Kain Knight InBrief 23

Issue 23 | May 2015

COSTSIN BRIEF

C O S T S L A W Y E R S – L E A D I N G T H E W A Y

Solving your costs problems in the new legal landscape

Colin Campbell joining Kain KnightKain Knight, one of the UK’s largest professional firms of Costs Lawyers, is pleased to announce that Colin Campbell, who retires as a Costs Judge of the Senior Courts Costs Office this year, joins the Group as a Consultant.

Colin will bring his many years experience in costs to bear in a number of activities. They include the provision of regular updates in costs law, its practice and procedure, advice on compliance and regulatory issues, presentations at conferences and client seminars with emphasis on topical issues such as costs budgeting, advising the Kain Knight Board on general strategy and its business development, including the provision of arbitration and mediation services for clients in the UK and internationally.

With his experience drawn from over twenty years at the SCCO, starting in 1993 as a Deputy Taxing Master and from 1996 as a permanent Costs Judge, Colin was formerly a litigation partner in a commercial law practice in Holborn. He has sat as an assessor with High Court Judges in numerous costs appeals and also with the Court of Appeal in Henry v News Group Newspapers. Sitting in other capacities, he has presided over costs hearings in the Supreme Court and Privy Council as a Judicial Taxing Officer. Colin was a member of a Working Group which reported

to Sir Rupert Jackson in the preparation of his Report – Review of Civil Litigation Costs. He is also an editor of the Civil Court Practice (the “Green Book”), general editor of Greenslade on Costs and joint editor of the Costs Law reports.

Commenting on his appointment, Colin Campbell said:-

“I am delighted to be joining Kain Knight. The Group continues to be a market leader in costs law and practice, nationally and internationally, whilst retaining its traditional values in providing a personal and dedicated service in the preparation of bills, costs budgets , advice and advocacy. The Jackson reforms have brought many challenges and I am looking forward to addressing these at Kain Knight, together with the opportunities that are opening up in developing areas such as arbitration and costs mediation”.

Also commenting on the appointment, Michael Kain, Chairman of Kain Knight said :-

“I am delighted that Colin Campbell is joining us. Anyone who has appeared before him or had the pleasure of hearing him speak will know that he has an encyclopaedic knowledge of costs. There is a lot going on at Kain Knight in costs law and its development at the moment, but we shall never forget that the root of our core business is to deliver costs services and Colin will help us to continue to achieve that.”

Inside this issuePart 36 offers in detailed assessments PJ Kirby QC

02

The new proportionality test in practice Andrew Post QC

04 Meet the Team… Scott Jarrold

08

CIP v Galliford Try & Others Mitesh Modha

06

Offers are made in all litigation including detailed assessment proceedings because one wants to achieve a settlement. Settlement gives certainty. Settlement reduces the risk including the risk of incurring substantial further costs.

Part 36 offers April 2013 saw the application of Part 36 offers to detailed assessment proceedings and the revocation of CPR 47.19 and offers made pursuant to that provision.

Just when we were getting used to Part 36 offers in the context of detailed assessment proceedings amendments to CPR 47.20 were made pursuant to The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 8) Rules 2014 as from 6 April 2015.

A Part 36 offer must be in writing, making clear that it is made pursuant to Part 36. It must specify a period of not less than 21 days within which the defendant will be liable for the claimant’s costs in accordance with rule 36.13 or 36.20 if the offer is accepted. It must also state whether it relates to the whole of the claim or to part of it or to an issue that arises in it and if so to which part or issue; and state whether it takes into account any counterclaim.

A detailed assessment hearing will now be “in progress” from the time when it starts until the bill of costs has been assessed or

agreed. So a not untypical 2 stage detailed assessment hearing spread over several months will be in progress throughout and any Part 36 offer can therefore only be accepted with the permission of the Court CPR 36.11(3)(d).

If detailed assessment proceedings are to be appealed a new Part 36 offer should be made as an existing one will not carry with it the Part 36 costs consequences (CPR 36.4(1)).

Unless stated otherwise any offer will be treated as being inclusive of the cost of preparation of the bill, interest and VAT (PD47.19)

CPR 36.7 makes clear that a Part 36 offer can be made at any time so that would include before any detailed assessment proceedings are commenced.

