Politics−Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh

Politics−Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh:Consequences for the Public Service Commission

Ferdous Jahan & Asif Mohammad Shahan

Published online: 12 September 2008# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008

Abstract The paper attempts to analyze the consequences of political pressureplaced on the Public Service Commission (PSC) of Bangladesh. Through extensiveliterature review and empirical research, the authors conclude that the independence,efficiency and effectiveness of the PSC largely depend on the politics–administrationrelationship. Furthermore, this relationship is affected by regime types and itregulates the optimum functioning or malfunctioning of the institution.

Keywords Public Service Commission . Bangladesh Civil Service .

Politicization of bureaucracy . Recruitment . Corruption .

Institutions of accountability . Ministry of Establishment .

Public administration in Bangladesh

Introduction

In the last several decades, a number of new forces have emerged in the environmentwithin which the public service functions. Forces including globalization andinformation technologies have, to a large extent, “…transformed the way we thinkabout governance, the role of government and the work done by the public sectorinstitutions” (Bourgon 2005: 13). On the other hand, development challenges of atwenty-first century developing country demand for a dynamic and vibrant publicpersonnel administration (Amin 1985: 1). Thus, there is a thriving need for anefficient and effective public administration in Bangladesh.

Public Organiz Rev (2008) 8:307–328DOI 10.1007/s11115-008-0061-8

F. JahanDepartment of Public Administration, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladeshe-mail: [email protected]

A. M. Shahan (*)Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladeshe-mail: [email protected]

In Bangladesh, the public personnel administration is conducted by two centralpersonnel agencies—the Ministry of Establishment (MoE) and the Public ServiceCommission (PSC). The PSC enjoys the status of a constitutional body and isresponsible to conduct examinations for selecting personnel for the cadre services ofthe administration. Recently, however, allegation of corruption and politicizationdogged this constitutional body. The PSC had to cancel one of its preliminaryexaminations (24th Bangladesh Civil Service examination) due to an alleged leakageof question paper and the viva-voce of the 27th BCS examination due to allegedcorruption and politicization. The PSC thus became the centre of controversy inrecent months continuing the trend for the past several years.

Recent studies undertaken to analyze the institution identified a number ofproblems and related reasons behind this malfunction. Interestingly, most of theseproblems were inherited from the British colonial era little impact during autocraticregimes but proliferated during democratic regimes. Henceforth, this paper arguesthat optimum functioning or malfunctioning of the PSC depends on the ‘type’ and‘nature’ of the regime within which the institution operates. The colonialbureaucratic heritage and bureaucracy’s continual adherence to the ruling regimesduring autocratic periods (both in pre-1971 and post-1971 Bangladesh) togethercreated a situation that antagonized political parties against the bureaucracy.Consequently, during the democratic regimes in Bangladesh, the politiciansattempted to politicize the bureaucracy. However, due to a pre-matured democraticsystem, the politicians failed to determine a profitable and affordable level ofpoliticization, rather the emphasis was on ensuring partisan appointments inimportant posts and recruiting party loyalists in the civil service. The PSC inBangladesh became a victim of this politicization process which compromised itsindependence, efficiency and effectiveness as a constitutional body.

The article is divided into four sections. The first section defines and analyzesvarious dimensions of politicization of bureaucracy. While doing so, this sectionemphasizes on building a theoretical framework to describe the relationship betweenthe extent of democracy and the nature of bureaucracy. The second section movestoward describing the evolution and role of the PSC and the third section deals withthe problems the PSC faced during autocratic and democratic regimes. The fourthand final section deals with the influence of these regimes on the PSC. In thissection, we analyze the consequences of the political pressure placed on theinstitution and whether the “politicization efforts” have caused any threat to theindependence, effectiveness and efficiency of the PSC. The paper refers to the natureand culture of bureaucracy in Bangladesh to a limited extent pertinent only todiscussing the PSC.

For the purpose of the paper, we have conducted extensive literature review onthe evolution of the PSC in the Indian sub-continent as well as problems faced by theinstitution over time. Furthermore, we have analyzed the data collected for an IGS(Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University) study for its research on the“Institutions of Accountability”. The empirical study was conducted during May–August 2007 and aimed to examine the problems of the PSC. Throughout the study,the IGS interviewed 20 key informants. Among them, one was an ex-chair, five wereeither ex or current members of the PSC, five were academics and researchers whohad vast experience in conducting research regarding the institution and nine were

308 F. Jahan, A.M. Shahan

members of staff at the PSC. The ex-chair served his tenure during the autocraticregime and out of the five members, two worked during the autocratic period and theremaining three served their tenure during the democratic period. The IGS alsoorganized an international workshop with 41 participants to validate the findings ofthe empirical study. The participants included academics, bureaucrats, activists,media personnel and civil society members who either specialize in or are aware ofthe activities and problems of the PSC.

Politicization of bureaucracy: a theoretical framework

The politicization of the bureaucracy is not necessarily a negative phenomenonrather if defined properly, an affordable and profitable level of politicization can playa pivotal role in fostering the democratization process (Rouban 2007; Carino 1991).Therefore, the discussion on politicization of bureaucracy mainly aims to identify theeffective line of interaction between the politicians and the bureaucrats.

The concentration on defining the hazy area of interaction between politics andadministration is not new and in fact, these attempts owe their origins to Max Weberwho has advocated for a ‘Neutral Competent’ bureaucracy and a clear distinctionbetween politics and administration (Weber 1947). Woodrow Wilson’s classic essay‘The Study of Administration’ champions Weber’s idea in a modified manner. Hehas advocated for what Svara (1999) termed as ‘Complementarity’ model of politicsand administration, where separation principle had been used mainly as a safeguardto partisan influence on bureaucracy and bureaucracy’s active participation in policymaking has not been barred (Svara 1999). This ‘Complementarity’ of politics–administration relationship has been firmly established in the developed democraciesdue to “…increasing complexity of the welfare system and public interventionism”(Rouban 2007: 203). Thus, a successful resolution of politics–administrationrelationship often leads to a successful implementation of the ‘Complementarity’model.

