-mad changed his direction of march to position himself at the openingof the pass in the hills through which the caravan route entered theBadr plain from the northwest. It was here that he intended to ambushAbu Sufyan and his caravan.

Abu Sufyan’s scouts had failed to locate the Muslims. Muhammadand his men were probably still approaching the hills around Badr fromthe east and had not yet made their way to the ambush site. The Meccancaravan meanwhile had stopped just short of the northern entrancewhere the road forked and ran a few miles farther west close to the RedSea coast. Abu Sufyan probably would have preferred to halt at Badr, buthe was an experienced field commander and knew that Badr was theobvious place for an ambush. Abu Sufyan decided to reconnoiter theBadr wells himself. If there was any sign of Muhammad’s men inside thering of hills that surrounded Badr, Abu Sufyan could move west andsouth along the coastal road and bypass Badr entirely.

At the wells of Badr Abu Sufyan asked some of the villagers if theyhad seen any strangers. An old man told him that two camelmen hadstopped here to fill their water skins a short time ago. These camel-men were, of course, Muhammad’s scouts who had arrived earlier inthe day on a similar reconnaissance mission. The timing of the twoincidents allows us to conclude that Muhammad was still on theeast–west road to Badr and had not yet begun to move toward theambush site. The Meccans and Muslims were stumbling around notmore than a few miles apart, unable to locate one another. Abu Sufyanwalked over to where the Muslim camelmen had couched theircamels. “Abu Sufyan came to the spot where they had halted, pickedup some camel dung and broke it in pieces and found that it containeddate stones. ‘By God,’ he said, ‘this is the fodder of Yathrib.’”10 Bedouincamels live by grazing; only in towns and oases (like Medina) were

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camels fed on dates and ground pit flour. The dung told Abu Sufyanthat the camels belonged to Muhammad’s men. The fact that theyhad been at the Badr wells only a few hours before told him that theMuslim force was close by, probably somewhere just beyond the ringof mountains surrounding the town. Abu Sufyan rode quickly back towhere he had halted the caravan and ordered it to take the west forkand move down the coastal road. He pressed the caravan into a forcedmarch that lasted for two days and nights until he reached safety far tothe south of Badr. Out of harm’s way, Abu Sufyan sent a camel rider toinform the Meccan reaction force that the caravan was safe and that itwas no longer necessary for them to continue moving north. He sug-gested that they turn around and return to Mecca.

Unbeknownst to Abu Sufyan, however, the Meccan column hadmoved more quickly than expected so that both columns, the Meccanrelief force and the caravan, had passed one another, one heading southand the other north, on parallel roads about five miles apart. By thetime Abu Sufyan’s messenger reached the Meccan column, it wasalready well north of the caravan and only three miles south of Badr.By now Muhammad had reached the ambush site only to learn thatthe caravan had passed. At about the same time, the Meccan armyreached the outskirts of Badr and had sent watermen forward to locatethe wells and fill their water skins. With the caravan beyond reach,Muhammad turned his attention to locating the Meccan army.

He sent a small reconnaissance party into Badr, where they raninto the Meccan watermen and took two prisoners. Although the textsays nothing about it, one supposes that the other Meccan watermenescaped to return to the Meccan camp and spread the alarm that theMuslims were already in Badr. The two Meccan prisoners were beatenand told their captors that they were part of the Meccan force just out-side the village. Thinking they were part of Abu Sufyan’s caravan, theMuslim interrogators beat them again until Muhammad intervened.The prisoners told Muhammad, “They [the Quraish] are behind thishill which you see on the farthest side (the hill was Al Aqanqal).”Muhammad asked how many men the Meccans had with them. Thewatermen could only answer “many.”11 Using his knowledge of caravanlogistics, Muhammad asked the prisoners “how many beasts [camels]they slaughtered every day.” The prisoners answered nine or ten, fromwhich Muhammad deduced that the Meccan force was between ninehundred and one thousand men.12

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Muhammad now knew the location and strength of the Meccanforce. He asked the prisoners how many nobles there were with theforce. The watermen rattled off the names of seventeen Meccan nobles.Upon hearing this Muhammad was gratified and he told his troops,“This Mecca has thrown you the pieces of its liver!”13 The metaphorsignifies that the Meccan contingent contained the best men or keyleaders of Mecca. One might surmise that Muhammad could hardlybelieve his luck. He was fighting a political war, and here the enemyhad concentrated its most important leaders in a single place. If hecould engage and defeat the Meccans at Badr and kill many of theirnobles, he would cripple the Quraish and remove the primary opposi-tion to his movement. It was an old maxim of the guerrilla forces inVietnam that “to kill a tiger, you must first draw it out of its lair.”Fortune had provided the circumstances that lured the Meccan leader-ship out of their stronghold exposing them to attack. Muhammad wasdetermined to bring them to battle.

Abu Sufyan’s messenger had reached the Meccan army to tellthem the danger to the caravan had passed and there was no need for afight. Many of the Meccans had relatives and even sons who hadbecome Muslims and were not disposed to fight their own clan kin if itwas not necessary. The result was an acrimonious discussion amongthe clan chiefs in the Meccan contingent with some wishing to returnto Mecca and others desiring to stay and fight. In the end three clansrefused to take part in any fight with their Muslim relatives and turnedfor home. In rough numbers this probably reduced the strength of theMeccan force by about three hundred men, leaving approximately sixhundred to seven hundred combat soldiers in the field. Many of thosewho remained, however, still had serious reservations about the need toshed the blood of their fellow clan members. Even Utaba and Shaiba,the sons of Utba ibn Rabia, whose client Abdullah ibn al Hadhrami hadbeen killed at Nakhla, objected strongly to bloodshed. Indeed, Utaba’sown son was in the Muslim ranks. But the requirements of honor andthe blood feud were very strong, and when Utaba and Shaiba werereminded by the others that the blood debt of their father was also theirdebt, they reluctantly remained with the Meccans.

The psychological disposition of the Meccan soldiers was differentfrom that of the Muslims. Many of the Meccans entered the battlewith serious reservations; shedding clan blood without a very seriousreason was an infamy. And yet the code of the blood feud pulled them

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in the opposite direction. It is reasonable to surmise that the élan andfighting spirit of the Meccans was low even before the battle began.Muslim fighting spirit, however, must have been high. Muhammad’smen had adopted the new religious community as a replacement fortheir loyalties to clan and kin and had done so with sincere enthu-siasm. The Muslims were fired by their belief in paradise as a rewardfor fighting for their faith. They had few reservations about having tofight their former clan members who, in their minds in any event,were idolaters and already condemned to hell. On a more human level,many of Muhammad’s men harbored strong resentments against theirformer Quraish tribesmen. They had been forced to flee their homes,some had been beaten and tortured, most had been reduced to povertywith no way to make a living in Medina, and many had been separatedfrom their wives and children—all because of their conversion toIslam. Many of the Muslim warriors who took the field at Badr wereangry at their Meccan tormentors and eager for revenge. When thetime came to fight, the superior fighting morale of the Muslims provedcrucial to the outcome of the Battle of Badr.

Its wells and sufficient pasture made the village of Badr an excellentstopping place for caravans. One of the annual trade fairs was held there,and the village probably had a small idol shrine somewhat similar to theKaaba at Mecca, but not as large or as well attended by pilgrims. Thesettlement itself sat on an oval-shaped plain about five and one-halfmiles long and four miles across surrounded by mountains. Access tothe Badr plain was gained by one of three roads that ran through moun-tain passes. One of these connected Badr to Syria and approached fromthe northwest; a second road leading from Medina approached Badrfrom the east. The third road connected Badr with Mecca allowingpassage through the mountains from the south. Badr is ten or twelvemiles from the Red Sea. It was this road running between the sea andthe mountains surrounding Badr on its western side that Abu Sufyanused to bypass the village and avoid Muhammad’s ambush. Theground around the village was stony and strewn with pebbles, makingit hard on the soft feet of the camels.14 To the west, near Mount Asfal,the ground was broken by sand dunes that afforded some difficulty tothe movement of troops. The Meccans were encamped about threemiles to the south. Muhammad and his men were camped along thenorthwest road through the mountains near the ambush site. Each sidewas aware of the other by now.

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94

Map 6. Battle of Badr, 624 c.e.

Muhammad took the initiative and moved through the mountainpass gaining the plain from the north. He moved quickly to the centerof the plain and occupied the nearest wells and ordered a halt. Here wesee Muhammad on the eve of battle for the first time in command of alarge body of troops. His knowledge of tactics was strikingly poor.Instead of moving farther south and seizing all the wells, he left the farwells unoccupied where they could be used by the Meccans when theyarrived. In a desert climate water is life. The larger Meccan forcerequired more water to sustain itself than Muhammad’s contingent.Muhammad’s failure to realize this was a grave tactical error andreflected Muhammad’s lack of any military experience.

Fortunately for Muhammad, one of the military chiefs of the ansarclan, Hubab ibn al Mundhir, was riding with the Apostle when hedrew the army to a halt and immediately saw the mistake. He turnedto Muhammad and asked, “Is this the place which God has orderedyou to occupy, so that we can neither advance nor withdraw from it, oris it a matter of opinion and military tactics?”15 One of Muhammad’sstrengths as both a political and military commander was his willing-ness to listen to those who knew more than he. There can be littledoubt that while Muhammad had supreme confidence in his politicaljudgment, he was certainly aware of his lack of experience in militaryaffairs. Muhammad responded that the troop disposition had nothingto do with revelation and that it was his idea, not God’s. The chiefthen suggested that it would be wise to move forward and seize all thewells. There must have been a number of smaller wells forward of theMuslim position. Al Mundhir suggested these be stopped up. Thewells closest to the Muslim positions were to be diverted into a cisternlarge enough to provide water for Muhammad’s force. This done, “theMuslims would have plenty of water; then they could fight the enemywho would have nothing to drink.”16 Muhammad took al Mundhir’sadvice and moved his troops forward to occupy the southernmostwells. He ordered the cistern to be constructed and the remainingwells sealed. Then “his men replenished their drinking vessels” so asto have a ready supply of water when the battle commenced.

Later texts tell us that Muhammad “roamed over the plain alongwith some of his officers,” probably to find a place to draw up hisarmy.17 Aside from raids and ambushes, most Arab battles of thisperiod were set-piece affairs in which neither side made any effort todisrupt the deployment of the other. Muhammad chose a site where

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his men would be facing west and to the south, forcing the Meccans toface east. Arab battles usually began in the early morning when theday’s heat was not yet at its height. Muhammad’s choice of positionforced the Meccans to fight while facing into the blinding rising sun.The Meccan army had already begun to move through the southernpass and was deploying across the plain to Muhammad’s front, behindthe sealed wells, where they pitched their camp. Neither side made anyattempt to interfere with the other. The Meccans sent some cavalryriders to reconnoiter the Muslims’ strength. They rode all around theplain looking for hidden reinforcements. Finding none, they reportedback that the Muslim army consisted of “three hundred men, a littlemore or less. . . . They have no defense or refuge but their swords.”18

The two armies began to arrange themselves for battle while itwas still dark. One of the Meccan soldiers, angry because the wellswere sealed and, perhaps, also because the army was beginning to sufferfrom thirst, attempted to make his way to the Muslim cistern anddrink. He was cut down by the night guard. Muhammad arrayed hismen in ranks; the ansar formed up by clan under their own chiefs.Muhammad arranged his troops into units of Emigrants, Awsites, andKazrai. He inspected the troops and dressed their ranks using an arrowto prick the stomach of any soldier out of line. There is no doubt thatsome of the ansar, although technically converts, had come along onlyfor the chance to obtain booty. Each unit had its own banner. Arabarmies used watchwords or passwords at night to control infiltration.These watchwords were equally useful during the day. Arab armies ofthis period had no distinguishing uniforms or equipment, so that inthe middle of an infantry melee it was often difficult to tell friend fromfoe. Soldiers would shout their army’s password when encounteringanother soldier so that each could determine the identity of the other.

One of Muhammad’s tactical tendencies, one that the later Arabarmies of the conquest period demonstrated as well, was a preferencefor the defense. At Badr and in most other battles that he foughtMuhammad chose to get to the battlefield first, select a strong defen-sive position, and wait for the enemy to come to him. At Badr he chosea position where his army was on the back edge of a field of sand dunesbetween himself and the Meccans so that the Meccans would be forcedto make their way over the dunes before engaging his front ranks.Muhammad probably hoped that the soft sand would tire the enemy,weakening them before they engaged his rested infantry. As it turned

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out, it rained during the night turning the Meccan camp “into aswamp.”19 It is difficult to believe, however, that the Meccan campwas affected so severely. A rainstorm of such magnitude surely wouldhave been mentioned in Ibn Ishaq’s account, which it is not. More likelya modest rain firmed up the ground under the feet of the Muslims atthe edge of the dunes while leaving most of the dunes between theMuslims and Meccans still soft in deep sand. If the Meccans werebeginning to suffer from thirst, having to make their way across thesoft dunes might well have consumed much of their energy before thebattle even began, just as Muhammad may have calculated when hechose his position. A later text tells that Muhammad instructed histroops to collect piles of stones, the grenades of the day, to throw atthe enemy. The thrown stone was an important weapon in antiquity,especially so among tribal armies. Troops arrayed in the defense couldcollect and throw more stones than an advancing enemy, who, havingto carry their weapons and shield, could each only carry one or twostones at a time.20

Muhammad addressed his troops before the battle. Ibn Ishaq tellsus only that “the Apostle had ordered his companions not to attackuntil he gave the word, and if the enemy should surround them theywere to keep them off with showers of arrows.”21 Later texts have theProphet addressing his troops in considerably more detail in the fashionof the orations of commanders found in classical texts of the West.These accounts even have Muhammad giving precise instructions. “Donot move to break your lines but stay on; do not commence fightinguntil I order; do not waste your arrows while the enemy is still beyondreach; discharge your arrows only when the target is within reach;when the enemy approaches, begin to throw stones with your hands; onhis nearer approach use lances and spear, the sword being drawn onlyfinally for hand to hand fighting.”22 Given Muhammad’s lack of mili-tary experience, it is unlikely that he would have been able to addresshis troops in such practical detail. More likely the later text is a versionof events redacted to demonstrate Muhammad’s military prowess.

At Badr we see Muhammad’s forces operating under a unified systemof command, an overall field commander whose orders are followed bysoldiers and clan chiefs regardless of their own tactical propensities,desire for loot, and even considerations of individual honor. At Badr theummah fought together for the first time. Muhammad was transformingArab warfare from war as sport, clan revenge, or individual glory into an

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instrument for the achievement of political goals. Muhammad intendedto destroy the Quraish, not to fight for honor or loot. He could have safelyreturned to Medina after he failed to ambush Abu Sufyan’s caravan.Instead, he remained at Badr looking for the opportunity to draw theMeccans into battle in the hopes of killing the Meccan leadership at asingle opportunity. In Muhammad’s intention to do just that we see thefirst example in Arab warfare of an army demonstrating strategic direc-tion and unity of command under a single commander.

Muhammad and a small bodyguard climbed a low hill that over-looked the battlefield from behind the Muslim positions. A small hut orenclosure made with palm fronds was constructed for Muhammad. Anumber of riding camels were tethered outside to be used for Muham-mad and his staff to make their escape should things go badly. LikeMoses at the Battle of Rephidim against the Amalekites, the overallcommander was not on the battlefield but on a hill overlooking it. Theabsence of the overall commander from the actual battle was an oldpractice in the West. It was probably Philip II of Macedon at the Battleof Cheronea who was the first field general to command his army froma position removed from the actual fighting.23 The practice quicklycaught on among sophisticated armies of the West so that we findCaesar, Scipio, and others commanding from near the battlefield butnot engaged in the battle itself. But Arab warfare was tribal war in whichevery able-bodied man took part. This was especially so for the clanchiefs and commander of the army who were expected to set the stan-dard for bravery and military prowess in battle. At Badr Muhammadseems to have introduced the Western practice of removed command.He had appointed his tactical commanders, selected the defensive posi-tion, developed a tactical plan, and inspected his men before retiringfrom the battlefield to seek a “light sleep” in the hut. General SirBernard Montgomery during Operation Market Garden in World War IIretired to his tent to sleep after “doing all he could” to prepare hisarmy for the battle. Like Montgomery, Muhammad left control of theactual fighting to his subordinate unit commanders.

The Meccans “marched forth at daybreak” leaving their encamp-ment just inside the southern pass and deployed facing the Muslimranks. In traditional Arab fashion the Meccans issued the usual chal-lenge that the Muslims send out their best men to engage in individualcombat. Three men of the ansar came forward to answer the challenge.The Meccans were Quraish and refused to accept the challengers from

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Medina. They wanted to fight the men from the Quraish tribe who hadbecome Muslims saying, “Send forth against us our peers of our owntribe.”24 The Meccans sent forth Utaba ibn Rabia, the son of the manto whom the blood debt was owed; Utaba’s son, al Waleed, who tookup a position on his father’s left; and Utaba’s brother, Shaiba, whostood to the right. Muhammad sent his uncle Hamza, a warrior notedfor skill and ferocity; his cousin and recent son-in-law, Ali, who hadmarried Muhammad’s daughter, Fatima; and an old warrior, Ubaidaibn al Harith. The fight did not last long. Hamza killed Shaiba and Alislew Waleed in hand-to-hand combat. Ubaida and Utaba hacked at oneanother for some minutes until both simultaneously landed near-fatalblows and fell to the ground. Hamza and Ali rushed toward the woundedUtaba and killed him. They carried their wounded comrade from thefield, but to no avail. Ubaida’s leg “had been cut to the marrow” andhe bled to death.

The sun shined into the eyes of the Meccans who had just seenthree of their best warriors slain before them. The heat, thirst, and fearmust have begun to take their toll on the fighting spirit of the Meccanarmy, many of whose men had never been eager for a fight that day.Muslim morale had been strengthened further by the victories of theirchampions. The texts do not tell us who attacked first, only that awild melee of flashing swords took place as both sides crashed into oneanother. Even with their fighting spirit weakened, the Meccans did notcrack, and the battle moved back and forth, neither side gaining anadvantage. The Meccans were unable to use their superiority in numbersto force a decision. Curiously, there is no mention of the participationof the Meccan cavalry that was surely present at Badr and had beenused earlier to conduct a reconnaissance of the battlefield. The poetryand oral traditions of the battle mention that cavalry was present, inone instance making reference to fleeing “on a swift footed noblemare,” and in another where the poet complains that the horses wereno protection during the fight. Arab cavalry, as mentioned earlier, wasnot a decisive military arm and could not successfully attack disci-plined infantry while it remained in formation. Like the cavalry ofmost armies of the ancient world, Arab cavalry hovered on the flankspicking off strays waiting for the infantry to break and run. In thatevent, cavalry could be put to good use hunting down and killing indi-vidual targets. The lack of participation of the Meccan cavalry at Badrsuggests that the Muslim infantry retained its cohesion and continued

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to fight as an organized unit, just as Muhammad must have hoped themembers of the ummah would do. It also suggests that Muhammad’sintroduction of a unified command for Muslim armies was a success.

The Battle of Badr might have been a close call, however, for it wasonly after the fighting had raged for some time (we are not told howlong by any of the texts) that Muhammad left his hut on the hill and “went forth to the people and incited them by saying, ‘By God inwhose hand is the soul of Muhammad, no man will be slain this dayfighting against them with steadfast courage, advancing not retreating,but God will cause him to enter Paradise.’”25 The promise of eternallife in paradise was new to Arab thinking as it had been for the earlyEgyptians who may have been the first to conceive of a theology of resurrection and eternal life and for Christians who appear later tohave adopted these ideas into their own theology.26 Modern religiousdevotees long accustomed to this idea perhaps do not always appre-ciate its attraction for a people who had never conceived of such athing before. Muhammad’s promise of paradise was completely new toArab theology and was a powerful motivational force for his soldiers.

Muhammad may have left his hut to rally his troops because thingswere going badly or because the outnumbered Muslims, despite holdingtheir ground, were hard pressed by the advantage of Meccan numbers.Ibn Ishaq records that after Muhammad addressed his troops one soldierwas so moved that he threw down his rations (there must have been alull in the battle) and waded back into the fight. Another threw off hiscoat of mail and plunged into the battle unarmored, fighting until hewas killed.27 Muhammad stopped speaking, reached down and pickedup a handful of pebbles and threw them at the enemy, and then orderedhis men to attack. It was then, tradition says (but the original texts donot support), that a wind came up driving the dry sand into the faces ofthe Meccans. The shock of the Muslim attack broke the spirit of theMeccans, who turned and fled. A Meccan soldier who fought at Badrlater described the flight of his own troops in a poem. “When I saw thearmy panic, running away at top speed, and that their leaders lay dead,I thought the best of them were like sacrifices to idols. Many of themlay there dead. And we were made to meet our fate at Badr.”28 With nocavalry of his own Muhammad could not pursue, and the remnants ofthe Meccan army were allowed to limp back to their camp unmolested.

Depending on the source, the Meccans lost either 49 or 70 deadand about the same number taken prisoner, a loss of 20 percent of the

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total force. By traditional Arab casualty standards this number wasenormous. The Meccans had suffered a major defeat. Muhammad’scontingent had suffered fourteen dead with no number of woundedrecorded. If one assumes an equal number of wounded to dead, thenthe Muslims suffered a total combat loss of about 10 percent ofstrength. Nothing revealed the changed nature of Arab warfare at Badrmore than the manner in which the Meccan prisoners were treated.The mercy and holding for ransom that had characterized traditionalwarfare in Arabia for centuries were almost completely absent atBadr. A number of prisoners were beheaded by men who held personalgrudges against them. In one case a father chopped off the foot of hisson who was fighting for the Meccans.29 Other prisoners were exe-cuted for no apparent reason. “They hewed them to pieces with theirswords until they were dead.”30 The ideological fervor of the Muslimsis obvious when it is remembered that they were killing members oftheir own tribe, men who were blood relatives and sometimes evenfamily members. Muhammad had brought a new cruelty and lethalityto Arab warfare.

Whatever the military value of the Muslim victory at Badr, inMuhammad’s view it was first and foremost a strategic political victory.Muhammad killed without mercy all the Meccan leaders that hadfallen into his hands. In one case Muhammad ordered the battlefieldsearched for one Abu Jahal, a chief of the Beni Makhzoom clan, and anearly opponent of Muhammad. Jahal had been a childhood friend ofMuhammad, but later turned against him. Jahal was discovered woundedamong a pile of Meccan corpses. When being taken to Muhammad he issupposed to have taunted his captor with the result that his captor cutoff his head on the spot. Jahal’s head was brought to Muhammad. Thesoldier said, “I threw the head before the Apostle and he gave thanksto God.”31 Muhammad ordered his men to dig a large pit into which thecorpses of the Meccans were thrown and buried. As the bodies were beingthrown into the pit, Muhammad stood on its lip and said, “O people ofthe pit, have you found that what God threatened is true? For I havefound that what my lord promised me is true.” His companions weretaken aback and one of them asked, “Are you speaking to dead people?”Muhammad replied, “They hear what I say to them. . . . They hear!”32

On his way back to Medina Muhammad took the opportunity tosettle some other old scores. Not all the prisoners had been killed. Oneof these was al Nadhr, who used to follow Muhammad around through

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the streets of Mecca mocking him and telling people that his storieswere as true as Muhammad’s! When Muhammad was told that hisridiculer was in his hands, he had the man brought before him.Muhammad ordered Ali to behead the man before his eyes. Later inthe journey another man, Uqba ibn Muait, was brought beforeMuhammad. He pleaded for his life crying out, Who will care for mywife and children? Muhammad replied coldly, “Hellfire!” Some ofMuhammad’s behavior can be explained as pure revenge for personalslights suffered earlier. But most of the executions were nothing lessthan political murder to deprive the Meccans of their leadership and toweaken them strategically. The killings were coldly calculated andcarried out on the grounds of political ideology and expediency.Muhammad himself seems to have suggested exactly this. When theMuslim army entered Medina some people ran up to him and congrat-ulated him on the victory at Badr. Ali shunted them aside. “What are youcongratulating us about? By God, we only met some old bald womenlike the sacrificial camels who are hobbled, and then we slaughteredthem.” Muhammad is said to have turned to Ali and smiled. “Butnephew, those were the chiefs.”33 In this exchange Muhammad revealedhis clear understanding of the political nature of warfare as conductedby an insurgency, something that was completely different from thewarfare to which Arabs had been previously accustomed.

Two important events followed the Battle of Badr: Muhammad’sreform of the marriage laws and his first attack on the Jewish tribes ofMedina. The reform of the marriage laws was probably in response tothe relatively large number of Muslim males killed at Badr. While we cannot be certain, it might have been that the greater number ofthe dead were suffered by the Emigrants, thus leaving a considerablenumber of women widows and children orphans with no one to care forthem. Soon after Badr Muhammad had a revelation that reformed thetraditional Arab customs governing marriage. The instruction appearsin the Quran and says, “If ye fear that ye may not act with equity inregard to the orphans, marry such of the women as seem good to you,two or three or four—but if ye fear that ye may not be fair (to severalwives), then one only or what your right hands possess.”34 Muhammadwas not placing a limit on some previous Arab practice of unlimitedpolygamy as is sometimes thought. On the contrary, he was encouragingmen who had only one wife to marry up to four. Muhammad’s injunction

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was not a restriction of an old practice, but the introduction of a com-pletely new one.35

The immediate stimulus for Muhammad’s reforms of the marriagelaws was the need to find husbands and fathers for the wives and childrenof the men that had been killed at Badr. The losses at Badr had throwninto sharper relief a problem that had plagued Arab societies for cen-turies. What with male deaths suffered in raids and personal combat,and lost to disease, and the generally higher survival rates of femalebabies, it is likely that there was always a surplus of females in Arabia.The surplus was somewhat held in check by the old bedouin practiceof female infanticide in times of famine. Even so, the problem of howto care for women in general and widows and orphans in particularwas chronic. This was one reason why girls as young as ten years oldwere sometimes “married” to older men who promised to take care ofthem. Men frequently married widows and orphans for their dowryor property left by the previous spouse, only to treat them badly andsteal their wealth. This left widows and orphans in a worse state thanbefore.36 Muhammad’s reforms, which also forbade female infanticide,were designed to correct both these problems by permitting men to have as many as four wives but only on the condition that allwives and children be treated fairly and equitably. It was the losses atBadr, however, that may have prompted Muhammad to proclaim thereforms when he did.

The second major event following closely upon the Battle of Badrwas Muhammad’s attack on the Qaynuqa, one of the Jewish tribes ofMedina. The immediate result of the victory at Badr was a tremendousincrease in the prestige and morale of the Muslims. No one could denythat they had defeated a powerful Meccan tribe in open battle, killingoff much of its leadership and taking weapons, armor, and camels asloot. Muslims are correct when they regard the Battle of Badr as themost significant military event in the history of their religion, for hadthey lost at Badr the Muslim movement might well have collapsed. InMuslim eyes it was a victory owed to God’s intercession and is called“the day of the furqan,” or day of proof. The victory at Badr is seen byMuslims as the equivalent of God’s intervention to save his chosen peopleby parting the waves of the Red Sea so that Moses and the Israelitescould escape pharaoh’s chariots. For many at the time the victory at Badrconfirmed or “proved” Muhammad’s claim to be God’s Messenger, with

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the result that conversions increased and Muhammad’s following grew.Most important to Muhammad’s decision to move against the Jews ofMedina was the fact that large numbers of the Aws and Kazrai tribes ofMedina converted to Islam, thereby forswearing their previous allianceswith the Jewish tribes.

Muhammad moved quickly to consolidate his power in Medina.His hatred of poets was well known and he immediately ordered theassassination of two Medinan poets: Asma bint Marwan, a marriedwoman with five children; and a man, Abu Afek, were both killed onMuhammad’s order. Here we see assassination for political ends. Thesekillings were political murders carried out for ideological reasons orpersonal revenge. Muhammad believed he was doing God’s work, andall those who opposed him or his faith had to be eliminated. To permitpoets or anyone else to ridicule him or the new ideology of Islam wasto undermine the primary reason why Muhammad was conducting theinsurgency. At the same time, however, Muhammad hired his ownpoets to spread his propaganda among the tribes. One of these wasHassan ibn Thabit. When Muhammad asked him if he could defendhim from the attacks of his enemies, ibn Thabit is said to have stuckout his tongue and replied, “There is no armor which I cannot piercewith this weapon.”37

Muhammad now turned against the Jews in Medina. They hadbecome increasingly hostile to his claims to be a prophet, publicly heldhim up to ridicule, and confronted him with arguments to refute hisclaims. There had been few conversions among the Jews, and the threeJewish tribes, when taken together, could mount a formidable armedforce against him. Of the Jewish tribes—Beni an-Nadir, Beni Qurayzah,and Beni Qaynuqa—the Qaynuqa alone were said to have three hundredsoldiers with armor and four hundred without armor.38 The other twoJewish clans were either larger in absolute numbers or had strongeralliances with the Aws and Kazrai Arab tribes, which made them toopowerful for Muhammad to attack. He seems to have chosen to confrontthe weakest of the Jewish tribes. The Beni Qaynuqa were goldsmiths andarmorers and owned no fields; they had their own compounds and asmall marketplace where they traded and sold their wares.

The immediate cause of the break with the Jews was an altercationthat occurred in the Qaynuqa marketplace involving some sort of inde-cency to a Muslim woman. Both Hamza and Ali, two of the Apostle’sclosest companions, were involved, leading one to suspect that the

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confrontation was deliberately provoked. The Jews reacted to thethreat by arming their men and withdrawing to their fortified com-pounds to await a Muslim attack. The Beni Qaynuqa had allianceswith clans of the Aws and Kazrai and expected them to come to theiraid against Muhammad. But most clans of both Arab tribes had alreadyconverted to Islam and made it clear that their new loyalties abrogatedtheir previous pledges to the Jews. Isolated and with no possibility ofmilitary aid, the Beni Qaynuqa surrendered after a siege of two weeksduring which there was no fighting and no casualties on either side.

The question now was, what to do with the Jews? Ibn Ishaq’s accountsuggests that Muhammad wanted to kill them.39 A leader of a clan ofthe Kazrai, one Abdullah ibn Ubay, an influential leader in Medina anda man known for his reasonableness, went to Muhammad. Ibn Ubaywas a Muslim convert and begged Muhammad to show mercy to theBeni Qaynuqa who had once been his allies. In the Kazrai wars withthe Aws the Jews of the Beni Qaynuqa clan had sided with his clan,and one of them may have saved ibn Ubay’s life on the battlefield.Ibn Ubay said to the Apostle, “Oh Muhammad, deal kindly with myallies.” Muhammad rudely turned his back on him. Ibn Ubay seizedMuhammad by the cloak and spun him around. Ibn Ishaq tells us,“The Apostle was so angry his face became almost black. He said,“Confound you, let go of me!” Abdullah replied, “No, by God, I willnot let you go until you deal kindly with my clients. Four hundredmen unarmored and three hundred in armor protected me from myenemies. Would you cut them down in one morning? By God, I am aman who fears that circumstances may change!”40

Abdullah’s words to Muhammad—“Would you cut them down inone morning?”—suggest that Muhammad had planned to execute theJewish males. They were, after all, his ideological enemies; any hopesfor Jewish conversions were slim. The Jews of Medina would always behis enemies. Why not deal with them now once and for all? The timewould come when Muhammad would have all the males of anotherJewish tribe beheaded in Medina’s public square. Ibn Ubay was clearlythreatening Muhammad when he said, “I am a man who fears that cir-cumstances may change!” He was a powerful chief of the Kazrai tribe,and although a Muslim, he seemed to be saying he was prepared to sup-port his old allies and observe the traditional tribal obligations insteadof his obligations as a Muslim. He was threatening Muhammad withcivil war. Muhammad grasped the calculation of interests immediately.

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He could not hope to outfight a coalition of the Kazrai and the Jews. Ifhe attempted to do so, he risked losing the support of other Arab clansand even some converted clans of the Aws who had until recently alsobeen allies of the Jews. Muhammad drew back from the confrontation.“You can have their lives,” he said, and walked out.41

Muhammad’s opposition to the Jews of Medina seems to havearisen from a number of factors. Whether Muhammad was an anti-Semite as some have claimed remains a question beyond the scope ofthis work. But once the Jews of Medina were dealt with Muhammadordered special protections for Jews and Christians, even going so far asto forbid that they be targets of Muslim proselytizing. Muhammadwas, however, a committed revolutionary ideologue. There was nodoubt that on this score the Jews could not be permitted to undermineMuhammad’s claim to be God’s Messenger. To do so would underminethe fundamental reason for the insurgency. The Jewish tribes of Medinawere also a formidable military threat if they chose to use their strengthagainst the Muslims. Muhammad’s control over Medina would neverbe complete so long as these competitors for military power were per-mitted to retain their forces. Moreover, Muhammad could never hopeto expand his insurgency beyond Medina or to move with militaryforce against Mecca unless his base of operations in Medina was com-pletely secure. To achieve this he had to reduce the threat of the Jewishforces in the city. Finally, Muhammad’s sensitivity to personal ridiculeseems also to have played a part in his motivations. During the time ofthe quarrel with the Beni Qaynuqa Muhammad had a revelation thatseems to explain his anger at the Jews in precisely these terms. Sura 5,verse 57, of the Quran says, “Oh you who believe, do not take as alliesthose who received the Books before you [Jews and Christians] butwho treat your religion as a joke and a game.” As with all revolutionaries,past and present, ideological opponents were always seen as the worstenemies, more so when they made the mistake of not taking a revolu-tionary idealist seriously.

The Jews of the Beni Qaynuqa were ordered to leave Medina and toleave most of their property and wealth behind. Muhammad expresslycommanded that they leave their metalworking tools and equipmentwith which they made weapons and armor. Muhammad now had hisown armory. The houses, property, fields, and animals of the BeniQaynuqa were distributed among the Muslims, which helped lift themout of the terrible poverty they had endured for so long. The Jews

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migrated north to Syria. Never a man to overlook details, Muhammadturned to another personal matter. An Arab poet, Kaab ibn al Ashraf,was living with his mother’s Jewish tribe and was thought to be a Jewhimself. Ibn al Ashraf had composed a poem lamenting the death ofthe Meccans at Badr. Muhammad’s intelligence service also suspectedthat he was traveling regularly to Mecca, where he was urging theMeccans to take revenge for Badr. According to Ibn Ishaq, Muhammadsaid to his companions, “Who will rid me of Ibn al Ashraf?”42 A half-brother of the poet who had become a Muslim was used to lure alAshraf into the night, where he was murdered. Muhammad was becominga man with a reputation for not suffering insults easily.

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7

Battle of UhudMarch 625

The Meccan leadership had been decapitated, and one can onlyimagine Abu Sufyan’s shock upon learning that so many of the

city’s leaders had been killed at Badr. Many of the old chiefs werequickly replaced by their less experienced sons, leaving Abu Sufyanthe only Quraish leader of stature to direct the civic and militaryaffairs of the city. The older leadership had been divided on how todeal with Muhammad, with many being reluctant to use force againsthim. The devastating defeat at Badr, the rise of the younger chiefs, andAbu Sufyan’s public outrage and oath to take revenge changed that.Many Meccans were now convinced that Muhammad could be dealtwith only by force. Within a month the Meccans assembled a raidingparty of 150 to 200 men under Abu Sufyan’s command to undertake araid on Medina. The small size of the raiding party suggests that its pur-pose was mostly psychological, to serve notice that the Meccans werestill a force to be reckoned with and were ready to fight. The point mayalso have been to send a message to the bedouin tribes who controlledthe caravan routes and on whom the Meccan trade depended for its safetravel. The Meccans now regarded Muhammad as their archenemy.

In April 624 Abu Sufyan’s raiders approached Medina. In Arabfashion they prepared to attack in the early morning, switching from

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camels to horses. Ibn Ishaq is silent on the details of the raid, but itappears to have been a minor engagement with only a few workerscaught tending the fields killed and two houses burned before the raiderswithdrew. The Quba section of Medina where the raid took place liessouth of the town and was densely settled so that compounds, datepalm groves, and walled gardens made cavalry maneuver difficult bycanalizing the raiders into narrow files. Once the alarm was sounded,the Meccans broke off the attack and returned to their camp, switchedmounts to their camels, and moved quickly south along the road toMecca. It took some time for Muhammad to assemble a reaction forceand give chase. The Meccans had a significant lead but were slowed bythe need to attend to their horses tethered behind the camels. At somepoint the Muslims must have gotten close. To lighten their load andincrease their speed the Meccans jettisoned some of their baggage,including several sacks of dried barley used for making porridge. InMuslim chronicles Abu Sufyan’s foray and retreat is known derisively asthe “Porridge Raid.” The Muslims broke off their pursuit, having givenchase mostly to save face and not to engage the Meccans.

In May 624 Muhammad sought to capitalize on the increasedprestige afforded by his victory at Badr by assembling a force of twohundred men and leading raids against two bedouin tribes, the Ghatafanand the Beni Sulaym. The Ghatafan bedouins lived between Medinaand Kheibar, the main Jewish oasis to the north of Medina. The BeniSulaym lived to the south of Medina, astride the main caravan routefrom Mecca. These raids accomplished little but the capture of fivehundred camels from the Ghatafan. No fighting took place. In June624 Muhammad assembled a larger force of 450 men and set out toraid the Ghatafan again. The Ghatafans detected his advance and movedfarther into the desert to avoid contact. In August 624 Muhammad ledthree hundred men against the Beni Sulaym but once more was unableto find them and bring them to battle. These failures throw into sharprelief the inability of Muhammad’s intelligence service to performadequately. Given their locations along the main caravan route, boththe Ghatafan and Beni Sulaym tribes must have had long-standingcommercial relations to provide lodging, forage, and protection for theMeccan caravans. They were also, of course, pagans. Muhammad’sattempt to attack these tribes was not motivated by religion, but byhis desire to weaken the transportation infrastructure of inns, wells,

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feeding places, and the friendly tribes that controlled them that theMeccan caravans required to carry out their journeys. Muhammad wasattempting to strangle and isolate Mecca economically and politically.

The strategy seems to have had some success. Ibn Ishaq tells usthat the “Quraish were afraid to follow their usual route to Syria afterwhat had happened at Badr, so they went by the Iraq route.”1 A poetlater described the difficulty that the Meccans faced in getting theircaravans by Muhammad’s blockade. “You can say good-bye to thestreams of Damascus, for in between are swords like the mouths ofpregnant camels who feed on arak trees.”2 The sources describe theMeccan caravan in 625 as carrying a rich load of silver and other goods,a description that suggests it was the annual spring caravan. But thisseems unlikely. The guard was too small for such an important caravanand was easily driven off by the Muslim force of only one hundredmen. If Muhammad had planned to attack the spring caravan, hewould have put a much larger force in the field to deal with the strongguard that would have attended it in light of his own recent attacks.Most likely the caravan was a small one and the figures regarding itscaptured cargo were inflated by the Muslims for propaganda purposes.

Muhammad’s intelligence source in Mecca, his uncle Abbas, seemsto have supplied the information necessary to make the raid a successby permitting Muhammad sufficient time to assemble a force andposition it where it could ambush the caravan.3 The raiding party con-sisted of only a hundred men under the command of Zayd, the formerChristian slave whom Muhammad had adopted as his son. The caravanwas attacked while it watered at a well near Qarda in Jejed, the guarddriven off, and its cargo seized. Zayd returned to Medina with the booty.There were no Muslim casualties. The news of the caravan’s capturereached Mecca to widespread outrage. The new Meccan leadershipseems to have understood that Muhammad’s attacks had now becomea strategic threat to their livelihood and economic survival. There wasno alternative but to break Muhammad’s blockade with force. AbuSufyan, the most prominent man left in Mecca since Badr and an expe-rienced military commander, was selected to raise an army to destroyMuhammad once and for all.

In late January 625 an army of three thousand men and two hundredhorses made up of the Quraish, an assembly of bedouin client tribes,and some “black troops” who were probably Abyssinian mercenariesmarched out of Mecca toward Medina to bring the war to Muhammad.4

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The Meccan army took twelve days to reach Medina. Their route ofmarch took them west of the city itself and then north where theycamped at a place known as the Two Springs on an open plain at the footof a rocky outcropping called Mount Uhud. The reason the army did notcome directly at Medina from the south was due to the terrain. Medinais situated on a lava plain about ten miles wide and ten miles longsurrounded on three sides by steep mountains. Access from beyond themountains to the plain itself is through a few narrow easily defendedpasses. The approach from the south was through Quba, an area thicklypopulated with clan compounds, walled gardens, and date palm groves,all of which make movement by units in formation difficult. The lavafields to the southeast rendered the terrain unsuitable for cavalry anddifficult for infantry and camels as well. To the southeast lay the com-pounds of the Jewish tribes, and the west was thick with more groves andgardens. Any attempt to move the Meccan army through the southernpass at Quba would be difficult and expose it to the risk of ambush.