If a party makes a second improved Part 36 offer that will not be treated as withdrawing the original offer which may therefore still be relied on subsequently when it comes to dealing with costs (CPR 36.9(5)). A Part 36 offer can be withdrawn by giving written notice of the same as previously. An offer can now be automatically withdrawn in accordance with its own terms so it could lapse after a certain period of time provided that was not before 21 days (CPR 36.9(4)(b)). As Part 36 offers remain open for acceptance until withdrawn there could now arise disputes as to whether the terms of the offer itself provided for its automatic withdrawal and whether the same had therefore been withdrawn in accordance with the terms of the offer.

02 | Kain Knight InBrief

Part 36 offersConsiderations Tactics&in detailed assessments

Tactically Part 36 offers should be the preferred route for receiving parties but for paying parties a Calderbank all inclusive offer is normally preferable.

Kain Knight InBrief | 03

Acceptance of a Part 36 Offer There is now express reference to the receiving party being entitled to the costs of the proceedings “including their recoverable pre-action costs”. (CPR 36.13(1)). Where the receiving party accepts a Part 36 offer out of time the court must order the offeree to pay the offeror’s costs for the period from the date of the expiry of the relevant period to the date of acceptance (CPR 36.13(5).

If a Part 36 offer is accepted but the sum is not paid within 14 days then the receiving party can apply for a final costs certificate (CPR 47.20(4)(d)).

Beating a Part 36 Offer There can be very substantial benefits to a receiving party beating its own Part 36 (CPR 36.17). The receiving party will, unless the court considers it unjust, be entitled to interest at a rate not exceeding 10% above base on the sum awarded from the date on which the relevant period expired (normally 21 days after the offer), costs on the indemnity basis from the expiry of the relevant period, interest on those costs at a rate not exceeding 10% above base and an additional amount of up to £75,000 being 10% of the first £500,000 awarded and 5% of any amount above that up to a total of £75,000. As the additional amount is calculated by reference to the amount awarded that will be 10% of the first £500,000 including disbursements and VAT (but probably not interest – Watchorn v Jupiter Industries Ltd [2014]).

The court can find it to be unjust to make the normal orders consequential on a Part 36 offer being beaten but unless the case is unusual one would expect the normal consequences to follow, see Downing v Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust [2014].

As the costs are likely to be subject already to interest at the judgment rate of 8% the enhanced rate must take that into account so as base rate is .5% the receiving party may only receive an additional 2.5%.

Solicitors should consider the terms of their retainers and whether the same entitle them to retain the interest or the additional amount which otherwise will belong to the client.

The advantages of a Part 36 offer to a paying

party are an entitlement to costs from the expiry of the relevant period and interest on those costs. The costs will only be on a standard basis.

CPR36.23 applies where the offeror is treated as having filed a costs budget limited to applicable court fees. If the offeror then does better than the offer that he made then notwithstanding that pursuant to CPR3.14 his costs budget is limited to applicable court fees he will be able to recover 50% of his assessed costs. This raises the possibility of having to consider the budget of a party who is restricted to court fees in case in due course they do better than any Part 36 offer they have made!

Part 36 offers and provisional assessments Part 36 applies to provisional assessments PD 47 14.3(d). On a provisional assessment the most that the court will award as costs of the assessment (other than the costs of drafting the bill of costs) is £1,500 plus VAT and any court fees (CPR 47.15(6)). However the receiving party should still be entitled to enhanced interest and the additional amount being 10% of the sum provisionally assessed if it beats its own Part 36 offer. Indemnity costs can still be awarded but subject to the maximum of £1,500 plus VAT.

CPR 47.15(6) refers to the “costs of the assessment”. If a Part 8 costs only claim was required those costs arguably should be allowed in addition. In Tasleem v Beverley [2013] the Court of Appeal concluded that the fixed costs for obtaining a default costs certificate did not include the costs of issuing Part 8 proceedings which were in the discretion of the court.

Disadvantages of Part 36 offers A paying party who makes a Part 36 Offer will be liable to pay the receiving party’s costs (CPR 36.13(1)). A Part 36 offer will, unless otherwise stated, be presumed to include the cost of preparing the bill. That change may make pre-detailed assessment proceedings part 36 offers more attractive to paying parties than previously where there was the risk of having to pay for the preparation of the unserved bill in addition to the sum offered.

The receiving party has 21 days to accept the Part 36 offer and is entitled to its costs up to that time. Significant costs could be incurred

by the receiving party in that period. A Part 36 offer made at the same time as the Points of Dispute runs the risk that the receiving party will claim the costs of the replies which have to be served within 21 days of the points of dispute.

The problem for a paying party making a Part 36 offer is that there remains uncertainty as to how much is ultimately payable because it is not known what pre or post action costs the receiving party may be entitled to.

