made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in

Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in

Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as

members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as

such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter

was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious

that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,

either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding

made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

6. OSMENA VS PENDATUN

109 Phil. 863 Political Law The Legislative Department Parliamentary Immunity

In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently,

House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by

Osmea during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may

be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.

Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmea avers

that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in

Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court

has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?

HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon

members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a

democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being

made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of

Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever

his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore,

Osmeas petition is dismissed.

-----------

FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with

preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of the

Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment

of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member

of the Special Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the

petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech entitled A Message to Garcia wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the Presidents administration selling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15

months for the serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.

2. Whether or not petitioners words constitute disorderly conduct. 3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the speech

and words of Osmena.

4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD: 1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body

itself as stated in the provision that xxx shall not be questioned in any other place.

2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the

judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House

knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power.

3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the

suspension of the House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done by

unanimous consent.

4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committed

to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

7. Adaza v. Pacana

135 SCRA 431

FACTS:

Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective term of

office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and

respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as the governor.

Petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom, claiming to be the lawful

occupant of the position.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP) can exercise

the functions of both simultaneously; and 2) whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of

MP but lost, can continue serving as vice governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor

if said office is vacated.

HELD:

Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may not

hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject to

regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions on his

holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP

Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or members of sangguniang or barangay officials, upon filing

a certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent

reassumed the position of vice-governor after the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the

instant petition is denied.

8. PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN

FACTS:

On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a

private corporation, was held six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called

the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat

Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.On 25 May 1979, the Acero

Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds

the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as

counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that

no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an

administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his

appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had

purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized

only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC

Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was

granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect

appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the

Constitutional provision.

RULING:

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman

Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the

protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez.

He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on

30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed, and

one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved

to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was

objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,

instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an

administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention"

was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an

Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal

participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the

Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act

which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the

prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting

Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside

9. AVELINO VS CUENCO

Facts:

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to

formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next

session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session

for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other

Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory

and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al

were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others,

as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad

however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just

banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers.

Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the

deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-

tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order

not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Taada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech.

Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President.

This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the

following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto

proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in

view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to

the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor

taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding

officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,

change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the

Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the

morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall,

prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their

unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten

or less. **Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor

was in the USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by

Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into

the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding

Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When

the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the

Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one,

at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and

Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco,

one against and one abstained.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION In March 1949, Avelino and his group (11 senators in all)

insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the

decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional

quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators;

one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it

change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or

13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no

quorum.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of

subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the

majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the

evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such

formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail,

because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the

Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the

petition is dismissed.

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the

number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and

this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by

reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes

which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process

which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to

constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere

oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three

(23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

10. ALEJANDRINO VS QUEZON

11. US vs Pons

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez

arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were

delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any

listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby

discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and

dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently

importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence

arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session.

He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the

special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the

case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381

was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go

beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to

inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have

said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which

the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent

department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the

Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on

February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these

journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

12. ARROYO VS DE VENECIA

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of

the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,

charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-

mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments.

A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House

and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the

interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a

roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.

Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the

motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the

Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President

of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill

was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the

House

Held:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,

modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.

Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the

legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying

the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject

to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the

legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to

question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of

seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court

should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was

effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a

quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously

present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

13. MABANAG VS LOPEZ VITO

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by

senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the

lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House

Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the

Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As

a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these

members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment

would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners

filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents

argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the

conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said

resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House

and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the

basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due

enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as

amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not

bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not

do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind

the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two,

the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been

noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if

discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that

duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. **Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides:

Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the

journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies

certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the

Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by

the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of

such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In

case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

14. CASCO VS JIMENEZ

FactS: Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in

bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the

importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said

glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior

thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529

of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation

of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused

to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in

not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609.

Issue: Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

Held: No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished

product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction and between the terms urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of urea formaldehyde and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If

there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by

amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner

15. TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY

FACTS:

Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded

Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate

from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even

though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not

complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means

Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that

what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text

of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent

with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the

HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come

from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version

rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice

of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere

matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt

his over what has been done.

16. PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO

Facts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the

Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking

privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commission and its

Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the

lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named

measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354.

