Bangladesh in 1973 Management of Factional Politics

8/3/2019 Bangladesh in 1973 Management of Factional Politics

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Bangladesh in 1973: Management of Factional PoliticsAuthor(s): Rounaq JahanReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1973: Part II (Feb., 1974), pp. 125-135Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643085 .Accessed: 26/11/2011 05:48

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BANGLADESHN 1973:

MANAGEMENTFFACTIONAL OLITICS/ RounaqJahan

In the first ear followingiberation, angladesh howed onsiderable uc-cessin establishing stablepolity nd even undertook ong term political

planning.' he Indian "model" of political evelopmentppeared o bethe

AwamiLeagueregime's referred odeland the regime went bout n abrisk fashion o introduce system f parliamentary overnment ith adominant ingle arty.2 n the econd year fter iberation, heregime on-tinued ts commitment o the Indian "model" but faced many more chal-lenges o its proposed ystem. he opposition gainst he regime becamevoluble n 1973.In spite of the Awami League'soverwhelming ictory ntheMarch1973 national lection, heyear aw a marked rosion f popularsupport from the Awami League regime. Sheikh Muj bur PRahman's

charisma lso waned little. he regime's ailure n the economic ront-its mismanagement f the economy nd the continuing igh prices ,ofessential ommodities-resulted n tremendous conomichardship or themassesof the people.But when the masses felt he economic queeze,asmallminority ained.3 Unequal sharing of austerity, oupled with theallegation f widespread orruption n the regime, ed to growing opulardisenchantment ith the government. rmed attack on police stations,which ncreased n alarming roportion fter une 973,was an indicationof the regime's oss of support n the countryside.

The regime trengthened nd multiplied ts law and order enforcingagencies, utmere se of ts coercivemachinery, n the bsence f mobiliza-tion of people behind ts policies and programs, ndermined he supportbase of the regime. he task of strengthening he grassroots rganizationof the party was given ittle riority n 1973; rather he regime pent mostof ts time nd energy n managing he factional onflicts n the party ndthe dministration. f the party n power wasfactionalized, o too were he

'Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh n 1972:Nation Building n a New State," Asian Survey,XIII:2, (February 973).'For an elaboration of this argument ee my "The Emerging Political System of

Bangladesh," n unpublished paper presented t a seminar on Political Development nSouth Asia held at the University f Rajasthan, Jaipur, ndia, February 5-9, 1973.

'In 1973Bangladeshsaw the emergence f a small group of new rich-usually AwamiLeague supporters-who made quick money s recipients f the regime's patronage.

125


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126 BANGLAD ES H

parties n opposition; nd they ailed o provide viable alternative o theregime. n 1973 the regime's uthority as eroded but no substitute u-thority merged.THE ECONOMY

Theyear 1973 proved o be a bad year for heBangladesh conomy. hereconstruction ork agged behind chedule, roduction n both gricultureand ndustry ailed o reach he evel chieved efore iberation, herewereshortfalls n imports nd exports, nd prices and the cost of living ndexsoared. GrossDomesticProduct GDP) in 1972-73was estimated o be12-14% ower n real terms han he GDP in 1969-70 nd GDP per capitawasestimated obe one-fifthower han heGDPper capita of preliberationdays.4Rice production n 1972-73was about 15% lower than that of1969-70 nd industrial utput n 1972-73was 30% lower han he normaloutput f 1969-70.5 he ute ndustry's utput as28% lessthan he1969-70production.6 xports n 1972-73were stimated o be 30% lower han thelevel chieved n 1969-70 nd the mport f non-food temswas also about30% less than normal requirements.7 his shortfall n imports, ogetherwith sharp ncrease n money upply nd a decline n production, ed toa doubling f averageprice evels.According o one study, rom he base

of 100in 1969-70, hecost of iving ndex of an industrial orker ose to200.31at the end of 1972.8 Revenue ollection lso lagged behind and itfailedto match ven the recurrent xpenditure f the government.

The only right pot n the economic ector n 1973 was the ntroductionof heFirst ive Year Plan.ThePlan envisagesan xpenditure f 44.55bil-lion takas, 0% of which s to be financed y domestic ources.The FirstFive Year Plan sets a modest objective f increasing he country's DPby 5.5% per year and it puts priority n agriculture.9 hile ntroducingthe plan, the DeputyChairman lanning Commission nnounced hat he

plannerswould attempt o hold the 1972-73price ine but that t wouldnot be possible ogo back to the 1969-70 prices.The Annual Plan published by the government f Bangladesh rgues

that he hortfalls n the conomy nd the high prices re largely heresultof inefficient anagement, .e., lack of coordination abor-managementproblems nd the reation f multiplemiddlemen n the market.10 he plan

'Planning Commission, nnual Plan 1973-74, Dacca: Bangladesh Government ress,1973),p. 1.

