Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh

8/3/2019 Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh

1/25

University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Leadership, Parties and Politics in BangladeshAuthor(s): Zillur R. KhanReviewed work(s):Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1976), pp. 102-125Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447587 .

Accessed: 26/11/2011 06:03

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

University of Utah and Western Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

preserve and extend access to The Western Political Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=utahhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpsahttp://www.jstor.org/stable/447587?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/447587?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpsahttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=utah


2/25

LEADERSHIP, PARTIES AND POLITICSIN BANGLADESHZILLUR R. KHANUniversity of Wisconsin-Oshkoshand University of Dacca, Bangladesh

B EFORE he war of liberation, a rapidly growing discontent among the Ben-galis against the "internal colonialism"' of the West Pakistani political, eco-nomic and military elites gave most Bengali political parties the justifica-tion to incorporate political demands for some sort of autonomy in their partymanifestos. The question of whether to demand more local autonomy under awestern-type federal structure, or to aim at a confederated status, or to demandcomplete independence for East Pakistan, created the original political divisionsbetween Bengalis. These divisions had certain ramifications in the Bengali policy-making process both before and after the independence of Bangladesh. Themajority of those people who were politically conscious expected the central govern-ment to concede greater autonomy to East Pakistan as a way of resolving peace-fully the disparities between the two parts of the country. On the other hand,conservative Muslims and right-wing politicians, who made up a small but vocalminority, wished East Pakistan to continue as a part of the Islamic Republic ofPakistan. Another group, comprised mainly of leftist radicals and Maoists, advo-cated complete independence, which they expected could only be achieved througha prolonged guerrilla warfare. They not only aimed at ending West Pakistani ex-ploitation, but also the exploitation perpetrated by the Bengalis themselves. Anaggressive minority within the strongest Bengali party- the Awami League-also wanted complete independence. But the League's charismatic leader, SheikhMujibur Rahman, wanted greater political autonomy, not complete independence,for East Pakistan through a Six-Point program he had drawn up and which, heasserted, was designed to establish a more equitable relationship between Islamabadand Dacca.

Politically conscious Bengalis, who originally wanted autonomy but not inde-pendence, started to support the Awami League's Six-Point program2 as the

This term, used in New Left writings (Herbert Marcuse, Angela Davis, Tarik All, amongothers), connotes a process of domination and exploitation of one ethnic group byanother within the same country For a detailed analysisof the exploitationof Bengalisby Pakistanis,see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan:Failure in National Integration (New York:Columbia University Press, 1972), Chap. 2-3; Zillur R. Khan and A. T. R. Rahman,Autonomy and Constitution-Making:The Case of Bangladesh (Dacca: Green BookHouse Ltd., 1973), Chap. 1 and 3; Stephen R. Lewis, Pakistan: IndustrializationandTrade Policies (Oxford University Press, 1970), Chap. 6; Edward S. Mason, RobertDorfman and Stephen A. Marglin, "Conflictin Pakistan: Backgroundand Prospects"(Cambridge: Harvard University, unpublished, 1971), pp. 1-15; W. H. Morris-Jones,"PakistanPost-Mortemand the Roots of Bangladesh,"Political Quarterly, 18 (April-June, 1972), 190-96; U.S. House of Representatives,Committee on Foreign Affairs,Subcommitteeon Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearings: Crisis in East Pakistan, 92ndCong., 1st Sess., May 11, 25, 1971 (Washington,D.C.: Government Printing Office,1971), pp. 27, 29-31.2 Summaryof Six-PointProgrampresentedby Mujibin February,1966:Point 1. The Constitutionshouldprovide for a Federation .. with supremacyof Legis-lature directlyelected on the basisof universaladult franchise.Point 2. Federal governmentshall deal with only two subjects, viz., Defense and For-eign Affairs and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the federatingstates....Point 3. (A) Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may beintroduced, or (B) One currencyfor the whole country may be maintained.In this case, effective constitutionalprovisions are to be made to stop flightof capital fromEast to West Pakistan.Point 4. .... the power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federatingunits and that the Federal Centrewill have no suchpower... The consolidated


3/25

Leadership,Partiesand Politics in Bangladesh 103general election of 1970 aproached. The inaction of the Pakistani military juntaduring the 1970 calamity (when East Pakistan was struck by a devastating cyclonewhich left 500,000 to 1,000,000 dead and 3,000,000 to 6,000,000 homeless),3changed many Bengali minds in favor of the Awami League's brand of autonomy.The result was the landslide victory of Sheikh Mujib and his party which gave himan absolute majority in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.4The fear of being politically dominated by the new Bengali leadership dis-couraged many leaders of the West Pakistani parties from using constitutionalmeans to resolve their differences on the question of autonomy for East Pakistan.This was probably the main reason why Z. A. Bhutto, leader of the largest partyin West Pakistan, demanded concessions on two points - taxation and foreigntrade - of the League's Six-Point program prior to meeting with the Bengali rep-resentatives in the first scheduled session of the Constituent Assembly. When hefailed to get Mujib to agree to the central government's continuing its power ofdirect taxation, and absolute control over foreign aid and foreign trade, Bhuttorefused to participate in the deliberation of the Assembly. In a show of force,Bhutto threatened the elected members of his party - the Pakistan People's party,which had won the majority of seats in West Pakistan - with "dire consequences"if they dared to attend the first session of the Assembly without him.As well as Bhutto, other West Pakistani leaders put pressure on the Yahyajunta to postpone the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly until Mujib agreedto make concessions on his Six-Point program. The immediate effect was a politicaldeadlock during the last part of February and throughout most of March 1971.The so-called "Yahya-Mujib parleys" which took place between March 16-23,raised high hopes among Bengalis about a genuine possibility of a peaceful reso-lution of political conflicts between the two parts of Pakistan. But their hopeswere shattered when, on March 25, the Pakistani military junta tried once and forall to crush the Bengali movement for autonomy.5

FederalFundshallcome out of a levy of certainpercentageof all state taxes...Point 5. .... foreign exchange earnings of... East Pakistan shall be under the controlof East Pakistan government and that of West Pakistan under the control ofWest Pakistan government... The Constitution shall empower the unit govern-ments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missionsin, and enter into agreements with foreign countries.Point 6. ... setting up of a militia or a paramilitary for East Pakistan.U.S. Government sources indicated that Pakistani authorities were shockingly lax in co-ordinating a relief effort and spent only $4.7 million of a special congressional reliefappropriationof $7.5 million. See U.S. Senate, Committeeon the Judiciary, Subcom-mittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Hearings: Re-lief Problems in East Pakistan and India, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, June 28, 1971,(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 41-47, 50-51, 53-69.4 Yahya dissolved the Pakistani Parliament in 1969 when he took over from Ayub Khan. Thesame year he issued a proclamation- the Legal Framework Order of 1969 - whichwas designed to provide a guideline for the transfer of political power from military tocivilian hands. Under this order, a national election was scheduled to choose representa-tives for a Constitutional Assembly. However, two limitations were imposed on theconstitution-making process: the Assembly was obliged to frame a constitution within120 days; moreover, the new constitution had to be approved by Yahya before its imple-mentation. Because of these restrictions, a number of parties boycotted the 1970 electionfor the Constitutional Assembly.'The terror was responsible for a mass exodus of ten million Bengalis into India by Novem-ber, 1971. Many Bengali scholars were killed and many others had to flee the countryin order to escape the military suppression. For a detailed description of military sup-pression in East Pakistan between March and December, 1971, see M. Ayoob and K.Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1972), pp. 165-81; Zillur R. Khan, Situation in East Pakistan: An Eye-Witness Account (Chicago:Bangladesh Foundation Pamphlet, 1971); K. Choudhury, Genocide in Bangladesh (NewDelhi: Orient Longman, Ltd., 1972), pp. 22-67. Statement of Hendrick Van DerHeijden, Economist, Pakistan Division of the World Bank, in Thousand My Lais (Dac-ca: Society for Human Rights, 1972). Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs,Bangladesh Documents (New Delhi: Government Printing Press, 1971), Chap. VI &VII (includes testimony of foreign observers).


