Anatomy of Hartal Politics in Bangladesh

8/3/2019 Anatomy of Hartal Politics in Bangladesh

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Anatomy of Hartal Politics in BangladeshAuthor(s): Akhtar HossainReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2000), pp. 508-529Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021159 .

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ANATOMYOF HARTAL OLITICSINBANGLADESHAkhtar Hossain

Political instabilityremains the key impedimentto eco-nomic development in Bangladesh. With the passing of time, the hope forpolitical stabilityis becoming moreillusoryandpeople from all walks of lifearelosing confidencein the abilityof the presentpoliticalleadership o estab-lish a stable democraticpolitical system. It is not that the people have beendenied their democraticrightsin selecting leaders. General elections of onekind or anotherhave been held on a fairly regular basis since the country'sindependence in 1971, but they have not solved its fundamental politicalproblem, that is, the prevalenceof both authoritarian nd agitationalpolitics(also known as hartalpolitics). It was widely expectedthat the returnof theparliamentaryorm of democracyin 1991, after the overthrow of GeneralErshad'squasi-military ulein December 1990, would bring political stabilityand end authoritarianismn all affairs of state. The reality has been quitedifferent. The facade of democraticexperimentsover the past decade haspushed the nation toward what Fareed Zakaria calls an "illiberal democ-racy."2 For ordinarypeople, this experiment has been akin to a jump fromthe frying pan into the fire. The dangeris thatthe explosive political situa-

AkhtarHossain s Internationalconomist, MF-SingaporeegionalTrainingnstitute,ndSeniorLecturern Economics,University f Newcastle,Australia.AsianSurvey, 0:3, pp.508-529. ISSN:0004-4687? 2000by TheRegents f theUniversity f California/Society.ll rights eserved.SendRequestsor Permissiono Reprinto:RightsandPermissions, niversity f CaliforniaPress,Journals ivision,2000CenterSt.,Ste.303, Berkeley,CA94704-1223.

1. To be sure, nationalelections in Bangladesh have not always been free and fair. Voterigging is a common occurrence n the country. The strongerthe political party, the greaterthechance has been that it would indulge in vote rigging of one form or another. The commonattitudeof a candidate s not merely to win but to win by a large margin. In general, vote riggingtakes place with the connivance of election officials and the administration. Moreover, partyactivists (actually or perceived to be armed) often keep many voters away from voting centers.

2. FareedZakaria,"The Rise of IlliberalDemocracy,"ForeignAffairs (November-December1997), pp. 22-43.

508


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AKHTAR HOSSAIN 509tionnow existing within the countrymay lead to unwarranted olitical devel-opments.

What has gone wrongfor this country n the political sense? The commonperceptionis that Bangladesh's political instability is fundamentallya self-inflicted nationalindulgenceon trivial issues in which all social groups will-ingly or unwillingly show their proclivities. While this perceptionhas sometruth,it does not tell the whole story. Any attempt to identify factors thatmighthave causedpolitical instability n Bangladeshwould requirean inves-tigation of the social, cultural,and political traits that createsocial and politi-cal disharmonyratherthan a unified force for economic prosperity. Thisarticle addressessome of these issues within a broader perspective. Espe-cially, it attempts to explain the following puzzle: why does the politicalscene in Bangladeshcontinue to be characterizedby instability despite theconvergence toward the center (in terms of economic policy and politicalideology) on the partof both the major political partiesand voters?

The first section of this article provides a historicalprofile of the majorpolitical partiesthatpresentlydominateBangladesh's politics. It then offerssome thumbnail characteristicsof voting behavior in Bangladesh, followedby an analysis of the process of convergence to the center of the politicalspectrumby both the two major political partiesand the electorate since thelate 1970s. The second section explains why these partiesdo not cooperatewith each other (that is, conduct political activities as per parliamentarynorms and practices) and thereby establish a mutuallybeneficial two-partypolitical system. It arguesthat confrontationalpolitics as practicedby theseparties are a manifestationof an in-built undemocraticpolitical culture inwhich each partyseeks to monopolize state power as if the otherpartydoesnot even have the rightto exist. This themeis furtherdevelopedin the thirdsection of the articlethroughan argument hat,in an underdeveloped ociety,the mere transferof political power from the militaryto politicians or theconduct of ritualisticelections do not necessarily establish a stable demo-craticpolitical system. In such a society, the existing feudal political culture(often under the rubricof dynastic political leadership) s more likely to pro-mote confrontation hanstabilityandcause a deterioration ather han an im-provementin the governanceof the state.

Profile of Major Political PartiesAlthough Bangladeshhas a large numberof registeredpolitical partiesfromall across the ideological spectrum,only four of them won seats in the 1996parliamentaryelections: the Bangladesh Awami League (hereafter theAwami League), the BangladeshNationalistParty (BNP), the Jatiya Party,


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510 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XL, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 2000and the Jamaat-i-IslamiBangladesh (hereafterthe Jamaat-i-Islami).3 Otherparties eitherdo not have significantmass supportor remainalignedwith themajor parties on both political and nonpolitical issues. The sections that fol-low trace party origins, ideologies, and roles in Bangladesh's political devel-opment.

TheAwamiLeagueThe Awami League is a faction of the Muslim League, which was formed in1906 to representthe interestsof Muslims in undivided India. The MuslimLeague later led the movement for the creation of an independentPakistan,which occurredin 1947. In 1949, the left-leaning faction of the MuslimLeague in then-East Bengal split off to form the Awami Muslim League.The word "Muslim"was later dropped from the party's name as partof aneffort at secularizingthe organization. Enjoying negligible support n WestPakistan,the Awami League became a regional partyand came into promi-nence underthe leadershipof Sheikh MujiburRahman (popularlyknown asSheikh Mujib) duringthe autonomymovement in then-East Pakistan in thelate 1960s. Despite being a petit-bourgeoisparty,the Awami League propa-gated socialist and populist economic policies during the autonomymove-ment. This was part of a strategy to consolidate its leadership in theautonomy movement over the left-leaning parties, especially the NationalAwami Party.4