5Ibid,p. 9.'Ibid, p. 9.'Ibid, p. 10.8SawdeshR. Bose, "The Price Situation n Bangladesh," The Bangladesh Economic

Review,Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1973, p. 244.9TheBangladeshObserver, Dacca), November 28, 1973.10Planning ommission, overnment f the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Annual

Plan 1973-74, p. 1-10.


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further dmits hat, the difficult conomic ituation .. seriously ffectedthe daily ives of our people particularly he landlessrural workers ndgenerally heurban population . . (and) generated idespread ocialand

political ension.""1 ndeed ts failure n economic management ultipliedthe regime's roblems n the political ront.

POLITICS ANDADMINISTRATION

In 1973 the regime ontinued n its course of establishing secularparliamentary olitical ystem n Bangladesh. arliamentary lectionswereheld arly nd on schedule o legitimize he ystem. ut n the post-electionperiod pervasive actionalism n politics nd administration nderminedthe regime's apabilities or ong term planning. n spite of its massiveelectoral ictory he regime radually ost ts grip on the country. n themonths ollowing he lection, pposition o the regimemounted nd threatsand counterthreats f "civil war" and "class struggle" ecamefrequent.12Election nd the containment f factional euds, however, emained heregime'smajor achievements f the year.

Election: The Awami League regime wanted o hold an early electionto renew ts mandate rom he people. Parliamentary lectionswere heldon March 7, 1973. Fourteen parties and 1075 candidates ontested he

election or 288 seats.'3 Eleven Awami League candidates were electedunopposed. ince the election esults were a forgone onclusion, lectioncampaigning enerated ittle ublic nterest. hat s significant s that non-issuesfeatured rominently n the campaign. here was little ontroversyover fundamental ssues of socio-economic-politicalolicies. The majorcampaign ssue for all parties was "conspiracy."'4 very party ncludingtheparty n powerbranded heother arties s foreign gents ndulging nconspiracy gainst he nterests f the country. hough heAwamiLeaguewasexpected o win handsomely, ts margin f victory ame as a surprise

1lbid, p. 1.12Surprisingly nough the threats f "civil war" and "armed struggle" re more fre-

quently eing used by the Awami League and the Parties supporting he Awami League-i.e., NAP(M) and Communist arty (CPB). Opposition political parties complainthat heregime s using the bogey of civil war to eliminate he opposition. ee Badrud-din Umar, The United Front of Patriotic' Parties," Holiday, September 9, 1973.

13Electionn one constituency ould not be held in March due to the death of one ofthe candidates. n a later by-election he Awami League won the seat.

1"Acontent nalysis of the pre-election peeches by the leaders of various parties re-vealsthat the ssues of corruption, igh prices, political repression nd conspiracy fea-tured prominently n the campaign. Conspiracy, however, was the most frequentlydiscussed ssue. The Awami League branded the opposition parties as agents of "US-Chinese mperialists," onspiring oundermine he sovereignty nd integrity f Bangla-desh.NAP(M) and Communist arty of Bangladesh (CPB) also called the other partiesagents of "US-Chinese imperialism" ndulging in conspiracy against the "socialist"policy f Bangladesh.The National Awami Party, Bhashani group (NAP-B) and JSDwarned hat heAwami League, NAP(M) and CPB were tools of "Soviet-Indian ocialImperialists."


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ROUNAQ JAHAN 129

Management f FactionalPolitics: The year aw the continuation f oldschisms21 and the addition of new ones in the party and the administra-tion; and as before he regime howed great skill n holding ogetherdivided arty nd administration. actional ension n the Awami League,already isible n 1972,becameacute n 1973. An acceptable uccessor oSheikhMujibur Rahman as the party hief could not be found nd theAwamiLeague council essionwas postponed number f times o avoidan open plit n the party.22 here re factional chisms mong old AwamiLeaguers i.e., between ajuddin Ahmed nd Syed Nazrul slam), as wellas among he moreyouthful arty eaders i.e., between heikh FazlulHaqMoniand Tofail Ahmad). These schisms o down o the district nd sub-divisionalevels f he party.