4/25

104 WesternPolitical QuarterlyThe military suppression only hardened Bengali resistance against WestPakistani domination. Military coercion also brought unity and consensusamongthose Bengalis who had previously differed on the issue of independence. Most

of them had by now lost all patience with the Yahya regime and began to favorcomplete independence. But a strong minority of Bengalis, comprised chiefly ofconservative Muslims, members of rightist political parties, and a number ofpersonnel from the civil and military services, still adhered to the concept of onePakistan. It was from this group that the junta received political and adminis-trative support when the civil war broke out. The non-Bengali Muslim settlers,commonly known as the Biharis,made up the other group which gave unqualifiedsupport to the policy of Islamabad during this time. Both these groups wereviewed as collaboratorsand later were held responsibleby the Bengalis for Paki-stani atrocities. The defeat of Pakistaniforces in East Pakistan and the consequentcreation of Bangladesh saw a surge of public hatred for these groups. Moreover,Bengali political parties which had supported the junta were outlawed and theirleadersimprisoned. The Biharis were interned.Political radicalism and violence threatenedthe newly establishedgovernmentof Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Open challenge to Mujib by student groups and,later, opposition parties put Mujib's charisma and ideology to the test. Only hisoverwhelming victory at the polls saved his charismatic leadership for the timebeing, but the country'schronic food problems,coupled with worldwide shortagesof food grains and extremely high prices for oil, made the Prime Minister's taskof reconstructioneven more difficult. Another devastatingflood in 1974, an astro-nomical increase in food prices (about 400 percent to 500 percent increasein pricesof staple food like rice and lentils) and an impending famine (which, according toa recent estimate, could claim two to three million lives without massive inter-national aid) created a tragic and dangeroussituation. All these have contributedto the revival of not only the original divisions between the Bengalis, but have alsogiven rise to newer divisions within groups and parties that originally went alongwith the League's demand for autonomy. The state of national emergency, de-clared by Mujib on December 28, 1974, underscored he magnitude of the domesticcrisisin Bangladesh.In the international area, the situation is only slightlybetter. Political tensionin the subcontinent was somewhat relaxed by Mujib's decision to grant a generalclemency to those Pakistani military and civil service officials who were held inIndia on charges of war crimes. Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh and theMujib-Bhutto meeting at the Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore, Pakistan, inFebruary 1974, paved the way for future negotiation. It also satisfiedPeking and,in the absence of a Chinese veto, Bangladesh was admitted into the UN. Never-theless, a vocal section of the Bengali people, mainly comprising pro-Pakistaniconservativesand anti-Indian radicals,continued to hold India responsiblefor allthe ills besetting the new state. This group believes that India will never allowBangladesh to be self-sufficient. Therefore, India cannot logically allow Bangla-desh successfullyto carry out such ventures as the recently contracted agreementwith seven multi-national corporations (including three American companies) toexplore offshore oil. This group has alreadyalleged that India has willfully under-mined Bangladesh's international market for jute in order to rejuvenate its ownpreviouslysagging internationaljute trade.The original divisions between the Bengalis on the issues of secession and in-dependence had serious ramificationsin the Bengali army. First of all, it broughtabout a rigid caste-like differentiationbetween those who fought in the liberationwar and those who, for one reason or another, did not. Among the former, theredeveloped a further division along ideological lines (pro-Moscow v. pro-Washing-ton). In order to keep the militaryin check, a strongpara-militaryforce was raised


5/25


6/25

106 WesternPolitical Quarterlythe Bengali cause in the international area, Choudhury seemed the right man.Finally, Mujib knew that becauseChoudhuryhad a historyof high blood pressure,he would not accept any position which would be physically exacting; the presi-dency of a parliamentarydemocracyseemed to be a placid enough post.9As premier, Mujib immediately began to take steps to restore law and order.His first move in this respect was to ask the guerrillas to surrendertheir arms tolocal authorities. He tried to add incentive to his appeal by promising fifty rupeesfor every weapon surrendered. This scheme workedvery well and a great quantityof arms and ammunition was given up. Wherever necessary, Mujib approachedguerrilla leaders personally in order to arrange the surrenderof arms. A goodexample was his visit to the chief town of the Tangail district, located sixty milesnorthwest of Dacca, to attend a ceremony for the surrenderof arms by the guer-rillas who had been involved in the liberation struggle of the region.10However, Mujib was not so fortunate in his efforts to persuade a Maoistgroup, led by two Bengali communists- A. Motin and M. Alauddin - to sur-render its arms and to relinquish control of an area it had seized from the Paki-stani military during the conflict. Mujib made a number of gestures aimed atbringing one of the party's two leaders,Alauddin, to a conference table with himto iron out the differences between the Awami League's goals and those of therebel group. It appeared for a time that Alauddin might be receptive to the primeminister'sovertures for peace, but such hopes were swept away when some AwamiLeaguersvisited Atrai and were summarilyexecuted on suspicionof spying for theMujib government. The incident infuriated Mujib and his followers. The armywas ordered into the area and about 50 or 60 members of the party were killed.

Two views prevailedabout the course of action Mujib should have taken. Onejustifies his action in crushing the resistance of this particular group, becausetolerating it would have encouraged warlordism by other groups, including theMarxists-Leninists. The opposing view maintains that Mujib could have used theMotin-Alauddin group as a lever to put pressureon the vested economic intereststo support his moderate socialist program. Moreover, it was held that mere sup-pression of one Marxist-Leninist group, without fundamental socioeconomic re-forms, would not help the political stability of Bangladesh. Many left-leaningBengalis also believed that Mujib's decision to destroythe Motin-Alauddin strong-hold was actually influencedby the Indian government, which suspecteda strategiclink between the West Bengali Naxalites and the East Bengali Marxist-Leninists-Motin and Alauddin.Another difficultywhich Sheikh Mujib faced in his effort to restorenormalcyin Bangladesh centered on the question of the Biharis. After being freed by thePakistanis, Mujib had made an unequivocal commitment that the minorities in-side the country would be protected at any cost. However, upon his return toBangladesh, this commitment was not honored in relation to the Biharis.1The term "Bihari" is applied generally to all Indian immigrants living inBangladeshwhose original homes were in the provincesof Bihar,Uttar Pradesh,thePunjab, and Gujrat. In this sense, the term is not used in a pejorativeway. How-9In 1972, President Choudhurymentioned this aspect of his post to the author, but at thesame time expressed mpatienceand disappointmentwith his actual role in the decision-makingprocess. In 1973, he seemed not only tense but disappointedwith the perform-ance of the Awami League government. He even mentioned resigning. In November,1973, Mujib accepted his resignationand appointed him as a roving ambassador orBangladesh.10In Mujib's view, the surrenderof armsby 60,000 guerrillasto Mujib at Dacca stadiuminFebruary,1972, marked a very crucial stage of disarming he Bengali guerrillas.Source:author's interviewwith SheikhMujibur Rahman on July 17, 1973, in Dacca.n Times (London), January 10, 1972. Mujib reiteratedhis earlier stand of March 7, 1971,that the non-Bengaliminoritymust be protected and given equal rights as citizens.


7/25

Leadership,Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 107ever, the term is also used to refer to those Muslim refugees who fled to Bangladeshfrom Bihar, where they had lived as a minority, at the time of the partitioning ofIndia in 1947. Although arriving as refugees they soon occupied important posi-tions in business, trade and industry in Bangladesh. This transformation took placemainly for two reasons: they spoke Urdu, the first official language of Pakistanand the one spoken chiefly by the ruling class in West Pakistan, where all powerlay and, therefore, they were more readily accepted as Muslim brothers by theWest Pakistani power elite. The Biharis soon received all kinds of benefits from theWest Pakistani rulers, in the form of jobs in business and industry, low-interestloans from banks for investments, support for trading and industrial enterprises,opportunities for training and, later on, technical and managerial positions in busi-ness and industrial enterprises, most of which were owned and controlled by WestPakistanis. In short, the Biharis were soon identified by the bulk of the Bengalipopulation as permanent agents of the West Pakistani vested interests who couldnever be dislodged from Bangladesh as long as the Pakistani domination continued.This use of the term Bihari did have a pejorative sense.Bengali nationalism was geared primarily to getting rid of West Pakistaniexploitation, and the Biharis provided the Bengalis with a constant reminder ofthat exploitation. When the Bengalis rose in arms in March 1971, the Biharisbecame a logical target. This led to rioting and murders between the two groups.Apart from attempting to suppress the Bengali nationalist movement, the Pakistanimilitary took it upon themselves to avenge the Bihari killings. The net result wasthat from a limited communal riot the Bihari-Bengali conflict grew into a massivelyorganized killing of the Bengalis by the whole Pakistani army, in collaboration withthe Biharis of Bangladesh.It is quite understandable, therefore, that pockets of Bihari population werecompelled to protect themselves against the victorious Bengalis immediately afterliberation. In trying to protect themselves, they again became involved in anarmed conflict with the post-liberation Bengalis, which led to a further deteriora-tion of their position. Indeed, the Biharis were caught in a vicious cycle fromwhich they seemed to be unable to extricate themselves.Mujib showed restraint when he was confronted with the Bihari resistance inMohammadpur and Mirpur, two sections of the capital city of Dacca. There theBiharis were all armed with automatic weapons; moreover, some Pakistani soldierswho had not surrendered were hiding among them. It is suspected that thePakistani soldiers persuaded the Biharis to resist the efforts of the Bangladeshgovernment to enforce its policy of disarming all those who had arms. When thegovernment sent a small contingent of police and soldiers into the area, Pakistanisoldiers and Bihari militants murdered them.l2 The Bengali army and the guer-rillas, who had not yet surrendered their arms, were very bitter about the incident.To them it was shocking that even after they had gained their freedom, Bengaliswere still being killed by Biharis. What they resented most of all was that theIndian regular army was unable to make the Biharis and the Pakistani soldierssurrender their arms and thus allow the Bengalis freedom to move in their capitalcity. Mujib was left with no alternative other than to order the withdrawal ofthe Indian army from the two Pakistani-Bihari occupied areas, and to deploy theregular Bangladesh army in those areas with specific orders to make the Pakistani-Biharis surrender their arms as early as possible. Resistance was so strong at firstthat Bangladesh forces were obliged to use mortars and even to lay siege, so that

2 Independent observers declared that at least 100 were killed and several hundred morewere injured. New York Times, January 31, 1972. The author verified this report fromBangladesh army officers directly involved in that operation.