The politicization of bureaucracy can be analyzed from two dimensions. One ispoliticization as participation in policy decision and the other is politicization aspartisan appointments in the bureaucracy. The former is in fact based on the well-recognized politics–administration dichotomy, also regarded as the founding theoryof public administration. The dichotomy model proposes for a clear distinctionbetween politics and administration, where policy decisions are supposed to be madeby the elected representatives and bureaucracy would simply implement the policydecisions. From this dimension, politicization occurs when the civil servants arevested with the responsibility to “…carry out political decision, adopt them andexplain them, in other words to accomplish work of political nature that obviously isnot limited to the mere application of legal or economic rules” (Rouban 2007: 200).The dichotomy model has been credited from two perspectives. From the academicperspective, it has contributed in building the foundation of public administrationand from a practical point of view, it has prevented partisan intrusion within thebureaucracy (Sayre 1958; Svara 1998; O’ Toole 1984). However, since the early‘50s, the difficulty in distinguishing between making and implementing policy, hasled to dichitomy model being considered as a myth.

Politics–Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh: Consequences... 309

Another dimension of politicization generally refers to a situation whereappointment, transfer, promotion and other career decisions of civil servants aredependent on the will of their political masters. In different countries, the applicationof this principle has resulted in two extreme situations. At one extent, in manydeveloped democracies, partisan appointment at the key strategic positions of thegovernment is considered a normal phenomenon. This practice has often beendeemed as beneficial as it would allow the executive branch to practice some meansof control over policy decisions. Besides, in these cases, partisan appointment doesnot imply incompetence and partisan appointees are often separated from the careercivil servants through specific rules (Rouban 2007). On another extent, this form ofpoliticization is often used “…to hand out jobs to friends of political party or partiesin power, operating a shift from a relationship of clientele to one of parentela”(Peters cited in Rouban 2007: 204).

These two dimensions of politicization cannot be analyzed separately and oftenintertwined. In most developed democracies, the rejection of the dichotomy modelhas paved the way of political participation of bureaucracy in policy making. Thevarious procedures of partisan appointment may fit into the scenario to successfullyimplement the ‘Complementarity’ model.

However, what works in the developed world in reaching to the level of‘Complementarity’ is not universal. Rather politicization of bureaucracy in manyinstances has resulted in a “parentela”. Whether politicization would result in a‘Complementarity’ or in a ‘Parentela’, depends on two issues—the relative strength ofpolitical leadership and the bureaucratic performance. Based on these two issues,Carino (1991) identifies four different models to explain the relationship between thegovernment and the civil service. One of them, a regime-dominant model wherepolitical leadership completely controls the public service. The second model, namedas bureaucratic coprimacy, refers to a democracy dominated by bureaucracy due to its“…expertise, permanence and institutionalization” (Carino 1991: 736). The thirdmodel marks bureaucratic subordination under an authoritarian regime where thereexists little room to maneuver for the bureaucracy. The Final model is known as‘authoritarian and bureaucratic coprimacy’ which “…shows authoritarian leadershipjoined by a bureaucracy assuming less explicitly subordinate roles. Usually, leaders ofmilitary and civilian bureaucrats combine in ruling the state” (ibid: 737).

Through analyzing the models and applying them to different developingcountries, Carino presents some significant observations—first, a government’scommitment to democracy to a large extent determines its mode of interaction andattitude towards bureaucracy. Second, regime changes even for a short while placethe bureaucracy in a vulnerable position. Thirdly, a well-institutionalized bureau-cratic system is capable of getting out of the vulnerable position, unless modified inan abrupt, dramatic or disruptive ways (Carino 1991).

Politics–administration relationship, therefore, depends on the nature of thebureaucracy and the extent of democratization. If a democratic system remainsdysfunctional, the possibility is that the ruling party will engage in negative politics.In this case, the ruling political party will fail to perform its role and the upperechelon of party will turn into a ‘guild of notables’ (Weber 1978; Weber in Gerth andMills 1948).


According to Wood (2000), the political parties in such a dysfunctional statefollow a clientelist mode in recruiting their leaders who enter in politics for personalgain (Wood 2000: 228–229). In this situation, “…the party rewards a loyal civilservant by quicker promotion, profitable postings and important positions in theparty or party think tank or cabinet positions after his/her retirement. He/she plays akey role as the party spokesman or in policymaking” (Islam 2004:9). Thus, if thedemocratic system goes wrong, it shifts the bureaucracy towards patrimonialism andthus undermines its rational basis and efficiency. The situation becomes morecomplex if the bureaucracy itself is reluctant to be managed by political masters andpossesses a negative attitude towards the politicians. In this case, the flaweddemocratic system attempts to strictly control the bureaucracy even by adoptingillicit or illegitimate means. In this paper, we will examine if this theoreticalframework can sufficiently explain the impact of negative politicization on the PSC.The following section provides a historical as well as a contemporary account of theevolution of the PSC and problems faced by the organization.

Historical background: growth of the PSC

Public service commission during the British and the Pakistani period

In nineteenth century England, with the establishment of a parliamentary democracy,a clear distinction was made between politics and administration to bring an end tothe system of patronage. Also, in running the administration, generalist personnelwere preferred to specialist personnel. Naturally, the countries and/or regions thatwere under the British rule followed these two principles (Hakim 1991; Amin 1985).Following the Government of India Act, 1919 and the Lee Commission report of1923, the Indian PSC started functioning from 1926. However, it did not work as anindependent institution; rather it was a subordinate body of the Home Department.

In 1935, based on the recommendations of the Simon Commission, the Governmentof India Act, 1935 laid the foundation of a central PSC and a PSC for each province.Although the PSC remained a mere advisory body, it was a convention that the advice ofthe PSC were to be implemented. The Act clearly described the structure and functionsof the institution. Members and Chairs of the PSCwere to be appointed by the GovernorGeneral and one half of the Members were required to be persons with 10 years ofservice under the crown (Ahmed 1990; Amin 1985).