In the 1970 general elections, the Awami League won a majorityof seatsin the national Parliament and was expected to form a governmentat thecenter. However, Parliamentwas neither convenednor power transferred othe Awami League. A Pakistanimilitarycrackdownon the common peoplein Dhakaon March25, 1971, precipitated he war for Bangladesh'sindepen-dence, at a time when political negotiations on constitutional issues had3. TheJamaat-i-Islami oes not figure strongly ntomy analysis,but a briefdescriptionof this

partyis warranted.The Jamaat-i-Islamis a "fundamentalist"slamicpartywith a long, contro-versialhistory. Its parent organization Jamaat-i-IslamiHind) was established in the undividedIndia andopposedthe creationof Pakistan. The Jamaat-i-IslamiBangladesh s the former East-ern Wing of the Jamaat-i-IslamiPakistan;it actively collaborated with the PakistanimilitaryduringtheIndependenceWar. Allegationspersistthatmanyof its membersparticipatedn polit-ical assassinationsof many intellectualsandothers. After the countrybecame independent, hepartywas banneduntil the political change in 1975. Since then it has rehabilitated tself in thepolitical arena,although ts supportbase remains imited. Unlike othermajorpoliticalparties,itis cadre basedand believed to be well funded. It propagates he establishmentof anIslamic statein Bangladeshandmaintainsspecialrelationswith Pakistanand most of the Muslim countries nthe Middle East. Like the BNP, the Jamaat-i-Islamiemains anti-Indian n rhetoricbut does notpreachcommunalism in a strict sense.

4. The NationalAwami Partywas formed in the late 1950s by the left faction of the AwamiLeague under the leadershipof MaulanaAbdul Hamid Khan Bhashani.


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AKHTAR HOSSAIN 511stalled. Most AwamiLeague leaders took refuge in India and provided polit-ical leadership or the IndependenceWar. The military leadership n the warcame mostly from Bengali officers who deserted from the Pakistani army.The common masses, although without visible political leadership, whole-heartedly supportedthe struggle and provided materials and sanctuary forfreedom fighters (popularlyknown as the muktibahini). Most of the muktibahini were drawnfrom the middle and lower-middle class with rural andsemi-urbansocial background. The Indiangovernment eventually providedmilitary anddiplomatic support o the provisionalgovernmentof Bangladeshoperatingin Calcutta.5 Bangladesh became independenton December 16,1971, following the surrender f the Pakistanimilitary to the joint commandof the Bangladesh-India orces in Dhaka.

The Awami League,headedby Sheikh MujiburRahman,formedthe firstgovernmentof Bangladeshandpropagated uch stateprinciplesas socialism,secularism, andBengali nationalism. However, these conceptsremainedun-defined and, as the governmentbecame unpopular,ost muchof theirnoveltyvalue. Among the many factors that caused the downturn of the govern-ment's popularity,the majorones were economic mismanagement,rampantcorruption,political repression, and, most controversially,the establishmentof a one-partypolitical system, e.g., the BangladeshKrishakSramik AwamiLeague (BKSAL) system. In particular,the government never recoveredfrom its role in, andmismanagementof, the 1974 famine. TheMujib govern-ment was overthrownon August 15, 1975, by a bloody military coup. Sincethen, the Awami League remainedin the opposition until it won the 1996parliamentary lections and formed the present governmentwith supportofthe Jatiya Party.

The Awami League's political fortuneshave fluctuatedwidely since the1960s. While it enjoyed the overwhelming backingof the public duringthelate 1960s and early 1970s, its supportbase has graduallyshrunksince thenand the partywon only 37% of the vote in 1996. In recentyears, the partyhas made some changesto its basic strategies. Forexample,on the ideologi-cal front, the Awami League has given up socialism, thoughit has retainedsecularism and Bengali nationalism as its principles. These principlesandsome otherfactorshave proven effective in retainingmost of the Hinduvoteas a bloc. In the sphereof international elations,it has maintained riendlyrelationswith India butappears o have become cool towardEastEuropeand5. The formerSoviet Union provided militaryand diplomaticsupport o India andtherebyto

Bangladesh'sstrugglein its IndependenceWar,while the U.S. gave both diplomaticandmilitarysupport o the governmentof Pakistan. Chinaprovided diplomaticsupport o the Pakistanigov-ernmentas well but put pressureon Islamabadto solve this internalmatterthrough politicalrather han militarymeans.


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512 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE000the countriesof the former Soviet Union. Its relationshipswith both the U.S.and China have improved, but they have yet to be consolidated.

The Bangladesh Nationalist PartyGeneral ZiaurRahman(popularlyknown as Zia) founded the BNP in 1978when he became president of the country. He was the deputy chief of thearmy during the 1975 military coup but was not directly involved in it. Hebecame the de facto leader of the military governmentthat was formed onNovember 7, 1975, after a series of coups and countercoups. Over the nexttwo years, Zia consolidated his power andpromotedhimself to the chief ex-ecutive positionof president n 1977. He then contested and won a presiden-tial election in 1978. Zia's next step was to provide a democratic shape toBangladesh's political structure. After founding the BNP, he organized theparliamentary lections of 1979 in which the BNP gaineda majorityof seats.In the process of this democratizationdrive,he allowed all the political par-ties (includingthe bannedJamaat-i-Islamiand the Muslim League) to func-tion openly withoutrestrictions.

Thus, within a short period of time, Zia was able to create the mass-ori-ented BNP vis-a-vis the Awami League. Although critics suggest that hisposition of power and patronagemade the trick possible, other factors werebehind the success of this party. For example, while the Awami League re-mained a center-left political party, the BNP located itself at the vacantcenter-rightposition in termsof ideology and economic policy. It was thenable to draw supportfrom disenchantedgroups who either held right-wingviews or opposed the Awami League for other reasons. These groups in-cluded the formersupportersof the MuslimLeagueandmanydeserters romthe Awami League. Since many of the Muslim League supporterscollabo-rated with the Pakistanimilitary duringthe IndependenceWar, they found inthe BNP a respectableforum for political rehabilitation.This respectabilitycame from the fact that Zia was a war hero and his honesty was beyondreproach.While his position of power andpatronagewas indeed instrumen-tal in gaining personal popularityfrom those who sufferedthe most duringthe Awami League government,the institutionalsupportof the BNP camefrom the military itself. Nevertheless, the BNP was far from serving as aplatformof discarded eaders or right-wingzealots. The party's intellectualleadershipcame from the supportersof various pro-Beijing,left-leaning par-ties that opposed the Awami League and remainedcritical of India's hege-monic interference n Bangladesh'saffairs.6