8/25

108 Western Political Quarterlyfood could not be brought in from the outside; together, the bombardment andthe siege forced the Pakistanis and Biharis to surrender.'3The condition of the Biharis was pathetic. Not only did the Bengalis regardthem as collaborators, but even after independence, they had proved themselves tobe the supporters of the Pakistanis in open confrontation with the Bangladesharmy. The result was that for six months the Biharis could not move about thecity freely for fear of reprisals. Since the majority of the Biharis cannot speakfluent, accent-free Bengali, the fear of being detected through language preventedmany of them from moving about the city. Indeed, some Biharis showed a sig-nificant lack of interest in accepting an independent Bangladesh as their home,l4looking instead toward West Pakistan or even India, though neither New Delhinor Islamabad seems interested in having them. Later, as a result of a repatriationagreement between India and Pakistan, signed in August 1973, Islamabad agreedto accept 80,000 Biharis out of an estimated 300,000 living in Bangladesh.15There was another area in which Mujib had to make a highly sensitive de-cision. This pertains to the proposed trial of certain Pakistani POWs for warcrimes. The matter of war crimes was complicated by a variety of problems. Onewas that of territorial jurisdiction. Pakistani soldiers had been taken out of Bang-ladesh into Indian territory and therefore were not under the direct territorialjurisdiction of Bangladesh. In any war crime trials, India would have been direct-ly involved, despite statements made by New Delhi that it would have nothing todo with the question. Moreover, Islamabad threatened that should such trial takeplace, it would be obliged to bring to trial a number of Bengali military men andcivilian administrators in Pakistan against whom treasonable charges could beleveled. Moreover, Bhutto very shrewdly put added pressure on the Bangladeshgovernment to compromise on the question of POWs and trials for war crimesby blocking the entry of Bangladesh into the UN, with the help of a Chinese vetoon August 25, 1975.16 Though over 100 countries, including all the major powersexcept China, accorded recognition to Dacca, Bhutto's clever pro-Islamic diplo-macy, in the beginning at least, prevented most Arab countries from extendingrecognition. At one point, Bhutto even took Pakistan out of the British Common-wealth because of the recognition accorded to Bangladesh by all the other Com-monwealth countries. Such pressure discouraged the policy-makers in both Bang-ladesh and India from a full commitment to implement the decision to try Paki-stani soldiers for war crimes.A third aspect of the issue was the problem of war criminals per se. TheNuremberg trials had left a bitter taste in the mouths of international jurists andlawyers. As a result, the big powers would have been hard put to agree even toallow the trials to take place under the auspices of an international body.It seemed quite inevitable, therefore, that compromises had to be made onthe question of alleged war criminals. In fact, the process of relaxation of the3Colonel Khaled Mosharraftold the author that the Pakistanisand Bihariswere deprivedof food during the siege. A foreign journalist somehow slipped through the cordonand thoroughly investigated the situation; later he told Mosharrafthat the colonel wasdoing almost the same thing to the Pakistaniforces as they had done to the Bengalis.

14In 1973, the author interviewed thirty Biharismainly from two age groups. Without ex-ception those who were over fifty years of age wanted to go to Pakistan. Three inter-vieweesover sixty even said that they would ratherbe dead than remainin Bangladesh.All those in the younger age groups of 16-18 and 35-40, wanted to go to Pakistanaswell. But five in their twenties said that if things were better, they would considerstaying.During his visit to Bangladeshin 1975, the author expected a significant changein this attitude, but found the previous attitudinal pattern holding in spite of manyBiharisworking in differentjobs both in governmentand in the private sector. Thosewithoutjobs- majoritybeing women- have takento street-begging."5 ee New YorkTimes,October20, 1973.6Ibid., August 26, 1972.


9/25

Leadership,Partiesand Politics in Bangladesh 109Bangladesh government'sstand in regard to war crimes was already visible whenthe International Crimes Bill was passed by the Bangladesh Parliament on July17, 1973. Unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crime cases, the InternationalCrimes Act not only gave the accused the right to cross-examinethe witnessesandto examine the documentary evidence of the prosecution at a reasonable timebefore the trial, but also granted the convicted the right to appeal to the SupremeCourt of Bangladesh.17After the repatriation agreementbetween India and Pakistanin August 1973,the Bangladesh government moderated its position further, when the number ofPakistanis waiting for trial was reduced from 195 to 178. The general clemencygiven to the Bengali collaborators in December 1973 also signified a change inpolicy toward the war crime trials. Finally, in February, 1974, following Bhutto'srecognition of Bangladesh and Mujib's participation in the Islamic summit con-ference in Lahore, a general clemency was issued to all Pakistanis charged withwar crimes.

IIAs Mujib had attempted to unify the Bengalis through his personal efforts torestore law and order, contain warlordism, settle the Bihari question, grantclemency to collaborators and Pakistani POWs charged with war crimes, so didhe seem to try to generate mass support for and neutralize opposition to his govern-ment through political parties, citizen groups, and so forth. During the liberationstruggle, Mujib received unquestioned loyalty (though he himself was in a Paki-stani jail) from most Bengali political parties and their guerrilla extensions whohlad previously united against the Pakistanis. Though after independence thesepolitical groups were rapidly engulfed by internal dissensions and intergroup con-flicts, Mujib tried to reunite some of them behind him and his government. Mostof these groups fell under the category of branch party, ranging from extreme leftto left of the middle. Maoist parties followed a cell party structure. Rightistparties were banned for collaborating with the Pakistanis. The Awami Leaguehad become a mass party, without losing its earlier characteristics of a branchparty.'8 It held a middle position in the political spectrum.In spite of the power struggle which was going on between different politicalgroups, the leftist parties found common ground in their criticism of the League's

policies. They accused the League government of collusion with New Delhi andMoscow to suppress the opposition, particularly those members who were advocat-ing a neutral foreign policy for the country. The Maoist factions even chargedthat the ruling party was conspiring with the Indian Congress party to liquidatethe Maoists on both sides of the borders. The supressions of Maoists at Atrai byMujib and in West Bengal by Chief Minister S. Ray were cited as examples.The pro-Moscow parties, the National Awami party led by Muzaffar Ahmad,as well as the Bangla Communist party led by Moni Singh, had had certaininitial confrontations with the Awami League, but the consistent support of Mos-cow for India and the Bengali cause turned them into close allies of the League.However, the election of 1973 was to show that this alliance was not to bringany rich dividends to the pro-Moscow parties.As far as the National Awami party, led by M. Bhashani, was concerned, itlacked an efficient organization. Moreover, in spite of Bhashani's popularity7 Sections 16.2 and 21 of International Crimes (Tribunal Act), 1973, respectively.18Here, I have followed basically the classificatory system provided by M. Duverger, PoliticalParties (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1955), pp. 63-79. As happened with theAwami League party in Bangladesh, the Congress party in India and the PakistanPeople's party in Pakistan, a significant increase in popularity can transform a branchparty into a mass party without affecting its previous ideology.


10/25

110 Western Political Quarterlyamong the Bengali peasantry and his long-time image as a reform politician, a largepart of the political elite had reservations about his ability to organize and directnational development. His critics point out that he had never formed a govern-ment nor had he ever been a part of any administration in Bengal. The obviousimplication, which was accepted by a major section of the elite, was that Bhashanimight be a good opposition leader, but was poor material for national leadership.Moreover, he had been unable to resolve the ideological conflicts within his partythat arose between Islamic socialism and secular socialism. Lastly, his ambivalenceand political non-decisions in 1972 hurt his party considerably.Ataur Rahman's Bangla Jatio League suffered from certain weaknesses. Inthe power struggle over the question of who should be the second in command inthe Awami League hierarchy, Ataur Rahman lost out to Mujib in 1957. More-over, he did not have the opportunity to form his own party - as Bhashani had,that same year

- because of the military takeover by Ayub Khan. After the coupa number of politicians fell under the new president's Elective Bodies Disqualifica-tion Order, Ataur Rahman being one of them. Not until 1964, when the Disquali-fication Order was revoked, did he have the opportunity to develop his politicalarm, the Pakistan National League, which later became the Bengal NationalLeague or Bangla Jatio League. Unfortunately, both infighting and lack of widemass support further weakened the party so that by 1972 it was politically unim-portant. Yet Ataur Rahman as a politician and national leader continued to en-joy support from his constituents, and this at least allowed him to be elected in1973, the year of the greatest landslide victory of the Awami League party.In the 1970 national and provincial elections, in which the Awami Leaguescored a tremendous victory, all the leftist opposition parties except Muzaffar'sNAP and the Bangla Jatio League boycotted the elections. On the other hand,most of the rightist political groups (e.g., the Muslim League, Jamat-i-Islam,Nizam-i-Islam, Jamat-i-Ulema-i-Islam and the Pakistan Democratic party), con-tested the elections and, later on, during the liberation struggle, collaborated withthe Pakistani military.19 After liberation, the Awami League leadership did nothave to face any opposition from them because the rightist pro-Pakistani partiesin Bangladesh were disbanded and most of their leaders imprisoned under theCollaborator's Act.20 They were granted clemency by Mujib in December 1973.The leftists strongly resented the fact that clemency did not apply to them.21

