Hazard Identification (1)

7/24/2019 Hazard Identification (1)

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Major Hazard FacilitiesHazard Identification


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Overview

This seminar has been split into two sections1. Hazard Identification

2. Major Accident Identification and is! Assessment

The seminar has been developed to provide

" #onte$t with MHF e%&lations

" An overview of what is re'&ired

" An overview of the steps re'&ired

" ($amples of hazards identified


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)ome Abbreviations and Terms

" AFA* + As far as ,reasonabl- practicable" /0 + /an%ero&s %oods

" (mplo-er + (mplo-er who has mana%ement control of thefacilit-

" Facilit- + an- b&ildin% or str&ct&re at which )ched&le 1

materials are present or li!el- to be present for an- p&rpose" FM(AFM(#A + Fail&re modes and effects anal-sis Fail&re

modes and effects criticalit- anal-sis

" FTA + Fa&lt tree anal-sis

" HAI/ + Hazard identification

" HAO* + Hazard and operabilit- st&d-" H) + Health and safet- representative

" 3O# + 3oss of containment

" 3O*A 4 3a-ers of protection anal-sis


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)ome Abbreviations and Terms

" MHF + Major hazard facilit-" MA + Major accident

" OH) + Occ&pational health 5 safet-

" *F/ 4 *rocess Flow /ia%ram

" *5I/ 4 *ipin% and Instr&mentation /ia%ram

" *)6 4 *ress&re safet- valve

" )M) + )afet- mana%ement s-stem


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Topics #overed In This *resentation

" e%&lations" /efinition 4 Hazard

" Introd&ction

" HAI/ e'&irements

" HAI/ Approach

" #ons&ltation

" #ond&ctin% the HAI/

" Overview of HAI/ techni'&es

" eview and evision

" )o&rces of Additional Information


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e%&lations

" Hazard identification (R9.43)" is! assessment ,7.88

" is! control ,i.e. control meas&res ,7.89: )7A 21;

" )afet- Mana%ement )-stem ,7.8

" #ons&ltation

Basic outline


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e%&lations

a All reasonabl- foreseeable hazards at the MHF that ma- ca&sea major accident? and

b The !inds of major accidents that ma- occ&r at the MHF: the

li!elihood of a major accident occ&rrin% and the li!el-conse'&ences of a major accident.

Regulation 9.43,Hazard identification states@

The emplo-er m&st identif-: in cons&ltation with emplo-ees:contractors ,as far as is practicable and H)s@


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/efinition

Hazard

Regulatory definitionper *art 2; of the Occ&pational Healthand )afet- ,)afet- )tandards e%&lations 1778 @

A hazard means the potential to ca&se inj&r- or illnessB

Interpreted:An- activit-: proced&re: plant: process: s&bstance:sit&ation or other circ&mstance that has the potential to ca&seharm.


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Introd&ction

" HAI/ is critical to safet- d&ties and the safet- report" (mplo-er m&st identif- all major accidents and their related

ca&ses &sin% a s-stematic and doc&mented HAI/ approach

" The process m&st be transparent

" HAI/ res&lts m&st be reflected in ris! assessment: )M):

adoption of control meas&res and safet- report


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Introd&ction

An e$ample + 0ramerc- Al&mina efiner-: C) /epartment of

3abor eport I/ Do. 192: 9 E&l- 1777 at 9am


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Introd&ction

Were the hazards identified?


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Introd&ction

" HAI/ process m&st be on%oin% to ens&re e$istin% hazards are!nown: and

" Dew hazards reco%nised before the- are introd&ced@

- *rior to modification of facilit-

- *rior to chan%e in )M) or wor!force

-efore and d&rin% abnormal operations: tro&bleshootin%- *lant condition monitorin%: earl- warnin% si%nals

- (mplo-ee feedbac! from ro&tine participation in wor!