Medina could only be approached from the north over open groundfree of obstacles. Much of the land between Medina and Mount Uhudwas saline and unfit for cultivation.5 Once past the foot of MountUhud, however, there was a good well at Zaghabah and sufficient grassto feed horses and camels. There were also some small crop fieldswhere the Meccan animals could feed. The old riverbed runningthrough the area was full of soft sand that was a comfort to the camels’feet. The Meccan army went into camp just north of the foot of MountUhud. The arrival of the Meccans was no secret, and Muhammadimmediately dispatched Muslim scouts to keep watch on them. Hecalled for a general mobilization to deal with the threat. About a thou-sand men reported for duty.6

Muhammad knew that he was greatly outnumbered and that givingbattle on the open plain would relinquish the advantage to the Meccans.Worse, there was no Muslim cavalry while the Meccans had two hun-dred mounted horsemen under the command of Khalid al-Walid andIkrimah ibn Abu Jahl, later to become two of the most famous Muslimgenerals in the wars of conquest. Muhammad called his staff togetherfor advice. He was, as always, disposed to the defense and wanted todraw the enemy into Medina itself in house-to-house fighting. In thishe was supported by Abdullah ibn Ubay, the chief of the Kazrai and anexperienced warrior. Ibn Ubay said, “Oh Apostle, stay in Medina, donot go out to them. We have never gone out to fight an enemy but we

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112

Map 7. Battle of Uhud, 625 c.e.

have met disaster, and none has come in against us without beingdefeated.” (Ibn Ubay’s references to past battles were to the tribal wars,not to any previous Muslim engagements.) “If they stay, they stay in anevil predicament, and if they come in, the men will fight them and thewomen and children will throw stones on them from the walls, and ifthey retreat they will retreat low-spirited as they came.”7 Ibn Ubay wasinclined, as Ibn Hisham tells us, “to fight it out in the streets.”8

Medina was full of obstacles to both cavalry and infantry move-ment deployed in large formations; the palm groves, springs, walledgardens, and the fortified compounds with their towers made the useof Meccan cavalry impossible while at the same time making it dif-ficult for the Meccans to bring their superior infantry numbers to bear.The terrain and obstacles would force the Meccan units to break upinto smaller ones, making them vulnerable to ambush and to piecemealengagement by the Muslims. Moreover, the Meccans had no siegemachinery. If the Muslims withdrew into their compounds and refusedto give battle, it would only be a matter of time before the Meccanarmy, lacking any supply train, would have consumed what crops werestill in the fields before being forced to withdraw. Both Muhammadand ibn Ubay showed considerable grasp of tactics in their analysis ofhow to deal with the Meccan threat.

Muhammad failed, however, to put his original tactical plan intooperation. A crowd gathered around Muhammad’s house and clamoredto be led out to meet the Meccans in open battle. Many of the youngermen, perhaps seeking martyrdom, were particularly adamant in theirdesire for an open fight, perhaps believing that the God that hadgranted them victory at Badr would do so again. The debate continuedfor two days before Muhammad finally put an end to it by agreeing tolead his men into battle against the Meccans on the open plain.Muhammad retired to his house and put on his armor and retrieved hisweapons. When he emerged he found that the crowd had changed itsmind and now wanted to stay in the city and fight!9 But Muhammadwas now resolute in his decision and ordered his men to assemble inthe cul-de-sac at the foot of Mount Uhud.

As the Muslim soldiers retrieved their armor and weapons fromtheir houses and straggled toward the assembly area, two interestingevents occurred. Depending on which source one reads, a contingent ofJews from the remaining tribes had assembled to help Muhammadbecause they were allies of Abdullah ibn Ubay; they showed up to

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fulfill their traditional tribal obligations to defend their allies. One of theMuslims told Muhammad that the contingent were Jews. Muhammadis said to have replied, “It is not right to invoke the aid of polytheists tofight other polytheists.”10 The other version of the story is that oneof Muhammad’s officers, no doubt reflecting on the fact that theMuslims were outnumbered, asked Muhammad directly, “Oh Apostle,should we not ask help from our allies, the Jews?”11 Muhammad replied,“We have no need of them.”12 It is unlikely that the first version iscorrect. Muhammad certainly knew that the Jews were not poly-theists and never seems to have referred to them as such even thoughit became somewhat common for later Muslim sources to refer to bothChristians and Jews as polytheists. The second version rings true andis interesting in that it reflects Muhammad’s view of war as ideologicaland not based in traditional clan obligations. In terms of numbers,Muhammad surely could have made good use of the Jewish warriors.He chose not to on ideological grounds. War was a God-directed activityof the faithful, not merely a military exercise.

The second event was potentially more ominous. Abdullah ibnUbay strongly disagreed with Muhammad’s decision to offer battle in theopen plain instead of engaging in house-to-house fighting in the streetsof Medina. He withdrew his contingent of Kazrai tribesmen, about threehundred men or “a third of the men,” and rode back to Medina.13 IbnUbay seems to have realized that Muhammad’s choice of an assemblyarea at the foot of Mount Uhud had uncovered the approaches to Medinaitself exposing it to attack. When formed for battle the Meccan armyhad a clear avenue of advance toward Medina. Ibn Ubay may have cal-culated that if Muhammad was driven from the field, a not unrealisticexpectation in light of the relative strengths of the armies, there wasnothing to stop the Meccans from taking the city, looting it, andputting it to the torch. Ibn Ubay thought this too great a risk andretired with his men to his own clan compound, where he prepared todefend it against the Meccan attack that he expected would come inthe wake of Muhammad’s defeat.

Upon the arrival of the Meccans Muhammad ordered a picket lineto be thrown across the northern approaches and nightly patrols con-ducted to warn of enemy activity. Muhammad surrounded himselfwith a bodyguard of fifty men. The withdrawal of ibn Ubay’s troopsleft Muhammad with only seven hundred men. Of these one hundredhad coats of mail. The Meccans had three thousand men and two

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hundred horses; seven hundred Meccans had coats of mail armor.14

There were also contingents of “black troops” among the Meccans,probably Abyssinian mercenaries who were known as good javelinmen. By any reasonable military calculation the Meccan army waslarger, better equipped, more experienced, and led by experienced cavalry and infantry officers. Only a commander like Muhammad whobelieved that God was on his side and would determine the outcome ofthe fight would have engaged the Meccans under these circumstancesand upon open ground. From a military perspective his decision borderedon incompetence.

Map 8 depicts the battlefield of Uhud and the relative positions of the Muslim and Meccan armies. Muhammad made no attempt to takeadvantage of any natural obstacles and deployed his forces for a directinfantry engagement. He realized that his defensive position was exposedto cavalry attacks on both flanks and that some way had to be found toneutralize the Meccan cavalry. Across the field the Meccan cavalryhad deployed in a somewhat unorthodox manner. One troop under thecommand of Ikrimah ibn Abu Jahl was deployed forward of the mainMeccan infantry line and was likely intended to skirmish with theMuslim front line using their lances from horseback. The more seriousthreat to Muhammad’s position was the second troop, probably larger,under the command of Khalid al-Walid that deployed far to the right ofthe Meccan infantry line. Its mission was to turn Muhammad’s flank.

The terrain to Muhammad’s left and in front of al-Walid’s troopswas broken by palm groves and walled gardens, but insufficiently so toprevent a movement in formation by the Meccan cavalry. To prevental-Walid’s cavalry from turning his flank, Muhammad posted fiftyarchers on the Ainain Hill, hereafter called the Hill of Arrows in Muslimchronicles. Later texts state that Muhammad sent a few mounted mento help fill the gap between the hill and the groves.15 The earliest textstell us, however, that Muhammad had only two horses available andhe was mounted on one. What might have occurred is that some Muslimsoldiers arrived late and may have brought a few horses with them. Inany event it was a paltry force and no match for al-Walid’s cavalry. IfMuhammad was to prevent the Meccans from turning his flank, itwould have to be with the indirect fire from the archers positioned onthe Hill of Arrows.

That Muhammad recognized the importance of the archers’ posi-tion to his chances of success is clear from the instructions he issued

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Map 8. The Battlefield of Uhud

to Abdullah bin Jubayr, their commander. Ibn Ishaq records thatMuhammad instructed his commander to “keep the cavalry awayfrom us with your arrows and let them not come on us from the rearwhether the battle goes in favor or against us; and keep your places sothat we cannot be got at from your direction.”16 In short, hold theposition to the last man or until relieved. Later sources record a moredramatic instruction. The archers were ordered not to leave theirpositions “even if the vultures perch on the corpses of the Muslims.”17

Muhammad seems to have realized that if his flank were turned,defeat would be inevitable and, as Abdullah ibn Ubay had predicted,the road to Medina would be open.

Ibn Ishaq tells us that when Muhammad emerged from his housein full armor, “the Apostle wore two coats of mail on the day ofUhud.”18 The story makes little sense for a double shirt of mail wouldweigh close to seventy pounds and would have made movement verydifficult. This said, when Muhammad had been knocked to the groundduring the battle one text tells us that “he had put on two coats ofmail so when he tried to get up he could not do so” and had to be liftedup and carried to safety.19 A later source says that Muhammad didnot put on two coats of mail but exchanged his armor with one of hissoldiers, one Ka’b ibn Malik, “apparently for the purposes of disguiseand security on the day of the battle.”20 This is a more plausible expla-nation, and as events turned out it was Muhammad’s disguise thatsaved his life that day.

Muhammad reviewed his troops on horseback and moved theminto position on the battlefield. The sources do not tell us the time ofday the battle began, but there is no reason to suspect that it was anyother time but late morning. The two lines of infantry drew up oppo-site one another. The battle began when a Meccan warrior steppedforward challenging the Muslims to send forth a champion to meethim in individual combat. Ali rushed from the Muslim ranks, attackedthe Meccan, and killed him with a single slash of his sword. A greatcheer—“Allah akbar” (God is great!)—rose from the Muslim ranks.The brother of the slain warrior rushed from the Meccan ranks toattack his brother’s killer. Before he could reach Ali, the fierce Hamzastepped between them and cut down the Meccan. Three more menfrom the Meccan line challenged Hamza, one after another; all threemet their deaths. Excited by the victorious combats taking placebefore their eyes, the Muslim ranks charged the Meccans engaging

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them in fierce hand-to-hand combat “until the battle grew hot.”21 Thewounded were slain without mercy.22 As the battle raged a Muslimsoldier, Abu Dujana, cut his way through the enemy ranks reachingthe Meccan camp. It was common Arab practice for the clans to bringtheir women to the battlefield where they would sing, bang tam-bourines, and shout poems to encourage their men to fight well.23 AbuDujana rushed headlong into the camp scattering the women, who fledfor their lives.

Hamza, meanwhile, prowled the battlefield looking for Meccanwarriors to fight and seems not to have taken part in the Muslim charge.A Meccan, Abu Niyar, passed close to him and Hamza challenged himto a fight saying, “Come here, you son of a female circumciser!”24 Thetwo warriors began fighting. Off to the side watching the combatantswas Wahshi, an Abyssinian slave armed with a javelin. While Hamza’sattention was focused on his opponent, Wahshi threw his javelin atHamza; Wahshi recalled that “it pierced the lower part of his body andcame out between his legs. He came on towards me, but collapsed andfell. I left him there until he died, then I came and recovered myjavelin.”25 What happened to Hamza was a classic case of Arab bloodrevenge. Wahshi had been hired by a woman named Hind, Abu Sufyan’swife and daughter of Utaba ibn Rabia, who had been killed by Hamzaat the Battle of Badr. His daughter had sworn revenge for her father’sdeath. It was she who hired Wahshi and promised him his freedom ifhe killed Hamza. The highly personal nature of Arab warfare was fur-ther demonstrated when Wahshi, having killed Hamza, retrieved hisweapon and then “went off to the camp, for I had no business withanyone but him.”26

The ferocity of the Muslim attack succeeded in breaking the Meccanline at several points permitting groups of Muslims to penetrate andbegin isolating segments of the Meccan ranks, hacking them to pieces.For a while their superior numbers allowed the Meccans to hold on.Eventually, however, they began to waver and finally to fall back in asemidisciplined fashion. It was at this point that the Muslims pressedthe attack with great force penetrating completely through the Meccanranks “until they cut them off from their camp and there was an obviousrout.”27 With Muslim soldiers behind them and in the midst of theirranks, the Meccan defense collapsed. Once more Muhammad’s disci-plined infantry had proven that a smaller highly motivated force coulddefeat a larger less motivated force in close combat. Had the Muslims

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even a small cavalry contingent with which to attack the scatteredMeccan ranks, the Battle of Uhud would have been a disaster for theMeccans and a great victory for Muhammad.

What happened next is a matter of some debate. Later Muslim his-torians suggest that the gap between Muhammad’s left and the Hill ofArrows was narrow and marked by uneven terrain and palm grovesthat made passage by cavalry difficult and easily covered by indirectarrow fire.28 There is a hint in these later accounts that the Meccancavalry under Khalid al-Walid had tried several times to attack throughthe gap and had been driven back by arrow fire. These historians suggestthat at some point al-Walid decided to ride completely around MountUhud and come at the Muslims from the rear. A ride of this distancewould have been at least ten to twelve miles, taken more than anhour to complete, and arrived on the battlefield with horses unfit forbattle.29 The account is implausible on military grounds and may havebeen devised to put a gloss on what seems to have been a breakdownin Muslim discipline exposing Muhammad to the charge of incompe-tence in leaving his critical left flank so poorly defended.

Ibn Ishaq’s earlier account of events seems more likely. He suggeststhat even after the Muslim attack had broken the Meccan ranks, theenemy cavalry had not engaged at all. In typical fashion it had hoverednear the flanks ready to strike if the Muslim ranks broke, hoping topursue and kill the fleeing remnants. But when the Meccan ranks brokeexposing their camp the Muslim attack lost its momentum as its soldiersabandoned the fight and began to plunder the camp.30 Seeing theirfellow soldiers sacking the camp, the Muslim “archers turned asideto the camp when the enemy had been cut off from it making for thespoil.”31 Only a handful of archers held their posts on the Hill of Arrows.When al-Walid saw the Muslim archers leaving to sack the Meccancamp, he rallied his cavalry and led it at full gallop through the nowunprotected gap turning Muhammad’s flank and striking his forces inthe rear. Ibn Ishaq says, “Thus they [the archers] opened our rear to thecavalry and we were attacked from behind.32

Two hundred Meccan cavalrymen struck the Muslim rear with suchforce that it brought the Muslim infantry attack to a halt. Attempting toregroup along the line of departure, the Muslims broke off their lootingand turned around. This provided breathing room for the Meccans toreform and return to the attack. Khalid al-Walid continued to wreakhavoc behind the Muslim positions, his horsemen riding about the

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rear striking targets of opportunity with their long lances. The Musliminfantry began to lose its cohesion and flee. “The Muslims were putto flight and the enemy slew many of them. It was a day of trial andtesting in which God honored several with martyrdom.”33 The Muslimdefense collapsed.

Events went from bad to worse. Muhammad and his bodyguardwere now surrounded by Meccan soldiers pressing the attack withgreat force. As the din of combat swirled around Muhammad, he wasstruck in the face with a slingstone that shattered one of his teeth andcut his lip and cheek; blood ran down his face.34 Another account saysthat a slingstone struck the cheek plate of his helmet with such forcethat it drove it into Muhammad’s face. The force of the impactknocked Muhammad off his feet. The Meccans closed in on the smallgroup of Muslim soldiers protecting Muhammad. At some point hewas struck on the head by a blow from a sword knocking his helmetdown over his eyes. Muhammad fell to the ground dazed and coveredwith blood. His bodyguard was being cut to pieces. “They fought indefense of the Apostle man after man, all being killed until only Zayed(or Umara) was left fighting until he was disabled. At that point anumber of Muslims returned and drove the enemy away from him.”35

One imagines a pile of bodies and wounded strewn around the woundedMuhammad as Abu Dujana “made his body a shield for the Apostle.Arrows were falling on his back as he leaned over him, until there weremany stuck in it.”36 A few more moments and Muhammad mighthave been killed, perhaps putting an end to Islam as well.

Suddenly the rumor swept the battlefield that Muhammad hadbeen killed. A cheer arose among the Meccans, who broke off their attackin celebration. The remaining Muslim contingents, thinking their chiefdead, began to flee. What seems to have happened is that a Muslimstandard-bearer, one Mus’ab ibn Umayr, had been killed by a Meccanwho, upon seeing Umayr dressed in Muhammad’s armor, thought hehad killed the Apostle himself. For whatever reason, Muhammad hadswitched armor with another soldier earlier that day. The logic is com-pelling that it must have been with Umayr, but no source testifies tothis fact. In any event, the news of Muhammad’s death brought thebattle to an end. Muhammad was safe under a pile of bodies protectedby a few stalwart Muslim warriors.

Ali, Abu Bakr, Umar, and a few others were close by and begansearching for Muhammad. One of the men, Ka’b ibn Malik, “recognized

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his [Muhammad’s] eyes gleaming from beneath his helmet and . . . calledout at the top of my [his] voice, “Take heart, you Muslims, this is theApostle of God.”37 Muhammad realized that he had only survivedbecause the Meccans had not recognized him and told ibn Malik to stopshouting and be quiet. Muhammad’s men helped him to his feet andcarried him up the rocky slopes of Mount Uhud, where they concealedthemselves in a shallow glen. “When the Apostle reached the mouthof the glen Ali came out and filled his shield with water from al-Mihras[a well located nearby on Mount Uhud] and brought it to the Apostle,who refused to drink it because its evil smell repelled him. However, heused the water to wash the blood from his face and as he poured it overhis head he said, ‘The wrath of God is fierce against him who bloodiedthe face of His prophet.’”38 Later, Muhammad’s wounds were cauterizedby a hot iron,39 a procedure that would surely have left Muhammadwith a scar on his face. There are no early portraits of Muhammad ordescriptions, however, that indicate such a scar.

The view from the glen might have disheartened even so fervent abeliever as Muhammad. Below the Muslim army was scattered all overthe field. Meccan cavalrymen rode around the battlefield skeweringMuslim infantrymen with their lances. “The army had fled away fromthe Apostle,” Ibn Ishaq tells us.40 The Meccans were mutilating thedead and killing the wounded. Abu Sufyan himself ran his lance intothe mouth of the dead Hamza saying, “Taste that, you rebel.”41 Forsheer horror, however, no one matched Abu Sufyan’s wife, Hind, in herthirst for revenge. “Hind and the women with her stopped to mutilatethe Apostle’s dead companions. They cut off their ears and noses andHind made them into anklets and collars and gave her anklets and collarsand pendants to Wahshi, the slave. . . . She cut out Hamza’s liver andchewed it, but she was not able to swallow it and threw it away. Thenshe mounted a high rock and shrieked at the top of her voice.”42 Hind’sattempt to eat Hamza’s liver seems a curious vestige of some pre-historic animism, wherein one devours the liver of one’s enemy in thehope of acquiring his strength. Even among the primitive Arabs,Hind’s actions would have been shocking.

The Meccan army formed up and began to move toward its camp.Abu Sufyan and a small troop of cavalry rode up to a vantage point onMount Uhud where he was sure he could be seen and heard by theremnants of the Muslim army. Nearby Muhammad and his small bandof companions kept hidden in the glen. Abu Sufyan cried out, “Victory

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in war is like a bucket in a well, going alternatively up and down.Today is in exchange for Badr. Show thy strength, O Hubal.”43 Inex-plicably, Muhammad ordered Umar to get up and answer Abu Sufyan’sboast, risking revealing his hiding place. Umar shouted back, “We arenot equal. Our dead are in paradise; your dead in hell.”44 Abu Sufyanmust have spotted Umar for he called to him to approach. WhenUmar came near, Abu Sufyan asked, “By God, Umar, have we killedMuhammad?” Umar replied, “By God, you have not, he is listening to what you are saying now.” Abu Sufyan must have known thatMuhammad was nearby. He could easily have ordered the cavalrymenwith him to seek him out and kill him, putting an end to the entirenasty business. But in Abu Sufyan’s view war was sport and honorwas central to its practice. To kill Muhammad now that the battlewas over and he had already been beaten was not the valiant thing todo. And so Muhammad survived.

Abu Sufyan’s chivalric view of war was also evident when he calledout to Muhammad. “There are some mutilated bodies among yourdead. By God, it gives me no satisfaction, and no anger. I neither pro-hibited nor ordered mutilation.”45 As Abu Sufyan and his small troopof cavalry turned to ride down the mountain, he called out, “Yourmeeting place is Badr next year.” The Apostle told one of his compan-ions to answer, “Yes, it is an appointment between us.”46 The battlehad been a good day’s manly sport. Both sides would meet again nextyear to continue the game. Seventy-four Muslims and twenty-threeMeccans were killed at Uhud. Of the Muslim dead only four or fivewere Emigrants; the rest were ansar.

The defeat of the Muslims at Mount Uhud opened the road toMedina. Had the Meccans regarded war as Muhammad did, as a meansof obtaining strategic goals in the service of God’s will, the logical stepafter defeating the Muslim forces in the field would have been tomarch on Medina and put it to the sword. Even if not all the Muslimsin Medina were slain, the city’s destruction would have at least put anend to Muhammad’s ability to interrupt the Meccan caravan trade.Such a disaster befalling Medina would have weakened Muhammad’sclaim to prophethood, and it is not inconceivable that Islam as a religio-social movement might have collapsed entirely. Had their positionsbeen reversed, Muhammad would almost certainly have attacked anddestroyed Mecca. But Abu Sufyan was a traditional Arab chief, notthe leader of an ideological insurgency, and for him war was a means

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of settling conflicts between men in a chivalric manner. Instead ofattacking Medina, Abu Sufyan ordered his troops to pack up and beginmaking their way back to Mecca.

No sooner had Abu Sufyan ridden down from Mount Uhud andordered the Meccan army to begin moving than Muhammad emergedfrom his hiding place and ordered Ali to follow the Meccans and see ifthey were heading for Medina. Muhammad knew that if the Meccanswere making for Medina only a few miles away, they would be ridingtheir horses and leading their camels; if they were preparing for the longjourney to Mecca, they would be riding their camels and leading theirhorses. Ali followed the Meccans for a few miles and then returnedyelling with joy that the Meccans were riding their camels and headinghome. Surprisingly, Muhammad sent no one to follow the Meccans tomake sure that Ali’s report was true. The Meccans had traveled only afew miles from the battlefield when Ali turned back, and they couldjust as easily have changed their minds and turned to attack Medina.Once more Muhammad’s luck held.

Muhammad and his officers came down from Mount Uhud to findthe battlefield littered with Muslim dead and wounded. He searched forand found the body of Hamza “with his belly ripped up and his livermissing, and his nose and ears cut off.”47 Muhammad flew into a rageand cried out, “If God gives me victory over Quraish in the future I willmutilate thirty of their men.”48 Other Muslims took up the vengeful crysaying, “[W]e will mutilate them as no Arab has ever mutilated any-one.”49 Muhammad was no Buddha, and was quite capable of workingup a murderous rage against his enemies. The threat to mutilate hisenemies was not an idle boast. Later, however, Muhammad had a revela-tion in which God urged him to punish his enemies proportionately; “ifyou punish, then punish only as you have been punished.”50 Muhammadforbade mutilation. Some Muslims wanted to carry their dead and burythem in Medina, but Muhammad ordered the dead buried where theyhad fallen. Sometimes two or three corpses were buried together.

The Battle of Uhud had been fought on Friday; on Sunday morningMuhammad ordered the remnants of his army to assemble. From Medinahe marched south along the road to Mecca halting at Hamra ul-Asad,about eight miles from Medina. There he ordered every man to build acampfire so that at night the fires would give the impression of a muchlarger army. Muhammad was in no position to pursue anyone, certainlynot the victorious Meccans. What he was attempting to do was to

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deceive the Meccans that he was ready for a fight should they decideto return to Medina. Muhammad’s deception made sense only if theMeccans could see his campfires at night. The Meccans had been on themarch only three days after reassembling their army, and could not havebeen more than two or three miles ahead of Muhammad. This meantthat they were no more than ten to twelve miles from Medina, a dis-tance easily covered if they decided to turn around and attack the city.

As events turned out Muhammad’s concern was well founded.The Meccans began to rethink what they were doing, and some youngchiefs were in favor of returning to Medina and exterminating theMuslims. And then there occurred a remarkable stroke of fortune. Agroup of bedouins of the Khuza’a tribe was making their way down theroad when they came across Muhammad’s camp. The Khuza’a werestill idolaters, but had made a compact with Muhammad at some timein the past in which they agreed that “they would not conceal fromhim anything that happened here.”51 The leader of the bedouins,Ma’bad bin Abu Ma’bad al-Khuza’a, had a conversation with Muham-mad. There is little doubt that it was Muhammad’s idea to use Ma’badas an agent of deception.

The bedouins left Muhammad’s camp moving south until theyencountered the Meccans and Abu Sufyan’s camp. Abu Sufyan askedMa’bad what the news was about Muhammad and the Muslims thatthe bedouins had just passed. What happened next must be counted asone of the great tactical deceptions of ancient military history. Ma’badtold Abu Sufyan that “Muhammad has come out with his companionsto pursue you with an army whose like I have never seen, burning withanger against you. Those who stayed behind when you fought themhave joined him; they are sorry for what they did and are violentlyenraged against you. Never have I seen anything like it. . . . God I donot think that you will move off before you see the forelocks of hiscavalry.”52 Ma’bad’s tale was a complete fabrication. Muhammad wason his last legs militarily. Had the Meccans turned around it is likelythat Muhammad would have been destroyed. Apparently, the Meccanshad already decided to turn back and attack Medina! Abu Sufyanreplied to Ma’bad’s tale, “But we have determined to attack them toexterminate their survivors.” Ma’bad replied, “I would advise againstthat.”53 And so it was that “these words turned back Abu Sufyan andhis followers,” who thus marched on to Mecca. The Meccans hadmissed their best chance yet to destroy Muhammad and his movement.

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Unconventional War

The Battles of Badr and Uhud attracted the attention of the bedouinclans in and around Medina and Mecca. The conflict between Muham-mad and the Meccans was a major event that might shape the future ofany bedouin clan if one’s opportunities were seized. Whether out ofself-interest, the desire for loot, genuine interest in the new creed ofIslam, or the pull of old alliances, the bedouin clans were now payingclose attention to events in Mecca and Medina. The awareness ofMuhammad’s insurgency was spreading from the cities to the country-side, and clan chiefs waited to see what would happen next and howthey might take best advantage of events.

Two months after Uhud, in May 625, a group of tribesmen from the’Adal and al-Qara clans, allies of the Hudhayl tribe, came to Muham-mad saying that some of their clan had already become Muslims andthat others wanted to convert. They requested that Muhammad sendsome Muslims to instruct them in the new religion. Seeing an opportu-nity to strengthen his position with a new clan, Muhammad agreed tosend six disciples with them. At a place called al-Raji the Muslim partywas betrayed by their fellow travelers and ambushed by members ofthe Beni Lihyan clan of the tribe of Hudhayl. Of the six Muslims,three died fighting and three were taken prisoner. One of these waslater killed trying to escape. Why the Muslims were betrayed is notclear, but it may have been that the Hudhayl tribe were allies of theQuraish. The location of their territory near Ta’if, only thirty miles orso from Mecca, suggests this might have been the case.54 The fact thatthe Muslim prisoners were turned over to the Quraish also suggests an alliance. How such an alliance could have escaped Muhammad’sattention is not clear. Perhaps he knew of it and saw the request forMuslim missionaries as an opportunity to weaken it. The two Muslimprisoners were turned over to the Quraish, who delivered them tofamilies who had lost members in the fighting at Uhud. One of theMuslims was tied to a tree with ropes and crucified; he was stabbedwith a spear by the young son of a man who was killed at Uhud. Theother prisoner was decapitated.

Muhammad was furious at the death of his missionaries and imme-diately took steps to avenge himself on the Hudhayl by assassinatingtheir chief, Sofian ibn Khalid. Muhammad sent one Abdallah ibn Unaysto the Hudhayl camp, where he gained the chief’s trust by criticizing

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Muhammad. Ibn Khalid offered ibn Unays to sleep in his tent. Duringthe night ibn Unays cut off ibn Khalid’s head and fled. Traveling only at night to avoid capture, ibn Unays returned to Medina, wherehe flung ibn Khalid’s head at Muhammad’s feet.55 Muhammad waspleased and gave ibn Unays a wooden rod as a reward. When the assassinasked what the meaning of the rod was, Muhammad replied that onjudgment day it would be a sign of the special relationship betweenMuhammad and a chosen few. “There shall be few then who hold arod.”56 Muhammad could not have been clearer: assassination in theservice of religion was permitted.

In the absence of military victory, assassination was becomingMuhammad’s primary tool of influencing events in precisely the sameway that political murder and terror bombing became basic tools forlater insurgents. It was, of course, the tool of the weak. Had Muham-mad been able to deliver his adversaries a fatal military blow hewould surely have done so. Weakened militarily, Muhammad shiftedthe struggle to political grounds using assassination as a means to inflictviolence. Muhammad sent two men to Mecca to assassinate Abu Sufyan,the leader of the Meccans at Uhud and his major opponent in Mecca.The killers were recognized and the plot foiled, but not before they hadkilled two Meccans and taken another prisoner. Muhammad’s use ofpolitical murder was truly an innovation in Arab politics, and wentwell beyond the blood feud. In blood feuds it was not the custom toassassinate enemies, but to meet them in combat. As Sir John Glubbobserves, “In all the voluminous accounts of the Prophet’s life, theredoes not seem to be any mention of anyone else sending assassins tomurder anyone.”57 Once Muhammad demonstrated the practical valueof assassination, however, “ever since assassinations have exercised anunhappy influence on Islamic societies. Political murders have alwaysbeen tragically numerous in Muslim countries.”58

In June 625 Muhammad was approached again, this time by atribal chief named Abu Bara, head of the clan called Beni Amir. He toldMuhammad that he wished to become a Muslim and that he and hiswhole clan would convert to the new creed. He asked Muhammad tosend some Muslim missionaries to instruct his people. According toIbn Ishaq, Muhammad agreed to the request and sent “forty of hiscompanions from the best of the Muslims.”59 Later sources place thenumber of missionaries at seventy.60 At a place called Bir Maoona somefifty miles southeast of Medina the party was attacked by the Beni

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Sulaym clan as the missionaries were drawing water from the well. Allbut one of the Muslims were killed. A year earlier Muhammad had ledraids against the Beni Sulaym in an effort to demonstrate his influenceand shake their loyalty to the Meccans. Both times the Beni Sulaymhad avoided battle. Muhammad may have wondered if his raids had hadthe intended effect. Now, at Bir Maoona, he received his answer.

The loss of forty (or seventy) Muslim warriors was a major setback.In four months Muhammad and the Muslims had suffered three succes-sive reverses—Uhud, al-Raji, and Bir Maoona. The insurgency was notgoing well in the countryside, and there had been no major defectionsfrom the status quo to the Muslims. Muhammad himself was probablyundeterred by these setbacks, but it is reasonable to suspect that hisprestige among non-Muslims had fallen and that some defections fromthe Muslim cause may have occurred. Muhammad desperately needed asuccess, some gesture of power and ability to influence events, to holdhis own ranks fast, and to convince the idolaters that he was still a manto be feared. Once again he attacked the Jews of Medina.

Attack on the Beni an-Nadir

Muhammad approached the tribal leaders of the Jewish Beni an-Nadirtribe on the pretext of asking them to raise money to settle a blood-witowed by one of the Muslims for killing two members of the Beni Amirclan. He was received cordially and told to wait while the Jews dis-cussed the issue. According to Ibn Ishaq, the Jews were plotting to killMuhammad by sending someone to the roof of the house along whosewall Muhammad was waiting and drop a stone on his head. But “newscame to him from heaven about what these people intended, so he got upand went back to Medina.”61 There he told his companions about thetreachery of the Jews and “ordered them to prepare for war and to marchagainst them.”62 But had the Jews wanted to kill Muhammad they couldhave done so directly; there was no need to hide the deed by a surrepti-tious attempt to drop a stone on his head. The account of a warning fromheaven, apparently unaccompanied by the usual physical symptoms, issuspicious as well. The account, probably added later to Ibn Ishaq’s workby his editor, is likely a fabrication to justify Muhammad’s practicalstratagem of scapegoating the Jews to bolster his own political support.63

The Jews of Medina still had Arab allies, among them Abdullahibn Ubay, who had pleaded the case for mercy when Muhammad had

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earlier expelled the Jews of the Beni Qaynuqa. Muhammad maneuveredto neutralize these alliances and isolate the Beni an-Nadir. He sentsome of their allies who had become Muslims to inform the Jews that“hearts have changed and Islam has wiped out old alliances.”64 IbnUbay, however, appeared ready to observe his obligations to his Jewishallies. “Stand firm and protect yourselves, for we will not betray you,”he told them and advised them to fight.65 In time-honored fashion theJews retreated to their strongholds and awaited Muhammad’s siege.For three weeks, from August to September 625, Muhammad and histroops besieged the Jewish strongholds, at one point cutting downsome of the date palms to demonstrate his resolve. No Arab allies,including ibn Ubay, came to help the Beni an-Nadir. The Jews sued forpeace and came to an agreement with Muhammad, who permittedthem to leave Medina. Many went to Kheibar; others to Syria. Theywere permitted to take with them as much property as their camelscould carry. Their armor and weapons, however, were confiscated.Muhammad himself inventoried the military equipment: fifty coats ofmail armor, fifty helmets, and 340 swords were turned over to theinsurgency’s armory. The land, houses, groves, and other property weredistributed by Muhammad among the Emigrants. Muhammad keptsome barley-growing land and a date grove for himself. Muhammadhad his victory. The defections stopped, and those outside Medinaonce more paid attention to the man in Medina.

The Second Battle of Badr

At Uhud Abu Sufyan had challenged Muhammad to return to Badrwithin a year for another fight to settle matters. In April 626, at thetime for the annual spring trade fair at Badr, Muhammad arrived withfifteen hundred men and a small number of cavalry to answer theMeccan challenge. Abu Sufyan and a Meccan force of two thousandmen and fifty cavalry left Mecca for Badr only to turn back after a fewdays. It was a drought year and the animals were weak and there waslittle forage with which to feed the animals.66 Later sources say theMeccans came to Badr but stayed out of town.67 To force the animalsover a march of two hundred miles during drought risked their deaths,and the horses would be useless in a fight by the time they arrived atBadr. Muhammad’s army had only to travel eighty miles from Medinato reach Badr over ground that was better provided with forage for their

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mounts. When the army returned to Mecca they were greeted withderision. They were called the Porridge Army who “merely went outto drink porridge.”68 Muhammad gained an important psychologicaland political victory at Second Badr, as the “battle” has become knownin Arab chronicles. He had arrived to meet the challenge for all to see,and the Meccans had not shown up. Moreover, the Muslim army offifteen hundred men was twice as large as it had been the year before.Whatever defections had occurred had apparently been more thanmade up for by conversions. Islam was finally gaining a foothold amongthe bedouin clans outside of Medina itself.

Muhammad continued the political war. He was greatly concernedthat the Meccans might be shoring up their support among the bedouinsand trying to assemble a large coalition of tribes with which to attackMedina. He moved to preempt this with a campaign of assassinationsand raids. In May 626 Muhammad sent a small group of assassins tomurder Abu Rafi, one of the chiefs of the Beni an-Nadir tribe that hadbeen driven from Medina. Abu Rafi had gone to Kheibar, where heattempted to gather support for an attack against the Muslims. Theassassins killed him in his bed. The assassination of another Jewishleader in Kheibar occurred a short while later. Muhammad sent a hand-picked “commando unit” of thirty killers to Kheibar disguised as anofficial diplomatic approach to the Jews there. The Muslims negotiatedwith their leader, Usayr ibn Razim, and convinced him to come toMedina to negotiate with Muhammad. The Muslims offered to guaran-tee his safety with their own escort of thirty men. Among Arabs, nothingis more valued than a man’s word, his pledge of safety and protection,so ibn Razim felt safe. Somewhere on the road to Medina, however,the Muslims fell upon the Jews and killed them all.

When the leader of the commandos returned to Medina he was metby Muhammad, who congratulated him on his work.69 Muhammad wasearning a reputation for ruthlessness and an ability to kill at a distancejust as the size of his army was increasing and he was becoming betterable to support his followers economically. The message to his oppo-nents outside the cities was that they, too, were not safe as long asthey failed to join him.

In June 626 Muhammad turned his attention once more to theimportant Ghatafan tribe and led a strong force to attack them. At Dhatal Riqa, 60 miles northeast of Mecca, he encountered the Ghatafan.Dhat al Riqa is 180 miles from Medina. Muhammad’s ability to project

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military power over considerable distances was becoming impressive.To be able to conduct military operations so close to Mecca was alsopolitically impressive to the other tribes as well. Muhammad was takingthe offensive. Nevertheless, the Ghatafan contingent must have beensubstantial, and both sides thought it better to withdraw rather than tofight. Even so, Muhammad had made his point.70 Two months later, inAugust 626, Muhammad and a force of one thousand men marched toraid the oasis of Dumat al-Jandal some 350 miles north of Medina. Onceagain he encountered the bedouin tribes, but once more no fightingtook place. The purpose of the raid was more political than military, ademonstration of force and the will to use it to preempt the bedouinsfrom joining the Meccan coalition. A few months later, perhaps inDecember, Muhammad led another large raiding party against the BaniMustaliq near the shore of the Red Sea.71 This time Muhammad struckwith force. Taking the enemy by surprise at a well, he quickly put themto flight and captured their baggage train of two thousand camels, fivethousand head of sheep and goats, and two hundred women.72

Within Medina the expulsion of the second Jewish tribe and theconversion of many of the Kazrai and Aws to Islam had considerablyweakened Abdullah ibn Ubay’s influence leaving Muhammad thecity’s most important chief. His base of operations was now secure.The preemptive raids against the potentially hostile bedouin tribes allalong the caravan route and close to Mecca probably had some effectin reducing the military manpower that was available to the Meccancoalition. A number of Muhammad’s influential and outspoken oppo-nents had been silenced by assassination, a warning to any bedouinchief who might be tempted to side with the Meccans. If the size ofMuhammad’s raiding parties was any measure, it seems reasonable thatIslam was gaining adherents at a substantial pace, increasing Muham-mad’s military manpower base. In less than a year Muhammad hadreversed the humiliation of Uhud, and the insurgency was once againactive and on the offensive.

But a storm was brewing in Mecca.

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8

The Battle of the DitchMarch 627

For almost a year Muhammad had been conducting assassinationsand raids against those bedouin tribes who had long-standing

commercial ties with the Meccans in the hope of dissuading themfrom joining the Meccan military coalition. At the same time he madeefforts to secure the support or neutrality of other tribes through nego-tiation. In these efforts politics always took precedence over religion,and he formed several alliances with pagan tribes without requiring apromise of conversion. Muhammad also reconstituted his militaryforces that had been badly mauled at Uhud. His raids involved largerand larger forces over greater and greater distances, often reaching closeto Mecca itself and sometimes even south of the city.

The result was that Muhammad was effectively able to close downboth the northern and eastern caravan routes used by the Meccans.Even smaller caravans moving from Mecca southeast around Ta’if andNakhla were raided. Two years after Uhud, Muhammad’s influence andreputation had increased considerably and reached far to the south ofMecca to Najd and as far east as Yamamah. This last alliance with thechief of the Yamamah territory provided Muhammad with a powerfuleconomic lever against Mecca. Yamamah was the granary of southernArabia and the main source of Mecca’s grain.1 The sources do not tell usif the chief of Yamamah was a Muslim or not, but at Muhammad’s

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request he ordered that grain shipments to Mecca be stopped.2 Even theweather favored Muhammad when a severe drought struck the region.The drought and the embargo created severe food shortages in Mecca.In a clever political maneuver Muhammad sent money to Mecca topurchase food for the poor and starving. Among Arabs generosity wasone of the most important virtues a man could possess. Muhammad’sgenerosity toward the Meccan poor (even as he was the indirect causeof their sufferings in the first place) went a long way toward convincingmany Meccans that he was a fair and just man. Muhammad surelyknew that many of his converts had come from the lower social ordersof Arab society, and that feeding the poor of Mecca could only increasethe attraction of Islam and support for him. By November 626 word hadreached Muhammad from Mecca that Abu Sufyan and the Meccanswere planning a major military campaign. The source of this informa-tion was probably Abbas, Muhammad’s uncle and agent-in-place amongthe Meccan leadership.