6. As already indicated,the BNP is located at the center-rightposition in terms of politicalideology and economic policy. The supportersof pro-Beijing political partiesdiscardedtheirsocialist economic policies in favor of the BNP platformbecause they absolutely opposed the


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AKHTARHOSSAIN 513ZiaurRahmanwas assassinated n May 1981 duringa failed militarycoup.The BNP governmentretainedpower afterhis assassinationand a new presi-dent, Abdus Sattar,was duly elected in December 1981 through a general

election. The Sattargovernmentwas overthrown n March 1982 by a blood-less military coup under General Ershad,then the chief of the army. TheBNP was in disarrayafter the coup, and the Awami Leaguetook the opportu-nity to provide tacit support o the militarygovernmentwith the hope that theBNP would fade away once it was out of power. But the reality was quitedifferent. The BNP not only survivedpolitically but also won the parliamen-taryelections held in February1991. This election was held afterthe fall ofthe Ershad government in December 1990 following urban mass uprisings.The BNP remained n power for the next five years,but the last two yearsofits tenure were markedby continuouspolitical agitation led by the AwamiLeague. The BNP lost to the Awami Leaguein the 1996 parliamentarylec-tions. Since then, it has been in the opposition.The BNP has passedthroughvariouscriticalstages in establishing tself asa mass-oriented,center-rightorganization. One reason for the party's massappeal has been that,along with its pro-marketeconomic philosophy,it haschampionedthe concept of Bangladeshi nationalism that has implicitly up-staged the Muslim identity of a majority of the people. This has given theBNP an edge over the Awami League,whose ethnicity-basedBengali nation-alism and secularism lost some of their appeal over the years. The rise ofHindu nationalism in Indiahas particularlydiminished the viability of secu-larism in Bangladesh's politics. On internationalrelations, the BNP main-tains friendly relations with China, the U.S., Pakistan, and the Muslimcountriesof the Middle East. In recent years, it has become anti-Indian nrhetoricbut not necessarilyin practice.

TheJatiya PartyGeneral Ershad came to power in March 1982 througha military coup andruledthe country until December 1990. From his initialposition as the mar-tial law administrator, e moved onto the presidencyof a quasi-militarygov-ernment hrougha referendum.Like his predecessor,ZiaurRahman,Ershadfoundeda political party;he hoped that his center-rightJatiyaParty,estab-lished in 1986, would replace the BNP. As such, there are no fundamentaldifferences between these partiesin termsof ideology and policy. As indi-Awami League's apparentcomplicity in growing Indianhegemony. The pro-BeijingNationalAwami Party (NAP) under Maulana Bhashani at one stage supported he center-rightmilitarygovernmentof Pakistan underAyub Khanduringthe 1960s, when the latter courtedfriendshipwith China. Thus, the strategicalliance betweencenter-rightBNP andthe left-leaning pro-Beij-ing political parties was not uncommon in Bangladesh's politics. Importantly, he supportofpro-Beijingpolitical partiesdid not change the locationalposition of the BNP.


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514 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XL, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 2000catedearlier,the Awami League providedtacit support o the Ershadgovern-ment and participatedin the 1986 parliamentaryelections. However, theJatiyaPartywon a majorityof seats while the Awami League remained n theopposition. As the BNP did not participate n the 1986 plebiscite, the partyfound a political platformfor startingan agitation movement against the Er-shad government. However, the BNP was not successful in dislodging thegovernmentuntil the Awami League reluctantly oined the effort in 1990.The Ershad government fell in December 1990 after an urban-basedmassuprising.

Despite the loss of powerandlater the jail sentenceto General Ershadforvarious charges against him, the Jatiya Party managedto win a significantnumberof seats in both the 1991 and 1996 parliamentary lections. After the1996 parliamentary lections, it played the kingmaker's role by supportingthe Awami Leaguein formingthe present government. Inreturn or Ershad'support, he Awami League governmentprovidedtacit support or his releasefrom jail on bail. Their relationship,however, did not last long. The JatiyaParty broke up in 1999 and only a faction decided to remain loyal to theAwami League government. Ershadtook the rest of the party into the oppo-sition ratherthan remain as a coalition partnerof the Awami League. Re-cently, the JatiyaParty (Ershad)and the Jamaat-i-Islamihave joined a four-party opposition alliance led by the BNP. At the time of writing, this coali-tion was demandingan early election. There are indications that if thesepartieswin sufficient seats in the next parliamentary lection, they may trytoform a coalition government.

Distributionof Both ParliamentarySeatsand Votersamong Political PartiesTable 1 reportsthe distributionof bothparliamentaryeats and voters amongthe major political partiesin the selected parliamentary lections for the pe-riod 1970-96. It shows that the Awami League gained nearly all the seatsand 73% of the popularvote in the 1970 and 1973 elections. However, theheyday of the Awami League did not last for long. The section that followswill show that the political change in 1975 createda situationthatled to analteration n the distributionof voters in termsof ideology and policy. Thisprocess has continued since then. Currently,he Awami Leaguehas the sup-portof no more than35%of the voting public,which is roughly equal to thevoting supportfor the BNP. Thus, approximately70% of the voting publicsupportseither of these two parties. The Jatiya Party and Jamaat-i-Islamishare the continuedsupportof around20% of the voters. Therefore,the fourmajor partiesjointly have the supportof around90% of the voters, respec-tively. The smallertwo among these now hold strategic political power be-


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AKHTARHOSSAIN 515

TABLE 1 Distribution of Both Parliamentary Seats and Voters among PoliticalParties in Selected Elections, 1970-1996Awami Jatiya(a) Percent of Seats Won League BNP Party Others

Pakistana1970 parliamentarylection 98.8 NA NA 1.2BangladeshParliamentarylection: 1973 97.7 NA NA 2.3Parliamentarylection:1979 13.0 69.0 NA 18.0Parliamentarylection: 1986 25.3 NA 51.0 23.7Parliamentarylection: 1991 31.0b 46.7 11.7 10.6Parliamentarylection:1996 (June) 48.7 38.7 10.7 2.7

(b) Percent of Votes ReceivedCPakistana1970 generalelection 72.6 NA NA 27.4eBangladeshParliamentarylection: 1973 73.2 NA NA 26.8Parliamentarylection: 1979 24.6 41.2 NA 34.2Parliamentarylection:1986 26.2 NA 42.3 31.5

