InBrief 21 e Lisbon Final

7/27/2019 InBrief 21 e Lisbon Final

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The Lisbon Treaty was signed in December2007, after years of debate over the desir-able degree of European political integra-tion. It reflects the latest phase in thegradual transformation of the EU froma rather inward looking community, to aglobal player, inter alia , by expanding itslist of objectives. For the first time thesegeneral objectives include the eradication of poverty, which is currently only an objectiveof development cooperation and not evenamong the objectives of EU external action.However, development cooperation will be

used by the EU as just one of its tools of external action in the overall more politicalrole it seeks to play in the world.

This InBrief aims to provide an overview of the innovations in the Lisbon Treaty which,directly or indirectly, are likely to affect theEU's relationship with developing countries.The first section will examine the issuesaffecting the future use of development

cooperation in the context of the EUs widerexternal action and Common Foreign andSecurity Policy (CFSP). It will also point outthe challenges in terms of putting theseinstitutional innovations into practice.The second part of this InBrief will look athow the changes could play out in practicethrough changes in institutions and struc-tures and in the implementation of policies,such as the recently launched Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

1. The basics of the LisbonTreaty

1.1.From Nice to Lisbon: the mainchanges

The Lisbon Treaty, would bring aboutmost of the changes to further Europeanintegration that were proposed by theConstitution in 2004. It adopts a legal

framework to improve the effectiveness of an enlarged EU. Essentially:

Co-decision would be the standard legis-lative procedure.2 The structure of threepillars European Community, CFSP andJustice and Home Affairs is formally abol-ished. However, this mainly affects the thirdpillar where, e.g., judicial cooperation incriminal matters and legal immigration aresubject to the community method. Co-decision in the areas of agriculture, fisheries,transport and structural funds is another

important extension. The CFSP remainssubject to specific procedures 3 , i.e. inter-governmentalism.

Democratic accountability would be some-what enhanced. With the enhancementof the community method with qualifiedmajority voting (QMV) in the Council, theEuropean Parliament (EP) is involved in40 additional areas through the co-deci-

In Brief In Brief No. 21 -June 2008

A more political EU external actionImplications of the Treaty of Lisbon for the EU'srelations with developing countries

European Centre for Development Policy Management

Centre europen de gestion des politiques de dveloppement

Eleonora Koeb

This InBrief aims to provide an overview of the innovations in the Lisbon Treaty which, directly or indirectly, are likely to affect the EU'srelations with developing countries. It will examine the issues affecting the future use of development cooperation in the context of theEUs wider external action and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

STOP PRESS! As this InBrief goes to press, the Irish voters have just rejected the Lisbon Treaty in a referendum, by a smalbut with a reasonably high turnout. In addition to this, ratification has been delayed in other member states, pending high courdecision, signature by the president, parliamentary elections or approval from legislative bodies. However, all of this does notnecessarily imply the demise of the Lisbon Treaty. European leaders are already consulting how best to respond to the situation giventhat the Treaty contains many innovations needed to make the European Union (EU) operate more efficiently. If the Lisbon Treadoes have to be abandoned, all the more reason therefore to look at the proposed changes in detail and try to find ways to pahead with those reforms that have the potential to significantly improve EUs policy and action towards development countries.


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sion procedure. The EP has equal standingto the Council of Ministers when decidingon the EU budget. 4 The role of NationalParliaments is also being strengthened,mainly due to a new mechanism for moni-toring the subsidiarity principle. Democracyat EU level is further enhanced through thepossibility of a Citizens' Initiative, whichmay lead to new dimensions in the involve-ment of citizens at EU level. 5 The Councillegislates in public, a great step forward fortransparency of the EU. 6 The President of the Council and the High Representative areboth required to brief and consult the EP ona more regular basis. 7

The President of the European Council,

appointed for two and half years, whichmay be extended once, replaces the systemof the rotating presidency. The Presidentconvenes, chairs and drives forward thework of the European Council. He overseesthe preparation of the work of the EuropeanCouncil together with the President of theCommission, based on the work of theGeneral Affairs Council.

The Council would be chaired by a team ofministers from three member states for aperiod of eighteen months - with the excep-tion of the Council of Foreign Ministers (seebelow).8

The number of European Commissionerswould be reduced from 27 to 18 by 2014.9 In future, the member states appointCommissioners based on a rota system.

Enhanced Cooperation and PermanentStructured Cooperation 10 : In responseto calls for differentiated integration, theTreaty includes some provisions which allowfor various speeds of integration and differ-ent degrees of cooperation. QMV allows acore group of at least nine states to moveahead, while unanimity will still apply in

the Council of 27.11

Enhanced cooperation isalso allowed in the CFSP. Permanent struc-tured cooperation in the area of defencefulfils the same purpose (see below).

Decision making would be simplifiedtoimprove efficiency in the Union of 27member states and in preparation for futureenlargement. There is a new standard vot-ing rule in the Council, the double majorityrule , which basically gives more weight topopulation figures, meaning that smallercountries loose their previous over-repre-sentation. The double majority voting wouldnot take effect until 2014.

The Lisbon Treaty would provide forflexibility . Cleared of all references to aConstitution, it lends itself to revisionsooner rather than later (see Box 1).

1.2. Main Innovations in the area ofexternal action

The design of development policy and theimplementation of development coopera-tion would primarily be affected by the newinstitutions involved in external action, asset out below.

The new High Representative of the Unionfor Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

(EUHR)would wear a second hat as Vice-President of the Commission. In his firstrole he chairs the Political and SecurityCommittee 14 and the newly establishedForeign AffairsCouncil, which will be sepa-rated from the General Affairs Council. 15 It is unclear which of these fora handlesthe development, trade and enlargementtopics currently dealt with by the GeneralAffairs and External Action Council. In hislatter role, the EUHR will head DG RELEXand lead the ECs group of external actionCommissioners. The EUHR will take part inthe work of the European Council , prepareand oversee implementation of the CFSP 17,represent the EU in CFSP matters and inter-national organisations and conduct politicaldialogue. 18 Together with the Council, theEUHR, willensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. 19 The EUHR will be assisted by a EuropeanExternal Action Service (EEAS).20 The incumbent will be appointed by theEuropean Council (with the agreement of the President of the Commission) acting, if necessary, by qualified majority, and subject

to a vote of consent by the EP. Accordingto an agreed declaration, the EuropeanParliament can use suitable contacts to par-ticipate in the appointment process., even inthe initial phase in January 2009.

The European Council would determine thestrategic interests and objectives for all EUexternal action , including CFSP, on the basisof unanimity, further to proposals from theCouncil. 21The President of the EuropeanCouncil like the EUHR is charged withthe task of representing the Union in CFSPand play a role in crisis situations. 22 There isa Secretary-General of the European Council,whose role and function is different fromthat of the EUHR.23

The European Commission would seize tobe fully associated with the CFSP.24 Theright of initiative in the CFSP remains withthe Council. The EUHR can submit proposalsto the Council, for which he can request theCommissions support. 25 The Commissioncan submit proposals for other areas of external action, jointly with the EUHR.