The intra-party actional ights ere ontained n 1973either y SheikhMujiburRahman's ersonal ntervention r by the accommodation f fac-tional eaders n powerposition. hus soon after lection,when he YuboLeague of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni and the Sramik League of AbdulMannanstarted heir much publicized uddhi Avijan (purification am-paign), sometimes gainst their rival factions within he party, heikhMujib had to mediate personally etween hefactions.23 ut mere media-tion was not enough. n September he regime had to expand the cabinetand appoint fourteen tate ministers o keep the support f some of thefactional eaders. In December wo more ministers were added to thecabinet. Thus Sheikh Mujib averted n open division of the party byjudiciously alancing he various actions nd distributing olitical atron-age among hem. Additionally he ontinuing ersonal opularity f SheikhMujib worked s a deterrent gainst actional evolt. actional eaders didnot break way from he party ince they wereuncertain f their politicalsurvival s Mujib's opponents.24 hen MizanurRahman Choudhury, neof the cabinetministers nd a top Awami Leaguer,was asked to resign y

Sheikh Mujib, he did so without ublic protest nd did not join anyopposition arty.Factionalism eleaguered he administration oo. In 1972 there was

bitter nfighting etween he "Muj bnagar" and "non-Mujibnagar" d-

2"Seemy "Bangladesh in 1972," op. cit., for discussion of some of these schisms.22TleAwami League Constitution tipulates hat the posts of party president nd the

leader of the Parliamentary arty should not be held by the same person. However, sno acceptable candidate was found n 1972Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had to continue nboth posts.

28Before nd after the March election, Sheikh Moni and Mannan repeatedly an-nounced hat upon Sheikh Mujib's order they would soon start a purification ampaignto cleansethe administration, arty nd the country f unpatriotic nd corrupt lements.Sheikh Mujib's directives, owever,did not come through, when Mannan's supporterskidnapped Ahmed Fazlur Rahman, a businessman nd Awami League supporter, ndbrought im for questioning Mujib had to personally ntervene o get Fazlur Rahmanreleased.

24TajuddinAhmed reportedly id not break away from the party for fear that hispolitical areer would be destroyed y Sheikh Mujib if Tajuddin joined the opposition.


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ministrators 25 in 1973 a third category of schism was added-the re-turnees from Pakistan.26 The jockeying for position by the three groupsundermined he coherence and efficiency f the services. The morale of theservices was already low because of their ob insecurity. After iberationthe erstwhile ivil service of Pakistan was abolished and in the absence ofa new structure he top bureaucrats felt insecure. Additionally the civilse-vices, used to freedom from political control during the Pakistani days,found t difficult o adjust to the changed set-up n a parliamentary ystemwhere they were placed under the control of the political leadership. Apartfrom their own factional division, members of the civil bureaucracy werecaught in the factional schisms of the Awami League.

The armed forces also could not escape factional tension. Conflict be-tween the forces repatriated from Pakistan and those who fought in theliberation war was particularly cute. A large number of the army repatri-ated from Pakistan were left out of the Bangladesh army and many of thesenior military officers were posted in insignificant posts after their re-patriation.27 Conflict nd jealousy also prevailed between the military andthe more political para-militia, the Rakkhi Bahini. The multiplication ofBahinis,28most of which belonged to the government r the party n power,added to the problems of coordinating he law and order enforcing gencies.

The regime did make some attempts o reorganize its faction-torn utputsector. A number of commissions were set up to recommend ways andmeans of effecting uch reorganizations. The report of the Administrativeand Services Reorganization Committee ASRC), submitted o the govern-ment in April, recommended, among other things, the separation of thecivil bureaucracy into two separate branches-general and developmentadministration. he report -of he ASRC is under scrutiny by the govern-ment and its fate is still undecided. The Pay Committee submitted itsreport n May and recommended ten national pay scales, and taka 2000/

as the maximum and taka 130/ as the minimum pay. A part of the reportof the Pay Committee was implemented by the regime from July 1973.However, the report of the Education Commission, ubmitted o the govern-ment n June, s yet obe published.

25Seemy Bangladesh in 1972," op. cit., p. 200 for discussionof the conflict etweenthe "patriots" and the "collaborators" after iberation.

26A arge number of bureaucrats were repatriated romPakistan after August 1973.As many f the top government osts were already filled by the "Mujibnagar" and "non-Mujibnagar" administrators, he returnees rom Pakistan found t difficult o land top-ranking obs.