This decision is seen by the Bengali leftists as a definite change in the AwamiLeague's domestic as well as foreign policy. They believe that domestic politics willbecome more and more involved with religious militant conservatives, since SheikhMujib and his party can expect support from such groups because of his act ofclemency.22 Though the ban on the rightist parties was not lifted, the releaseof rightist politicians would tend to strengthen the Awami League's efforts to con-9 For a detailed analysis of the role and platform of all political parties in the election of1970, see Zillur R. Khan and A. T. R. Rahman, Autonomyand Constitution-Making:The Caseof Bangladesh,pp. 163-200.20The act was promulgatedby the Bangladeshgovernmentto deal with the local collaboratorsof the Pakistani junta. Under it, a person suspected of collaboration could be im-prisoned without bail.1Holiday (Dacca), December 9, 1973. The leftist, radical revolutionaryparties are: JatioSamajtantric Dal (National Socialist party), Purbo Bangla Sarbohara party (EastBengal Communist party), Purbo Banglar Sammobadi Dal- Marxbadi-Leninbadi(Communist Party of East Bengal- Marxist-Leninist), Purba Bangla Communistparty- Marxbadi-Leninbadi East Bengal Communistparty- Marxist-Leninist),andEast Pakistan Communist party- Marxist-Leninist (led by Motin and Alauddin).Among these parties,only the JSD (National Socialistparty) worksas a front organiza-tion of the BangladeshCommunistLeague, an undergroundparty. The rest are entirelyundergroundparties.22Mujib's press statement on December 15, 1973. See Bangladesh Observer,December 16,1973; also Holiday (Dacca), December 16, 1973.


11/25

Leadership,Partiesand Politics in Bangladesh 111tain leftist opposition in Bangladesh. Moreover, the price of support from therightists could be in terms of a significantchange in foreign policy, that is, frompro-Russian to pro-American. The anti-Hindu, anti-India and pro-Americanatti-tude of rightist politicians might give Mujib a greater leverage with India inpolitical and economic bargaining. This could, in time, result in establishing aconfederate tie with Pakistan. Ironically, the leftists are also in favor of such arelation with Pakistan because it would tend to reduce dependence on India, andconsequently,Indian influence in Bangladesh.In order to insure the Leagure'spredominance over other parties, Mujib andhis close associates sought to replace the League's old ideology of the Six-Pointprogram with a new one. The Six-Point program had effectively served theLeague's political goal of ending Pakistani domination and exploitation of Bang-ladesh. The new ideology of Mujibism or Mujibbad, Mujib's followers claimed,could accomplish for the Bengali nation wvhat he old Six-Point had before thecountry was liberated. Mujibism comprisednationalism, democracy, socialismandsecularism,which were subsequently ncorporatedin the constitutionof Bangladeshas fundamental principles of state polity.23 Mujib describesMujibism as follows:It is for the philosophers to expound on ideologies, if you think Mujibismis one. I can tell you what I think whether you call it Mujibism or byany other name. First, I believe in democracy; supremacyof the will ofthe people; governmentbased on the consent of the governed; free think-ing, free expressions and other popular freedoms which help blossomhuman hearts and minds. This is what I mean by democracy and I alsoknow that you can interpretdemocracyin innumerableways. Along with

my conviction in democracyis my belief that the democratic experienceis only possible in a society free of exploitation and that is why I wantsocialism with democracy. I also believe that all religions in Bangladeshmust exist on equal footing and that is what I mean by secularismfreedom of religion. Last but not least, I want the people to draw in-spiration from the Bengali culture, language, folklore, mores and thegeneral Bengali environment. Such inspirationwill act as the motivatingforce for the Bengalis to work for the betterment of their golden Bengaland this is, again, what I mean by nationalism.2The strongest denunciation of Mujib for failure to implement Mujibismcame from Bhashani in the post-election period. "Democracy does not only meanfreedom, it also means responsibilityand commitment on the part of the leadersand the led. In the Awami League government in Bangladesh today, we find free-dom not in its real sense,but in its most distortedinterpretation freedom to loot,to plunder and to corrupt."25The first open challenge to Mujibism occurred in May 1972, when the stu-dent political party aligned to the Awami League - the Bangladesh ChatraLeague--split into a pro-Mujibism group and an anti-Mujibism group. Thelatter musteredenough support to challenge effectively the pro-Mujibismgroup inthe Dacca University student election in May 1972 (however, due to widespreadviolation of electoral rules, such as looting of ballot boxes, the election result could

not be published), and this factor gave an added significance to the oppositionstudent groups throughout the country. This rebel group openly challenged Muji-23Constituent Assemblyof Bangladesh, Constitutionof the People's Republic of Bangladesh(Dacca:Governmentrinting ress,1972),p. 13.' Author'snterviewwithMujibonJuly17,1973, n Dacca.' Author'snterviewwith MaulanaBhashani n August6, 1973. Bhashani iteda numberof casesof politicalkilling,lawlessness nd corruptionn whichthe AwamiLeaguegovernment adbeendirectlyor indirectlynvolved.On theverydayof the interviewan attackwas madeon Bhashani'some n Santosh 70 miles romDacca). Fortunately,no harm ame o him.


12/25

112 Western Political Quarterlybism and claimed that the only way in which the socio-politico-economic condi-tions in Bangladesh could be improved was to introduce scientific socialism (whichemphasizes class struggle and ultimate victory of the working class) instead ofexperimenting with utopian socialism (which does not incorporate class struggleas the means of securingsocial justice for the workingclass) of the Mujib brand.They claimed that unless Bangladesh went all the way with socialism and estab-lished a revolutionarygovernment to enforce socialisticgoals no real progresswouldbe possible, and without tangible results the masses would rise against the Mujibgovernment and start a full-fledged revolution to establish scientific socialism.Their claims could have been brushedaside as just talk, but certain incidentswhich occurred during July 1972 indicated that the anti-Mujib group had cometo stay and could probably start a viable political opposition in the country. Inthe simultaneouslyheld national conferences of the two groups of the BangladeshChatra League, Mujib encouraged the pro-Mujib faction by accepting an invita-tion to open their conference, thereby snubbing the rebels. A few months earliersuch a direct denunciation by Mujib could have destroyedthe new group, but inJuly 1972 such a gesture against the rebels did not have the desired effect. Theauthor went to both meetings and was astonished to find that there was almostequal attendance at both. Moreover, a real surprisecame when the anti-Mujibleader openly challenged Mujib's leadership and raised slogans to the effect that"Mujib should resign and let a competent leader govern the country." The sig-nificance of organized political opposition to Mujib by a student group was thatit cleared the way for open criticismof the regime from other opposition parties.26The students demonstrated that the masses were prepared to listen to criticalvoices.Some left-leaning political commentators suggested that ultimately a unitedfront would emerge under the leadership of Bhashani, the only politician whocould possibly come close to challenging the Awami League. It has also been sug-gested that the Bangla Communist party and the new-born Bangladesh Com-munist party (Leninist), SromikKrishakSamajbadi Dal (Laborer-PeasantSocial-ist party) and the Bangladesh Jatio League (Oli Ahad faction), and their alliedorganizations in worker and student groups were the possible partnersof a Jukta(United) Front against the Awami League.27 But this united front did notmaterializein the election of 1973.

One ominous political trend in the pre-election months was an increased useof violence by the party workersof both the government and the opposition par-ties.28 Both the Awami League and the opposition parties attempted to fix theresponsibility for the use of violent tactics on one another and their respectiveinternational allies. The government claimed that certain parties who were en-gaged in violence were receiving clandestine support from China and America.On the other hand, the opposition parties held that the violence was the result2 For a. good treatment of the Rab-Shiraj student group of BCL (Bangladesh ChatraLeague), see Holiday (Dacca), July 23 and August6, 1972.27The coalition politics worked successfullyin 1954 when the opposition parties, includingthe Awami League, defeated the Muslim League party, which was responsiblefor thecreationof Pakistan, n the provincialelectionof East Bengal.28Between February, 1972, and February, 1973, political killings claimed the lives of 700workersof the government party (A. L.) and 500 workers and supportersof the op-position parties. See Holiday (Dacca), January 7, 1973. The numberof such murdersdecreased considerablyafter the election, but from September 1973 onwards, they roseagain. In April 1974, one group of pro-Mujib students rounded up seven studentsbelongingto anotherpro-Mujibfaction and machine-gunnedthem to death in a Daccauniversity dormitory (Jinnah Hall). Political violence was one of the justificationsgiven by Mujib for his decision to declarea state of emergencyfor the countryat largeon December 28, 1974. See Bangladesh Observer,December 29, 1974; see also, ThePeople's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh, Embassy of Bangladesh, Washington,D.C., February1, 1975, p. 1.


