EVOLUCION RECONOCIMIENTO

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The Evolution of ReconnaissanceIn the 21st Centuryby Sergeant First Class Frank R. Belonus

Authors Note: I wrote this article fivemonths before the tragic events of Sep-tember 11th and the war we now findourselves in. The operations our armed

forces are now conducting emphasizethe need to understand the complexitiesof an asymmetrical environment like

Afghanistan. This article addresses theexpanded, “multidimensional” aspectof reconnaissance needed to combat

guerrilla units and terrorists in com- plex terrain. It also highlights some ofthe distinctive characteristics of the

RSTA Squadron found within the IBCT,identifying some of its unique assetsand capabilities when working in thisenvironment. The recently releasedQuadrennial Defense Review re-em-

phasizes the need for such an organiza-tion by making the IBCT a priority andaccelerating its fielding. I would alsolike to extend my thoughts and prayersto those who have lost loved ones, andto all that place themselves in harm’sway in order to protect and serve thisgreat country and its people.

SFC Frank Belonus30 October 2001

Introduction

With the continued technological de-velopments in intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets,the reconnaissance scout still remainsthe commander’s primary informationgatherer. Information collected from ahuman source is the most reliable formof information gathering.

The fundamentals of reconnaissancehave not changed much over the last 50years,1 but the focus, tempo, and en-gagement criteria for reconnaissancecontinue to evolve.

Today, many factors influence the fo-cus of reconnaissance. The type of re-connaissance unit conducting the op-eration, its capabilities, its limitations,the types of operations it normally con-ducts, and the environment it operatesin, all help drive the reconnaissancefocus.

“Normally, Recon Platoon’s primary function in life was to patrol an area for reconnais-sance purposes only, avoiding —if possible — detection and con-tact. We were chartered to collectinformation for use by higherheadquarters, all (hopefully)without the enemy’s awareness ofour surveillance.”

Sergeant Major F. Miller2 Medal of Honor Recipient

There are two types of reconnaissanceorganizations. One type relies solely onpassive surveillance, human intelli-gence (HUMINT) derived from humaninteraction, and technical means to per-form reconnaissance. The other typeuses these techniques and assets, buthas the additional capability of fightingfor information.3

Reconnaissance organizations foundin the first category, such as task force

scout platoons found in armor ormechanized infantry battalions, BrigadeReconnaissance Troops (BRTs), lightcavalry units, and recce units in theReconnaissance, Surveillance, and Tar-get Acquisition (RSTA) squadron of theInterim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT),focus purely on information gathering.They are not capable of surviving pro-tracted engagement with threat forcesand, therefore, rely on stealth and theintegration of other ISR assets for sur-vivability and success. These types oforganizations avoid direct fire contactand engage threat forces with direct fire

weapons only in self-defense. Theylack the capability to fight for informa-tion.

Reconnaissance organizations such asarmored cavalry regiments (ACR) anddivision cavalry squadrons not only usethe common techniques and assets(HUMINT, passive surveillance, andtechnical means) but also are capable ofemploying combat power to fight forinformation. Because these units areusually the forward-most elements inmajor theater of war (MTW) environ-

ments, they must have the capability tosurvive meeting engagements and todestroy or impede threat forces as nec-essary to sustain operations in high-threat areas. These unique, combinedarms organizations employ tanks, at-tack helicopters and, usually, BradleyCavalry Fighting Vehicles (CFVs) toenhance survivability and to sustain theaggressive tempo required for opera-

tions in this environment. The capabili-ties of the integrated weapons plat-forms, working together, allow theseorganizations to fight for informationusing a higher level of engagementcriteria and tempo than those recon-naissance organizations not organizedin this manner. These units are capableof fighting through threat reconnais-sance (destroying the threat’s “eyes andears”) to gain combat informationneeded by higher unit commanders. Inshaping operations, the ability to fightfor information is important in deter-mining the intent of a threat (for exam-ple, whether the threat is willing todefend, withdraw, or fight when con-fronted) without committing main bodyinfantry or armor units.

These two types of reconnaissance or-ganizations are mutually supporting.Organizations working forward in anarea of operations provide the initialinformation that may allow the refine-ment of focus for follow-on reconnais-sance elements. This information canalso enhance survivability and missionsuccess by enabling the follow-on or-ganization to maneuver out of contact(using stealthy movement) and then

make initial contact on the most favor-able terms, at the time and place(s) oftheir own choosing.