A single procedure in CFSP calleddecision replaces what is now called common strate-gies of the European Council and commonpositions and joint actions of the Councilof Ministers. The European Councils deci-sions can cover all areas of externalactionand there is an explicit reference to the pos-sibility of a thematic approach ,26 in additionto the geographic one applied up to now. 27

The EU would have a legal personality, which before only accrued to the EuropeanCommunity. The European Community isreplaced by the EU throughout the Treatytext. This has a few implications in the EUsexternal action. It would simplify the EUsrepresentation in international organisations,e.g., in the UN Peace-building Commissiondual representation of the Council and the

Comission will be replaced by a single EUrepresentative due to the 'double-hatting'proposals. Furthermore, in cases where mem-ber states are willing to forego their rightto speak, they can be represented by the EU.This would increase the weight of the EU asa group which is also one of the principalfunders of many multilateral organisationswhile reducing its own multilateral image.Legal problems and anomalies in relationto the signing of international agreementswill be eliminated. 28 The CommissionDelegations would become EU Delegations.The European Court of Justice could possiblygain competences in new areas.

Box 1: Structure of the Lisbon Treaty

The Reform Treaty actually consists of two treaties:

The Treaty of the European Union(TEU)12, containing most of the insti-tutional provisions, resembling aConstitution;

The Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union (TFEU)13, is more akinto implementing legislation; someof the provisions of the TFEU can bemodified with a simplified procedure.


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InBrief 21June 2008 A more political EU external action Page 3

2. Development cooperationas part of the EUs externalaction

2.1. The EU as a global actor

The EUs external policy would clearly bestrengthened through the institutionalinnovations of the Lisbon Treaty. ThePresident of the European Council is meantto ensure the continuity of policy priori-ties beyond the six-month duration of thecurrent rotating EU presidency. The High

Representative and the EEAS are designedto provide the EU with a stronger politicalprofile and an increased capacity to act onthe world stage. Both are hybrid animals,intended to function as a platform facilitat-ing an immediate interconnection betweenthe intergovernmental and communitarianareas.

Through reformed decision-making, theTreaty also helps to make the working of the EUs external action machineries moreefficient. A few member states have ensuredthat the CFSP and the CDSP have been care-

fully delimited in the intergovernmentalarea, but some consider that the slightexpansion of qualified majorityvoting in these areas will help the EU togain a stronger profile in internationalrelations. 29

Furthermore, with the Lisbon Treaty thescope and ambition of the EUs externalpolicy would be elevated to a new level. Itpresents the EU for the first time as a moralactor in the world 30 - shifting the empha-sis from peace, well-being and prosperitywithin the EU to a concern with address-ing global challenges. See Box 2 for the setof founding values introduced in the newArticle 2 and revised Article 3, setting outentirely new ambitions to emanate these

values in the EUs relationship with thewider world.

A new Chapter in the TEU on external action-including CFSP and the community areas-opens with an article on principles, some-what mirroring the doctrine of the EuropeanSecurity Strategy designed by Javier Solanain 2003 (see Box 3). This article sets out somefundamental values, such as human rightsand democracy, but also includes some of the aspects that have given rise to the termsoft power in relation to the EU, i.e., therecognition of global problems that demandglobal solutions, as well as the commitmentto foreign relations based on the rule of lawand to multilateralism. The list of the EUs objectives of externalaction following the statement on principlesis significantly expanded. It now includesall areas of external action, from security totrade (see Box 4).

The strengths and limits of the EUs foreignpolicy is a key concern for developmentcooperation under the new set-up for exter-nal action in the Lisbon Treaty. The EU willonly be able to exploit the entire range of

external action to make a difference in anyarea, including development cooperation, if the EU starts to punch at its weight onthe global scene on the basis of the newarrangements.

Box 2:The overall values and aims of the European Union

Treaty of Nice Treaty of Lisbon

TEU, Article 2

The Union is founded on the values of respect forhuman dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are com-mon to the Member States in a society in which plural-ism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity andequality between women and men prevail.

TEU, Article 2 TEU, Article 3 (paragraph 5)

to assert its identity on theinternational scene, in particu-lar through the implementa-tion of a common foreign andsecurity policy including theprogressive framing of a com-mon defence policy, whichmight lead to a commondefence, in accordance withthe provisions of Article 17.

5. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shalluphold and promote its values and contribute to theprotection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace,security, the sustainable development of the Earth,solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free andfair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, aswell as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Box 3: The principles of the EUs external action

TEU, Article 21 (paragraph 1)NEW

1. The Unions action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles whichhave inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks toadvance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibilityof human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter andinternational law.

The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, andinternational, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to inthe first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, inparticular in the framework of the United Nations.


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2.2. Development cooperation andhumanitarian aid as areas of EUexternal action

Development Cooperation would becomeone of the EUs areas of external action, allcontributing to the same new overarchingobjectives of the EU in the world. It is placedunder the new Part V on external action inthe TFEU (see Box 5 and Figure). Separationfrom the provisions on the intergovern-mental CSFP, which are treated in the TEU,

still remains. This is politically relevant andhas led to some concern that developmentcould be instrumentalised by the CFSP.

However, a number of changes wouldstrengthen the status of developmentwithin the EUs external action. Firstly,development cooperation would be, for thefirst time, mentioned as one of the overallobjectives of the EUs external action(Box4).

Secondly, the consistency requirementwould be strengthened (Box 6). The Union

has to respect the principles and pursue theobjectives of its external action in the different areas of the Unions external action and in the external aspects of its other policies .31 As poverty reduction is amongthese objectives, the provision has gainedrelevance for development. In addition,consistency has to go beyond consistencywithin external action, with the LisbonTreaty requiring consistency between exter-nal action and other policies. What is alsonew is that the Commission and the EUHR

are directly responsible for consistency, inaddition to the Council.

The consistency requirement is reiterated inthe opening article of the specific provisionsfor the CFSP, thereby also implying that inthe Lisbon Treaty CFSP shares the aim of poverty reduction in developing countries. 32The current Article 13 (Treaty of Nice) refersto consistency within CFSP only and placesresponsibility only with the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Box 4: The objectives of the EUs external action



1. The Union shall define and implement a common for-eign and security policy covering all areas of foreign andsecurity policy, the objectives of which shall be:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental inter-ests, independence and integrity of the Union inconformity with the principles of the United NationsCharter,

- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,- to preserve peace and strengthen international security,

in accordance with the principles of the United Nations

Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki FinalAct and the objectives of the Paris Charter, includingthose on external borders,

- to promote international cooperation,- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of

law, and respect for human rights and fundamentalfreedoms.

2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shallwork for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, inorder to:

(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence andintegrity;

(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and theprinciples of international law;

(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security,in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United NationsCharter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of

the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;

(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, includ-ing through the progressive abolition of restrictions on internationaltrade;

(f) help develop international wmeasures to preserve and improve the qual-ity of the environment and the sustainable management of global naturalresources, in order to ensure sustainable development;

(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and

(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral coopera-tion and good global governance.

Box 5:External action provisions in theLisbon Treaty structure

Placed in the TEU, Title V, a new open-ing Chapter 1 includes the principlesand objectives of the entire externalaction and the roles of the Counciland the HRFASP. However, Chapter 2covers specific provisions on the CFSPand the CSDP, separated from theother dimensions of external action to

be found in the TFEU. In the TFEU, there is a new Part V on

external action by the Union, whichcovers:- Common Commercial Policy- Cooperation with third countries and

humanitarian aid- Unions Relations with International

Organisations and- Third Countries and the Union

Delegations.