- After an incident


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Introd&ction

" Information from accident investi%ations can be &sef&l as inp&t todetermine contrib&tin% ca&ses


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HAI/ e'&irements

" A s-stematic: transparent and comprehensive HAI/ processsho&ld be &sed based on a comprehensive and acc&ratedescription of the facilit-

" MAs and the &nderl-in% hazards sho&ld not be disre%ardedsimpl- beca&se@

- The- appear to be ver- &nli!el-

- The- have not happened previo&sl-

- The- are considered to be ade'&atel- controlled b- e$istin%meas&res


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HAI/ e'&irements

The ris! dia%ram can be &sef&l for ill&stratin% this aspect: as

shown below

Consequence Severity

Safety Report Inuence

OH&S CatastrophicFire &Explosion

Maintenance

Protest picetsPersonal in!uryIn"ustrialstoppa#e

Hi#h technolo#y an" hi#h

ha$ar" syste% failuresClass actionsMaret collapse

Fatality fatalities'

(rea"o)nsPu*lic criticis%

Sta+co%plaints

Relativ

e

Fre

quenc

yofO

c

currence

Increasin# ris


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HAI/ e'&irements

" The HAI/ process ,for MHF compliance is not intended toidentif- all personnel safet- concerns

" Man- ind&strial incidents are ca&sed b- personnel safet-breaches: s&ch as the followin%@

- *erson falls from hei%ht

- (lectroc&tion

- Tripsslips

- #ontact with movin% machiner-

- etc

Exclusions


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HAI/ e'&irements

" These are %enerall- incidents that do not relate to the stora%eor processin% of )ched&le 7 materials and are covered b-other parts of an (mplo-erGs safet- mana%ement s-stem for afacilit- s&ch as@

+ *ermit to wor!

+ #onfined space entr- and mana%ement

+ or!in% at hei%hts

+ or! place safet- assessments

+ etc

Exclusions


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HAI/ Approach

" hat can %o wron%

" hat incidents or scenarios co&ldarise as a res&lt of thin%s %oin%

wron%

" hat co&ld ca&se or co&ldcontrib&te to these incidents


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HAI/ Approach

" #onsiders all operatin% modes of the facilit-: and all activitiesthat are e$pected to occ&r

" H&man and s-stem interfaces to%ether with en%ineerin% iss&es

" /-namic process to sta- ahead of an- chan%es in the facilit-that co&ld erode the safe operatin% envelope or co&ld introd&cenew hazards


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HAI/ Approach

The HAI/ approach is re'&ired to@

" e team+based

" Cse a a process that is s-stematic

" e pro+active in searchin% for hazards

" Assess all hazards" Anal-se e$istin% controls and barriers + preventative and

miti%ative

" #onsider size and comple$it- in selectin% approach to &se


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HAI/ Approach

" #onsideration needs to be %iven in selectin% the HAI/techni'&e

" )ome iss&es to ta!e into acco&nt are@

- 3ife c-cle phase of plant

- #omple$it- and size

- T-pe of *rocess or activit- coverin%@

o (n%ineerin% or proced&ral

o Mechanical: process: or activit- foc&ssed


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HAI/ Approach

" The HAI/ approach can be &sed inthe first sta%es of the life c-clephase of a project

" *rior to desi%n phase: littleinformation will be available and the

HAI/ approach will need to be&nderta!en on flow dia%rams

" Ass&mptions will need to betransparent and doc&mented

Concept

Design

Commission

Production

Decommission

Disposal

Construction

Life Cycle Phases of a Project


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HAI/ Approach

Complexity and ize" The comple$it- and size of a facilit- incl&des the n&mber of

activities or s-stems: the n&mber of pieces of e'&ipment: thet-pe of process: and the ran%e of potential o&tcomes

" )ome HAI/ techni'&es ma- %et bo%%ed down when the- areapplied to comple$ processes

" For e$ample: event tree and fa&lt tree anal-ses can becometime cons&min% and diffic&lt to str&ct&re effectivel-