Parliamentarylection: 1991 32.6b 30.8 11.9 24.7Parliamentarylection:1996d (June) 37.5 33.3 16.1 13.1SOURCE: Author's compilation based on the Bangladesh Election Commission Resultsreported by A. S. Haque and M. A. Hakim, "Elections in Bangladesh:Tools of Legitimacy,"Asian Affairs 19:4 (April 1993), pp. 248-61; TalukdarManiruzzaman,BangladeshRevolutionand Its Aftermath(Dhaka:BangladeshBooks International,1980); and Stanley A. Kochanek,"Bangladesh n 1996: The 25th Year of Independence,"Asian Survey37:2 (February1997), pp.136-42.NOTES: As the main opposition partiesdid not participaten the elections, the 1988 and 1996(February)parliamentary lection results are not reported. NA means the partyeither did notexist at the time of this election or boycottedit.aOutof 162 nationalassembly seats allocated to Bangladesh.bBKSAL ncluded.cPercent of eligible voters who cast votes: 1973 = 54.9%; 1979 = 54.9%; 1986 = 60.3%;1991 = 55.4%; and 1996 = 73.2%.dThisvoter distribution s based on the first roundof voting, not adjustedfor changes in voterdistribution ollowing repollinglater in 27 constituencies from electoral irregularities.eParties nclude Jamaat-i-Islamiand Muslim League.

cause the Awami League and the BNP remain mutually antagonisticandclaim similar levels of popular support.


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516 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE000Voters in Bangladesh: A Brief Profile

In this article,I take the view that Bangladeshi voters in generalmake theirvoting decisions on the basis of limited and imperfect information. Sincemost voters are uneducated,politically ill-informed, and possess unsophisti-cated character raits, they remain vulnerableto manipulationof one form oranotherby politicians. They indeed have limited ability or incentive to pro-cess complex information or making political decisions. By contrast,politi-cal leaders have incentives to package economic and political issues insharplydrawn terms as a strategyto provokethe raw instincts or prejudicesof voters.

Historically, political leaders identified a "commonenemy"and mobilizedvoters under a common symbol or slogan. Priorto the partitionof India in1947, Muslim League politicians used religion and identified Hindus as theenemy of Muslims in India, especially in Bengal. Similarly,Awami Leaguepoliticians used Bengali ethnicity duringthe 1970 election to mobilize thepeople of then East Pakistan against the Punjabi ruling class of West Paki-stan. This shows that in both of these history-making elections, politicalleaders acted as producersof issues and programsand voters consumed them.Thus, leaders clearly led the voters on both these occasions.

This view contrastswiththe common belief that voterswereenlightenedorhighly informed and made their voting decisions accordingly. The fact is thatmost voters made voting decisions during these elections with limited infor-mation. The situationhas changed somewhatafter the independenceof Ban-gladesh. Since then, political leaders have had to struggle to package ec-onomic and political issues in an environmentwere there is no "commonenemy"thatcan be used as a rallying point for mobilizing masses. But thisdid not deter them. On the one hand, political leadersrespondedto the pre-vailing sentimentsor prejudicesof votersandadapted heirpolitical positionsaccordingly. On the other, they have packagedtheir policies in terms thatinvoked the raw instincts and prejudicesof voters. For example, after theoverthrowof the Awami League government n 1975, the BNP, by propagat-ing market-orientedconomic policies andprograms hat contrastedwith thesocialist economic policies of the Awami League, capitalized on the anti-Awami League sentiment of voters. The revealed distributionof voters in1979 election thus exhibited a patternto the right, as Table 1 shows. Here,leaders were somewhat led by the voters' sentiment n the sense thatthey hadto producepolicies thatvoters were thoughtto have desired. Thispatternhasbeen followed since then.

Both the Awami League and the BNP have now re-packagedtheir eco-nomic policies and political programs n black and white terms to invoke orexploit the voters' raw instincts or prejudices along feudal lines. For exam-ple, lately the Awami League has been trying to divide the nationbetween


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AKHTARHOSSAIN 517the so-called "pro-liberation" nd "anti-liberation"orces. In doing so, all ofits political rhetorichas been centered on the name of its past leader, SheikhMujib. In hermission to perpetuatea dynasticrule, the presentprime minis-ter, Sheikh Hasina(the daughterof Sheikh Mujib) has takenthe lead in theinstitutionalization f feudalismin nationalpolitics. Similarly,the BNP hasbeen trying to divide the nation between the so-called "nationalist/Islamist"and "pro-Indian,anti-nationalist" orces. In doing so, all of its rhetorichasbeen centered on the name of its past leader,Ziaur Rahman. In her missionto perpetuatea dynastic rule, the presentleader of the opposition, KhaledaZia (the widow of ZiaurRahman),has also taken the lead in institutionaliza-tion of feudalismin the nationalpolitics. Theircommon strategyof dividingthe nation vertically is designed to invoke the raw instincts of voters in themilieu of a feudalisticsetup. While remainingengaged in such a fight, realeconomic issues never come into the picture and the rationale behind thedynasticrule is never challenged. Consequently,the rulers continueto rulewith impunity and the masses continueto suffer from deprivation.

Therefore,the argumentn this section that voters arebasically uneducatedand politically ill-informed,thus subjectto manipulationboth crude and so-phisticated, s not inconsistentwith the view thatpolitical leadersrespondtoactual or perceived changes in views and attitudes of voters. Like others,voters have some access to informationandlearnfromexperiences. So, theirviews andattitudeschangeandthey may responddifferentlyto political rhet-oric and stimulation. Realizing this shift, political leaderschange theirpoli-cies and rhetoric and package them in a way that is compatible with theinstincts or prejudicesof voters. The following sectionexplainsthis dynamicphenomenonthrough he revealed distributionof voterpreference n termsofeconomic policy and ideology.Convergenceof Political Parties and Voterstowardthe Center:Policy and Ideology

Facing intense competitionfrom one another since the overthrow of the Er-shad government,the Awami League and the BNP have moved toward thecenter of the political spectrumfrom theirrespective center-left and center-right positions. This reflects the actualor perceivedchanges in the distribu-tion of votersarrangedby theirpreference or economic policy andideology.The discussionbelow shows that,from a distributionof votersthatwas heav-ily skewed to the left in the early 1970s, the presentdistributionof voters is abell-shapedcurve (Figure lb and ic, respectively), with most of the massclustered around he center. Withina predominantly wo-partypolitical sys-tem, a unimodal distributionof voters can ensure political stability if thedominantparties follow rules and norms and cooperate with each other in


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FIGURE 1 Convergenceof Political Parties and Votersin Termsof EconomicPolicy and Ideology(a)

I I

Communist Awami Jamaat-i-IslamiParties League andtheMuslimLeague

(b)

{ I ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ICommunist Awarni BNP Jamaat-i-IslamiParties League and he Muslim

League

(c)

Communist Awami BNP Jamaat-i-IslarniParties Leaguc andthe MuslimLeague


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AKHTARHOSSAIN 519establishingdemocratic nstitutionsstrongenough to absorbrandompoliticalshocks.