A paying party may prefer to make a Calderbank/without prejudice save as to costs offer in order to save the additional unknown costs that flow from the acceptance of a Part 36 offer. Such an offer will not however carry with it the automatic consequences of a Part 36 offer in the event that it is not beaten by the receiving party. It may still be taken into account by the court in the exercise of the discretion as to the costs of the detailed assessment proceedings.

Tactically Part 36 offers should be the preferred route for receiving parties but for paying parties a Calderbank all inclusive offer is normally preferable. The offer should make clear that it is “without prejudice save as to the costs of the detailed assessment”. It should include interest, the costs of the preparation of the bill and the costs of the detailed assessment proceedings (assuming they have commenced) and in the event that there were also Part 8 costs only proceedings, the Part 8 proceedings.

PJ Kirby QC, Hardwicke Chambers

We all know that in the brave new post-Jackson world, proportionality is a key concept. But what does new style proportionality mean, and how are the rules being interpreted in the small number of cases that have come before the courts so far? How important is proportionality under the new rules?

Put shortly, it’s central to the scheme of the new rules. The significance is best demonstrated by the new formulation of the overriding objective at CPR 1.1. The old formulation was

1.1(1) These Rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly.

But the new rule is significantly different:

1.1(1) These Rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.

This is self-evidently a fundamental change. Proportionality is now elevated to equal billing with justice. This may surprise those of us who seem to recall that the big building on the Strand is the Royal Courts of Justice, not the Royal Courts of Justice and Proportionality…

This change is why the principle in Lownds v Home Office [2002] EWCA Civ 365 has been pushed aside. Necessity no longer trumps proportionality.

What do the rules say about proportionality?

CPR 1.1 carries on as follows:

(2) Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable –

(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing;

(b) saving expense;

(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate –

(i) to the amount of money involved ;

(ii) to the importance of the case;

(iii) to the complexity of the issues; and

(iv)tothefinancialpositionofeachparty;

(d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;

Thus saving expense is right up at the top of the list of aims, and the first focus of the proportionality test is on the amount of money involved.

The reversal of Lownds is effected by 44.3(2):

Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis the court will –

(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred.

The other rules defining proportionality are in CPR 44.3(5):

Costs incurred are proportionate if they bear a reasonable relationship to –

(a) the sums in issue in the proceedings;

(b) the value of any non-monetary relief in issue in the proceedings;

(c) the complexity of the litigation;

(d) any additional work generated by the conduct of the paying party; and

(e) any wider factors involved in the proceedings, such as reputation or public importance.

Guidance as to what these rules mean

Litigators, and indeed litigants, might be forgiven for throwing down the White Book in exasperation and asking “but what is a reasonable relationship?” If the claim is

for money, does this mean that the costs should not exceed the damages or should not exceed a percentage of the damages, or should not amount to more than twice the damages? And how does that relationship

alter if the litigation is complex? And what if the claim is not for money at all?

The new Senior Costs Judge has, however, expressed the opinion, in a speech to the Commercial Litigation Association in October 2014, that no further guidance is required.

It is said that we will need guidance on how to apply the new test. I disagree. The guidance is already there. It is likely that somebody will in some case or another seek to appeal the approach that has been taken. But I would suggest that there is no reason to suppose that the court hearing the appeal will do other than restate the guidance that has already been givenbyJacksonLJinhisfinalreport:

“ I propose that in an assessment of costs on the standard basis, proportionality should prevail over reasonableness and the proportionality test should be applied on a global basis. The court should first make an assessment of reasonable costs, having regard to the individual items in the bill, the time reasonably spent on those items and the other factors listed in CPR rule 44.5(3). The court should then stand back and consider whether the total figure is proportionate. If the total figure is not proportionate, the court should make an appropriate reduction. There is already a precedent for this approach in relation to the assessment of legal aid costs in criminal proceedings: see R v Supreme Court Taxing Office ex p John Singh and Co [1997] 1 Costs LR 49.”

Lord Neuberger in the 15th Implementation lecture declined to give general guidance and said that the law would have to be developed on a case by case basis.

The new proportionality test in practice

So how long is

a piece of string?


What does all this mean for practitioners?

Do all you can to avoid the argument entirely. If costs are awarded on the indemnity basis, you will avoid the entire problem. So think about arguments in favour of an indemnity costs order. Think about making a Part 36 offer at a realistic level, so that if the offer is not accepted, this will ground an application for indemnity costs. Even if the case is an all or nothing one, think about offers that will form the basis for an award of indemnity costs.