After the end of the British rule in 1947, the provisions of the Government of IndiaAct, 1935 was followed in Pakistan: a central PSC and three provincial PSCs wereestablished. Up to 1956, the Governor General was required to consult with the cabinetbefore appointing the chair and members of the central PSC (renamed as Pakistan PublicService Commission). However, the constitution of 1956 gave the sole responsibility ofappointing members and chair to the President. The constitution also specified thefunctions and structure of the commission. A further change was made regarding thecomposition and function of the PSC under the constitution of 1962. It was renamed asthe Central Public Service Commission and was given the responsibility of conductingexaminations and tests for the appointment to the services and posts of the central


government and also to advise the President on any servicematter onwhich the PSCwasto be consulted (Braibanti 1966a).

The post-independent public service commission

The Constitution of Bangladesh contains ‘provisions embodying the basic principlesrelating to the composition and function of the PSC’ (Khan 2005:98–102; Ahmed1990: 92–93). Articles 137 to 140 of the Constitution state the basic functions andcompositions of the PSC. According to article 138, the President would appointMembers and Chair of the PSC. Half of the Members must have held office in theservice of Bangladesh for more than 20 years. Article 139 determines the 5-yearterm (renewable for one additional term) of the office of the Chair and Members.After completion of their term, they have been barred from further employment inthe service of the republic. However, Members may be appointed as the Chair of thecommission. Article 140 specifies functions of the commission—

(a) To conduct tests, examinations for the selection of suitable persons forappointment to the service of the Republic

(b) To advise the President on any matter on which the commission is consultedunder clause 2 or on any matter connected with its functions which is referredto the commission by the President

(c) Such other functions as may be prescribed by law

Clause 2 of Article 140 provides that the president shall consult the PSC withrespect to—

(a) Matters relating to qualifications for, and methods of recruitment to, the serviceof the Republic

(b) The principles to be followed in making appointments to that service andpromotions and transfers from one branch of the service to another, and thesuitability of candidates for such appointment, promotions and transfers

(c) Matters affecting the terms and conditions (including person rights) of that service(d) The discipline of the service

As stated in the Constitution, the functions of the commission, to some extent,should be determined through rules and regulations. Several ordinances along withthe Bangladesh Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations 1979circumscribed the functional jurisdiction of the PSC (Ahmed 1986: 280–289; Khan2005:103). At present, the main activities of the PSC are as follows:

(1) to advise various ministries/divisions in case of framing recruitment rules(2) to conduct competitive examinations for direct recruitment to services/posts

under different ministries/divisions(3) to conduct tests and/or interviews for promotion only when the government

servants are moving from class II to class I positions(4) to examine the performance appraisal tool (i.e. Annual Confidential Report) of the

civil servants to recommend for promotion and to determine the seniority of theofficials

(5) to conduct departmental/professional examinations for government servants


(6) to advise on disciplinary and appeal matters affecting government servants(Ahmed 1986).

Role of the PSC at different times: problems faced

Recruiting entry-level bureaucrats

As mentioned earlier, the performance of the PSC eroded significantly sinceindependence. The PSC’s main function has always been the conducting of recruitmentexaminations to select personnel for the civil service. During the British period, acarefully designed selection process was applied to recruit the most competentcandidates. The British rulers, until 1924, were reluctant to welcome the Indians intothe Indian Civil Service. However, through implementing the recommendation of theLee Commission, 1924, the process of ‘Indianization’ achieved a momentum and at thesame time, the examination procedure conducted by the then PSC (known as FederalPublic Service Commission), had remained beyond any controversy. The officialsselected through the process, irrespective of their class, caste or race, reflected a highdegree of objectivity, especially in intellect. Their efficiency in managing the complexmanagement issues was quite outstanding and the reliance of the British Empire on thebureaucratic machinery can be cited as a proof of that (Braibanti 1966a).

During the Pakistani period, conducting civil service examinations had been thesole responsibility of the Central Public Service Commission (CPSC). Ironically, thelittle democracy the united Pakistan had observed, failed to make the CPSC anorganization which could be trusted to select personnel objectively. Political turmoilplayed its part and the government felt comfortable to recruit personnel withoutgoing through any established selection mechanism (Braibanti 1966a). The end ofdemocracy, however, brought an end to this anarchy and from 1962 and onward, theCPSC sucessfully conducted one combined examination each year to recruit entry-level bureaucrats. The examination process was credible and reliability was notquestioned. As Braibanti observed, “…while virtually all others aspects ofgovernment were the object of carping criticism and suspicion, the examinationadministered by the CPSC are regarded as being free from the taint of improbity”(Braibanti 1966b: 258–275).

The independent Bangladesh saw a sudden change in the examination process.Though the government during the Pakistani period decided not to interfere in theselection process of the civil servants, the democratic government just after theindependence decided to choose a different path. Through a controversialexamination procedure, in 1973, a number of party loyalists were included into thecivil service and despite some effort in 1976 and 1978, ‘ad-hocization’ became acommon phenomenon in case of recruitment in civil service of Bangladesh. ThePSC’s role was quite insignificant and was circumscribed through promulgation ofvarious ordinances. It is interesting to note that the first regularization attempt in caseof recruitment came during the first martial law period through the Pay and ServicesCommission, 1977 which paved the road of framing a recruitment rule for the civilservice. Consequently, the Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules, 1981 was


introduced and for the first time, the PSC achieved a formal role. Up to 1981, thePSC’s annual reports attempted to create pressure on various ministries/divisions tocome up with a solid recruitment procedure which finally bore fruit with therecruitment rules of 1981 (GoB 2004; Ahmed 1986).

The second martial law regime acknowledged the importance of the role playedby the PSC and prescribed certain measures to be adopted by the organization toensure its effective functioning. The Martial Law Commission on Organizational SetUp, 1984 provided a detailed road map and the examination was conducted withregular intervals. It is however true that during the martial law regime, the PSC wasnot immune to political pressure, but at the same time, it was not as vulnerable as itturned out to be with the restoration of democracy in 1991.

