ISCN

JAEA’s R & D ActivitiesRelated to Measurement and Detection of

Nuclear Material and Nuclear Forensicsfor Nuclear Security and Safeguards

Yosuke NaoiInternational Symposium on Technology Development

for Nuclear Security27 October 2016, Tokyo, Japan

Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

ISCN

Sector of Fukushima

R&DPromoting the use ofresearch facilities and

advanced computationalscience

Safety and RegulatoryCompliance

Sector of Nuclear Safety Research and

Emergency Preparedness

Sector ofDecommissioning

andRadioactive Waste

Management

Sector of Nuclear Science

Research

Sector of Fast Reactor

Research and Development

Dissemination ofresults/collaboration

withindustry-academia-

government

Securing public trust

in nuclear energy

IntegratedSupport Center

for NuclearNonproliferation

andNuclear Security

InternationalCooperation

andNuclear Power

TrainingSafety research

and contribution to nuclear safety

1. JAEA Profile

R&D for restoration from the accident of TEPCO’s Fukushima

Daiichi NPP

Fundamental research and human resources development

R&D for fast reactor

R&D for nuclear fuel cycle and disposal of

radioactive waste

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ISCN

Japan’s National Statement at 2010 Nuclear Security Summit : Establishment of an integrated support center for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security in JAEA and development of technology related to measurement and detection of nuclear material and nuclear forensics based on international cooperation

2. Establishment of ISCN

On December 27, 2010, ISCN was established in JAEA.

Japan PM Speech at 2012 Nuclear Security Summit “In particular, through our "ISCN" established in late 2010, Japan will expand its hosting and training of human resources. “

Japan PM Speech at 2014 Nuclear Security Summit We will further promote research and development activities for leading-edge technologies including nuclear forensics and nuclear detection capabilities at JAEA.

2

U.S.-Japan Joint Statement at 2016 Nuclear Security Summit The United States especially applauds the indispensable role which the JAEA’s ISCN is playing in the capacity building of personnel from other countries, particularly those from Asian countries, and expects ISCN to continue to serve as a leading Center of Excellence in this area.

ISCN3. ISCN’s Main Activities andCooperation with Domestic/Foreign Organizations

(1) R & D activities for nuclear nonproliferation (safeguards) and nuclear security(2) Capacity building assistance through human resource development (3) Support for CTBT(4) Policy research on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security(5) Support for nuclear material transport and management of research materials(6) Public engagement (awareness raising, information sharing)

Structure of cooperation with domestic/foreign organizations

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ISCN4. Technology Research and Development

① Demonstration of a Spent Fuel Pu-NDA System (PNAR Detector) (JAEA-US joint)4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (1/14)

PNAR Detector

Fugen Spent Fuel Assembly

PNAR Detector (developed by LANL)

PNAR: Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity; Quantifying 239Pu-effective Mass

[239Pu-effective=C1*M(235U) +M(239Pu)+ C2*M(241Pu)］

Measured Fugen fuel Assemblies

Type Burn-up（GWd/MT）

Cooling Time（Years）

7 MOX type 3.7 – 19.2 10.2 – 19.8

1 UO2 type 6.1 10.3

Measurements of Fugen spent fuel assemblies were done under the collaboration of JAEA/DOE(LANL) in June 2013 (in the course of USDOE-NGSI spent fuel NDA program).

PNAR detector developed by LANL was installed by JAEA in the Fugenspent fuel pool. Measurements / transfers of assemblies were done jointly.

Measurements data is under evaluation for application of PNAR method to less Pu quantity assembly like Fugen’s.

Fuel Transfer Machine (Crane)

SFA Pool

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② Development of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence NDA Technology 4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (2/14)

238U243Am0+ 0 0+ 0 0+ 0

1 680

21761+

Absorption

Absorption

Emission

Emission

24101

12245

++

Energy [keV]

Flux of gamma-rays

Tunable

235U7/2-

1733

18152003

239Pu1/2+

21432423

237Np0 0

938977933 -

Nondestructive Detection using NRF

Electron Laser photon

Scattered photon(LCS X-ray /Gamma-ray)

Laser Compton Scattering

Generation of high intensity monochromatic X-ray /γ-ray beam (dE/E ~ 1%) using collimator

Interrogation of monochromatic γ-ray beam to the target

Nuclear material ?