13/25

Leadership,Partiesand Politics in Bangladesh 113of the government's suppressionof all dissent. They also held that the governmentsuppressionwas not only supported but also instigated by the Indo-Soviet lobbyinside the Bangladesh government. The examples of political repression by thegovernment readily cited by the opposition were: the Atrai incident (mentionedearlier), imprisonment of Major A. Jalil, who, under the pressureof public opin-ion, was freed and later joined forces with Rab and Shiraj in forming the JSD(Jatio Samajtantrik Dal or National Socialist party), the banning of oppositionnewspaperssuch as Ganakanthaand Desh Bangla, the burningof the party officesof Muzaffar (NAP) and Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) in Dacca, andpolice shooting at a group of demonstratorsprotesting the American bombingof Hanoi.

Against this backdrop of political violence, final preparations for the firstgeneral election of Bangladesh were made. A number of political analysts andcommentators predicted that the election would be postponed indefinitely. A fewfelt that if the election were held according to the schedule, there would be wide-spread rigging of votes in favor of the League at the polls. And there were otherswho believed that the opposition parties would win 30 to 40 percent of the seatsin the National Assembly. None of these predictionscame true.Mujib and the League won a landslide victory, gaining 292 out of the 300seats and thus repeating their performanceof 1970.29 However, more right-wingparties ran in 1970 and out of the five seats won by the nongovernmentparties,four went to rightistparties: Jamaat-i-Islam (1), Nizam-i-Islam (1) and PakistanDemocratic party (2). In 1973 more leftist political parties participated in theelection and the rightist parties were excluded because of their associationwith thePakistanimilitary junta during the liberation struggle.3 In the 1973 election, fiveout of eight non-government seats were won by independents, though the threeleftist parties31not only polled more votes than the independentsbut some of theircandidates came close to defeating a number of League candidates.32 Thoughthe opposition parties lost, the voting in some constituencies was very close. Theelection was essentially free. Had the opposition succeeded in resolving theirdifferencesand thus presenting a united front to the electorate, they might havesecured more seats.The 1970 and 1973 Awami League victories resembledeach other in generaloutcome. Both had been landslide victories for the AL; both victorieswere largelydetermined by the personal appeal of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Moreover inboth elections the victory surpassedthe expectationsof the political commentators.This is particularly true in 1973 when a number of protest marches against high29Inthe 1970 election held under the Yahya regime,the AwamiLeague polled 72.68 percentof the votes; in 1973 it polled 73.1 percent. Excluding Independents and the WestPakistani-basedNAP (Pakhtoon), BaluchistanUnited Front and Sind Mahaz, fourteenparties contested the 1970 and 1973 elections in Bangladesh.0In fact, the 1970 election was boycotted by the leftist parties in protest of the restrictionson election and constitution-making imposed by the Legal Framework Order of YahyaKhan."The only leftist party that won a seat in the provincial elections of Bangladesh in 1970was NAP (Wali), of which Professor Muzaffar Ahmad was General-Secretary. Afterthe March 25, 1971, Pakistani suppression,Muzaffar left the Wall NAP and startedhis ownparty,NAP(M).sSpokesmen call their parties left democratic parties. NAP (M) secured one seat andpolled 1,586,441 or 8.6 percent of the total votes cast; Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (JSD)won one seat and polled 1,195,572 or 6.5 percent and NAP (B) polled 1,001,312 or5.4 percent of the poll. The third opposition seat was won by Mr. Ataur Rahman, aformer Awami League chief minister and a major political rival of Mujib, whose party,BJL, polled 61,541 votes or .3 percent of the poll. Source: Bangladesh Observer,March 9 and 10, 1973. Also, First Election to Parliament of Bangladesh, ElectionCommission, the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh (Dacca, n.d.; probably 1973).


14/25

114 Western Political Quarterlyprices and government corruption were organized not only by opposition parties,but also by some of the pro-AL elements of the student organizations.33The main reasons behind the failure of opposition parties in the 1973 electioncan be summed up as follows: first, internal organizational weaknesses and infight-ing among the opposition parties made it impossible for them to make any dentin AL support. Not only did the opposition parties put up separate candidatesin most of the 300 constituencies, but they allowed further fragmentation of theirsupport by letting some of their candidates run simultaneously in two or moreconstituencies. The opposition parties also suffered from chronic lack of funds.The AL, on the other hand, not only possessed the necessary funds to fight anelection, but also had the use of government facilities from the time campaigningbegan to the time votes were cast. Generally, the identification of the left partieswith communism also weakened their strength. Traditionally, Bengalis havelooked upon communist ideology as detrimental to their faith.These reasons for failure are reflected in specific party experiences. Bhashaniprofessed Islamic socialism, but he failed to generate sufficient mass support forthree reasons: Islamic socialism as an ideology was never clearly defined by eitherhimself or his followers and therefore it confused many; in post-liberation Bang-ladesh the term "Islamic Socialism" reminded many of Bhutto's "Islamic Social-ism" and consequently became suspect by association; the pro-Peking leanings ofhis party also hurt it at the polls. Professor Muzaffar Ahmad's National Awamiparty had similar difficulties. Its alignment with Moscow and New Delhi becamea liability during the election, when many voters thought the party was too muchunder foreign influence; lack of any real difference between the Muzaffar NAPplatform and the AL platform reduced its appeal to many who were looking for aviable alternative to the AL; finally, the AL leadership, particularly the appeal ofMujib, made the difference. Another left party, JSD (Jatio Shamajtantrik Dalor National Socialist party) was completely identified with Marxism and thereforefailed to make sufficient appeal to the voters to pose any real threat to the AL.The reason JSD polled the second highest number of votes among the oppositionparties was due chiefly to the personal appeal of its leadership, particularly theliberation hero, Major A. Jalil, who is regarded more as a freedom fighter and areform-minded nationalist than a communist. On the other hand, the foundersof the party, Rab and Shiraj, who were the first to challenge Mujib's policiesopenly, came to be closely identified with Marxism as a result of their continuedespousal of scientific socialism. This group also suffered from their alignmentwith the Maoist factions.The 1970 and 1973 AL victories differed in one important respect. Whereasorganizational difficulties and lack of understanding among the opposition partieswere partially responsible for the landslide victory in 1973, Bengali nationalismand anti-West Pakistani sentiments contributed to the party's triumph in 1970.Mujib's personal appeal was a very important factor in the victory of 1970, butit became even more important in 1973 when the AL, as a political party, con-fronted political reality after liberation and was unable to deal with major prob-lems, such as political violence, the Bihari settlement,34 the prisoner of war issue,repatriation, and rapid inflation. The party depended more heavily on Mujib be-33Political commentators critical of the AL suggested that the government took recourse topressure tactics in the constituencies where left-wing party candidates made a strongshowing. See Holiday, March 11, 1973. It was also rumored that Ataur Rahman wononly because he invited foreign journalists to observe polling in his constituency andtheir presence prevented the Awami League workers from stuffing the ballot boxes.84Mujib has declared the Biharis who opted for Pakistan as Pakistanis who should be re-patriated to Pakistan. The Biharis choosing Bangladesh have been declared bonafideBengalis with equal rights and privileges.


15/25

Leadership,Partiesand Politics in Bangladesh 115cause its chiefs found that he was not only a unifying force but also a highlyflexible leader who knew what the people wanted him to do and when to do it.35

IIIThe result of the 1973 election proved that in spite of the growing oppositionto and an increasing distrust of the AL, Mujib'spersonalpopularitywas sufficientto carry the party to victory. How could a leader enjoy so much popularitywhenhis own political party was facing so much mass criticism? As the Indians tried todo with Nehru, the Egyptianswith Nasser, the Indonesians with Sukarno and theArgentinians with Peron, the Bengalis also tried to separate Mujib from his partyin orderto resolve this dilemma of leadership.There were many unfortunate consequences to separating a leader from hisparty. In most democratic systems, the party is an integral part of the politicalprocesswhich converts the needs and the demands of a people into administrativeand political actions. The conversion abruptly stops when a leader is unable todiscipline and control his followers. Secondly, the charisma and popularity of apolitical leader ultimately depends on his ability to keep his promises. Failure tokeep them might be overlooked once or twice, but repeated failures can lead todisaster. Thirdly, the history of governmental corruptionand the arbitrarinessofruling parties in the Pakistani period, as well as in independent Bangladesh, hasbred suspicion, distrust and deep frustrationamong the people, which has madeit that much more difficult for Mujib to salvage the party through instituting aprogram of drastic reorganization. Even if the party were reorganized, there isno guarantee that it will not come to behave as before. In case of another failure,the people are likely to find it much more difficult to separate the leader from hisparty.The political infrastructuresand the line of political communications are sounderdeveloped that Mujib faced great difficulty in communicating his politicaldecisionsto the people in the firstplace, and having them carriedout in the second.This was complicated by the government'sdecision to disband the village guerrillaresistance groups, which had actively participated in the liberation struggle,with-out making any alternate provisions to preserve a political infrastructure. It hasalso contributed to a deeper division and a more acute competition among theex-resistancegroups, who were previously united against the Pakistanis but nowstarted fighting between themselves over control of allocation (relief goods andfunds) and distribution (assets of collaborators) of resources. Often this fightingspreads to non-political aspects of village life which further underminesthe effec-tiveness of governmentpolicies.The original division, which existed prior to the Pakistanimilitary supression,between the Bengali personnel of the armed forces was renewed by Mujib'spreferentialtreatmentof the Rakkhi Bahini, a paramilitarycadre-likegroup equip-ped and trained by the Indian military. The Bengali army, which grew out ofBengali units of the Pakistani army, had not only carried on guerrilla warfarethroughout the liberation struggle but, very significantly, played a crucial role ininiitially resisting the Pakistani military. In fact, the main purpose behind theraising of the Rakkhi Bahini was to reduce the influence of the Pakistani-trainedBengali armed forces. Mujib is well aware of the feeling among a large numberof Bengali officersthat the actual liberationstrugglewas spearheadedand sustainedby themselves and, therefore, they should be given a greatershare in the decision-making process. A large number of Bengali officersfeel that the Indian govern-

The political developments between February and March 1971 amply prove this point.See Zillur R. Khan, "March Movement of Bangladesh: Bengali Struggle for PoliticalPower,"Indian Journal of Political Science, 33 (July-September1973), 306-11.