The RSTA squadron is much bettersuited to conduct the multidimensionalaspect of reconnaissance (further ex-plained later in this article) in complexterrain, as well as integrating andmaximizing multiple, layered ISR as-sets in permissive/semi-permissive, orsmall-scale contingency (SSC) envi-ronments, whereas division cavalry,with its superior firepower and survival

20 ARMOR — March-April 2002



capabilities, is much better suited for aconventional, force-on-force, gun-to-gun form of conflict in a MTW envi-ronment. The focus of these two unitsis vastly different, but both are equallyneeded to deal with today’s threats.

Although the difference in these twoforces is obvious, they both must beprepared to transition to operationsoutside their normal realm, based oncontinuously changing operational en-vironments. Three major issues aredriving the current change in recon-naissance focus; they are the environ-ments where scouts will operate, theimpact of evolving technology, and thenature of threat forces in the future.

Future trends suggest that operationsin stability and support operations, andsmall-scale contingencies, are muchmore likely for U.S. forces versus theconventional MTW that U.S. forcescurrently train for, focus on, and arestructured to fight. Threats of the futureinclude mid- to low-end industrial-ageforces, guerrilla forces, or terrorists(commonly the type of forces found insmall-scale contingencies), capable ofcommunicating rapidly with cell phonesand the internet, working in small, de-centralized teams, and focusing on U.Sforces’ weak points.There are very fewforces in the world that could competewith U.S. forces in a heavy, conven-tional force-on-force meeting engage-ment in an environment that permits

large armor forces the flexibility tomaneuver freely.

Because of this, the weaker foe mustfind ways to even the odds, and againsta conventional, heavy force like theU.S. Army, this will be done by draw-ing us into difficult operating environ-ments, such as urban environments,while attempting to sway U.S. publicopinion by creating casualties and ma-nipulating the media.

By the year 2010, it is anticipated that75 percent of the world’s populationwill reside in, or around urban areas.4

Because of their seaports and airports,these hubs are key to the deployment ofU.S. forces into theaters of operation.Moreover, urban areas are where stabil-ity, support, and SSC operations tend tooccur. Another of our weaknesses is thelarge logistical footprint required for aheavy force. History shows many in-stances where it is the large logisticaltail that wags the dog.

These types of threats and environ-ments, coupled with today’s technol-ogy, drive the reconnaissance focus

into the 21st century. Today’s scoutmust be proficient at information gath-ering in any terrain and be capable ofmaintaining the flexibility to do theseoperations in a permissive environ-ment, a MTW, or anywhere in-be-

tween. He must understand the capa-bilities of evolving ISR assets and howthey support the reconnaissance andsurveillance effort. Scouts must under-stand digitization, how this will stream-line reporting and enhance situationalawareness (SA). Digitization facilitatesachieving a common operational pic-ture (COP), which is multiple leadersseeing the same operational picture. Anoperational picture (OP), in analogterms, would be like an overlay withfriendly and known enemy locationsposted. Digitization is also the key toachieving situational dominance on the

battlefields of tomorrow. Digitization isdiscussed in further detail later in thisarticle.

“Modern command, control,and communications technology

forms the neutrons and synapsesthat make agility possible by ty-ing together the brains and mus-cles of a field army… Agilityshould be limited only by themental and physical capability ofthe force, not by the communica-tions that link them together.”

Certain Victory – The U.S.

Army in the Gulf War5

Cold War Transition

The narrow, Cold War reconnaissancefocus of identifying military movementand communications or reconnoiteringterrain is derived from the Cold War-era form of maneuver. Maneuver com-manders would maneuver to make con-tact. Once contact is made, they woulddevelop the situation and maneuver,while still in contact. They then con-ducted decisive close combat opera-tions in order to destroy the enemy.

This type of maneuver does not allowthe commander the ability to strike atthe enemy’s weakest point/points, withsurprise, at a time of his choosing. To-day’s technology allows us to nowmake initial contact using ISR assetswhile still out of direct contact; thisincludes scouts with the long-rangeacquisition capability of the LongRange Advanced Scout SurveillanceSystem (LRAS3)(Figure 3). With thiscapability, the commander can maneu-ver his forces freely and conduct deci-

sive operations at his own chosen timeand place. This type of maneuver re-quires the scout to expand his focus toinclude other ISR assets in the recon-naissance plan, as well as capitalizingon information sources and tactics,

techniques and procedures (TTP) notpreviously maximized.