γ-ray beam

NRF- γ-ray

detector

NRF=Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence

Strong penetration of γ-ray Isotope specific detection No further radioactivation

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② Development of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence NDA Technology 4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (3/14)

LCS Demo-system based on ERL (@KEK)Electron Beam = 20 MeV, 57 μA

3000 5000 7000 9000 110000

2000

4000

6000

Measured spectrumE=6.91 keV, dE/E=0.5％

Demonstration of High Intensity Monochromatic X-/γ-rays Generationby LCS in March 2015 at Tsukuba (KEK)

Intensity ; 9 x 108 ph/s/mA[~100 times higher than the world highest ]

Laser Osc.

Electron Beam

Laser Enhancement Cavity(LCS Point)

γ-ray Beam

Examples of Possible Applications of NRF NDA System using LCS γ-rays

ERL (Energy Recovery Linac)

A Detection System of NMin Cargo Container

A Future LCS Gamma-ray Source with 3-loop ERL

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③ Demonstration of nuclear resonance fluorescence NDA technique

4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (12/14)

Laser equipment

Measurementroom

Laser

Monoenergeticγ-ray beam

Container

Welded vessel

γ-ray detector

Simulated nuclear

material

Scattered

γ ray

Monoenergetic γ-ray beam

Water for

neutron shield

New SUBARU synchrotron radiation facility

electron storage ring

BL01 γ-ray equipment

beam injection port

(2015JFY-2019JFY)・ Demonstration of non-destructive detection of nuclear material (NM) in a

heavily shielded container using NRF-NDA technique with actual energy(several MeV) γ-rays at New SUBARU of University of Hyogo

・ Improvement of NRFGeant4 code with taking coherent scattering effectsinto account for reproduction of the Bench-mark experiments at DukeUniversity

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ISCN4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (4/14)④ Development of He3-Alternative (Neutron) Detection Technology

Neutron Detection Unit using ZnS/B2O3 Ceramic Scintillator

A Demonstration NDA System (for INVS)(24 ZnS/B2O3 Ceramic Scintillator Detection Units)

In March 2011, IAEA requested member states to develop neutron detection technology using alternative to He-3 counters because of shortage of He-3 in near future.

①：He-3 proportional Counter②：Polyethylene③：Sample Cavity

NDA System for IAEA SG VerificationHLNCC （An Example)

(High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter)

①②

③

IAEA requests to member states Almost the same size Almost the same weight The same price or cheaper Develop prototype in 3 years

JAEA Development of Alternative Neutron NDA Sys.

INVS; Inventory Sample Counter（A HLNCC type NCC）

Alternate Sample Assay System (ASAS)Data Processing Unit

and Power SupplyNeutron Counter

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ISCN4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (5/14)④ Development of He3-Alternative (Neutron) Detection Technology

ASAS INVS (IAEA)Counting Efficiency (e) 15.97% 30.82%Die-away Time (t in μs) 77.67 45.36

Number of Tubes 24ZnS/B2O3 Ceramic Scintillator Tubes

163He tubes

Figure of Merit (FOM) <e2/t> 328.4 2094.1Figure of Merit (FOM) <e/t1/2> 1.81 4.58Total Measurement Uncertainty(Using MOX samples)

Passive Cal. Known-α Passive Cal. Known-α3.91% 4.14% 3.66% 5.74%

ASAS (Comparison with INVS)

-Counting Efficiency is smaller -Die-away Time is longer -FOM is smaller

→ ASAS can be used in actual safeguards inspection.

Results of Comparative Demonstration of ASAS in March 2015Demonstration of ASAS was done at PCDF-TRP(Tokai Reprocessing Plant) using actual MOX samples under an evaluation of specialists from IAEA, JRC and LANL .