" However: simple techni'&es ma- not provide s&fficient foc&s toreach consens&s: or confidence in the identification of hazards

Conclusion:Start with simple techniques and build

in compleit! as required


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HAI/ Approach

!ype of Process or "cti#ity" here activities are proced&ral or h&man error is dominant

then tas! anal-sis ma- be appropriate ,e.%. tas! anal-sis:proced&ral HAO*: etc

" here !nowled%e of the fail&re modes of e'&ipment is critical,e.%. control e'&ipment: etc then FM(A ma- be appropriate


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HAI/ Approach

!ype of Process or "cti#ity" here the facilit- is readil- shown on a process flow dia%ram

or a process and instr&mentation dia%ram: then HAO* ma-be &sed

" here m&ltiple fail&res need to be combined to ca&se anaccident: or m&ltiple o&tcomes are possible then fa&lt tree

anal-sis and event tree anal-sis ma- be beneficial


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#ons&ltation

" The MHF e%&lations re'&ire (mplo-ers to cons&lt withemplo-ees in relation to@

+ Identification of major hazards and potential major accidents

+ is! assessment

+ Adoption of control meas&res

+ (stablishment and implementation of a safet- mana%ement

s-stem

+ /evelopment of the safet- report


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#ons&ltation

" #ons&ltation is also re'&ired in relation to the roles that the(mplo-er defines for emplo-ees

" The ade'&ac- of the cons&ltation process is a !e- step indecision+ma!in% with re%ards to the %rantin% of licences

" A teamwor! approach between the (mplo-er: H)s andemplo-ees is stron%l- advocated for the safet- report

development process as a whole


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#ons&ltation

" (mplo-ees have a si%nificant effect on the safet- ofoperations: as a res&lt of their behavio&r: attit&de andcompetence in the cond&ct of their safet-+related roles

" The involvement of the emplo-ees in the identification ofhazards and control meas&res enhances@

- Their awareness of these iss&es

and

- Is critical to the achievement of safe operation in practice


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/

H"$I% !eam election

" The team selection for the area or plant is critical to the wholehazard identification process

" *ersonnel with s&itable s!ills and e$perience sho&ld be

available to cover all iss&es for disc&ssion within the HAI/process

" A well mana%ed: formalised approach with appropriatedoc&mentation is re'&ired

" Team selection and trainin% in methodolo%- &sed is to beprovided


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/

H"$I% !eam election

" Facilitated m&lti+disciplinar- team based approach

" )&itabl- '&alified and e$perienced independent person tofacilitate

" )&itabl- e$perienced and '&alified personnel for the process:operations and e'&ipment involved


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/

H"$I% !eam election

" These emplo-ees MAJ ( the H)s b&t /O DOT HA6( TO (

" However: the H)s sho&ld be cons&lted in selection ofappropriate persons + this process m&st be doc&mented and be

transparent" Do sin%le person can cond&ct a HAI/

" A team approach will be most effective


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/

H"$I% tudy !eam

The t-pical st&d- team wo&ld comprise@

" )t&d- facilitator

" Technical secretar-

" Operations mana%ement" H)Operations representative

" *roject en%ineer or project desi%n en%ineer for new projects

" *rocess en%ineer

" Maintenance representative

" Instr&ment electrical representative

Dote@ the above team ma!e &p is indicative onl-


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/

H"$I% Planning

The followin% steps are re'&ired@

" *lannin% and preparation

" /efinin% the bo&ndaries and provide s-stem description" /ivide plant into lo%ical %ro&ps

" eview *5I/s and process schematics to ens&re acc&rac-

" Optimise HAI/ process b- means of preplannin% wor!involvin% relevant sta!eholders ,operations: maintenance:

technical and safet- personnel


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/ 4 #onsider the *ast: *resent and F&t&re