Some of the key collection disciplinesin the ISR architecture are HUMINT,signal intelligence (SIGINT), imageryintelligence (IMINT), and measure-ments and signature intelligence(MASINT – a combination of elec-tronic imagery and signal intelligence).The assets within these disciplines mustbe understood and properly integratedinto reconnaissance and/or surveillanceoperations when available. The RSTAsquadron of the IBCT is structured tomaximize these assets in order to pro-vide the information needed by thebrigade commander. Legacy forces(current heavy forces) in places likeKuwait and the Balkans are currentlyusing many of these ISR assets.

HUMINT refers to information gath-ered by human sources. Some HUM-INT assets are scouts, military intelli-gence personnel, engineer recon, chem-ical recon, military police, and civilaffairs. Military police and civil affairscould play key roles in the multidimen-sional aspect of reconnaissance andsecurity (the multidimensional aspect

of reconnaissance is explained furtherlater in the article).

SIGINT gathers information fromelectronic and communications sources.Some of these assets are the ground-operating Prophet (Figure 1), aircraft-based Guardrail, and UH60-basedQuickfix.

IMINT refers to assets that gather in-formation using visual photographs,infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics,and radar sensors. The primary IMINTasset is the Tactical Unmanned AerialVehicle (TAUV) (Figure 2).

MASINT gathers information fromdirected-energy weapons. Some exam-ples are Ground Surveillance Radars(GSR), Remotely Monitored BattlefieldAssessment (REMBASS) that detectsseismic, acoustic, magnetic, and IR sig-natures, and the Q36 and Q37 radars,which detect and track incoming mortarand artillery rounds to enable rapidcounter-fires.

These ISR assets play a key role in thetransition from the Cold War focus.They not only support reconnaissance

ARMOR — March-April 2002 21



and security operations in any envi-ronment, but also enhance the likeli-hood of making initial contact with thethreat while still out of direct contact.The reconnaissance scouts can alsomaneuver while still out of contact inorder to gain and maintain contact andcontinue information collection. Assets

such as the LRAS3 (Figure 3) allow thescouts to acquire targets at a greaterrange, thus increasing their survivabil-ity.

ISR assets can also be used to helpdevelop and refine reconnaissance andsurveillance operations during theplanning phase. For example, usingUAVs to check danger areas (such asdominant, influencing terrain) and pro-posed infiltration routes prior to thescouts moving into sector6 increasesscout survivability and overall opera-tional success as well. All scouts mustknow how to use, and maximize, theseISR assets in support of their missions.

It should also be stressed that theseISR assets primarily support the re-connaissance/surveillance effort, theydo not conduct it by themselves. Inorder to maximize its time on station, aUAV, for example, needs to be focusedon the information needed. UAVs arealso good for confirming initial reports,but scouts need to factor in their vul-nerability and lack of stealth.

Assets, such as GSRs, can be used astactical triggers, allowing scouts tofocus on primary avenues of approach.A GSR team reporting initial contactcan trigger the scouts to shift focus andacquire the potential target. Once ac-quired, both may maintain contact toallow layered redundancy until hand-over of the confirmed target, or theGSR team may be directed to reestab-lish “observation” of its initial NAIwhile the scouts maintain contact.

These are just some examples of ISRintegration in support of the reconnais-sance/surveillance mission.

The Multidimensional Aspectof Reconnaissance

The multidimensional aspect of re-connaissance expands on the traditionalfocus of reconnaissance and surveil-lance by obtaining more detailed in-

formation about an area than scoutshave traditionally gathered:

-Enemy, threat forces (military, pa-ramilitary, criminal, and other types)

-Society, civilian demographics

-Infrastructure (including utilities,transportation, and the political, eco-nomic, and agricultural situations)route obstacles, etc.

-Terrain

This kind of reconnaissance focus, de-liberate and detailed, requires scoutsand HUMINT collectors (97B organic

to the recce platoons) to develop rela-tionships with the local military/civil-ian leaders to gain information that mayprove pertinent to current, or futureoperations in that area. This is time-consuming and may continue indefi-nitely. While the threat level deter-mines the level of interaction with localpersonnel, even in a MTW environ-ment, local non-combatants may pro-vide valuable information. And whenworking in a permissive, or semi-permissive environment, maximum useof this kind of reconnaissance can pro-vide the commander with information

that may prevent future escalation ofhostilities.