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Figure: External action provisions in the Treaty structure

Treaty of Nice

Treaty on the European Union

Title ICommon Provisions

Title IIProvisions amending the Treaty of

the European Economic Com-munitywith a view to establishing the

European Community

Title IIIProvisions amending the Treaty

Establishing the European Coal andSteel Community

Title IVProvisions amending the Treaty

Establishing the European AtomicEnergy Community

Title VProvisions on a CFSP

Title VIProvisions on police and judicialcooperation in criminal matters

Title VIIProvisions on enhanced coopera-

tion

Treaty of Lisbon

Treaty on the European Union

Title ICommon Provisions

Title IIProvisions on democratic

principles

Title IIIProvisions on the institutions

Title IVProvisions on enhanced

cooperation

Title VGeneral Provisions on the Unions

External Action and specificProvisions on the CFSP

Chapter 1General Provisions on the Unionsexternal action

Chapter 2Specific provisions on the CFSPSection 1Common provisionsSection 1Provisions on the commonsecurity and defence policy

Treaty of Nice

Treaty on the Establishment ofthe European Community

PART IPrinciples

PART IICitizenship of the Union

PART IIICommunity Policies

Title IXCommon commercial policy

Title XXICooperation with third countries

and humanitarian aidTitle XX

Development Cooperation

PART IVAssociation of the overseas coun-

tries and territories

PART VInstitutions of the Community

PART VIGeneral and final provisions

Treaty of Lisbon

Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union

PART IPrinciples

PART IINon-Discrimination and Citizenship

of the Union

PART IIIPolicies and internal actions of the

Union

PART IVAssociation of the overseas

countries and territories

PART VExternal action by the Union

Title IGeneral provisions on the Unions

external actionTitle II

Common commercial policyTitle III

Cooperation with third countriesand humanitarian aid

Chapter 1Development cooperationChapter 2Economic, financial andtechnical cooperation withthird countriesChapter 3Humanitarian aid

Title IVRestrictive measures

Title VInternational agreements

Title VIThe Unions relations with interna-

tional organisations and third coun-tries and the Union delegations

PART VIInstitutional and budgetary provi-

sions

PART VIIGeneral and final provisions


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Provisions on Developmentcooperation

The Treaty of Lisbon clearly states that pov-erty reduction is at the heart of the Unionsdevelopment cooperation policy (Box 7).This focus is a major change from the cur-rent provision, in place since the MaastrichtTreaty of 1992, which mention sustainabledevelopment and smooth and gradual integration into the world economy as aimson an equal footing with the campaign

against poverty (see Box 7, paragraph 1).In addition, development cooperation iscurrently required to directly target govern-ance issues (see Box 7, paragraph 2).

While the legally binding objective of poverty reduction in all EU developmentcooperation is very welcome, critics havepointed out that some fundamental prin-ciples are absentfrom the Treaty. 36 In par-ticular, there is no mention of partnershipand ownership, while these are firmlyembedded in the Cotonou Agreement,which will be in place at least until

2020, and in the European Consensus onDevelopment. The Treaty does not establishlinks between quality, effectiveness and theimpact of development cooperation. 37

Policy Coherence for Development(PCD)would remain literally unchanged, tak-ing overthe current Article 178 TEC, whichrequires other EU measures to be consist-ent with development policy (Box 7). Butby means of the new focus on the goal of

poverty reduction, taking into account theobjectives of development cooperation inpolicies likely to affect developing countrieswill becomes a much stronger demand. Thefocus on poverty reduction, together withthe coherence requirement, also implies thatdevelopment policy is a policy in its ownright, and not merely an accessory to CFSP. Itis worth noting, however, that the PCD arti-cle remains to be located in the chapter ondevelopment cooperation. The other areasof external action, including CFSP and CDSPmerely have to be consistent with eachother.

Development cooperation and humanitar-ian aid would remain shared parallel competences between the EU and its memberstates. 38 This is the result of organic devel-opment rather than design. The memberstates rejected advances by the Commissionto hand over this area to EU competence in1992.39 Hence, one of the crucial aspects of the Lisbon Treaty is that it strengthens thecomplementarity and coordination provi-sions . What is new is that complementaritygoes both ways: previously the Communityhad to complement member states devel-opment policies, now the two complement and reinforce each other . There is a new ref-erence to complementarity and efficiency as the purpose of coordination within the

Union, while this coordination remains to bepromoted by the Commission.

Provisions on Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarian Aid would get a new legalbasis in Article 214, TFEU. This provisionstresses the specificity of the policy and theapplication of the principles of internationalhumanitarian law, impartiality, neutralityand non-discrimination. 42 However, theprinciple of independence is absent. NGOssee here a risk of instrumentalisation forpoliticalpurposes. 43

Humanitarian aid, as with developmentcooperation, is to be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectivesof the external action of the Union to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and pro-tection for people in third countries who arevictims of natural or man-made disasters, inorder to meet the humanitarian needs result-ing from these different situations .

There is also a complementarity require-ment: The Unions operations and those of

the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other.

The Treaty provides for the creation of aEuropean Voluntary Humanitarian AidCorps.44 Most people would agree that itis important to provide young Europeanswith the possibility of gaining experiencein developing countries. But at a time whenmany developing countries have an abun-dance of unemployed young people withuniversity degrees and long-established vol-unteer organisations have moved away fromworking with inexperienced volunteers,

Box 6: Consistency in the EUs external action



The Union shall be served by a single insti-tutional framework which shall ensure theconsistency and the continuity of the activi-ties carried out in order to attain its objec-tives while respecting and building uponthe acquis communautaire.The Union shall in particular ensure theconsistency of its external activities as awhole in the context of its external rela-tions, security, economic and developmentpolicies.

The Council and the Commission shall beresponsible for ensuring such consistencyand shall cooperate to this end. They shallensure the implementation of these poli-cies, each in accordance with its respectivepowers.

3. The Union shall respect the prin-ciples and pursue the objectives listed inparagraphs 1 and 2 in the developmentand implementation of the different areasof the Union's external action covered bythis Title and Part Five of the Treaty on theFunctioning of the European Union and of the external aspects of its other policies.

The Union shall ensure consistencybetween the different areas of its external

action and between these and its otherpolicies.

The Council and the Commission, assistedby the High Representative of the Unionfor Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shallensure that consistency and shall cooperateto that effect.

TEU, Article 13

The Council shall ensure the unity, consis-tency and effectiveness of action by theUnion.


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dispatching young volunteers should not beconfused with assignments for profession-als. NGOs are also concerned about qualitystandards and the principles of humanitar-ian response in the context of this Corps. 45

2.3.Conclusion: a more political form of external action a more political form of developmentcooperation

The new scope and ambitions of the EUsexternal action, as summarised in sec-tion 2.1, would amount to a politicisationof the EUs external action. DevelopmentCooperation is one of the instruments atthe Unions disposal for this purpose and,as such, also politicised. While the povertyfocus is more pronounced, the first sentencein the section on development cooperationreads as follows: Development Cooperationshall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the external action of the Union. Is this a good thing?The Lisbon Treaty has been received among

development practitioners as largely posi-tive. It is felt that development cooperationand humanitarian aid have been recognisedas EU policies in their own right, with theirown objectives.