Conduct: can you argue that there has been conduct on the part of your opponent such that it generated additional work?

If acting for the receiving party, remember the analogy in the

Jackson report between litigationand project management. Can you contend that costs are high because of a failure to exercise proper control and devise a proportionate litigation strategy?

Those acting for either side will want to think about how to give a judge a feel for the case and its issues and the best way to communicate what the case is all about, and why it is run of the mill (if you are the paying party) or exceptionally weighty (if you are not).

Good luck.

So how long is

a piece of string?


Andrew Post QC, Costs Silk at Hailsham Chambers

Decided cases so far

Some, albeit limited, assistance can be found in a handful of decisions.

Vitol Bahrain v Nasdec Commercial Court 5/11/13, Lawtel AC0139109 This was the summary assessment of the costs of a Commercial Court injunction. The successful party sought some £165,000. Notwithstanding that its opponent had spent some £242,000, and that the underlying action was worth some $119 million, Males J described the costs claimed as eye watering, concluded they were disproportionate and reduced the sum allowed to £75,000. This case indicates that there is not necessarily safety in numbers – spending at a lower rate than your opponent will not protect you. Nor is the underlying value of the claim enough to justify high costs on an application.

Savoye v Spicers Limited [2015] EWHC 33 (TCC) This was the decision on the summary assessment of the costs of an action to secure the enforcement of the decision of an adjudicator. The sum claimed and recovered was some £889,000, but there was only a single issue in the proceedings. The costs claimed were some £210,000. Akenhead J concluded that the extent of the work undertaken was unreasonable and disproportionate and that the sum claimed was disproportionate. He allowed £96,465. His approach was based on identifying the sums for various elements of the costs claim that it was reasonable and proportionate for the unsuccessful party to pay.

Yeo v Times Newspapers [2015] EWHC 209 QB In this case Warby J gave guidance as to costs budgeting, but specifically considered the correct approach to the issue of proportionality in this context. It was argued that the approach to proportionality should be impressionistic. The judge disagreed, and held that, at least on the facts of the case, it was necessary to have regard, when deciding the issue of proportionality, to the hours of work proposed and the hourly rates claimed.

Kazakhstan Kagasy PLC v Zhunus [2015] EWHC 404 (Comm) Leggatt J considered proportionality and reasonableness in the context of very hard fought commercial litigation, and drew a distinction between the amount which it was subjectively reasonable for a client to wish to spend, and the amount which was reasonable and proportionate in amount when it comes to determining what costs are recoverable from the other party.

The touchstone is not the amount of costs which it was in a party’s best interests to incur, but the lowest amount which it could reasonably have been expected to spend in order to have its caseconductedandpresentedproficiently,havingregardtoalltherelevant circumstances.

CIP Properties v Galliford Try [2015] EWHC 481 (TCC) The issue of proportionality arose on a costs management hearing in a construction claim based a series of alleged defects in the design and construction of a shopping centre. Coulson J followed Savoye and held that, although the claim was pleaded at some £18 million, in a case like this the value of the claim was a less important factor than its complexity. He considered that if all parties’ total costs equalled the value of the claim this would be at the upper level of what was proportionate.

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When Justice Coulson ordered costs budgets on this matter in October 2014 ([2014] EWHC 3546 (TCC)) I don’t think anyone expected this to result in a Costs Management Conference with 26 people (including me) in attendance or the 23-page judgment that followed which had such significant implications for the Claimant.

For anyone that has been hiding under a rock (you’d be forgiven for doing so if it was to somehow dodge the costs budgeting bullet), the Claimant submitted a budget in the initial sum of £9.2m and after a day long CMC with extensive submissions from all parties the budget was eventually approved at £4,226,446.41 to include both incurred and estimated costs.

To those that have been attending CMCs of late, a reduction of over 50% in the costs budget would not necessarily, of itself, come as much of a surprise (or maybe I’ve just become numb to such outcomes) but what was more concerning for the Claimant was that it had already incurred costs of £4,226,768.16 ! So, how did Justice Coulson arrive at this conclusion and what can parties learn going forward?