If area stability deteriorates and hos-tilities escalate to the point where ma-neuver forces are needed, the maneuvercommander must have the informationnecessary to defeat the threat using thecontact paradigm discussed earlier.This further identifies a potential re-quirement of prioritizing types/focus ofthe information initially collected, inanticipation of the maneuver command-er’s information needs. This may be

standardized in unit SOPs. In the eventof layered reconnaissance efforts, thebrigade’s reconnaissance assets may beinitially working in the area focused onthe collection of the brigade com-mander’s critical information require-ments (CCIR) or intelligence require-ments (IR) to fill voids in the brigade’sintelligence preparation of the battle-field (IPB). As hostilities escalate, re-connaissance handover (further ex-plained later in this article) may beconducted with the battalion maneuvercommander’s reconnaissance assets,who will then, in turn, focus their re-

connaissance efforts for their com-mander, fulfilling the maneuver com-mander’s CCIR or IR (which may bedifferent than the brigade command-er’s), facilitating successful operationsby the maneuver force.

In the 1970s, Rhodesia’s Selous Scoutsbecame world-renowned for their abil-ity to gain information in their envi-ronment.7 Their ability to provide cru-cial information to their leaders in atimely manner allowed the country’ssmall security forces to be at the rightplace at the right time to interdict raid-ing enemy forces. They accomplished

this task by working in small, dis-mounted teams for extended periods inenemy territory, establishing observa-tion posts (OPs) to observe main ave-nues of approach. Another frequentmethod used to gain information was tomake contact with village communitieswithin the area to glean pieces of in-formation on enemy movement, in-tended targets and rendezvous loca-tions. This often led to penetration ofenemy camps and neutralization ofcomplete enemy groups. This example

Fig. 1 The Prophet ground SIGINT system




of the multidimensional aspect of re-connaissance shows that this is notsomething new. This aspect of recon-naissance is being conducted today inthe Balkans, showing the need for to-day’s scouts to understand this dimen-sion of reconnaissance.

Emerging doctrine for scouts expoundseven further on this subject. It explainsintelligence collection operations andactivities, defining the HUMINT col-lector as the subject matter expert, butthe reconnaissance leader must under-stand how to properly focus scout/HUMINT information collection. High-er headquarters may provide assess-ment forms to further focus scout/HUMINT information collection ef-

forts. These products help the unit togather information on enemy, terrain,society, and/or infrastructure in an ur-ban environment. They also address therequirement to identify the basic humanneeds of the society (such as food, wa-ter, and shelter).

This information gives the highercommand the ability to influence thesociety based on these identified needs.Scouts and HUMINT collectors alsoidentify potential information sourcesthat can be further queried by follow-on

military intelligence(MI) units.8 These MIunits collect thescout’s information,and the information

from HUMINT opera-tors, and analyze it todevelop intelligencefor the commander.This form of informa-tion collecting is criti-cal in urban environ-ments because of thedifficulty of gatheringinformation in suchcomplex terrain. De-veloping doctrine alsogoes on to describeother factors related tocivil-military opera-

tions, such as localcustoms, bribery, giftsand liaison opera-tions.9 The multidi-mensional aspect mustbe considered in theplanning phase of alloperations. “Multidi-mensional” is not anoperation of its own, itis part of every recon-naissance and surveil-

lance operation that scouts conduct,regardless of the terrain and the envi-ronment in which they will operate.

Urban OperationsDeveloping doctrine further defines

the scout’s role in urban operations.The extent of the urban reconnaissanceis based on the threat level of the envi-ronment. When working in a permis-sive, or semi-permissive environment,plan for all aspects of urban reconnais-sance, to include the multidimensionalaspect.

Initially, during the planning phase,all existing intelligence is retrieved andanalyzed prior to the upcoming recon-naissance. Assets like Trojan Spirit —

a system enabling reach-back to im-agery and video from worldwide sourc-es — greatly enhance this intelligenceretrieval. ISR assets are deployed alsoto confirm or deny reported informa-tion and to conduct preliminary recon-naissance.10

Scouts conduct reconnaissance out-side the urban area and establish OPs toobserve the urban area prior to move-ment into the built-up area. They de-velop urban operations sketches priorto entering the urban environment.