Issues: (1) Whether or not its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose

(2) Whether or not it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies

of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage;

(3) Whether or not it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary

Held: (1) Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall

embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The purposes of this rule are:

(1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the

legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might

therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the

people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of

legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by

petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking

privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes. R.A.

No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,

Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes

Connected Therewith." The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to

be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the

measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all

the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is

sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the repeal of a statute on a

given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and

therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the

subject. The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the

subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly

expressed in its title. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the

accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient

and effective postal service system.

(2) It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to

and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was

enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of

the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then

presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine of

separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the

presiding officers of Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters

that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill).

(3) It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege

from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the

Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections;

former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public

in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. The withdrawal of the franking privileges

was indeed discriminatory. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking

privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those

who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,

especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need

it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the

Constitution. The classification was not based on substantial distinctions.

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Facts: Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec

35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking

privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were

withdrawn from them.

In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it

becoming a law.

Issues:WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one

subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it

has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been

distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the

necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of

a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon

shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause

Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's

adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an

index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made

by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between

the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

17. ASTORGA VS VILLEGAS

Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an

enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker

of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on

its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,

respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential When courts may turn to the

journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled

bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then

sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas

recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was

approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its

certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino

amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and

attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate

President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus

was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the

Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.

ISSUES: (1)Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law (2)Whether or not the entries in the

journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

RULING:

Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in

open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has

passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the

President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of

the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all

bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his

approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress

should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not

passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official

attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the

President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive

departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the

laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires

the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills

authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,

whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and

independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed

Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if

the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort

to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical

conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may

still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the

presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends

when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill

or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and

not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.

When courts may turn to the journal

Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to

speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a

case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution

requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting

and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the

text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of

Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to

the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were

introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to

the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the

alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted

and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief

Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed

and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to

perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become

law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by

the law-making body.

18. ABBAS VS SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of

the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional

elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme

Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from

partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case.

Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process

imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification,

Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum,

if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no

abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this

would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members

who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the

Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its

composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their

respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall

be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be

Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on

the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations

registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal

shall be its Chairman.

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the

Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications

of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the

resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the

Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit

or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the

Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he

sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial

judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as

such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the

three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

19. LAZATIN VS HRET

ISSUE: WON the issue should be placed under HRETs jurisdiction

20. BONDOC VS PINEDA

FACTS: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of

the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda

was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are

members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the

NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman

Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim

Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter

informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido

Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said

political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter

informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives

decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party

therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

RULING: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to

provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office,

devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with

complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to

which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for

the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for

having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and

appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives

committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of

expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it

violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of

congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy

security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated

except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death,

permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation

with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the

House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with

another.

20. DAZA VS SINGSON

Facts: On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a

political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party

formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and

correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original

members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional

member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the

Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Briefly stated, the

contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments

because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature

and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly

impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its

representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses

that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to

proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

Issue: Whether petitioners removal is unconstitutional; Whether the election of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado to the Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional;

Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13,

1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the

Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI,

Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio: If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion

from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party,

the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is

clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on

Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected

by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.

In view of the Allied Majority of 1961

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista

Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber

in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4

from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent

over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the

Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber.

It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had

not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were

still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was

invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House

of Representatives as required by the Constitution.

The Court held: The constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on

Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of

Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional

REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the

authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a

consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the

Commission, but also, subsequently thereto.

In view of Congress authority

Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its

representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may

transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be

permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving

severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one

political party to another.

In view of the Courts intervention

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of

Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our

jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be

resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we

are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely

discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not

evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

NOTE: If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress is substantial so as

to dramatically decrease the membership of one party while reducing the other, the number of

representatives of the different parties in the Commission on Appointments may also be changed in

proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the Senators

was only temporary so as not to result in the change of membership in the Commission on Appointments)

22. LIDAZAN VS COMELEC

Facts: RA 4790, entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del

Sur, took effect on June 18, 1966. It sought to create the new municipality of Dianaton within barrios

in Lanao del Sur, but also included barrios located in Cotabato. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer

of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato requested for certiorari and prohibition and declare RA

4790 as unconstitutional because its Title is misleading and invoked the provision of the Constitution

that the title of a bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public

and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Issue: Whether the title of RA 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of

Lanao del Sur" satisfied the provision of the Constitution that the title of an act must be sufficient to

notify the public and others concerned of its substance.