However, there is also great concern amongNGOs that the consolidation of the EUexternal action and CFSP risks sideliningcommitments on development and thatthe role of poverty reduction in the policymix of the EUs external action is underthreat. Worse than this, NGOs fear that theincreased politicisation of development cooperation and the funding allocated forit, could be instrumentalised to achieveforeign policy objectives. This concern iscompounded by the fact that no additionalfunding seems to be forthcoming to matchthe more ambitious structure and policy inthe CFSP area.48

Others argue that the politicisation of

development cooperation should not beseen as a threat. There is a lot to gain from amore political approach, given that we lendcredibility to the EU as a normative power.Although the EUs approach to externalaction based on subscription to the rule of law and multilateral solutions runs into dif-ficulties when confronting military powerse.g., in the areas of energy and security, ithas a unique potential in promoting devel-opment through a Whole-of-Governmentapproach.

Given that institutions - governance, therule of law, accountability, etc. - are key fordevelopment and their evolution is para-mount to development, this creates a needfor a more political approach to support thebeneficial evolution of local institutions.EU development cooperation with its newpolicies, such as programme support or theGovernance Initiative, demands that thepolitical dimension of relationships with

Box 8: Policy Coherence for Development


TEEC, Article 178 TFEU, Article 208 Article 178 Article 208

The Community shall take account of theobjectives referred to in Article 177 in thepolicies that it implements which are likelyto affect developing countries.

1. Union development cooperation policyshall have as its primary objective thereduction and, in the long term, the eradi-cation of poverty.The Union shall take account of the objec-tives of development cooperation in thepolicies that it implements which are likelyto affect developing countries.

Box 7: The objectives of development cooperation


TEEU, Article 177 TFEU, 208

1. Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall becomplementary to the policies pursued bythe Member States, shall foster: The sustainable economic and social

development of the developing countries,and more particularly the most disadvan-taged among them,

the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the worldeconomy,

the campaign against poverty in thedeveloping countries.

2. Community policy in this area shall con-tribute to the general objective of devel-oping and consolidating democracy andthe rule of law, and to that of respectinghuman rights and fundamental freedoms.

3. The Community and the Member Statesshall comply with the commitments andtake account of the objectives they haveapproved in the context of the UnitedNations and other competent internationalorganisations.

1. Union policy in the field of developmentcooperation shall be conducted within theframework of the principles and objectivesof the Unions external action.The Unions development cooperationpolicy shall have as its primary objectivethe reduction and, in the long term, theeradication of poverty.

2. The Union and the Member Statesshall comply with the commitments and

take account of the objectives they haveapproved in the context of the UnitedNations and other competent internationalorganisations.


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ACP countries also be upgraded. Vis--viscountries like Ethiopia and Sudan, wherethe security development nexus is mostapparent, diplomats are also clearly needed.Political dialogue is meaningless withoutthe political backing of the EU as a globalactor.

In addition, Europe is the largest globaleconomic power - in trade, investment anddevelopment aid. Combining external actioninstruments in a Whole-of-Governmentapproach to address global challenges rather than development cooperation aloneas a technical and often marginal exercise

has the potential to counter-balance theinfluence of commercial interests, hard pow-ers and emerging donors in Africa. Moreadequate institutions such as the EUHR,EEAS and strengthened Delegations shouldbe better equipped to ensure coherence of engagement on the ground. From an opti-mistic perspective, such an approach couldlead to the allocation of more adequatefunds from all areas of EU external action toaddress global problems, ranging from pov-erty to climate change.

The task for the development communitywill be to harness the entire breadth of theEUs external action for development effec-tiveness and EU policies affecting the South.In the next section we will look at someaspects of this task ahead.

3. From principles toimplementation

3.1. Institutional changes

The Lisbon Treaty would provide the nec-essary political push to move ahead on a

number of institutional reforms, many of which do not necessarily depend on a newlegal framework but have been discouragedby a lack of political guidance and uncer-tainty about institutional developments.

EU foreign policy has grown organically responding step by step to outside chal-lenges since the Balkan wars of the early1990s. These developments were slowlyframed by a few crucial institutional andprocedural adaptations in the consecutivetreaties, with the latest culmination in theLisbon Treaty. These adaptations should not

be underestimated. However, some of theinnovative features such as the double-hat-ted formula have been successfully pilotedalready. In terms of policy-making in thearea of external action, closer cooperationbetween Council and Commission is alreadythe order of the day in many areas. Debateon reforming the multitude of overlappingCouncil working groups dealing with issuesrelating to Africa has also been triggeredby the need to implement the multidimen-sional Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

This shows that there is already clear recog-nition that something has to be done aboutsome incoherent and inefficient structures,and that innovative ways have to be found

to address ubiquitous challenges, such asmainstreaming cross-cutting issues in exter-nal action.

The fact that the Treaty leaves more openthan it clarifies is of concern, however. Itsvagueness in terms of the institutionalset-up poses the threat of greater incoher-ence through a proliferation of overlappingactivities by a multiplicity of actors. 49 There is a danger of competition among thethree leaders in the field of external action,in particular, between the EUHR and thePresident of the European Council becausethey are both responsible for representationin CFSP matters and between the EUHR andthe President of the Commission becauseof the ambiguous reporting position of theEUHR. Commentators have argued that a lotwill depend on the personalities of the threetop leaders. Some see the ambiguity of therelevant Treaty provisions as an advantageallowing the people who take up the threetop positions to find a modus operandi among themselves and shape the three jobsin a flexible manner. It is highly question-able whether this is the best way to deter-mine the outcome. There would seem to bea need to clarify the roles, responsibilities

and hierarchies as soon as possible by legalacts. Such regulations should be the resultof a broad consensus in the spirit of the newmulti-dimensional external action.

Commission services for developmentcooperation

The role of the EUHR offers great potentialfor improving coherence between the twospheres of intergovernmental CFSP andthe Commissions work on external rela-tions. However, it would remain to be seen

Box 9: Complementarity in development cooperation


TEEC, Article 177 TFEU, Article 208

1. Community policy in the sphere of devel-opment cooperation, which shall be com-plementary to the policies pursued by theMember States,

1. The Unions development cooperationpolicy and that of the Member States com-plement and reinforce each other.

TEEC, Article 180 TFEU, Article 210

1. The Community and the Member Statesshall coordinate their policies on develop-ment cooperation and shall consult each

other on their aid programmes, includingin international organisations and duringinternational conferences. They may under-take joint action. Member States shall con-tribute if necessary to the implementationof Community aid programmes.

2. The Commission may take any useful ini-tiative to promote the coordination referredto in paragraph 1.

1. In order to promote the complementarityand efficiency of their action, the Unionand the Member States shall coordinate

their policies on development cooperationand shall consult each other on their aidprogrammes, including in internationalorganisations and during international con-ferences. They may undertake joint action.Member States shall contribute if necessaryto the implementation of Union aid pro-grammes.

2. The Commission may take any useful ini-tiative to promote the coordination referredto in paragraph 1.


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whether the High Representative can resist

the pressure to primarily expand the inter-governmental space rather than promotethe community policies at the Council. Inother words, the issue is: who does theEUHR to be appointed by the EuropeanCouncil which also has the power to dismissthe incumbent ultimately report to? TheCouncil or the Commission President?