Once in the built-up area, they con-firm and refine urban mapping. Theymay develop urban overlays (Figure 4)reflecting known hostile areas, mainroutes, and subterranean routes. Scouts

may be used to confirm existing over-lays, or gain the information requiredfor higher to develop these overlays,which also facilitate rapid informationhandover to other units. They may es-tablish OPs in urban areas to continuesurveillance.

Buildings can make good OP loca-tions, but scouts should not enter build-ings in a high threat environment.Scouts primarily do not clear build-ings; rather, they reconnoiter buildingsfor potential OP locations or to meetthe requirements of a compliance in-spection. Building clearance is nor-mally an infantry task associated withurban assaults and usually requires alarge number of soldiers. Scouts mustknow, however, how to move securelyin a building and how to check roomsas they move past them. Reconnais-sance elements moving mounted and/ordismounted in urban areas, buildingentry techniques, movement techniqueswithin buildings, and engagement tech-niques within buildings are now ad-dressed in emerging reconnaissancedoctrine.11 Emerging doctrine also ad-dresses the role of reconnaissance insupport of infantry assaults of an urban

area.ISR assets can collect some of the in-

formation needed from within an urbanarea, but you need human involvementto determine such things as crowdmood, a factor that could assist thecommander in anticipating their nextaction, and tactical questioning of po-tential information sources. Movingcrowds may now be NAIs for scouts.

Scouts may also conduct presence pa-trols within an urban area in order tosupport stability operations. As statedearlier, scouts can support combat op-

erations in urban areas, but they nor-mally operate as part of the fire supportelement or the security element in as-sault operations in urban areas.

Digitization and SituationalAwareness

Situational awareness is the ability tomaintain a constant, clear mental pic-ture of relevant information (informa-tion important to the commander forC2) and the tactical situation. Digitiza-tion can now support the commander’s

Fig. 2. The Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV)

Fig. 3. The Long Range Advanced Scout SurveillanceSystem (LRAS3) as mounted on a HMMWV’s roof.

ARMOR — March-April 2002 23



situational awareness. Technologicaladvancements such as the Force XXIBattle Command Brigade and Below(FBCB2) (Figure 5) provide the user adegree of the operational picture (OP),which is unit icons on the screens of theunits within their command, or thecommon operational picture (COP),which presents the identical operationalpicture shared by more than one com-mand.

This has also opened the door for digi-tal reporting and coordination, whichsaves time. But it also contributes to

information overload. It will be up toevery user to act as a filter to preventoverloading the system with redundantinformation. Filters will also have to bestandardized, possibly in SOPs, to siftout everything that is not relevant. Thistechnology will have a tremendousimpact on how scouts will send andreceive information. To maintain a sig-nificant information advantage (situ-

ational dominance [SD]), threat infor-mation collecting assets may becomepriority targets to be immediately de-stroyed during reconnaissance opera-tions.

Scouts at the lowest level must under-stand the COP and how the actions insomeone else’s area of operation mayaffect what may occur in his. This isespecially true in urban operations.Digitization is also assisting with coor-dination with forward, rearward, andflank units. The digital information andenemy icon(s) on the FBCB2 help re-connaissance elements remain situa-tionally aware, and supports better re-connaissance handover.

Reconnaissance Handover

The subject of reconnaissance hand-over is currently part of emerging doc-trine. It is defined as a task betweentwo units/elements that coordinatestransfer of information and/or responsi-

bility for observation (reconnaissanceand surveillance) of an assigned area,or contact from one unit/element toanother, if they were initially separatedby time and space. Unlike battle hand-over, it does not imply assumption of abattle. This task provides informationconnection, overlapping communica-tions, and focus on their commander’sCCIR and reconnaissance objectives(which may be a different focus foreach echelon). Reconnaissance hand-over is normally associated with a des-ignated area or reconnaissance hand-over line [phase line]; it may be of a

sector/zone, NAI, TAI, and/or threatcontact. Reconnaissance handover canbe visual, electronic, digital, or analog.It applies not only from OP to OPwithin a platoon, but links ACR, divi-sion cavalry, BRT, and task forcescouts, ensuring reconnaissance layer-ing, or interlock. Reconnaissance hand-over is also used to integrate ISR as-sets, ensuring they are properly inte-grated into the reconnaissance opera-tion, as explained earlier in this article.Reconnaissance handover begins in theplanning phase of an operation, andmust be rehearsed at all levels.