Consider the distributionof voters in the 1970 general election (see Figurela). It was heavily skewed to the left. As indicated earlier, by positioningitself at the center-left of the political spectrum, he Awami League was ableto mobilize masses by propagatingpopulist economic and political programsthatwere compatiblewith the prevailingdepressedeconomic condition in thecountry. M. Rashiduzzamanhas suggested that the overwhelming supportfor the Awami League in that election was because of its leadershipin theautonomy movementrather hanthe superiorityof its economic policies andprograms.7In fact, other political partiesproclaimingsimilar economic poli-cies and programswere not rewardedat the polls. Nonetheless, despite theAwami League's landslide victory in the 1970 election, right-wing politicalparties (namely, the Jamaat-i-Islamiand the Muslim League) jointly gainedaround 18% of the popularvote. This is politically significantbecausemanysupportersof the Muslim League and the pro-Beijing, left-leaning partieslater coalesced around the BNP and the Jatiya Party and downsized theAwami League's dominancein national politics.

Following the overthrowof the Awami League governmentin 1975, thecountryremainedundera militaryor quasi-militaryrule until the overthrowof the Ershadregimein 1990. Duringthisperiod,a numberof elections wereheld as partof establishingthe legitimacyof the military government. Theseelection results show that the distributionof voters that skewed to the leftduring1970 had shiftedto the rightin 1979 (see Figure lb). This apparentlycame about as a reaction to the Awami League's economic mismanagementwithina socialist development paradigm. The changeddistributionof votersbenefited both the BNP and the JatiyaParty. One must recall that after thecountry's independence, both the Jamaat-i-Islamiand the Muslim Leaguewere banned and discreditedbecause of theircollaborationwith the Pakistanimilitary. As no credible political partywas located at the center-rightposi-tion of the political spectrum,the BNP gained supportof voters who eitherdeserted the Awami League and the Muslim League or supportedpro-Beij-ing, left-leaning partiesthatopposedthe Awami League. It appearsthat theJamaat-i-Islami,because of its strongideological orientation,managedto re-tainits supporters althoughon occasion they mighthave given supporteitherto the BNP or the Jatiya Party).

With the emergenceof the BNP as a formidablepolitical rival, importantchanges have occurredon the Awami League side of politics. The suddenoverthrowof the governmentin 1975 and the killings of Sheikh Mujib and7. M. Rashiduzzaman,"TheAwami League in the Political Developmentof Pakistan,"Asian

Survey 10:7 (July 1970), pp. 574-87.


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520 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE000some prominent eadersin the Dhaka central ail greatly shocked the AwamiLeague. It recovered partially during the next few years and continued todefend its center-leftposition in terms of policy and ideology. This is one ofthe reasonswhy Ershad'sJatiya Partywas able to drawsupportfrom votersand politicians whose ideology was compatiblewith the center-rightpositionof the political spectrum. The 1991 election, after the overthrow of the Er-shad regime, remindedthe Awami League that rigid ideological position andpolicies are not always sustainable. Some pressurefrom Western aid donorsalso made the Awami League's socialist policies untenable. Most impor-tantly, by this time, India's Congress Party governmenthad discardedsomeof its socialist policies. This enabled the Awami League, which patterneditself after Congress, to move toward the right in terms of policy and ideol-ogy. The rightwardmobilityof the Awami League, however, was not fast orcredible enough for the public and the BNP won this election. The partyreplaced the Jatiya Party at the center-rightposition once the latter was nolonger in power. Also, the BNP conducted a credible election campaigninwhich KhaledaZia establishedherselfas anuncompromising eader basedonher record during the agitationmovement againstthe Ershadregime.

The revealed distributionof voters in the 1996 election shows a bell curveshape with a distinctmode at the center and most of its mass clustered aroundthe mode (see Figure ic). It appearsthat the rapid opening of the economyduringthe BNP government adversely affected various social groups. Thismight have reduced some support for the BNP's market-oriented conomicpolicies, especially trade iberalization. The BNP was also in serious troublepolitically. Recall thatthe BNP was in a defensive mode duringtheperiodofpoliticalchaos (1994-96) and failed to resolve the politicalcrisis in its favor.The decision by the main opposition parties (the Awami League, the JatiyaParty,and the Jamaat-i-Islami)o boycott the February1996 elections inten-sified, rather hanresolved,the political crisis. Eitherthis reducedBNP cred-ibility so much that it could not move from its center-right position fastenoughto locate at the center,or the party simply failed to realizechanges insentiments of voters that took place since it had been elected to power in1991. The Awami League reapedthe benefitsof the changedattitudeof vot-ers as it located itself closer to the centerby discarding ts socialist policiesand ideologies and asking for forgiveness from the people for its past mis-takes. Given the shape of the distributionof voters, the BNP and the JatiyaParty sharedthe votes of those who were located at the right-of-centerof thepolitical spectrumwhile the Awami League capturedmost votes within therange from the center to the extreme left. Although the BNP lost in thiselection, it managedto get around33%of votes comparedwith around37%of the Awami League, as Table 1 shows. Given the circumstancesunderwhich the BNP left the government,this was a good result.