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Type of Counter(used in HLNCC type NDA Sys.)

Developer(Organization)

DemonstrationTime Place

A 10B lined counter(proportional counter) US-ORNL/GERS Oct. 2014 JRC-ITU (Ispra)

B10B (B4C) Coated Straw Tube(proportional counter) PTI (USA) Oct. 2014 JRC-ITU (Ispra)

C ZnS/10B2O3 ceramic (scintillation counter) JAEA Mar. 2015 TRP-JAEA

D parallel-plate boron-lined proportional counter US-LANL/PDT May 2015 TRP-JAEA

E6LiF/ZnS Blade (scintillation counter) Symetrica (Oct.

2014) JRC-ITU (Ispra)

Liquid scintillation counter IAEA/JRC Oct. 2014 JRC-ITU (Ispra)

(Development Period; March 2011 – May 2015)Recently demonstrated HLNCC type NDA system

using alternative counters to 3He in the world

4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (6/14)④ Development of He3-Alternative (Neutron) Detection Technology

A

B

C

D

E

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ISCN

NRD: Neutron Resonance Densitometry

NRD: A NDA method to quantify the amount of special nuclear materials (U/Pu) (each ofU/Pu isotopes) in samples with unknown elemental and isotopic composition, (such as melted fuel debris generated in severe accidentsof nuclear reactors)

NRD : A non-destructive mass spectrometry method

⑤ Development of Neutron Resonance Densitometry (JAEA-EC/JRC-IRMM Joint)4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (7/14)

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ISCN4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (8/14)

Au, W, Rh, Cu, Co, Mnsamples (plates) with different thicknesseswere prepared .

Unknown samples (plates) were placed in the box.Then measurement were performed.

For NRTA unknown number of samples were placed in the box then sealed.

→By NRTA unknown samples were identified and quantities of elements were determined with difference less than 2%.

For NRCA/PGA unknown number of samples were placed in the box then sealed.

→By NRCA/PGA unknown samples were identified.

Demonstration Experiments at GELINA in March 2015⑤ Development of Neutron Resonance Densitometry (JAEA-EC/JRC-IRMM Joint)

FLIGHT PATHS SOUTH

FLIGHT PATHS NORTH

ELECTRON LINAC

TARGET HALL

GELINA

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⑤ Development of Neutron Resonance Densitometry (JAEA-EC/JRC-IRMM Joint)A Picture of a Practical NRD System

Accuracy of NRD: ~3 % ⇒ Accuracy level of partial defect test

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4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (9/14)

ISCN

⑥ Development of Active Neutron NDA Techniques (JAEA-EC/JRC Joint)

A D-T PulsedNeutron Source

Differential Die-awayAnalysis （DDA）

Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy （DGS）

Prompt Gamma-ray Analysis （PGA）

Neutron Detector Bank

A Li-glass Neutron Detector

（Inside）

Gamma-ray Detector

Transmitted Neutrons

Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis

（NRTA）

Detected Objects

NM with Explosives/Toxic Materials

Neutron Shielding（Concrete etc.）

Neutron Shielding and Transportation

Gamma-ray Detectors

A picture of the integrated system of 4 techniques(2015JFY-2017JFY)

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4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (10/14)

ISCN

Active NDA Techniques What Quantified / Identified

DDA: Differential Die-away Analysis

239Pu-effective

DGS:Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy

Ratio of 235U/239Pu/241Pu

NRTA:Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis

Quantity of each of U/Puisotopes

PGA/ NRCAPrompt Gamma-ray Analysis

Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis

Existence ofexplosives / toxic materials

Active (D-T Source) neutron NDA techniques to be developed

⑥ Development of Active Neutron NDA Techniques (JAEA-EC/JRC Joint)4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (11/14)

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Overview• In reprocessing plant, Pu including FP

is stored and has very high radioactivity.

• Establishing real-time measurement and continuous monitoring technology is necessary for enhancement and effectiveness of safeguards.