The claim itself is a construction defects claim valued at £18m in respect of a large mixed use development in Birmingham. In justifying its budget the Claimant was placing considerable reliance on the significant value of the claim and the complexity of the issues at stake. That was dealt a swift blow when Justice Coulson described the claim as “not particularly complex” and a “relatively standard TCC defects claim”. These findings were key to his conclusion on proportionality which, in turn, was a factor in the large reduction of the costs budget. By now, everyone should be aware that we are all (costs lawyers included) litigating in a new realm of proportionality where such a consideration trumps reasonableness and necessity. Any arguments in support of proportionate costs should now be tailored

to the five factors in CPR 44.3(5) as opposed to simply arguing that a particular item of costs is necessary. Although no particular weight is to be attached to each of these individual factors, it is no surprise that “value” finds itself at the top of the list and, on the whole, tends to be the primary consideration for most judges. Justice Coulson also had reference to the guidance of Justice Akenhead in the recent case of Savoye and Savoye Ltd v Spicers Ltd [2015] EWHC 33 (TCC) at paragraph 17 of that particular judgment.

Justice Coulson concluded that the £9.2m budget was “wholly disproportionate” to the complexity and value of the claim. Indeed, he went as far as saying, before even considering each phase of the budget individually, that £4.5m (if not less) was an appropriate sum to spend in total on a claim of this type and value. This is not the first time a judge has commenced the budgeting process with a proportionate figure in mind, before delving into the detail of the budget. In Redfern v Corby Borough Council [2014] EWHC 4526 (QB), Deputy Master Eyres was confronted with a costs budget of £744,000 on a claim valued at £700,000 and he commenced this process commenting that an overall figure of £220,000 would be reasonable. The budget was eventually approved at £226,000. This approach was upheld on appeal by HHJ Seymour QC. The matter was proceeding to the Court of Appeal (to the relief of much of the profession who were hoping for some guidance on the mire they find themselves in) however we have since learnt that the matter settled (boo!).

Right, back to CIP. One of the issues raised by the Defendant and Third Parties was the unreliability of the Claimant’s budget, a criticism that Justice Coulson found to be “fully made out” for a number of reasons.

A number of the reasons were based upon the fact that the costs now budgeted for were wholly inconsistent with estimates that had been submitted previously with no proper explanation as to why. There had also been a number of amendments made to the budget in the lead up to the CMC and following the submission of objections. As Justice Coulson himself made clear in Murray & Stokes v Neil Dowlman Architecture Ltd [2013] EWHC 872 (TCC), get the budget right the first time round. Subsequent amendments due to errors simply suggest that the exercise was conducted other than properly and undermine the reliability of the final budget.

Further, and this was probably the nail in the coffin, the budget was accompanied by an assumptions document which ran over “six closely typed pages and contains no less than 65 separate assumptions”. At the CMC, Justice Coulson commented that if the CPRC saw the document “they would be outraged”. It’s no surprise then that he concluded in his judgment that “There are so many of these assumptions, and they are so widespread in nature and effect, that they alone render the Claimant’s costs budget wholly uncertain and therefore unreliable”. Now, I’m all for detail in assumptions on the basis that they underpin your budget and also act as a reference point for any subsequent amendments on the basis of a “significant development” having occurred on your claim – but these

CIP V Galliford Try & Others: What have we learnt?


assumptions took the proverbial. A prime example was the budgeting of £101,000 under PTR with the assumptions stating this figure was arrived at on the basis that “no chronology, case summary or dramatis personae will be required”. I’m no commercial litigator but even I know that this is unlikely and in any event what was £101,000 being spent on otherwise? (Not that £101,000 is ever going to justifiable for a 1-day “housekeeping” PTR!)

Assumptions can be a useful tool to justify your budget but they are not meant to be War & Peace on the subject. A tabular landscape document of assumptions exceeding no more than 2 pages should suffice for most budgets. Assumptions are also a useful place where you can put your opponent on notice of brief fee tranches and expert cancellation fees with both often being significant if a matter settles only shortly before trial. They can be used to outline items which are excluded as well as included, but as before, there is a line. Exclude every possible eventuality and you will be perceived as trying to hedge your bets in providing “get out clauses” for amendment applications later on down the litigation line.

Something I’ve not yet mentioned is the budgets of the Defendant and Third Parties. These were £4.4m, £2.4m, £1.15m and £1.9m. An allegation levelled at the Defendant and Third Parties by the Claimant was that they had an incentive to put in low budgets given that they were likely to end up being paying parties at conclusion. Rather surprisingly, Justice Coulson stated that he had never come across such a suggestion in the TCC before and he considered the allegation to be unfounded for various reasons. I suspect those that undertake Defendant insurance litigation would overwhelmingly agree with Justice Coulson but Claimant lawyers amongst you might have sympathy with this argument.