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AKHTARHOSSAIN 521The electoral analysis yields several conclusions. Anthony Downs sug-gested that whether or not equilibriumexists in a political system dependsuponthe numberof political partiesandtheirideologicalpositions.8 Political

developmentsthathave takenplace in Bangladesh thus far are favorabletothe creation of a stable political system. First, despite a large numberofideology-orientedpolitical parties of the left and right, the distributionof vot-ers has graduallybecome distinctlyunimodal at the center. An implication sthat the ideologically orientedsmaller partiesof the left and right would notbe in a position to musterenoughvotes to generatepolitical instability. Thisis predictedin coalition governmentsunder multipartysystems with a dis-tinctly polymodaldistributionof voters. RecentIndianpolitical developmentsmentsundervariouscoalitiongovernmentsgive credenceto thisview. Second,boththe Awami Leagueand the BNP have shownflexibility in terms of poli-cies and ideologies and moved towardthe center of the political spectrum.This indicates that, if these partieswere to cooperatewith each other, theycould dominate national politics, and their locational stability around thecenter would likely reduce the danger of militaryintervention. Over time, iffree and fair elections were held at regular intervals, these parties would beexpected to converge further n policies and ideologies.9

Roots of Antagonismbetween theAwami League and the BNPThe section above shows why it is in the interests of both the Awami Leagueandthe BNP to follow democraticnorms andpracticesin political activities.However, the way each of them tries to pull down governmentsformed bythe othercannotbe reconciled with that analysis. These partiesfail to coop-eratenot only because they underestimateeach other's political strengthbutalso because each has an urge to establisha monopolisticrule by knockingout the other,believing that the losing partywould simply fade away. There-fore, unlike in a maturedemocracy,neitheris prepared o engage in politicalgames played within established rules and norms.

At a deeperlevel, both partiescarryhistoricalbaggagethat putsthemin anadversarialposition. For the supportersof the Awami League,the BNP itselfis an enigma or, less charitably,an undesirablecreature n the landscapeofnationalpolitics. Even after 20 years, most Awami League supportershavedifficultiesin recognizingthe BNP as a mass-orientedpartyand a contender8. AnthonyDowns, An EconomicTheoryof Democracy(New York:HarperandRow, 1957).9. This is to be expected because, if free and fair elections are held at regular intervals, the

naturaltendency of politics will be to exhibit dual characteristics. For details, see MauriceDuverger,Political Parties: TheirOrganizationand Activityin the ModernState (translatedbyBarbaraand Robert North) (London:Methuen and Company, 1955).


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522 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE000for state power. Recall that the Awami League was overthrownfrom statepower ratherunceremoniouslyby a militarycoup. The BNP was createdby amilitary ruler who himself benefited from this coup. While the AwamiLeague led the autonomy movement and later the IndependenceWar, theBNP reached out to those who were againstthe independenceof Bangladesh.Cooperation with such a party continues to be unacceptable to diehardAwami League supporters.For BNP supporters,the issue is not as sharply defined as the AwamiLeague tries to portray. The first Awami League government (1972-75)chose not to prosecutethose who mighthave collaboratedwith the Pakistanimilitary. Thus, it was appropriateor the BNP to recruitpeople whose roleduring Bangladesh'swar of independencewas dubiousat best, but who hadnever been convicted in any court of law. While this may be interpretedaspolitical opportunism, he BNP cannotbe consideredsimply a partyof col-laborators.The militaryruler who created the BNP was the personwho formally de-claredthe independenceof the countryand actively participated n the 1971war.10 He also broughtinto politics many people who fought againstPaki-stan in the war or held respectable positions in private society. For manyBNP supporters, he Awami League's claim of leadership duringthe Inde-pendenceWar was indeed spuriousor atbest exaggeratedsince common peo-ple did the actual fighting. Meanwhile, Awami League leaders remainedengaged in frivolous pursuitsin luxuryhotels in Calcutta.On the questionof political legitimacy, critics point out that the BNP wasconceived in the cantonment,as if its formation was illegitimate. In myview, these critics fail to acknowledge that the Bengali army personnelplayeda decisive role in the IndependenceWar andtheirvery act of rebellionagainstthe Pakistanimilitarywas a politicaldecision. Therefore, heirrole inthe formationof a political partyand later oining in it, when they were not inactive duty, did not necessarilyconstitutean undemocraticbehavioron theirpart. This is especially the case when a democraticregime was turned nto aone-partyauthoritarianystem and the countrywas in desperateneed afterthe 1975 politicalchangefor a partyto bringsome semblance of democracy.Further, t is to be noted that many army officials have joined the AwamiLeague and participated n its political activities directly or indirectly. Infact, political leadersin Bangladeshhave always practiced nduction of mili-taryin politics throughclandestinemeans since the 1960s.

10. By contrast, why Sheikh Mujib allowed himself to be arrestedby the Pakistani militaryremainsa controversial opic. In fact, Mujib himself was uncomfortablewith most issues relat-ing to the IndependenceWar because he did not have any direct role in it. For details, seeMoudud Ahmed, Era of Sheikh MujiburRahman (Dhaka:UniversityPress Limited, 1983) andreferences therein.


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AKHTAR HOSSAIN 523Therefore, t is not the question of legitimacybut rather he very success ofthe BNP that has been the cause of concernfor the Awami League. To beprecise, the BNP's arrival n national politics has effectively downgraded he

Awami League's position from a political monopolist to that of a politicalduopolist. This is reflected in the patternof distributionof political supportfor these parties. At the mass level of politics, the BNP's support s spreadall over the country;the north and southeast regions are its stronghold. Bycontrast,the south and southwest regions are the strongholdof the AwamiLeague. Thus, like the Awami League, the BNP should be considered amass-based political party that accommodatesinterests and views of manysocial groups.Nevertheless, on the ideological front, the Awami League and the BNPdiffer fundamentally n their interpretationof historical emergence of Ban-gladesh. While upstagingBengali ethnicity, the Awami Leaguetends to denythat part of Bangladesh's history that led to the partitionof India and thecreationof Pakistan n 1947. The BNP acknowledgesthis history and beginsit not from 1971 or 1947 but fromthe establishmentof Muslimrule in Bengalat the beginningof the 13thcentury (or even with the much earlier arrivalofMuslim preachersand traders). Thus, the defeat of the last Bengal NawabSirajuddowlaat the Battle of Plassey by the BritishEast IndiaCompanywith

the connivance of the Nawab's Muslim courtiersandHindu financiers s con-sidered a low pointin the historyof Muslimsin Bengal. The next two centu-ries witnessed the humiliationof Indian(andparticularlyBengali)Muslims atthe hands of both the British and the majorityHindus.