Muhammad was away leading a raid through the territory of theGhatafan moving toward their main trading town at Dumat al-Jandalwhen word reached Medina that the Meccans had taken the decisionto raise an army and attack his base of operations.3 A camel courierwas immediately dispatched to inform Muhammad. The rider caughtup with him just outside Dumat al-Jandal. Muhammad and his raidersturned around and began making the fifteen-day journey to Medina,where he immediately undertook to plan a defense.4 Muhammad’ssuccess in rebuilding his military capabilities and in cutting off Mecca’scommercial routes was strangling the Meccan economy. By now itwas likely that Abu Sufyan realized that his display of chivalry in nothunting down and killing Muhammad after the Battle of Uhud hadbeen costly indeed. The accusation made by Ibn Ishaq and repeated bylater writers that it was the Jews of Kheibar who originated the idea ofan attack on Mecca and then convinced the Quraish to adopt it seemsnothing more than Muslim propaganda. The economic situation inMecca was becoming critical and Abu Sufyan, himself the chief oppo-nent of Muhammad from the beginning, hardly needed urging fromthe Jews of Kheibar to see that Muhammad had to be removed as thesource of Mecca’s discontent.

The Meccans raised an army of ten thousand men comprising fourthousand Meccans and their local allies, two thousand Ghatafan bedouinsfrom north of Medina, and some seven hundred others from the Beni

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Sulaym tribe, which harbored a personal grudge against Muhammad.The remainder were drawn from various small bedouin tribes, somefighting for pay, others attracted by the prospect of loot.5 Ibn Ishaq saysthat there were contingents of “black mercenaries” as well.6 As atUhud these were probably Abyssinian professionals. The coalition hadsix hundred cavalrymen, two hundred of which were Meccans underthe command of Khalid al-Walid; the rest were bedouin contingentsunder their clan chiefs. Muhammad could muster three thousand menand thirty-five cavalrymen. Although smaller than the Meccan force,Muhammad’s army was still considerably larger than what he had beenable to put in the field at Uhud, suggesting that his efforts to reconsti-tute his military capability after the defeat there had met with consider-able success. By any traditional Arab standard an army of three thousandmen under the command of a single chief was a formidable militaryasset, one that also testified to the prestige of its commander.

After the defeat at Uhud there was no question of meeting theMeccan army on the open plain. Outnumbered three to one, Muham-mad wisely chose to defend Medina by taking maximum advantage ofits geography and the season of year. Muhammad knew that it wouldtake the Meccans several months to recruit and assemble their armyand that it was unlikely they could arrive outside Medina much beforeMarch 627. Muhammad had arrived back in Medina probably in earlyDecember, giving him almost four months to prepare for the attack.7

By March the harvest in Medina would have already been collectedand the barley and dates safely stored within the city. There would benothing for the Meccan horses and camels to eat in the barren fields. Aten thousand-man army required almost sixteen thousand camels totransport men and supplies, not to mention the six hundred–horseMeccan cavalry. With the fields around Medina barren of crops theMeccan army could sustain itself in the field for only a short timebefore its animals began to die.

The terrain around Medina offered good defenses on three sides.The large lava plains to the east and west were mostly impassableexcept for a few wadis too narrow to accommodate large military for-mations. The southern approaches were also through wadis, one ofwhich was sufficiently wide to accommodate an army. However, thisroute emptied into a heavily settled area of clan compounds, walledgardens, and fortified towers where “the passages between the gardenswas zig-zag, and so narrow that no formation except in long columns

BATTLE OF THE DITCH 133

134

Map 9. Battle of the Ditch, 627 c.e.

was possible for the enemy . . . [N]aturally even small outposts couldstop . . . these long columns.”8 The problem for Muhammad was theapproach from the north. Here the lava fields opened onto a large plainoffering the Meccan army a clear approach to Medina over relativelyunobstructed ground. The gap in the “horns” of the lava fields wasalmost four miles wide, plenty of room for the Meccans to deploy. Theopen ground also offered an excellent range of maneuver for the Meccancavalry. If Muhammad deployed against the Meccans on the northernplain, the numerically superior Meccan lines would easily overlap hisflanks leaving plenty of room on either side for the Meccan cavalry toenvelop the Muslim army with little effort. If Muhammad was to defendMedina, some way had to be found to block the northern approach.

It does not seem to have been Muhammad’s idea to dig a ditch acrossthe northern approaches to block the Meccan advance. Ibn Ishaq saysthat Muhammad overheard a discussion among some men wherein aditch was mentioned. Later Muslim historians attribute the idea to oneSalman al-Farsi.9 Salman was a Muslim convert. The son of a Persianlandowner who converted to Christianity as a boy, he had gone to Syriato study religion. When his teacher died Salman set out for Arabia,where he had heard that a new prophet (possibly a reference to Muham-mad) had appeared. On the way his caravan was ambushed, and he wastaken into slavery and sold to a Jew in Medina. As was his practiceMuhammad helped Salman raise sufficient money to purchase hisfreedom, and he became a Muslim. Muslim historians make much ofthe fact that the use of a ditch as a defensive fortification was of somenovelty in Arabia during Muhammad’s time. If so, then it is possiblethat Salman’s sojourns in Persia and Syria might have acquainted him,if only in a general way, with this type of fortification since it wasfamiliar to both Persian and Byzantine armies. The fact that Muslimchronicles call the ditch by its Persian name, khandaq, suggests thatthe story that the ditch was Salman’s idea may be true.

It is one thing to dig a long ditch; it is quite another to construct itin a manner where it can serve as a military obstacle to both cavalryand infantry. To cover the northern gap between the horns of the lavafields required a trench that was at least three and one-half miles longrunning in a roughly N-shaped line in order to incorporate the fewnatural obstacles into its course.10 There are no references in the originalsources as to its width and depth, only that a single laborer could dig ahole “five cubits in length and five cubits in depth” in a day.11 It was of


great concern to the defenders that the trench be sufficiently deep andwide to prevent cavalry horses from carrying it in a single jump. Thekey is the relationship between the depth of the trench and its width. Atrained jumper horse can barely carry itself over a twenty-foot ditch; atypical cavalry mount of the period would be lucky to make an sixteen-foot leap successfully. However, if the ditch was too wide and, say,only a yard deep, the horse could jump into the ditch and then jumpout the opposite side. Taken together a ditch about sixteen feet widewould seem to be adequate, especially if the dirt taken from the ditchwere used to construct a two-foot parapet on the far side, forcing theanimal to jump uphill. A depth of a little over six feet would make itdifficult for a horse to jump into and out of the ditch.12 Obviously aditch of these dimensions would at the same time constitute a for-midable obstacle to infantry attack. Defenders from behind the ditch’sparapet would have the advantage of height and steepness of slopefrom which they could rain down stones and arrows on the attackerswhile remaining somewhat safe from counterfire. Under these cir-cumstances the Meccan numerical advantage in infantry would beconsiderably reduced.

The ditch required almost four months to construct with everyonein Medina including Muhammad working on it. It is of interest thatthe sources tell us that the Jews of the Beni Qurayzah tribe, the lastJewish tribe left in Medina, also lent a hand in the digging.13 Later Arabhistorians note that the Muslims borrowed “digging implements”from the Jews.14 That the Jews would help Muhammad after the expul-sion from Medina of the other two Jewish tribes may seem curious. Inthis regard it must be remembered that the Jewish tribes in Arabiawere indistinguishable from Arab tribes in their values and customsin all respects except religion. The Jewish Qurayzah tribe had beensworn allies of the Aws, who were allies of Muhammad, and faithfullyobserved their obligations to Muhammad even when their fellowJews, with whom they had no such obligations, had been expelled. Allthe evidence supports the view that the Beni Qurayzah had correctlyobserved their obligations to Muhammad and had given him no reasonto suspect their loyalty. Indeed, if Muhammad had any such misgivings,he would certainly have taken steps against them before the Meccansarrived. Although the southern approaches to Medina were difficult, itwas in the southern neighborhoods where the Jewish strongholds werelocated. Moreover, the Jews could put a thousand men in the field. If

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Muhammad had any reason to suspect the Beni Qurayzah, he wouldhardly have permitted them to remain behind his defenses as he pre-pared to fight the Meccans.

On the eve of the battle Muhammad and his troops were in goodshape. Muhammad placed his command post on a low ridge on MountSal, the only significant high ground on the plain that offered him acommanding view of the battlefield. The ditch had been completed in time, and it provided a great advantage in neutralizing the Meccansuperiority of numbers and cavalry. Muhammad’s army had a sufficientsupply of food and water while the Meccans had limited supplies fortheir troops and animals. The fields were bare so that “the enemyhorses found on that account nothing except what their masters hadbrought with them.”15 Muhammad also had the advantage of interiorlines, which permitted him the important capability of being able toshift troops to counter concentrations of Meccan force wherever theyassembled along the ditch. This gave Muhammad control of the decisivepoints of concentration along the entire battle line and the ability toneutralize the Meccan numerical superiority at these points. Sometimein March 627 the Meccan army arrived outside Medina. Following thetrack they had taken at the Battle of Uhud, the Meccans avoided thesouthern approaches, passed west of the city, and encamped at twolocations on the plain north of Medina.

Abu Sufyan must have been furious when he found his way blockedby Muhammad’s ditch. He had come prepared for a traditional Arabbattle of infantry and horse on open ground, a repeat of the Battle ofUhud. He had planned to feed his army and animals on the fodder andcrops around Medina. With the fields bare, he must have realized thatthis had been a terrible mistake. It was only a matter of time, perhapstwo or three weeks, before his camels and horses would begin to weakenfrom starvation and die. Moreover, the Meccan army was a coalitionwith some of its contingents motivated by concerns other than revengeand Meccan commercial interests. If it became clear that there was nobooty to be had or that one’s flocks had been left untended for too long,some of these contingents might begin to drift away. Time was workingagainst Abu Sufyan and the Meccans.

As noted earlier, Arab warfare until Muhammad’s reforms wasprimitive in its applications, so much so that often a simple wall of afew feet was sufficient to block military movement. Whereas the Byzan-tine or Persian army (or almost any other army of antiquity!)16 would


have easily forded the ditch, it proved an insurmountable obstacle to the Meccans. The Muslims guarded the trench day and night withsentries and armed groups of men ready to react to any attempt at abreech. Muhammad had only thirty-five cavalrymen to patrol the lengthof the ditch.17 Occasional attempts were made by the Meccans to over-come the obstacle by having their cavalry jump over it. Most of theseseem to have been little more than pointless attempts at individualbravado, and none succeeded. At no time did the Meccans attempt tocarry the obstacle with simultaneous attacks at different points alongthe length of the trench, the most obvious tactical solution to theproblem. A few halfhearted attempts were made by small groups ofinfantry to fight their way across, only to meet disaster. No large-scaleinfantry attacks seem to have been attempted. After three weeks bothsides were reduced to remaining in their positions and hurling insultsat each other. Hamidullah observes that “there was never a pitchedbattle, but only the shooting of arrows was resorted to on both sidesfrom time to time.”18 At the end of a month the siege had resulted inonly three Meccan and five Muslim dead.19

And then a critical event occurred. Some of the Jews that Muham-mad had earlier expelled from Medina had settled in the Kheibar oasis north of Medina. The Meccan stocks of food for their troops wererunning dangerously low when a caravan attempting to resupply theMeccans arrived from Kheibar laden with twenty camel-loads of barley,dates for the troops, and husks for the animals. Later sources reportthat the caravan was captured by Muhammad’s men, although justhow this might have been accomplished is not stated.20 The importantpoint is that since the Jews of Kheibar were supporting the MeccansMuhammad began to suspect that the Beni Qurayzah Jews of Medina,who were at his back, might somehow be in league with their kinsmenin Kheibar and preparing to attack him from the rear. For the momentMuhammad did nothing; but his fear of a surprise attack by the Jewslingered in his mind.

The siege of Medina dragged on for another week with no resultsfor either side. By now the armies had been in the field for more than amonth. Muhammad could have continued to let the passage of timetake its inevitable toll on the Meccans’ supply situation. But he wasnever one to react to events if he could shape them, and his politicaland strategic mind was at work with ways to disrupt the political cohe-siveness of the Meccan coalition. Later sources tell us that Muhammad

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opened negotiations with the chiefs of the Ghatafan tribe, whose contingent numbered two thousand men. Using “secret agents” as go-betweens, Muhammad attempted to negotiate a separate peace with theGhatafan. The talks succeeded in reaching an agreement in whichMuhammad promised the Ghatafan one-third of the date crop of Medinaif they would defect from the Meccans and return home.21 But whenMuhammad gathered the “garden-owners” of Medina together, he wasunable to convince them that the agreement was in their interest andthe matter was dropped.22

Abu Sufyan had apparently come to the same conclusion asMuhammad that a military resolution to the stalemate was unlikely.Consequently, the Meccans attempted a political solution of their own.They were aware of Muhammad’s history with the Jews of Medina andcertainly knew that Muhammad was aware of the attempt by the Jewsof Kheibar to send supplies to the Meccan army. It was a reasonableguess, therefore, that the Jews of Medina might be convinced to attackMuhammad from their compounds located to the rear of the Muslims’positions. The Meccans made an approach to the Beni Qurayzah prob-ably using one of the Jews from Kheibar as an intermediary. Ibn Ishaqsays it was Huyai ibn Akhtab, a chief of the Beni an-Nadir tribe. Theapproach failed, and all the evidence indicates that the Jews refused tobreak with Muhammad and remained neutral.23

Word of the Meccan approach to the Beni Qurayzah must havereached Muhammad, and he seems to have believed that the BeniQurayzah could not be trusted to stay out of the fight. Muhammadcertainly understood that the Beni Qurayzah were the key to victory ordefeat. If they joined the Meccans, he was finished. Given the gravityof the threat, Muhammad cannot be faulted for trying to make certainthat the Beni Qurayzah did not ally with the Meccans. To this end hesent one Nuaim ibn Masood, a Muslim defector from the Ghatafan, tothe Beni Qurayzah. Apparently ibn Masood was known to the Jews “inthe heathen days” as a trustworthy man.24 He warned the Jews not totrust the Meccans. The Jews, he said, had much more to lose than theMeccans who could return to their homeland if things went badlyleaving the Jews alone to face the angry Muslims. So, ibn Masood sug-gested, “do not fight along with these people until you take hostagesfrom their chiefs who will remain in your hands as security that theywill fight Muhammad with you until you make an end of him.”25 IbnMasood then went to the Ghatafan chiefs telling them that the Jews


were going to side with Muhammad, and that to convince him oftheir loyalty they were planning to deliver several Quraish chiefs toMuhammad. Ibn Masood warned that “if the Jews send to you todemand hostages, don’t send them a single man.”26 And so it was that“God sowed distrust between them” and any concerted action becameimpossible. Muhammad’s back was safe.

The siege had now dragged on for over a month, and some of theMeccan horses and camels were dying for lack of fodder.27 The armywas running low on rations; camel milk and dates were still available,but barley for cakes and porridge was almost gone. Some bedouin clansworried that they had already been gone for too long from their flocksand women. A general malaise set in among the soldiers as it was nowevident to all that there was no way to overcome the ditch. The chancesfor loot and glory had disappeared. Ibn Ishaq tells us that “they [theMeccans] had no permanent camp,” by which he means that there hadbeen no attempt to build shelters or routinize the provision of food.28

This was the typical state of affairs of Arab clan-based armies, eachclan and its soldiers providing for themselves. The Meccans had expecteda quick pitched battle in open country and were ill prepared for a longsiege. It remains a mystery why no one on the Meccan side thoughtabout attacking Medina from the south. Although the terrain therewould have made an attack difficult, it was not an impossible courseof action and certainly much better than watching the Meccan armyatrophy with each passing day.

Then even the weather seemed to side against the Meccans. Theywere continually exposed to the elements even as they were weakenedby a lack of food. One night a violent storm struck the area accompaniedby a strong wind and a cold soaking rain. The wind blew down theMeccans’ tents and scattered the campfires, sending the cooking potsrolling across the desert. The sudden rain and cold probably took aconsiderable toll on the already weakened animals, with many dyingwhere they were tethered. The weather was so miserable that whenMuhammad asked for a volunteer to cross the ditch and reconnoiterthe Meccan positions, “not a single man got up because of his great fear,hunger, and the severe cold.”29 Even Muhammad’s promise that thevolunteer would “be my companion in paradise” should he be killed onthe mission produced no one. Finally, Muhammad ordered a man to go.

The morale of the Meccan army was finally broken by the fierceweather, and Abu Sufyan himself addressed his troops. “O Quraish, we

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are not in a permanent camp; the horses and camels are dying, theBeni Qurayzah (the Jews) have broken their word to us and we haveheard disquieting reports of them. You can see the violence of the windwhich leaves us neither cooking-pots, nor fire, nor tents to count on.Be off, for I am going!”30 He then mounted his camel and rode off. Besidesthe general discomfort and military failure, the annual pilgrimage and fairseason at Mecca was only a month away and there was business to bedone and money to be made. Once the Meccans departed, the rest of thecoalition quickly came apart and the clans “broke up and returned totheir own country.”

The Massacre of the Beni Qurayzah

The ruthlessness of Muhammad’s political intellect was demonstratedby what happened next. On the very day that the Meccan army beganwithdrawing from its positions, Muhammad moved against the lastremaining Jewish tribe in Medina. Sometime around noon Muhammadis said to have met the angel Gabriel, who told him that the angelshad not yet laid down their arms. Gabriel said, “God commands youto go to the Beni Qurayzah.”31 Muhammad immediately issued ordersto his troops to assemble at the compounds of the Qurayzah Jews.The urgency of his command was evident in Muhammad’s injunctionthat no one was to pray the afternoon prayer until they had assembledat the compounds with their weapons.32 Muhammad intended to dealwith the Jews of Medina once and for all.

Muhammad’s decision to annihilate the Beni Qurayzah was rootedin cold-blooded politics. Ibn Ishaq, the earliest source for these events,offers no reason for Muhammad’s action other than that God had com-manded him “to shake their castles and strike terror in their hearts.”33

Later accounts claim that the Meccan approach to the Beni Qurayzahto attack Muhammad from the back had in fact succeeded and that asmall number of Jews, said in the tradition to be eleven men, actuallywent into action against Muhammad.34 There is no evidence that thisattack ever occurred, and Rodinson is probably correct in saying that“the tradition had every incentive to exaggerate the incident as an excusefor the massacre which followed.”35 In fact, the Jews had resisted theMeccan approach to attack Muhammad and had remained in theircompounds observing their obligations to their Aws allies, who werealso Muhammad’s allies. Ibn Ishaq makes no mention of the Jews acting


against Muhammad, something we might be reasonably certain hewould have mentioned had it occurred. Hamidullah, citing later Arabicaccounts, also does not mention any Jewish betrayal of Muhammad. Tothe contrary he notes that one reason Muhammad was confident thatthe ditch would succeed was that the Meccans could not attack himthrough the Jewish areas to his rear because “relations with them [theQurayzah] were for the time being correct.”36

In the absence of any reliable account of Jewish treachery wemight reasonably conclude that Muhammad decided to exterminatethe Beni Qurayzah because the opportunity had finally presented itselfto rid Medina of a major competitor for influence and because it wouldstrengthen the insurgency politically. Muhammad was certain thatthe Beni Qurayzah would never become Muslims and, like other non-Muslim tribes and clans, would have to be dealt with sooner or later.Their military strength was considerable and represented a threat toMuslim security within Muhammad’s base of operations. The previ-ously exiled Jews had turned Kheibar into a hotbed of anti-Muslimactivity, and some Jewish chiefs there had supported the Meccanassault on Medina. If the Beni Qurayzah were permitted to leave,many would settle in Kheibar and that source of opposition wouldgrow even stronger. Muhammad seems to have decided that only thedead do not return. The massacre of the Beni Qurayzah would also helpfrighten and discourage the Jews of Kheibar and any other enemies. Itwould enhance Muhammad’s already considerable reputation for ruth-lessness among the bedouin tribes who Muhammad knew were thecritical factor in gaining the ultimate victory. Politically speaking,then, the massacre of the Jews of Medina was an excellent solution toone of Muhammad’s more serious problems.

Muhammad laid siege to the Jewish compounds for twenty-fivedays, during which only a few skirmishes between archers took place.Ibn Ishaq tells us that Huyai ibn Akhtab, the chief of the Beni an-NadirJews in Kheibar and the person who probably was used by the Meccansto approach the Jews of Medina and suggest they betray Muhammad,was still in the Beni Qurayzah compounds when Muhammad and hismen laid siege to them. Once it became clear that Muhammad intendedto make his point, ibn Akhtab is said to have suggested that the Jewshad three alternatives to their present difficulties. The first was for theBeni Qurayzah to convert to Islam “and then your lives, your property,your women and children will be saved.”37 The second was “kill your

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wives and children and send men with their swords drawn to Muham-mad and his companions leaving no encumbrances behind us, until Goddecides between us and Muhammad.”38 Both these alternatives havingbeen rejected, ibn Akhtab said, “[T]onight is the eve of the sabbath and itmay well be that Muhammad and his companions will feel secure fromus then, so come down, perhaps we can take Muhammad and his com-panions by surprise.”39 This, too, was rejected. With the siege dragging onand with no real chance of lifting it, the Beni Qurayzah sought to cometo terms with Muhammad. They sent word that they wanted to talk andrequested that Muhammad send one Abu Lubaba of the Aws tribe. TheAws were still technically allies of the Beni Qurayzah, and the Jewstrusted Abu Lubaba, with whom they had previous dealings.

The chiefs of the Beni Qurayzah met with Abu Lubaba and asked,“[D]o you think we should submit to Muhammad’s judgment?” NowAbu Lubaba was a Muslim convert, but he was enough of a tradition-alist to remain loyal to his previous commitments to his Jewish allies,who, after all, had fought on the side of the Aws in their battles againstthe Kazrai. Abu Lubaba said “yes” to the question but simultaneouslydrew his finger across his throat indicating that if they surrenderedthey would be massacred.40 It is important to note that both the earliestand many later sources agree on the essentials of the story; all agreethat Abu Lubaba had drawn his finger across his throat. How, then, arewe to explain the story of Abu Lubaba if not by the suspicion that thefate of the Jews had already been decided and that everyone aroundMuhammad knew it? The evidence indicates that Muhammad plannedall along to kill them. When the Beni Qurayzah chose not to go downfighting and surrendered to Muhammad the next day, they had sealedtheir fate. The siege had lasted twenty-five days.

Although the Aws had become Muslims, some of their chiefs felt aloyalty to their old comrades-in-arms and pleaded with Muhammad toshow mercy to the Beni Qurayzah. Muhammad probably anticipatedthat the Aws would try to protect their allies, and he maneuvered todeal with their objections. “Will you be satisfied, Oh Aws, if one ofyour own number pronounces judgment on them?” he asked.41 Theyagreed and Muhammad had just the right candidate for the job, Sa’dibn Mu’adh. Mu’adh had been one of the unlucky few wounded duringthe siege. An arrow had struck him in the arm, and the wound wasnow in an advanced state of infection. Mu’adh, a devout Muslim, wasfeverish and near death when he was asked by the Messenger of God to


judge the Jews. It is clear that he intended to die an obedient Muslim;having been wounded in battle, he would also die a martyr. When oneof the Aws whispered to him to be lenient with the Jews, Ibn Ishaqtells us he replied that “the time has come for Sa’d in the cause of God,not to care for any man’s censure.” But the more damning evidencecomes from the Muslim historical tradition that says Sa’d made aprayer before judging the Jews in which he said, “Oh Allah, if youmake the war with Quraish last a little longer, spare me so that I mayjoin in it . . . and do not let me die before I have comforted myself atthe expense of the Beni Qurayzah.”42

There is no evidence from the texts that Muhammad told Mu’adhhow to render his judgment. At the same time, however, the incidentwith Abu Lubaba suggests that Muhammad’s wishes to dispose of theJews were already well known among the Muslims. The choice of adevout Muslim wounded in battle whose wound was now causing hisdeath and who wished for paradise to render judgment on the Jewscould hardly have been accidental. Perhaps with one eye on history’sjudgment, Muhammad got what he wanted: to condemn the Jews andlevy the responsibility for the decision on someone else.

Sa’d ibn Mu’adh rendered his decision. First he asked, “Do youcovenant by Allah that you accept the judgment I pronounce onthem?” The Aws said yes. “Then I give judgment that the men shouldbe killed, the property divided, and the women and children taken ascaptives.”43 “Then they surrendered, and the Apostle confined them inMedina in the quarter of al Harith. Then the Apostle went out to themarket of Medina and dug trenches in it. Then he sent for them andstruck off their heads in those trenches as they were brought out tohim in batches.”44 Taken literally, Ibn Ishaq may be suggesting thatMuhammad himself took part in the beheadings of the victims. If so,then this is the first place in Arabic accounts of his life where Muham-mad actually is said to have killed someone with his own hand.“There were 600 or 700 in all, although some put the figure as high as800 or 900. . . . This went on until the Apostle made an end of them.”45

Every adult male of the Jewish tribe of Beni Qurayzah was killed thatday. The property of the Jews was distributed among the Muslims, andthe women and children were sold and the money divided or used topurchase arms. And so it was that the Beni Qurayzah of Medina wereannihilated. Muhammad was struck by the beauty of a particular Jewishgirl named Rayhana and took her as his concubine. The Apostle became

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quite fond of her and offered to marry her “and put the veil on her.” But“she had shown repugnance towards Islam when she was captured andclung to Judaism” and refused Muhammad’s offer of marriage.46

The impact of Muhammad’s victory at Medina cannot be overesti-mated. It was a great political and military triumph. All of Arabia hadbeen watching the events at Medina, especially those tribes who werenot yet committed to either side. A mighty coalition of ten thousandsoldiers had failed to defeat Muhammad; if they could not do it, thenperhaps no army could. Perhaps Muhammad was God’s Messenger afterall. Muhammad’s prestige and aura of political legitimacy increasedconsiderably, and tales of the victory at the Battle of the Ditch spreadthroughout the Hejaz. The Muslim state at Medina and its brilliantleader had proven themselves a force to be reckoned with.

Muhammad understood that the defeat of the Meccans wouldweaken their ability to retain the loyalty of their allies and increased hisopportunities to woo them over to his side. For the next year Muham-mad turned his attention to a political war of attrition trying to winthe loyalty of those tribes along the caravan routes and close to Mecca.Those he could not convince he threatened using assassination andraids to make his point. Shortly after the victory at Medina, he dis-patched a group of killers to Kheibar to kill Sallam ibn Abu-l’huqayq,one of the Jewish chiefs who had helped convince some of the tribesnear the oasis to support the Meccan attack on Medina.47 Muhammadwas certainly one to hold a grudge, and he used murder and the tortureof prisoners to take his revenge.48 However, like other successful revo-lutionaries who have come after him, Muhammad’s use of violencewas usually in the service of political ends and never just sadistic.

The year following the victory at Medina was a successful one forMuhammad and the cause of Islam. Within a few weeks of the Meccanwithdrawal, Muhammad struck. A force of seven hundred men was sentunder the command of Abd-al-Rahman ibn Awf to raid Dumat al-Jandal,the great trading center on the road to Syria where an important annualfair was held.49 Muhammad had attempted a raid more than a yearearlier when he tried to prevent the Ghatafan from joining the Meccans.Dumat al-Jandal was the territory of the Christian tribe of Kalb, butwas the major trading post for the Ghatafan bedouins. The Christianchiefs saw no interest in opposing Muhammad, who, as he often didwhen it was to his advantage, did not require the Christians to becomeMuslims. The old tribal values were still very much in force, and the


Christian chief concluded an alliance with the Muslims and gave hisdaughter to Abd-al-Rahman ibn Awf to seal the deal.50 Two monthslater, Zayd, Muhammad’s adoptive son, was sent on a raid to the northwith 170 men and successfully captured a Meccan caravan returningfrom Syria.51 Muhammad continued to forge alliances with the clansclosest to Medina apparently without any demand that they convert toIslam. Muhammad respected the terms of these alliances to the letterand expected others to do the same. When they did not, as when histerritory was violated or when his camel herds were raided, Muhammadresponded quickly and forcefully. On one of these raids Ali was sentagainst the Beni Saad, from whom he captured five hundred camelsand two thousand sheep.52

Six months after the events in Medina, Muhammad set out toattack the Beni Lihyan, the tribe that had earlier killed his missionariesand turned two Muslims over to the Quraish for execution. By nowMuhammad had come to appreciate the need for operational security,and he mounted the raid in secret. Many bedouins had become Muslimsand could act as desert guides, so that Muhammad’s ability to movetroops over long distances without being detected had improved con-siderably. Muhammad announced that his intention was to marchnorth and raid Syria. Medina was still full of spies to report his move-ments. About twenty miles north of Medina he turned left and headedsouth hoping to catch the Beni Lihyan by surprise where they wereencamped near Usfan.53 But the Beni Lihyan had been warned ofMuhammad’s approach and “took up strong positions on the tops ofthe mountains” where they prepared to resist.54 Having come all thisway only to be frustrated, Muhammad nevertheless made good use ofthe expedition. He sent two hundred riders on ahead to approach theoutskirts of Usfan. Ibn Ishaq tells us Muhammad said, “Were we tocome down to Usfan the Meccans would think that we intend tocome to Mecca.”55 Muhammad undertook a show of force to keep theMeccans in a state of apprehension. He even sent a small group of ridersfarther along the road to Mecca as if they were reconnoitering theroute for an impending attack by Muhammad’s raiders. Then he turnedaround and went back to Medina.

All this activity was gradually shifting the balance of loyaltyamong the bedouin tribes in Muhammad’s favor. We have no way toestimate the rate of conversion of these tribes, although it is clear thatsome became Muslims and that their conversions were genuine. Of

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military significance were the conversions of two experienced Meccanfield commanders, Khalid al-Walid and Amr ibn al-A’as. It had been al-Walid’s daring cavalry charge through the Hill of Arrows gap at Uhudthat turned the battle in favor of the Meccans and almost succeeded inkilling Muhammad. A bold commander with an excellent grasp ofstrategy and tactics, al-Walid rose quickly through the Muslim ranks.It was he who won many of the critical battles during the War of theApostates (Riddah) following Muhammad’s death that preserved Islamthrough a brutal civil war. And it was al-Walid who later defeated theByzantines and conquered Syria earning himself the title The Sword ofAllah. Amr ibn al-A’as had also been at Uhud. He, too, fought bravelyand well during the civil war. It was Amr ibn al-A’as who later led theArab conquest of Egypt. The addition of these two officers added con-siderably to Muhammad’s military expertise and capability.

Sometime in January 628 Muhammad’s intelligence agents obtainedinformation that the Bani Mustaliq were planning a raid on the Muslims.The Muslims caught them at a watering place at Al Muraisi near theseashore.56 There was a brief fight in which the bedouins were surprisedand several were killed. Muhammad captured a considerable numberof their women and children, animals, and flocks. One of the women,Juwairiya, was the daughter of the Mustaliq chief and went to Muham-mad to plead for her release saying that her father would willingly paywhatever ransom was asked. Ibn Ishaq tells us that Juwairiya “was amost beautiful woman who captivated every man who saw her.”57

Muhammad was so taken by her beauty that he proposed marriage to heron the spot! She accepted. As soon as the word spread that Muhammadhad married the daughter of the chief and that the Mustaliq had nowbecome Muhammad’s relatives, the Muslims released their prisoners.Ibn Ishaq tells us that a hundred families were released.58 With thisdiplomatic marriage Muhammad’s former enemies and allies of theMeccans all became Muslims. Muhammad had acquired the fealty of amajor tribe without any significant cost.

Sometime in March 628, Muhammad had a dream in which he sawhimself making a pilgrimage to Mecca. This was not one of Muham-mad’s revelations, so that the pilgrimage was apparently Muhammad’sidea and not a divine command. This is interesting insofar as it suggeststhat Muhammad may have undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca noton the spur of the moment as the dream story implies, but as part ofhis strategy to weaken the Meccans. The Battle of Uhud and the siege


of Medina had made it evident that Muhammad could not be destroyedby military force. At the same time Muhammad could not yet raisean army large enough to defeat the Meccans. A long stalemate was inthe offing unless something was done to alter the power relationshipbetween the two sides. From the beginning Muhammad had waged aninsurgency in which the critical circumstance was the campaign towin the hearts and minds of the general populace while his guerrillaarmy employed hit-and-run raids to isolate and weaken Mecca eco-nomically. As always, it was primarily a political struggle with ideologyand military operations made to serve political ends. It is a reasonableguess that Muhammad may have concluded that the time had come topress Mecca on the political front. Like other insurgent leaders whocame after him, Muhammad may have thought it time to confront theenemy on his home ground, relying not on military force but on theideological attraction of the new creed to produce a groundswell ofpopular support within the enemy stronghold to convince them thatfurther resistance was useless. It was the same strategic assumptionthat Mao Zedong made when he predicted that the cities would fallinto his hands like ripe fruit, and that the Vietcong made during theTet Offensive of 1968, and that Fidel Castro made on his first marchon Havana. It proved to be equally wrong.

In early April Muhammad set out for Mecca with a force of sevenhundred men.59 The column was virtually unarmed except for the tradi-tional defensive weapon permitted on the pilgrim’s journey, the sheathedsword. Pagan (and later Muslim) pilgrimages to Mecca were of twotypes: the hajj, or Greater Pilgrimage, which could only be made on aspecified day of the year, and the omra, or Lesser Pilgrimage, whichcould be carried out at any time. It was the Lesser Pilgrimage thatMuhammad undertook in 628. Muhammad wore the traditional garbof the pilgrim “so that all would know that he did not intend war andthat his purpose was to visit the temple and to venerate it.”60 Hebrought with him seventy camels, necks draped with garlands as wasthe custom, to sacrifice at the Kaaba.

It was a bold and dangerous gamble, and it would be naive tobelieve that Muhammad’s purpose was to venerate the Meccan shrinethat, after all, was the primary symbol of the very idolatry that hedespised. Muhammad was playing for higher stakes. The news of hisapproach reached Mecca in plenty of time and the Meccans sent out acavalry screen of two hundred horsemen to block Muhammad’s path.61

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The cavalry was only a tripwire to test Muhammad’s intentions, andits strength was such that Muhammad could easily have swept itaside, but only by starting the very battle he sought to avoid. Muham-mad must have received news of the Meccan cavalry long before theylocated his position, for Ibn Ishaq tells us that when Muhammadturned off the main road the Meccan cavalry commander knew thisonly by seeing the cloud of dust in the distance raised by Muhammad’scolumn.62 Using a local bedouin as a guide, the Muslims made theirway through a narrow pass coming within sight of the Meccan cavalrynow redeployed to block the alternate route. Muhammad called a halton level ground at a place called Hudaibiya, nine or ten miles north-west of Mecca. Here he ordered his army to pitch camp and water theanimals.63 Hudaibiya was located at the edge of the sacred groundaround Mecca within which violence was prohibited.

The Truce of Hudaibiya

History is sometimes cruel in presenting its actors with the circumstanceswith which they must deal. At the time of Muhammad’s pilgrimage,Abu Sufyan was suspiciously absent from Mecca. This deprived theMeccan leadership of its most decisive and adamant voice in theircounsels. Abu Sufyan had opposed Muhammad from the beginning, andthere would have been every expectation that he would have insistedthat Muhammad be opposed forcefully. Instead the Meccan leaderswere divided between those who wanted to attack Muhammad andthose who wanted to come to terms with him. The omra to Mecca in628 turned out to be one of the most crucial events in the history ofIslam. The Meccans had been unable to defeat Muhammad in the field.But here he was only eight miles from Mecca protected by only a smallforce with no line of retreat. It seemed that Muhammad had deliveredhimself into the hands of his enemies, offering the Meccans a pricelessopportunity to kill him and, perhaps, even to destroy Islam. Withoutthe counsel of Abu Sufyan, however, the Meccan leaders voted tonegotiate with Muhammad instead.

There is some tentative evidence that Muhammad may haveknown that Abu Sufyan would be absent from Mecca at this time, butthis is only speculation. The trusty Abbas was still serving as an agentamong the Meccan leadership, and the chief of the Khuza’a clan whohad the confidence of the Meccans and participated in the discussion


was also a source of accurate intelligence for Muhammad, for the“Khuza’a were the Apostle’s confidants, both their Muslims and theirpolytheists. They kept him informed of everything that happened in Mecca.”64 The details regarding the conduct of the negotiations are not important. It appears, however, that at some point both sidesbecame convinced that the other was about to attack. The “sponta-neous uprising” that Muhammad may have hoped to provoke by hisdaring entry into Mecca did not happen, and he was left in a vulnerablemilitary position. The result was that many of the outstanding issuesbetween the two parties were quickly resolved, and an agreement wasreached that became known as the Truce of Hudaibiya.

The Truce of Hudaibiya must be counted as among Muhammad’sgreatest political victories in his campaign to destroy his enemies andestablish Islam as the religion of virtuous Arab men. Ibn Ishaq tells usthat “[n]o greater victory in Islam was greater than this.”65 The agree-ment called for a truce between the Quraish and the Muslims to holdfor ten years. Muhammad never really had a chance of defeating theMeccans militarily, and the truce prohibited the Meccans, who certainlydid possess the military capability to destroy Muhammad (even as ithad been badly applied so far), from attempting to do so. With a singlestroke Muhammad had removed the military threat to his insurgency.To the Meccans the cessation of hostilities also meant that the caravanroutes would be reopened and commerce would resume unmolestedby Muslim raids. As we shall see, this was not what Muhammad hadin mind. A second provision required that any member of the Quraishwho went to Medina to become a Muslim without the legal permis-sion of their family or legal guardian was to be returned. Muslims whowanted to return to Mecca were free to do so and did not have to beforcibly returned. Some of Muhammad’s advisers thought this provisionhumiliating, but Muhammad saw it as a small price to pay for havingthe Meccans deal with him as an equal and recognize his status as theleader of Islam. Muhammad finally had the prestige and recognition heboth desired and required if he was to convince other chiefs to join him.

A third provision required the Muslims to depart from Mecca atonce, but permitted them to make an omra in the following year duringwhich they would be permitted to remain for three days. The Muslimswere to be armed only with the traditional sheathed sword of the pilgrim;the Quraish were required to withdraw from the city for three dayswhile the omra was going on. This seemingly minor provision was, as

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Muhammad knew, a major propaganda coup. The Meccans had alwaysargued that Muhammad was a danger because he sought to destroy theKaaba and its pilgrimage, actions that would cause great economicharm to the city. Muhammad’s demand that he be permitted to wor-ship at the Kaaba made it clear to the Meccan populace and merchantsthat he intended no such thing, and that the economic interests ofMecca had nothing to fear from Muhammad and his Muslims. Theprovision neutralized one of the major propaganda weapons of hisMeccan opponents with the result that many were now prepared togive Muhammad a fair hearing concerning Islam. Ibn Ishaq tells usthat “in those two years double as many or more than double as manyentered Islam as ever before.”66

The final provision of the Truce of Hudaibiya was the most impor-tant and gave Muhammad his greatest victory. The agreement permittedall the tribes of the region the freedom to make alliances with eitherside. This implied, as Muhammad saw it, that all prior alliances were nolonger in force or, at least, that the tribes were now free to change sidesor remain neutral. If they joined an alliance, the general truce applied tothem for ten years. Muhammad had been somewhat successful ingaining uncommitted tribes to his cause, but had been less successfulin attracting those tribes that were already allied with Mecca whopleaded that their obligations made switching sides dishonorable. Nowthese prior alliance obligations had been removed.

In one deft stroke Muhammad had altered the political powerbalance in the region. The powerful alliance of the Quraish, the Jewishtribes of Kheibar, and the large bedouin tribes of Ghatafan and Fazarahthat had so effectively opposed Muhammad was formally dissolved bythe truce. Muhammad could now deal with each opponent separatelywithout having to worry that the other’s allies would come to theiraid. His strategy of divide and conquer had provided Muhammad witha long-awaited opportunity. He moved quickly to bring the Jews ofKheibar under attack.


9

The Battles of Kheibar (628)and Mu’ta (629)

Muhammad remained in Medina for less than a month after theTruce of Hudaibiya, during which time he assembled an army of

fourteen hundred men and two hundred cavalry for his attack on theJewish settlement at Kheibar.1 Muhammad was eager to take advan-tage of the political confusion that had accompanied the loosening ofthe old tribal alliances after Hudaibiya and was determined to strikebefore a new coalition could be formed to oppose him. Kheibar was amajor agricultural oasis located some eighty miles north of Medina. Ithad a reputation for being infested with malaria, and caravans some-times avoided it altogether for this reason.2 The settlement was hometo a number of Jewish clans whose ancestors probably introduced datefarming and other agriculture to the oasis.3 The scale of date farmingwas enormous. An old description of the town notes that in one farmalone there were twelve thousand trees; another later source recordsthat the Katibah farm, the settlement’s largest, contained no fewerthan forty thousand trees.4 Farming on this scale made the tribes ofKheibar among the wealthiest in the region.