Some warn of the loss of the Developmentand Humanitarian Aid Commissioner. Itis however not likely that the develop-ment would be a victim of the reductionof Commissioners. Looking at the institu-

tional models for development cooperation

among the EU member states, only the UKreports to have an autonomous agencyfor development cooperation and some of the most generous EU donors incorporatetheir development cooperation as a sec-tion under the Foreign Affairs Ministry(Table 1). The comparison does show, how-ever, that lead countries in terms of livingup to Monterrey commitments, have aMinister for Development in the Cabinet. If Development Cooperation were to lose itsCommissioner this would be a major set-back.

Others are concerned about a hierarchy

among Commissioners with senior and junior members of the College. They fearthe subjugation of all other external actionDGs to a predominant DG RELEX promot-ing security-driven or influence-assertingpolitics. The role that the DevelopmentCommissioner can play in the College of Commissioners and in relation to the EUHRremains to be seen. Generally, in a smallerCollege, the political weight and the abilitiesof the individual Commissioners are likelyto play a bigger role than in the past. Inaddition, it is clear that this Commissionershould be on an equal footing with other

Table 1: Models of institutional arrangements for Development Cooperation

Examples Responsible for Development Cooperation ODA% of GDP (2006)

1. Autonomous Aid Agency(responsible for policy and implementation)

Minister for Development Cooperation

UK Department for International Development (DFID) 0.52

2. Policy Ministry with Separate Implementing Agency

Minister for Development Cooperation

Germany German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) Kreditantstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW)

0.36

Sweden Ministry of Foreign Affairs Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)

1.3

3. Development Cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Italy Directorate General for Development Cooperation 0.21

Minister for Development CooperationFinland Department for Development Policy; 0.39

Netherlands Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS); 0.81 (2005)

4. Integrated Ministry of Foreign Affairs (each section in the ministry has a development cooperation unit)

Minister for Development CooperationDenmark Danida Devforum, Technical Advisory Services 0.80

5. Multiple Ministries with Separate Implementing Agencies

France Agence Francais de Developpement (AFD), operates under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Overseas Ministry.

0.47

Portugal Instituto Portugus de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento (IPAD) 0.21

Source: EU Donor Atlas 2006 (http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/docs/eu_donor_atlas_2006.pdf)


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RELEX Commissioners to be coordinated bythe EUHR. Coordination and overseeing con-sistency and coherence under one externalaction approach is the main responsibilityof the EUHR. Hence, by definition the EUHRwould be a primus inter pares in the Collegeof Commissioners. However, in practice, thedistribution of power and influence wouldhinge upon control over the Communitybudget, which in turn will largely dependon the competences of the EEAS. The EEAScould become responsible for all externalrelations expenditure, for DG RELEX instru-ments only, or not have any financial con-trol, which would then remain with theCommission.

The Treaty has the potential to lead to astreamlining of the EC development archi-tecture. There are various ways to addressthe current multiplicity of instruments,with thematically and regionally overlap-ping coverage, managed with fragmentedstructures:

First, calls to unite all EU development pol-icies under one DGand one Commissionerhave been repeated further to the sign-ing of the Lisbon Treaty. Merging DGEuropeAid and DG DEV and hence bringingpolicy formulation and implementationtogether should increase effectiveness.Bringing the development programmesfor Latin America and Asia of DG RELEXtogether with those of DG DEV for ACPcountries, under the responsibility of theCommissioner for Development wouldincrease thematic coherence. The questionis whether the DG responsible for develop-ment would retain a geographical ratherthan a political role or if it would, in fact,be another DG RELEX working with devel-opment countries. Again, in practice, a lotwill depend on the nature of the EEAS (seebelow). For example, it has been proposedto integrate the Council Secretariats geo-

graphical desks with the political desks inDG RELEX, DG DEV and DG Enlargement aspolitical advisory units to the Commission.This constellation would leave the DGresponsible for development without anypolitical relations function. In any case, asingle DG with strong development policycapacity is key for the EC to be able to playits federating role within the EU, gather-ing lessons learned and consolidate bestpractices. It would also need to have theauthority to project development prioritieseffectively into all fora where EU externalaction is discussed and decided upon.

Second, due to the deletion of Article179(3) of the Treaty Establishing theEuropean Community, which excludes theEDF from the scope of that Treaty, budg-etisation of the European DevelopmentFund (EDF) is back on the agenda.

Third, further deconcentration of develop-ment cooperation is desirable and wouldbe logical in the context of the newlyempowered Delegations.

The Union Delegations and theEuropean External Action Services

The status of the Delegations would beenhanced significantly by the LisbonTreaty. The EU Delegations would have alegal personality enabling them to repre-sent the Union in the full range of Unioncompetencies. This implies combining theCouncils Delegations (i.e. in New York) withthe Commissions Delegations worldwide,into one service. Under the authority of the EUHR, the Delegations are required tocooperate closely with the member statesrepresentations. The Union Delegations alsobear responsibility for consular protectionof EU citizens.52 Together with the memberstates representation, they are also respon-sible for ensuring that the EUs policies arecomplied with and implemented; as statedin the Nice Treaty, they shall contribute to formulating and implementing the commonapproach .54

The establishment of the EEAS is requiredto give the EUHR authority and give himor her tools to deliver. It is set up to workin cooperation with the diplomatic serv-ices of the member states, and comprisesofficials from relevant departments of theGeneral Secretariat of the Council and of theCommission as well as staff seconded from

national diplomatic services of the member states . 55 It is not clear if the EEAS would befunded from the EU budget which wouldsubject it to the EPs scrutiny or from theCouncil Secretariats budget, and who wouldfund staff seconded from member states,ensuring equal conditions across the service.

The practical side of the EEAS remainsvery much in the dark. The paragraph onthe EEAS was taken over from the DraftConstitution with no changes. Since then,a 2005 Joint Progress Report on preparatorywork remained vague on the big questions

of the scope and size of the future EEAS. 56 It states that the EEAS should be of sui generis nature meaning that it will notbe a new institution but a service under theauthority of the EUHR, probably function-ing as an interface for the three staff send-ing parties. It should minimise duplicationand help save costs. The EEAS will consist, atleast, of the relevant services of the CouncilSecretariat (Directorate General E and PolicyUnit) and of the Commission (DG RELEX).Member states disagree on the inclusion of areas such as enlargement, neighbourhoodand development policy. There is a consen-sus that the Union Delegations should bean integral part of the EEAS . But this doesnot necessarily imply that all staff working in

the Delegations would need to be membersof the EEAS (those covering specific policiessuch as trade and management of financial assistance would continue to come from theservices of the Commission).

The EEAS and the Delegations would prob-ably constitute the battlefront where thepoliticisation of external action and devel-opment cooperation would be most keenlyfelt. The upgrading of EU Delegations willaffect the power balance between nationalembassies and the EU Delegations in partnercountries. On the technical side, memberstates may be more willing to delegatecooperation or channel funds for budget sup-port to Delegations with a greater capacityand stronger mandate for political dialogue.Hence, if the new Union Delegations canstrengthen their political and technicalcapacities through the EEAS, the Commissionmay be able to establish its added value inmanaging budget support in the context of the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour inDevelopment Cooperation. On the politicalside, member states could feel threatenedthat EU Ambassadors, who will also repre-sent the European Council instead of thecurrent rotational presidency, might take too

much political space. They may be less will-ing to engage in a division of labour in caseswhere that means withdrawing or cuttingback activities. More secondments of expertsfrom member states to the Delegationsmay have the potential to counter suchtendencies and further upgrade the techni-cal capacity of Delegations in all areas of external action. While the report mentionedabove insists on recruitment based on merit in which geographical balance has to bemaintained the member states are alreadyplanning on lobbying activities to place theirown diplomats.