• A challenge (feasibility study) of development of a new technology has been started to measure and monitor Pu with FP in the storage under the joint research program between US/DOE and MEXT.

Expected Effects and Results • This technology can be applied to real

time monitoring for entire reprocessing process.

• It can be used for verification of waste material generated from dismantling operation.

• Continuous monitoring technology can be extended to detect security events.

Implementation2015-2017 (3years)

Image of Pu monitoring technology development

Simulationevaluation of candidate

technologies

Radiation StudyVarious radiation measurements

High Active Liquid Waste tank

Example of a detector

※High Energy Gamma and Elementary particle are planned to be measured.

Detector (Out of Cell, New)Passive

Detector (Inside of Cell, New) Passive

1-1.5m

radiations

Concrete CellPu solution including FP

Design and Composition Survey

- Pu concentration- density- Pu isotopic composition- impurity contents and

nuclides etc.

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4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (13/14)⑦ Advanced plutonium direct monitoring technical development(Japan-US joint)

ISCN

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Achievement of FY2015 Collection of design

information of High Active Solid Liquid Waste (HAW) tank for MCNP modeling.

Destructive analysis on HAW samples and investigation of representative and available nuclides and the intensities for MCNP modeling.

Preliminary measurements of the radiation characteristics (γ and n) emitted from HAW tank at the outside of the concrete cell.

Plan of FY2016 MCNP simulation for the detector optimization. Preliminary measurements of the radiation

characteristics in concrete cell. Conceptual design of customized detector will be carried out.

Overview of the preliminary radiation measurement

4.1 Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material (14/14)⑦ Advanced plutonium direct monitoring technical development(Japan-US joint)

V35

Neutron detector(BCAT)

Neutron detector(GBAS)

Penetration pipe for thruster

Plug for shield

cradle

cradle

concrete

Air intake duct（screw type）

The first floor

The basemenr floor

cradle

The first floor

The basemenr floor

cradle

V35

Gamma-ray detector

(HPGe/LaBr)

Penetration pipe for thruster

Plug for shield

concrete

Air intake duct（screw type）

Gamma-ray detector

(HPGe/LaBr)

ISCN

Japan‘s National Statement at Nuclear Security Summit (Washington D.D. April 2010)

Development of analysis, detection, and capability of nuclear forensicsJapan will establish more precise and accurate capabilities in detection and forensic within a three year time frame, and sharing the fruits of these new technologies with the international community

Nuclear Forensics (NF) ?Process of identifying the source

of nuclear or radioactive material used in illegal activities, to determine the point of origin and routes of transit involving such materials.

“Attributions” of nuclear and radioactive materials- What is this ?- What’s the purpose ?- When is it produced ?- Where is it produced ?- How is it produced ?

4 Technology Research and Development4.2 Development of Nuclear Forensics Capabilities(1/3)

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ISCN

Transmission Electron Microscope

Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry

Technical Research and Development in JAEA• Establishment of NF Analysis Lab (analytical devices and system)• Impurity measurement• Particle analysis• Uranium age determination• Development of prototype National NF Library (NNFL)

4.2 Development of Nuclear Forensics Capabilities(2/3)

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We encourage further international cooperation within the IAEA and other relevant international organizations, aimed at(1) connecting and enhancing traditional and nuclear forensics capabilities(2) establishing national nuclear forensics databases

(3rd The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué)

4.2 Development of Nuclear Forensics Capabilities(3/3)

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5. Summary

In order to contribute for strengthening international nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security, ISCN/JAEA conducted R & D on nuclear material measurement and detection technologies making the best use of its capacity as a comprehensive nuclear energy institute in collaboration with international partners.

ISCN/JAEA obtained various outcomes through those activities, which were further disseminated to IAEA and international community.

ISCN

Integrated Support Centerfor Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

765-1 Funaishikawa , Tokai-mura, Naka-gun, Ibaraki, 319-1184 JAPANTel: +81-29-282-0495

Please visit our website! http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/index_en.html

Thank you for your attention.