From the beginning of the democratic era, the recruitment examination conductedby the PSC became an issue of controversy. The first allegation of leakage ofquestion of BCS examination was made during the first democratic regime (1991–1996)1, the second democratic regime (1996–2001) was accused of giving an edgeto the party loyalists in the examination procedure, especially through the viva-voceand allegation was raised that mark sheets were tampered to recruit certaincandidates (The New Age Xtra, February 16–22, 2007).2 These allegations becamerampant during the third democratic regime. Allegations of leakage of questionpapers became quite normal as the PSC had to cancel the 24th BCS preliminary testdue to the alleged leakage of question papers (The Daily Star, August 11, 2003).Later, the PSC decided to form a probe committee to investigate this leakageincident. The probe committee found no evidence of question leakage at that timeand termed the whole incident as baseless. But, it is important to mention that thethen Chair decided not to make the report public (New Age, April 6, 2005).However, during interview, an ex-member of the PSC stated the reason behind notmaking the report public was that the committee had in fact found the proof ofquestion leakage.

The 24th BCS examination was not the only incident where allegation was maderegarding leakage of questions. Again, a strong allegation of leakage of the questionpapers of 25th and 27th BCS examinations rocked the organization. According to arecent study conducted by Transparency International Bangladesh, contractualselection based on transaction of bribe had been quite unbridled. Even if acandidate fails to make it to the merit list, they could find themselves selected for thecustoms/tax cadre by paying an amount of Tk. 10–12 lakh (USD 14500–17500approx.). Paying Tk. 8–10 lakh (USD 11500–14500 approx.) might lead them to beselected for the administration/police cadre; Tk. 10–12 lakh (USD 4500–7000approx.) was enough to be selected for the professional cadre. A candidatesucceeding to the merit list could choose his own cadre with a bribe (CGS 2006;TIB 2007). A recent newspaper report claimed that a number of members weredirectly involved in taking bribe from the candidates and thus awarded them undueprivilege in viva-voce examination (The Daily Shamokal, January 27, 2007). The

1 Though members serving at that time completely denied this allegation, the academics who haveconducted research on the PSC confirmed that indeed the incidence of question leakage did take place atthis period.2 Through interview with ex-members of the PSC, it was found that these allegations were indeed true.


empirical study conducted by IGS included interviews of several potential BCScandidates. One of them reported that he was told in front of the viva board that if heagreed to pay money, he would get any cadre of his desire. This ‘money can buy anycadre’ attitude gravely tarnished the credibility of the civil service examination.

Effectiveness of the civil service examination in case of promoting meritocracyin the civil service

The degree of effectiveness of the PSC remained more or less same throughoutthe history of Bangladesh. The PSC failed to conduct a fair competitiveexamination when the form of government was democratic. The first democraticgovernment had accepted candidates into the administrative realm whose mostimportant qualification was the loyalty to the ruling party. Even the Chairs didnot hesitate to follow the guidelines provided by the ruling party.3 Thesubsequent democratic governments paved the way for introducing various formsof corruption in the examination procedure—tampering the marks sheet of BCSexamination, awarding civil service posts in exchange of money, accepting partyloyalists etc. It is, however, not true that the examination procedure was perfectduring the autocratic regime. Allegations existed but their forms were different.Besides, then commission was quite efficient to nip the allegations in the bud.One interviewee who served during the autocratic regime recalled that when therewas allegation regarding the involvement of a member in corruption, a probecommittee was formed immediately to find out the validity of the allegations. Onthe contrary, the democratic regime saw Members with party affiliation andinvolvement in corruption rise to a new level. As one interviewee recalled that s/he personally talked to the Chair regarding the corruption of a particular memberof the commission and the chair said that s/he also heard about these allegationsbut there was nothing s/he could do.

Government’s interference and the PSC’s authority

The PSC often fell victim to the control of political actors, be it government inwhatever form or a specific political party in power. In fact, control on the PSC’sactivities dated back to the British era. When the Simon Commission foradministrative reform was appointed in 1927, then Chair of the PSC, Sir RossBarker submitted a memorandum to the commission pointing out the problems hefaced due to the government’s control over the recruitment process.

The intention of the Lee commission was to make the PSC insulated from thedomain of politics and thereby its recommendations attempted to build a PSC whichwould enjoy extensive power in case of recruitment. Though during the Britishperiod, the PSC was an attached division of the Home Ministry; however, aconvention was followed where advice of the PSC were generally accepted (Amin1985; Ahmed 1990).

3 During interview, an ex-member recalled that an ex-Chair, for no reason at all, decided to form a singleinterview board. The members suspected that the reason was to provide good marks in viva-voce to thecandidates loyal to the ruling party.


During the Pakistani era, the PSC’s authority was limited. Due to political turmoilduring the early years of combined Pakistan, it was difficult for the PSC to work asan independent body, free from all executive influence. Moreover, the short-liveddemocratic regime made the matter worse for the institution. Though the 1962constitution inserted a provision that while taking decision regarding the methods ofrecruitment, promotion, transfer, disciplinary matters and matters affecting terms andconditions of the service, the president was required to consult the PSC, “…inpractice, this authority is not so extensive as it may appear, for the president may, byorder made after consulting the commission, remove any of these matters from thecommission’s jurisdiction. Moreover …there is no obligation to accept thecommission’s advice” (Braibanti 1966a:120). However, despite all these limitations,the post-1956 Pakistan saw an effective PSC, in terms of appointing persons onmerit into the civil service. The situation became worse after the independence. Italmost became a custom for the government not to pay attention to therecommendations of the PSC. For instance, it took the PSC 10 years to make thegovernment understand the importance of a simple modification of the quotareservation policy (Ali 2004).

Appointment of members and chair based on political leaning

The central problem regarding the PSC as reflected in existing literature is theappointment procedure to appoint the chair and members of the PSC. It is wellknown that in the PSC, the most significant role is played by the Chair. It is theChair, who deals with administrative matters, who is in charge of budgetpreparation and in reality, sets the tone for the institution (IGS 2007). Therefore,the appointment of the Chair, i.e., his/her qualifications, eminence, capability andintegrity is of utmost importance. Since the British period and up to 1971, successivegovernments tried to appoint members and chairs with proven capability, with goodacademic background and the persons so appointed were persons of the highestintegrity. Quite interestingly, this tradition was first ignored just after independencewhen a democratic government assumed power. The Chair appointed at the timelacked competence in managing the public personnel system and a number ofmembers had loyalty to the party in power. During the two successive militaryregimes, though the members and chairs were deliberately picked by the militarydictators, in their activities, they showed enthusiasm to bring about change in theinstitution, the ability to ignore requests made by the government, the capability toget their jobs done despite limited resources and vast ranges of experience to makethe recruitment procedure a meaningful one (Ahmed 1990; IGS 2007). However, thepost-90s democratic government intentionally moved away from the convention ofappointing a person of highest integrity and capability as the Chair of the institution.From that period, the persons’ appointed were university professors without priorknowledge of administrative procedure and with visible leaning towards the party inpower (TIB 2007; IGS 2007).