Kheibar was surrounded by a number of Arab tribes, the largest andmost powerful of which were the Ghatafans.5 The Jews of Kheibar werelong accustomed to paying bribes to these local tribes to reduce thebedouin propensity to raid agricultural settlements. With the Ghatafans

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this protection money took the form of gifts so that the arrangementassumed the shape of an alliance whereby the powerful Ghatafan tribeagreed to protect their Jewish allies. It was to Kheibar that the Beni an-Nadir tribe had gone after being forced by Muhammad to leave Mecca.The Beni an-Nadir had been anxious to avenge themselves on Muham-mad and had been instrumental in using their wealth and influence tohelp the Meccans assemble the coalition that had besieged Medina.They had been most effective in convincing the Ghatafan to join theMeccan coalition. Muhammad was aware of this and was convinced thatKheibar could never be neutralized through political accommodation butwould have to be reduced by force. Equally important was that Kheibarwas at Muhammad’s back. Any attempt to move against Mecca firstrequired that this hostile base of troops and supplies be neutralized.

In May 628 Muhammad and his army left Medina and moved by acircuitous route toward Kheibar.6 Muhammad’s intelligence servicewas operating efficiently and learned that the Ghatafan intended tocome to the aid of the Jews of Kheibar. Muhammad’s agents had beenactive among the tribes around Kheibar, and probably as a result ofMuslim bribes, none of the tribes except the Ghatafan remained loyalto their former allies in Kheibar.7 This was an outrageous breach offaith by Arab standards. Nevertheless, Muhammad’s financial stratagemhad seriously weakened his adversary. According to later sources theGhatafan and Fazarah rushed four thousand men to Kheibar, wherethey took up positions manning some of the Jewish forts.8 This seemsunlikely, however, since we hear nothing of these fighters from IbnIshaq nor are they mentioned as taking part in the battle later on.What seems to have happened is that, having detected the movementof some Ghatafan units on the way to reinforce Kheibar, Muhammadchanged his direction of march to place his army across the Ghatafanroute of march, blocking their way to the oasis.

Ibn Ishaq tells us that Muhammad “went forward with the armyuntil he halted in a wadi called al-Raji, halting between the men ofKheibar and Ghatafan so as to prevent the latter reinforcing Kheibar.”9

It might have been that the Ghatafan units were only an advanceguard and too weak to offer battle at al-Raji. In any event, the Ghata-fans rode back to their camp. Muhammad’s main force then turnedtoward Kheibar. But Muhammad seems to have remained wary thatthe Ghatafan might still try to come to the aid of their allies if theopportunity presented itself. To prevent this Muhammad detached

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several units, most likely cavalry to cover distance quickly, and setthem in the direction of the Ghatafan with orders to demonstratetheir intention to attack the Ghatafan territory, drive off the flocks,and capture the women and children. This seems to be the essence ofthe story as told by Ibn Ishaq, that after the encounter at al-Raji, theGhatafan “gathered together and marched out to help the Jews againsthim; but after a day’s journey, hearing a rumor about their propertyand families, they thought that they had been attacked during theirabsence so they went back on their tracks and left the way to Kheibaropen to the Apostle.”10 The rumor was probably the result of the move-ment and harassment in the Ghatafan rear by Muhammad’s cavalry.Following what would later be the advice of Napoleon to GeneralGhouci at the Battle of Waterloo to “keep the sabre in the back” of theadversary, maintain contact, and prevent the adversary from returningto the battlefield, Muhammad’s cavalry commander (whoever it was)kept pressing the Ghatafan until they moved off deeper into the desertfrom whence they could not return and support their allies in Kheibar.11

In a brilliant display of tactics, Muhammad had isolated his objectivefrom any outside help and was free to attack at will.

But Kheibar was no easy nut to crack. The settement lay in a deepvalley surrounded by an elevated table land and plateau. The valleybelow the table land was narrow, less than a mile wide, and ran on forseveral miles. The entire area, valley and plateau, was surrounded bylava hills that limited access to the fertile lands to only a few narrowdescending passes that were easily defended and through which noarmy could pass in force at one time. The approaches to and the mostlikely avenues of the advance within the valley itself were guardedby the usual fortified clan compounds, thick date groves, and walledgardens in zigzag fashion, all of which impeded rapid military move-ment. Ibn Ishaq says only that there were “innumerable” small fortsand compounds both on the table land and in the valley. Later sourcessay that Kheibar had only seven forts.12 Hamidullah, citing these samesources, suggests that the entire area may have been divided into “sevenmilitary regions,” by which one supposes he means integrated clancompounds. The size of the defensive forces at Kheibar is uncertain. IbnIshaq is completely silent on the matter, while later sources say thedefenders numbered between ten thousand and twenty thousand com-batants.13 The numbers are clearly exaggerations and may be referencesto the total population of Kheibar rather than to the number of available

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combatants. A total population of twenty thousand souls would not bebeyond reason for a settlement like Kheibar. But this population wouldonly be able to field between five thousand and six thousand soldiers,still a sizable force and considerably larger than Muhammad’s fourteen-hundred-man army (the two hundred cavalry now being unavailable).Moreover, the Jews of Kheibar had the advantage of the defense.

Muhammad staged from al-Raji and moved his column down asteep narrow trail that approached the valley floor from the east. Thetrail was so steep that the feet of a rider touched those of the rider infront of him.14 A walled compound and fortified tower commanded theexit of the trail where it met the valley floor. This was the compoundof the Na’im clan.15 Muhammad’s plan was to take this position andthen move his main force into the valley from where he could reduceeach of the forts one at a time. It required ten days for Muhammad’sarmy to subdue the Na’im fort. With the way finally clear, Muhammadmoved his main force into the valley and began attacking each of theother fortified positions in turn.

It was rough going. In one engagement fifty Muslim soldiers werewounded in a single day.16 The Jews fought well and in traditional Arabfashion. Some of their leaders came out of their defensive positions tochallenge Muslims to individual combat. This proved to be a foolhardydisplay of courage, and many of the chiefs of the Jewish clans werekilled in this manner. Still, resistance was stiff. In a number of instancesMuhammad was forced to order date palm groves cut down to clear anavenue for his troops to advance.17 Whenever a position fell to theMuslims, the remaining defenders would fall back to another fort andcontinue the fight. Sometimes they abandoned their women and childrento the attackers. Some clans fought vigorously, even conducting salliesto attack the Muslim positions; others fought less well. In one case a fortwas betrayed by a local resident who revealed a secret tunnel leadingfrom the walls to a place near the table land. Muhammad took theposition by gaining entrance through this tunnel.18

As always with Arab armies, Muhammad’s real problem was time.He had been engaged in the valley for more than three weeks when hisarmy began to run short of supplies. Forage was so difficult to come bythat Muhammad ordered large numbers of date palms cut down to feedthe animals. The army, too, was suffering from a lack of food. A soldierwent to Muhammad to complain. Muhammad turned his head sky-ward and prayed, “O God, You know their condition and they have no


strength, and that I have nothing to give them, so conquer for them thewealthiest of the enemy’s forts with the richest food.”19 As eventsturned out, the next day the compound of the al-Sab Beni Mu’adh clanwas taken, “which contained the richest food in Kheibar.”20 It wasapparently a storehouse of some sort.

The shortage of food caused a curious incident. The Muslim troopshad come across a herd of domestic donkeys, which they began toslaughter and cook. Muhammad happened to pass by one of the cookingfires and saw what was happening. He immediately pronounced that itwas forbidden to eat the flesh of the donkey. Ibn Ishaq tells us, “TheApostle’s prohibition of the flesh of domestic donkeys reached us as thepots were boiling with it, so we turned them upside down.”21 Interest-ingly, “when the Apostle forbade the flesh of donkeys he allowedthem [the soldiers] to eat horseflesh.”22 The order must have horrifiedthe troops, especially the cavalry! Horses were expensive and highlyvalued, and were not usually eaten under most circumstances. To orderhis troops not to eat the donkey but to kill and eat their horses insteadwas bizarre, to say the least. It also made no military sense because itwould reduce the number of mounts available to the army.23

The Muslim assault on Kheibar took more than a month beforethe last strongpoint was taken. Even then one of the Jewish leaderscame out from the fort carrying his weapon and challenged the Muslimsto a fight. The challenge was answered and he was killed. It had been along tough fight, but the Muslims had succeeded in capturing thetown that was second only to Mecca in the strength of its oppositionto Muhammad. Several factors contributed to the Muslim victory.First and perhaps most important, the Jews failed to bring their man-power advantage to bear. By even conservative estimates the Jews ofKheibar outnumbered the Muslims by four to one. Had they chosen tomeet Muhammad in open battle deployed across the narrow valleyfloor, they would have given themselves a huge numerical advantage.Instead they chose to fragment their forces into isolated groups, eachdeployed in and around the clan compounds. This meant that Muham-mad could bring numerical superiority to bear against each defensiveposition subduing them one at a time. The Jewish tactical deploymentgranted Muhammad the advantage of economy of force at the decisivepoint of each engagement. Second, to defend from their clan compoundsrequired that adequate supplies of food, forage, and water be gathered

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for a long defense. For whatever reason, this was not accomplishedwith any regularity so that the defenders were often as short of suppliesas the attackers. Some compounds surrendered to the Muslims becausethey had run out of food. Third, the defenders of Kheibar did not conducttheir defense under a unified command. Although all of the clans wereJewish, each clan fought its own battle for its own compound with littleor no coordination with other clans. The absence of a unified commandhad plagued Arab armies for centuries, and the establishment of such acommand was one of the most important reforms Muhammad hadintroduced to Arab warfare. Its absence at Kheibar proved fatal for thedefenders. Fourth, while both sides seem to have fought bravely, one isstill left with the conclusion that the Muslims were better fighters andmore highly motivated than the defenders. The kill ratio was seven toone in favor of Muhammad’s troops with only fifteen Muslims killedwhile ninety-three Jewish defenders perished.

Kheibar was a very rich oasis and the booty taken must have beenenormous. Al-Maqrizi tells us that five hundred bows, one hundredcoats of mail, four hundred swords, and one thousand lances were takenfrom the single fort of Katibah, which had taken two weeks of heavyfighting to subdue.24 The same source says that in one fort the Muslimscaptured a catapult (manjaniq) and that in another several covered cars(dabbabah) or wagons used in siege operations. These siege machineswere commonly known in Yemen, where they were vestiges of thelong years of Persian presence and influence, but were relatively rare inthe rest of western Arabia. Perhaps the leaders of wealthy Kheibar hadpurchased them for use in defending their forts. There is some tenta-tive evidence that the one catapult that was captured was then used bythe Muslims to attack the other forts.

It is important to note that Muhammad never seems to haveplanned to kill the Jews of Kheibar. All the sources agree that the firstplan for dealing with the residents of the town was to expel them,“that they should leave the country [territory] with nothing except theclothes on their bodies.”25 Additional evidence to this effect is thatMuhammad apparently returned all the copies of the Hebrew scrip-tures captured in the fighting to the Jews of Kheibar once the battlehad ended.26 The residents of Kheibar were permitted to keep theirfarms, date groves, and gardens with the provision that 50 percent ofthe harvest of the town was to be given over to the Muslims each year.


The lion’s share of the booty was given to the soldiers who had beenwith Muhammad at Hudaibiya, with the two hundred cavalrymenreceiving a double share.27

A few days later, Muhammad prepared to move against Wadi al-Qura,another Jewish oasis in the area, which surrendered without resistanceon the same terms as Kheibar. A short time later, two other larger Jewishoases, Fadak and Tayma, settled with Muhammad on the same terms.The events surrounding the treatment of the Jews in these oases stronglysuggests that Muhammad’s slaughter of the Jews of Beni Qaynuqa inMedina was carried out for security reasons, that is, to remove a poten-tial threat to his primary base of operations. He could have easilycaused the Jews of Kheibar to be killed or sold into slavery. Insteadhe came to a traditional Arab accommodation with them; peace andprotection in return for money or a share in the harvest. Muhammadwas certainly capable of cold-blooded terror against any of his enemies,but he seems to have harbored no particular animus against the Jews.With the accommodation with the Jews of Kheibar, Muhammad seemsto have solved his “Jewish problem” once and for all.

Muhammad returned to Medina, where he spent the rest of theyear carrying out a series of small raids against the various clans aroundMedina and Mecca to demonstrate his power and importance. Muham-mad was reminding those clans who opposed him that he was a powerto be reckoned with, more so since his victory at Kheibar. Throughoutthis period Muhammad made numerous attempts to negotiate with thevarious clans as he attempted to garner their support, conversion, orpromises of neutrality. Muhammad’s grasp of the strategic politicalrealities was evident in that he rarely demanded that a clan convert toIslam as the price of an agreement, being content to accept the tradi-tional form of Arab obligation. As always, his diplomatic efforts wereaimed at winning over or neutralizing the countryside as a key elementin his continued prosecution of the Muslim insurgency.

In February 629, a year after the agreement at Hudaibiya, Muham-mad set out from Medina to make his promised pilgrimage to Meccaand to test the sincerity and strength of his Quraish opponents there.When last he had attempted to make the Lesser Pilgrimage at Meccahe had gone without arms, placing himself in great danger. Now he setout for Mecca with a bodyguard of two thousand soldiers and a largequantity of weapons. The weapons were hidden under guard near theborder of the city just outside the haram, or sanctuary where weapons

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and violence were forbidden. The Muslim pilgrims approached theholy shrine armed only with the sheathed sword. Muhammad led thecolumn of men riding on a camel and surrounded by his intimate com-panions, including Ali, Abu Bakr, and Umar ibn al Khattab.28 Sixtycamels prepared for sacrifice accompanied the party.29 Until this dayMuhammad had not set eyes on the city of his birth for seven years.

As they had promised at Hudaibiya the Meccans withdrew from thecity itself, retreating to the surrounding hills where they made camp andwatched the happenings below. Muhammad made the ritual turnsaround the Kaaba while riding on his camel and performed “the sevencircuits of the House, after which he withdrew to the foot of the littlehill of Safa, and passed to and fro between it and the hill of Marwah,seven courses in all, ending at Marwah, to which many of the sacrificialanimals had now been led. There he sacrificed a camel, and his headwas shaved. . . . This completed the rite of the Lesser Pilgrimage.”30

Behind him and on foot, his followers did the same shouting, LabbaykAllahumma Labbayk, “Here I am, O God, at Thy service.”31 While inMecca Muhammad married a girl of twenty-seven, Maymuna, the sisterof one of his uncles. When the Meccans came to him and remindedhim that their agreement called for Muhammad and his followers toremain in the city for three days, he replied that he would offer a weddingfeast for all if he could stay a few more days.32 The Meccans refused andMuhammad ordered his men out of the city by nightfall.

Muhammad’s return to Mecca was another political triumph alongthe same lines as his political victory at Hudaibiya. Once again theMeccan leadership was forced to treat Muhammad as an equal, a manof authority and reputation to be dealt with accordingly. Muhammad’sarrival in Mecca with two thousand followers was also a show of militaryforce that demonstrated that he possessed the means to protect himselfand his movement. Perhaps more important than both of these elementswas Muhammad’s observance of the traditional pagan ritual of worship atthe Kaaba, which put to rest the accusation of his Meccan opponentsthat Islam would destroy the old shrine and the economic benefits thatfell to Mecca because of it. Years earlier Muhammad had instituted theqiblah, the direction to be faced when Muslims pray. Originally, hehad required that Muslims face Jerusalem. After his initial difficultieswith the Jews of Medina he changed the direction of the qiblah so thatMuslims now faced Mecca when they prayed.33 Muhammad’s perfor-mance at the Lesser Pilgrimage had gone a long way to allay the fears


of the Meccans on both economic and religious grounds. The perfor-mance was so convincing that within a few months some prominentMeccan leaders converted to Islam and went over to Muhammad.Among the most important of these converts was Khalid al-Walid, thetalented field commander destined for military greatness; Amr ibn alMaimoona, who had distinguished himself on the field at Uhud, but whohad also been among the most prominent leaders of the oppositionagainst Muhammad in Mecca; and Othman ibn Talha, the hereditarykeeper of the keys to the door of the Kaaba itself. The conversion of theseand other important persons in Mecca probably went far to convincemany others that Muhammad’s movement was the wave of the future.34

The Battle of Mu’ta

In September 629, six months after the pilgrimage to Mecca, the firstmilitary clash between the Muslims and the world outside Arabiaoccurred with the forces of the Byzantine Empire at the small town ofMu’ta located southeast of the Dead Sea in modern-day Jordan. Thiswas the first penetration of the borders of the Byzantine Empire by aMuslim army, and for the first time in history information concerningMuhammad can be obtained from some source other than a Muslimone. The Byzantine historian Theophanes recorded the events thattranspired at Mu’ta between the Byzantine and Muslim armies.35 AMuslim army of three thousand men left Medina in early Septemberand made its way toward the Syrian border. Command of the armywas given to Muhammad’s adopted son, Zayd ibn Harithah, withinstructions that if Zayd were slain command was to fall to Jafar ibnAbi Talib, the brother of Ali. If both were killed, Abdullah ibn Rawaha,an ansar of Medina, was to assume command. These were notablepeople close to the Apostle himself, and their presence indicates thatMuhammad attached considerable importance to the raid into Syria.

The account of what happened at Mu’ta is one of the more obscureto have come down to us from Muslim sources. It remains unclearwhy Muhammad ordered the expedition in the first place. Three possi-bilities exist. According to Muslim tradition Muhammad sent six lettersto the great leaders of the world outside Arabia, including the Persianand Byzantine emperors, urging them to recognize his prophethood andthe new religion of Islam by becoming Muslims. Among the recipientsof these letters was the chief of the Beni Ghassan (Ghassanid) tribe that

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had served the Byzantines as allies for more than a century andguarded the Syrian frontier against Arab raids. No reliable informa-tion on the letter’s content has survived, nor do we know if the letterwas ever delivered, or if there was a reply. What is known is thatMuhammad’s messenger was set upon and murdered, an event thatMuhammad seems to have attributed to the chief of the Ghassanidshimself or to one of his tribe’s clans.36 The murder of an envoy whocomes carrying a letter in peace has always been regarded as a terriblecrime in the Arab mind. It is possible that Muhammad decided toavenge the insult with a punitive raid against the territory of the per-petrators. The size of Muhammad’s force, three thousand men, wouldseem appropriate to this task.

A second reason for the raid on Syria is offered by the famousscholar Philip K. Hitti and is less complex. Hitti suggests that thepurpose of the attack was to raid Mu’ta itself. Mu’ta contained anarmory where the famous Mashrafiya swords were manufactured, andMuhammad wanted to obtain a large quantity of these excellent weaponsto outfit his army for his planned attack on Mecca. Gifts of these expen-sive weapons would also have been valuable in gaining the support ofthe bedouin tribes that Muhammad absolutely required to raise anarmy large enough to attack Mecca.37

Yet another reason may have been that Muhammad’s success atMecca during the Lesser Pilgrimage may have convinced him thatMecca would eventually come into the Muslim fold and that a periodof benign neglect toward it was the best policy for the time being.While negotiations with the bedouin tribes in the Hejaz region con-tinued with good success, Muhammad may have turned his attentionto the north for two reasons. First, the northern area from Kheibar tothe Syrian border was still in the hands of the powerful Ghatafan tribeand their allies. Muhammad may have thought that a military expedi-tion through their territory would have the effect of demonstrating hisability to move at will through their lands. Second, there is no evidencethat Muhammad ever intended to limit his movement to the Hejazregion or its major cities of Medina, Mecca, and Ta’if. Islam was to befor the Arabs of all Arabia and that included those living on the bordersof the two great imperial realms.38 Moreover, the Ghassanid chiefs hadlost considerable power and influence with the Byzantine Empire as aconsequence of their adoption of the heretical Monophysite Christianreligion, and their control over their subtribes was weakening. It is


unlikely that Muhammad was unaware of these events. Muhammad’sfirst expedition to Syria, preceded as it was by a letter to the region’sgovernor urging conversion to Islam, may have been a missionaryexpedition to spread the faith. It is not impossible that Muhammadmay have had all of these reasons in mind when he sent the Muslimraiders to the north.

As so often happened with Muhammad’s military expeditions, thisone, too, was detected long before it reached its target. As the Muslimarmy approached the Syrian border, a local Byzantine official namedTheodore the Vicar raised a force of Arab auxiliaries to oppose them.These Arab auxiliaries were pagans and Christians living in the regionto the southeast of the Dead Sea in the old biblical land of Edom.39 Thearmy assembled a few miles farther east near what is now the town ofKerak, called Ma’ab by the Arabs of the day, the biblical Moab.40 IbnIshaq says that when the Muslims reached Ma’ab in Syria about fiftymiles south of Mu’ta, reports reached them that Heraclius himself, theByzantine emperor, was in command of one hundred thousand Greeksencamped in Mu’ta.41 The numbers are clearly an exaggeration, andthe claim that Heraclius himself was involved is completely false.The terrain, the desert, and the water supply do not permit such largenumbers, and certainly not in response to a minor border raid. Morelikely the Byzantine force was relatively small, perhaps comprisingfour thousand to five thousand Arab tribesmen stiffened by a regimentor two of Byzantine regulars or even local auxiliaries for a combinedforce of five thousand to six thousand men at most.42

The Muslims approached the town of Ma’an, where news of theByzantine force deployed to their front reached them. A debate brokeout among the commanders as to what to do. Some wanted to send amessenger back to Medina and ask the Prophet for advice. The distancebetween Medina and Ma’an was almost six hundred miles. The ideathat a messenger could reach the Prophet and return in time was aban-doned. One of the Muslim commanders, the ansar and zealot Abdullahibn Rawaha, stood up and told the others that they had forgotten that“we are not fighting the enemy with numbers, or strength, or multitude,but we are confronting them with this religion with which God hashonored us. So come on! Both prospects are fine: victory or martyrdom.”43

The other commanders and troops agreed that ibn Rawaha was right.And “then the army went forward” to engage the Byzantines.

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It is likely that the first contact was made by the Muslim advanceunits that were ranging to the front of the army. The Byzantine units,after a brief skirmish, withdrew northward toward Mu’ta. The Muslimforce followed cautiously. The terrain between Ma’an and Mu’ta isrough, narrow in places, and cut by ravines and wadis so that there arefew places to accommodate open battle with even a small force ofthree thousand men. But Mu’ta itself was located on a small openplain large enough to accommodate the Muslim force which encampedthere. Muslim reconnaissance units moved northward probing to findthe main Byzantine force. At some point contact was made, and theByzantines advanced on Mu’ta. Ibn Ishaq tells us, “When the enemyapproached, the Muslims [he means the advanced reconnaissanceunits, which might have been of some strength and mistaken for unitsof the main army itself] withdrew to a village called Mu’ta. There theforces met and the Muslims made their dispositions, putting over (incommand of) the right wing Qutba bin Qatada . . . and over the leftwing an Ansari called ’Ubaya bin Malik.”44

The details of the engagement are sketchy. What is puzzling is thatall three Muslim commanders were killed, which suggests that thefighting may have been heavy and close in. But Ibn Ishaq and laterhistorians record that only eight other Muslims were killed, whichfurther suggests a sharp clash of short duration where the Arab sidebroke and ran. The deaths of the Muslim commanders can be explainedfrom Ibn Ishaq’s account.45 Zayd, the Prophet’s adopted son, was the firstto engage and the first to die, followed quickly by Jafar ibn Abi Talib,the brother of Ali, and finally by Abdullah ibn Rawaha, who said aprayer before entering battle.46 The Muslim top leadership was gone ina matter of minutes, probably slain in traditional Arab fashion by chal-lenging the warriors of the opposing Arab units to individual combatswherein they met their deaths. It is not unlikely that the Muslimranks, their leaders having been killed before their eyes, broke whenstruck by the Byzantine attack. As regards casualty figures, much ofthe army consisted of recently converted bedouins, some recruitedalong the way with the promise of loot, and may simply have beenconsidered of insufficient importance to merit mentioning in theaccounts of the engagement. Only the better-known Muslim fighters,those from Medina, were thought worthy of mention. Thus, only eightMuslim soldiers were reported killed.


That the Muslim army broke and ran seems beyond doubt. In thegeneral battlefield confusion with no one to take command, the Muslimunits simply came apart. Ibn Ishaq tells us that Khalid al-Walid, theMeccan cavalry commander who had almost killed Muhammad atUhud but who had now become a Muslim, saved the day by rallyingthe troops, breaking contact, and conducting an orderly withdrawal.As Ibn Ishaq tells it, al-Walid “called on the Muslims to rally roundone man, and when they wanted to rally to him he demurred and theyrallied to Khalid al-Walid. When he took the standard he tried to keepthe enemy off and to avoid an engagement. Then he retreated and theenemy turned aside from him until he got away with the men.”47 Havingbloodied the Muslim raiders, the Byzantines apparently thought itunnecessary to pursue them and permitted their withdrawal withoutfurther opposition.

Mu’ta was a strategic and tactical failure as well as a personal tragedyfor Muhammad, who lost his adopted son in the engagement. Reportsof the defeat reached Medina before the returning army. When the armyarrived at Medina the Muslim inhabitants greeted them with shouts ofderision, throwing dirt on the soldiers for their disgrace in fleeingfrom the battlefield. In a religious worldview that sees martyrdom inbattle as more valuable even than victory, a soldier surviving a defeatis difficult to understand. The defeat at Mu’ta seems to have encourageda degree of restlessness among some of the other northern tribes, whoattempted to form a coalition to attack Medina. Only a month afterMu’ta (October 629) Muhammad was compelled to send an expeditionagainst the two northern tribes of Bali and Quada’ah.48 Both thesetribes had been part of the Ghassanid frontier defense coalition andhad participated in the fighting at Mu’ta. Now they were active inhelping to form a rival coalition of tribes to attack Muhammad. It ispossible that Muhammad’s activities had finally come to the attentionof the Byzantine authorities, who may have decided to use their Araballies as a means to attack Medina and remove the possibility of anyfuture raids along the frontier. Muhammad learned of the situation inthe north and dispatched a strong force led by Amr ibn al-A’as to attackthe Bali and Quada’ah. The importance of this foray was evident inthat a second force was sent to reinforce al-’As’s troops that had withit Abu Bakr, Umar, and Abu Ubaydah, three of the Prophet’s closestcompanions.49 Details of this engagement are completely lacking, but

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the expedition seems to have been a success in dispersing the threat-ening coalition.

In the two years since Muhammad and the Meccans had signed theTruce of Hudaibiya (March 628), Muslim accounts record seventeenmilitary expeditions carried out by Muhammad. These expeditionswere of three types. (1) Expeditions against tribes that openly opposedMuhammad in the north and east of Medina. Some of these raids, likethose against the Fadak and Ghatafan tribes, were failures in whichsignificant numbers of Muslims were killed in battle. Others, like theattack on Kheibar, were major successes. (2) Expeditions against the clansof the powerful Hawazin tribe, who controlled the territory aroundMecca. The Hawazin were a large tribe allied with the Meccans andopenly hostile to Muhammad. These raids finally led to one of the mostimportant battles of Muhammad’s life, the Battle of Hunayn. (3) Expedi-tions against Byzantine provinces to the north of which the defeat atMu’ta was the most notable. During this entire period Muhammad wascontent to permit Mecca to remain unmolested if only for the obviousreasons that his control of his own strategic territory and resources wasnot yet complete and that his army was not yet sufficiently large orequipped to take on the Meccans and their powerful bedouin allies.After Mu’ta Muhammad turned his attention once more to Mecca.


10

The Conquest of MeccaJanuary 11, 630

Ever since the Truce of Hudaibiya Muhammad had concentrated onbuilding his alliances among the bedouins of the Arabian country-

side. These efforts were successful among the tribes and clans of theHejaz, while those tribes farther north remained hostile. The tribes to thesouth of Mecca and in Yemen remained largely unaffected by Muham-mad’s movement until after his death. In the Hejaz Muhammad’sgrowing power and reputation induced many clan chiefs to seek hissupport against local rivals, sometimes drawing the Prophet too deeplyinto local quarrels. Other chiefs, some of whom were once supportersof Mecca, remained neutral out of fear of ending up on the wrong sidewhen the clash between Muhammad and the Meccans finally came.Muhammad’s astute sense of politics, his negotiating skills, and hisreputation as an honest judge often permitted him to settle local disputesto his advantage with both sides declaring their allegiance to him. Twoyears after the Truce of Hudaibiya, Muhammad’s power had grown tosuch an extent that the Meccans were no longer a match for him.1 Overthe decade since the Meccans first recognized Muhammad as a threat,they had failed to develop a consistent strategy to oppose him. Theinternal politics and personal jealousies of the city had made it impos-sible for anyone to assume effective leadership to oppose Muhammad.Where once Meccan aristocrats were influential throughout the region,

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now only Muhammad possessed the reputation and power sufficient toput forth a claim to leadership of the Hejaz. Muhammad had carefullybided his time, and now the moment had come to march on Mecca.

The Truce of Hudaibiya was only six months old when Muhammadfound a way around one of its central provisions. The truce requiredthat Muhammad would no longer attack the Meccan caravans movingover the northern route to Syria. Mecca lived by trade, and the disrup-tion in its economic lifeline threatened its very existence. For the first sixmonths after Hudaibiya no raids were undertaken against the northernroute caravans. And then a curious series of events occurred, leading oneto suspect that Muhammad had once more devised a brilliant stratagemthat permitted him both to observe the truce and at the same time tocarry out raids on the Meccan caravans, thus renewing the economicpressure on Mecca that had been so effective in weakening its powerand influence.

The Truce of Hudaibiya required Muhammad to return to Meccaanyone who came to Islam in Medina without the permission of hisfamily or guardians. One day a man named Abu Basir ’Utabah binUsayd arrived in Medina seeking to become a Muslim. He had beenheld prisoner by his relatives in Mecca for his Muslim sympathies buthad escaped and made his way to Medina in search of sanctuary.Muhammad dutifully turned Abu Basir over to the two guardians whohad arrived in Medina seeking his return. On the way back to MeccaAbu Basir somehow obtained possession of the sword of one of his captors and killed him, fleeing back to Medina. Abu Basir’s remainingguardian followed him to Medina, where once again he asked Muham-mad to hand over Abu Basir. Muhammad dutifully offered to placeAbu Basir in the custody of the guardian as required by the truce, butthe guardian was terrified at the prospect of having to escort Abu Basirall the way to Mecca by himself and refused Muhammad’s offer. Havingtwice complied with his obligations under the truce, Muhammad nowwashed his hands of the whole affair. Moreover, because Abu Basirtechnically had not yet been a Muslim when he was first turned overto the Meccans, Muhammad bore no responsibility for the bloodshedthat had occurred.2

But what to do with Abu Basir? Muhammad knew that his ownactions, although technically correct and legal under the truce agree-ment, would anger the Meccans and might provoke them further.Muhammad was not yet ready for a showdown with Mecca. At the

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same time, however, Abu Basir’s loyalty to Muhammad and anger atthe Meccans might yet be put to good use. Although Abu Basir was nowconsidered a Muslim because of his presence in Medina, Muhammadmade a strange request: that Abu Basir leave Medina.3 Almost certainlywith Muhammad’s urging, Abu Basir left Medina and went to a placenear the seacoast that overlooked the Meccan caravan route to Syria.There he gathered some seventy other men about him, presumablyMeccans like himself who wished to become Muslims and did not wantto be returned to Mecca.4 Abu Basir’s band of men turned to attackingthe Meccan caravans with a vengeance and killing any Meccan whofell into their hands. The result was that Muhammad was able partiallyto restore economic sanctions against Mecca and to do so withoutbreaking the letter of the truce. The raiders were not officially membersof the Muslim community, so Muhammad had no responsibility fortheir raids. The Meccans were, of course, free to attack the raiders,but the ambushes occurred far from Mecca and the distance made itdifficult to mount effective military operations against them. After aperiod of some months the Meccans appealed to Muhammad in des-peration to take the raiders into his community and bring the raids toa halt. Muhammad seems to have agreed to do so, but only after someconsiderable delay. When a letter from Muhammad finally reachedAbu Basir’s camp instructing him to cease his brigandage, Abu Basirhad already died. The sources are not clear whether the raids everended or whether they continued under a new chief. In either caseMuhammad had once more brilliantly outmaneuvered his enemies.Although Muhammad’s conduct had been correct under the strict letter of the truce, there were those in Mecca who were furious atwhat had happened and had come to the conclusion that the Truce ofHudaibiya had been a mistake. What they wanted was an excuse tobreak the truce and take their revenge on Muhammad. The opportu-nity to do both arose in November 629.

What Ibn Ishaq called “the causes that led to the occupation ofMecca” began in November 629 when the Beni Bakr, bedouin alliesof the Quraish, set an ambush and attacked the Khuza’a tribe whilethey were resting at a well near Mecca.5 The Beni Bakr and Khuza’ahad been enemies for years and had been at each other’s throats severaltimes before the Truce of Hudaibiya. The Beni Bakr were longtimeallies of the Quraish of Mecca, and the Khuza’a declared their loyalty toMuhammad soon after the truce was signed. Apparently at the urging

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of some Quraish who had supplied them with weapons, the Beni Bakrattacked the Khuza’a without warning, killing two of them.6 The Khuza’awere driven back into the sanctuary zone surrounding the Kaaba. TheBeni Bakr pursued the Khuza’a survivors into the sacred precinct,where the latter took refuge in two houses. The attackers laid siege tothe houses and finally dragged the Khuza’a from them killing twentyof their men.7 This was very bad business by Arab standards, and certainto lead to more difficulties between the Meccans and Muhammad. Achief of the Khuza’a tribe came to Medina and asked if Muhammadintended to keep his word as an ally and come to the aid of the Khuza’a.Nothing could have served Muhammad’s ends more than a pretext toattack Mecca. He had apparently already reached the conclusion thatthe time was politically and militarily favorable to move against thecity and dispose of the Meccan problem once and for all. Muhammadimmediately began making military preparations for an attack.

The Meccan leadership seems to have realized that the Khuza’aincident risked setting off greater problems and dispatched Abu Sufyan,the leader of the Meccan army at Uhud and a longtime opponent ofMuhammad, to Medina to meet with him and calm things down byreaffirming the peace obligations of the Truce of Hudaibiya. But AbuSufyan was a practical man, and he realized that things had alreadygone beyond anyone but Muhammad’s ability to control them. He alsoseems to have come to the conclusion that the time was long pastwhen Muhammad and his movement could be destroyed by Meccanpolitical influence with the bedouins or even by military force. Shortlyafter reaching Medina, where Muhammad refused to see him, he surelyrealized that Muhammad had every intention of conquering Meccaand bringing it into the fold of Islam. The only question was whetherthis would be accomplished peacefully or through violence. To a manof Abu Sufyan’s intelligence it was clearly time to change sides, and thereare indications that Abu Sufyan and Muhammad entered into a secretagreement to bring about a peaceful capitulation of Mecca.8

The seeds of Abu Sufyan’s political conversion may have actuallybeen planted two years earlier, even before the negotiations accom-panying the Truce of Hudaibiya. It is difficult to imagine that Muham-mad would ever have contemplated the Lesser Pilgrimage into the heartof enemy territory without having first been reassured by some powerfulfigure in Mecca that he would not be harmed. Most likely it was AbuSufyan who was in a position to deliver this guarantee. Moreover, Abu


Sufyan was not present at the negotiations that produced the Truce ofHudaibiya and therefore could not be held responsible for its imple-mentation, an excuse that would serve him well when it came time torepudiate it. Of significance, too, is the fact that shortly after the Truceof Hudaibiya was concluded, Abu Sufyan’s daughter, Umm Habibah,married Muhammad, perhaps sealing a bargain between the two menwho were, after all, still of the same tribe of Quraish.9 Finally, whenthe truce was broken by the Khuza’a incident, it was Abu Sufyan whotraveled to Medina to negotiate with the Prophet.10 Without the sup-position that Abu Sufyan and Muhammad had entered into a secretagreement, the events involving Abu Sufyan leading up to the attackon Mecca make little sense. This aside, however, Abu Sufyan wasprobably horrified at the prospect of a house-to-house street battle for control of the city. He seems to have come to the conclusion thatresistance was futile and that the only way to save the city was tofacilitate its surrender to Muhammad without violence.

Whatever was going on between Abu Sufyan and Muhammad on thepolitical front, Muhammad continued his military preparations for anattack on Mecca. Having had so many of his past operations compro-mised, this time Muhammad took great care to maintain operationalsecurity, making great use of deception “so that we may take them [theMeccans] by surprise in their land.”11 The first thing Muhammad didwas to seal off the exits and entrances to Medina with armed guards.To prevent anyone from warning the Meccans, no travel was permittedoutside the city. It was a wise precaution, for no sooner had the guardsbeen mounted than one Hatib bin Abu Balta tried to warn the Meccansby sending them a letter hidden in the hair of a woman. The “Apostlereceived news from heaven” about the letter and sent guards afterthe woman, who was caught and the letter found.12 Muhammad nowmounted a diversion. He assembled a small body of men, perhaps afew hundred, and sent them north toward Syria to deceive any spiesstill lurking in Medina into believing that the unit was either anadvance party or a reconnaissance for a larger movement to the north.He hoped to convince the spies that he intended to move against thenorthern tribes and not against Mecca.13

Muhammad began to gather his army in a manner designed to con-ceal the assembly of the force from the Meccans. Any attempt toassemble the tribes in Medina, as he had previously done on occasion,would surely have been noticed. Instead, Muhammad sent trusted

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agents to each of his bedouin allies ordering them to prepare for warand to be ready to join his army as it passed through their territory orclose to some nearby rendezvous point along the planned route ofmarch toward Mecca. On January 1, 630, Muhammad set out fromMedina with a force of perhaps no more than three thousand men. Hewas joined along the way by his bedouin allies. By the time he reachedthe outskirts of Mecca his army had grown to ten thousand.14 By now,of course, it was no longer possible to conceal the fact that Muham-mad had raised an army and was marching in the general direction ofMecca. It was, however, still possible to deceive the Meccans as to hisintentions. To this end he encamped at a place called Marr al-Zahran,two days’ march short of Mecca. Here the roads joined. From this loca-tion Muhammad could march with equal facility toward Mecca orTa’if or the Hawazins’ territory, all places where there were enemiesagainst whom Muhammad had good reason to take military action.Even at this late time, however, the Meccans could still not be certainthat Muhammad was planning to attack them, a situation that helpedparalyze their decision making.15 Finally, with his intentions stillunknown, Muhammad decided to reveal his strength in an effort tostrike fear into the Meccans. He ordered each man to light an individualcampfire at nightfall—ten thousand campfires—giving the impressionthat his army was even larger than it was.

By now the Meccans were in a panic having come to the conclu-sion that Muhammad’s objective was to attack Mecca. One can onlyspeculate what role Abu Sufyan played in stoking the fires of fearamong the Meccan leadership. But if he really was a double agent whohad come to an accommodation with Muhammad to deliver the citywithout bloodshed, it is reasonable to expect that his role here wassignificant. Also significant was that Abu Sufyan was sent by theMeccan leadership to negotiate with Muhammad, a fact that suggestsAbu Sufyan had not raised the suspicions of his fellow Meccans as tohis true loyalty. Abu Sufyan had visited Muhammad in Medina severalweeks earlier, ostensibly to negotiate an end to the crisis caused by theKhuza’a incident, but had been turned away. Now he came to DhuTuwa, a day’s march closer to Mecca, to where Muhammad had movedhis army in preparation for the attack on the city, for another meeting.He was met by Abbas, Muhammad’s uncle, who had been an agent-in-place among the Meccans for almost a decade and whose cover, wemay reasonably presume, was now blown. Abbas escorted Abu Sufyan


into Muhammad’s presence, where Umar immediately suggested thatAbu Sufyan be killed on the spot! This was probably a bit of arrangedtheater to convince Abu Sufyan that he was no longer a free agent andhad no choice but to agree to Muhammad’s demands. Muhammad senthim away without speaking to him with instructions to Abbas that hebe brought back in the morning.16

Abu Sufyan returned the next morning, and the two men got downto business. Muhammad began by asking, “Isn’t it time for you toadmit that there is no god but God?” Abu Sufyan, now an old man,looked about the room and did not reply to Muhammad’s question.Muhammad continued, “Isn’t it time for you to recognize that I amthe Messenger of God?” This time Abu Sufyan answered. “As far asthat is concerned, I still have my doubts.”17 Muhammad must havebeen somewhat taken aback at this personal affront, but it was Abbaswho reacted by threatening Abu Sufyan. “Submit and testify that thereis no God but Allah and that Muhammad is the Apostle of God beforeyou lose your head,” he said. And as Ibn Ishaq tells us, “he did so.”18

The whole story, while dramatic, doesn’t ring true, and may havebeen designed by Muhammad and Abu Sufyan to maintain Abu Sufyan’scover that he was a loyal Meccan and not an agent for Muhammad. Forall his earlier opposition to Muhammad, Abu Sufyan was still a Quraishas was Muhammad. When Muhammad was a young boy being tor-mented by other boys, he had taken shelter in the house of Abu Sufyan.Abu Sufyan had also become Muhammad’s father-in-law. Abu Sufyanhad not opposed the Truce of Hudaibiya, and it was probably AbuSufyan who had guaranteed Muhammad’s safety with the Meccanswhen Muhammad made the Lesser Pilgrimage. Now Muhammad wasto make his best use of Abu Sufyan by offering the Meccans an amnestyif they surrendered their city without a fight. Had Abu Sufyan’s earlieragreement with Muhammad become known even to Muhammad’sclosest advisers, to say nothing of the Meccans, Abu Sufyan’s value inconvincing the Meccans to surrender would have been worthless.