Existing

conditions

!uture

conditions

"istorical

conditions

hat has %one wron% in the past

hat co&ld %o wron% c&rrentl-

hat co&ld %o wron% d&e to chan%e

#oot Cause"istorical #ecordsProcess Experience$ear %isses

&denti'ied

"a(ards")*&D +or,sop")*.P /tud/cenario De'initionsCec,lists

Cange %anagement+at-&' udgementPrediction

un'oreseeale


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/

It is temptin% to disre%ard Don+#redibleB )cenarios CT

" Don+credibleB scenarios have happened to others

" orst cases are important to emer%enc- plannin%


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It happened to someone else K

Aftermath of an e$plosion,C.). #H(MI#A3 )AF(TJ AD/ HAA/ ID6()TI0ATIOD OA/: )I(A

#H(MI#A3 #OM*ADJ (*OT DO. 7L+;;1+I+D6: Ean&ar- 17LL


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/

Issues for consideration

" ('&ipment can be off+line

" )afet- devices can be disabled or fail to operate

" )everal tas!s ma- be conc&rrent

" *roced&res are not alwa-s followed" *eople are not alwa-s available

" How we act is not alwa-s how we plan to act

" Thin%s can ta!e twice as lon% as planned

" Abnormal conditions can cross section limits

4 *ower fail&re


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/ 4 HAI/ *rocess

Existing studies

De'ine oundar /stem description

Diide sstem into sections

/stematicall record all a(ards

&ndependent cec,

#eisit a'ter ris, assessment"a(ard #egister

/elected metods

asset or euipment 'ailure

external eents process operational deiations a(ards associated it all materials uman actiities ic could contriute to incidents interactions it oter sections o' te 'acilit

Analyse each section


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/

&eeting 'enue

" Hold on site if possible

" Avoid interr&ptions if possible

" )ched&le within the normal wor! pattern: or within the safet-

report activities" Meetin%s less than > ho&rs are not effective

" Meetin%s that last all da- are also not effective: howeverpracticalities ma- re'&ire all da- meetin%s

" /onGt &nderestimate the time re'&ired


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#ond&ctin% the HAI/

Recording %etail" The level of detail is important for@

- #larit-

- Transparenc- and

- Traceabilit-

" A s-stem ,hazard re%ister is re'&ired for !eepin% trac! of theprocess for each anal-sed section of the facilit-

" The items to be recorded are@

+ )t&d- team

+ )-stem bein% eval&ated

+ Identified hazard scenario

+ #onse'&ences of the hazard bein% realised

+ #ontrols in place to prevent hazard bein% realised and theirade'&ac-

+ Opport&nit- for additional controls


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HAI/ Techni'&es + Overview

" #hec!lists + (uestions to assist in hazard identification

" rainstormin% + )hate#er anyone can thin* of

" hat If Anal-sis + possi+le outcomes of change

" HAO* + identifies ,process plant- type incidents

" FM(AFM(#A + e(uipment failure causes

" Tas! Anal-sis 4 maintenance acti#ities. procedures

" Fa&lt Tree Anal-sis + com+inations of failures

&ncreasinge''o

rtre5uired


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#hec!lists

" )imple set of prompts or chec!list '&estions to assist in hazardidentification

" #an be &sed in combination with an- other techni'&es: s&ch ashat IfB

" #an be developed pro%ressivel- to capt&re corporate learnin% ofor%anisation

" *artic&larl- &sef&l in earl- anal-sis of chan%e within projects


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Initiating

E#ents

/eneral Causes Initiating Causes

Overfills And)pills

ImproperOperation

Operatin% (rror

Inade'&ate Incorrect *roced&re

Fail&re To Follow *roced&re

O&tside Operatin% (nvelope

Inade'&ate Trainin%

6esselTan!er)hell Fail&re

#orrosion et H2) #rac!in%

0eneral *rocess

#oolin% ater

)team #ondensate

)ervice ater

MechanicalImpact

Missiles

#rane

6ehicles

#hec!lists


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#hec!lists

"d#antages" Hi%hl- val&able as a cross chec! review tool followin%

application of other techni'&es

" Csef&l as a shop floor tool to review contin&ed compliancewith )M)