Lookingfrom such a historicalviewpoint, the BNP leaders and supportersremainsympathetic owardthose objectiveconditions that led the Muslims ofIndiato fight for the creationof Pakistan. In theireyes, the creationof Ban-gladesh did not invalidate the basis of Pakistan's so-called "two-nation"he-ory. The recent rise in Hindu nationalismin India gives credence to theirposition. This also fits well with an emerging view that the core of Indiannationalism remains Hindu nationalism. When the historical factors arelinked to contemporarypolitics, despiteits majorrole in the autonomymove-ment and later the IndependenceWar,the Awami Leagueis seen by many asa stooge of Indiaor an obstacle to the developmentof an independentdentityfor the people of Bangladesh. This, in short, explains why the rivalrybe-tween these partiesis not merely for the statepower but also for the controlover actual or perceivedhistory of Bangladeshfrom the elite perspective.

Hartal:An Instrument ofTit-for-TatPolitics?The earlierdiscussion suggests that, being the dominantpartyand politicalmonopolist mmediatelyafterindependence,the Awami League tried to stop


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524 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE000the BNP from establishing itself as a viable political rival. However, as theAwami League was in the opposition for most of the time, the BNP managedto survive politically and flourish, even though it was out of power for aconsiderableperiod of time. While the Awami League's tacit supportto Er-shad's military rule was expected, the League surprisedmany by taking avengeful attitude oward the BNP. The latter not only survived but also wona popular election after the fall of the Ershad government. The AwamiLeague starteda campaignof protest againstthe BNP governmenton politi-cal issues that could have been resolved throughthe courts or the electioncommission. It resorted to continuous street violence and createdan unwar-ranted political precedent. The BNP government stepped down after twoyears of political turmoil. It seems that the Awami League opted for an all-out agitation against the BNP governmentbecause it underestimated he lat-ter's political will and strengthto fight back. Thus, the ongoing hartalsshould be seen from a historical perspective. They are a manifestationofbitterness that has been created between these two parties; they also haveproven to be an effective instrument or toppling governments.

Having sufferedat the hands of the Awami League, the BNP is now in aposition to retaliateby destabilizing the Awami League governmentthroughagitationunderany pretext. The BNP intends to send a message-as long asit does not antagonize the public-that it is capable of destabilizing theAwami League government n the same way that the Awami League destabi-lized the BNP government. The BNP apparentlyhas taken the view that afailure to continue with agitationpolitics could be misinterpretedas a sign offrailty, which may become costly politically in the long run. This is one ofthe reasons why hawkish elements within the BNP supportan all-out agita-tionmovementagainstthe Awami League government. The BNP current it-for-tat strategycan thus be seen as constrainton the behaviorof the AwamiLeague in the event that the BNP wins the next election.

Would the present agitation movement backfire, that is, turn off votersfrom the BNP? It dependson whethervoters have a shortor long memoryandhow forgiving they are. The BNP arguesthat if the people can forgivethe AwamiLeaguefor its agitationmovement for over two years, why shouldthey not forgive the BNP when the festive election season arrives? Nothingshould, however, be taken as guaranteed. Any aggressive stance on the partof BNP may backfire. This is perhapsthe reason why the BNP has beenfollowing a low-key approach o destabilizethe Awami League government.Needless to say, this is a negativeformof politics. WhetherBangladesh canafford such self-inflictedpolitical instabilityis a different matter. Thatissuefalls into the domainof normative politics.


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AKHTARHOSSAIN 525Underdevelopment,Feudalism,and PoliticalCulture

The above discussion suggests that political non-cooperationbetween theAwami League and the BNP is the immediatecause of political instability.However, at a deeper level, political instability is also a symptom of socialand economic underdevelopment hat gives rise to a patron-clientpoliticalculture. A patron-client political culture leads to political fanaticism thatbreedspolitical instability. Therefore, political instabilityshould be viewedas a reflection of feudalcharacterof a traditional ociety in which most peo-ple areuneducated,socially backward,andpolitically uninformedandhencepossess unsophisticatedcharacter raits, includingfeudal or tribalrivalry. Itis the patron-clientculturein all spheresof life that is behind the personal-ized, factionalized characterof Bangladesh's politics.

The fact thatpolitics in Bangladeshresonateswith feudalism in its charac-ter, intensity, and ferocity is also reflected in the class base of the politicalleadership. Although most political leaders during the Pakistani eraoriginatedfrom the urbanizedrich and propertiedclass, the presentcrop ofleadersin Bangladeshhas been mostly drawn from the middle or lower mid-dle class with ruralor semi-urban ocial backgrounds. One of the factors thatmotivate them in politics is an easy access to state resources for personalenrichment. Aftergainingpower, they not only engage in corruptionbut alsotend to behave as if they are feudal patronsand demand blind loyalty fromtheir clients in exchange for protectionand patronage. Jealousy, suspicion,mistrust,and vengeance are hallmarksof theirpolitical culture."

Consequently,althoughelections of one form or anotherhave been held ona regularbasis, not much has changedin the feudalnatureof politicalbehav-ior. This suggests that elections and competitivepolitics do not necessarilyestablish a democraticculture in a traditional ociety. Ritualisticdemocraticpolitical events are useful but not so effective in removing deep-rootedan-tidemocraticsocial and culturaltraitsengrained n the minds of politicalpar-ticipants n a traditional ociety. Any competitivepolitics in a feudal society(usually fought on trivial issues that mobilize and polarize the masses verti-cally alongfeudallines) merely generatepassionas political leaders andtheirsupporterscarry with them some of their raw feudal charactertraits. Thedivisionof political supportalong feudal lines thus has a manifestation:mostpeople do not care much about the niceties of democracybut want to win atany cost andby any means. This also reflects the fact that for most politicalleaders,economic stakes are too high to lose gracefully.

11. James J. Novak, Bangladesh: Reflectionson the Water (Bloomington, Ind.: IndianaUni-versity Press, 1993).


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AKHTAR HOSSAIN 527different symbols and slogans, the political elite has sharplydivided the soci-ety along feudal lines. In doing so, Bangladesh's political elite has created apredatorystate in which politicians,bureaucrats,big businesses, and leadersof numerous radeunions or even professionalbodies continue to engage in aprimitive form of capital accumulation.