Muhammad told Abu Sufyan that he was prepared to declare ageneral amnesty and that there would be no killing if the Meccanssurrendered the city. Anyone who remained in their house and did nottake up arms would be safe. Anyone who sought safety in the courtyardof the Kaaba would be left unmolested. He was further prepared todeclare Abu Sufyan’s house a place of asylum (jiwar) and to guaranteethat anyone who took shelter there would not be harmed.19 To declare

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Abu Sufyan’s house a place of asylum was an honor, but one that wouldsurely compromise Abu Sufyan in the eyes of the Meccans. Perhapsasylum was offered to reassure Abu Sufyan that his loyalty would berewarded once Muhammad was in control of Mecca while at the sametime sending the message to the Meccan leadership that one of theirmost important leaders had already gone over to Islam and that theyhad little choice but to join him or die. Abu Sufyan returned to Meccacarrying Muhammad’s offer.

According to Ibn Ishaq Muhammad told Abbas to delay Abu Sufyan’sdeparture from the camp by taking him to the top of a hill overlooking anarrow part of the wadi below “so that when God’s armies pass by hewould see them.”20 Abu Sufyan was detained until Muhammad’s entirearmy had passed before him in full battle kit and ready for war. “Finallythe Apostle passed with his greenish-black squadron [a reference to thecolor of the troops’ armor] in which were muhajirun and ansar whoseeyes alone were visible because of their armor.”21 Muhammad’s gifts ofweapons and armor to his bedouin allies had produced an army in whichmost contingents were fully armed and armored with helmets, breastplates, and back plates.22 Abu Sufyan was duly impressed, no doubt asmuch with the fact that he had chosen the winning side at just the rightmoment as with the size of Muhammad’s army.

Delaying Abu Sufyan’s departure for Mecca had more than a psycho-logical purpose, however, for it was unlikely that Abu Sufyan needed tobe convinced further of Muhammad’s strength. The delay served animportant tactical purpose as well. By the time Abu Sufyan caught upand rode past the army to reach Mecca and spread the word of Muham-mad’s coming, the army would have already encircled the city and cutoff the exits. Neither escape nor reinforcement would any longer bepossible. Even if the Meccans succeeded in getting word to their bedouinallies, itself a doubtful prospect, reinforcements would have to fighttheir way through Muhammad’s army to reach the city. In yet anotherbrilliant tactical maneuver, Muhammad had completely outsmarted hisenemy and cut off the objective. If the Meccans chose to fight, theywould have to do so alone.

When Abu Sufyan reached Mecca he quickly spread the word thatMuhammad was coming in force but that the city might yet save itselfby surrendering and taking advantage of the amnesty. The reaction musthave been ferocious. Abu Sufyan’s own wife, the infamous Hind whohad chewed on Hamza’s liver at Uhud, seized him by his moustache


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Map 10. The Conquest of Mecca, 630 c.e.

crying out, “Kill this fat greasy bladder of lard! What a rotten protectorof the people!”23 Abu Sufyan protested that all would be safe if theyremained indoors or took advantage of the sanctuary granted to hishouse and the Kaaba. By now a crowd had gathered shouting that AbuSufyan should be killed where he stood for his treachery.24 But whenhe told them that if they remained in their houses with the doorslocked they would also be safe, “the people dispersed to their housesand the mosque.”25 Meccan morale was broken, and within a few hoursthe streets of Mecca were deserted.

Map 10 shows that there was only one major road from the norththat ran through the entire town and out the other side. Two other roadsbisected the city from east and west. Muhammad divided his army intofour columns, each approaching the city from a different direction. IbnHisham tells us that the movement of the columns was coordinatedby a series of messengers on horseback who carried the commands ofMuhammad to the column commanders. A special wazir, or marshal,was in charge of these communications and was always by Muhammad’sside to relay orders.26 The account that follows is taken from Hamidullah,who relied on Ibn Hisham and al-Tabari for his information.27

The main army group of the Muslims, with the Prophet Muham-mad himself in their midst, advanced from the main northernside. The high town (Ma’lat) is situated there. A group was led byZubair Ibn al-Auwam on the Kada road, in order to close theescape to the sea coast, via Wadi Fatimah. A strong army groupentered the city from the main thoroughfare from the south, viaLit, and occupied Masfalah or the low town. Maybe it was acavalry group, and in spite of the detour, synchronized its arrivalin the city at the same time as the other detachments . . . thisdetachment was led by Khalid al-Walid, commander of thecavalry corps. Yet another group entered the city from the Hajunroad, and closed the escape to Jidda as well as to Yemen.28

To the south Khalid al-Walid and his cavalry met some resistance froma few diehards, but quickly swept them aside. Twenty-four Quraishand four Hudhayl were killed with no Muslims lost.29 A small group ofMuslim troops seems to have become disoriented and ran into a forceof Quraish, losing two men.30 Muhammad’s columns met in the centerof the city at almost the same time. For almost a decade Mecca hadbeen gradually weakened by economic strangulation and political


maneuver that had left it leaderless, without resolve, and isolated.Muhammad’s show of military force was almost incidental to thecity’s collapse; it fell without resistance.

The occupation of Mecca by Muhammad on January 11, 630,became known in Muslim history as the fat’h, or Conquest. The wordfat’h properly means “opening” but is also used with other meanings,for example, God’s bestowing gifts on man or rendering a judgmentbetween contestants.31 Muhammad had forbidden his men to loot thecity so there was no booty with which to pay the army. To compensatehis troops, especially the bedouins, Muhammad took out large loansfrom the Meccan bankers and paid his men in cash.32 Muhammad thenwent to the Kaaba, where he ordered all the idols there destroyed leavingonly the images of Abraham, Jesus, and the Virgin Mary remaining. Allthe houses in Mecca were also required to destroy their idols.33 Later,he dispatched special teams of Muslims to destroy the other idols andshrines that had been competitors with those in Mecca. The shrinesto Manat at Mushallal (between Mecca and Medina) and to Uzza atNakhla along with some others were destroyed.34

Muhammad remained in Mecca for about two weeks during whichtime he made a speech and invited the Quraish to come and payhomage to him. Many Meccans also became Muslims at this timeacknowledging Muhammad’s claim to be the Messenger of God. Inter-estingly, a significant number of Meccan leaders acknowledged theirobligations to Muhammad in the traditional Arab manner but withoutbecoming Muslims.35 These Meccan leaders were important peoplewhose talents Muhammad needed to complete his mission of convertingall of Arabia to Islam.36 Questions of religious conversions could besubordinated to political realities, at least for the time being. EliasShoufani has observed in this regard that “Muhammad knew how toemploy Meccan skill and talent in the service of his movement; andthey [the Meccans], in turn, soon learned how to exploit that move-ment outwards. He, a religious leader first and foremost, and they, amercantile society, had the common interest of expansion, and theyjoined their energies to achieve it.”37

Although Muhammad had forbidden killing and looting by histroops, he had not promised to forgo personal revenge. Within days hissecret police began tracking down and executing a number of peoplewhose names Muhammad had placed on a list for liquidation. Theoffenses for which these people were executed tells us something about

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Muhammad’s fears and personality. The executions were a combina-tion of settling old scores, as in the case of a man who had insultedMuhammad during his early years in Mecca eight years before; politicalnecessity, when he ordered the execution of Ikrimah, the son of AbuJahl, who had followed in his father’s footsteps and led the oppositionto Muhammad in Mecca; ideological fervor, as when two men whohad renounced Islam were killed; and the purely personal, as whenMuhammad ordered that two professional singing girls be killed becausethey had once composed songs unflattering to him and had sung themin public.38 The executions were apparently carried out in public anddeliberately so. The Quraish became alarmed that they might be aprelude to further killings now that the city was completely withinMuhammad’s control. The Meccan leaders sent Abu Sufyan to approachMuhammad for reassurances. Muhammad made it clear that the execu-tions were limited, and that they would be finished in a few days. Hekept his word and peace fell upon Mecca. Muhammad’s conquest ofMecca was the achievement that ultimately led to the success of Islamin all Arabia. And it was the Meccans who played an important part inthis ultimate success.


11

The Battle of HunaynFebruary 1, 630

Almost immediately after taking control of Mecca, Muhammadbegan sending parties to the surrounding bedouin tribes in the

hope of reaching accommodations with them. At least three expedi-tions to secure the submission of the bedouin tribes of the surroundingdistrict were sent out. No information about these expeditions hasbeen preserved except for the third one under the command of Khalidal-Walid against the Beni Jadheema clan of the Beni Kinana living onthe coastal plain south of Mecca.1 Al-Walid was a brave and daring combatcommander, but he was also headstrong and bloodthirsty when it cameto matters of personal revenge. Many years before, some members of theBeni Jadheema had killed al-Walid’s uncle in a dispute. When al-Walidestablished contact with the Beni Jadheema, he told them that sincethe war with Mecca was over there was no need for further bloodshed.He told them to lay down their arms. When they had done so, “Khalidordered their hands to be tied behind their backs and put them to thesword [beheading], killing a number of them” in payment for the deathof his uncle.2 Presumably only a few of the Beni Jadheema chiefs werekilled, but the record is unclear and it is possible that a significantnumber of the clan were executed. The fact that Muhammad wasappalled at the murders and cried out to God that he had not ordered

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the killings lends some support to this view.3 Al-Walid himself was notpunished and was quickly assigned the mission to proceed to Nakhlaand destroy the shrine of al-Uzza, which he seems to have accom-plished without bloodshed.4

These were minor events, however, compared to the trouble that wasbrewing among the bedouins around Mecca and Ta’if. By all accountsthe tribes and clans of the region who had previously been allies ofthe Meccans submitted themselves to Muhammad’s governance with-out incident. Those that had been enemies of the Meccans, however,were another matter altogether. Among the foremost of these was thepowerful tribe of the Hawazin located north and east of Mecca andwhose territory sat astride the main trade route to Hira in Iraq. TheHawazin were allied with the men of the town of Ta’if, located southand east of Mecca, whose trade routes ran through Hawazin territory.This alliance had been enemies of the Meccans long before Muhammadappeared on the scene and had engaged in several wars with the Meccansprobably concerning trade disputes between Ta’if and Mecca.5 Given thishistory, the chiefs of the Hawazin and the men of Ta’if saw Muhammadas another powerful Quraish chief who had returned to claim the leader-ship of his people. The Hawazin chiefs could hardly have been ignorantof Muhammad’s almost decade-long campaign to expand his power andspread the new faith of Islam, and it was a reasonable expectation thathe would continue his efforts until all Arabia were brought under hiscontrol. In the Hawazin strategic view, war was inevitable. The Hawazindecided to force the issue sooner rather than later.6

The chief of the Hawazin, Malik ibn Auf, began to mobilize hisforces for war, an activity that was immediately detected by Muham-mad’s agents.7 Muhammad sent agents into the Hawazin camp tomonitor the enemy’s preparations and dispositions.8 In Muhammad’seyes the Hawazin mobilization and willingness to fight was all to thegood. Muhammad had a great army already in the field. Ibn Ishaq tellsus that Muhammad’s army comprisedthe ten thousand companionswho had accompanied him to Mecca and two thousand Meccans whonow joined him for a fight against their old enemy. The total forcenumbered twelve thousand, most of them well equipped and fullyarmored.9 The Muslim force was deployed in and around Mecca, whichcould be used as a supply base and a good fallback location to mount adefense if things went badly. Moreover, Mecca was close enough to

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Ta’if and the Hawazin homeland that if Muhammad carried the day inthe field, he could readily pursue until he was in possession of theenemy’s strategic heartland.

From a political point of view, the chance to defeat the Hawazinprovided several opportunities. If the Hawazin were defeated, Muham-mad would control all of the important caravan routes in the Hejaz. Thedefeat of the Hawazin would make it almost certain that Ta’if itself,the third-largest city in the Hejaz, would fall into his hands. Finally, anarmy of twelve thousand men under a single commander was almostunknown in Arabian warfare at this time. A victory over the Hawazinwould send a strong message to other tribes that Muhammad’s insur-gency was unstoppable. They would be forced to come to terms. Asalways with Muhammad, the application of force was inevitably in theservice of political objectives. The two opposing armies met at a placeknown to history as Wadi Hunayn on February 1, 630.

The Battle of Hunayn presents the historian with some difficulties.First, we do not know exactly where it was fought. Ibn Ishaq is silent onits location, so we have only later sources to aid us, and these are uncer-tain.10 The accounts of the battle tell us that the men of Ta’if retreated tothe safety of their city, only a short distance from the battlefield. Ta’ifis located about sixty miles southeast of Mecca. The accounts say thatMuhammad marched three days before reaching the battlefield. If so,then the battlefield was thirty-five to forty-five miles southeast ofMecca.11 The difficulty is that there is no wadi there wide enough toaccommodate the size of the armies mentioned in the later accounts.We remain uncertain, therefore, as to the exact location of the battle,being able to say only that it was probably no farther than a day’s ride,about fifteen miles, from the city of Ta’if itself.

The second difficulty has to do with the numbers of troops involved.That Muhammad’s army numbered twelve thousand men seems certainand is confirmed by Ibn Ishaq.12 But there is no early source for thelater claim that the opposing army numbered twenty thousand.13 Theclaim is repeated in all later accounts, but one is hard pressed tobelieve that the figure is accurate. Ibn Ishaq tells us that the enemyarmy was comprised of the Hawazin, the men of Ta’if, and only a fewadditional clans.14 As large as the Hawazin tribe was, it defies credulitythat it could place anywhere close to twenty thousand men in the fieldeven with the aid of Ta’if-area clans, many of whom fled the battlefieldin any case. The answer may lie in the fact that the commander of the

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Hawazin, the thirty-yearold Malik ibn Auf, made the decision to bringthe entire tribe to the battlefield. This was an old Arab practice, the ideabeing that if soldiers knew that their women, children, and flocks wereat risk they would fight more fiercely. The danger, of course, was thata defeat risked everything, including the tribe’s physical existence. IbnAuf seems to have deployed the tribe’s women, children, and flocks atthe far end of the battlefield so that when the Muslims entered thewadi they were frightened by the “black mass” of what they thoughtwere enemy soldiers assembled at the far end of the wadi. It is possible,then, that the number of twenty thousand enemy “soldiers” was reallya reference to the total size of the Hawazin tribe, including old men,women, and children. If so, a tribe of twenty thousand people couldfield about four thousand to five thousand soldiers at maximumeffort.15 If these circumstances obtained, then it is probable that latersources are incorrect when they say that Muhammad fought anddefeated an army more numerous than his own. Rather, it was theHawazin who were outnumbered almost four to one. As we shall see,the tactics of the Hawazin and the behavior of the Muslim army atWadi Hunayn suggest that this was the case.

Muhammad sent his scouts to reconnoiter the Hawazin, dispatchingone Abdullah ibn Abu Harad to “go among them and stay with themuntil he learned all about them.”16 Abu Harad did so and dutifullyreported back to the Apostle. At the same time, Malik ibn Auf senthis scouts to spy on the Muslims.17 Both commanders, therefore, hada good idea as to their positions relative to the other’s, as well as areasonable idea of the relative size of their forces. The evidence sug-gests that Muhammad learned that his army was considerably largerthan that of the Hawazin, information that led him to be careless inthe manner in which he approached the battlefield. Three eventssupport this view. First, there is no doubt that the Muslims reachedWadi Hunayn unprepared for battle. There are no reports that thearmy had even donned its armor. Muhammad himself certainly hadnot.18 Second, when the Hawazin attacked, Muhammad was still on his “white mule” far back in the column. If he were prepared forbattle, he would have been on horseback.19 Finally, as we shall see,the Muslims were taken by surprise while still in column of march.Taken together, these circumstances suggest that Muhammad wasoverconfident and incautious, probably as a consequence of his supe-riority in manpower.


Malik ibn Auf must have been greatly concerned when he learnedthat the Muslim army was significantly larger than his own. He hadbrought his entire tribe with all their women and possessions to thebattlefield only to discover that he was greatly outnumbered. His entiretribe faced death or slavery if he was defeated. Moreover, stories of thefighting élan and courage of the Muslim soldiers certainly had reachedhis ears, no doubt convincing him that a direct infantry engagement onopen ground would spell disaster. Malik ibn Auf would have to makebrilliant use of terrain, deception, and surprise if he was to have anychance of defeating the Muslims at Wadi Hunayn.

The Hawazin chief took great advantage of all three factors as heprepared for battle. He selected Wadi Hunayn as the place to fight.Wadi Hunayn is a long, dry riverbed of modest width, perhaps notmore than a half mile from side to side, bracketed by steep rocky wallsthat make descent into the wadi difficult and slow. There were open-ings along the wadi walls at various places leading to narrow canyonslarge enough to conceal cavalry units of significant size. The floor ofthe wadi itself, however, was free of vegetation and obstacles and wassufficiently broad and flat to permit room for cavalry to maneuver.Ibn Ishaq, quoting one of ibn Auf’s officers, describes the terrain as “afine place for cavalry. Not a hill with jagged rocks, nor a plain full ofdust.”20 Ibn Auf used the night before the battle to move his forces intoposition in the wadi.

He deployed his forces to lure Muhammad into a trap. The baitwas the Hawazin women and their flocks of sheep, goats, and camels.Ibn Auf positioned this mass of women, children, and flocks at the farend of the wadi, placing a thin infantry screen in front of them so thatfrom a distance—say, from where ibn Auf expected Muhammad toenter the wadi—this “black mass” (as the accounts refer to it) wouldlook like the main body of the Hawazin army arranged in formationfor an infantry battle. An infantry battle would surely play to Muham-mad’s advantage in numbers, and ibn Auf probably reckoned thatMuhammad would think precisely that when he saw the Hawazin“troops” massed at the far end of the wadi. If so, ibn Auf could reason-ably expect that Muhammad would continue his column of marchinto the wadi taking his time to deploy his forces for a traditionalinfantry engagement. It was in anticipation of these developments thatibn Auf had hidden his cavalry squadrons in the canyons on both sidesof the wadi. Once Muhammad’s army had gained the wadi floor and was

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183

Map 11. Battle of Wadi Hunayn, 630 c.e.

still marching toward the far end, ibn Auf planned to use his cavalry toattack the Muslim army on both flanks, driving it back upon itselfuntil it could not move. It was a sound tactical plan.

Muhammad had camped near one of the entrances to the wadi.There is no evidence that Muhammad used the evening to prepare forbattle, so that he entered the wadi riding his white mule and withouthis armor on. It is also a fair assumption that the rest of the army hadnot yet donned its armor and were riding their camels leading theirtethered horses behind them. Just before dawn the Muslim columnbegan to move down the steep path to the wadi floor. Ibn Ishaq recountsthat one of the men who fought at Wadi Hunayn told him, “[W]e camedown through a wadi wide and sloping. We were descending graduallyin the morning twilight.”21 The vanguard of the column was led by a cavalry squadron from the tribe of Sulaym commanded by Khalid al-Walid. Sighting the “black mass” to his front, al-Walid may havebecome fixated on what he thought was the main body of the Hawazinarmy. There does not seem to have been any reconnaissance screen orscouts in advance of the Muslim van nor on the flanks. The Muslimarmy was moving along the wadi floor straight at the Hawazin, butwas doing so without “any eyes and ears.” Ibn Auf’s deception hadworked and Muhammad had taken the bait.

About a third of the Muslim column was already on the wadi floorwith the rest still outside the wadi trying to make its way in when theHawazin struck. Suddenly, from out of the canyons on both sides ofthe wadi, ibn Auf’s cavalry attacked in force aiming for both flanks ofthe Muslim column. Ibn Ishaq tells us that “the enemy had got therebefore us and had hidden themselves in its bypaths and side tracks andnarrow places. They had collected and were fully prepared, and by Godwe were terrified of them. . . . [T]he squadrons [of cavalry] attacked usas one man.”22 Al-Walid’s van was struck immediately with such forcethat it came apart. The Sulaym tribesmen took to their heels and fled.23

The Muslim column was struck all along the flanks by Hawazin cavalry,sending it into immediate disarray and headlong rout to the rear. AbuSufyan, who was with Muhammad as the fleeing soldiers streamedpast, cried, “Their flight will not stop until they get to the sea!”24

The confused mass of Muslim soldiers fled to the rear, crashinginto other Muslim units that had just reached the wadi floor and sendingthem into disarray. The large mass of men and animals became pressedtogether so tightly that no one was able to gain the trail that led out of

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the wadi to safety. The trail was blocked by units trying to descendonto the wadi floor. Muhammad and his entourage escaped being sweptaway by the wave of panic by clinging to a small hill near the southwall of the wadi. To his credit Muhammad did not panic. He stoodbravely in the stirrups of his white mule in full view of the enemy callingto his troops to stop and gather around him to continue the fight.25

One by one men gathered about the Apostle until there were about ahundred around him. “Finally, a hundred were gathered by him andthey went forward and fought. . . . They were steadfast in the fight andthe Apostle standing in his stirrups looked down at the melee as theywere fighting and said, ‘Now the oven is hot.’”26

Ibn Auf’s plan had worked perfectly to this point. But now circum-stances turned against him. The sheer size of the Muslim force hadproduced a great mass of dismounted soldiers gathered around theclogged exit from the wadi. Had they been able to use the exit, the routmay have continued indeed until it reached the sea. But with nowhereelse to go, the Muslim troops turned to face the enemy in what mighthave become a last stand. Muhammad’s presence and bravery on thebattlefield gave them assurance that the Prophet was still alive andwith them. By now the Hawazin cavalry attacks had spent themselvesagainst the jumble of massed men and animals and had lost theirmomentum. Ibn Auf had hoped that the rout would be complete anddid not foresee that the clogged exit would stop it. The small size ofhis army made it impossible for him to hold any strength in reserve.Except for the small infantry screen in front of the women and animalsat the far end of the wadi, there were no units available to attack thestalled enemy. As the Muslims gathered themselves together to con-tinue the fight, the battle became exactly what Ibn Auf had hoped toavoid, a hand-to-hand infantry battle in which numbers were decisive.

As the battle raged the Muslim advantage began to tell, with theresult that the Hawazin were gradually forced back and pressed on allsides. Ibn Auf himself stood and fought beside his war banner untilseventy of his men were killed around him before leaving the field.27

Some of the men of Ta’if fought bravely until the end; others only for ashort time before fleeing to the safety of their city’s walls. At a keypoint in the fight a strange incident occurred. Ibn Ishaq tells us,“Before the people fled and men were fighting one another I saw thelike of a black garment coming from heaven until it fell between usand the enemy. I looked and lo black ants everywhere filled the wadi. I


had no doubt that they were angels.”28 While we cannot be certain,this was probably a reference to Khalid al-Walid, who had rallied hiscavalry squadron of Beni Sulaym tribesmen and was leading a fiercecavalry charge that slammed into the rear of the dismounted Hawazincavalry now fighting as infantry and broke their resistance.29 Else-where, the Nasr clan of the Hawazin held open a narrow pass at thefar end of the wadi so that some of their soldiers could escape. TheHawazin infantry deployed in front of their camp seems also to havefought bravely to protect their women, families, and goods.30 It wasall to no avail. The fighting men of Hawazin were dispersed, captured,or killed, and the women, children, animals, and goods fell into thehands of Muhammad’s army. As the Hawazin remnants made theirway out of the wadi, Muhammad sent cavalry units in pursuit todrive them away from the battlefield so they could not mount anattempt to rescue their families.31

The victory at Wadi Hunayn was a turning point in Muhammad’scampaign to bring Islam to Arabia. The battle was larger than any battlethat anyone in the Hejaz could remember. It was an encounter thathad been long in coming between Muhammad’s Muslims and thebedouin tribes. The bedouins had given it their all against Muhammadand lost. The lesson was not lost on the remaining bedouin clans whohad not yet pledged their loyalty to Muhammad. Most of the chiefs ofthe Hawazin clans and of Ta’if were still at large, but this was of noconsequence. Muhammad was in possession of the Hawazin’s women,children and flocks, without which their lives were meaningless. Itwould not take long before the Hawazin would ask Muhammad forpeace and he would offer to return their families to them in the tradi-tional Arab manner of bargaining. For the present, however, the armywas still in the field and its blood was up. Muhammad struck whilethe iron was hot and moved to place the town of Ta’if under siege.

Ta’if was the second occasion in which Muhammad attempted tosubdue a fortified town, the first being Kheibar. Kheibar possessed nosurrounding walls, and the Jews of Kheibar did not fight under a unifiedcommand; therefore, Muhammad was able to overcome the settlement’sinterior compounds one at a time. In addition, the residents of Kheibarhad not prepared for a siege with the result that food and water short-ages weakened their ability to resist. Ta’if presented Muhammad withfar more difficult problems. First, it was a walled city complete with

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fortifications. Tradition had it that the city was constructed when thePersians controlled Yemen, and that as a favor to the town the Persiansatrap sent engineers to Ta’if to construct its walls and fortifications.32

The name Ta’if means “with a wall around.”33 The town had plenty ofinternal wells to supply water and there were many gardens and smallfarms for food. Probably most important was that, having lost a consid-erable number of men at Hunayn,34 Ta’if was prepared to resist to thedeath fighting under a unified command. All of these circumstanceslimited Muhammad’s options in bringing the siege to a quick conclusion.

The accounts of the siege are short and confused, and it is difficult toobtain anything but a broad outline of the events at Ta’if. Later sourcessay that Muhammad had catapults and covered cars for use against thewalls and to protect his miners. Since Muhammad marched directly onTa’if after the engagement at Wadi Hunayn, it is difficult to see wherehe may have obtained this equipment, although it is possible that itmight have been obtained somewhere in the locality of Ta’if itself. IbnIshaq tells us that two of the chiefs of the Ta’if were absent from the citybecause “they were in Jurash learning the use of the testudo, the catapult,and other instruments.”35 Perhaps these machines were manufacturedin a town close to Yemen, where Persian influence and technology wasmost evident and more available than heretofore thought.

At first Muhammad made a strong attempt to take Ta’if by force ofarms, but his men were beaten back by a storm of arrows. When heattempted to mine the walls from below, the defenders dropped “scrapsof hot iron” on them that burned through the leather roof of the wheeledplatforms protecting the miners.36 An assault on the main gate wasalso repulsed with significant Muslim casualties.37 The arrow fire fromthe walls was dangerously effective. Muhammad seems to have madethe mistake of placing his camp too close to the city’s walls and withinrange of the defenders’ arrow fire. A later source says “the arrows shotby them from the ramparts would sometimes take a toll of the besiegers,especially when they were off guard in the camp during the night.”38

Muhammad ordered the construction of a khashab, or wooden plankfence, around the camp to protect his troops.39 At some point Muham-mad ordered that “wooden thorned balls and fresh branches from thorntrees be strewn all around the wall” in order to “prevent all ingress ofprovisions, men, and material.”40 It is possible, however, that theseobstacles were also designed to prevent the defenders from mounting


offensive sallies against the attackers. At one point Muhammad grewso frustrated with his lack of progress that he ordered the famous andprecious vineyards of Ta’if destroyed.41

The siege lasted about three weeks before Muhammad broke it offand retired.42 The resolve of Ta’if remained strong, and Muslim casualtieswere beginning to mount. If the siege dragged on much longer withoutresults, the army’s morale might begin to weaken and the clans beginto drift homeward. The prestige of the Muslim victory at Wadi Hunaynmight also evaporate if the stalemate went on too long, reducing theMuslim image for military prowess. While no source mentions it, theproblem of supplying the army with food and forage must also have beena consideration. The army had fought a major battle only a few daysbefore besieging Ta’if. Fodder for the animals must have been runningshort. Finally it was never Muhammad’s goal to destroy Ta’if; hewanted to convert it. To this end the less blood shed the better. With theHawazin defeated, the clans of Ta’if were isolated. Sooner or later theywould have no choice but to reach an accommodation with Muhammad.

Muhammad and the army retired to a place called al-Jirana to dividethe spoils taken at Wadi Hunayn. Six thousand Hawazin women andchildren had been captured along with thousands of camels, sheep, andother animals,43 a number sufficient to give every man in the Muslimarmy four camels or the equivalent.44 Muhammad made a public displayof dividing up the animals to send the message to the Hawazin thatunless they came to an accommodation soon, their women and childrenwould also be distributed as booty.45 While all this was taking place,an old woman named Shima who claimed to be the woman who hadsuckled the young Muhammad when he was sent into the desert as ababy to be wet-nursed was brought before the Prophet. Muhammadasked if she had any proof, and she showed him a bite he had givenher when she carried him on her hip. The woman was a member ofthe Beni Saad, a clan of the Hawazin, and asked Muhammad to treathis “relatives” kindly.46 Muhammad agreed and offered to return thewomen and children to the Hawazin, who in turn swore their loyaltyto Muhammad.

The conversion of the Hawazin to the Muslim cause deprived theTa’if of their last significant ally. Moreover, the victory at Wadi Hunaynhad convinced other clans around Ta’if that their future lay with Islam,and a good number of them went over to Muhammad. This shift inbedouin loyalty completely cut off Ta’if from the Meccan market and

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exposed their caravan routes to Iraq to attack. With no options left,Ta’if sent a delegation to Muhammad asking for talks. Muhammadasked the whereabouts of Malik ibn Auf, the chief of the Hawazin. Hewas told that he had taken refuge in Ta’if. Muhammad promised that ifibn Auf came to him in peace there would be no punishment. Ibn Aufarrived in the Muslim camp a few days later to be greeted with respect.Muhammad returned his animals and his family to him.47 The price ofthe accommodation, however, was that the pagan shrines to the idolsUzza and Lat located in Ta’if were to be destroyed and the populationwere to become Muslims. A year later, a delegation from Ta’if traveledto Medina and agreed to Muhammad’s terms.

Muhammad remained at al-Jirana from February 24 to March 9, atwhich time he left and returned to Mecca to make another omra.48

While in Mecca he lavished large gifts on the city’s leaders, givingmany a hundred camels each in an effort to assuage their fears andmake them loyal allies. This infuriated some of the Muslims, especiallythe ansar who, Ibn Ishaq tells us, received nothing in the way of spoils.49

Equally infuriating was the fact that many of the Meccan leadersremained pagans! Muhammad did not demand their acceptance ofIslam, a clear indication of the importance he attached to their support.Before he left Mecca to return to Medina Muhammad appointed a youngman under thirty to be in charge of his affairs in Mecca. The man, Attabibn Asid, was a member of Abu Sufyan’s Umayyah clan, evidence thatalthough Muhammad wanted the support of the Meccan old guard, thefuture belonged to his loyal Muslim ally, Abu Sufyan, and his clan.50

The Battle of Hunayn against the largest and most powerfulbedouin coalition in the region was Muhammad’s greatest militarysuccess and was the first cooperative achievement of Muhammad andhis new Meccan allies. In the view of some Arab historians, the victoryand alliance was the real beginning of the Arab conquests that wouldeventually see Arab armies conquer the Byzantine and Persian Empires.51

With Mecca, Medina, and Ta’if, the three main towns of the Hejaz,and Kheibar and the other oases in the north finally under his controland with large segments of their populations having accepted Islam,the bedouin tribes located near these settlements lost their ability tomaneuver politically. There was only a single chief whose authorityand power ran throughout the entire Hejaz, and that was Muhammad.No single tribe or feasible coalition of tribes in the Hejaz could hope toresist Muhammad and his Muslims through force of arms. There was


no realistic choice but to submit. The bedouins of the Hejaz submittedand joined the Muslim state. So closely did they become identifiedwith Islam that a separate history has not been recorded for them.52

If the victory at Wadi Hunayn was Muhammad’s greatest militaryachievement, winning the Meccans to his side was certainly his greatestpolitical achievement. In one of the curious turns of history it was theMeccans who came to play the central role in the conquest of the rest ofArabia and, later, in the Arab conquest of the entire Middle East.

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12

The Tabuk Expedition andthe Death of Muhammad

630–632

In September to October of 630, ten months after the fall of Mecca,Muhammad began to prepare for a major military expedition to the

north. If we can believe the sources, Muhammad mobilized betweentwenty thousand and thirty thousand men for the operation.1 The armyconsisted of troops from Medina, Mecca, and the bedouin tribes of thesurrounding areas.2 Despite his prior success Muhammad’s influence didnot extend much farther than the area from which these troops weredrawn. Unlike his previous military operations, Muhammad took theunusual step of publicly announcing the purpose of the expedition. Itwas to raid the rich border provinces of Byzantine Syria.3 Muhammad’spublic pronouncement does little, however, to clear up the question ofwhy he chose to mount such an expedition at this time of year when itis clear that a campaign against the Byzantines made no military sense.

All the sources except Ibn Ishaq are vague regarding Muhammad’smotives behind the expedition. Many regard Muhammad’s actions as aresponse to a divine command. Ibn Abbas tells us that “the prophetremained in Medina six months after his return from Ta’if. Then Godordered him to attack Tabuk.”4 Other sources say that rumors reachedMedina of an impending invasion of Arabia by Heraclius, who was saidto be assembling a large army for that purpose.5 Heraclius had just wona resounding victory over the Persians, and Muhammad surely realized

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that his army was no match for the Byzantines fighting from behindtheir considerable border defenses. Heraclius’s army was assembled atEmesa (Homs) and in a perfect position to defend the Syrian borderagainst Muhammad’s attack, although it is uncertain whether or notMuhammad was aware of these circumstances. The trek from Medinato Tabuk was more than 250 miles and would still leave Muhammad’sarmy another 200 miles’ march from the nearest Byzantine garrison,most of it over open desert. The same terrain and distance made ithighly unlikely, and at certain times of the year even impossible, thata Byzantine regular force or their Ghassanid Arab allies could haveattacked Medina. Moreover, by the time of the Tabuk expedition theByzantine and Ghassanid alliance had all but collapsed due to religiouspersecution and imprisonment by the Byzantine authorities of someGhassanid chiefs for their heretical Monophysite faith. We have noway of knowing if any of these circumstances were known to Muham-mad and his advisers. But any competent assessment of these factorswould have forced the conclusion that an attack against the Byzantineprovinces was simply unlikely to succeed.

Equally puzzling from a military perspective was why Muhammadchose to mount a northern expedition in October. The weather in Arabiaat this time of year is terribly hot and dry, making the long march ofalmost five hundred miles to the Syrian border extremely difficult.The heat and terrain combined to make it a “dry year,” which madeany travel hazardous. A delay of two months would have brought coolerweather. In October there would be insufficient grazing and water forthe men and animals. October was also the time of year when the datecrop was harvested. Medina and other oases relied on the crop for theirlivelihood. Muhammad’s expedition threatened to draw off consider-able manpower that was needed to help harvest the dates. Finally, thebedouins were greatly concerned that an arduous journey under suchharsh climatic conditions might kill their horses and camels, a seriousloss of personal wealth. If only from consideration of weather and terrain,Muhammad’s northern expedition was a highly questionable endeavor.It was not for nothing that the operation became known in Arab historyas jaysh al-usrah, the Army of Distress.6

Within Medina there was considerable opposition to the expedi-tion, and many men found excuses to avoid going. The most commonexcuse was that their camels were already in poor condition due tothe drought and would not survive the rigors of the march.7 Others

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begged off because of the severe heat. Muhammad called on the richerMuslims to provide money to purchase replacement mounts for anycamels or horses lost.8 Right up to the date of departure, individualsdeserted or refused to muster for the march. The difficulties associatedwith organizing the expedition appear to have been the subject of arevelation, now found in sura 9 of the Quran, wherein God chastisedthe Muslims for their lack of trust in him and their unwillingness tobear hardships in his name. Verse 38 says, “O you who believe, what isthe matter with you, when you are told to go forth in the name of God,that you make such heavy weather about starting? . . . The good thingsof this life are but trivial in comparison with the life to come.” Therevelation issued a grave threat: “If you will not go forth, God willpunish with a painful punishment and He will exchange you foranother people and will not do Him any harm . . .”

Even with the threat of divine retribution things continued to gopoorly. The night before Muhammad left Medina he pitched camp atThaniyatu’l Wada, a pass overlooking Medina from whence he hadpreviously set out on other military campaigns.9 Below him Abdullahibn Ubay and his contingent of ansar had pitched their camp. Severalsources say that Ubay’s camp was larger than Muhammad’s, suggestingthat the claim that Muhammad’s army numbered thirty thousandmen may be somewhat of an exaggeration.10 When Muhammad andthe army moved out the next morning, ibn Ubay did not follow butreturned to Medina, where he “stayed behind with the hypocrites anddoubters.”11 Most of the ansar of Medina, however, seem to have accom-panied Muhammad in hopes of obtaining their share of booty.

Under these circumstances Muhammad must have had a verypressing reason to continue with the expedition, and it is unlikelythat the reason was a military one. It may be telling that Muhammadordered Ali, his most renowned soldier, to remain behind in Medina.The victory at Wadi Hunayn had been a military success, but it hadturned into a political failure. In order to secure the loyalty of theMeccans, Muhammad had lavished large portions of the Hawazinbooty on them. To encourage the Hawazin to pledge their loyalty tohim, he had returned much of the booty that was left. The ansar,already angry that there had been no booty from the attack on Mecca,were furious at Muhammad for what seemed his preferential treat-ment of “his own people [Quraish].”12 Abdullah ibn Ubay, the leader ofthe ansar in Medina, had never accepted Muhammad’s leadership even

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though he had become a Muslim. It could hardly be expected that hewould refrain from using the ansar’s discontent to recoup some of hislost influence among the clans of Medina. His refusal to accompanyMuhammad on the expedition was an ominous threat to undercutMuhammad while he was away, perhaps by assaulting the familiesand property of the Muslims or even leading a revolt. Muhammad’sdecision to leave Ali behind may have been a precaution against ibnUbay’s ambitions and to suppress any revolt that broke out. It wasthese ansar, then, who were referred to as the hypocrites (nifaq) andopponents (munafiqun) of Muhammad in Medina, and whom Muham-mad punished when he returned.

The victories at Mecca and Wadi Hunayn had produced largenumbers of supporters who flocked to Medina to become Muslims.These are referred to in the sources as ashab al-suffah, that is, the poorwho lived on the contributions of the Muslims and the Apostle andwhom the Muslims used to take along on raids so they could obtainbooty.13 It was from these impoverished converts that the sa’alik,groups of brigands who rallied around a leader from among themselvesand lived on plunder, arose among the Muslims.14 Muhammad did notpossess the resources to support the large number of poor who flockedto Islam after the fall of Mecca. More disturbing was the potential ofthe sa’alik to resort to violence against him if their needs went unmetfor too long. Muhammad was in danger of losing his grip on the mostimportant asset of any insurgency, his popular base of support, throughthe opposition of the ansar and other opponents in Medina. The extentof the opposition even within Muhammad’s own expeditionary forcecan be gauged by his decision to plant spies in his own ranks to reporton the “murmurings” of the troops.15

The problems confronting Muhammad were serious and threatenedthe future of the insurgency. It was to resolve them, then, that he decidedto attack the Byzantine border provinces and the Arab tribes of the SyrianDesert. If the expedition succeeded it would produce sufficient booty tosupply the ashab al-suffah with their needs, compensate the ansar fortheir past efforts at Mecca and Wadi Hunayn for which they had receivednothing, and satisfy the Quraish who had become restive with the loss oftrade and finance that was no longer being generated in Mecca.16 It was abold gamble, of course, but one that could be expected of an insurgentleader who understood the primacy of political power over military con-cerns when it came to conducting a revolution. Muhammad was on the

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brink of losing all he had fought for. To rescue the situation he turnedoutward for a military solution to a political problem.

There were other factors that might have impinged on Muhammad’sdecision to undertake a major military expedition under unfavorableconditions. The triumph of Islam in the Hejaz had imposed new rulesgoverning Arab behavior that had serious unforeseen consequences.Arabia was a poor land and could not feed itself; the bedouins especiallywere half starved most of the time. They survived by raiding settle-ments and each other’s flocks, which redistributed the wealth and foodsupply permitting many to survive who otherwise would have perished.But now Islam forbade raiding the towns and flocks of other Muslims,greatly increasing the poverty of many bedouins. Islam also forbadethe traditional practice of war to the death among Muslims to avengepersonal wrongs. This ancient means of recreation and demonstrationof manliness had been one of the major psychological foundations ofmale Arab life. Now it was gone. Even the spice trade was no longerlucrative. The Islamic laws against usury had dried up much of thecommercial activity relative to the risks involved in undertaking caravans. One result was that Mecca itself, once the primary commer-cial center of the Hejaz, fell into serious decline. Islam’s promise ofparadise through jihad that had worked well enough in attractingtribes to war against idolaters now seemed empty. Without enemies toattack, how was one to become a martyr and gain paradise? All theseprohibitions meant that there was no booty to be had and therefore noway to improve one’s lot in life.