Scout Issues

Dismounted operations continue to bethe key to success for scouts. Scoutsurvivability tremendously increaseswhen they are dismounted. The recceplatoons of the RSTA squadron con-duct the majority of their operationsdismounted and have designated dis-mount teams in each squad.

Fig. 4. Some examples of urban overlays tracking, from left, allegiances, likely disturbance sites, and sewer mains.

Fig. 5

The FBCB2 systempresents a commonview of the area ofoperations


Continued on Page 46



Organic to each squad is a HUMINTsoldier, usually MOS 97B, who is alsocross-trained to conduct dismountedreconnaissance and surveillance. Al-

though scouts in this organization arecross-trained in tactical questioning, theHUMINT collectors play a vital role inthe platoon by advising the platoon’sleaders, identifying potential sources tobe exploited by the squadron’s MIcompany, and are the primary reporterson the CHATS system, a network sys-tem specifically for reporting HUMINTinformation.12

Although the recce platoon is ideallysuited to conduct the multidimensionalaspect of reconnaissance, support op-erations, stability operations, and small-scale contingencies, it is the legacy

force scouts that are conducting theseoperations right now, and there is adoctrinal need by all scouts to haveinformation in support of these opera-tions.

Developing doctrine also addressesthe distance each echelon of reconnais-sance is deployed. The BRT now fillsthe void that existed between the taskforce scouts and the division cavalry,but now there is a concern for how farthey are being deployed. The distanceshould be based on METT-TC and thecapability to support them, supportbeing CASEVAC, indirect fires, com-munications, and so on. This may, inturn, drive how far forward the divisioncavalry may operate. There may needto be a designated reconnaissance hand-over line between each element to pre-vent confusion and loss of targets in thefolds between elements. This line alsodefines areas of responsibility for directand indirect fires, and maneuver.

There is a need for standardization be-tween the different branches of serviceto allow digital support of future jointoperations. Currently, the differentbranches of the Army are working

closely together to standardize evolvingdoctrine to ensure true combined armscapability. Emerging reconnaissancedoctrine will also address operationsfor both digital and analog units.

Information dominance will becomeincreasingly more difficult. Technologynow allows the smallest of threats theability to communicate and gain intelli-gence immediately through the use ofcell phones, the internet, and CNN.Computer hackers, computer viruses,and worms are now major concerns to

U.S. forces. These are threats the Armyhas not previously faced, threats whichmust be addressed with minimal, if any,historical precedence.

Notes1FM 17-22, Reconnaissance Platoon and Re-

connaissance Company, 1 May 1950.

2F. Miller& E. Kureth, Reflections of a Warrior, Presidio Press, 1991, p. 59.

3MAJ G. Athey/SFC F. Belonus, developed forFM 3-20.98 Reconnaissance Platoon, Coordinat-ing Draft, May 2001.

4Defense Science Board, 1996.

5BG R. Scales Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War , 1994.

6FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, Coordi-

nating Draft, May, 2001, Infiltration.7F.A. Godfrey, War in Peace, War in the Bush,

Orbis Publishing, 1981, p. 82.

8FM 3-20.971 Reconnaissance Troop, Coordi-nating Draft, May 2001.

9FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, Coordi-nating Draft, May 2001.

10FM 3-20.96, RSTA Squadron, CoordinatingDraft, date pending.

11FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon.

12MAJ Petery, RSTA Squadron Armor Confer-ence Brief, 22 May 2001.

I would like to thank LTC James Berg,Chief, Doctrine Division, at Fort Knox,and MAJ David “Gregg” Athey, Chief,Cavalry Branch, for all their help andsupport in the development of this arti-cle.

SFC Frank R. Belonus enlisted inthe Army in 1986 as a 19D scout.He has served in both light andmechanized units, to include 5-73rdArmor and 1-10th Cavalry, 194thArmored Brigade, Fort Knox, Ky.;3/11th ACR, Germany; 2-9th Cav-

alry, 7th ID (L), Fort Ord, Calif.; 1-4th Cavalry, 1st ID (M), Fort Riley,Kan.; Seattle Recruiting Battalion;and 1-34th Armor, Fort Riley, Kan.He has attended ANCOC, MasterGunner School, Pathfinder School,and Air Assault School. He is cur-rently senior developer/writer forCavalry Doctrine, Cavalry DoctrineBranch, Directorate of Training andDoctrine Development (DTDD), FortKnox, Ky.


Evolution of Reconnaissance Continued from Page 24

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