Regarding the PSC, academic knowledge of a chair can provide the guidelinehowever, the practical experience of its inner working remains quite outside his/herdomain. According to the empirical research conducted by the IGS, the academicbackground of the academics was not sufficient to provide them with the knowledge


surrounding administrative procedures, rules and regulations. Out of the four Chairs,three were natural science faculty members of universities without having any proof oftheir administrative capability with all of them holding strong political affiliation withthe ruling parties. It may not be a hasty conclusion that they were handpicked by thedemocratic governments intentionally, knowing that it would be easier to exerciseinfluence upon them.4 The PSC recently received a career bureaucrat as its chair in2007 and this appointment was made under an undemocratic regime. Democraticgovernments’ denial to appoint a civil servant as the PSC chair may be a reflection ofpolitical parties’ distrust of the civil service.

Executive interference in the PSC’s activities

The range of administrative independence had never been clear or transparentthroughout the history of the PSC. During the British period, the PSC worked asan attached department of Ministry of Home Affairs, which one ex-Chair referredto as an impediment to the institution’s independent functioning (Ahmed 1990).During the Pakistani period, the “…Public Service Commission has beensubordinated to the Establishment Division of the President’s Secretariat to whichit is related as an attached department” (Braibanti 1966a: 122). The question ofindependence was raised by the PSC Chair in Pakistani period, but neither theEstablishment Division nor the then President considered the issue (Braibanti 1966a,b). The same practice continued within independent Bangladesh. At present, theindependence of the PSC from the Ministry of Establishment is determined by theability and status of the PSC Chair. Persons interviewed for the IGS study admittedthat being a career bureaucrat had always been an added advantage in case ofdischarging duties. It has been noticed that it is easier for a civil servant to muddlethrough the executive control, the MoE’s hindrances and obstacles because being acareer bureaucrat enables him/her to realize the deeply set values of theadministrative arena and to get the job done accordingly. If s/he is an ex-civilservant, he/she will be able to manage his office well, but to an ‘intruder’ in theadministrative realm, the story is quite different. The MoE’s control throughdeputation coupled with the lack of administrative knowledge of the PSC Chair maylead to the PSC to become an attached the MoE.

We have found a strong correlation between the lack of administrative knowledgeon the part of the Chair and the MoE’s control over the PSC. As mentioned earlier,five ex or current members of the commission were interviewed by the IGS for itsempirical study. Out of the three members who served during the democratic period,two admitted that the MoE, indeed had a significant influence on the PSC and tosome extent, the Ministry determined the role of the PSC. On the contrary, the twomembers who served their tenure during autocratic regime and under the

4 In Dhaka University, the teachers are divided into two panels—the white panel is considered as Pro-BNPand the Blue Panel as Pro-AL. The first PSC Chair during the democratic regime is known as founder ofthe Pro-BNP wing of the Teacher’s Associations. Parties who came into power later preferred to appointacademics from their own panel.


chairmanship of career bureaucrats found no sign of interference from the MoE intheir activities. The lack of clarity regarding PSC-MoE relationship is reflectedthrough the existence of confusion among the PSC employees.

An analysis of problems faced by the PSC

The problems of the PSC that are shown in the literature, as well as found throughour study, may be divided into two parts—problems attained through inheritance andthe problems created after independence (Table 1). Problems like narrow scope ofoperations, inadequate resources and the extent of governmental control are not new.These problems were quite common during the Pakistani period. On the other hand,though much attention has been drawn to the political appointment of the membersand chairs of the PSC, interestingly, it is not a recent phenomenon but rather anemergence since the independence of Bangladesh. What the existing literature failsto answer is—why the PSC was able to recruit competent civil servants during thePakistani period even though the analysis of problems remained almost the same? Apossible answer may be non-partisan appointment of members and chair. In contrast,if the political appointment of the members and chair of the PSC was the seed of allevils, the question remains—why the PSC did not become a gateway for ruling partyactivists to the civil service of Bangladesh up to 1990?

Table 2 shows that during the democratic regimes, the appointments of the PSCchairs were based on political affiliation; the MoE’s control over the PSC wassignificant; the examination procedure was corrupt and appointment of party

Table 1 Check-list of problems of PSC in different regimes

Problems Period

British period(1926–1947;colonial)

Pakistaniperiod (1947–1971;autocratic)

Bangladesh(1972–1975;democratic)

Bangladesh(1976–1990;autocratic)

Bangladesh(1991–present;democratic)

Appointment ofmembers and Chairbased on politicalleaning

X X √ –a √

Narrow scope ofoperations of the PSC

X √ √ √ √

Inadequacy of facilitiesand resources

√ √ √ √ √

Governmental controlover the functions ofthe PSC

–a √ √ √ √

Corruption inExamination procedure

X X √ X √

√ Significant presence of the problem; X absence of the problema Non-significant presence of the problem


loyalists to civil service was evident. Thus, there exists a definite relationshipbetween the nature and type of regime and the performance of the PSC. The PSCperformed better under the autocratic regimes. On the other hand it failed to meetthe expectations during the democratic regimes. Now, we will attempt to explain thisparadox using the theoretical framework discussed in “Politicization of bureaucracy:a theoretical framework”.