Decision: RA4970, An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del

Sur, is deemed unconstitutional. The very title projected the impression that Lanao del Sur is the only

province affected by the act. This statute apprised neither Congress nor the people in the towns of

Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato that part of Cotabatos territory is

being taken to add to the adjacent Lanao del Sur.

Dissenting opinion: Fernando, J.

The said provision of the Constitution must be construed liberally as this has been the general

disposition in all courts, as opposed to the strict interpretation of the Supreme Court. Thus, the title of

RA 4790 is sufficient to inform the public of its substance, namely, the creation of the Municipality of

Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur.

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The case questions the law entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are

transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two

provinces. Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through

the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be

suspended until clarified by correcting legislation.

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute

should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations

upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of

heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify

the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill. This constitutional requirement breathes the spirit of command. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its

deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic

Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of

Representatives where the bill, being of local application, originated.

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language

of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It

suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,

the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of

the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and

discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the

legislators.

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is

not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the

details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed

of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in

referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in

omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. In determining

sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of

the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the

court.

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur 8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest

intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new

Lanao del Sur town. The phrase in the Province of Lanao del Sur, read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-

pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from

twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2)

it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not

inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the

towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their

territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of

Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by

the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act

4790.

23. PHILCONSA VS JIMENEZ

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of Republic Act No. 3836

insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators

and Representatives. PHILCONSA now seeks to enjoin Pedor Gimenez, the Auditor General, from

disbursing funds therefor.

According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the

Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,

contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes

selfish class legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of

service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other

officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and

are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in

any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the

highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the

legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of retirement or pension benefits

under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers does not constitute forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not

constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said

Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.

HELD: No, the said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, provides:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by

law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems

and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their

respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places

of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said

compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the

Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law,

the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an

annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress,

the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as

follows:

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the

members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.

In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National

Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the

expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such

increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term

compensation other emoluments.

Emolument is the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of

compensation for services of one possessing any office.

RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement

benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all

the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision

clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby

declared unconstitutional by the SC.

24. TOBIAS VS ABALOS

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a

petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act

Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of

Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same

legislative district.

The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the

constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of

Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong

into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which

provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty

members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate

congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by

the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the

return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the

standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census

showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue: (1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?

(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?

(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first

contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for

Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and

logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been

invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the

provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides

that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise

provided by law. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show

that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to

justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were

not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional

processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for

the establishment of separate legislative district

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

25. TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY

FACTS

RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the

tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal

Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716

on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but

is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on

separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution,

respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public

debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of

Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three

readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its

Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its

immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no

amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and

the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the

Constitution.

HELD

No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo

extensive changes in the Senate.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only

of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required

by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the

revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of

Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative

process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would

be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills,

bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come

from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the

members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does

the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the

bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House

bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as

required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this

was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed

with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon

the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of

printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

26. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS VALENCIA

Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting

Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television

(channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then

Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that

because of CBNs continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his department.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by

the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation

to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-

1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations

particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage;

and if there are expenditures made by Valencias department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this

provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached

to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.

Note: This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it

follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation

bill, therefore, remains.

27. BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

FACTS: PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices,

schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino

people.

The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over

personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First

Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into

the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act).

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started

its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear

before it and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin

Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their

testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.

SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its

investigation of the matter.

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the

SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative

purpose.

The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the

civil case.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.

2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.

3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.

4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.

RULING:

1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of

checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the

government. The Court has provided that the allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task which the

judiciary must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political

question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The

jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that

obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with

the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the

purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to

conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.

2. No.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the

Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the

implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the

formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the

Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of

legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of

the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had

violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears

more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator

Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"

Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because,

firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein

petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.

4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by

such inquiries shall be respected.

It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition

of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the

proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.

What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply

because he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows

him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to

reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness stand completely

28. SENATE VS ERMITA

The Facts:

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate

Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the

attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those

employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines

(AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various

officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers

in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China

National Machinery and Equip