Page 10 Making the EUs external action more development-oriented April 2008 InBrief 21


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In addition to confounding the traditionalrelations between the EU and the memberstates in the field, the power balance withinthe new Delegations is another major issue.All depends on the extent to which officialsresponsible for Commission developmentprogrammes would also be EEAS membersand what their lines of reporting wouldbe in relation to the probably also double-hatted heads of the new EU Delegations.Should development cooperation personnelbe integrated into the EEAS, while the Headsof Delegations have to wear two hats, theHeads of Cooperation may find themselvesin a position of having to weigh develop-ment priorities against more short term for-eign policy objectives. The staff in question

could end up being marginalized within theDelegation, in violation of the Whole-of-Government approach. There would also becompetency overlaps as well as high trans-action costs for the new cross-body commu-nication and coordination.

If development cooperation staff were partof a larger EEAS, it is feared that instrumen-talisation would take place in the service of a diplomatic agenda while the Commissionwould lose influence. However, integratingdevelopment in the EEAS may provide anopportunity to acknowledge the increas-ingly political nature of the EUs relationshipwith many developing countries.Both options have advantages and disad-vantages and this may be a case for tryingto find the least worst solution. Criticsfearful of the EEAS taking over aspects of development cooperation in the Delegationsshould be reminded of the current staff-ing situation in Delegations. Many postedofficials are by no means necessarily devel-opment experts but mostly technocratscoming from an entire range of educationalbackgrounds. The technical experts aremostly contractual agents, whose powerand competencies are limited. Due to the

limited duration of their contracts, com-pounded by recent changes in recruitmentthrough standardised exams, their experi-ence is not available to the Commission ona continuous basis.

3.2. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy- Couldthe Treaty support a more policitalrelationship?

The Lisbon Treaty has the potential to sup-port the paradigm shift from PCD to a

Whole-of-Government approach.The trend towards a more political and amulti-dimensional approach to develop-ment cooperation, which has just receivedrecognition in the Lisbon Treaty, is probablybest exemplified by the Joint Africa-EUStrategy, signed by 70 heads of states fromthe AU and the EU in December 2007 at theLisbon summit. Encompassing eight policyareas peace and security, migration, mobil-ity and employment, democratic govern-ance and human rights, trade and regionalintegration, the Millennium DevelopmentGoals, energy and climate change and sci-ence, information society and space it isnot just about development cooperation. Itgoes beyond aid, committing both Unions

to a renewed long-term political partnershipbased on common values and interests, andstrategic objectives. Engaging in a politicalpartnership with the AU based on commoninterests and strategic objectives, the EU canalso draw lessons from the successes of thePre-accession and Neighbourhood Policies.These EU policies have demonstrated that acombination of strong incentives and own-ership is the key to change.

Would the entering into force of the LisbonTreaty impact on the implementation of theaction plans agreed on in the Joint Africa-EUStrategys eight topical partnerships? Thereare three reasons why, in principle, thisshould be the case:

First, the EU will gain a number of com-petences, in security policy, governanceissues, trade, energy, migration and spacepolicy that will allow it to actually rep-resent the EU member states and moveahead in the agreed areas.

Second, a coherent Whole-of-Governmentapproach is especially promising in thecontext of common interests and strate-gic objectives. For the former, the broad

spectrum of foreign policy goals in theLisbon Treaty is to some extent mirroredby the eight partnership areas. This wouldallow the EU to provide adequate incen-tives to match the priority goals. Thelatter could encourage more political willto go beyond aid and offer some conces-sions. There is reason for some optimismhere, as most partnerships representareas of common interest, where the EUneeds Africa as much as Africa needs theEU.

Third, the double-hatted new institutions should support this approach. The imple-mentation of the Joint Strategy, involv-ing up to seven current Council groups,many Commission DGs and the memberstates, will be an exercise in EU coher-ence and complementarity par excellence,from which lessons can be learned inthe future. The establishment of a HighRepresentative to the AU preceded theentering into force of the Lisbon Treaty,but definitely constitutes an importantbasis for progress in the various partner-ships.

The remainder of this section looks at oneEU policy the European Neighbourhood

Policy (ENP) and two exemplary areas of the eight partnerships in the Joint Africa-EUStrategy, in an attempt to grasp some of theimplications of the Lisbon Treaty for coher-ence in general, and the implementation of the respective action plans in particular.

The European Neighbourhood Policy

The ENP would receive a new level of recognition in the Lisbon Treaty. Thisagain confirms the reality of the currentintensification of the ENP. It seems clearthat the ENP would remain separate fromdevelopment policies, firmly rooted inDG RELEX. As the only policy mentionedin a very prominent position in Title I,Common Provisions of the TEU, amongcore principles such as the Unions aims,the subsidiarity principle, etc., the aim isclearly to establish another level a spe-cial relationship with a group of EasternEuropean and Mediterranean countries.

With regard to coherence, the ENP offer-ing a deeper political relationship and economic integration is clearly in con-tradiction to treating Africa as one, as

postulated in the Joint EU-Africa Strategy.The implications for African integrationare not at all clear. Through the ENP theEC applies some of the features of possi-bly the most successful area of EU foreignpolicy, the Pre-Accession Policy, aimingat the eventual transfer of its legal andregulatory framework, including to someNorthern African countries. It cannot beruled out that the potential benefits of the privileged relationship with NorthAfrica would have positive spill-overeffects within Africa.


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Peace and security

The Lisbon Treaty would strengthen theUnions security policy in many respects(Box 10). In case of urgent financial assist-ance, the Council acts by qualified majorityupon a proposal from the Commission.This should mean quicker financial assist-ance in the future. The expansion of thePetersberg tasks confirms the reality of the EUs missions in recent years but it isalso a sign that the EU intends to furtherstep-up its profile in international crisisintervention.

In relation to the Joint Africa-EU Strategyfor Africa and its partnership on Peace and

Security, it may be noted that cooperationwith regional and continental organisa-tions is strengthened under the Treaty(Box 3). In this context, these provisionsgive hope that cooperation with the AUwill not be limited to agreed action planson peace and security but also relate toEU missions in Africa which have thus farrather sidelined the African Peace andSecurity Architecture (APSA).

The new context of the rationalisation of EU external action may shed a differentlight on another aspect of this action plan,i.e., the sustainable funding of African-ledPeace Support Operations (PSOs). Morecoherent external action could provideother options for supporting PSOs thanthe current main EU instrument for thistask, the African Peace Facility (APF). If the EU is serious about human security inAfrica, as well as strengthening its ownsecurity threatened by conflict and lack of rule of law in Africa, it will not only have toapply the entire range of external actioninstruments and policies to the problem,but also allocate adequate funds to it. Thisissue will definitely impact on the reviewof the APF scheduled for 2009.