16/25

116 WesternPolitical Quarterlyment was not fair when it allowed the Indian armyto seize Pakistanimilitaryhard-ware as trophieswithout giving Bengali soldiers their share. Even some pro-IndianBengali officers showed resentment toward this particular policy, when the Delhitalks between Indian and Bengali military commanders to settle the issue came toan impasse in April 1973.36 Most pro-Indian officers, however, feel that Indianhelp in the liberation struggle can never be overestimated and, therefore, theBengali and Indian military should work in close cooperation in maintaining thesecurity of the subcontinent. They also feel that the Bengalis should not resentthe Indian decision to carry off Pakistani military goods amounting, roughly, to$500 million because Indian aid to Bangladesh came to that amount, if not more.The opposite is argued by pro-Pakistani Bengali army officers, who eitherfought for Pakistanor avoided the conflict by securinga quick transfer to units inWest Pakistan. Many have been retired or transferredto civilian administration.Those who have managed to stay in the regular Bangladesh army cannot expectearly or easy promotion. Quite often they have made use of deteriorating eco-nomic conditions to buttress their contentions that they were right in opposing theindependence movement and that India was at the root of all evils, starting withthe guerrillamovement and destructionof the Islamic state of Pakistan, and end-ing with the pauperization of the Bengali nation. Such officers have not onlygained increasedsupport from among the mass of the soldiery,but also have wonover many noncommitted officerswho, though they had fought against the Paki-stanis, were not pro-Indian. In sum, what bothers Mujib most about the regulararmy is the combination of internal conflict and the army's growing disenchant-ment with the League government. This combination could become too explosivefor the civilian government to handle if the contending factions within the armystarted drawing active support from different groups which once took up armsagainst the Pakistanis.Though internal conflicts within the Bangladesh armed forces preventedMujib from relying too heavily on the regular army, he tried to use it to curbwidespread corruption, hoarding, smuggling and political violence. But everytime the operation affected his partymen adversely,he ordered it stopped. His de-cision to stand by his followers, some of whom were allegedly involved in corruptpractices,further alienated those armypersonnelwho were questioningthe Leaguegovernment's commitments to social justice. However, the state of emergency,which Mujib declared in December, 1974, would offer him another opportunityto use the armed forces to enforce the hitherto unenforced laws. Should Mujibfail to make full use of the army again, his potential as a mobilizer and unifiercould be seriouslyundermined.In addition to the military, there are substantialreligiousobstacles to effectiveenforcement. Even the repressionsof Bengali Muslims by the Pakistani Muslims,who considered the former as inferior converts from Hinduism, failed to reducethe influence of Islam over the Bengalimasses. This was amply demonstratedwhenthe Mujib government submitted to the popular demand to restore the morningrecital of the Quran on Radio Bangladesh. The Mujib government also gave into demands to prohibit the serving of alcoholic beverages to Bengali Muslims inprivate clubs. These events indicate that government policies such as birth con-trol and secularmeasures n generalare likelyto face seriousopposition from ortho-dox Bengali Muslims. This is probably why Mujib, in private interviews, em-phasizes the need for family planning, but he never mentions it in mass rallies.

Mujib won an important concession from New Delhi in the India-Bangladesh summit meet-ing of May 15, 1974. At this meeting he got Mrs. Gandhi to agree to the return of allmilitary hardware taken out of Bangladesh by the Indian army after the surrender ofthe Pakistani forces. See, for details, Bangladesh Observer, May 16 and 17; Holiday,May 19, 1974; Bangladesh, Embassy of Bangladesh, Washington, D.C., 4, No. 9, May24, 1974, p. 1.


17/25

Leadership,Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 117If he openly advocates the implementation of population control policies, he mightlose the supportof the Bengali peasantry,most of whom are conservative Muslims.If, on the other hand, he does nothing to control population (which, increasingat3 percent annually, is expected to double in 25 years), Mujib will face increasingcriticism from that same peasantry as the gap between demand for food and itsproduction widens. As in the Middle East, Islam may not be sufficiently dynamicto provide new interpretationsof social events and to help bring about neededsocial reforms, but it is still a strong enough ideological force to prevent revolu-tionarychanges in Bengalisociety.Mujib faces serious problems with his own charisma. According to MaxWeber, charisma is inherently unstable, but its instability can be overcome bywhat he defines as "routinization of charisma," a concept which exemplifies theprocess by which charisma is tranformed from an "extraordinary and purelypersonal relationship (between leader and followers) into an establishedauthoritystructure that is no longer necessarilydependent upon personal charismatic quali-fications in the incumbent leader."37This transformation can best be effected bywhat I. L. Horowitz calls "party charisma," a synthesis "of practical politicalconsiderationand symbolically laden personalist authority."38The role of "partycharisma,"according to Horowitz, "is... to establisha basis of authoritywhich isat one and the same time personal and legal - one that focuses on the party andnot on either the individual or the law as such."39Charismatic leaders like Nasserand Mujib ostensiblytried to routinize their charismaby strengtheningtheir party,but they always ended up weakening it. For example, periodic reshufflingof cabi-nets both by Mujib and Nasser weakened the party structureby creating newerdivisions.Infighting within the charismat's own party also undermines the process ofinstitutionalization. For example, both Nasser's Arab Socialist Union and Mujib'sAwami League have suffered from internal conflict between rival party factions.In both cases, the leader was consideredby his party factions as an institution inhimself, which did not help the process of routinization. Instead, it widened thedivision within the party because each faction vied for his support,as happened inthe Arab Socialist Union between radical communists and Islamic socialists. InMujib's Awami League, the division and the resulting conflict between pro-Moscow social democrats and pro-Washington democratshas lately become morepronounced.40The problem of institutionalizationof charismagoes beyond the centralpartystructure and the omnipresence of its charismatic leader. At the village level,where 90 percent of the Bengalis live, innovative structureshave been introduced,such as the Panchayat committees,4l in order to provide a firm basis for institu-tionalization. But their acceptance by the masses and authority they wield havebeen more a result of the successattained by incumbentsthrough face to face con-tacts and relationshipsrather than the loyalty or commitment of the peasantrytoan impersonalizedpolitical structure. Like Nasser, Mujib has failed to institution-alize the basic administrativestructure. The influential Awami League leader, the7 S. N. Eisenstadt, editor, Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building (Chicago: Uni-versity of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 54-55.38 Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of Inter-national Stratification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 231.89Ibid., p. 232.40 t caused the fall of finance minister M. Tajuddin, who served as prime minister duringMujib's imprisonment in Pakistan and, later, became the leader of pro-Moscow factionwithin the ruling party.41These replaced the basic democracy councils of the Pakistani period. The local bureaucrats,such as circle officers and thana officers, were ordered by Mujib to cooperate with thesecommittees. However, most of the committees are controlled by the members of theAwami League.


18/25

118 WesternPolitical Quarterlypopular village doctor, or the respected Panchayat chairman wield power andauthority because of personal, face-to-face relationships that they have developed,and not because of any loyalty to any institution.