Consideration of these circumstances has led some to suggest thatMuhammad’s expedition against the Byzantine border provinces waspart of a larger strategic vision, a “northern strategy” designed to findnew enemies against whom Muslims could fight and pillage.17 In thisview the northern strategy was preferable to an attack against the Per-sian provinces in Iraq because the routes to the north were well knownand more easily traversed than the longer and more difficult easternroute to Iraq. But even if Muhammad had devised such a strategy, wasthis the right time to attempt to implement it? Muhammad was barelyin command of the Hejaz, and most Arabs remained idolaters. Moreover,the powerful tribes of the north were his declared enemies, and anynorthern route to the Byzantine provinces would pass perilously close totheir territory. Moreover, Muhammad surely knew that his army was nomatch for the Byzantines. Perhaps the northern strategy was a long-term


plan to be put into operation once Islam had triumphed in all Arabia,when all its manpower resources would be at Muhammad’s disposal.

Given these assumptions, perhaps Muhammad’s northern expedi-tion was really a reconnaissance in force to test the enemy’s defensesand see what allies might be acquired for future operations. PerhapsMuhammad also had in mind taking revenge for the Muslim defeat atMu’ta that had taken the life of his adopted son, Zayd.18 The difficultywith this analysis is that if the expedition was either a punitive raidor a reconnaissance mission, in neither case could it be expected toproduce the booty Muhammad needed to meet the needs of his dis-gruntled followers. In the end the only reason that makes sense is thatMuhammad did indeed intend to attack the Byzantine provinces, butcircumstances prevented him from doing so.

The trek to the north was very difficult, probably much more sothan Muhammad had anticipated, and took much longer than itwould have taken two months later when the weather was cooler.The 250 miles between Medina and Tabuk might easily have beencovered in ten to twelve days under more favorable conditions, butseem to have taken upwards of eighteen to twenty days. The heat wasunbearable, and in traditional Arab fashion under such conditions thearmy moved mostly at night when it was cooler. This resulted in aslower pace whereby the army moved in stages over shorter distances.Fodder for the animals was scarce, and it is a reasonable conclusionthat some of the animals perished in the heat. Ibn Ishaq reports thatwater, too, was in short supply and that the troops suffered fromthirst.19 The column stopped at al-Hijr, 180 miles into the march. Theplace was marked by caves and ruins from prehistoric times, andMuhammad seems to have believed the place was haunted. He forbadehis men to leave the camp unless accompanied by a companion.20

Although the army was suffering from thirst, Muhammad forbadethem to drink from the well. One soldier ignored the warning and wasstruck with a constriction of the throat that killed him.21 The armysuffered throughout the night, and “[i]n the morning when the menhad no water they complained to the Apostle, so he prayed, and Godsent a cloud, and so much rain fell that they were satisfied and carriedaway all the water they needed.”22 By the time Muhammad’s armyreached Tabuk, the troops must have been exhausted, short of supplies,and in no condition to fight the Byzantines, whose nearest garrison, inany case, was still two hundred miles away.

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It was probably at Tabuk that Muhammad learned for certain thatHeraclius’s army was bivouacked at Homs in Syria, only half the distanceto the border that Muhammad would still have to cover from Tabuk toattack the Byzantine provinces. It was at Tabuk that Muhammad musthave also realized that his poorly equipped army so far from home was inno condition to continue the march and engage the Byzantines. To do sorisked disaster, and Muhammad’s weakened hold on his base of popularsupport could probably not survive another military disaster like Mu’ta.Muhammad decided to call off the expedition.

Muhammad remained in Tabuk for ten days, during which time herested his army and entered into negotiations with local chiefs formingseveral new alliances. “The Apostle stayed in Tabuk some ten nights,not more. Then he returned to Medina.”23 The presence of so large a Muslim army, no matter how bedraggled, was still a clear demon-stration of Muhammad’s power that impressed the local chiefs, andsome traveled to Tabuk to treat with Muhammad. One of these chiefs,Yohanna ibn Ruba, was the “governor” of Alia (modern Aqaba) andconcluded a pact with Muhammad in which he agreed to pay a tax inreturn for Muslim protection of the port. This protection extended tothe ships as well.24 Three Jewish towns—Jerba and Udhruh, 80 milesnorth of Alia in the Transjordan, and Maqna, a fishing village on the RedSea—also entered into similar agreements.25 Muhammad sent Khalidal-Walid and a few hundred men to the oasis of Dumat al-Jandal, wherethey killed the king’s brother and brought back the Christian kingunder guard. The king agreed to pay tribute to Muhammad and wasreleased. These agreements constituted only small victories, for thelargest and most powerful Arab tribes on the Syrian border—the Ghas-san, Lakhm, and Bahra—remained unremittingly hostile to Muhammadand Islam. With his army rested, Muhammad turned southward andmarched for Medina.

The failure of the Syrian expedition could only make mattersworse in Medina, and one can only wonder what “murmurings” wenton among the ansar who had accompanied Muhammad only to returnempty-handed for the third time. The ansar resentment of the Meccansincreased as Muhammad now appointed more Meccans to high posi-tions.26 A later source tells us that one of the ansar publicly rebukedMuhammad’s new Meccan advisers as having “the most voraciousstomachs of us all, the newest in nobility, and are the most cowardlyin battle.”27 Another said, “And these are the men who are now put


over us to lead us! Muhammad is right, we are worse than donkeys!”28

Reports of the opposition’s activities in Medina must have reachedMuhammad while he was still on the return march. He halted at DhuAwan, a town about an hour’s journey from Medina itself, where someMuslims had constructed a mosque that they said was for the sick andneedy. Muhammad somehow knew that the mosque had become acenter for the opposition and ordered it burned.29 Some people wereinside when the mosque was set afire “and the people ran away fromit.” The attachment to the account of a list of the twelve men whoconstructed the mosque suggests, however, that they may have beenburned inside. Some later sources suggest that opposition plotters hadmet in Medina in the house of a Jew. Muhammad apparently learnedof this and had the house burned immediately upon his return.30

Once back in Medina Muhammad moved swiftly against the oppo-sition. Those ansar who had refused to accompany the expedition werepublicly identified and banished from the city for 50 days. They werelater called one by one before Muhammad (and one suspects his advisersor perhaps the suffah), where they had to publicly recant and explainwhy they had refused the Prophet’s command. The whole episode,while vague as to details, rings suspiciously like the public show trialsof later revolutionary regimes. One later source even suggests that anopposition clique plotted to assassinate Muhammad by throwing himover a cliff.31 The plot failed and nothing is known of the fate of theplotters. But it is not too far-fetched to suggest that they may well havedied amid all the odor of sanctity. We do not know what happened tothe opposition parties in Medina, but it is not beyond imagination thatthey were liquidated by Muhammad’s henchmen as a prelude to theimposition of a greater discipline upon all his followers that shortlyfollowed. It was probably not coincidental that at this time Muhammadreceived a revelation in which all Muslims were instructed in thefuture to pray “at the tombs of the unyielding Doubters.”32

If Muhammad needed reminding, the resistance of the troops tothe Tabuk expedition and the open revolt in Medina demonstratedclearly enough that many Muslims were halfhearted converts broughtinto the fold when their chiefs or clan leaders had come to Medina toreach an accommodation with Muhammad. Many of these chiefs hadsworn allegiance to Islam as a way of gaining support from Muham-mad in their local squabbles; others saw the acceptance of Islam as anopportunity for booty. Many of Muhammad’s allies were still idolaters,

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and all of Arabia beyond the Hejaz remained pagan. Muhammad couldnot hope to succeed in his mission of spreading the new faith through-out Arabia unless he first established firmer control and disciplineover his own followers, Muslims and idolaters alike. The suppressionof his opponents in Medina was the first step.

“War to the Knife”

Like all insurgencies since, there came a time when the backslidersand opportunists had to be weeded out or forced to make a genuinecommitment. It was against this backdrop that shortly after returningfrom Tabuk Muhammad made a drastic change in his policy towardhis non-Muslim allies. The Quran tells us that during that same year(631) Muhammad had a revelation instructing him to impose an oblig-atory yearly tax on all those who sought his support.33 In the Quranictext the tax is called the sadaqah. It was later called the zakat. Muham-mad may have calculated that while he was strong enough to imposehis will in the Hejaz, he was not yet strong enough to impose his willthroughout Arabia. The imposition of the tax on all those who soughthis support, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, was a bold gamble. Hewould give the tribes of Arabia one last chance to join the movement,and payment of the tax, the traditional Arab means of showing sub-mission to a chief from time immemorial, would be the test of theirloyalty. Those who refused would be killed.

Muhammad designated Abu Bakr to lead the annual Muslim pil-grimage to Mecca, where Abu Bakr announced the imposition of thenew tax. Muhammad remained behind in Medina. Shortly after theMuslims and Abu Bakr left Medina, Muhammad received anotherrevelation. This instruction is known in the Muslim tradition as Suratal-Bara’ah, or “Freedom from Responsibility.” It is also sometimescalled Surat al-Tawbah, or “The Repentance,” and is found in theQuran.34 The revelation proclaimed Muhammad’s new policy towardthose who refused to obey him. Its importance justifies its beingquoted here in full.

An acquittal, from God and his Messenger, unto the idolaterswith whom you made covenant: “Journey freely in the land forfour months; and know that you cannot frustrate the will ofGod, and that God degrades the unbelievers.”


A proclamation, from God and his Messenger, unto mankindon the day of the Great Pilgrimage: “God is quit, and His Mes-senger, of the idolaters. So if you repent, that will be better foryou; but if you turn your backs, know that you cannot frustratethe will of God. And give thou good tidings to the unbelievers ofa painful chastisement; excepting those of the idolaters withwhom you have made covenant, then they failed you naught nei-ther lent them support to any man against you. With them fulfillyour covenant until their term; surely God loves the godfearing.

“Then, when the sacred months are drawn away, slay theidolaters wherever you find them, and take them and confinethem, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But ifthey repent, and perform the prayer, and pay the alms, then letthem go their way.”

It is significant that Muhammad sent Ali to Mecca to announce thenew policy. The fact that Ali was the most renowned Muslim soldierin all Arabia was probably not lost on the audience.35

The Arab world changed dramatically with the promulgation ofthe Surat al-Tawbah. It was now time to choose between the old orderand the new, and Muhammad declared war against all non-Muslims.The idolaters were given four months’ grace after which Muhammaddeclared himself free of any responsibility toward them. Muslimswould then “slay the idolaters” wherever they were to be found. Thosenon-Muslim tribes who had existing covenants with Muhammad weresafe for the time being. But even these were to be secure only for anunspecified period. No longer would Muhammad form alliances withnon-Muslims. The choice for all Arabia was to join the insurgency orface “war to the knife.”

Muhammad soon announced another revelation, this one prohibitingnon-Muslims from making the traditional pilgrimage to Mecca. “Thepolytheists are nothing but unclean, so let them not approach thesacred mosque after this year of theirs.”36 Mecca was now a holy cityfor Muslims only, and almost two centuries of traditional Arab reli-gious practice was swept aside. It is of interest that the promulgationof the Surat al-Tawbah is the only example of Muhammad forcing“conversion by the sword” under penalty of death, and it occurredwithin Arabia and among Arabs and not, as Westerners sometimesmaintain, among Christians and Jews in those lands outside Arabia

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that later fell to the Arab conquest. It is important to note as well thatMuhammad’s threats applied only to Arab idolaters; Christians and Jewswere not included and were not to be harmed.

Muhammad’s threat of religious war seems to have been promptedby the political circumstances with which he was forced to deal at thetime rather than any religious zeal. It was a time of crisis for Islam.Either the pagan tribes would be forced into the fold setting the stagefor the religious conversion of all Arabia or Islam would remain a creedconfined to the Hejaz. In the circumstances attending the later Arabconquests, conversion by the sword was forbidden. To be sure, resistanceto the Arab armies was punishable by death. But once established, Islamrecognized only voluntary acceptance of Islam. Taxes were required ofall subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim, with Muslims paying the zakatand non-Muslims subject to a land tax (kharaj) and a poll tax (jizya).Muslims were required to perform military service in addition to thetax. Christians and Jews were exempt from military service.

When the pilgrims at Mecca returned to their tribes, they broughtnews of Muhammad’s new edicts. The news was cause for alarm, forfew chiefs doubted that Muhammad would use his large army as hethreatened. The politics of Arabia made it almost certain that sometribes would also join Muhammad for the opportunity to settle oldtribal rivalries. And there was, as always, the prospect of loot to be had.Muhammad had threatened to turn all of Arabia into a battlefield.Under these circumstances many of the chiefs chose to join Muham-mad’s movement and to profess Islam, which, in any case, was now acondition for any agreement with Muhammad. In 631 representativesfrom tribes as far away as Yemen began to arrive in Medina to maketheir peace with Muhammad and to adopt Islam. This is referred to inthe tradition as the Year of Deputations. There is no doubt that many ofthese “conversions” were less than sincere. To many chiefs the need toswear allegiance to Muhammad and Islam was probably not seen asmuch different from the traditional practice of swearing loyalty to anypowerful chief as had been done in Arabia for centuries. Whether sinceresubmissionor alliance of convenience made no difference. Muhammadwas now the new prince and chief of a considerable part of Arabia.

Muhammad’s change in policy and the pressure he imposed on thetribes and clans left them with little choice but to submit to hisauthority or take up arms against him. When Muhammad’s agentsbegan arriving in the tribal territories to collect the zakat, resentment


surfaced immediately. The weaker tribes and those close to Mecca andMedina had little choice but to promise to pay. The stronger tribes, how-ever, defied Muhammad’s ultimatum and stood in unconcealed hostilityto him. Even while representatives of some tribes were streaming intoMedina during the Year of Deputations to swear allegiance, the strongertribes—al Aswad in Yemen, Musaylimah in Yamamah, and Talhah inAsad—all openly declared their animosity to Muhammad, his allies,his tax, and his religion.37 When Muhammad died less than a yearlater, these tribes were still in open defiance. Muhammad never sentan army to deal with their recalcitrance. The powerful tribes of thenorth, the Ghatafans, and those along the Syrian border never cameunder Muhammad’s influence during his lifetime. It is probably withgood reason that tradition says that until he died Muhammad com-plained bitterly that many Muslims were less than observant and someeven outright hypocrites.

Whatever its limitations, Muhammad’s authority and manpowerbase from which to raise an army was much greater than before, andhe began to plan for another expedition against the Byzantines.38 Whilethe expedition was still in its planning stages, Muhammad under-took his famous Hijjat al-Wada, or Farewell Pilgrimage, to Mecca. OnMarch 9, 632, he gave a sermon in which he repeated the injunctionsfrom God that were to govern the behavior of all Muslims. At the endof the sermon he asked the gathered crowd, “Have I not told you whatto do and completed my mission?” The crowd responded with a roar,“Yes, by God, you have.” Muhammad raised his eyes to heaven andcried out, “O God, bear witness!”39 He left Mecca never to return.

Muhammad’s Death

Upon his arrival in Medina he continued his preparations for the expe-dition against the Byzantines, appointing the eighteen-year-old Usamah,son of Zayd ibn Harithah, to command. The boy’s youth was the sub-ject of much complaint among the more experienced soldiers, butMuhammad remained firm in his decision. The appointment of sucha young and inexperienced soldier is puzzling. Perhaps Muhammadwished formally to avenge the death of his adopted son, Zayd, who hadbeen killed at Mu’ta by appointing the young Usamah, Zayd’s onlyson, to command the army that would exact that revenge.40 The choiceof commanders is difficult to explain in purely military terms.

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One night in June 632 Muhammad called to one of his companionsand told him that God had ordered him to go to the cemetery and prayfor the dead. He prayed at the cemetery for some time and thenreturned home, where he fell asleep. The next morning Muhammadwas struck with a violent headache. Some sources say that he hadbeen suffering from fever and headaches for some time, perhapsbrought on by fatigue from the pilgrimage.41 Despite his pain Muham-mad continued spending the night with each of his wives in turn. Hesent for Usamah, and two days later he was strong enough to performthe public ceremony of bestowing the war banner on Usamah and histroops. Ibn Ishaq tells us that “the Apostle went out walking betweentwo men of his family. . . . His head was bound in a cloth and his feetwere dragging.”42 There was sufficient concern for his health thatUsamah delayed the scheduled departure of the expedition to Syria.

Muhammad was moved to his wife Aisha’s apartment so she couldcare for him. He seems to have suffered from a burning fever and a ter-rible headache. He instructed one of his companions to “‘[p]our sevenskins of water from different wells over me so that I may go out to themen and instruct them.’ We made him sit down in a tub and wepoured the water over him until he said, ‘Enough! Enough!’”43 Onewitness told Ibn Ishaq that “when the Apostle’s illness became severehe and the men came down to Medina and he went in to the Apostlewho was unable to speak.”44 Despite these difficulties Muhammadwent to the mosque “with his head wrapped up,” where he permittedAbu Bakr to lead the prayer. On the tenth day of his illness Muham-mad suffered a high fever and his body was racked with pain. Thosearound him thought he might be suffering from pleurisy the symptomsof which are similar to pulmonary edema and adult respiratory distresssyndrome that is sometimes accompanies long-term malarial infection.45

The next morning he arose and went to the mosque and sat down inthe courtyard to rest. Then he returned to his bed in Aisha’s apartmentand cleaned his teeth.

At some point he asked for writing materials with which to write adocument to keep the faithful from error, but there is no evidence thatMuhammad ever executed such a document.46 He lay down with hishead in Aisha’s lap and talked to her for a while. Suddenly his headgrew heavy and his eyes became fixed. “Lord, grant me pardon,” he saidand slipped away into death “with the heat of noon that day . . . on thevery day that he came to Medina as an emigrant, having completed


exactly twelve years in his migration.”47 There was some dispute amongthe Muslims as to where to bury the Prophet. Some wanted to bury himin the mosque, while others wanted him buried with his companions inthe cemetery. Abu Bakr settled the matter when he claimed “I heard theApostle say, ‘No prophet dies but he is buried where he died’; so the bedon which he died was taken up and they made a grave beneath it. . . . TheApostle was buried in the middle of the night of the Wednesday.”48 Andthat was the end of Muhammad ibn Abdallah.

Muhammad’s death was not, of course, the end of his influence onhistory. He had founded a new religion that would sweep the Middle Eastwithin a few short years of his death. Over the centuries Islam wouldspread to peoples and countries yet unknown in Arabia and to the Westuntil it came to be among the world’s great religions. Within Arabiaitself Muhammad had shown the way toward a new form of govern-ment, administration, and social life that would eventually replacethe old tribal system by subsuming it into the new ummah, or com-munity of the faithful. Islamic law and moral instruction eventuallyreplaced many of the harsher aspects of Arab custom with far lessattendant loss of life than was previously the case. But all these thingswere only partially achieved at the time of Muhammad’s death, andwould probably not have been achieved at all had it not been forMuhammad’s other important achievement, his transformation of theArab armies and their manner of warfare. It was this legacy, his militarylegacy, that provided his successors with the means to conquer therest of pagan Arabia and impose Islam on it, reform the Arab socialorder along the lines of Islamic morality and law, and embark on thegreat Arab conquests that destroyed the Persian and Byzantine Empiresand replaced them with the Empire of Islam.

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13

Muhammad’sMilitary Legacy

The fragile unity of the Islamic insurgency that Muhammad hadmanaged to hold together during his lifetime began to crumble

even before his death. Now it threatened to come apart altogether. Atthe time of Muhammad’s death no more than perhaps one-third ofArabia had been exposed to Islam in any way, and far less than a thirdof the population, perhaps no more than 20 percent or so, had actuallyprofessed it. Beyond Mecca, Medina, and Ta’if and the bedouin tribesin the immediate vicinity of these towns, the pull of Islam was weak ifextant at all.1 Even within the insurgency many professed loyalty toMuhammad himself more than to the creed. In the traditional fashionof Arab covenants, upon Muhammad’s death many tribal and clanchiefs no longer felt bound by their old agreements with the Prophet.The crux of the problem was the zakat, the annual tax that Muhammadhad imposed. The zakat had been announced at the Meccan pilgrimage,but Muhammad died before the tax could be collected from all but thetribes nearest Medina and Mecca. Some of the allied tribes sent delega-tions to Medina to negotiate new agreements with Abu Bakr, who hadbeen elected to succeed Muhammad, promising to remain Muslim andsay the daily prayer in exchange for repeal of the tax. Abu Bakr refusedsaying, “By Allah, if they withhold a rope of a camel they use to give

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its due zakat to Allah’s Messenger, I will fight them for it.” The resultwas the Riddah, or the War of the Apostates.

It was Abu Bakr who was responsible for the ultimate success ofIslam by using the Arab armies to suppress all opposition to it and toenforce conversion on all Arabia by military means. During the two-year period of the wars of the Riddah we see Muhammad’s reformedarmies operating on a larger scale over greater distances than ever beforewith several campaigns taking place at once, all of them operating underunified command to implement a single strategic goal formulated by AbuBakr. The same operational characteristics that became typical of thearmies of the later Arab conquests were first revealed during the Riddah,and it was Abu Bakr who was the political and military genius behind it.2

Abu Bakr assumed leadership of the insurgency when the move-ment was on the verge of collapse. He reckoned correctly that to accedeto the tribes on the issue of the zakat meant the end of centralizedcontrol over the movement, opening it to schism, eventual disintegra-tion, and perhaps, even absorption by other monotheistic religions. Toprevent this Abu Bakr declared war on all those who would not obey. Heproclaimed withdrawal from Muhammad’s coalition to be a denial ofGod’s will (the concept of kufr) and declared secession from the coalitionand the ummah as apostasy (riddah) that was punishable by death. Oncethe tribes had joined Muhammad, he asserted, they were no longer freenot to be Muslims. Nor could they be loyal to God under any leaderwhose legitimacy did not derive from Muhammad. This fusion of twoonce separable phenomena, membership in Muhammad’s communityand faith in Islam, became one of Islam’s most distinctive features.Perhaps to forestall the influence of others claiming to be prophetswho had already arisen in Arabia during Muhammad’s lifetime, AbuBakr declared Muhammad to be the last prophet that God would send.Although these tenets were originally devised and introduced as part ofAbu Bakr’s political strategy to isolate and destroy the enemies of theinsurgency, over time they became important religious tenets of Islam.

The term al-Riddah has been used by traditional Arab historianswho wished to cast the opposition of the tribes in religious terms, asapostasy, a falling away from the true faith and thus an attack on Islam.These traditionalists saw the war as a religious and defensive one tosave the true faith.3 But this view is only partially correct. An apostasycould only apply to those tribes and clans who had already agreed to thetax. Muhammad had died before his agents could collect the zakat, and

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most chiefs had never agreed to pay it while Muhammad was alive.Now that it was demanded by Abu Bakr, they saw no reason to pay it toa man in whose election they had played no part. These chiefs couldonly be deemed apostates under Abu Bakr’s new tenets of Islam and notunder the tenets with which Muhammad had governed.

While certainly a war about religion, the Riddah was also really awar declared by Abu Bakr, his Meccan allies, and the local loyalbedouin tribes to spread the authority of Medina and the faith of Islamthroughout Arabia. The conquest of Arabia served the interests of theMeccan aristocracy to expand their financial and commercial markets;it served the interests of those, among them certainly Abu Bakr, whowished to spread the true faith and destroy the idolaters; and it servedthe interests of the loyal bedouin tribes for battle and booty. Seen inthis larger context, the Riddah was not so much a war against apos-tates as it was a war of outright conquest driven by a combination ofpolitical, economic, and religious motives.

The Armies of the Riddah

The decision to attack the “apostates” was not a popular one with manyof the faithful, including some of Muhammad’s field commanders andadvisers. Abu Bakr removed these commanders from their positionsand appointed Meccan officers who had supported his election over theopposition of the ansar and some Emigrants.4 Once the conquest ofArabia had been accomplished, however, these commanders were rein-stated and went on to play important roles in the campaigns againstthe Persians and Byzantines.5 Abu Bakr appointed Khalid al-Walid ascommanding general of the Muslim forces during the Riddah. Theseappointments and Abu Bakr’s negotiations with the recalcitrant tribesoccurred while Usamah was conducting the expedition against theByzantines that Muhammad had ordered before he died. Usamah’s armywas a small contingent, between seven hundred and three thousandtroops,6 and it seems to have succeeded only in plundering and burningthe town of Ubna in southern Jordan as revenge for his father’s death.7

Usamah returned to Medina forty days after he had left. During hisabsence Abu Bakr had assembled a Muslim army from the tribes aroundMedina and immediately marched to Dhu al-Qassah (northeast ofMedina), where he attacked several of the tribes of Najd and defeatedthem. Abu Bakr then ordered a general mobilization of all Muslim

MUHAMMAD’S MILITARY LEGACY 207

forces and ordered his Meccan commanders to join him at Dhu al-Qassah. From there al-Tabari tells us that he dispatched eleven armies,supposedly at the same time, to all parts of Arabia with the mission ofsubjugating the “apostatizing” tribes.8

Abu Bakr’s military operations were carried out simultaneouslyand in four different directions over almost eighteen months with theresult that all Arabia fell to the Muslim armies and accepted Islam. Al-Tabari provides a list of the Muslim commanders and the tribes againstwhich they fought.9 (Map 12 depicts the major campaigns of the Riddah.)Campaign 1 was carried out to the east and northeast of Medina underthe overall command of Khalid al-Walid accompanied by Shuranbil binHasanah ad al-Ala bin al-Hadrami against the Tayii, Ghatafan, Asad,Tamin, Bani Hanifah, and Rabi’ah tribes. The most famous engage-ment of this campaign was the Battle of Aqraba, which al-Walid foughtagainst the Bani Hanifah under the command of Musaylimah. The BaniHanifah supposedly put forty thousand men in the field and had alreadycrushed two Muslim armies sent to bring them to heel.10 Khalid al-Walidattacked with five thousand men driving the Bani Hanifah back untilthey took refuge in a walled orchard known to Arab history as Hadiqatal-Mawt, the Garden of Death. In desperate hand-to-hand combat mostof the Hanifah army was slain including its commander. Muslim losseswere twelve hundred dead.11 Among the dead were a number of “Quranreciters,” men who had memorized the sayings and instructions ofMuhammad that would later be collected in the Quran. Had all of thembeen killed, the Quran might have been lost to history.

Campaign 2 was undertaken to the southeast under the leadershipof Ikrimah ibn Abu Jahl, Hudhayfah bin Mihsah, and Arfajah binHarthamah against the tribes of Oman and Mahrah. The southwestcampaign (3) was led by al-Muhajir bin Abi Umayyah and Ziyad binLabid, who conquered Yemen and Hadramawt. The north and north-west campaign (4) was aimed at the Arab tribes along the Syrian borderwho had once been allies of the Byzantines. Two generals, Amr ibn al-A’as and Khalid bin Sa’id, succeeded in getting some of these tribes todefect to the Muslims before undertaking a series of major operationsinto Palestine and Syria. By the time the Byzantines’ former allies hadgone over to the Muslims, some fourteen months after the start of theRiddah, most of Arabia had been pacified and Khalid al-Walid was onthe border of Iraq. Abu Bakr ordered al-Walid to march to the aid ofAmr ibn al-A’as in his campaign on the Syrian border. As the other

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209

Map 12. Military Campaigns of the Riddah, 632–633 c.e.

victorious Muslim commanders began to return to Medina from dif-ferent parts of Arabia with their armies, Abu Bakr ordered them to theSyrian front to reinforce the Muslim armies there with troopsrecruited from among the newly converted tribes in Arabia. The resultwas the collapse of the Byzantine defenses on the Syrian frontier andthe beginning of the Arabs’ westward conquests.

The armies that carried out Abu Bakr’s campaigns left Medina asrelatively small contingents, each numbering perhaps four thousand tofive thousand men or even less, comprising ansar, Emigrants, and tribalunits of local bedouins under the leadership of experienced field com-manders. Only Khalid al-Walid’s army seems to have been substantiallylarger, a circumstance that made sound military sense given that hehad the mission of subduing some of the larger and more powerfultribes in Arabia. The size of the Muslim contingents seems to havebeen only large enough to engage and defeat those small clans andtribes encountered along their routes of march. These contingents wereexpected to recruit more manpower along the way with religiouspromises and loot. If this failed, then military action could be under-taken to inflict a defeat on the recalcitrant clan, which would thenmake a peace agreement with the victors that required them to acceptIslam and join the campaign. Once within the area of the operationsof the target, Muslim commanders would seek to take advantage oflocal rivalries to attract additional manpower to their armies.12 It wasa technique Muhammad had used on several occasions, and it workedwell for the armies of Abu Bakr.

The armies of the Arabian conquest demonstrated all the opera-tional capabilities that Muhammad had introduced into Arab warfare.The Muslim officer corps was competent and experienced, and hadacquired in Muhammad’s wars the skills needed to command largearmies over long distances. Abu Bakr, while remaining in Medina,was able to coordinate the eleven major campaigns and to shift forcesas needed from one front to another.13 The units within the armies,while mostly organized on tribal or clan lines, nevertheless operatedunder a unified command structure through which all subordinatecommanders were expected to carry out the missions assigned to themas part of a larger tactical plan. Abu Bakr’s campaigns demonstratedthe primacy of strategic objectives in tactical planning, something thathad been absent in Arab warfare until introduced by Muhammad. Eventhe idea of a single tribe or political group conquering all of Arabia was

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inconceivable until Muhammad showed the Arabs how to think instrategic terms. Logistics and supply for large armies had improvedconsiderably under Muhammad and were put to good use in Abu Bakr’scampaigns. We have no reports of serious shortages of water, fodder, orarmaments in any of the campaigns of the Riddah. Muslim morale andfighting spirit were superior to that of any tribe the armies engaged withthe possible exception of the Bani Hanifah who fought to the death toretain their freedom. Muslim soldiers had learned to fight as units oper-ating within a larger tactical design, while the warriors of most tribesfought in the old manner as individuals. Finally, the quality of Muslimcombat leadership, certainly at the field commander level and probablyin the major subordinate units as well, was superior to their adversaries.Muslim field commanders were never selected on the grounds of piety,but always on the basis of demonstrated competence in war.

Muhammad’s legacy of new operational capabilities passed intactto the armies of Abu Bakr and produced the conquest and conversion ofall Arabia. The Muslim military experience against the border garrisonsof the Byzantine and Persian Empires had demonstrated that both werehollow and ripe for defeat. By the spring of 633 the Riddah was overand Arabia was an armed camp full of warrior tribes ready to seek newadventures and loot. An Islamic Arabia lacked sufficient resources offood and wealth to sustain itself under the limitations that the newIslamic laws placed on the old ways of life. If new sources of wealthwere not found, the Muslim state that Abu Bakr’s military campaignshad brought into being would soon fragment into warring tribalgroups. Muhammad’s earlier raids attempted against the Byzantineborder provinces provided the guiding strategic concept behind AbuBakr’s decision to use the united Arab tribes as a means to an evenlarger conquest. In 633 Abu Bakr ordered three Muslim armies to attackthe Byzantines. The great Arab conquests had begun.

The Armies of the Arab Conquests

The armies of the Arab conquests were those military forces of Arabianorigin that established the Empire of Islam before being subsumed intothe larger Muslim convert population. The original Arab armies can besaid to have existed from 622 when Muhammad first formed them toapproximately 842 when the Abbasid caliph, al-Mutasim, introduced theMamluke Institution of slave Turk soldiers who replaced the original


Arab contingents in the armies of Islam. Until then the armies ofMohammad and his immediate successors consisted almost exclusivelyof Arabs from Arabia. It was these armies that invaded and conqueredlarge segments of the Byzantine and Persian Empires between 633 and656. Over the next hundred years the Arabs fought three civil wars. Thefirst replaced the original successors of Muhammad with the Umayyaddynasty, which ruled from Syria from 661 to 750. The Umayyads sur-vived the second civil war (684–692) but were driven from power duringthe third civil war (744-750) and replaced by the Abbasids, who ruledfrom Iraq and retained the caliphate, although in much altered form,until 1258. The Arab invasions produced a new sociopolitical order thateventually included the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, all the Persianlands, and the Byzantine provinces of Syria and Egypt.14

The structure of the Arab army reflected the structure of Arabtribal society. Arab society during Muhammad’s day and for more thana century afterward never really developed a stable political orderworthy of being called a state. There was no state per se and no admin-istrative structure of government. Arab society remained what it hadalways been, a tribal society characterized by personal leadership andappointed retainers that drew no distinctions between the social, reli-gious, and military aspects of life. Indeed, there was never a formalarmy as such. Instead, there was an alliance of powerful tribal chiefswho led their personal armed retinues in battle. There was no financialsystem, and what treasury there was came from gifts and booty obtainedin raids. Government was essentially an enlarged tribal system ofnegotiated consensus among powerful tribal chieftains, and it wasthese warrior chiefs who controlled the Arab populace and the army.Governance was effected indirectly through tribal intermediaries. Thissystem of indirect rule plagued the Muslim Empire until its end. Powerebbed and flowed from the center of authority, but no caliph ever wasable to retain control of the tribal and regional armies for very long.Revolts and insurrections rooted in jealousy, political interests, reli-gious apostasy, and blood feuds went on for centuries.15

Some authorities have argued that the invasion of the Byzantineand Persian Empires by the Arab tribes was comparable to the invasionof the Western Roman Empire by the Germanic tribes with the samegeneral result, the establishment over the long run of a number ofseparate states ruled by powerful national kings. It seems more correctto say, rather, that the Arab invasions were unlike the tribal invasions

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in the West, for they were coordinated from a single center, Medina,for a specific religious purpose, to extend the rule of God’s believers overthe unbelievers as commanded by God himself. This central leadership,direction, and religious purpose led to results quite different from thoseof the Germanic invasions. Instead of conquering, settling, and thenruling the new lands, the Arab conquerors stayed together as soldiersliving in garrison cities (amsar), military districts (ajnad), and evenmilitary monasteries (ribat) whose members remained celibate.16 TheArab conquerors remained apart from the societies they conqueredand showed little interest in governing the new lands, leaving the oldsystems, leaders, kings, and governmental officials—now converted toIslam—in place to continue to administer the conquered lands.17

The military garrisons remained just that, fortresses that accom-modated Arab armies that could be sent forth on further conquest orused to suppress revolts. This arrangement was possible because theArab armies, although receiving religious direction from the center,were not really structured armies at all. They were tribal coalitions ledby local chieftains and made up of emigrants from Arabia who lefttheir homes to serve as soldiers in a holy war. In Islam, all believerswere soldiers. There was no Muslim army distinct from Muslim society.The Muslims were a holy army and their society, living apart from theconquered infidels with their families at government expense untilcalled to further holy war, worked well.

The Arab armies that attacked the Byzantines and Persians mayhave been infantry armies, but they did not move on foot. Instead,they made extensive use of the camel in transporting their armies tothe strategic objective. This provided them with superior strategicmobility enabling them to bypass enemy strong points and offer battleat times and places of their own choosing. The guiding tactical conceptwas to move quickly to a favorable position, establish the infantry onthe ground, and then force the enemy to attack at its disadvantage.Once the horse became widely available, Arab armies continued theirpractice of using mounted infantry in a strategic manner. Eventuallythe Arab armies produced the best war horse of the day, the Syrian-Arab crossbreed combining the small strong North African Barb withthe heavier Iranian mount.18

Once established in their new lands the Arabs attempted to remainan ethnically homogeneous, warlike, and religious society apart fromthe conquered infidels. But their numbers were not very large. Crone


suggests that the total size of the Arab armies that left Arabia couldhardly have exceeded one hundred thousand people, including menand children, whereas the population of the conquered lands probablyexceeded 20 million souls!19 All Arab emigrants lived in garrison citiesor military districts and were registered in the diwan, or “register.”The registered soldier was entitled to monthly rations for himself andhis family, and received an annual cash stipend as did his wife andchildren. Quarters were also provided for the soldier and his family. Inreturn these religious warriors were available for military service at amoment’s notice. As the Arab occupation stabilized, military calls toactive service became relatively infrequent. When called to service, thesoldier had to supply his own mount—horse or camel—and militaryequipment that included a lance, sword, shield, bow, quiver, and armor,usually some form of mail.20

Once registered on the diwan, the soldier remained on the roll forlife. There was no classical Arabic word for veteran soldier, and no specialprovisions were made for them. Soldiers too old for service probablyprovided substitutes or worked for the army administration. Disabledsoldiers were registered as cripples and continued to draw some portionof their annual pay and allowance. Arab soldiers were usually forbiddento engage in agriculture, although in rare instances it was permitted.Such limitations on “fraternization” and economic activity workedagainst the creation of an Arab “society” in the conquered lands, atask left to the conquered infidels who converted to Islam. In somerespects the diwan may have been adopted from the military role ofthe Byzantines, but with a very important difference: the diwan wasnot seen by the Arabs as an institution for the maintenance of the army,but as a social institution for the maintenance of Muslims. Stipendswere not military pay, but a right claimed by every Muslim emigrantand his descendants as a reward for participation in the conquest ofIslam over the infidels. Islam was religion, society, and army all in one,and the diwan was the mechanism for sustaining all three.

This attempt to sustain a separate Arab identity apart from theinfidels was bound to fail in the long run on the grounds of numbersand conversions. Even as military manpower demands increased, theArabs made no effort to recruit the able-bodied men of the conqueredlands into their armies. Captives were sometimes resettled on conqueredlands, and some even served as special units, often private guards orurban police. Gradually native peoples were permitted to lend military

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service, usually ethnic or racial units serving as separate battalions. Butonce the conquered peoples accepted Islam, more and more non-Arabscame to serve in the Muslim armies even as the purely Arab elementsremained isolated in their garrisons. Over time the Arab elements ofthe Muslim armies came to see the military diwan as a social stipend,and the Arab elements became a smaller and less used segment of thearmies as the Arabs gradually were submerged into the Muslim armiesof disparate peoples who had converted to the new faith.21

With gradual assimilation and widespread conversion, the old citi-zen armies eventually gave way to professional armies manned largelyby non-Arab Muslims, although their commanders remained Arabsfor many years. The regional armies of the old tribal chiefs survivedfor centuries, but for the most part they were confined to their gar-risons supported by the diwan and were of little use. As the Arabswere submerged in a sea of Muslims, the old tribal consensual style ofgovernment became more difficult to operate and proved insufficientto constrain tribal and personal ambitions. The result was two civilwars. The second war (684–692) forced the Umayyads to abandon theold ideal of consensual rule completely, and they governed by forcesupported by their professional army made up mostly of Syrian troops.It was not until the last Umayyad caliph (750), however, that thearmies became professionalized.

Under the Umayyads heavy cavalry became increasingly impor-tant. Originally, Arab cavalry was divided into armored and unarmoredhorse, or heavy and light cavalry. The heavy cavalry still comprisedonly a small number of units and was used mostly as shock troopsalong Byzantine lines. Light cavalry, when not used as skirmishers andreconnaissance, was used only to complete the destruction of alreadydisorganized or broken enemy units. Surviving records of the perioddescribe the full equipment of the seventh-century Arab cavalryman aslance, sword, shield, hauberk, packing needles, five small needles,linen thread, awl, scissors, horse’s nose bag, and feed basket.22 Duringthe Umayyad period the bulk of Arab cavalry became armored in atransition toward the Byzantine model in mounts, armor, and weapons.Unlike the Byzantines, the Arab armies retained their old infantrytraditions. Byzantine cavalrymen, for example, were trained for use asshock troops fighting from horseback only. Arab heavy cavalrymenwere trained in the old tradition of fighting first from horseback andthen being able to dismount and fight on foot. Heavy cavalry never


became a truly decisive arm in Arab armies until much later, andheavy infantry remained the central combat arm. The cavalry woulddeploy safely behind the infantry formations and sally forth as oppor-tunity permitted to attack the enemy only to retreat quickly behind itsown infantry for protection. The idea of cavalry against cavalry in opencombat was unknown to Arab commanders.

When the Arab armies encountered the Central Asian horse archeron the rim of the empire they were unable to find a tactical solutionto this novel way of fighting. The Arabs did what the Byzantines andPersians had done before them: they hired whole contingents of horsearchers and used them against their countrymen. The new cavalry threatforced a change in Arab cavalry equipment, most notably in the adop-tion of light felt armor for man and horse to protect against arrows andthe introduction of the iron stirrup (over the objections of Arab scholarswho claimed the device would make soldiers effete by hindering theirability to mount and dismount rapidly in battle).23 But even with theintroduction of the horse archer, infantry remained the king of thebattlefield in Arab tactical thinking.