A coherent Whole-of-Governmentapproach to peace and security seems tobe of the utmost importance in view of the EUs increasing appetite to engage inmilitary and civilian crisis managementin developing countries and with the EUslargest ever crisis intervention mission just dispatched to Chad. The year 2007brought new policies and instrumentsrelating to the development and securitynexus, but implementation has beenslow. While the conditions for meaning-ful EU engagement in global crisis have

Box 10: Major changes in the EUs security policy

The expansion of the scope of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), tobe called Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), under a new separate headingincluding: a solidarity clause and a mutual defence commitment, both with sub-stantial qualifications and provisos; 61

The significant expansion of the Petersberg tasks reflects the reality and the ambi-tions of the EUs international missions. The HRFASP "acting under the authority of theCouncil and in close contact with the Political and Security Committee, rather thanthe PSC, has the responsibility to oversee and ensure coordination of the civilian andmilitary aspects of such tasks. 62

The possibility for the Council to entrust the implementation of a task to a group of member states which are willing and have the necessary capability ;63 As Dagand pointsout, this provides formal recognition of the Artemis mission led by the French in theDemocratic Republic of Congo in September 2004; thereby institutionalising the develop-ment of such practices .64

The possible establishment of permanent structured cooperation in the field of defence; 65 mirroring enhanced cooperation, but does not require a threshold numberof countries; the establishment of start-up financing for a defence policy mission canbe agreed upon by QMV. 66 These provisions might lead to accelerated enhancementof military capacity and increases in defence spending, requirements for the EUs rolein international crisis management. 67 However, there is concern that permanent struc-tured cooperation could lead to a two-tier Europe, excluding smaller MS which lack the

means to participate in such cooperation. Remarkably, out of the dozens of EU agencies, only the European Defence Agency

is mentioned in the TFEU. It was established in 2004 in Brussels, and is tasked withdefence capabilities development; armaments co-operation; the European defence,technological and industrial base and defence equipment market; research and tech-nology. Clearly, this article constitutes a strong signal reflecting the EUs determinationto enhance its military power. 68

Petersberg Tasks

Nice Treaty Lisbon TreatyTEU, Article 17 (paragraph 2) TEU, Article 43

Questions referred to in thisArticle shall include human-itarian and rescue tasks,peacekeeping tasks andtasks of combat forces incrisis management, includ-ing peacemaking.

The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means,shall include joint disarmament operations, humani-tarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistancetasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks,tasks of combat forces in crisis management, includ-ing peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. Allthese tasks may contribute to the fight against terror-ism, including by supporting third countries in com-bating terrorism in their territories.


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improved with the Treatys innovations inthis area, a common political backing fora coherent human security-oriented EUprofile has yet to emerge. In its absence,the possibility of delegating militarymissions to one or more member statesas established by the Treaty may pose athreat, i.e., endorsement of a continuationof the franafrique politics under the EUflag.

The new bridging institutions have raisedexpectations in bringing together themultitude of actors involved, i.e., DGRELEX for conflict prevention and increas-ingly for external aspects of energy andclimate policy, DG DEV and DG EuropeAid

dealing with the APF, and various Councilgroups handling the military and civil-ian aspects of security-related EU mis-sions. The recent appointment of aSpecial Advisor for African PeacekeepingCapabilities with a mandate tostrengthen the partnership between Africa and EU in the field of preventionmanagement and resolution of conflicts is a sign that the EU is, to some extent,taking seriously the need to support theAPSA, but a double-hatted envoy thestandard approach with the Lisbon Treaty would be preferable.

Trade and regional integration

With the Lisbon Treaty the EU wouldarguably give its mission of strong pro-motion of global trade liberalisation,albeit with reservations with regard tocultural services or agriculture, a newlevel of significance. The Treaty of Niceincluded the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries intothe world economy as one objective of development cooperation. While the onlyobjective mentioned in the chapter on

development cooperation in the Treatyis poverty reduction and eradication, theoverarching objectives of external actioninclude: to (e) encourage the integrationof all countries into the world economy,including through the progressive aboli-tion of restrictions on international trade .The adjectives "smooth and gradual" werelost in this re-phrasing, which could beinterpreted as an ideological shift (seeBoxes 4 and 7).

In addition, the Treaty would bringthe entire Common Commercial Policy

including trade in services, foreign directinvestment and intellectual propertyrights, which are currently shared compe-tences under exclusive EU competence,mostly subject to the co-decision proce-dure.69 Hence we can expect the EC tocontinue to push for broad liberalisation,as already pursued in the EPA negotia-tions.

In terms of a coherent Whole-of-Government approach, there are concernsthat the Lisbon Treaty would reinforce theEUs generally protectionist agriculturepolicy which has an impact on develop-ing countries. Bringing the CommonAgricultural Policy (CAP) under the co-

decision procedure, the EP with its trackrecord of opposing CAP reform gainsinfluence. However, the ACP as a group isagainst CAP reform (with the exception of cotton).

On the institutional side, DG Trade wouldnot be integrated in the EEAS and theCommissioner for Trade would not nec-essarily be reporting to the EUHR. Inconclusion, there is a strong case for DGDEV to develop stronger policies on tradeand agriculture policy towards Africa andto set up mechanisms and structures toensure that EU trade policies are condu-cive and supportive to development.

4. Conclusion

The Lisbon Treaty would provide the EU withthe tools and frameworks for a more politi-cised profile in external action. As shownabove for the areas of peace and securityand trade, the Treaty entails potential ben-efits but also risks for development. In addi-tion, reforms in some of the internal andexternal common policies would give the EU

many more competences to play a strongerrole on the global scene and to build moremeaningful partnerships, e.g., in some areasof the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. While effortsto increase consistency, PCD and effective-ness of structures and policies are alreadyon the way in many areas, there is plenty of room for manoeuvre in the implementationof the Lisbon Treaty reforms.

Improvements in PCD would not comeautomatically. By building on this reformedlegal framework, development coopera-tion would have to assert itself within the

EUs external action. A strong proponent- such as a unified DG Development withstrong development policy capacity headedby a Commissioner - needs to ensure thatthe development dimension is adequatelyaddressed in other policy areas such aspeace and security and trade. However,political backing would be key in determin-ing the role of development cooperation far more than any institutional arrange-ment. With an external action policy thatrepresents a fairly radical break with thepast, the new set-up may not have to followthe old recipe. The chance of capitalising onthe entire breadth of external action for thebenefit of development is an exciting pros-pect, but will have to be fought for.

The way forward would be through exten-sive analysis and inclusive consultation onthe pros and cons of the detailed options forreporting and financial control structures,the set-up of the EEAS and the reform of Commission services and aid architecture.An ample and inclusive debate would beneeded in order to get the most out of theTreaty changes for development coopera-tion. Such a debate would also form thebasis for developing response strategiesfor development partners in dealing with asomewhat transformed counterpart.


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Notes

1 TEU, Art. 3 (The numbering of articles refers to the consolidatedversion of the Lisbon Treaty, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=1296&mode=g&name=)

2 TFEU, Art 294.3 TEU, Art. 24, paragraph 1; TEU, Art. 314 TEU, Art. 14, paragraph 15 TEU, Art. 11, paragraph 4 and TFEU, Art. 246 TEU, Art. 16, paragraph 87 TEU, Art. 15 and Art. 368 TEU, Art. 16, paragraph 9; TFEU, Art. 236; Declaration 99 TEU, Art. 1710 Enhanced Cooperation: TEU, Art. 20; TFEU, Art. 236-234;

Permanent Structured Cooperation: TEU, Art. 42 and 46;11 TFEU, Art. 32612 The successor to the TEU as conceived in the Maastricht Treaties

(1992). The modifications here affect the institutions, enhancedcooperation, foreign and security policy and defence policy.13 The successor to the Rome Treaties (1957), the Nice Treaty,

became the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC).It sets out the competences and areas of intervention of theEuropean Union.