The major problem with these structural innovations, such as the villagebranch of the party dominating the village council, has been the continuation oftraditional patterns of authority and the correspondingly weak legitimacy of theparty. While respect and authority were accorded to leaders like Mujib and Nasseron the basis of their charismatic appeal, the local bureaucracies and the localparties and their incumbents were denied the legitimacy. Like Nasser, Mujibfailed to make a transition from traditional to a legal-rational system through theinstrumentalities of his charisma. This is evident in his efforts to propagate Bengalinationalist and socialist principles among rural people. These principles receivedmass acceptance and, therefore, legitimacy because they were regarded as Mujib'sexpress will, and not because they were the basic principles of Mujib's party. Asin the Egyptian case, rather than being the vehicle of institutionalization, Mujib'scharisma became an institution in itself.The failure of charisma as an institutionalizer has resulted in the shift ofresponsibility for policy implementation from institutions to the charismat and hisclose advisors.42 This is when the popular efforts to separate the leader from hisparty or ideology stop. Even the rural masses, who previously gave their un-questioned loyalty to the leader, start holding him responsible for deterioratingconditions. This creates the need for reinforcement of charisma. Like somecharismats - Nasser, Indira Gandhi, Per6n - Mujib sought replenishment of hischarisma from his neutral foreign policy in the face of considerable pressure andhis diplomatic coup with Iran and the Arab countries, where he received assur-ances of economic support.43 The 1974 agreements with seven multi-national oilcompanies for offshore oil exploration, his recent meeting with President Ford, hisaddress to the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress and to the UnitedNations, served to reinforce somewhat Mujib's rapidly depleting charisma. Usually,however, charisma depletes faster than the leader can replenish it. This is preciselythe reason why theorists, such as, among others, Max Weber, Edward Shills, S. N.Eisenstadt, I. L. Horowitz, Jean Lacouture, C. Geerts, David Apter and Ann RuthWillner,44 have emphasized the process of institutionalization through which thecharismatic, unusual, characteristics are transferred from the unique personalityor the unstructured group to orderly institutional reality.4 The most powerful used to be pro-Moscowfinance minister Tajuddin who resignedfromthe cabinet in November, 1974, just before Henry Kissinger paid an official visit toBangladesh. The coincidence raised speculation in the Bengali press that his ousterwas calculated to please the Americangovernment. See Holiday (Dacca), November3,1974, p. 1. Other close advisorswere Syed Nazrul Islam (former Minister for Indus-tries and now, Vice-President), Dr. Kamal Hossain (Foreign Minister), Tufail Ahmed(Political Secretary to Prime Minister), and Ghazi Golam Mostafa (President of theDacca District Awami League). After declaring a state of emergency,Mujib chose ashis close advisorsa senior civil servant, A. K. M. Ahsan, and a civil engineer, MajorGeneral Majedul Huq. This is seen by the Bengali elite as a new trend of the govern-ment's increasingreliance on technocrats. Holiday (Dacca), February21, 1975.43The People's Republic of Bangladesh,Bangladesh,Press & InformationDivision, Embassyof Bangladesh,Washington,D.C., November15, 1974, pp. 1-2.44Respectively, n Theory of Social and Economic Organization, introduction by TalcottParsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 358-373; "Charisma,Orderand Status," American Sociological Review, 30 (April 1965), 199-203; Tradition,Change and Modernity (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 119-49; Three Worldsof De-velopment: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Ox-ford University Press, 1966), pp. 231-43; The Demigods: CharismaticLeadership inthe Third World (New York: Knopf, 1970), pp. 93-106; "Ideology as a CulturalSystem,"in D. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964),pp. 62-63; The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1965); CharismaticPolitical Leadership: A Theory (Princeton: Princeton University,Centerof InternationalStudies, monograph,May 1968), pp. 1-48.


19/25

Leadership,Partiesand Politics in Bangladesh 119Mujib's inability to build new institutions,to replacethe ones destroyedduringthe liberation struggle, such as a respected bureaucracywhose authority was ac-cepted at every level of society, the viability of opposition parties (the Awami

League was one between 1949 and 1954, and between 1958 and 1971), an impartialjudiciary, a free enterpriseeconomy, an open education system,has brought abouta crisis of confidencein regard to the political leadership. This has led to a criticalevaluation of the government's claims of honesty, justice and self-sacrifice. Theresult has been a revival and intensification of the issues of autonomy (or inde-pendence) and socioeconomic justice which originally created divisions betweenthe Bengalis and non-Bengalis (including Pakistanis) and between the Bengalisthemselves. Gone are the unity and consensus achieved among Bengalis duringand immediately after the liberation struggle in respectwith basic national objec-tives and ways of attaining them. It has given rise to a situation in which publicconfusion has increased and the chances of social mobilization have correspond-ingly decreased.No doubt, in the early days of crisis,immediately following independence, thecharismatic leadership of Mujib providedbadly needed unity and direction for thecountry. The Bengalis were inspired to maintain law and order in the absence oforganizedpolice forces (the Bengali police forces were destroyedby the Pakistanimilitary's preemptive strike on the night of March 25, 1971, when the Pakistanisuppression of the Bengalis started). Mujib's charismatic appeal also kept theoriginal division between the Bengalis to a minimum. His preaching of the prin-ciples of Bengali nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism raised hopesamong the Bengalis,who were expecting to enjoy the fruits of independence.But the rising expectation of the Bengalis only served to aggravate the crisis,when their leadershipfailed to fulfill them. For example, many expected a betterlife after the Pakistaniexploitation ended. Instead, life after independencebecameincreasingly more difficult. In spite of massive UN aid amounting to $3.8 bil-lion, given between January 1972 and December 1973, the economic conditionsteadily deteriorated. Though it was not developmental aid or, in other words, itwas given on humanitarian grounds for relief and rehabilitation, it released thestate's own resources to be used for development. Questions are now being raisedby the internationaldonors as well as by the Bengalis themselves on how such aidand the releasedBengaliresourceswere used.Questions are also being asked about the problems faced by Mujib and hisclose advisors in implementing the much espoused principles of Bengali socialismand democracy. In the name of socialism, all banks and industries with capitalinvestment of over 2.5 million Takas (about $300,000) were nationalized. Therepublic's gross national product decreased at least 10 percent; meanwhile, thepopulation increased about 15 percent.45 As a result of sagging individual incen-tive and rising cost of material, the government raised the ceiling of allowablecapital investment of private industries to 30 million Takas, an increase of over1,000 percent.46 In addition, the moratorium on nationalization of foreign in-dustrieswas raised from ten to fifteen years.47However, the government'sdecisionwas vague in regard to properties (houses and land in residentialareas) and small(and a few middle-sized) industrieswhich were abandoned by the Pakistanisand,later, taken over by Bengalis. By the government'sown admission, only 5,000 outof 20,000 abandonedhouses have been recoveredfrom illegal possession. Only 139out of innumerablesmall and medium industrieshave been returnedto the owners

6 WallStreet Journal,November26, 1974.46The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh, Embassyof Bangladesh, Washington,D.C., August 1, 1974,pp. 1-2.47Ibid., p. 2.


20/25

120 WesternPolitical Quarterlyor disinvested.48Not only has socialism been unsuccessfulin usheringin economicstability, but, in its name, many have increased their private properties. Thecountry'seconomic policies seem to consist largely of socialist slogans; the dedica-tion, the discipline and organization necessary to run a socialized economy arenot there.

Just as the failure of the general economy has lately widened the already re-vived division between the Bengalis,so has the failure of parliamentarydemocracy.First of all, the overwhelming victory of Mujib and his party at the 1973 generalelection greatlyreduced the chances of a balanced growth of parliamentarydemoc-racy in the country. Out of 300 seats in the Constituent Assembly, Mujib'sLeague had 292, giving the administration the flavor of a one-party government.Moreover, when issues, such as restoration of abandoned propertiesto their right-ful owners and violation of fundamental rights by government, tended to dividethe majority, Mujib and his advisors disciplined the deviant members of theirparty by reminding them that the Assembly was constituted for the purposes ofconstitution-makingand, therefore, it must not be considered as a sovereign de-liberating body in the spirit of parliamentary democracy. The printing and pressordinance, the three months ban on strikes, the prohibition of public gathering,the declaration of a state of emergency under which civil rights have been sus-pended and, finally, the establishment of a single-party system have underminedthe spirit of liberaldemocracy.When the division between the Bengalis was widening on all these issues,Mujib tried to reverse the processby inviting political parties to unite for a com-mon cause of national progress. In 1973, as mentioned earlier, the first alliancetook shape between the Awami League party, the National Awami party (Muzaf-far) and the Communist party of Bangladesh (CPB).49 The chances of anotheralliance have greatly increased after the establishment of a one-party system.According to the fourth amendment of the constitution, passed overwhelminglyby the Bangladesh Parliament in January 1975, independentsand membersof theopposition parties will have to join the National party, headed by Mujib, in orderto participate actively in politics (and to retain their seats in the Parliament).5"The opposition parties could never present any real opposition to Mujib and theLeague. In 1974, NAP (requisitionist), JSD and CPB (Leninist) triedonce moreto unite against the League under the name of JGU (Jatio Ganomukti Union orNational People's Freedom Union) and failed again.51 They had a partial successwith a general strike on November 26, 1974, which was first called by the JSD inspite of the government's ban on all strikes, to forge a united mass movementagainst "a thoroughly corrupt, unworthy, and anti-people repressiveregime prop-ped up by hegemonistic India, revisionist Soviet Union and imperialist UnitedStates."52 These Marxist parties do not have the necessary mass base, nor arethey expected to establish such a base in the foreseeable future, to challengeeffectivelyMujib's charismatic leadership.Probably,Marxism and Islam will nevermix sufficientlyto start a class struggle which could ultimately lead to a dictator-ship of an Islamic proletarianstate.'Holiday (Dacca), November 24, 1974. All the banks, except two, and all the major in-dustrieswere owned by Pakistaniswho abandonedthem after independence.4 The alliance was called Gono Oyko Jote (People's Unity group) which established itsbranchesat the districtlevel.0The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh, Embassyof Bangladesh, Washington,D.C., February1, 1975,p. 2.Holiday (Dacca), November 10, 1974. The resignationof Bhashani from the chairman-ship of the National Awami party (B) increased the chances of its alliances with theMarxistparties. See ibid., January12, 1975.63 Ibid., December 1, 1974.