27Thus fter his return from Pakistan, Lt. General Wasiduddin, who is the seniormost rmy fficer, as made an officer n special duty n the foreign ministry. e wasnot offered he post of Chief of the Bangladesh Army.

28Thegovernment as nearly half-a-dozen rmed organizations. Apart from he threeservices f the military, here are the Bangladesh Rifles, Rakkhi Bahini, Police, Ansarand village defense force. The Awami League has its ChesyasevakBahini (volunteercorps) and the party's abor front-Sramik League-has its lal bahini. Clashes amongstthese Bahinis are quite frequent.


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The task of reorganizing heparty nd the administration as seriouslyimpeded y the visible orruption hat rept nto ll echelons f the regime.Even Sheikh Mujibur Rahman tated epeatedly hathe could not get thecountry moving o rebuild "sonar Bangla" (golden Bengal) because ofwidespread orruption round him. Public and private umors f corrup-tion f top Awami Leaguers bounded.29 heikhMujiburRahman'sfamilyalso came under fire or allegedmisuseof power.30 he allegation f cor-ruption t the top eveladversely ffected hemorale f party workers ndthe civil/military ervices.The administrative fficiency uffered, o didthe egime's fficacy. riticism f and opposition gainst heregime ecamevoluble.

ThePoliticalOpposition:The year started n a tense politicalnote. OnJanuary two tudents elonging o the Bangladesh tudents nion NAP-M's student ront) werekilled n a police firing n a procession rotestingthe Vietnamwar. The incident lectrified he opposition who were ookingfor n issue to mobilize mass sentiment gainst heregime.All oppositionpolitical arties protested hepolice action and a complete trike was ob-served he next day. But when hey ried o draw an analogybetween he1952 languagemovement nd 1973 Vietnam rotest ay, the opposition,especially he NAP(M), CPB and Students nion, overplayed heir hand.

Personal riticism f Sheikh Mujib turned he tide of popular sympathyagainst hem; nd then when hey apitulated nd toned own heir riticismthe NAP(M), CPB and the Students nion ost face and support.3'

In the election ampaign heopposition arties ocused n a number fissues ritical f the regime. he NAP M) and CPBemphasized orruption,political epression nd the aw and order roblem. hey did not differ iththe AwamiLeague on any fundamental olicy ssue and earned the nick-name f being he B team" of the Awami eague.The NAP B) and JatiyaLeague focused n Indo-Bangladesh elations nd tried o exploit herisinganti-India entiment n the country. he JSD's campaign hemewasscienti-fic socialism.

All the opposition arties aredbadly n the election.While the AwamiLeague polled73% of votes ast,the NAP(M) got8%, NAP(B) 5% and

29Therewere allegations of corruption gainst the top leadership of the party. Onlya few Awami Leaguers were known to be noncorrupt.

80Thepolitical nvolvement nd influence f Sheikh Moni (Sheikh Mujib's nephew)and Sheikh Kamal (Sheikh Mujib's son) generated widespread criticism. ee Ganakan-tha, Dacca), September , 1973.

81TheNAP(M), CPB and Students Union launched a bitter attack against SheikhMujibafter January . The Students Union eaders demanded that Sheikh Mujib shouldask the forgiveness f students. But even on January , when Dacca was shut down bya strike, heikh Mujib went to Barisal and addressed a mammoth ublic meeting whichwas an index of his tremendous opularity. The Awami League and its student andlabor fronts aunched a counter-movement nd demanded that the NAP and StudentsUnion eaders should apologizeto Sheikh Mujib. NAP and Students Union finally avein. This capitulation ost them oss of credibility with their upporters.


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the JSD 6%.32 The election result demoralized he opposition parties.NAP(M) and CPB3 oonwent ack to their ld policy f seeking n alliancewith heAwami League.3 The student's ront f the NAP(M) took theinitiative n striking n alliance with he AwamiLeague'sstudent ront theStudents eague), and put up a joint panel of candidates n the DaccaUni-versity entral tudents nion (DUCSU)election n September.34 ollow-ing the tudent's nitiative, AP(M) andCPB formed n alliance with heAwamiLeague known s the Gono Oikya Jote.35 he Jote eaders pledgedjoint action gainst he"anti-socials."36

The year aw the NAP(B) tornby factional euds.After iberation, heNAP(B) picked p somerightwing upport ecauseofBhashani's nti-India

statements. eft-right ension n the party became quite visible. Bhashanimade several ttempts o launch mass movement gainst he regime utwithoutmuch uccess. n May he started fast unto death which rousedpopular ympathy nd support ut his party ailed o mobilize mass cam-paign.As the year drew o an end Bhashani alled for n "armed truggle,"but he ther eaders f the party were t pains to point ut that NAP wouldcontinue o be a constitutional arty.