Badruddin Umar has gone much deeper into this malaise and arguedstronglyandprovocatively that the presentpolitical instabilityis a reflectionof an extremelylow level of culture among the rulingAwami League leader-ship. This culture evolved since independencethrough corruption,plunder,and graft.13 His singling out of the Awami League leadershipwith the lowlevel of political culture s, however,a bit extreme. Most leaders of two othermajor political parties (the BNP and the Jatiya Party)are also in the trapoflow political culture. After all, many of them have risen to political leader-ship positions through the same routes of corruption,plunder,and graft. Inshort, politicians from all sides of the political divide have contributed o thedebasementof Bangladesh's political culture. Consequently,politics has lostits spirit of idealism and for many essentially become a "sleazy"business inwhich most politicians are no better than thieves, thugs, or crooks.

When and how will this end? Wouldhigh economic growthlead to politi-cal developmentalong democratic ines? The common presumption, hatec-onomic growthalong capitalistic ines would promote democracy n the thirdworld, is by no means certain. It is not a mere rise in per capita income butratherchanges in class and social structurecaused by industrializationandurbanizationhataremost consequential or democracy. While economic de-velopment per se does not necessarily lead to establishmentof liberal democ-racy, one cannot ignore the influence of economic factors on sociopoliticaland culturalbeliefs andattitudes. The underdevelopedpoliticalbelief systemis expected to change in response to sustained economic growth along thecapitalistlines. The idea is that economic prosperitywill provide the com-mon people with access to modem educationandpolitical information.Thiswould help them articulateeconomic aims and develop political beliefs toachieve them. Consequently,such political awakeningwould ensureconsis-tency in theirpolitical behavior and weaken fanatical instincts. The reactionof well-informed masses to political issues is generally measured,balanced,and less emotive. Measured behaviorin politics could diminish the role ofagitation-mongers.Economic growthis expectedto have another mpacton politics. Politicalinstability poses a threatto the propertiedclass. This class would thereforeattemptto capturepolitical power and maintainpolitical stability as partof13. BadruddinUmar, "Ruling Class Culture and the People,"Dhaka Courier,on the World

Wide Web at Accessed January3, 1999].


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528 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XL, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE000consolidating its economic gains. Although the capitalist class was wary ofextending suffrage to the workers in 19th century Europe, the bourgeoisie ofadvancedcapitalist societies of the West now supportdemocratic nstitutionsbecause the alternativesare a threat to their material interests. This couldalso be the case for Bangladesh. Political power in this country has beengraduallyshifting towardthe nouveau riche business class. With furthereco-nomic progress, they wouldconsolidate their political power and be in a posi-tion to safeguardtheir economic interestsby maintainingpolitical stability.However, class formation n Bangladesh is in its early stage. As there is stillscope for rapid social, economic andpolitical mobility throughall means, itis likely that social and political tensions would continue to intensify for aconsiderableperiodof time before the presentunstablesociopolitical systemsettles down to an equilibrium state.The question is how quickly such a change could take place. Politicalculture and structurechange with economic change, but only slowly. AtulKohli suggestedthatauthoritarianalues andstructuresarenot readilytrans-formedby the spreadof educationor throughthe rise of the middle class.14Nevertheless, the impact of economic growthon political cultureand struc-ture cannot be ignored, especially in a nascent democracy. Without eco-nomic growth, democracy itself may not survive for long.

Summaryand ConclusionThis article has analyzed the dynamicsof Bangladesh's politics from a histor-ical perspectivewith a view to identifying factors causing political instability.It has showed that in the midst of political instability,voters have congre-gated systematicallyaround two major political parties,the Awami Leagueand the BNP. If these parties cooperate politically from the viewpoint ofenlightened self-interest,they can establish a stable two-party political sys-tem. The article has also explained why these partiesremain in confronta-tional mode on trivial issues: noncooperationbetween these parties is theoutcome of a political culturein which each partyintends to monopolizethestate power as if the other does not even have the right to exist. This hasbeen a reflectionof the attitudeof born-to-ruleunder a dynasticleader-a farcry from the spiritof power sharingundermultipartyparliamentarydemoc-racy.A policy implicationof the above findingsis thatany meaningfulcoopera-tion between the Awami League and the BNP would requirethe breakingupof the hereditary eadershipsystem in both these parties. To put it bluntly,neither Sheikh Hasina nor Khaleda Zia should be seen as an upholder ofdemocraticideals; rather,they are obstacles to the creation of democratic

14. Kohli, "Introduction."


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AKHTARHOSSAIN 529cultureandinstitutions. Throughagitationpolitics over the past decade,theyhave divided the nation, created and perpetuateddynastic myths aroundtwopast leaders,and thereby derived legitimacy for their leadership. What theysell as democraticstruggles could moreaccuratelybe describedas theperpet-uation of a feudal rule within an encompassing patron-client ystem. Such asystem gives rise to a political culture that promotessuspicion andbetrayal,arroganceof power, intolerance of political opposition and criticism and,most importantly,state-sponsored errorism,corruption,and otheraspectsofstatemisgovernance. Within such a degenerativepolitical culture,it is diffi-cult, if not impossible, for someone with leadershippotentialto remaincleanand then to rise above sleazy politics and challenge the existing leadership.After all, a dynastic political system destroys the political leadershipneededto re-invigoratea society.The creation of such a politicalculturecannotbe simply done with legisla-tion. Bangladeshrequiresa structural hange both in the economy and thesociety, such that the attitudeand outlook of the people towardpolitics andthe affairs of the state is qualitativelychanged. Only then would bothpoliti-cians andthe people show respectfor rules of law, majorityverdict,minorityopinions, and otheraspectsof a constitutionthatgo with democracy.15Sus-tained high economic growth is, however, not possible without deep eco-nomic andinstitutionalreforms. Such reforms areunlikely to be undertakenin the near futuresimply because they would decreasethe scope for corrup-tion by politicians, bureaucratsand other interest groups (including tradeunion officials). Unfortunately, though, Bangladesh has been caught in aclassic conundrum. Withoutpolitical stabilityand clean politics, there wouldbe little economic and social development n this country. Similarly,withoutrapideconomic and social development,the hope for political stability andclean politics could remain an illusion.

15. G. Rizvi, "Democracy,Governance,and Civil Society in South Asia," Pakistan Develop-ment Review 33:4(1) (1994), pp. 593-624.

Documents

Anatomy of Hartal Politics in Bangladesh