The Umayyad period was brought to an end by yet another civilwar, and the Abbasids were brought to the throne by rebel armies raisedin Iran. These troops replaced the Syrian troops of the Umayyads inimperial garrisons, and the capital was moved to Baghdad. These Iraniantroops, or Khurasiani, were mostly horse archers, and this type of cavalrynow became dominant in Arab armies. Although cavalry was now thearm of decision, infantry still played an important role on the battle-field, and close infantry and cavalry cooperation remained central tothe new Arab tactical design. These new troops wore clothes similar tothe eastern Christian monks and wore beards and long hair. Greatreliance was placed on the bow and lance. The attack was marked by ashower of arrows as the cavalry closed with the enemy at the gallopfiring as it went. Once in contact, the lance came into play along withother weapons of close combat like the curved sword, mace, battle-ax,and short sword of single-edge design.24

The Abbasids made no effort to broaden the base of their army orgovernment, relying instead on those groups and tribes of mostly easternorigin that had brought them to power. The Arab armies were nowmostly cavalry armies, and since horses were expensive and trainingtook a long time, it was more efficient for the Abbasids to rely on thenatural horsemen of the Khurasiani rather than to outfit and train Arabs

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themselves. The reliance on foreign troops and the failure to extendgovernmental participation to the powerful regional chiefs resulted inthe imperial army being run more like a mafia than a military institu-tion. The caliphs and the army became increasingly isolated from thesociety with the consequence that the Abbasids were forced to dealwith frequent revolts.25

During one of the civil wars that threatened to topple the Abbasids,one of the participants, al-Mutasim (r. 833-842), had outfitted his armywith four thousand Turkic troops whom he had purchased as slavesand then freed for military service under his command. Once al-Mutasimhad become caliph, he expanded the practice of purchasing and trainingTurkish slaves for service in his armies, thereby bringing into exis-tence what Muslims came to call “the Mamluke Institution.” Theessence of this institution was the systematic reliance of the caliphateon soldiers of servile and non-Islamic origin. The use of other foreign,non-Muslim, ethnic units in the army also increased greatly. The resultwas that the areas of the empire under direct imperial control werepoliced by these slave Turks. Over time, most of the major militarycommands and some important governorships were assigned to Turkicofficials as well. Eventually the Mamlukes carried out a military coupagainst the Abbasids and took control of the caliphate.

For the next two centuries the Abbasid caliphs continued to rulefrom Baghdad, but mostly in name only while genuine power wasexercised by Turkic military commanders who continued to pay lip-service to the rule of the caliphs. In reaction to this state of affairs, thegovernors of various provinces, using their regional armies as leverage,broke into open revolt time and again with one province after anotherseceding from the empire by force of arms. By the middle of the ninthcentury the old Arab empire had ceased to exist, and with it the Arab“army of God” that had swept over the ancient Mediterranean worldwielding the sword of Allah also disappeared.26

Without doubt Muhammad’s greatest military legacy was the doc-trine of jihad, or holy war. It is indisputable that divinely justified warfarebecame a force of major importance during the early Islamic period andremained a powerful motivator for the Islamic conquests that followedMuhammad’s death. This is even more amazing when it is recalledthat pre-Islamic Arabia knew no notion of ideology of any sort, muchless the idea of religiously sanctioned war. Pre-Islamic warfare wasdirectly linked to the economic and social circumstances of pasturage,


material wealth, and prestige, and there is no evidence of any kind tosuggest any religious or ideological motivation for Arab warfare prior tothe influence of Muhammad and Islam.27 Under these circumstances,martyrdom had little meaning, and no transcendent meaning wasapplied to warfare as a reward for carrying out the instructions of God.28

The idea of warfare as a command of God rewarded by martyrdom andparadise seems to have been an innovation with no precedents in Arabculture, custom, or practice brought about completely by Muhammad’sthinking and influence on events.

The concept of jihad came to have many meanings over the yearsas a consequence of the influence of Muslim legalists, scholars, andtheologians. The term derives from the root jahada, which is definedas “exerting one’s utmost power, efforts, endeavors, or ability in con-tending with an object of disapprobation.”29 There are, therefore,many kinds of jihad, most of which have nothing to do with warfare.Thus, the “greater jihad” (al-jihad al-akbar) refers to a struggle within oragainst one’s self while the “lesser jihad” refers to warring in the path ofGod.30 Jihad, therefore, may not have always been equated with holy war,although that is the primary meaning that Muhammad seems to havegiven it. With regard to jihad as holy war most Muslim scholars subscribeto what is called the classic evolutionary theory of holy war: that whatMuhammad meant by jihad depended on the historical circumstancesand needs at different times during his prophetic mission. Thus,

At the beginning of his prophetic career in Mecca when he wasweak and his followers few, the divine revelations encouragedavoidance of physical conflict. Only after the intense physicalpersecution that resulted in the Emigration (Hijra) of the Mus-lim community to Medina in 622 were Muhammad and thebelievers given the divine authority to engage in war and onlyin defense. As the Muslim community continued to grow innumbers and strength in Medina, further revelations widenedthe conditions and narrowed the restrictions under which warcould be waged, until it was concluded that war against non-Muslims could be waged virtually at any time, without pretext,and in any place.31

It is this classical interpretation of Islam as a “religion of dominion” thatprovided the ideological justification for the Arab conquests and that isvery much alive in the minds of Islamic jihadis of the present day.

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Muhammad’s military legacy lives in the minds of these jihadis intheir memory of Muhammad as a great general and passionate revolu-tionary who created and fought a successful insurgency to achieve hispolitical and religious goals. It is this legacy of Muhammad as successfulrevolutionary that motivates Muslim insurgents and revolutionaryleaders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. In their portrayal of theirinsurgencies as divinely sanctioned acts, these modern revolutionariesare imitating Muhammad. It can scarcely be denied that at least tosome extent some suicide bombers are motivated by their desire tobecome martyrs in the same manner that many of Muhammad’s soldiers were willing to die for their faith. The Osama bin Ladens ofthe Muslim world, like Muhammad, speak of creating a more moralworld in which to live, a community of believers living according tothe instructions given by God himself. Like Muhammad, they are prepared to use violence to bring that new moral order into being.Those who do not understand the historical roots of modern Musliminsurgencies fail to do so at great risk.


NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. I am indebted to Michael Edwards for his thoughts that appear in hisIbn Ishaq’s Life of Muhammad, Apostle of Allah (1964) on the difficultiesencountered in researching the lives of religious figures. The book is a trun-cated version of Ibn Ishaq’s lengthy book and is only marginally useful as asource due to its heavy editing.

2. Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, 237.3. Examples of these types of attributions can be found in Hamidullah,

Battlefields of the Prophet. Hamidullah is a fine scholar except when he permitsreligious elements to cloud his military explanations, something that may beaccounted for by his writing for an already religiously committed audience.This said, Hamidullah’s early work is invaluable for reconstructing the terrainof Muhammad’s battlefields. On a pilgrimage in 1939 Hamidullah walked theground and provided some descriptions and primitive maps of the battlefieldsthat can be cross-checked against the observations of others and descriptionsof the terrain as they appear in Ibn Ishaq’s text.

4. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 263; see also Payne, Why NationsArm, 125. Huntington’s paraphrase of Payne is inaccurate. Moses was an excel-lent military commander. Siddhartha Gautama, before he became the Buddha,was a prince of the warrior class of India and was certainly trained in warfaresince this class had no other function but to fight wars. There is, however, norecord of the Buddha having experienced combat. For more on Moses’ combatexperience as a commander, see Gabriel, Military History of Ancient Israel,the chapter entitled “Exodus.”

221

5. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 276.6. What is meant politically and militarily by the term “ideology” is cap-

tured by the German Weltanschauung, a systematic set of ideas that provides a“total world outlook.” More than just a general set of beliefs, it is a systematic,logically interconnected set that explains all of one’s life, relationships, andobligations in much the same way as do the doctrine of a religious cult. Ethnicand religious differences as such do not constitute an ideology in the same waythat Islam did for Muhammad’s followers. For more on the Muslim influenceon later Christian doctrines of war and the Crusades, see Gabriel, Empires atWar, 3:792.

7. For more than thirty years I have argued that the military history of theancient world did not end in 450 c.e. as is often asserted but when the last armyof the ancient world, that of the Byzantine Empire, met its end at Constantino-ple in 1453. The argument for this point of view can be found in my Empires atWar, 1:15, cited above. The relevance of the argument to the present work liesonly in my referring to Muhammad has having lived during the ancient period ofmilitary history. I hope the reader will grant me this indulgence even whilereserving judgment as to the validity of the argument.

8. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 17. 9. See Giap, People’s War, People’s Army, for the methods required to

organize and conduct an insurgency.10. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 257.11. The story appears in Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 40, citing

Ibn Hajar Isabah, no. 8336. 12. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 257.13. See Gabriel, Subotai the Valiant, and Military History of Ancient

Israel as examples of the author’s previous work dealing with foreign-languagesources in works of military history.

14. Ibn Ishaq, Life of Muhammad, xxxiv (hereafter cited as Ibn Ishaq).

1. THE LAND OF ARABIA

1. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 3–4.2. Ibid., 85.3. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 17. 4. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 169.5. Ibid.6. Gabriel, Military History of Ancient Israel, 121.7. Yadin, Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1:19.8. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 19.9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 20.11. Ibid., 25.

2. THE STRATEGIC SETTING

1. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 142, says the idol was of Nabataeanorigin. See also page 156 for Ibn Hisham’s description of the idol and the rituals

222 NOTES TO PAGES xviii–12

used in the Kaaba. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 100, suggests that the idol mayhave been of Moabite origin, which, in any case, was close enough to Nabataeato account for the disparity in the claims. According to tradition there weremore than a thousand idols in the ka’bah during Muhammad’s day.

2. Glubb, Life and Times, 50.3. For the history of the military collapse of Constantinople in 1453, see

Gabriel, “Byzantines and Ottomans,” Empires at War, vol. 3.4. For a brief account of the life and battles of Heraclius, see Dupuy and

Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History, 329.

3. ARAB WARFARE

1. Gabriel, “Ancient India,” Empires at War, 1:235–52.2. Gabriel, “Japanese Way of War,” Empires at War, 3:837–72.3. Gabriel, “Rediscovery of Infantry,” Empires at War, 3:915–44.4. Gabriel, Military History of Ancient Israel, 118. See Deuteronomy

20:16–17 for the complete quote.5. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 95.6. Glubb, Life and Times, 27.7. Gabriel, “Charlemagne and the Franks,” Empires at War, 2:659–700. 8. Gabriel, “The Crusades,” Empires at War, 3:791–836.9. Glubb, Life and Times, 220.

10. Rodinson, Muhammad, 223–24. 11. The idea that Muslim soldiers are bloodthirsty fanatics remains very

much alive in the Western mind today largely as a result of the continuinginsurgency in Iraq.

12. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 139.13. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 188–89.14. The Arabs of Arabia were primarily an illiterate and backward people.

Their conquest of much of the eastern ancient world brought little to it exceptthe Arabic language and the Islamic religion. The peoples of the conqueredlands were the heirs to the art, architecture, literature, and science of theancient world. Over time the conquered populations converted to Islam andtranslated their ancient texts into Arabic, which then made their way to theWest. It was the knowledge and technology of the conquered peoples thattransformed the Arabs, not vice versa. The Western habit of referring to allpeoples who speak Arabic and observe the Muslim faith as Arabs is a grossmischaracterization and misunderstanding of both the Islamic conquests andthe Arabs. See Gabriel, “Wars of Arab Conquest,” Empires at War, 2:639–58.

15. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 173.16. Nicolle and McBride, Armies of Islam, 11. 17. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 173; Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 188

says that the bamboo shafts were assembled in al-Bahrayn, but not grownthere.

18. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 189.19. Nicolle and McBride, 9.20. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 189.21. Nicolle and McBride, Armies of Islam, 8.

NOTES TO PAGES 13–31 223

22. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 147, suggests the real reason Muhammadattacked Mu’ta was that the Mashrafiya swords were manufactured there.

23. Ibid., 173.24. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 189.25. Ibid. The reference to David as a maker of iron is found in the Quran,

sura 34:10–11, 21.80, which says, “We bestowed upon David Our favours . . . andmade hard iron pliant for him, telling him to make coats of mail and measuretheir links with care.”

26. The poetic text is from the Mu’allaqat, the seven famous pre-Islamicpoems, found in Lyall, Ten Ancient Arabic Poems; see also the translation ofsame by Arberry, Seven Odes.

27. Nicolle and McBride, Armies of Islam, 13.28. Crone, “Early Islamic World,” 311.29. From the Mu’allaqat. 30. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 173.31. From Tufayl ibn ’Auf, Poems of Diwan.32. Goldschmidt, Concise History, 23. See also Bulliet, Camel and the

Wheel.33. Gabriel, Military History of Ancient Israel, 81–86.34. Gabriel, Soldiers’ Lives, 149.35. As reckoned by Muhammad prior to the Battle of Badr as recorded by

Ibn Ishaq, 295. Interrogating a Quraish waterman to discern the strength of theenemy, Muhammad asked, “[H]ow many beasts (camels) were slaughteredevery day” to feed the army. The prisoner replied, “[N]ine or ten.” Muhammadcalculated that “the people [enemy] are between nine hundred and a thousand.”

36. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 21–22.37. Goldschmidt, Concise History, 23.38. Ibid.39. Rodinson, Muhammad, 13.40. Glubb, Life and Times, 225.41. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 22.42. Parry and Yapp, War, Technology, and Society, 32.43. Roth, The Roman Army, 207.44. Rodinson, Muhammad, 13.45. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, 553.46. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 22.47. Gabriel and Boose, Great Battles of Antiquity, 98.48. Ibn Ishaq, Life of Muhammad, 373.49. Parry and Yapp, War, Technology, and Society, 36.50. Roth, The Roman Army, 61–62.51. Ibid.52. Only the Israelites seem to have used the mule as their primary military

animal. David is portrayed as fleeing Jerusalem on a mule. Ibn Ishaq reports thatMuhammad sometimes rode a white mule.

53. Gabriel, Soldiers’ Lives, chap. 12, “Cavalry.”54. Gabriel, “Wars of Arab Conquest,” 646.55. Parry and Yapp, War, Technology, and Society, 35.56. Ibid.

224 NOTES TO PAGES 31–41

57. Ibid.58. Ibid., 39.59. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 173.60. Ibid.61. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 139.62. Ibid., 140.63. Ibid.

4. MUHAMMAD

1. Quran, sura 14:40.2. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 103.3. Glubb, Life and Times, 64. According to legend Qusai was also the

first warrior to tie a banner around his lance to distinguish himself on thebattlefield as the leader of the clan, thus making himself a target.

4. Retreating to the desert to meditate remains a common practiceamong Arabs to this day.

5. Glubb, Life and Times, 72.6. Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, 12. The dispute is of long

standing and cannot be definitively resolved.7. Glubb, Life and Times, 84.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 85.11. Lings, Muhammad, 44–45, quoting Ibn Ishaq.12. Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, 18–19.13. Glubb, Life and Times, 97, quoting Ibn Ishaq.14. Ibn Ishaq, 279–80.15. Ibid., 279–80; Ibn Ishaq identifies Aisha as the original source of the

story.16. Ibid., 280, quoting one Yaquba ibn Utaba as the source.17. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Toby Rose, physician, pathologist,

and coroner in Toronto, Canada, and Dr. Lucy Harvey of Montpelier, Vermont,for providing me with the information on the symptoms of malaria. Dr. PeterF. Weller notes, “Clinical symptoms develop about 1 to 4 weeks after infectionand typically include fever and chills. Virtually all patients with acute malariahave episodes of fever. At the outset, fever may occur daily; over time, theparoxysms may develop the typical every-other or every-third day pattern.The paroxysms of fever (as high as 41.5 degrees C [106.7˚F] and chills (with or without rigors) may be irregular, however. Other symptoms may be head-ache, increased sweating, back pain, myalgias, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, andcough. . . . Cerebral involvement may lead to delirium, focal disorders, (e.g.,seizures), and coma. P. malariae organisims can persist in the blood as an indo-lent, even asymptomatic, infection for years or even decades.” See Weller,“Protozoan Infections: Malaria,” 1–6.

18. Ibn Ishaq, 143.19. Ibid., 194.20. Ibid.


21. Ibid., 203.22. Ibid., 204.23. Ibid., 213.24. Ibid.25. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 321.26. Lings, Muhammad, 35. The original source for Lings’s description can

be found in Ibn Ishaq, 725–26. 27. Glubb, Life and Times, 238.28. Rodinson, Muhammad, 279.29. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 321.30. Glubb, Life and Times, 334.31. Ibid., 228.32. The term is taken from James H. Breasted, The Development of Reli-

gion and Thought in Ancient Egypt. Breasted used the phrase to describe the religious ferocity of Pharaoh Akhenaton, the ancient world’s first truemonotheist and the ruler from whom Moses may have adopted the idea of asingle God. However, the first use of the phrase was to describe the famousreligious philosopher Baruch Spinoza.

33. Ibn Ishaq, 157.34. Ibid., 131.35. Ibid., 106.36. Ibid., 227.

5. INSURGENCY

1. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 170.2. Muhammad Hamidullah, Le Prophete de l’Islam, cited in Glubb, Life

and Times, 170. Hamidullah’s estimate seems correct. When Muhammaddestroyed one of the Jewish tribes of Medina, he executed nine hundred malesof military age. Reckoning the number of wives, children, and aged relatives,the Jewish tribe could easily have numbered thirty-six hundred. Given thatthere were two more Jewish tribes, two major Arab tribes, and eight Arab clansin Medina at the time, it is probable that the population of Medina exceededten thousand.

3. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 104.4. Ibid. The term means town in the sense of “jurisdiction.” No doubt

the identification of town with jurisdiction stems from the fact that Arabsociety was overwhelmingly nonurban, but highly tribal and territorial.Whether one was in a town or in the countryside, it was very important toknow whose “jurisdiction” in the sense of tribal territory one was in at anygiven time.

5. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, 170.6. Glubb, Life and Times, 143.7. Ibn Ishaq, 226.8. Ibid., 232.9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


11. Ibid.12. Ibid.13. Ibid.14. Glubb, Life and Times, 170.15. Ibn Ishaq, 233.16. Ibid., 283.17. Ibid.18. Glubb, Life and Times, 175.19. For the figures on the range and speed of a riding camel, see Doughty,

Travels in Arabia Deserta, 553.20. Ibn Ishaq, 287.21. It is not unlikely that some of Moses’ massacres of his own people that

are recounted as due to violations of religious ritual or divine command wereattempts to suppress rebellions by some who thought his leadership incompe-tent. It may also have been that Moses did not reach the Promised Landbecause he was killed in one of these rebellions and replaced with Joshua. Formore on this theory see Gabriel, Gods of Our Fathers, and Jonathan Kirsch,Moses: A Life.

22. Ibn Ishaq, 288.23. Ibid.24. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 7, argues, “The essential part of Muham-

mad’s sealed orders to Abdullah ibn Jahash was to go to Nakhla and ambush acaravan of Quraish. The further clause (in some versions) about bringing backa report to Muhammad is clearly a later addition intended to give the wordtarassadu the meaning ‘keep a watch’ instead of ‘lay an ambush.’ In this wayall responsibility for blood shedding would be removed from Muhammad.There can be no doubt, however, that Muhammad sent out the raiders on anerrand which he realized might involve deaths among both his own men andthe enemy.”

25. Ibid., 6.26. Ibn Ishaq, 287.

6. THE BATTLE OF BADR

1. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 120, citing the later sourceIbn Sa’d, II/i: 4.

2. Ibid., citing Ibn Sa’d, II/i: 6.3. Glubb, Life and Times, 179. Ibn Ishaq is silent on this matter.4. Ibn Ishaq, 293.5. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 45, citing al-Tabari, 1:1299.6. Ibn Ishaq, 289.7. Ibid., 293.8. Ibid., 294.9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 295.11. Ibid.12. Ibid.


13. Ibid.14. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 27, citing Ibn Hisham, 439.15. Ibn Ishaq, 297. The man who warned Muhammad was named al-

Mundhir, whose name means “the warner.” 16. Ibid.17. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 33.18. Ibn Ishaq, 295–96.19. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 27, citing Ibn Hisham, 439.20. Ibid., 37, citing al-Waqidi.21. Ibn Ishaq, 299.22. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 36, citing Ibn Hisham, 443.23. Gabriel, Empires at War, 1:296.24. Ibn Ishaq, 299.25. Ibid., 300.26. For more on the Egyptian sources of the Christian doctrines of resurrec-

tion and eternal life, see Gabriel, Gods of Our Fathers, and Jesus the Egyptian.27. Ibn Ishaq, 300.28. Ibid., 355.29. Ibid., 303.30. Ibid.31. Ibid., 304.32. Ibid., 305.33. Ibid., 308.34. Quran, 4.3; see also Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 274.35. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 274.36. Ibid., 275–76.37. Glubb, Life and Times, 196.38. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 195.39. Ibn Ishaq, 363.40. Ibid.41. Ibid.42. Ibid., 367.

7. BATTLE OF UHUD

1. Ibn Ishaq, 364.2. Ibid. The poem is taken from al-Waqidi’s account.3. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 43.4. Ibn Ishaq, 370.5. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 47–48.6. Ibn Ishaq, 372.7. Ibid.8. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 50.9. Ibn Ishaq, 372.

10. Glubb, Life and Times, 205, quoting al-Waqidi.11. Ibn Ishaq, 372.12. Ibid.


13. Ibid.14. Ibid., 371.15. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 52, citing Ibn Hisham, 560.16. Ibn Ishaq, 373.17. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 52.18. Ibn Ishaq, 373.19. Ibid.20. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 52, quoting Isti’ab.21. Ibn Ishaq, 374.22. Ibid., 375.23. Ibn Ishaq, 374. The Meccan women sang, “If you advance we hug

you / Spread soft rugs beneath you / If you retreat we leave you / Leave and nomore love you.”

24. Ibn Ishaq, 375. Circumcision among Arabs predates Muhammad byseveral centuries, perhaps even by a millennium. The custom seems to havebegun in Egypt, probably as a ritual in which Egyptian military conscripts werecircumcised as part of an oath of loyalty to serve the pharaoh, their warrior god.The story of Abraham in Genesis aside, the first historical mention of circum-cision among the Israelites occurred when Joshua circumcised all Israelitemales of military age prior to crossing the Jordan and invading Canaan. Thatceremony, too, was military in character in that like the Egyptian rite it was acovenant between the Israelite soldier and Yahweh Sabaoth, the Israelite godof war. Long before the Christian era, Egyptian or Moabite caravanners mayhave brought the custom to Arabia, where it may have taken root as a ritualassociated with male military prowess. This pagan custom found its way intoMuslim practice even though Muhammad was not circumcised, circumcisionis not mentioned in the Quran, and it has no religious significance in Islam.For more on the subject see Lowin, “Muslims and Circumcision,” 18–21.

25. Ibn Ishaq, 375.26. Ibid.27. Ibid., 379.28. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 55–56.29. Ibid.30. The same thing happened to Ramses II at the Battle of Kadesh. His

troops abandoned the attack to loot the Hittite camp with the result that hewas almost killed and his army nearly destroyed.

31. Ibn Ishaq, 379.32. Ibid.33. Ibid., 380.34. Ibid.35. Ibid.36. Ibid., 381.37. Ibid.38. Ibid., 382.39. Rodinson, Muhammad, 183. 40. Ibn Ishaq, 383.41. Ibid., 386.


42. Ibid., 385. In the Iliad Hecuba offers to eat Achilles’ liver.43. Glubb, Life and Times, 211. Hubal was the main idol of Mecca.

Sufyan’s boast was that the idol’s power in battle was greater than that ofMuhammad’s god.

44. Ibn Ishaq, 386.45. Ibid.46. Ibid.47. Ibid., 387.48. Ibid.49. Ibid.50. Ibid.51. Ibid., 390.52. Ibid.53. Ibid.54. Ibid., 426.55. Rodinson, Muhammad, 189.56. Ibid.57. Glubb, Life and Times, 220.58. Ibid., 221.59. Ibn Ishaq, 434.60. Glubb, Life and Times, 222, citing al-Tabari.61. Ibn Ishaq, 437.62. Ibid.63. Ibn Ishaq, 437. This is the view taken by Guillaume.64. Rodinson, Muhammad, 192.65. Ibn Ishaq, 437.66. Ibid., 447.67. Rodinson, Muhammad, 195.68. Ibn Ishaq, 447. The reference is to sawiq made of crushed parched barley

or wheat mixed with water or liquid butter that is drunk as a sort of thin por-ridge. Sawiq was a common military ration.

69. Rodinson, Muhammad, 249.70. Ibn Ishaq, 445. It was here that Muhammad introduced the Prayer of

Fear for soldiers; one-half of the force prayed while the other half stood facingthe enemy weapons in hand and ready to do battle.

71. Rodinson, Muhammad, 196.72. Ibid., 197. Muhammad’s men wanted to rape the women before selling

them, but Muhammad objected. Then the soldiers asked if it would be permittedfor them to perform azl, or coitus interruptus, with the women, which in theArab view was not technically rape. Muhammad gave his permission saying,“You are not under any obligation to forbear from that.”

8. THE BATTLE OF THE DITCH

1. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 80, citing Ibn Hisham.2. Ibid.3. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 64, citing al-Sha’miy.4. Ibid., 84.


5. Rodinson, Muhammad, 183; see also Glubb, Life and Times, 241.6. Ibn Ishaq, 452.7. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 68.8. Ibid., 66.9. Ibid., citing al-Tabari, 1:1465.

10. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 68; Ibn Ishaq is silent on thelength of the ditch.

11. Ibid., quoting al-Waqidi.12. I am grateful to Alison Gagliardi, an accomplished equestrian, for the

information regarding the jumping capabilities of a horse.13. Rodinson, Muhammad, 209.14. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 71, citing al-Waqidi.15. Ibid., 72, quoting al-Sha’miy. 16. For the military capabilities of the major armies of antiquity from

4000 b.c.e. to 1453 c.e., see Gabriel, Empires at War.17. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 73, citing al-Waqidi.18. Ibid.19. Rodinson, Muhammad, 210.20. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 74, citing al-Sha’miy. The

story is almost certainly a fabrication. The Kheibar caravan would have beencoming from the north to the rear of the Meccan positions. Muhammad’stroops were ensconced behind the ditch enclosed by the horns of the lava plain.It is inconceivable that a force large enough to capture the Kheibar caravancould have somehow slipped out of Medina, passed through the Meccan posi-tions undetected, ambushed the caravan, and then returned to the Muslimpositions with the booty.

21. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 76, citing Ibn Hisham andal-Tabari.

22. Ibid. Nothing of this story appears in Ibn Ishaq’s text.23. Rodinson, Muhammad, 210.24. Ibn Ishaq, 458.25. Ibid., 459.26. Ibid.27. Ibid.28. Ibid.29. Ibid., 460.30. Ibid.31. Glubb, Life and Times, 249.32. Ibid.33. Ibn Ishaq, 461.34. Rodinson, Muhammad, 211.35. Ibid.36. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 66.37. Ibn Ishaq, 462.38. Ibid.39. Ibid.40. Ibn Ishaq, 462; Glubb, Life and Times, 250; Rodinson, Muhammad,

212; the latter two sources cite later Arabic accounts.


41. Ibn Ishaq, 463.42. Ibid. See also Rodinson, Muhammad, 214, quoting Ibn Hisham, 679,

for Sa’d’s prayer. 43. Ibn Ishaq, 464.44. Ibid.45. Ibid.46. Ibid., 466.47. Ibid., 482.48. Rodinson, Muhammad, 249. See also Ibn Ishaq’s account (515) of

Muhammad’s order to torture a chief at Kheibar who would not reveal thelocation of the town treasury. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 114(citing al-Maqrizi, 1:320), provides an account of the same incident confirmingthe use of torture.

49. Glubb, Life and Times, 248.50. Ibid.51. Ibid.52. Ibid., 249.53. Ibn Ishaq, 485.54. Ibid., 485–86.55. Ibid.56. Glubb, Life and Times, 262; Ibn Ishaq, 490.57. Ibn Ishaq, 492.58. Ibid., 493.59. Ibid., 500; Ibn Ishaq also cites reports from some men who claimed to

have been there that the number of soldiers was fourteen hundred.60. Ibid., 500.61. Ibid. Interestingly the Meccan cavalry screen was commanded by

Khalid al-Walid, who apparently had not yet converted to Islam. The strengthof the cavalry screen as comprising two hundred horses is Rodinson’s estimate,in Muhammad, 250.

62. Ibn Ishaq, 500.63. Rodinson, Muhammad, 250.64. Ibn Ishaq, 501.65. Ibid., 506–507, for details regarding the provisions of the truce.66. Ibid., 507.

9. THE BATTLES OF KHEIBAR (628) AND MU’TA (629)

1. Rodinson, Muhammad, 253; Ibn Ishaq, 522.2. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 109.3. Rodinson, Muhammad, 253.4. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 109, citing al-Maqrizi, Imta’,

1:320.5. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 111.6. Ibn Ishaq, 511.7. Rodinson, Muhammad, 253.8. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 111.


9. Ibn Ishaq, 511.10. Ibid.11. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 112 (citing al-Sha’miy, Sirah,

chapter on Kheibar), says that the Ghatafan had already reached Kheibar beforeMuhammad shifted his route of march toward their territory.

12. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 108, citing Yaqut’s Geogra-phy, 108.

13. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 113 (citing al-Ya’qubi, 11:56),says the population of Kheibar was twenty thousand; al-Maqrizi, 1:310, saysthe population was ten thousand.

14. Ibn Ishaq, 511.15. Ibid. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 114 (citing al-Maqrizi,

Imta’ 1), says it was the region of Natat.16. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 115, again citing al-Maqrizi.17. Ibid., al-Maqrizi, 311.18. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 112, citing al-Sha’miy, Sirah.19. Ibn Ishaq, 514.20. Ibid.21. Ibid., 511.22. Ibid., 512.23. “The Apostle prohibited four things that day: carnal intercourse with

pregnant women who were captured; eating the flesh of domestic donkeys; eatingany carnivorous animal; and selling booty before it had been duly allotted.” IbnIshaq, 512.

24. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 115, citing al-Maqrizi, Imta’,1:319–20.

25. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 116, citing al-Maqrizi; IbnIshaq (515) agrees.

26. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 113, citing al-Maqrizi, Imta’,1:325.

27. Ibn Ishaq, 522.28. Glubb, Life and Times, 286.29. Lings, Muhammad, 146. Lings says seventy camels were sacrificed. 30. Ibid., 281.31. Ibid., 280.32. Ibn Ishaq, 531.33. Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, 99.34. Glubb, Life and Times, 288.35. Rodinson, Muhammad, 256.36. Glubb, Life and Times, 289; Ibn Ishaq is silent on the whole matter

of a letter, and it is possible that the story is a later invention complete withforgeries.

37. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 147.38. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 66.39. Rodinson, Muhammad, 256.40. Glubb, Life and Times, 290; Ibn Ishaq, 532.41. Ibn Ishaq, 532.


42. Glubb, Life and Times, 290. Glubb was himself a professional soldierwho spent more than three decades serving with Arab units in the MiddleEast. His estimate deserves serious consideration as being correct.

43. Ibn Ishaq, 533.44. Ibid., 534.45. Ibid., 534–35.46. Ibid.47. Ibid., 535.48. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 55.49. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 39.

10. THE CONQUEST OF MECCA

1. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 22.2. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 61, citing both Ibn Hisham and al-

Waqidi as sources. Interestingly, Ibn Ishaq makes no mention at all of thisimportant incident.

3. Ibid.4. The suspicion arises, of course, that Muhammad may have supplied

some men to Abu Basir. It is unlikely that a sufficient number of would-beMuslims from Mecca would have been wandering around the countryside tojoin Abu Basir’s raiders without being mentioned in some other source.

5. Ibn Ishaq, 540.6. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 62, citing al-Waqidi.7. Rodinson, Muhammad, 258.8. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 24.9. Ibid., 25, citing al-Baladhuri, a much later source (ca. 892 c.e.).

10. The argument that Abu Sufyan was probably a double agent is mademost forcibly by Shoufani and Watt.

11. Ibn Ishaq, 544.12. Ibid., 545.13. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 66, citing al-Waqidi.14. Ibid., citing Ibn Hisham, 810, and al-Waqidi, 332. The latter also pro-

vides a partial list of tribes and the number of troops each committed toMuhammad’s army.

15. Ibn Ishaq tells us that the “Quraish were completely ignorant of thefact and did not even know what he [Muhammad] was doing.” Ibn Ishaq, 546.

16. Ibid., 546–47.17. Ibid., 547.18. Ibid.19. Ibid., 548.20. Ibid.21. Ibid.22. Glubb, Life and Times, 307.23. Ibn Ishaq, 548.24. Ibid.25. Ibid.


26. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 85, citing Ibn Hisham, 818.27. Ibn Ishaq agrees with the account in substance but offers fewer details.28. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 85.29. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 66.30. Ibn Ishaq, 550.31. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 66.32. Ibid., 67.33. Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, 260.34. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 68.35. Ibid., 68.36. Rodinson, Muhammad, 262. The importance of political considera-

tions over even personal vengeance can be gauged from the fact that the infa-mous Hind—wife of Abu Sufyan, who had paid a slave to kill Hamza at Uhudand then mutilated his body and chewed his liver—was not killed.

37. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 26.38. Rodinson, Muhammad, 261.

11. THE BATTLE OF HUNAYN

1. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 70.2. Ibn Ishaq, 561.3. Ibid.4. Ibn Ishaq, 565–66.5. Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, 71.6. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 26, suggests that the initia-

tive for the battle came from Muhammad, who was strongly pressured by theMeccans to do battle. The manner in which the military events unfolded sug-gests that it was the Hawazin who initiated the war.

7. Ibn Ishaq, 567.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.

10. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 91–99, identifies these latersources as al-Maqrizi, Ibn Hisham, Ibn Hajar, al-Baladhuri, and Ibn Sa’d.

11. Hamidullah is the only Muslim historian of whom I am aware whoactually walked the ground in an attempt to locate the battlefield at WadiHunayn.

12. Ibn Ishaq, 567–68.13. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 72, citing al-Waqidi, 368.14. Ibn Ishaq, 566.15. This estimate was calculated by using the method outlined in Yadin,

Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1:19, according to which the number of males ofmilitary age in a tribal society of the Middle East during antiquity was approx-imately 20 percent of the total population of the tribe. For an example of theuse of Yadin’s method, see Gabriel, Military History of Ancient Israel, 114.Yadin’s method of calculation supports Glubb’s contention that the size of theHawazin army at Wadi Hunayn was between four thousand and five thousandmen. See Glubb, Life and Times, 321.


16. Ibn Ishaq, 567.17. Ibid.18. Ibid., 569.19. Ibid., 570.20. Ibid., 566.21. Ibid., 569.22. Ibid.23. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 72, citing Ibn Hisham, 850.24. Ibn Ishaq, 569.25. Ibid., 570.26. Ibid.27. Glubb, Life and Times, 323; Ibn Ishaq, 572.28. Ibn Ishaq, 572.29. The reference to “black ants” may reflect the Arab tradition of wearing

black robes when dressed for war. Al-Walid’s tribesmen may have been wearingblack robes. In addition, the Beni Sulaym always resented the accounts of thebattle in which they were portrayed as having fled. To counter the charge, aSulaym poet authored a long poem emphasizing the bravery of his tribe. Oneof the verses strongly suggests that they were the men who saved Muhammadby taking part in the cavalry charge that broke the Hawazins’ morale. Thepoem is cited in Ibn Ishaq, 582, and reads in part, “Until we came on thepeople of Mecca with a squadron / Glittering with steel, led by a proud chief /Composed of Sulaym’s sturdiest men.”

30. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 72, citing al-Waqidi.31. Ibn Ishaq, 572.32. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 96, citing al-Aghani, 12:48–49.33. Ibid.34. Ibn Ishaq (572) says that the men of Ta’if lost seventy. Perhaps these

were the same men who died alongside Malik ibn Auf defending the war banner.35. Ibn Ishaq, 587.36. Ibid., 589.37. Ibid.38. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 99, citing al-Baladhuri,

Ansab, 1:367.39. Hamidullah, Battlefields of the Prophet, 99, citing Ibn Sa’d, II/i: 114.40. Ibid.41. Ibn Ishaq, 589.42. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 73; see also Hamidullah, Battlefields of

the Prophet, 99 (citing Ibn Sa’d, 11/i: 114), which says the siege lasted for fortydays.

43. Ibn Ishaq, 592.44. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 73.45.Ibid., 75, citing al-Waqidi, 385.46. Glubb, Life and Times, 324.47. Ibn Ishaq, 593.48. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 75.49. Ibn Ishaq, 596.


50. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 75.51. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 27.52. Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 87; see also Lewis, The Arabs in His-

tory, 51.

12. THE TABUK EXPEDITION AND THE DEATH OF MUHAMMAD

1. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 42, citing al-Waqidi, 822, andIbn Sa’d, II/i: 98. The figure of thirty thousand men is also cited by Rodinson,Muhammad, 275. It was certainly the largest army Muhammad had ever com-manded in the field.

2. Caetani, Annali dell’Islam 2. Caetani’s ten-volume work is regardedas one of the classic Western works on the history of Islam based in originalsources.

3. Ibn Ishaq, 602, tells us, “This was the sole exception.” 4. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 40, citing Abbas; Watt,

Muhammad at Medina, 180.5. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 40, citing Ibn Sa’d, II/i: 119.6. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 39, citing al-Waqidi, 990, and

Ibn Sa’d, II/i: 120.7. Ibn Ishaq, 603.8. Ibid.9. Ibid., 604.

10. Ibid.11. Ibid.12. Ibid., 596.13. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 40.14. Ibid., citing al-Aghani, 3:70–83.15. Glubb, Life and Times, 321. 16. The argument is presented in its entirety by Shoufani, Muslim Con-

quest of Arabia, 42.17. Caetani, Annali dell’Islam, 1:307–308.18. Rodinson, Muhammad, 274.19. Ibn Ishaq, 605.20. Ibid.21. Ibid. In a footnote, Guillaume explains the event as a case of disease

or infection known to the Arabs as khunaqiya that attacks men, horses, andsometimes birds in the throat.

22. Ibn Ishaq, 605. Heavy spontaneous cloudbursts are not rare occur-rences in Arabia even in October.

23. Ibid., 608. Other later sources cited by Rodinson, Muhammad, 275,say Muhammad stayed in Tabuk for twenty days.

24. Ibn Ruba was not a “governor” in the sense of a Byzantine official. Hewas a local prince or tribal chief. It should not be thought, therefore, thatMuhammad was negotiating with officials of the Byzantine Empire.

25. Rodinson, Muhammad, 275. There is some unresolved difficulty herein that Glubb says the three villages were not Jewish but Christian.


26. The success of the Meccans in reaching high positions under Muham-mad and the later caliphate is exemplified by the position of Abu Sufyan,Muhammad’s onetime archenemy, was now one of Muhammad’s trustedadvisers. Abu Sufyan placed his family into prominent positions. It was thisfamily that later became the famous Umayyad dynasty. Abu Sufyan’s son,Yazid, was appointed governor of Tayma, and his other son, Mu’awiya, becamethe Prophet’s secretary. Later, Abu Bakr replaced many Muslim commanderswith Meccan officers.

27. Rodinson, Muhammad, 277, citing al-Waqid, 3:1066.28. Ibid.29. Ibn Ishaq, 609.30. Rodinson, Muhammad, 277. It seems clear from these incidents that

Muhammad’s intelligence service in Medina was working well during hisabsence.

31. Ibid., citing al-Waqidi, 3:1066.32. Quran, sura 9:85.33. Ibid., 9:104.34. Ibid., 9:1–6.35. Ibn Ishaq, 619.36. Quran, sura 9:28.37. Ibn Ishaq, 648–49; Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 46.38. Ibn Ishaq, 652, says Muhammad began planning the expedition after

his return from the pilgrimage; Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, says hebegan planning after his return from Tabuk.

39. Ibn Ishaq, 651–52.40. Rodinson, Muhammad, 286.41. Ibid.42. Ibn Ishaq, 679.43. Ibid.44. Ibid.45. Ibid., 680. See Weller, “Protozoan Infections: Malaria,” 2:5.46. Rodinson, Muhammad, 288.47. Ibn Ishaq, 689.48. Ibid.

