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ISCN Panel Discussion 2 The International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Security 29 November 2016 Hirofumi TOMIKAWA General Manager Technology Development Promotion Office Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security Japan Atomic Energy Agency JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and Potential Technologies for Nuclear Disarmament Verification 0

ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

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Page 1: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN

Panel Discussion 2 The International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear

Energy, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Security 29 November 2016

Hirofumi TOMIKAWA General Manager

Technology Development Promotion Office Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and Potential Technologies for Nuclear

Disarmament Verification

0

Page 2: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN

1

JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); • Prohibition of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in any

spaces • Establishment of verification regime to verify that each member state adheres the treaty

Page 3: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disposition of excess Weapon Plutonium

Cooperation by JAEA

Cooperation with Russian national laboratories to implement R&D activities; • Fabrication of MOX fuel using vibro-

packing technology • Irradiation in a Russian fast reactor (BN-

600), etc.

Dismantled warheads

MOX granules

Vibro-packing

Vi-pac fuel Vi-pac MOX fuel assemblies

Fast reactor BN-600

Process of disposition

Background • After 1996 nuclear safety summit held in Moscow, Japan, France, Canada,

Germany and other countries began cooperation with Russian Federation in order to evaluate the options and costs to dispose surplus weapon grade plutonium.

• Based on the evaluation, Japan proposed vibro-packed fuel option (burning vibro-packed MOX fuel using Russian fast reactor BN-600) at 1999 G8 Summit.

2

Page 4: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN ISCN What should be verified for nuclear disarmament?

Temporary Store

Temporary Store

Site Storage Dismantlement Building

STEP- 6~7 STEP- 8 STEP- 9~10

NDA Check Point Dismantlement Station

NM(BEFORE)

NDA

HE NM

NDA

Temporary NDA Check Point

Gate Gate

(ENTER) (EXIT)

Holding Area (AFTER)

<Datalink>

HE

Inspector's Room Control Room

Site Storage Dismantlement Building Temporary Storage

Temporary Storage

Dismantlement Station

NDA check point (After)

NDA check point (Before)

Temporary Holding Area

Inspector’s Room Control Room

(Example: Dismantlement of nuclear warhead)

: Nuclear Warhead : Monitor : CCTV Camera

: Optical Fiber Seal : In/Out Access Control : Containment Area

: Nuclear Material : Explosive Material : Non-destructive AssyNM HE NDA 3

Page 5: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN ISCN

Tokai

Ningyo-toge

Tsuruga (Monju)

Tokyo

U Enrichment

FBR

Reprocessing MOX fabrication

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities in JAEA

Oarai Research reactors

A variety of nuclear measurement and C/S systems has been developed to meet IAEA’s SG requirements and enhance nuclear security.

Enriched monitor

U holdup counter

Dual C/S system

Vitrified Counter

Hull monitor GB assay

system Fuel Assembly assay system

4

Page 6: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN ISCN

NDA Types Rough Explanation

Passive Type Detection of self-emitted radiations from NM

Active Type

Using outer sources of radiation to activate NM Detection of induced / transmitted radiations (changes of radiations)

NDA Technologies

Detecting self-emitted radiations from NM

Irradiated Radiation

Transmitted Radiation

Irrad

iatio

n So

urce

NM

Radiation Detectors

Induced Radiation

Radiation Detectors

Detecting induced/transmitted radiations (Detecting changes of radiations)

NM

5

Page 7: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN ISCN (Example) Passive type NDA

Pu Quantity

(240Pu-effective)

- PCAS [Plutonium Canister Assay System] *Counting of Spontaneous Fission Neutrons from 240Pu etc.

Pu Isotopic

Compositions

- HRGS [High Resolution Gamma-ray Spectrometer] *Counting of Self–emission Gamma-

rays from Pu isotopes HPGe-detector

Pu canister

6

Page 8: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN ISCN

Fissile material Quantity

- FNDI [Fast Neutron Direct Interrogation method]

*Counting of Induced neutron interrogated by Pulsed fast neutron

Identify each

Isotope

- NRF NDA [Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence] *Counting of Induced γ-rays Interrogated by monochromatic γ-ray beam

(Example) Active type NDA

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Measurement Interrogation Neutrons

Induced Neutrons

Integrated Fission Neutrons ∝ Fissile Materials Mass

Monochromatic γ-ray beam

Container

γ-ray detector

Scattered γ-ray Nuclear

material

Page 9: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN ISCN

Motion Direction Sensor (MDS)

ID check camera Detector Transfer Carts

01/1/23 10:01 3232±12.2 01/1/23 10:02 3216±11.8 01/1/23 10:03 3178±11.1 01/1/23 10:04 3265±12.1 01/1/23 10:05 3221±12.4

(time)

No.001

No.001

2001/1/23

No.001

No.001

2001/1/23 10:02

No.001

2001/1/23 10:01

ID data

Measurement Data

MDS data

Date Time Pu mass

Receipt Shipment

Unattended NDA system

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• Once triggered by radiation detector, ID check camera and NDA system automatically activated.

• Acquired data is transferred to data review station.

Page 10: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN ISCN

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(Example) Applicable technologies

Temporary Store

Temporary Store

Site Storage Dismantlement Building

STEP- 6~7 STEP- 8 STEP- 9~10

NDA Check Point Dismantlement Station

NM(BEFORE)

NDA

HE NM

NDA

Temporary NDA Check Point

Gate Gate

(ENTER) (EXIT)

Holding Area (AFTER)

<Datalink>

HE

Inspector's Room Control Room

Site Storage Dismantlement Building Temporary Storage

Temporary Storage

Dismantlement Station

NDA check point (After)

NDA check point (Before)

Temporary Holding Area

Inspector’s Room Control Room

Presence of NM Passive γ, n Active γ, n

Presence of NM & Isotope ratio Passive γ, n Active γ, n

Presence of HE & absence of NM

Active γ

NDA Surveillance camera

Review station Prevention of

information leakage Unattended System

Presence of HE Active γ

Page 11: ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and …...ISCN 1 JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ); • Prohibition

ISCN ISCN

• JAEA has contributed to CTBT International Verification Regime and cooperated in disposing excess weapon Pu.

• JAEA has long history of development of SG technologies in order to meet IAEA’s requirement and contribute effective/efficient SG. These are potentially applicable to nuclear disarmament verification scheme .

Conclusion

Technical Challenges; Technical features of nuclear disarmament verification, e.g.

Information Barrier, have to be taken into account. The detail design information cannot be disclosed to NNWS,

and it’s difficult to conduct computer simulation and optimize measurement system

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International collaboration including NWS and NNWS might be essential solution to overcome the challenges.