%isad#antages

" Tends to stifle creative thin!in%

" Csed alone introd&ces the potential of limitin% st&d- toalread- !nown hazards + no new hazard t-pes are identified

" #hec!lists on their own will rarel- be able to satisf- re%&lator-re'&irements


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rainstorm

" Team based e$ercise" ased on the principle that several e$perts with different

bac!%ro&nds can interact and identif- more problems whenwor!in% to%ether

" #an be applied with man- other techni'&es to var- thebalance between free flowin% tho&%ht and str&ct&re

" #an be effective at identif-in% obsc&re hazards which othertechni'&es ma- miss


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rainstorm

"d#antages" Csef&l startin% point for man- HAI/ techni'&es to foc&s a

%ro&pGs ideas: especiall- at the projectGs concept phase

" Facilitates active participation and inp&t

" Allows emplo-ees e$perience to s&rface readil-

" (nables thin!in% o&tside the s'&areB" 6er- &sef&l at earl- sta%es of a project or st&d-

%isad#antages

" 3ess ri%oro&s and s-stematic than other techni'&es

" Hi%h ris! of missin% hazards &nless combined with other tools" #a&tion re'&ired to avoid overloo!in% the detail

" elies on e$perience and competenc- of facilitator


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hat If

" hat if anal-sis is an earl- method of identif-in% hazards" rainstormin% approach that &ses broad: loosel- str&ct&red

'&estionin% to post&late potential &psets that ma- res&lt in anincident or s-stem performance problems

" It can be &sed for almost ever- t-pe of anal-sis sit&ation:especiall- those dominated b- relativel- simple fail&re

scenarios


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hat If

" Dormall- the st&d- leader will develop a list of '&estions toconsider at the st&d- session

" This list needs to be developed before the st&d- session

" F&rther '&estions ma- be considered d&rin% the session

" #hec!lists ma- be &sed to minimise the li!elihood of omittin%some areas


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hat If

($ample of a hat If report for a sin%le assessed item


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hat If

"d#antages" Csef&l for hazard identification earl- in the process: s&ch as

when onl- *F/s are available

" hat If st&dies ma- also be more beneficial than HAO*swhere the project bein% e$amined is not a t-pical stead- stateprocess: tho&%h HAO* methodolo%ies do e$ist for batch and

se'&ence processes

%isad#antages

" Inabilit- to identif- pre+release conditions

" Apparent lac! of ri%o&r

" #hec!lists are &sed e$tensivel- which can provide t&nnelvision: thereb- r&nnin% the ris! of overloo!in% possibleinitiatin% events


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HAO*

" A HAO* st&d- is a widel- &sed method for the identification ofhazards

" A HAO* is a ri%oro&s and hi%hl- str&ct&red hazardidentification tool

" It is normall- applied when *F/s and *5I/s are available

" The plantprocess &nder investi%ation is split into st&d- nodesand lines and e'&ipment are reviewed on a node b- node basis

" 0&ideword and deviation lists are applied to processparameters to develop possible deviations from the desi%nintent

H"#$% results in a &er! a s!stematic assessment of hazards


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HAO*

($ample of a HAO* report for a sin%le assessed item


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HAO*

"d#antages" ill identif- hazards: and events leadin% to an accident:

release or other &ndesired event

" )-stematic and ri%oro&s process

" The s-stematic approach %oes some wa- to ens&rin% allhazards are considered

%isad#antages

" HAO*s are most effective when cond&cted &sin% *5I/s:tho&%h the- can be done with *F/s

" e'&ires si%nificant reso&rce commitment

" HAO*s are time cons&min%

" The HAO* process is '&ite monotono&s and maintainin%participant interest can be a challen%e


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FM(AFM(#A

" Objective is to s-stematicall- address all possible fail&remodes and the associated effects on a technical s-stem