13. MUHAMMAD’S MILITARY LEGACY

1. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 40.2. In the same way that Paul of Tarsus influenced the development of

Christian doctrine and helped bring about the spread and institutionalizationof Christianity, so it appears that Abu Bakr influenced the doctrines of Islamon critical theological points. It was also Abu Bakr, not Muhammad, who wasultimately responsible for the spread of Islam and its institutionalization as aformal religion.

3. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 71–73. For Western perspec-tives on the Riddah that challenge the religious perspective, see Wellhausen,Skizzen und Vorarbeiten, 6:7–8; Becker, “Expansion of the Saracens,” in TheCambridge Medieval History, 2:335–36; Caetani, Studi di Storia Orientale,


3:349–52; and Lewis, The Arabs in History, 51–52. My own view is that Wattis correct in Muhammad at Medina, 147–48, where he argues that the Riddahproceeded from a combination of religious, political, and economic motives.

4. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 62, citing Ibn Abi al-Hadid,6:23.

5. Ibid. Al-Hadid provides a list of these commanders.6. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 111, citing al-Waqidi and

Caetani, Annali dell’Islam, 2:587–88.7. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 109, citing Ibn Sa’d, II/i, 136.8. My account of Abu Bakr’s campaigns closely follows that of al-Tabari,

vol. 1. Shoufani, who is the leading Arabic expert on the Riddah available inEnglish, states that al-Tabari’s account is the most complete and trustworthy.

9. Al-Tabari’s list of Abu Bakr’s field commanders during the Riddah canbe found in Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 116.

10. Hitti, 141.11. Ibid.12. Shoufani, Muslim Conquest of Arabia, 118.13. An example of the flexibility of Muslim armies under Abu Bakr is evi-

dent in the movements of Khalid al-Walid’s army. Al-Walid marched from Dhual-Qassah to al-Buzakhah, where he fought a major battle against a coalition ofthe tribes of Najd. After defeating the coalition, al-Walid pressed out in severaldirections until one of his columns engaged the enemy at Al-Butah against theYarbu. Winning here, he was ordered to swing far to the southeast to rescueIkrimah ibn Abu Jahl, who had been twice routed by the tribes of the BaniHanifah. Al-Walid fought the largest battle of the Riddah at Aqraba dealing theBani Hanifah a devastating defeat. He then turned northeast, crossed theremaining desert, and began raiding along the Persian border. Poised to crossthe Euphrates, al-Walid was ordered by Abu Bakr to turn west, march acrossthe Syrian Desert, and join the Muslim armies preparing to attack Palestineand Syria.

14. Gabriel, “Wars of Arab Conquest” in Empires at War, 2:639.15. Ibid., 2:642–43.16. It was the puritan caliph Umar who, fearing that the Arabs would

loose their fighting spirit and fall into sin if they mixed with the infidels,decided to segregate the Arabs by establishing military cantonments for themto live in. Glubb, Short History, 55.

17. Crone, “ Early Islamic World,” 311.18. Nicolle and McBride, Armies of Islam, 11.19. The size of the Arab armies and their accompanying families is a

matter of some debate. Glubb, Short History, 19, says that they numberedfive hundred thousand, while Crone, “Early Islamic World,” 314, says onehundred thousand. Using Yadin’s method of calculation, this would mean thatthe Arab armies per se comprised between 25,000 and 125,000 soldiers, not ahuge number in either case.

20. Nicolle and McBride, Armies of Islam, 12.21. Crone, “Early Islamic World,” 316.22. Nicolle and McBride, Armies of Islam, 12.23. Ibid., 13.


24. Gabriel, “Wars of Arab Conquest,” 647.25. Crone, “Early Islamic World,” 318.26. Those interested in pursuing the development of Muslim armies after

the conquest period might consult Gabriel, “The Crusades,” 791–836, and“Byzantines and Ottomans,” 987–1030, both in Empires at War 3.

27. Firestone, Jihad, 37.28. Ibid., 39.29. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, bk. 1, pt. 2, 473.30. Watt, “Islamic Conceptions of Holy War,” in Murphy, Holy War,

141–56.31. Firestone, Jihad, 50.


Bibliography

The literature on Muhammad is vast. However, most of it either does notaddress Muhammad’s military exploits at all or does so only in passing and is oflittle use to the military historian. This bibliography lists only those works Ifound most important to understanding and researching Muhammad’s militarylife. It is not intended to address other areas of scholarly interest concerningMuhammad’s life. The purpose of any bibliography is to help other scholarscheck one’s work, criticize it, or build on it. I include in a separate section theoriginal Arabic sources so that Arabic scholars and historians can use them in asimilar manner as well. I have made occasional notes regarding those entriesthat I thought may be particularly valuable to the military researcher.

SOURCES IN ENGLISH

Arberry, A. J. The Seven Odes. London: Allen and Unwin, 1957. Valuable forthe military facts that may be extracted from a very close reading of thematerial.

Becker, Carl. H. “The Expansion of the Saracens.” In The Cambridge MedievalHistory, 2:332–38. New York, 1913. The classic Western view of the forcesthat shaped both the Riddah and the Arab conquests.

Beeston, A. F. L. Warfare in Ancient South Arabia. London: Luzac, 1976.Bousquet, G. H. “Observations sur lat nature et les causes de lat conquete

arabe.” Studia Islamica 6 (1956): 37–52.Breasted, James H. The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient

Egypt. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959.Brockelmann, Carl. History of the Islamic Peoples. Translated by J. Carmichael

and M. Perlmann. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1960.

241

Buhl, Franz. Das Leben Muhammeds. Translated by H. H. Schaeder. Leipzig,1930. A compact biography full of scholarly notes of great value.

Bulliet, Richard W. The Camel and the Wheel. New York: Columbia Univer-sity Press, 1990.

Caetani, Leone. Annali dell’Islam. 10 vols. Milan, 1905–26. Probably the mostcomprehensive treatment of the history of the Arabs in which all then-extant Arabic sources can be found, year by year, quoted, analyzed, andcompared. It has not been translated into English as far as I am aware.

———. Studi di Storia Orientale. 3 vols. Milan, 1911–14.Crone, Patricia. “The Early Islamic World.” In War and Society in the Ancient

and Medieval Worlds, edited by Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein.Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Doughty, C. M. Travels in Arabia Deserta. London, 1936.Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy. The Encyclopedia of Military History.

New York: Harper and Row, 1986.Edwards, Michael. Ibn Ishaq’s Life of Muhammad, Apostle of Allah. London:

Folio Society, 1964.Firestone, Reuven. Jihad: The Origins of Holy War in Islam. London: Oxford

University Press, 1999.Gabriel, Richard A. “Ancient India.” In Empires at War, 1:235–52. Westport,

Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005.———. “Byzantines and Ottomans.” In Empires at War, 3:987–1030. Westport,

Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005.———. “Charlemagne and the Empire of the Franks.” In Empires at War,

2:659–700. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005.———. “The Crusades.” In Empires at War, 3:791–836. Westport, Conn.:

Greenwood Press, 2005.———. Empires at War: A Chronological Encyclopedia. 3 vols. Westport,

Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005. A basic reference for the major battles,armies, equipment, weapons, tactics, and commanders for wars fought inantiquity from 4000 b.c.e. to the fall of Constantinople in 1453 c.e.

———. Gods of Our Fathers: The Memory of Egypt in Judaism and Christian-ity. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002.

———. “The Japanese Way of War.” In Empires at War, 3:837–72. Westport,Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005.

———. Jesus the Egyptian: The Origins of Christianity and the Psychology ofChrist. New York: iUniverse Press, 2006.

———. The Military History of Ancient Israel. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003.———. Soldiers’ Lives through History: The Ancient World. Westport, Conn.:

Greenwood Press, 2006.———. Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General. Westport,

Conn.: Praeger, 2004.———. “The Swiss and the Rediscovery of Infantry.” In Empires at War,

3:915–44. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005.———. “The Wars of Arab Conquest, 600–850 C.E.” In Empires at War,

2:639–58. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005.Gabriel, Richard A., and Donald W. Boose, Jr. The Great Battles of Antiquity:

A Strategic and Tactical Guide to the Great Battles That Shaped theDevelopment of War. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994.

242 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Giap, Vo Nguyen. People’s War, People’s Army: The Viet Cong InsurrectionManual for Underdeveloped Countries. New York: Bantam Books, 1968.

Glubb, Sir John. The Life and Times of Muhammad. New York: Cooper SquarePress, 2001. Glubb was a professional soldier who lived and served withArab units for many years. His experiences provide valuable insights inthis small volume.

———. A Short History of the Arab Peoples. New York: Stein and Day, 1969.Goldschmidt, Arthur, Jr. A Concise History of the Middle East. Boulder, Colo.:

Westview Press, 1988.Hamidullah, Muhammad. The Battlefields of the Prophet. Paris: Revue des

Etudes Islamiques, 1939. Reprint, New Delhi, 1973. Mostly useful for themaps and terrain descriptions of the battlefields.

Hitti, Philip K. History of the Arabs. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,2002. First published in 1937 and still one of the best historical sourcesavailable.

Hoyland, Robert G. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Comingof Islam. London: Routledge, 2001.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of theWorld Order. New York: Touchstone, 1996.

Ibn Ishaq. The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Life ofMuhammad. Translated by Alfred Guillaume. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1967. Perhaps the most important source and most easily accessiblefor understanding the detail and context of Muhammad’s military life.

Kirsch, Jonathan. Moses: A Life. New York: Ballantine Books, 1998.Lane, Edward. An Arabic-English Lexicon, bk 1. London: Williams and Norgate,

1865.Laoust, Henri. Les Schismes dans l’Islam. Paris, 1965.Lewis, Bernard. The Arabs in History. London: Grey Arrow, 1958.———, ed. Historians of the Middle East. London: Holt, 1962.Lings, Martin. Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources. Rochester,

Vt.: Inner Traditions International, 1983. An excellent narrative historybased strongly in original sources.

Lowin, Shari. “Muslims and Circumcision,” JTS Magazine 10, no. 1 (fall 2000):18–21.

Lyall, C. J. A Commentary on Ten Ancient Arabic Poems. Calcutta, 1894.Macdonald, M. C. A. “Hunting, Fighting, and Raiding: The Horse in Pre-Islamic

Arabia.” In Furusiyya: The Horse in the Art of the Near East, edited byDavid Alexander, 73–83. Riyadh: King Abdulaziz Public Library, 1996.

Murphy, Thomas Patrick, ed. The Holy War. Columbus: Ohio State UniversityPress, 1976.

Nicolle, David, and Angus McBride. The Armies of Islam, 7th–11th Centuries.London: Osprey, 1982. A good source for descriptions of Arab militaryequipment.

Parry, V. J., and M. E. Yapp. War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East.London: Oxford University Press, 1975. A useful collection of articles dealingwith Arab warfare at different periods with emphasis on technical detail.

Payne, James L. Why Nations Arm. Oxford: Blackwell Books, 1889. One of thefirst books published in the modern West that deals with Muhammad as asoldier.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 243

Rodinson, Maxime. Muhammad. New York: New Press, 2002. Contains anexcellent section on Muhammad’s military exploits.

Roth, Jonathan P. The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 264 BC–AD 235.Boston: Brill, 1999. Chapter 1, “Supply Needs and Rations,” is particularlyvaluable for information dealing with the soldier’s nutritional needs andthe military capabilities of animals in war.

Shoufani, Elias S. Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. Toronto:University of Toronto Press, Arab Institute for Research and Publishing,1973. The definitive work on the Riddah in English.

Watt, W. Montgomery. “Islamic Conceptions of Holy War.” In Thomas PatrickMurphy, ed., The Holy War, 141–56. Columbus: Ohio State UniversityPress, 1976.

———. Muhammad at Mecca. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.———. Muhammad at Medina. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.———. Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman. London: Oxford University Press,

1961.Weller, Peter F. “Protozoan Infections: Malaria.” In David C. Dale and Daniel

D. Federman, eds., Scientific American Medicine, 2:1–6. New York: Sci-entific American, 1999.

Wellhausen, Julius. Skizzen und Vorarbeiten, 6 vols. Berlin: 1884–89. LikeCaetani’s work, a classic in the field that deals with all the sources andthe conflicts between them.

Yadin, Yigael. The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in Light of ArchaeologicalDiscovery. 2 vols. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

ORIGINAL ARABIC SOURCES

Abu Yusuf, al-Kufi, Ya’qub ibn Ibrahim (731–98). Kitab al-Kharaj. Cairo, 1933.Baghdadi, ’Abd al-Qahir ibn Tahir al- (d. 1037). Al-Farq bayn al-firaq. Edited by

Muhammad ’Abd al-Hamid. Cairo, 1959.Baladhuri, Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn Jabir al- (d. 892). Ansar al-ashraf. Vol. 1.

Edited by Muhammad Hamidullah. Cairo, 1959.Ibn Hisham, ’Abd al-Malik (d. 834). Sirat al-nabi. Edited by Muhammad ’Abd

al-Hamid. 4 vols. Cairo, 1963.Ibn Sa’d, Muhammad (d. 845). Biographen Muhammeds (known as Al-Tabaqat

al-kubra). Edited by Edward Sachau. Leiden, 1904–40.Maqrizi, Ahmad ibn ’Ali al- (1364–1442). Kitab al-niza wa-al-takhasum fi ma

bayn bani Umayyah wa-bani Hashim. Cairo, 1937.Tabari, Muhammad ibn Jarir al- (838–923). Annales. 15 vols. Translated into

German and edited by M. J. de Goeje. Leiden, 1879–1901.Tufayl, Amir al-. The Poems of Diwan. Edited by Sir Charles Lyall. London:

E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, XXI, 1913.Tufayl ibn ’Auf. The Poems of Diwan. Edited and translated by F. Krenkow.

London: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, 1927.Waqidi, Muhammad ibn ’Umar al- (747–823). Kitab al-Maghazi. 3 vols. Edited

by Marsden Jones. Oxford, 1966.Ya’qubi, Ahmad ibn Abi Yaqub al- (d. 897). Tarikh al-Ya’qubi. 2 vols. Beirut,

1960.

244 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aba, 8Abbas, xxv, 110, 132, 171, 172, 173Abbasids, 211, 212, 216, 217Abdallah ibn Unays, 125, 126Abd-al-Rahman ibn Awf, 145, 146Abdul Muttqalib, 54, 57Abdullah, 54Abdullah al Hadhrami, 83, 85Abdullah bin Jubayr, 117Abdullah ibn Abu Harad, 181Abdullah ibn Jahash, 82Abdullah ibn Rawaha, 160, 162, 163Abdullah ibn Ubay, xxii, 105, 111, 113,

114, 117, 127, 128, 130, 193Abraham, 176Abu Afek, 104Abu Bakr, 120, 159, 164, 199, 204, 205,

207, 208, 210, 211Abu Bara, 126Abu Basir ‘Utaba ibn Usayd, 167, 168Abu Dujana, 120 Abu Jahal, 77, 101Abu Lubaba, 143, 144Abu Niyar, 118Abu Rafi, 129Abu Sufyan ibn Harb, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,

91, 93, 108, 110, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123,124, 126, 128, 132, 139, 140, 149, 169,170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 184, 189

Abu Talib, 55, 56, 60Abu Ubaydah, 164Abyssinia, 12, 30; army of, 13Abyssinian mercenaries, 110, 115, 133acacia trees, 35Acre, 24Adal, 125Afghanistan, 14, 219Africa, 5Ainain Hill, 115Aisha, 57, 203ajnad, 213Akhenaton, 64al-Ais, 77Al Aqanqal, 91al-Asad, 202al-Bahrayn, 30Al-Bara, 61al-Harith, 144Al Hijaz, 3al-Hijr, 196al-jihad, 30, 61al-Jirana, 188, 189al-Khatt, 30al-Maqrizi, 157al-Mihras, 121al-Muhajir bin Abi Umayyah, 208al-Muraisi, 147al-Mutasim, 211, 217

245

Index

al-Mut’im bin Adiy, 60al Nahr, 101al-Raji, 125, 127, 153, 154, 155al-Uzza, 179al-Waleed, 99Alexander the Great, xx, 40, 43Alexandria, 21Ali, 117, 120, 121, 123, 146, 159, 163,

193, 194, 200Alia, 11, 56, 99, 102, 104, 197Allah, 47, 59, 70, 74, 217Amalekites, 36, 53, 98Amr ibn al-A’as, 49, 147, 164, 208Amr ibn al Maimoona, 160Anatolia, 39ansar, xxii, 61, 70, 72, 75, 77, 79, 81, 87, 89,

93, 94, 96, 98, 122, 160, 162, 163, 173,189, 193, 194, 197, 198, 207, 210, 213

apostates, 207Aqraba, battle of, 208–209Aqaba, 60, 69, 70, 75, 89, 90, 197Arab armies, 8, 42, 43, 44, 204, 211, 212,

214, 216Arab battles, 32–33Arab bows, 30, 31Arab cavalry, 30, 31, 41Arab conquests, xx, 43, 44, 50, 189, 201,

206; armies of, 197–211, 218Arab infantry, 33, 44 Arab moral virtues, 31Arab society, 10Arab warfare, 23–52; moral basis of,

23–29; weapons and equipment, 29–32;tactics, 32–36; transport, 36–42;military revolution, 42–52; socialcomposition, 43–45; unified command,45–46; cohesion, 46–47; motivation,47–48; strategic war, 48–49; officercorps, 49; training and discipline,49–50; logistics and force projection,50–51, 210

Arab warrior virtues, 24Arabia, xx, xxiv, xxvii, 3–10; geography

of, 3–6; crops, 7–8; sociology of, 8–10,11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 25–30, 38, 39, 41, 53,54, 88, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206, 207,208, 210, 212–14

Arabian camel, 37Arabian Peninsula, 3, 212Arabian Shield, 3archers, 50Arfajah bin Harthamah, 208

armor, 51armies of the Arab conquests, 211–17armies of the Riddah, 207–211Army of Distress, 192asabiyah, 10Asad, 208ashab al-suffah, 194Asia Minor, 13, 15assassination, xxv, xxvi, 28, 75, 104, 125,

126, 129, 130, 131, 145, 198Assyrians, 39, 40Asthma bint Marwan, 104Attab ibn Asid, 189Augustus Caesar, 43Aws, 67, 68, 69, 70, 81, 96, 104, 105, 106,

130, 135, 141, 143, 144

ba’ir, 37 Bactrian camel, 37Badr, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101,

102, 103, 107, 108, 109, 110, 122Badr, battle of, xviii, xxiii, xxiv, 51, 64,

72, 86–107, 118, 125, 128Badr, Second Battle of, 128–29Baghdad, 14, 216, 217Bahra, 197Bali, 164Bani Hanifah, 208, 211Bani Mutaliq, 130Bar Kokhba Revolt, 7Battle of Karkar, 36bedouin, xxiv, xxv, 12, 14, 17, 18, 6–10,

25, 36, 37, 39, 44, 49, 54, 73, 76, 77, 79,80, 81, 88, 89, 103, 108, 109, 110, 124,129, 130, 131, 140, 142, 145, 146, 147,148, 152, 161, 163, 166, 168, 169, 171,173, 171, 178, 179, 186, 188, 189, 190,191, 192, 195, 205, 207, 210

Beisarius, 14Beni Amir, 126, 127Beni an-Nadir, 67, 68, 104; attack on,

127–28, 129, 139, 142, 153Beni Bakr, 168, 169Beni Dhamra, 80, 81Beni Ghassan, 17Beni Jadheema, 178Beni Kinana, 80, 178Beni Lihyan, 125, 146Beni Makhzoom, 101Beni Mutaliq, 147Beni Qurayzah, 68, 67, 104, 135, 136, 138,

140; massacre of, 141–45

246 INDEX

Beni Quynuqa, xxvii, 67, 104, 105, 106, 158Beni Saad, 55, 56, 146Beni Sulaym, 127, 133bin Laden, Osama, 219Bir Maoona, 126, 127black mass, 181, 182, 184black mercenaries, 30blood debt, 92, 99blood feud, 26, 27, 28, 51, 59, 61, 69, 70,

71, 85, 92, 126blood-wit, 10, 36, 69, 71, 127Bukhari, 72bushi, 23Byzantine Empire, xviii, xx, 11, 13, 15,

18, 19, 43, 160, 161, 189, 204, 211, 212Byzantines, 5, 14, 18, 19, 40, 135, 137,

160, 161, 163, 164, 191, 191, 195, 196,197, 202, 207, 208, 209, 213, 214, 216

Caesarea, 19camel, 36–39camel caravans, 5camel’s hair, 8Canaan, xxvii, 23catapults, 187cavalry, 50Central Asian horse archers, 216, 217chain mail, 31–32Cheronea, battle of, 98Chosroes II, 14Christ, 64Christianity, 24, 54Christians, xxviii, 17, 8, 47; monks, 56,

64, 216; sects, 21; warrior saints, xix,100, 114, 145, 162, 200, 201

civil wars, 215–16Clausewitz, Carl von, xix, 49coats of mail, 114, 115, 157community of believers, xxii, 27, 45, 61,

70, 219compound bow, 32Constantinople, 13, 14, 17conversion by the sword, 200Coptic Christians, 63Covenant, 70, 71, 75covered cars, 187Crusades, xx, 24, 40Ctesiphon, 14, 19Curtius, xxix

dabbabah, 48, 157Dahna Desert, 5

Damascus, 11, 14, 19, 55, 81, 87, 88, 110darah, 6date palm, 7, 37, 67, 69, 111, 128, 155day of the furqan, 103day of proof, 103Day of Bu’ath, 69Dead Sea, 160, 162desert asceticism, 57dhalul, 37Dhat al Riqa, 129Dhu al-Qassah, 207, 208Dhu Awan, 198Dhu Tuwa, 171Ditch, Battle of, 131–49diwan, 214, 215diya, 10Doubters, 198Dumat al-Jandal, 130, 132, 145, 197

Eastern Roman Empire, 13Edom, 162Egypt, xxii, 5, 2, 13, 15, 19, 147, 212Emesa, 192Emigrants, 39, 65, 72, 77, 79, 80, 82, 87,

96, 102, 122, 128, 207, 210Empire of Islam, xx, 43, 204, 211Empty Quarter, 5enclosed nomadism, 9Euphrates, 14, 19, 80executions, 177, 178

Fadak, 158, 165faras, 41Farewell Pilgrimage, 202faris, 41fat’h, 176Fatima, 99Fazarah, 151, 153female infanticide, 103First Pledge of Aqaba, 61fortified compounds, 29, 42, 68, 111, 109,

113, 133, 154,Freedom from Responsibility, 199

Garden of Death, 208Gaza, 12, 53, 67, 76Ghassanids, 17, 18, 160, 161, 192, 197Ghatafan, 109, 129, 130, 132, 139, 145,

151, 152, 153, 154, 161, 165, 202, 208ghazw, 9, 25gift from Allah, 37Gingibu the Arab, 36

INDEX 247

Glubb, Sir John, 126god-intoxicated man, 64, 74God’s Messenger, xxii, 45, 74, 83, 103,

106, 145Greater jihad, 218Greater Pilgrimage, 148Greece, 13, 43Guillaume, Alfred, xxviii, xxxGulf of Aqaba, 11

Hadiqat al-Mawt, 208Hadramawt, 208hadith, xxx, 64hagar, 6hajj, 148Hajun road, 175Halys River, 15Hamad, 5Hamra ul-Asad, 123Hamza, 55, 77, 79, 99, 104, 117, 118, 121,

123, 173haram, 54, 158harbah, 30harrah, 42Hashim clan, 54, 55Hassan ibn Thabit, 104Hatib bin Abu Balta, 170Hawazin, 38, 55, 165, 171, 178, 180, 181,

182, 184, 186, 188, 189; cavalry, 184–85hayy, 10Hegira, 66Hejaz, 3, 7, 6, 38, 73, 80, 88, 145, 161,

165, 166, 167, 180, 186, 189, 190, 193,195, 199

helmets, 51, 128, 173Helpers, xxii, 61Heraclius (575–641), 15, 162, 191, 191, 197Hijra, 66, 218Hijjat al-Wada, 202Hill of Arrows, 115, 119, 147Hill of Marwah, 159Hill of Safa, 159Hind, 118, 121, 173hindi, 31Hira, 12, 19, 80, 82, 179Hisma, 5holy war, xix, 217Homs, 192, 197honor oath, 45Hubab ibn al Mundhir, 96Hubal, 12, 54, 122Hudaibiya, 158, 159, 165

Hudhayfah bin Abi Umayyah, 208Hudhayl, 125, 175Hunayn, battle of, 178–86; 165, 180, 187,

189Huyai ibn Akhtab, 139, 142, 143Hypocrites, 72, 193, 194, 202

Ibn Abbas, 191Ibn Hisham, xxviii, 113, 175Ibn Ishaq, xxviii, xxiv, xxxi, 58, 60, 61, 62,

65, 66, 70, 77, 82, 83, 84, 90, 97, 100,105, 109, 110, 117, 119, 121, 132, 133,135, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147,148, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 162, 163,164, 168, 172, 173, 178, 179, 180, 182,184, 185, 187, 189, 191, 196, 203

ideological warfare, 28idol worship, 1, 17, 21, 54, 195Ikrimah ibn Abu Jahl, 111, 115, 177, 208India, 5, 21, 23, 29Indian swords, 31infantry, 50insurgency, xxi, xxiii; criteria for, xxvii,

59, 61, 66–74, 75–84, 67–88; 158, 180,194, 200, 205, 206, 219

intelligence service, xxv, xxviiqal, 8Iraq, 12, 19, 84, 86, 179, 189, 195, 219ird, 24Iranian mount, 213Islam, 17, 18, 19, 21, 28, 29, 43, 46, 49,

51, 54, 57, 59, 61, 64, 75, 77, 79, 84, 93,104, 122, 125, 128, 129, 130, 132, 142,145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 158, 159,160, 162, 167, 168, 173, 176, 177, 178,179, 186, 188, 189, 190, 194, 195, 196,197, 198, 201, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,213, 214, 215, 218

Island of the Arabs, 3Issus, 15

Jafar ibn Abi Talib, 160, 163jahada, 218jarida, 42jaysh al-usrah, 192Jazirat-al Arab, 19Jedjed, 110Jerba, 197Jerhum tribe, 53Jerusalem, 14, 19, 40, 57, 159Jesus, 57, 176Jewish War, 68

248 INDEX

Jewish tribes, xxvii, 7, 28, 29, 67, 68, 69,70, 72, 75, 81, 102, 103, 106, 111, 141,151, 152, 156

Jews, xxviii, 67, 68, 76, 104, 105, 113,114, 127, 128, 129, 132, 136, 138, 139,141, 142, 143, 144, 151, 152, 153, 154,155, 156, 157, 159, 186, 200, 201

Jidda, 175jihad, xix, 47, 195, 217, 218jihadis, xviii, xx, 218, 219jiwar, 172jizya, 201Jordan, 17, 160, 207Judaism, xxvii, 54Jurash, 187Justinian (527–565), 14Juwairiya, 147

Kaaba, 55, 59, 60, 65, 93, 148, 151, 159,160, 169, 172, 175, 176

Kaab ibn al Ashraf, 107ka’ba, 12, 54Ka’b ibn Malik, 117, 120, 121Kada road, 175 Kalb, 145Katibah, 42, 152, 157Kavadh II, 15Kazrai, 61, 67, 69, 75, 81, 96, 104, 105,

106, 111, 114, 130, 143Kerak, 162Khadijah, 56, 57, 60, 63Khalid al-Walid, xxii, 49, 111, 115, 119,

133, 147, 160, 164, 175, 178, 179, 184,197, 207, 208, 210

Khalid bin Sa’id, 208khamis, 34kharaj, 201khashab, 187khatti, 30khayl, 42Kheibar, xxiii, 109, 129, 128; battle of,

152–60, 132, 138, 139, 142, 145, 151,161, 165, 186, 189

Khurasiani, 216Khuza’a, 53, 124, 149, 150, 168, 169, 170,

171King David of Israel, 32King Faisal, 8kufiyah, 8kufr, 206Kurdistan, 14kurdus, 42

Lakhmids, 17, 18, 19, 197lava fields, 6, 38, 42, 74, 111, 133, 135, 154leather shields, 31Lesser jihad, 218Lesser Pilgrimage, 148, 158, 159, 161,

169, 172Lat, 189Lit, 175Livy, xxix

Ma’ab, 162Ma’an, 162Ma’bad bin Abu Ma’bad al-Khuza’a, 124maghazi, xxviii Mahrah, 208Mahya’a, 59mail armor, 128Makkah, 54malaria, 7, 67, 151Ma=lat, 175Malik ibn Auf, 179, 181, 182, 184, 185, 189Mamluke Institution, 211, 217 Manat, 176manjaniq, 48, 157Maqna, 197Marib, 53Marib dam, 5, 7, 68Mariya, 63Marr al-Zahran, 171martyr, 47martyrdom, xixMashrafiya swords, 31, 161Masfalah, 175massacre, 28, 48; of Beni Qurayzah, 141–45Maymuna, 159Mecca, xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, 5,

11, 12, 13, 39, 46, 53–60, 64, 66, 67–79,82, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 110, 123, 125,126, 129, 131, 132, 135, 146, 147, 148,150, 151, 153, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161,165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173,176, 177, 178, 189, 190, 194, 199, 200,201, 202, 205, 218

Meccan cavalry, 86, 99, 115, 121, 149, 164Meccan caravans, 72, 73, 74, 77, 80, 81,

86, 88, 110, 122, 146, 167, 168Medina, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxvii, 7, 11, 21,

28, 29, 35, 50, 58, 87, 88, 93, 98, 99,101, 102, 103, 104, 108, 114, 117, 122,123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134,135, 137, 138, 139, 142, 144, 145, 146,150, 152, 153, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162,

INDEX 249

163, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 176,189, 191, 192, 193, 196, 197, 198, 199,202, 203, 205, 207, 208

Medinta, 68Mediterranean Sea, 13, 21Medna, 110Mesopotamia, 7, 39Messenger of God, xix, 61, 70, 71, 84, 143,

172, 176metal helmet, 31metalworking, 20Midianite kit, 8military monasteries, 213missionaries, xxviMoab, 162Monophysite Christians, 17, 18, 161, 192moral basis of Arab warfare, 51Morocco, 21Moses, xix, xxii, 57, 64, 83, 98, 103Mount Asfal, 93Mount Hira, 57Mount Sal, 137Mount Uhud, 111, 113, 114, 119, 121,

122, 123mounted infantry, 39Mudlij, 81muhajirun, 64, 65, 72, 173Muhammad, birth of, 13; early life,

54–56; revelations, 57–59; medicalaspects of, 57–58; early ministry,58–60; founder of Islam, xviii; psycho-logy of, 63–65; physical description, 62;insurgency commander, xx, xxi, xxxi,15, 16, 41, 67–85; military reformer,xx, 42–52; marriage law reform, xviii;death of, 202–204

Muhannad swords, 31mukuraba, 54munafiqun, 194murder, 145muruah, 24Mus’ab ibn Umayr, 120Musaylimah, 202, 208Mushallal, 176Muta, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 196, 197,

202Mu’ta, battle of, 160–65

Nabataeans, 7, 12, 39nadih, 37Nafud Desert, 5

Na’im, 155Najd, 131, 207Nakhla, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 176, 179Nasr, 186Nehawand, 21Nestorians, 14, 17, 15nifaq, 194Nineveh, 15Nofal clan, 60nomads, 9North African Barb, 213North African littoral, 13northern strategy, 195Nuaim ibn Masood, 139, 140

Old Testament, 23, 36, 53Oman, 208omra, 148–50, 189oral tradition, xxixOrthodox faith, 15Othman ibn Talha, 160Ottomans, 13Oxus River, 14, 21

Palestine, 5, 36palm groves, 115, 119pastoral nomads, xxiiPersia, xix, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 135, 160Persian Empire, xviii, xx, 11, 13, 18, 29,

43, 189, 204, 211, 212Persian Gulf, 5, 1 2Persians, 19, 40, 135, 137, 157, 191, 207,

213, 216Philip of Macedon, xx, 43, 98Phocas, 15Pledge of Women, 61poets, xxvi, 65political murder, 126, 129–30polytheists, 114, 200Porridge Raid, 109Porridge Army, 129pre-Islamic armies, 34; tactics, 32–33;

warfare, 25–27, 217psychological warfare, 48psychology of war, 51

Qadasiya, 19Qarda, 110Qarnaw, 6qasr, 68Qaynuqa, 103qiblah, 159

250 INDEX

Medina, continued

Quada’ah, 164Quba, 109, 111Quraish, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 65, 73, 74,

82, 85, 86, 91, 92, 98, 99, 110, 123, 125,140, 141, 146, 150, 151, 158, 168, 169,170, 172, 175, 176, 177, 179, 194; of theHollow, 53

Quran, xx, xxvii, xxviii, 32, 54, 57, 61, 83,102, 106, 193, 199, 208

Quran reciters, 208Quranic law, xxxiQusai, 53, 54Qutba bin Qatada, 163

Rabi’ah, 208rabita, 42Rayhana, 144Ramadan, 57, 88Red Sea, 3, 54, 67, 77, 81, 86, 93, 103, 130,

197Rejeb, 82, 83Rephidim, battle of, 36, 98ribat, 213Riddah, 46, 147, 206, 207; military cam-

paigns, 207–211; 208, 211rikab, 37Roman Empire, 43Rome, xixRub’ al-Khali, 5rumh, 30

Sa’ad ibn Abi Waqqas, 79sa’alik, 194Sa’d ibn Mu’adh, 143, 144sadaqah, 199saddle, 33Sahara, 42Saladin, 24Sallam ibn Abu-l’huqayq, 145Salman al-Farsi, 135sariya, 42Sarus River, 15Sassanids, 14, 19, 40Saudi Arabia, 8Second Pledge of Aqaba, 65, 69Second Badr, xxiiisecret police, 176shahada, xixShaiba, 92, 99shi’b, 42Shima, 188shields, 31

Shuranbil bin Hasanah ad al-Ala bin al-Hadrami, 208

siege machinery, 69, 113, 157smallpox, 13Sofian ibn Khalid, 125, 126spice trade, 12, 195spice road, 5stirrup, 8, 33, 38, 185, 216strategic direction, 98suffah, xxv, xxvi, 75, 198Sulaym tribesmen, 184, 186Sun Tzu, xixsunna, xxxsurat al-Bara’ah (Freedom from Respon-

sibility), 199surat al-Tawbah (The Repentence), 199,

200Sword of Allah, 49, 147swords, 128Syria, xxii, 13, 17, 29, 31, 36, 39, 55, 80,

86, 89, 93, 107, 110, 128, 135, 145,146, 147, 160, 162, 167, 170, 191, 202,212

Syrian Desert, 3, 5, 193, 194

Ta’if, 60, 80, 82, 125, 131, 171, 179, 180,185, 186, 187, 188, 189; siege of, 186–89,191, 205

Tabuk, xxiii, 50; expedition to, 191–99tahannuth, 57Talhah, 202tali’a, 42Tamin, 208tamr, 7Taurus Mountains, 19Tayii, 208Tayma, 158terror, xxv, xxvi, 48, 75, 158testudo, 187Thaniyatu’l Wada, 193thawb, 8 Theodore the Vica, 162Theophanes, 160Tigris, 14, 21Timna, 6torture, 145trade fair, 54, 60, 93, 128Transjordan, 197Truce of Hudaibiya, 149–51, 152, 158,

165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172True Cross, 14Tunisia, 21

INDEX 251

Turks, 40; turkic troops, 217Two Springs, 111

Ubaida ibn al Harith, 99Ubaya bin Malik, 163Ubna, 207Udhruh, 197Uhud, 115, 117, 127, 126, 130, 131, 147,

160, 164, 169, 173Uhud, battle of, 108–124; 123, 125, 132Umar bin al-Khattab, 6, 41, 59, 64, 122,

164, 172Umara, 120Umayyads, 21, 41, 189, 212, 214; heavy

cavalry, 214, 216Umm Habibah, 170ummah, xxii–xxv, 21, 27, 43, 44, 45, 46,

49, 61, 70, 71, 75, 97, 100, 204unified command, 45, 98, 100, 157Uqba ibn Muait, 102Usamah, ibn Zayd ibn Harithah, 202, 203,

207Usayr ibn Razim, 129Usfan, 146Utab, 92Utaba ibn Rabia, 85, 92, 99, 118utum, 68Uzza, 176, 189

Wadi al-Qura, 158Wadi Fatimah, 175Wadi Hunayn, 180, 181, 182, 184, 186,

188, 190, 193, 194

Wahshi, 118, 121walled gardens, 5, 42, 67, 69, 74, 109, 111,

113, 115, 133, 154, 155, 156Waraqah, 56war of attrition, 145War of the Apostates, 43, 147, 206war to the knife, 199–202wazir, 175wet nurse, 54, 55white mule, 181, 184, 185

Yadin, Yigael, 6Yamamah, 131, 202Yanbu, 77, 81Yarmuk River, 19Yathrib, 35, 60, 61, 68, 90yay, 10Year of the Deputations, 201, 202Year of the ElephantYemen, 3, 5, 6, 12, 48, 53, 157, 166, 187,

201, 202, 208Yohanna ibn Ruba, 197

Zaghabah, 111Zagros Mountains, 19zakat, 199, 205, 206Zayd ibn Harithah, 56, 110, 160, 163, 196,

202Zayed, 120Ziyad bin Labid, 208Zubair Ibn al-Auwam, 175

252 INDEX

Also byRichard A. Gabriel

The Ethnic Factor in the Urban Polity (New York, 1973)(ed. with Sylvan H. Cohen) The Environment: Critical Factors in

Strategy Development (New York, 1973) Program Evaluation: A Social Science Approach (New York, 1975)Managers and Gladiators: Directions of Change in the Army (Concord,

N.H., 1978)(with Paul L. Savage) Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the

Army (New York, 1978)Ethnic Groups in America (New York, 1978)The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier

(Westport, Conn., 1980)The New Red Legions: A Survey Data Sourcebook (Westport, Conn.,

1980)To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the

Soldier (Westport, Conn., 1982)NATO and the Warsaw Pact: A Combat Assessment (Westport, Conn.,

1983)Antagonists in the Middle East: A Combat Assessment (Westport,

Conn., 1983)Nonaligned, Third World, and Other Ground Armies: A Combat

Assessment (Westport, Conn., 1983)

253

The Antagonists: A Comparative Combat Assessment of the Sovietand American Soldier (Westport, Conn., 1984)

The Mind of the Soviet Fighting Man: A Quantitative Survey of SovietSoldiers, Sailors, and Airmen (Westport, Conn., 1984)

Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (NewYork, 1984)

Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn’t Win(New York, 1985)

(ed.) Military Psychiatry: A Comparative Perspective (New York, 1986)Soviet Military Psychiatry: The Theory and Practice of Coping with

Battle Stress (New York, 1986)No More Heroes: Madness and Psychiatry in War (New York, 1987)The Last Centurion (Paris, 1987)The Painful Field: Psychiatric Dimension of Modern War (New York,

1988)The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development (New York,

1990)(with Karen S. Metz) From Sumer to Rome: The Military Capabilities

of Ancient Armies (New York, 1991)(with Karen S. Metz) History of Military Medicine: Ancient Times to

the Middle Ages (1992)(with Karen S. Metz) History of Military Medicine: From the Renais-

sance through Modern Times (1992)(with Karen S. Metz) A Short History of War: The Evolution of Warfare

and Weapons (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1992)(with Donald W. Boose, Jr.) The Great Battles of Antiquity: A Strategic

and Tactical Guide to the Great Battles That Shaped the Develop-ment of War (Westport, Conn., 1994)

Great Captains of Antiquity (Westport, Conn., 2001)Warrior Pharaoh: A Chronicle of the Life and Deeds of Thutmose III,

Great Lion of Egypt, Told in His Own Words to Thaneni the Scribe(Lincoln, Neb., 2001)

The Great Armies of Antiquity (Westport, Conn., 2002)Gods of Our Fathers: The Memory of Egypt in Judaism and Christianity

(Westport, Conn., 2002)Sebastian’s Cross (Lincoln, Neb., 2002)Lion of the Sun: A Chronicle of the Wars, Battles and Great Deeds of

Pharaoh Thutmose III, Great Lion of Egypt (Lincoln, Neb., 2003)The Military History of Ancient Israel (Westport, Conn., 2003)

254 ALSO BY RICHARD A. GABRIEL

Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General (Westport,Conn., 2004)

Jesus the Egyptian: The Origins of Christianity and the Psychology ofChrist (Lincoln, Neb., 2005)

Empires at War: A Chronological Encyclopedia, 3 vols. (Westport,Conn., 2005)

Soldiers’ Lives through History: The Ancient World (Westport, Conn.,2006)

ALSO BY RICHARD A. GABRIEL 255

Documents

media.8kun.top · M u h a M M a d I s l a M ’ s F I r s t G r e at G e n e r a l r I c h a r d a . G a b r I e l M u h a M M a d I s l a M ’ s F I r s t G r e at G e n e r a l