Table 2 The relationship between ‘who is the PSC chair’ and ‘problems faced by the PSC’

Issues Regime

Democratic Autocratic

1972–1975 1991–1996 1996–2001 2001–2006 1976–1981 1981–1990

Professionalbackgroundof the Chair

Civil servant Universityprofessor

Universityprofessor

Universityprofessor

Civilservant

Civilservant

Academicbackground

Soil science/soil sciencea

Soil science/politicalscienceb

Political science/botanyc

Politicalassociationof the Chair

None Founder ofpro-governmentteacher’sassociation

Activesupporter ofpro-governmentteacher’sassociation

Active leader ofpro-governmentteacher’sassociation

None None

PSC–MoErelationship

Not found MoE’scontrol overPSC’sactivities

Increase inPSC’sdependenceon MoE

Completedependence onMoE

Cordial,PSC worksas anindependentbody

Cordial,PSC Worksas anindependentbody

Effectivechange madeinexaminationprocedure

None None Change inquotareservationpolicy

Change inexaminationstructure andmarks distribution

Introductionof newrecruitmentrules

Introductionof PSCrelated rules

Effectivenessof theexaminationprocedure

Completelyineffective

Firstallegation ofquestionleakage

Allegationof tamperingmarks sheet

Question leakage,bribery,cancellation ofexamination

None None

Nature ofcorruption

Favoritism,nepotism,appointingpartyworkers incivil service



Taking bribe inexchange ofappointment,nepotism,appointing partyworkers in civilservice

Favoritism Favoritism

a During this period, two university professors served as PSC Chair and both came from the Department ofSoil Science, Dhaka Universityb The Chair appointed during the previous regime was allowed to serve his tenure and after him, the thendemocratic government appointed another academic as Chair who prior to appointment was a Professor ofDepartment of Political Science, Dhaka Universityc In 2001, a new democratic government came into power and after the tenure of the previous Chair cameto an end, another Professor of Department of Botany, Dhaka University was appointed as Chair


Theoretical analysis of the PSC and its problems

The growth of colonial heritage in civil service

If we look into the nature of the bureaucracy of Bangladesh, we find that it bears acolonial legacy in its public administration system (Huque 1997). During the Britishperiod, the ultimate aim of the bureaucracy was to serve imperial interests of theempire and that is why, “…it was designed to be administered by a handful ofadministrators at its apex who would rule or govern” (Laporte 1981: 581). Even,when the Government of India Act, 1935 was framed in the expectation that theministers would be Indians, it enabled the civil servants to bypass the ministers. Infact, the bureaucratic system was framed in such a manner that it would curb thedevelopment of indigenous political institutions (Khan and Zafarullah 1991). Thus,there was no question of partisan selection of personnel rather attempts were taken toselect the best among the good men (Syed 1971: 168; Laporte 1981: 581).

The Pakistani period presented a different scenario for the bureaucracy. Until1958, the political turmoil helped the bureaucracy (i.e., the CSP) to take control overthe politicians. The extent of this control was, in some cases so strong that thebureaucrats made even a number of political decisions, like the dismissal andappointment of the Prime Ministers, the dismissal of Constituent Assembly ofPakistan etc. (Ziring 1962: 117–118). After the military take over in 1958, thebureaucracy found itself in a difficult position as the autocratic regime started tocriticize the CSP for the condition of the country. However, the situation changedsoon when Ayub Khan decided to implement the Basic Democracies Order of 1959.In order to implement the program, he needed an effective and efficient bureaucraticmachinery, which was contentedly supplied by the CSP. Thus, a partnership wasbuilt between the army and the bureaucracy. Burki (1969) describes:

“The Basic Democracies Order of 1959 has given the civil servants working inthe divisions and districts “controlling power” over the new local bodies. Underthe system created by the Order, CSP Commissioners preside over theDivisional Councils and CSP (or Provincial Civil Service) Deputy Commis-sioners are the Chairmen of the District Councils. It is not surprising, therefore,that the CSP displayed such enthusiasm in setting up the local bodies under thesystem of Basic Democracies. The system of Basic Democracies stopped theerosion of the power of the CSP; by being the undisputed leaders of the localcommunities, the civil servants commanded authority not as the agents of a lawand order administration but as the representatives of an avowed welfare state”(Burki 1969: 250).

This partnership helped the CSP to gain its elite status back and also preventedthe government from taking “undue initiative” to control public personnelmanagement system. This partnership was further strengthened due to Ayub’sdistrust towards political leaders and thus helped the CSP to consider itself as thegovernment and equate the national interest with its own (Syed 1971). Thus, thePSC did not face any undue politicization in recruiting the best candidate followingthe colonial tradition during this period.


Independent Bangladesh and the civil service

Because of the CSP dominance during the Pakistani regime, the CSPs became themain target of political hatred after the independence of Bangladesh. There arenumber of reasons behind this. First of all, the CSPs always made efforts to preserveimperial heritage which would allow them to accumulate key positions in thebureaucracy. Second, “they manifested a negative attitude toward politicians on theone hand, and a paternalistic attitude towards the common man, on the other” (Khanand Zafarullah 1991: 653). As a result, both the politicians and the citizens held ananti-CSP attitude and the ruling political party promised to build an administrationfree from elite and isolated attitude. Ahamed describes, “Bureaucracy was in fact amuch hated word in the political lexicon of Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib often becamelivid with anger when he denounced bureaucracy. Moulana Bhasani, anotherprominent Bengali leader, did not complete a public speech without making astinging attack on the bureaucracy” (Ahamed 2004:106). Moreover, after theliberation, the bureaucracy was divided into two groups and engaged in a ‘war’within itself. In the one side were the bureaucrats who remained in Bangladeshduring the liberation war and on the other side were the bureaucrats who workedwith the government-in-exile. Therefore, the environment tempted the politicalleaders to violate the standing convention of political non-interference in recruitmentand routine civil service management. Instead, they started to politicize thebureaucracy to establish control over bureaucrats.

However, within a few years, the bureaucracy managed to regain its position. Reformplans were shelved and the government found it necessary to rely on the bureaucraticmachinery (Carino 1991). The pace of this reliance received a momentum during thepost-75 scenario where, due to the colonial heritage, distrust towards political leadersand paternalistic attitude to the citizen on the part of the bureaucracy, an effectivepartnership was built between the bureaucrats and the military government. Thus,according to Carino’s analysis as described in “Politicization of bureaucracy: atheoretical framework”, during the autocratic regime, the interaction between thebureaucracy and the government can be termed as ‘Authoritarianism and BureaucraticCoprimacy’, where civil bureaucrats and military power contrived in ruling thecountry. At the same time, the experience of this relationship left a lasting imprintupon the attitude of the bureaucrats.