Of all the opposition arties he JSD showed ome success n picking ppopular upport. ts student ront-Students eague (R-S faction) won anumber f college union elections. n the DUCSU election,which s oftenregarded s the barometer f the country's olitics, t proved o be a strongforce.37 he various Marxist-Leninist actions f the Communist arty lsoworried he regime. The regime racked down hard on such factions nPabna,Rajshahiand Kushtia; the eaders f some of these arties were m-prisoned r went nderground. n November t was reported hat he Marxist-Leninist roups ormed common ront o give an united pposition o theregime.

32Source:Bangladesh Election Commission.33During he national liberation movement nd after iberation the NAP(M) and

CPB repeatedly alled for an alliance of the "patriotic" parties. The Awami League,however, purned such requests for an alliance.

34During nd after he Vietnam Day Protest, here were bitter xchanges of chargesand counter-charges etween the Students Union and the Students League. The Unioncalled the League a fascist organization nd the latter called the former a mistress fthe Awami League not deserving qual status with the wife," the League presumablybeing the wife.When Union made common ause with he League even after uch publicinsults, ts image suffered.

3"TheGono Oikya Jote and the Union-Leaguealliance were formed t the initiativeof CPBwho followed he Soviet ine in Bangladesh. See Badruddin Umar, "The UnitedFront of Patriotic' Parties," Holiday, September 9, 1973 and Sirajul Hossain Khan,"The CarnivalCongress,"Holiday, December9, 1973, for n elaborate discussion of theSoviet role in the formation f the alliance.

"6TheBangladeshObserver, Dacca), September , 1973."7Though heDUCSUelection result could not be published because of the ooting of

ballot boxes, t was reported that the contest between the joint panel of Union andLeague and the Students League (R.S.) was a close one.


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From hemiddle of 1973 the regime's uthority n the countryside asseriously hreatened y the rising ncidence f armed ttack n local lawand order nforcing gencies. etween une nd November, here ere rmedattacks n 52 thanas nd police tations.38 hile uch attackswerereportedfrom ll over he country, hedistricts f Dacca,Barisal,Kushtia nd Raj-shahiwere he worst ffected. s a retaliatory easure hegovernment om-menced ombing perations n a number f districts-i.e., hittagong illTracts, ajshahi,Barisal and Khulna.The regime t first randed hese t-tacks as the work of "ultra leftists" nd "Naxalites," but later called themthe work of "miscreants."39

In response to rising criticism of the government, he regime took a num-

ber of steps to strengthen tshand.

In Septemberthe second amendment o

the constitution was passed by the parliament which provided for the in-clusion of emergency provisions in 'the constitution. Under the amendmentthe president s empowered to declare a state of emergency f he is satisfiedthat "a grave emergency exists in which the security or economic life ofBangfladesh . . is threatened y war or external aggression or internal dis-turbance. 40 The regime also tried o control the press. Several attempts we'remade to close down the newspapers and weeklies belonging to the opposition-Ganakantha, Holiday, Wave and Desh Bangla. Individual journalists and

editors were also harassed. After the Vietnam Protest Day two journalistsworking in a government-managed ewspaper lost their jobs for writingpieces critical of the regime. The editor and newsmen of Desh Bangla wereimprisoned. The editor of Holiday was harassed after the DUCSU electionand the weekly was closed down temporarily.

But side by side with these restrictive measures the regime also cameforward with reconciliatory gestures towards the opposition, such as theformation f the Jote. The regime's announcement of the release 'of nearly33,000 "detained collaborators was another example of its reconciliatorymood.4' Clearly the regime's policy was to divide the opposition and isolatethe far eft groups and crush them. By a judicious mixture of repression andreconciliation he regime achieved considerable success in winning over orneutralizing he moderate opposition. As the year drew to an end, SheikhMujib's major political problems lay not with the opposition but with thefactions n his own party.

"'The Ittefaq, Dacca), November0, 1973.""The term miscreant," irst opularized by the Pakistani occupation army to refer

to the Bengali freedom ighters, ater became part of the Bangladesh government's ffi-cial vocabulary with reference o militant eft groups.