" The &nderl-in% e'&ipment and components of the s-stem areanal-sed in order to eliminate: miti%ate or red&ce the fail&reor the fail&re effect

" est s&ited for mechanical and electrical hardware s-stems

eval&ations


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FM(AFM(#A

($ample of an FM(AFM#(A report for a sin%le assessed item

Potential

0ailure

&ode

Potential

Effects of

0ailure

Potential

Causes

of0ailure

Comments Recommendations

Open

indicator

switch failed

ron%

indication of

valve bac! to

control s-stemca&sin%possible

incorrect

controlleraction to be

ta!en

ear and

tear

#ommissionin%

and test

proced&res

m&st ens&rethat all divertere'&ipment

indicators are

correctl- wiredto the diverter

control s-stem

The inte%rit- of the

position indicators for

the /iverter s-stem

e'&ipment is critical tothe lo%ic of the controls-stem.

It is recommended that

the position indicatorsare discretel- f&nctiontested prior to

commencement of eachpro%ram


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FM(AFM(#A

"d#antages" 0enerall- applied to solve a specific problem or set ofproblems

" FM(AFM(#A was primaril- considered to be a tool or processto assist in desi%nin% a technical s-stem to a hi%her level ofreliabilit-

" /esi%ned correction or miti%ation techni'&es can beimplemented so that fail&re possibilities can be eliminated orminimized

%isad#antages

" It is ver- time cons&min% and needs specialist s!ills from

different bac!%ro&nds to obtain ma$im&m effect" 6er- hard to assess operational ris!s within an FM(AFM(#A

,li!e the- can be within a HAO* or hat if st&d-


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Tas! Anal-sis

" Techni'&e which anal-ses h&man interactions with the tas!sthe- perform: the tools the- &se and the plant: process orwor! environment

" Approach brea!s down a tas! into individ&al steps andanal-ses each step for the presence of potential hazards

" Csed widel- to mana%e !nown inj&r- related tas!s in

wor!place

" ($cellent tool for hazard identification related to h&man tas!s


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Tas! Anal-sis

%isad#antages" /oes not address plant process deviations which are not related

to h&man interaction

Caution

" elies on m&lti+disciplined inp&t with specific inp&t of personwho normall- carries o&t the tas!

" Often ass&med to be the onl- tool of hazard identification orris! assessment: as it is &sed %enerall- at the shop floor


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Fa&lt Tree Anal-sis

" 0raphical techni'&e approach" *rovides a s-stematic description of the combinations of

possible occ&rrences in a s-stem which can res&lt in anidentified &ndesirable o&tcome ,top event

" This method combines hardware fail&res and h&man fail&res

" Cses lo%ic %ates to define modes of interaction ,AD/s Os


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Fa&lt Tree Anal-sis

,-. OR

PSV does not

relieve

Process

pressure

rises

Control

'ails ig

P/ too

small

/et point

too ig

P/ stuc,

closed

!ouling inletor outlet

Pressure

rises

Process

vessel over

pressured

,-.


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Fa&lt Tree Anal-sis

"d#antages" &antitative + defines probabilities to each event which can be

&sed to calc&late the probabilit- of the top event

" (as- to read and &nderstand hazard profile

" (asil- e$panded to bow tie dia%ram b- addition of event tree

%isad#antages

" Deed to have identified the top event first

" More diffic&lt than other techni'&es to doc&ment

" Fa&lt trees can become rather comple$

" Time cons&min% approach" &antitative data needed to perform properl-


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eview and evision

")*&D

#eision

.rgani(ational

canges

Process or

condition

monitoring

canges&ncident

inestigation

results

)normal conditions

troug design enelope

canges

$e

proects

The followin% are e$amples of when a HAI/ revision sho&ld occ&r

) f Addi i l I f i


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)o&rces of Additional Information

" 'oss %re&ention n he %rocess ndustries: )econd (dition: eed(d&cational and *rofessional *&blishin%: F. * 3ees:177

Documents

Hazard Identification (1)