21/25

Leadership,Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 121Neither does Mujib's leadership face any immediate challenge from theregular army. It could pose a real threat to him if a workable understandingwere to come about between it and the paramilitary forces- Rakkhi Bahini

(Securitiy Force). But even if such an unlikely alliance were to take place, otherelements, such as the Awami Jubo League (Youth League)53 and Lal Bahini(Worker's Force), could probably have a neutralizing effect. Furthermore, forthe time being, Mujib is safe from the internal factions of his party. None of thefactions is politically viable enough to challenge him, because they themselveshavederived their legitimacy from Mujib, and without him they will disintegrate.This raises a crucial question about the future of Bangladesh. Theorists ofcharismatic leadership agree that crises of society (lack of unity, order, identity,economic growth, participation, etc.) create situations in which the unusual andextraordinary characteristics of the charismat are desired by people who aresociopsychologically affected by the crisis. The theorists also point out that thecharismat restoresnormality by acting as a bridgebetween aspirationsof the massesand realities of survival. When he fails in this role and the crisis continues, acounter-leadershipemerges, which then serves as stabilizer (by establishment ofinstitutionsto bring about an orderedrelationshipbetween individuals and groups,based on legal-rational considerations). But when a counter-leaderfails to emerge,and the people are left with the original charismat, who himself has failed to usehis charismato build integrativeinstitutions,the whole society startsshowing signsof dissolution. Bangladesh seems to be passing through this stage, as Argentina,Egypt and Indonesia have passed during the last days of charismatsPer6n, Nasserand Sukarno respectively.The need for institutionalization and mobilization has been emphasized bythe Bengali planning commission, which was set up under Mujib's orders,as fun-damental to meaningful social change. The need for innovation and adjustment,the commission felt, can never be fully met by functionaries of government. Thecommission concluded that "it is only a political cadre with firmrootsin the peopleand motivated by the new ideology (Mujibism) and willing to live and workamong the people as one of them that can mobilize the masses and transformtheir pattern of behavior."54 But the problem with the development of cadres ina multi-partysystem is that other parties will also try to develop their own cadres,which may very well lead to open fights between them as happened in Germanyin the early 1930s and in Argentina, Bangladesh, Ceylon, India and Pakistan inthe early 1970s. A one-party system (as adopted by Mujib by amending the con-stitution in January 1975) is more likely to establishcadres who might be able towork outside the government and, at the same time, to mobilize support for gov-ernment policies and their implementation. This would amount to Mujib's as-sumption of the ultimate responsibility (by abrogating the right of the oppositionparties to exist) for Bangladesh. But, like Nasser, Mujib is attracted to, yet fear-ful of, such responsibility.55 His assumption of absolute authority through his

8 Since Bangladesh has a high percentage of young people (53.1 percent of the total popula-tion belongs to an age group 15-24, whereas 17.7 percent of the U.S. population fallsunder the same age group). Source: U.S. Census of 1970 and Bangladesh Census of1974. This youth organization, led by Sheikh Mujib's nephew--Sheikh Moni, couldbecome ultimately a source of political strength to Mujib. According to newspaper re-ports, 100,000 young people have already been recruited as members. Its leaders plan-ned to start a purge in March, 1973, to "eliminate opponents of Mujibbad," but itnever began. See Morning News, February 16, 1973.MGovernment of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, First Five Year Plan: Social and Politi-cal Perspective, in Morning News, November 28, 1973.

" On July 17, 1973, in an interview with the author, Mujib said that he could have becomea dictator, but he did not want absolute power and responsibility. See, for a compari-son of attitudes of Mujib and Nasser, Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of theRevolution (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes, and Marshall, 1959), pp. 61-62; see also John


22/25

122 WesternPolitical Quarterlydeclaration of a state of emergency for the nation in December 1974, is a sig-nificant change in his attitude toward administrative centralism and a single-partygovernment.56

Previously, ideological uncertainty and administrative inexperience preventedMujib from concentrating all authority in his hands or making badly needed dele-gation of authority to lower hierarchies within his administration as well as ininstitutions outside it. The result is that power at every level is personalized, leav-ing the masses very little scope for appeal to institutionalized authority for redressof their grievances. The government planners urge the people to report allegedcorruption to the authorities, and not just spread rumors and grumble about it;but they should realize that the people do not want to take risks of reprisals byreporting corruption to officials who are either corrupt themselves or lack theinstitutional support to press charges against other officials or party-men. Like

P. Entelis, "Nasser'sEgypt: The Failure of CharismaticLeadership," Orbis, 18 (Sum-mer 1974), 463-64.5 In an interview on June 28, 1975, in Dacca, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman told the authorthat divisive activities of the opposition parties, especially the radical parties, com-pelled him to institute a one-party systemof government. Through a centralizedparty(with Mujibismas its ideology) he hopes to bring about another revolutionarychangeto the Bengali society. "With a strong chain of command and a careful delegation ofauthority and responsibility to successive levels of the party organization,"assertedMujib, "I am mobilizing the Bengalis again, not against any external enemies butagainst internal enemies corrupt officials, black marketeers, smugglers and perpe-trators of political violence. Under my orders (President'sOrder No. 9) many publicofficialshave been discharged (including one state minister, some middle-level bureau-crats and about 300 lower-level government employees), and now black marketeersand smugglerscan face death by firingsquad if found guilty. I believe in extrememea-sures. Either I shall survivepoliticallyif I succeed in improvingthe economicsituationsor I shall go down if I fail to bring about improvements."Indeed, by the end of July1975 prices of staple food, which had soared to 400 to 600 percent between 1970 and1974, showedsignsof decline.Following is the organization structure of the National party called BangladeshKrishakSramikAwamiLeague (BAKSAL)

Chairman (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was also President of the republic)Parliamentary Sub-committee in Secretary-General (M. Mansoor All, who was also the Prime MinisterSub-committee party discipline 1 of the country)

Secretry ecretary Secretary(Sheikh Fazbul Huq Moni, (A. Razzak) (7illur Rahman)Mujib's nephew)Executive Committee (15 members)Central Committee (115 members)

Five Fronts_Jatio Krishak League (Peasants' Front)Secretary: Phani MajumdarDistrict Committees & Councils National CouncilJatio Sramik League (Labor Front) (deliberative body --Thana Committee & Councils Secretary: Yusuf Ali elects 2/3 of theI 1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~members of the centralUnion Councils (Primary Groups) _Jatio Mohila League (Women's Front) committee, the party(established with 5 full members Secretary: Sajeda Choudhury, M.P. chairman nominates the[a distinction has been made in rest, every five years)the party constitution between _Jatio Jubo League (Youth Front)full members and applicant- Secretary: Tofail Ahmed, M.P.members] belonging to anygovernment or non-government _Jatio Chatra League (Students' Front)organization. Whenmembership Secretary: Sheikh Shahidul Islam (nephew of Mujib)exceeds 20, than a workingcommittee must be elected. AnyPrimary Group belonging to thecountry's armed forces must bedirectly supervised by the ExecutiveCouncil of the Central party.)

Mujib also reorganizedthe country's administrativesystem, dividing the originalseventeen districts into sixty districts and putting each under an appointed governor(who has been vested with much greater financial powers than his predecessor--thedistrict magistrateor deputy commissioner). Mujib told the author that this admini-strative change was designed to end the colonial administrativetraditionby destroyingthe policy-makingpower of the bureaucracy (membersof careerbureaucracycomprise13 percent of the governors) and by establishinggrassrootspolitical and administrativeinstitutionsin order to generate administrativeresponsiveness o and participationfromthe masses.


23/25

Leadership,Partiesand Politics in Bangladesh 123Nasser, Mujib's temperament training and background prevented delegation andrelinquishment of authority, which would allow the development of intermediateorganizational structure. Again, like Nasser, he is intricately bound to the thoughtand temperament of his own society: he has been suspicious, conspiratorial, dis-trustful, and fearful of relinquishing power. Probably, these traits helped to pre-vent the transformation of Bangladesh into the prosperous-socialist society-Sonar Bangla (Golden Bengal) -he had hoped for. Paradoxically, however,while the chances for Mujib to transform charismatic authority into a more per-manent institutional authority are slim, it is doubtful whether or not the processof institutionalization can be successfully completed without such a charismat.

POSTSCRIPT

On August 15, 1975, in a pre-dawn coup staged by a handful of middle-levelofficers of the Bengali army, Mujib, his wife, two married sons and their wives, oneminor son and all inhabitants of the house, including other relatives and servants,were killed. The Rakkhi Bahini, a countervailing force carefully raised by Mujibto keep the Pakistani trained Bengali army in constant check, did come to Mujib'sdefense. But physical distance (Rakkhi Bahini's base is located in Sabhar, aboutfifteen miles from Dacca, whereas the army base is located about five miles fromMujib's residence), surprise and lack of combat experience were chiefly responsiblefor the inability of the Bahini to counter the attack of the crack units of the EastBengal regiment of the army agai