"0SeeBadruddin Umar, "The Political Significance of the Emergency Provisions,"Holiday, September 23, 1973.

"1OnNovember 9, Sheikh Mujib announced a general amnesty or all the prisonersheld under the collaborators ct. Exceptions were made only n cases where there werespecific riminal harges. See The Bangladesh Observer, Dacca), November 30, 1973.


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FOREIGNRELATIONS

Theyear 973 aw a breakthrough n the talemated ndo-Pak-Bangladesh

conflict hat rose fter he break up of Pakistan n 1971.Throughout 972the outstanding ssues between he three countries-i.e., the fate of thePrisoners f War POWs) in ndia and Bengalis n Pakistan, ecognition fBangladesh y Pakistan nd the division f assets nd iabilities etween hesuccessor tates-could notbe solved ecauseof the rreconcilable ttitude fthe hree arties. akistan nsisted n an unconditional eleaseof all POWsincluding hose Bangladeshwanted o try or war crimes.Bangladesh n-nounced tsnon-negotiableommitment o hold war rime rials nd refusedto be present n a meeting ith akistan rior to ecognition. he deadlock

wasbrokenwhen akistan nd India signed tripartite greement egard-ing repatriation. nder he agreement ndia and Bangladesh greed othereleaseof all but 195 of Pakistani POWs, and Pakistan agreed to let allBengalis eavePakistan nd to accept ack a substantial umber f Pakistanicivilians nd Biharis iving n Bangladesh. he 1973 agreement as the re-sult f compromise n the part of all parties. ndia and Bangladesh ave uptheir arlier ecognition irst emand. hey agreed o the release of POWseven efore akistan ecognized angladesh. angladesh lso toned own itsearlier tand n war crime rials. nstead f 1500,Bangladesh greed o tryonly 95 POWs. Pakistan lso agreed othe epatriation f Bengalis nd non-Bengalis, nd implicitly ecognized angladesh, s clause V of the agree-ment tates hat Bangladeshwouldparticipate n a meeting with Pakistanonly n the basis of sovereign quality." he August greement reated

climate f further ccommodation etween akistan nd Bangladesh. How-ever, he greement tselfwas a diplomatic ictory or Pakistan ince underthe greement angladeshmademanymore compromises hanPakistan.

In 1973, hemajor diplomatic ain for Bangladeshwas its recognition ythe Arab bloc countries. angladesh lso participated n the nonalignedconference eld n Algiers n September. o gain Arab recognition, angla-desh layed p ts "muslim" mage nd during heArab-Israeli ar n Octo-ber, Bangladesh ent doctor's eam ohelp the Arab side.ThoughBangla-deshwas recognized y more than one hundred ountries, akistan andChinarefused ogive diplomatic ecognition oBangladesh, nd their on-tinued pposition ept Bangladesh ut of the UnitedNations.

Theyear 973 saw the Prime Minister aking ersonal nterest n interna-tional ffairs. heikhMujiburRahmanwent n state isits oYugoslavia nd

Japan nd attended heCommonwealth onference n Ottawa nd the non-aligned onference n Algiers. angladesh ontinued ts non-aligned oreignpolicy. angladesh eceived ubstantial id from he U.S.,U.K. West Ger-many, apan nd othermultilateral gencies uch s the World Bank.At thesame ime angladesh btained id from nd pledged riendship ith ndia,the Soviet Unionand the other ast Europeancountries. nti-Indian ndanti-Sovietentiment, owever, ecamequite visible s these wo countries


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wereblamed for having undue influence nd control over the administration.In sum: 1973 saw the Awami League regime continuing n its old policies

in economic, political and international ffairs. The early predictions of ablood bath and famine did not materialize in Bangladesh. The regimeachieved commendable success in its task of economic/political reconstruc-tion of the country. However, there was a growing frustration specially inthe urban areas. The high prices squeezed the urban salaried groups and theywere particularly ensitive o the ssue of corruption. The rural landless wasthe other group adversely affected y the economic conditions prevailing nthe country. The regime's major success in 1973 was that it was able tokeep the various frustrated roups fragmented o that there was no massivemovement gainst the regime.

ROUNAQJAHAN s an Associate rofessor nd Chairman f the Political cienceDepartment, acca University, angladesh.

Documents

Bangladesh in 1973 Management of Factional Politics