14 TEU, Art. 3815 TEU, Art. 18 (paragraph 3)16 TEU, Art. 15, paragraph 217 TEU, Art. 27, paragraph 118 TEU, Art. 27, paragraph 219 TEU, Art. 26, paragraph 2;20 TEU, Art. 27, paragraph 321 TEU, Art. 22 (paragraph 1); Currently, the European Council

unanimously determines strategies for the CFSP on the basis of Council proposals only (Treaty of Nice, TEU, Art. 13, paragraphs 1and 2).

22 TEU, Art.s 15, paragraph 6 and 26, paragraph 1;23 TFEU, Art. 24024 Treaty of Nice, TEU 18, paragraph 4;25 TEU, Art. 22 (paragraph 2) and TEU, Art. 30 (paragraph 1).

Currently, the European Commission can be requested by theCouncil of Ministers for Foreign Affairs to submit any appropri-ate proposal for CFSP to this Council (Treaty of Nice, TEU, Art. 14,paragraph 4).

26 TEU, Art. 2227 Only three Common Strategies have been adopted since the

introduction of the instrument by the Treaty of Amsterdam (onRussia, the Ukraine and the Mediterranean).

28 Dagard, Sophie (2008): This overcomes the anomaly wherebythe EU had to find roundabout ways to fulfil its internationalresponsibilities, for example, when the EU Special Envoy wasobliged to sign the Dayton agreements as a witness.

29 TEU Art. 31: In addition to the current exceptions to the unanim-ity rule in CFSP (1. Decisions on the basis of a common strategy;2. Decisions implementing a joint action of common decision; 3.Appointment of a special representative), the Council can nowuse QMV on proposals presented by the HRFASP - acting inde-pendently or with the support of the Commission.

30 Manners, Ian (2008) The normative ethics of the EuropeanUnion., International Affairs 84:1 (2008), 45-60

31 TEU, Art. 21, (paragraph 3)32 TEU, Art. 23

33 TFEU, Art. 208, paragraph 2 ;34 Treaty of Nice, TEEU, Art. 17735 Treaty of Nice, TEEU, Art. 17736 BOND (November 2007) International Development and the

new EU Reform Treaty, p237 ibid38 TEU, Art. 439 Communication to the Council and the Parliament

Development-cooperation policy in the run-up to 2000.40 TFEU, Art. 20841 TFEU, Art. 21042 TFEU, Art. 21443 BOND (November 2007) International Development and the

new EU Reform Treaty, p244 TFEU, Art. 21445 BOND (November 2007) International Development and the

new EU Reform Treaty, p2

46 TFEU, Art. 20847 BOND (November 2007) International Development and thenew EU Reform Treaty, p2

48 Stocker, Simon (2007) Simon Stocker examines the potentialimpacts of the Lisbon Treaty. Strengthening Europes aid

49 Santopinto, Federico (2007/5) Le trait de Lisbonne et l'actionextrieure de l'Union europenne, Rapport du GRIP

50 EU Donor Atlas 200751 For an overview of the issue see: Mackie, J., Frederiksen, J. and

C. Rossini. 2004. Improving ACP-EU Cooperation. Is 'budgetising'the EDF the answer? (ECDPM Discussion Paper 51). Maastricht:ECDPM.

52 TEU, Art. 3553 TEU, Art. 3554 TEU, Art. 32, paragraph 355 TEU, Art. 27, paragraph 356 Council of the EU, Joint progress report by the Secretary-

General/High Representative and the Commission on theEuropean External Action Service., Brussels, 9 June 2005,9956/05, CAB 24, RELEX 304

57 TEU, Art. 858 The Policy: What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?,

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm59 For comprehensive overviews see: Dagand, Sophie (2008) The

impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP, ISIS Europe European Security Review no. 37, 03/2008, and Quille, Gerrard(2008) The Lisbon Treaty and its implications for CFSP/ESDP,Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, DirectorateB, Policy Department, European Parliament, 02/2008;

60 TEU, Art. 21 (paragraph 1)61 TEU, Art. 4262 TEU, Art. 42 (paragraph 1)63 TEU, new Art. 4464 Dagand, Sophie (2008) The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP

and ESDP, ISIS Europe, European Security Review no. 37, March2008, p 3

65 TEU, new Art. 4666 TEU, Art. 4167 Santopinto, Federico (2007) Rforme des traits: Une coopra-

tion structure permanente pour mieux armer lUE, Notedanalyse, GRIP;

68 TFEU, Art. 4569 TFEU, Art. 206 and 207


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ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of StatesAPF African Peace FacilityAPSA African Peace and Security ArchitectureAU African UnionCAP Common Agriculture PolicyCDSP Common Defence and Security PolicyCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyDG DEV Directorate General for Development CooperationDG RELEXDirectorate General for External RelationsEC European CommissionEDF European Development FundEEAS European External Action ServiceENP European Neighbourhood Policy

EU European UnionEP European ParliamentESDP European Security and Defence PolicyEUHR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security PolicyJHA Justice and Home AffairsPCD Policy Coherence for DevelopmentTEC Treaty on the Establishment of the European CommunityTEU Treaty on the European UnionTFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European UnionQMV Qualified majority voting

List of acronyms


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European Centre for Development Policy ManagementOnze Lieve Vrouweplein 21NL-6211 HE MaastrichtThe Netherlands

Tel +31 (0)43 350 29 00 Fax +31 (0)43 350 29 02

'InBrief' provides summarised background information on the main policy debates andactivities in ACP-EC cooperation. These complementary summaries are drawn from consultative processes

in which the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) engages with numerousstate and non-state actors in the ACP and EU countries. The Centre is a non-partisan organisation that

seeks to facilitate international cooperation between the ACP and the EC. Information may be repro-duced as long as the source is quoted .

The ECDPM acknowledges the support it receives for theInBrief from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in

Information on ECDPMs work on ACP-EU cooperationwww.ecdpm.org

Information on the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategyhttp://europafrica.org/

Joint Action Aid and ECDPM Project Wither EC Aidhttp://weca-ecaid.eu/

The three Cs initiative (coordination, complementarity and coherence)www.three-cs.net

EC Information on the Lisbon Treatyhttp://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm

Latest information on the ' Future of Europe/Institutional Reform' by the President of the EuropeanCommissionhttp://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/priorities/future/index_en.htm

Eurostep/EEPA information page on the Lisbon Treaty and development cooperationhttp://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/index.php

Statewatch Observatory on the EU Constitution-Reform-Lisbon Treatyhttp://www.statewatch.org/euconstitution.htm

French Presidency of the European Unionhttp://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/acceuil

European Commission, DG Developmenthttp://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/index_en.htm

European Parliament, Committee on Developmentwww.europarl.europa.eu/committees/deve_home_en.htm

Council of the European Unionwww.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/index.htm

Information sources


www.ecdpm.org/infocentre

Documents

InBrief 21 e Lisbon Final