Putnam in his classic study of 1973 on attitudes of senior civil servants of Britain,Germany and Italy, has classified the bureaucrats in two types—the classicalbureaucrat and the political bureaucrat. According to his analysis, the classicalbureaucrats prefer to resolve public issues in terms of objective standard of justice,legality or technical practicality and ignore the socio-political aspect. As a result, theclassical bureaucrats have nothing but distrust towards the institutions of politics andto them the activities of politicians are “at best senseless, at worst positively inimicalto the permanent interests of the state”. And the impact is, as Putnam describes it,“…such a bureaucrat may well find the ideas of pluralist democracy less congenialthan the quieter, more ordered, less conflict-ridden world of benevolent autocracy”(Putnam 1973: 259–260). On the other hand, the political bureaucrats have adifferent point of view. They acknowledge public interest as a pluralistic concept andalso are aware of political realities and political influences on policy making.


Contrary to the view of classical bureaucrats, the political bureaucrats consider thepoliticians “…as a participant in a common game, one whose skills and immediateconcerns may differ from his own, but whose ultimate values and objectives aresimilar” (Putnam 1973: 260).

Based on this classification, a study conducted by Jamil (2002) has revealed thefact that bureaucrats of Bangladesh are mostly classical, i.e., they perceive politics asa tool of gaining narrow interest, prefer to be non-partisan and moreover, expectpolitics to be constrained (Jamil 2002). Consequently, Huque and Rahman point outthat the bureaucracy has always found itself in a comfortable position in case ofworking with the autocratic regime (Huque and Rahman 2003). Khan and Zafarullah(1991) explains it in the following way—

The military–bureaucracy relationship has been mutually advantageous for bothgroups. The bureaucrats have all along manifested an aversion for politicians.They seem to be allergic to political control and accountability. On the otherhand, they are comfortable in a work environment that is impersonal, formal,and legal-rational and where the value system of political structures does notimpede bureaucratic norms (Khan and Zafarullah 1991: 658–659)

The military regime was not interested in taking any initiative that may hinder thisrelationship. In order to perform in an effective manner, the martial law regimerequired a civil service which was effective, efficient, capable and competent, thus itdid not want to jeopardize the whole recruitment process.5 The possible outcome ofwhich was non-interference in the civil service recruitment process.

Moving towards a democratic system, in fact, redefined the relationshipbetween the bureaucrats and the politicians. Looking back at Carino’s analysis,two issues become pertinent here. First, the vulnerability of the bureaucracyduring regime change and second, the relation between the commitment todemocracy of the party in power and its interaction with the bureaucracy. Therestoration of democracy indeed placed the bureaucracy in a vulnerable position.With its classical outlook towards the politicians, soon it became the target ofattack. At the same time, according to Carino’s theory, if the political parties thatassumed power possessed strong commitment towards democratization, theymight eventually move forward towards achieving the ‘Complementarity’ model.Unfortunately, that was not the case.

In its 16 years’ life-span (1991–2006), the nascent democracy of the countrysuffered a setback as the parties that came into power attempted to strengthenexecutive control at the expense of legislature and the judiciary. The centralization

5 One interviewee commented, “Well, the autocratic governments do not represent any particular politicalparty. Thereby, it is not necessary for them to sacrifice the efficiency of the civil servant at the price ofappointing their party loyalists.”


of decision-making in the executive office helped the party in power tosuccessfully maintain a patron–client relationship which allowed illicit channelingof public resources to specific client groups (IGS 2007, 2008). Besides, thisexecutive ascendancy tempted the political actors to be involved in a ‘state-capture’practice. Partisan politics seemed to permeate all aspects of public life and thispenetration of politics had an adverse impact on the structure and operation of thepublic institutions (CGS 2006). Thus, the temptation of state-capture andmaintenance of patron–client relationship developed a ‘winner-takes-all’ systemwhich simply ridiculed the whole philosophy of democracy. The State ofGovernance in Bangladesh 2007, prepared by IGS has depicted this scenario inthe following manner:

As the party in power was the system’s immediate beneficiary, the only changes itwas interested in makingwere to assure its return to office in the next elections. Theopposition waited, maintained its networks and prepared to win elections the nexttime around and then capture its share of benefits. Thus, the consensus betweenparties over the rules of the game continued with periodic outbursts of violence andturmoil which intensified before elections (IGS 2008: xiv).

The possibility of a partnership between the classical bureaucrats and thepoliticians were almost zero as by definition, the classical bureaucrats had nofaith in the politicians and the elitist mode of operation of the classicalbureaucrats made the politicians quite sceptical about them. The believers(classical bureaucrats) and non-believers (politicians) regarding the politics–administration dichotomy envisaged a battle field between them. Due to thepractice of ‘state-capture’, the political parties, instead of bringing aboutsystematic change in the politics–administration relationship was more interestedrecruiting party men in the bureaucracy. The democratic era in Bangladeshwitnessed massive politicization but it was not to gain efficiency and increaseeffectiveness. Rather, the primary emphasis was placed on recruiting “party menbureaucrats” irrespective of their qualifications.

Politics–bureaucracy inter-action: consequences for the PSC

Because of the dependence of the government on the bureaucracy for efficiency,effectiveness and legitimacy, the bureaucrats enjoyed a favorable partnership withthe government during the autocratic regimes. The government preferred to keep thenumber of appointments to party loyalists limited. To this end, the autocratic regimeadopted a two-way mechanism. On one hand, they preserved the integrity of thebureaucratic machinery to a visible extent by non-interfering in the recruitmentprocess and on the other hand, they allowed a certain level of ‘ad-hoc’ appointmentswithin the civil service to keep their loyalists satisfied. Due to an effectivepartnership between the military government and bureaucracy, the whole systemworked relatively well. Consequently, what we had witnessed at the autocraticperiod was that the governments at that period did not interfere into the PSCactivities especially regarding the conduction of BCS examination.