Justice Coulson also passed comment on the hourly rates being claimed within the budget. He did not assess the appropriate rate, having appreciated that the CMC was not meant to be a detailed assessment. He did however pass comment that a Grade A rate of £370 per hour for a fee earner in Birmingham on a claim of this type was unreasonable bearing in mind the guideline rate is £217 per hour. These comments will no doubt be relied

upon in any subsequent detailed assessment proceedings. This approach of passing comment in respect of hourly rates had also been adopted in Yeo v Times Newspapers [2015] EWHC 209 (QB), where Justice Warby factored in reductions on his finding that the hourly rates claimed were “too high by 20-25%” (see para 72 of the judgment).

Finally, we come to the tension in the rules that Justice Coulson had to deal with and what he described as the “interplay between incurred costs and estimated costs [which] has not been properly thought through”. As mentioned above, he considered £4.5m to be a reasonable figure for the entire litigation including incurred costs but the Claimant had already spent circa £4.2m. However, pursuant to PD 3E, para 2.4 he was not permitted to approve incurred costs but was required to take them into account when considering the reasonableness and proportionality of subsequent costs. Further, the CMC was not meant to be a detailed assessment of costs. Could he simply refuse to make a costs management order on the basis that the costs were so disproportionate and leave it to a costs judge to sort out on detailed assessment? Could he simply award nil future costs across the board on the basis that the Claimant had simply misspent the incurred costs to date?

Reluctantly, Justice Coulson concluded that he had to conduct the budgeting exercise in respect of each phase individually. Although he was in theory restricted from assessing incurred costs downwards, he did not want to allow the Claimant to “ride roughshod over the costs management process”. Accordingly, he passed comment on the level of incurred costs where relevant, outlining what he considered to be a reasonable and proportionate sum. However, he left the door open to a detailed assessment of those costs, stating that if he was wrong in his significantly reduced “assessment” of the incurred costs and on detailed assessment a higher sum was considered reasonable, the amount he approved for future costs should be reduced pound for pound so that the overall figure for the phase would not be exceeded. An interesting and novel exercise of judicial costs management! As far as I’m aware, this judgment is not being appealed. In the event you remain confused by the approach taken (I still am slightly) I refer you to paragraphs 83 onwards for your own enlightenment.

So what have we learnt? Proportionality is king. Assumptions are important but don’t be tempted to account for every eventuality. Comment can and will be made in respect of excessive hourly rates. Incurred costs will be taken into account when approving future costs and could in theory be reduced (subject to a detailed assessment!). Happy budgeting!

Mitesh Modha, Head of Technical & Special Projects, Kain Knight

To those that have been attending CMCs of late, a reduction of over 50% in the costs budget would not necessarily, of itself, come as much of a surprise… but what was more concerning for the Claimant was that it had already incurred costs of £4,226,768.16 ! So, how did Justice Coulson arrive at this conclusion and what can parties learn going forwards?

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Meet the team

Chuckles

Scott started his career when he joined Norwich Union as a Personal Injury claims handler and got his first taste of the legal sector. Here he learnt about the wonderful world of injury claims and somehow managed to be awarded claims handler of the year in 1999.Following redundancy, Scott then embarked on his sales career and joined a training company owned by John Cleese. Here Scott gained extensive training in sales, marketing and management whilst enjoying the fast pace of telesales and field sales. Scott excelled in this environment and achieved sales person of the year in 2004 & 2005.

Scott then looked for his next challenge and decided to take on the role of managing a sales team located in England and India for

an IT outsourcing company. This role was European based and regularly took Scott to companies in The Netherlands and France.

Scott then had an opportunity to move back into the legal sector doing business development for an ATE provider taking him to all four corners of England & Wales. This role allowed him to gain experience in commercial, personal injury and clinical negligence working with a range of firms from magic circle firms, international, large regional and specialist boutique firms providing solutions for their funding needs. In addition, Scott decided to study for the CILEx qualifications and is currently an Associate Member.

Scott finally entered the wonderful world of costs for the last 18 months and joined the Kain Knight Business Development Team in March 2015 focusing on new and existing clients.

Outside of work Scott has been married to his lovely wife Emily for the last 10 years and has two beautiful kids Sophia, 8 and Max, 5.

Scott loves to play golf and has played rugby for the last 35 years for his local club and is on the revenue committee. If all the above is not enough, Scott is also Chairman of the PTA at the local school.

Scott Jarrold

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Kain Knight InBrief 23