The above scenario can be depicted in the following manner (Fig. 1):


As shown in the above picture, the presence of the classical bureaucrats in theadministrative arena helped the autocratic regime to build a partnership which islater carried out between the bureaucrats and the loyalists to the autocratic regime.The effective functioning of the government demanded two sets of solution—first,to ensure a fair recruitment procedure and second, to continue recruitment on anad-hoc basis. As a result, the authoritarian regime, at one end, circumscribed theauthority of the PSC to allow the practice of ad-hocization (Ahmed 1990) and onthe other end, refrained itself from interfering at the entry-level recruitment process.For its own sake, the government required competent personnel at the right placeand the recruitment of competent personnel demanded a fair examination procedure.The final outcome was a semi-independent PSC, which carried out its dutyeffectively.

Partnership

Presence of classical bureaucrats in

administrative machinery

Loyalists to autocratic regime

Recruitment of competent personnel

Providing administrative posts in limited numbers

Fair examination Procedure

Circumscribing authority of PSC

PSC’s independence in discharging duties

Situation

Solution

Measures

Outcome

Situation

Solution

Measures

Fig. 1 How PSC operated during the autocratic regime


On the other hand, since the beginning of the democratic regime, the politicians‘successfully’ captured the public institutions and rather than using these institutionsfor delivering service to the people, they utilized them for private gain (CGS 2006).In order to increase the pace of this ‘state capture’ attitude, the two major politicalparties that reined the political arena during 1991–2006 depended largely onpoliticization of public sphere. At the same time, the inherent distrust towards theclassical bureaucrats compelled them to devise a mechanism through which thefunctioning of the bureaucracy could be controlled. Consequently, they developedtheir very own understanding of administrative reality where the performance of thecivil servants was evaluated through their political bias. At the initial stage, insteadof merit or efficiency, devotion to the party became the most important criteria inpromoting or transferring the civil servants. From that, the political partiesconcentrated on recruiting their party activists in the service and interference in thePSC’s activities became a common phenomenon.

The following figure makes it clear (Fig. 2):

Distrust in classical bureaucrats

Inclusion of party loyalists in administrative machinery

Appointing wrong person as Members and Chair of the

PSC and making examination procedure ineffective

An ineffective PSC

Situation Solution

Measures

Outcome

Fig. 2 How PSC operated during the democratic regime


According to the figure, the scepticism regarding the intention of the classicalbureaucrats and the existence of a pre-mature democracy tempted the ruling politicalparty to politicize the recruitment process to impose the ‘democratic control’ overthe bureaucracy (Jahan 2006). The bureaucracy, being in a vulnerable position,initially failed to resist the politicization and later accepted it (Huque and Rahman2003). People with political affiliation were appointed as members and chairs in thePSC. Subsequently, the examination procedure was tampered to recruit partyloyalists in the civil service. This ‘solution’ of the democracy resulted in the failureof the PSC in recruiting competent bureaucrats.

Conclusion

The success of democracy depends on the effectiveness of two ‘great gearingmechanisms’ of government—the formation of democratic popular control andthe transformation of this popular control in line with the administrative reality(Pfiffner 2007). Democratic popular control is shaped through the reflection ofpeople’s expectation of the activities of their elected representatives. When thisfirst mechanism succeeds in functioning properly then it is up to the politicians torealize these expectations and implement an action plan with the help of thebureaucracy. In the case of Bangladesh, the two types of regimes reflect twodifferent scenarios. During the autocratic period, the popular control was absentand thus there was no reflection of people’s expectations in the activities carriedout by the government. The regime defined its own vision and through theformation of an effective coalition with the bureaucracy ensured the designing andimplementation of an action plan to carry out its activities. The whole processrequired the presence of a competent bureaucracy. On the other hand, during thedemocratic period, lack of foresight and willingness of the ruling political party tolisten to the view of citizens resulted in failing to meet up of “the vision ofdemocratic popular control” (Pfiffner 2007). Furthermore, the regime’s reluctanceto build a partnership with the bureaucracy delimited its capacity to realize theadministrative reality. The vision was defined in an arbitrary manner and theregime attempted to take control of the bureaucracy to develop an action planwhile interpreting this vision. Thus, the regime required a bureaucracy whichwould remain politically loyal.

In this paper, we have shown that, during the autocratic period, as the regimerequired a competent bureaucracy to carry out its functions, it preferred not tointerfere in the recruitment process. Thus, the PSC was allowed to discharge itsduties in a semi-independent manner. However, when a democratic governmentcame into power, it tried to ensure partisan appointments and recruitments to controlbureaucracy. Thus, the PSC’s authority to ensure a fair recruitment procedure wascircumscribed. The present interim government has initiated a number of reformefforts to bring qualitative change in the functioning of the PSC. However, thereremains considerable doubt regarding the sustainability of these reform efforts whenan elected democratic government comes to power (IGS 2007, 2008). As theprevious sections show, this concern is not extraneous. A democracy, which isrefined or formal, tries to develop its very own method of making the bureaucracy


work, making it responsive and responsible. The problem is, in the name ofdemocracy, what we have seen until 2006 is a “democratic malfunctioning” modelwhich takes little account of the existing social, political or economic structure of thestate. Democracy has always remained rhetoric to us. And, this has its impact on thefunctioning of almost all the public institutions, including the PSC. If the democracythat we have had in the last 16 years continues, there remains a possibility that thereforms undertaken so far, in the long run, may fail to bring about the desiredqualitative change in the functioning of the PSC. The existing positive atmospherefor change may fade away quite quickly, if the political parties fall short indetermining their mode of interaction with the civil service.1

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Dr. Ferdous Jahan : Dr. Jahan is an Associate Professor of Public Administration at the University ofDhaka, Bangladesh. She has part time affiliation with BRAC Development Institute, BRAC University.Dr. Jahan is also a post-doctoral fellow of the Jerry Lee Center of Criminology, University ofPennsylvania, USA. Her current academic interests and research include: governance; corruption; legalempowerment of the poor; women’s empowerment issues in developing societies; how the state may affectwomen’s empowerment through public policies and laws; and other development related issues.

Asif Mohammad Shahan : Mr. Asif Mohammad Shahan is a Research Associate/Lecturer at the Instituteof Governance Studies, BRAC University. He completed his Masters Degree in 2007 in PublicAdministration from the University of Dhaka. His research interests are public management, governance,bureaucratic politics and politicization of the bureaucracy, local government.


Documents

Politics−Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh