Duns Scotus 1994 Contingency and Freedom Lectura i 39 9780792327073

8/7/2019 Duns Scotus 1994 Contingency and Freedom Lectura i 39 9780792327073

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JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

CONTINGENCY ANDFREEDOM

Lectura 139Introduction, Translation and Commentary

byA. VOS JACZN.H. VELDHUIS

A. H. LOOMAN-GRAASKAMPE.DEKKER

N. W.DENBOKResearch Group John Duns SCO/! lS ,

Franciscan Study Centre at the Catholic University of Utrecht,and the Theological Facul ty of Utrecht Univers ti ty

Library 01 Longress LalalUglIIg-lII-rUUII


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Acknow ledgementL at in t ex t f rom : Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, v ol . XV II , C ?p yr ig htPraef~ pp . 481-? 10, Polyglot Press; reproduced here by kind per-m is sio n o f th e V atic an P oly glo t P re ss .

D uring the sev enties, there w as a rev iv al of system atic philosophy ingeneral and of ontology in particular. A t the sam e tim e, especially inA ~gl o- Sa ~o n t hi nk in g, ~ ys tem ati c p hi lo so ph y i nt er ac te d v er y c re at iv elyw ith th e h is to ry o f m ed ie va l p hilo so ph y. It seem s to us that the w ork ofJ oh n D un s S co tu s (1266-1308) c ou ld s ub st an tia lly b en ef it t he se d ev el op -m ents. N ot only this, but his w orks cries out to be developed across thew hole spectrum of theology - that science w hich, in the M iddle A ges,r ule d a ll o th er s ( 'r eg in a s cie nt ia rum ') .T his book is the outcom e of several years of scholarship and friend-

ship during which, guided by D r. A . Vos, we have studied the work ofScotus. O ur research group is connected to the Theological Faculty ofUtrecht and to the D utch Franciscan Study Centre tStichting Francis-caans Studiecentrumy. T his s tu dy p re se nts a tr an sla tio n a nd c omm en ta ry~f Lect~ra I 39, which, in our v iew, is noteable as one of the key textsIn th e h is to ry o f s ys te ma tic th eo lo gy a nd p hilo so ph y.In th is b oo k w e h av e u sed spe cia list lan gu ag e an d argum en ta tion , bu t

at the same time have taken pains to make it useful to a circle of in-tereste d rea de rs w id er th an sim ply th at of th ose w ell-v erse d in m ed ie va lsc ho la stic ism . In this w ay , w e h op e to prese nt th e d iffic ult bu t instruc -tive work of the 'subtle m aster' (,doctor subtilis') in such a way as tom ak e it a ttr ac tiv e to o th er s ch ola rs a nd s tu de nts in th eo lo gy a nd p hilo so -phy.W riting in a fo.reign language is quite a task, w hich turns into really

hard w ork w hen It has to be a language full of precisely used w ords andnuanced details as it is needed for a book like this one. Our researchgroup w as so fortunate as to m eet som eone who is fam iliar with m edi-eval text~, experienced. in translating books into E nglish and quite agood writer herself: SIster Frances Teresa osc. She has been helpful~ ey~ nd o ur e xp ec ta yon s, b oth in co rre cting o ur m ista kes a nd in su gge st-mg Impr ovemen ts III o ur t ex t.

A . V os Ja czn .H . V e ld hu isA .H . Lo oman -G r aa s kampE . D ek ke rN.W . den Bok

Introduction

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS' LECTURA I 9: A KEY TEXTIn 1981 tw o im po rta nt s tu die s w ere p ub lis he d, b oth o f w hic h f oc us se don distinctio I 39 in John D uns S cotus' Lectura. A lth ou gh S . K n uu tti la

and A. Vos had each w ritten independently of the other, they eachd em on str ate d th e g re at im po rta nc e o f th is w ork fo r th eo lo gy , p hilo so ph yand the history of ideas'. Th e Lectura is a com mentary on Peter Lorn-

1 S. Knuutti la , 'Time and modali ty in scholast icism' , in: S . Knuutt ila (ed.) ,R efo rg in g th e g re at c ha in o f b ei ng . S tu die s o f th e h is to ry o f m od al th eo ri es , Dor-drechtlBoston/London 1981, 163-257; A. Vos, Kennis en noodzakelijkheid, Eel!k riti sc he a na ly se v an h et a bs olu te e vi de nti alis me in w ijs be ge er te e n th eo lo gie ,Kampen 1981 (abbrev.: KN). Knuuttila gives an extended history of modal theoryin the Middle Ages. Vos, in addition to hi s historical survey, also devotes anumber of chapters to a systematic development of his own epistemology andmetaphysics which he bases on Scotus' theory of contingency.Further recent s tudies of modal theor ies in the Middle Ages: K. Jacobi, Di eM odalbegriffe in den logischen Schriften des W ilhelm von Shyreswood und ina nd eren K om pen die n d es 12. un d 13. J ah rh un de rt s, F un kt io ns be st im m un g u ndG eb ra uc lt i n d er l og is ch en A na ly se , Leiden/Cologne 1980; S. Knuuttila, A ik a j amodaliteetti aristo telisessa skolastiikassa , Missiologian ja ekumeniikan seura,Helsinki 1975; S. Knuuttila, 'The statistical interpretation of modality in Aver-roes and Thomas Aquinas', Ajatus, 37 (1978), 79-98; S. Knuuttila, 'Duns Scotus'criticism of the 'statistical' interpretation of modality', S pr ac he u nd E rk en nt ni sim M ittelalter , Akten des VI intemationalen Kong r es se s f il r m i tt el al te r li ch ePhilosophie d e r S o ci et e intemationale pour l'etude d e l a p hi lo so ph ie m ed ie va le29. August - 3. September 1977 in B on n, Berlin/New York 1981, I. Halbband,441-450; S. Knuutt ila, 'Modal logic ', in: N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, 1. Pinborg(eds.), T he C am brid ge h isto ry o f la ter m ed iev al p hilo so ph y, Cambridge/NewYork/New Rochelle/Melbourne/Sydney 1982 (abbrev.: CHLMP), 342-357; L.Alanen, S. Knuuttila, 'The foundations of modality and conceivability in Descar-tes and his predecessors' , in: S. Knuuttila (ed.), M od er n m od alitie s, S tu dies o fth e h isto ry o f m od al th eo ries fro m m ed iev al n om in alism to lo gic al p ositivism ,DordrechtlBoston/London 1988, 1-69; C. Normore, 'Future contingents ', in:CHLMP, 358-381; E.L. Ormsby, Th eo dicy in Isla mic th ou gh t, Th e d isp ute o verAl-Ghazali's 'b est o f a ll p ossib le w orld s', Princeton 1984; A. Vos, 'On thephilosophy of the young Duns Scotus, Some semantical and logical aspects ', in:E.P. Bos (ed.), M ed ia ev al s em an ti cs a nd m eta ph ys ic s, S tu di es d ed ic ate d to L .M .de Rijk, P h.D . o n th e o cca sio n o f h is 6 0th b irth da y, Nijmegen 1985, 195-220.


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bard's Sententiae and was composed by lohn Duns (1266-1308) as ayoung theologian in Oxford. According to Knuuttila and Vos, Scotus,in distinction I 39 of this commentary, is the first scholar in the historyof theology and philosophy to give an extensive development of logical-ontological theory of what Vos caIls 'synchronic contingency'. Thistheory not only plays a crucial part in Scotus' theology but, in our view,it also deserves to be seen as indispensable, a cornerstone of all theol-ogy and philosophy. The text of Scotus' Lectura I 39 is important, notonly to the history of ideas but also to systematic thinking. The purposeof this book is to highlight that double relevance as much as possible.Since we have had to deal with a very complicated scholastic text, wehave opted for having the text in Latin and an English translation on theleft, and a parallel commentary on the right hand page.This introduction is designed to offer the reader a guide in his or her

exploration of the ground we shall cover in our analysis of Scotus' text.So the foIlowing opening sections start by presenting biographicalinformation about Scotus and then consider the place of Lectura I 39 inthe history of ideas ( 2-3). Next, they give a brief exposition of theformal and material structure of distinction I 39 ( 4-5) and describethe systematic heart of Scotus' theory: 'synchronic contingency' ( 6).After outlining the place of distinction I 39 in the Lectura as a whole( 7), the conc luding sections show the logical tools ( 8) and the basicassumptions of our trans lation ( 9).

Various studies in: T. Rudavsky (ed.), Divine omniscience and omnipotence inmedieval philosophy. islamic, Jewish and Christian perspectives, Dordrecht/Bos-ton/Lancaster 1985. For still more literature, see: A. de Libera, 'Bulletin d'his-toire de la logique medievale', Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques,69 (1985), (273-309), 281-291.

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2 10HN DUNS Scarus' DEVELOPMENT2

Itwas probably in the winter of 1266 that a new scion was born to theDuns family of Berwickshire on the Scottish Borders; 10hn3 Later,when he comes to take his place in the flourishing English Franciscanlife, he will usually be called John of Scotland ('Scotus'4) in order todistinguish him from other brethren of the same name. In about 1279Scotus was admitted to the Franciscan friary of Dumfries by his uncle,Elias. He was ordained to the priesthood by Oliver Sutton, Bishop of

2 A short survey ofDuns Scotus' l ifeand work is found in: C. Balic, 'The lifeand works of John Duns Scotus' , in: 1 .K. Ryan, B.M. Bonansea (eds. ), JohnDuns Scotus, 1265-1965, Washington, D.C. 1965, 1-27; J.I. Catto, 'Theologyand theologians 1220-1320', in: T.R. Aston (gen. ed.), The history of theuniversity of Oxford, Vol. I: The early Oxford schools, 1.1.Catto (ed.), Oxford1984, (471-517) 505-511; A.B. Wolter, 'Duns Scotus, John' , The new encyclo-paedia Britannica, vol. 4 , Chicago/etc. 1991, 278-279; John Duns SCOlltS,Philosophical writings, A selection, Translated with Introduction and Notes byA.B. Wolter, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1987 xiii-xxx ,Compact introductories to Scotus' thought: C. Balic, 'Duns Scorns, John', Newcatholic encyclopedia, New York/St. Louis/San Francisco/Toronto/London/Sydney 1967, volume IV, 1102-1106; A.B. Wolter , 'Duns Scorns, John', Theencyclopedia of philosophy, P. Edwards (ed.) , New York/London 1967, vol . 2 ,427-436. Reprinted in: A.B. Wolter, The philosophical theology of John DunsScotus, [compilation of Wolter's most important articles on Scotus], M. McCordAdams (ed.) , I thaca/London 1990, 1-23; 1.R. Weinberg, A short history ofmedieval philosophy, Princeton 19745, 213-234; W. Dettloff, 'Duns Scorns/Scotismus I', Theologische Realentyklopddie, G. Krause, G. Muller (eds. ), vol .IX, Berlin/New York 1982, 218-231. A more extensive study: E. Bettoni, DUllSScotus, The bas ic principles of his philosophy, t ranslated and edi ted by B.Bonansea, Washington 1961.3 In Scotus' t ime, one had tobe 25 in order tobe ordained to the pries thood.

Scotus was 25 by 17 March 1291 but because his Bishop had ordained youngtheologians in mid-December 1290, we may assume that Scorns had not been oldenough at that t ime and had only attained the pries tly age later . It follows then,tha t he had been born in the winter of 1265-1266. Anyway he was not bom in1274 as earlier biographers have maintained. This was the year in which Bona-venture and Thomas Aquinas died. Cf. E. Longpre, 'L'ordination sacerdotale duBx. Jean Duns Scot, Document du 17mars 1291', Archivumfranciscanum histo-ricum, 22 (1929), 54-62.4 'Scot (t)us' may also mean 'Irish' in early medieval La tin (Jolm Scotus

Eriugena!) but, contrary to the suggestion of L. Wadding, the 17th century editorof Scotus' Opera omnia, in 13thand 14thcentury England, it referred exclusive-ly to someone or something from Scotland.'1


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Lincoln, at the age of twenty-five on 17 March 1291. At that time,Oxford was part of the diocese of Lincoln", and it was here that in 1288Scotus began to study theology. We stiIl possess a document teJling usthat as from August 1300, Scotus was aJlowed to help with hearingconfessions in the busy Franci scan church in Oxford".To study theology in late-thirteenth century Oxford was a major

undertaking of thirteen years. In addition, we must remember thatScotus, before starting on theology, would have mastered the eight -yearphilosophy course (the 'artes'). He fol Iowed this course in the Francis-can ColIege Cstudium') in Oxford", probably from 1280. We know thathe was 'baccalaureus forrnatus" in 1300-13019 which in Oxford mark-ed the final year of the four year Bachelor's course, itself the final stageof the theological studies. So, after spending nine years in the facultyof theology, Scotus became a 'baccalaureus sententiarius' in 129710.

5 Oxford did not become an independent diocese until 1542, during the reignof Henry VIII. Consequently, the university of Oxford did not originate from acathedral school. Cf. A.B. Cobban, The medieval English universities: Oxfordand Cambridge to c. 1500, Aldershot 1988, 10-12, 19-30.6 This document is the Liber memorandum of John Dalderby, Bishop ofLincoln, who authorised Scotus and other 'fratres' to hear confessions. The textof this document is edited in: A.G. Litt le , Franciscan papers, lists, and docu-ments, Manchester 1943, 230-243, 262.7 Duns also s tayed in Cambridge for some time, but we do not exactly knowwhen. Cf. C.K. Brampton, 'Duns Scotus at Oxford, 1288-1301', Franciscanstudies, 24 (1964), (5-20) 18.8 L.M. de Rijk, Middeleeuwse Wijsbegeerte, Assen 19812, 128, characterisesa 'bacca1aureus' as "a semi-qualified student assistant who has the task of teach-ing".A 'baccalaureus formatus' is one who had finished the obligatory course ontheSententiae and Scripture and who is preparing for his doctora te. Cf. Li ttle,Pelster, op. cit., 169 f. For the curriculum oftheology in Oxford, see: Brampton,'Duns Scotus at Oxford, 1288-1301', 16. Cf. also footnote 10.9 Cf. E. Longpre, 'Philippe de Bridlington, O.P.M. e t Ie Bx. Duns Scot ',Archivum franciscanum historicum, 22 (1929),587-588; A.G. Little, F. Pelster,Oxford theology and theologians c. A.D. 1282-1302, Oxford 1934,310 and 345;Wolter, 'Duns Scotus, John'. The new encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 4 , 278.10 In Oxford, Scotus was a 'baccalaureus sententiar ius ' for the initial twoyears during the first ofwhich (1297-1298) hehad toprepare his one-year courseon Peter Lombard's Sententiae, the obligatory text in dogmatic theology, and thiscourse had to be given during the following year (1298-1299). During theseimportant years, the Lectura took shape. Inhis third year he served as 'baccalau-reus biblicus' and in the final year (1300-130 I) as 'baccalaureus forrnatus'. Cf.

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Even before this, he had been teaching, investigating fundamentalphi losophical questions. His logical Quaestiones, occasioned by thewritings of Aristotle and Porphyry on logic probably date back, at leastin part, to this early period. The Quaestiones contain a thorough anddetail ed examinat ion, which offers us a fascinat ing view of the frontlinein contemporary logic and conceptual analysis, but there is still no signof those theories which were to play such an important part in hisreconstruction of theology as a whole!'. These Quaestiones, therefore,are of minor relevance for a consi stent interpretation of Scotus' theolo-gical work.In 1297, Scotus eventualIy became 'baccalaureus' in theology. In

1298-1299, he gave a course on the Sententiae of Peter Lombard andthen turned to the great spokesmen of non-Christian philosophicalthought, Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes, as welI as to the greattheologians ('doctores nostri') like Augustine and Jerome". He con-centrated on the main questions raised by the fact that philosophersfoJlow a mode of thinking which excludes the very possibi lity of cont in-gent revelation or which simply denies revelation as such. What is atstake in this al l-inclusive debate between non-Christian thought and thetheology of the Church is whether Christianity's discourse on God andrevelation is tenable at all. Scotus was to challenge the non-Christianway of thinking quite fundamentally, a way to which Christians alsosometimes cling, and was to prove this way of thought inconsistent. Hisaim was to meet the demands of the theology of salvation history andTrinitarian doctrine, and he concentrated his attention on a renewal ofclassical theology. Guided by this tradition, Scotus, 1297-1299, devel -

Brampton, op. cit ., 18. Cf. on Paris : De Rijk, Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte, 117-124, 127-131.11 Although the writ ings on logical issues occasioned by Aristot le 's Desophisticis elenchis (ed. Wadding, I, 224-272) are generally held to be by Scotus,

the fact that his future ideas of contingency are not yet present , suggests thatthese Quaestiones 26-28 must be dated in the f irst half of the 1290s .In his art icle on Scotus in The new encyclopaedia Britannica (vol. 4 , p . 279)Wolter mentions a saying of Antonius Andreas' , to the effect that he had heardScotus lecturing from the master's chair ( 'sedentem super cathedram magistra-lem' ) on the Isagoge of Porphyry and the Categoriae of Aristotle. However, thisdoes not prove that Scotus' Quaestiones necessari ly date from this Par is ianperiod.12 Cf. Lectura I 3, Opera omnia, volume VI, Vatican City 1960, 339-341and compare I 3, 412.


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oped a well-reasoned refutation of the (often implicitly held) view thateverything is necessary and immutable. It is in this context that he madethe splendid discovery of what we shall call synchronic contingency.Lectura I 39 is the account of this discovery.The heart of Scotus' new theory of contingency, a view deeply rooted

in classical Christian insights, is that actual reality could have beendifferent from what, in fact, it is. God is essentially free; therefore hiscreating and re-creating acts are free. The fortunes of the world are asthey are, but they could have been otherwise. Things now are factuallythus or so, but it is now possible for them not to be thus or so. Thisinsight is dec isive for understanding the nature of our universe and itshistory.The discovery of synchronic contingency marked the start of Scotus'

career as a scholar". People were greatly impressed by his first theo-logical course in Oxford of any substance, on the Sententiae. Henry ofHarcley, later to be Chancellor of Oxford University, quickly adoptedits most important conclusions and was one of the first to lecture onthem!". Scotus' name was made, but in Oxford, there was a long wait-ing list of aspiring Franciscan professors of theology, so in June 130 I,the thirty-five year-old John Duns Scotus had satisfied all the require-ments for becoming a master (,magister'), but sti ll saw li ttl e opportuni tyof starting work as one.When the English province of the Franciscan Order ('Ordo Fratrum

Minorum') sought a candidate for the university of Paris, they chose theyoung 'magister designatus', and so by the autumn of 1302, we findScotus studying at Paris, Europe's most famous university. Once more ,as a 'baccalaureus', he was teaching the Sententiae of Peter Lombard.In the summer of 1303, conflict between the Pope Boniface VlII andKing Philip IV of France was so intense that any theologians who didnot agree with the royal policy, were ordered to leave the country.

13 We know Sco tus' first Oxfo rd period thr ough the Quaestiones super librumelenchorum mentioned above, as well as the Collationes Oxonienses. Cf. Little,Pels te r, op. ci t. , 53-56; Opera omnia, vol. I, Vatican City 1950,151*, and JohnDuns Scotus, Philosophical writings, xxvi-xxvii (introduction A.B. Wolter).14 Cf. C. Batie, 'Henricus de Harcley et Ioannes Duns Scotus', Melangesofferts ii Etienne Gilson, Toronto/Paris 1959, (93-121, 701-702) 102. For a

survey of Harcley's life and work, see: F. Pelster, 'Hein rich von Harcley,Kanzler von Oxford und seine Quastionen' , Miscellanea Fr.Ehrle I, Rome 1924 ,307-356.

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Scotus, too, went into exile at the end of June although we do not knowwhere he went to. It is possible that he was in Cambridge throughout thefollowing year. As soon as the si tuat ion between the new Pope Benedic tXI and the French king improved, Scotus returned to Paris. This was inthe summer of 1304.In the autumn of 1304, the new minister general of the Francis-

cans 15, Gonsalvus Hispanus, recommended Scotus as the 'baccalau-reus' best qualified to become a master. "I entrust the beloved father inChrist, John Scotus, to your love. I am well aware of his praiseworthylife, excelling knowledge and most discerning talent, as well as of hisother remarkable qual iti es, partly through my long persona l experienceand part ly because hi s fame has spread everywhere. "16Scotus finally became a doctor in 1305 and either in that same or the

next, was granted the chair in theology as 'magister regens'. Thismarked the beginning of a period of intense activity. Surrounded by astaff of assistants and secretaries, he worked at elaborating a compre-hensive commentary on the Sentences. This elabora tion i s the Ordinatio ,a work which was meant to be a new way of mapping the entire field ofsystematic theology. This Ordinatio was to be based on the Lectura ofhis Oxford days as well as on notes from his courses in Cambridge andPari s. He lectured in theology, led disputa tions, taught logic and workedon an impressive amount of Quodliheta:' . Parts of this new material

15 On Gonsalvu s Hispanus, see: G. Gal, 'Gonsalvus Hispanus', New catholicencyclopedia, New York/S t. Louis/San Franc is co/Toronto/LondonlSydney 1967,vol . VI, 608-609.16 ..( ... baccalareus hu ju smodi presentandus ad p resen s debeat esse de aliqua

p rovincia atiarum a p rov incia Prancie.] dilectum in Chr is to pat rem JohannemSco tum, de cu ju s vita laudabili, scien tia excellenti, ingen ioque sub tilissimoa tii sque ins ignibus condi tionibus sui s par tim exper ientia longa , par tim fama quaeubique d ivulgata est, info rmatus sum ad plenum, dilectioni vestre assigno (po std ic tum pat rem Egidium princ ipat it er e t ordinar ie presentandum.)" H. Denif le , A .Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 11,1, Paris 1891, 117 .17 A Quodlibet is th e repo rt of a disputation which is distin ct from the regularQuaestio disputata because the subject was determined by the aud ito rs. A Quodli-

bet was held twice a year, before Christmas and before Easter. It was a verypopular f orm of disputation during the second half of th e 13th and 14th century.Cf . De Rijk, Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte, 130-131; JohnR Wippel, 'Quodlibetalquest ions, chief ly in theology facul ti es' , i n: Les questions disputees et les questi-ons quodlibetiques dans lesfacultes de theologie, de droit et de medecine, Tum-hout 1985, 153-222. For the origin and technique of medieval disputation ingener al, see below section 3c.

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were immediate ly incorporated in the Ordinatio .Many, both students and masters, acknowledged the importance of

Scotus' work and al l co-opera ted wi th him. However, the Parisian scenecontinued to be turbulent; the Templars had to submit to damagingtrials" and at any moment someone might have discerned a possibleheresy in what was theologically new. This made creative theology arisky undertaking and by 1307 Scotus had again been forced to leaveParis. The reason is not certain but could well have been that of theo-logical conflict. He went to Cologne where he became master in theFranciscan college.Not long after, in the middle of his work on the Ordinatio ; Scotus

died. This was on 8 November 1308. His work, unfinished and unpub-lished, had all the complicated characteristics with which we havebecome so familiar .Fortunately, the systematically converging tendencies of Scotus'

thinking are very helpful to us here. The reader who traces the innerdynamic and structure of Scotus' theological and philosophical thinking,will find clues to the numerous detailed parts. The discovery of theinner coherence in one key part of his thought also offers a key to manyother sections of his theology. Often he dwells upon an importantsubject so, in e ffect , small monographs emerge which give an excel lenttraining in philosophical and theological thinking. They give us a richtheocent ric content which is set out in asystemat ic, philosophical style.Thus, in the prologue to the Lectura, the theories of science and methodare extensively dealt with, followed by the philosophical doctrine ofGod (I 2), epistemology (I 3), semantics (I 8 and 1 2 ), the doctrine ofgrace (I 17), ontology (I 39 and 1 8 ) and the theory of the individual (Il3).This tendency of Scotus to write short monographs culminated in his

f inal s tudy De prima principia , based on Ordinatio 1 2, in which hedeveloped the phi losophica l doct rine of God in an axiomatic way, whilelimiting internal scientific discussion to a minimum. This work is notdomina ted by an expanding debate but by the stri ct unfolding of Scotus'own argument. As a result, the quaestio technique underwent an import-ant development: instead of an arbit rary pil ing up of objections, alt erna-tive solutions were systematically scrutinised. His interest in details,

18 Cf, Wolter , 'Duns Scotus, John' , The new encyclopaedia Britannica, vol.4,279.8

which led him to a deeper formulation of the problem, came togetherwith his thrust towards an integral approach by which the problem is setwithin a wider frame - that is, of the semantic and logical, ontologicaland theological (scriptural , his torical and systematic) aspects.As becomes evident from De primo principio, Scotus intended to write

a second treatise on the 'credibilia', that is, the truths of faith which,unlike those of De primo principia, cannot be demonstra ted by naturalreason alone but which are certain because of their basis on God'srevelation!". This unwritten monograph would also have given anexposition of trinitarian theology, much of the material for which wasalready contained in the Ordinatio, So in Scotus' last work we see thata new way of dealing with subjects is becoming clearer, it is the germof a way in which the whole of theology might be presented, with a newsystematic and constructive clari ty .When Scotus died in 1308, there was intense grief among his fol-

lowers and those who worked with him and admired him. What to donext? His project had grandeur, it was inspiring, but who knew what itwas to become when the 'doctor subtilis' himself was no longer there todemonstrate? When he was buried in the Franciscan church nearCologne Cathedral, nothing had been finished, nei ther the Ordinatio norDe primo principia nor the Quodlibeta. Yet the inscription on his tombcannot be the final word on the work of John Duns Scotus:

"Scotia me genuitAnglia me suscepitGallia me docuitColonia me tenet "20

19 Cf. 1 0 1 m D Ul lS Scotus, A treatise on God asfirst principle, translated andedited with a commentary by A.B. Wolter, Chicago 1983, xiii, 146-147.20 "Scotland generated meEngland received meFrance educated meCologne holds me. "

A version different from this one, going back to a text of Will iam Worilong(about 1440), is presented by G. Abate in 'La tomba del Ven. Giovanni DunsScoto, o. min. nell a chiesa di S. Francesco a Colonia, Note e document i',Miscellanea francescana, 45 (1945), (29-79) 63: "Scotia me genuit - Anglia medocuit - Gall ia me recepit - Colonia me tenet". The present sarcophagus datesfrom 1957.

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3 THE LECTURA, A COURSE ON THE SENTENCES IN OXFORDa Editing Scotus' l iterary inheri tanceScotus' early death had serious consequences for the editing and the

reception of his work. Some of his books, works like De primo prin-cipio and the Quodlibeta, were almost ready for publication but othersl ike the Ordinatio and the commentary on Aristot le 's Metaphysica, stillneeded years of work. How should this body of writings be edited?Scotus' students soon began on all those books which were 'in statunascendi ', especial ly the Ordinatio, the texts of the Lectura, the Parisianlecture notes and the piles of notes and excursus. Eventually, in about1315 in the south of England, it became possible to publish a hugecommentary on Lombard' s Sentences, called the Opus Oxoniense . .Thiswas the name by which it has become known, but it is not written byScotus himself, nor was it written in Oxford. The genuine 'Opus Oxo-niense' is the Lectura.During the fourteenth and fi fteenth centuries, Scotus' work received

much attention and the invention of the art of printing did a great dealto help spread his work. All the same, the beautiful edition of LukeWadding was still not the critical edition", and while some of the textsin it follow good and important manuscripts, others were badly edited.The text of the Opus Oxoniense is not reli able, the Lectura had alreadybeen forgotten (together with the original meaning of the term 'Iectu-ra'), and many works were attributed to Scotus quite falsely. The well-known edition of L. Vives22 was not a fresh start but simply a re-edit-ing of Wadding, so it was not until the 1920's that a group of scholarsbegan the investigations essential for producing a critical edition. Onework after another turned out not to be authentic. The Lectura wasrediscovered by C. Balle, who became the chairman of a committeeworking on the critical edition. It had been planned that the edition ofthe commentaries on the Sentences would be finished by 1939, threehundred years after Wadding's edition" but in the event, the first

21 Opera omnia Ioannis Duns Scoti, Lyon 1639, 12 volumes (reprint Hildes-heim 1968). For older editions see the critical edition of the Commissio scotisti-ea: Johannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, vol. I, 127*-138*.22 Opera omnia, Editio nova iuxta editionem Waddingi, Paris 1891-1895,26volumes.23 Cf. C. Balic (ed.), Ioannis Duns Scoti, Theologiae Marianae elementa,

Sibenik (Jugoslavia) 1933, CXLII, note 188; c. Balic , 'Die Frage der Authenti-10

volume of the Opera omnia was not published until 1950. So far, onlyten volumes have been published, that is, seven containing the Ordinatioand three of the Lectura.

b The LecturaAlthough many t reati ses of the tradi tional edi tion of Scotus' coll ected

works have turned out not to be authentic, the Lectura is a substantialaddition to the 'scotiana?". Three volumes of the Lectura have beenedi ted in the Opera omnia (volumes XVI, 1960; XVII, 1966 and XVIII,1982) which contain, respectively, the Prologue and distinction 1-7 ofthe first book, distinction 8-45 of the first and 1-7 of the second book.The editors have managed to reconstruct a genealogy of the Lectura

manuscripts, which were, apparently, either directly copied from anapograph or copy of the orinal (the autograph) or else copies of anapograph". The editors have been able to show that these copies canbe traced back to the notes made by Scotus himself for his Oxfordcourse on the Sentences": So the Lectura is exactly what it is called:the text of a course not yet given, rather than the text of a coursealready delivered.Since it is the principal work from the Oxford period of Scotus'theological deve lopment , the Lectura deserves to be given priority. Itis an early work of a precocious genius and as such, deserves a place inthe history of ideas. Above all, it is the key to a better understanding ofScotus' work since his mature thinking is very highly developed and not

zitat und Ausgabe der Werke des 1. Duns Skotus in Vergangenheit und Gegen-wart', Wissensehaft und veisheit, 2 (1935), (136 -158 ) 147.24 The authenticity and dating of the Leetura, which has been defended by the

editors of the critical edition, has been challenged by V. Richter in Studien zumliterarischen mrk von Johannes Duns Seotus, Munich 1988 (collection ofpreviously published articles); see pp. 13 f., 28 f., 40. For a refutation ofRichter, see: L. Modric , 'Osservazioni su una recente critica all'edizione Vatica-na dell'Opera omnia di Giovanni Duns Scoto', Antonianum, 58 (1983), 336-357;L. Modric, 'Iesti di Duns Scoto sulla dimostrazione di dio in una strana edizio-ne', Antonianum, 65 (1990), 312-344 (Modric is the present chai rman of theCommissio scotistica, the committee in charge of the critical edition).25 For the manuscripts of the Lectura, see: Opera omnia, volume I, 144*-

148*, vol. XVII, Vatican City 1966,4*-10*, and vol. XVIII, Vatican City 1982,XI-XII; cf. vol. VII, Vatican City 1973,4*-6*.26 Cf. Leetura 126, 42. This passage isdiscussed onp. 13* of the 'Prolego-mena' in Opera omnia, volume XVII.

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easy to follow. Even today, scholars have tended to base themselves onthe Ordinatio and Quodlibeta, which are even harder than the Lecturato understand, while they ignore the way into his thought which thelatter offers. The opening up of Scotus' mental world needs to be byway of the Lectura.c Question, disputation and course on the SentencesAs a commentary on the Sentences, Scotus' Lectura fol lows the usual

medieval 'quaestio' t echnique, which had been developed from 'Iectio'or reading. Early scholasticism was not a culture of the printed word.Schools and monasteries in need of texts had to collect their own manu-scripts and it was these which rooted them in the soil of classical litera-ture. In the spheres of faith and theology, these manuscripts consistedof the authoritative writings of the Church Fathers". Because thesewere focussed on Scripture, theology used to be called the 'sacred page'(,Sacra Pagina'). Theology developed from a reflective reading, inter-pre tation, incorporating and elaborating of Scripture and tradition."In the early Middle Ages, the first scientific activity was a cursoryreading, issuing in short glosses. Later these were expanded intoextensive expositions ('exposit iones', 'commenta') which were onlyloosely connected to the text (by 'lemmata').The 'Iectio' had three phases: first, the literal explanation (the'li ttera'); next, the content of the text's lit eral meaning (the 'sensus')was recapitulated and finally the deeper meaning and intention of thetext were given (the 'sententia'). This final phase was the crown ofthe work of explication. [ ... JOf course people did not stop at the lectio. Twelfth century authorsexplicitly demanded that the elaboration of the text be continued bymeditation ('meditatio') through which it was integrated into eachperson's world of experience. Some passages may then give rise toquestions - which brings us to the genre of the 'questio'. "28Boethius had already stated that a 'quaestio' is a proposition which is

'dubitabilis'. 'Dubium' and 'duo' can be heard in this qualification. Soa 'quaestio' is a content of thought cast in a twofold question: 'whether... , or whether ... ' ('utrum ... , an ... '). The members of this question

27 From authoritative writings 'auctoritates' were derived: authoritative places(quotations, ' loci'). Cf. the medieval outlook concerning 'auctoritas ': De Rijk,M idd e le euw se w i js b eg e er te , 115-117.28 De Rijk, Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte, 129 (our translation).

show a fixed logical structure, because toge ther they form a cont radic-tion. Therefore, each member is formulated as a question: Is this thecase, yes or no ('sic' /'non')? The formal structure of the contradictionwas evoked by the tradition, because it contradicts itself on variouspoint s. Hence, the 'quaest io' formulating quest ions and problems devel-oped rather independently with respect to authori tative texts which couldnot be the final word on the subject. Arguments pro and contra wereadvanced to support the positive as well as the negative answer in orderto arrive at the right answer.With time, the research function of the 'quaestio' developed, becom-

ing the ' quaest io disputata ' of thirteenth century univers it ies."When there was some scientific controversy in the university or onewhich was considered to be of more general interest, a master wasenti tled to organise a publ ic di scussion in connection with his course,at which he could present the problem in hand (the 'questio') togetherwith his own solution. The technical term for this discussion was'disputatio'. "29The text of such a disputation would be characterised by a three-fold

division: A) an enumeration of the arguments against the master'sopinion (the 'obiec ta'); B) the presentat ion of his theory; C) a review ofthe arguments of A). By Scotus' time, the second part, B), had becomeconsiderably enlarged, but it was his master hand which fashioned the'corpus quaestionis' into an almost monograph-like analysis of alt erna-tive theories. Through the debates of the 'quaestio', his own theory wasalso fully expounded and defended.The 'quaestio' -technique which we have just summarised" is also to

be found in many other medieval 'commentaries' on Lombard's Sen-tences ( to which category Scotus' Lectura and Ordinatio also belong).The text of a course on the Sentences can be classified in three types:1) the 'lectura', consisting of notes made in advance by the teacher inpreparation for his lectures; 2) the 'ordinatio' or text drafted by theteacher after the course and official ly publ ished?"; 3) the 'reportatio'

29 De Rijk, M idd e le e uw s e w ij sb e ge e rt e, 130 (our translation).30 Cf. for an extensive treatment of the 'quaest io '-teclmique: B.C. Bazan,'Les questions disputees, principalement dans les facultes de theologie'. in: Le sq ue st io ns d is pu te es e t l es q ue st io ns q uo dl ib et iq ue s d an s l es f ac ul te s d e t he ol og ie ,d e d ro it e t d e m ed ec in e, Turnhout 1985, 15-149.31 Hence, the Opu s O xon i en s e, which was compiled by Scotus' students, wasnot an 'ordinatio'. The true Ordinatio ; which was writ ten in Paris, only now

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or report of the course which was made by a secretary or one of the stu-dents. When the teacher had examined and, if necessary, amended, a' reportat io", i t was called a ' reportat io examinata ':".d The version ofLectura 139 in the Opus OxonienseMedieval commentaries on the Sentences followed Lombard in his

division in four books and subdivisions into distinctions": Since thetime of Lombard, the section on God's knowledge (,scientia Dei') hasa fixed place in book I, distinc tions 38-39. Ifwe turn to Scotus' Ordina-tio, we discover that book I, distinction 39 is missing. There is a dis-t inction I 39 given in the manuscripts but it is one which has come downto us from an editor who, soon after Scotus' death, compiled the miss-ing distinction from the Lectura, the Reportatio and some othernotes". So this version does not come directly from Scotus but becauseits historical influence has been considerable, it is given in Appendix Aof volume VI of the Opera amnia (401-444). In this commentary onLectura I 39, however, we rarely appeal to it because its status, as atext, is unclear": We became convinced, though, that as far as thecantent is concerned, the text in the Appendix A is very reliable".

appears in the critical edition of the Opera omnia.32 In Scotus' case , a 'reportat io exarninata ' of book I of his Paris course onthe Sentences has survived.'Lectura' , 'ordinatio' , etc. are general terms, used in the field of teaching andpublishing; the range oftheir application, therefore, is wider than a course ontheSentences.33 Book I: Trinitarian God, Book II: Creation, Book III: Sin and Redemption,Book IV: Sacraments and Eschatology.34 Cf. Opera omnia, vol. VI, Vatican City 1963,26*-30*.35 When the Lectura is compared with Appendix A, we possibly find hints

indicating that the Lectura is not a revised report of a course on the Sentences .The Lectura, as we have said, follows the three-fold division of a 'quaestiodisputata' ; thus section C concludes with 87 which is a discussion of thearguments mentioned in A. Then, however, three further objections to Scotus'theory are advanced (and refuted) which have no equivalent in the version ofdis tinction 139 given in Appendix A (Opera omnia, VI, 444). In Appendix A,these objections are incorporated into the body of the text after a discuss ion ofthree objections (421-423) which do correspond to the text in the Lectura. Onpage 424 a fourth , and unannounced, objection is given and into the frame ofthisadditional argument, 88-93 of Lectura I 39 are incorporated.36 A critical edition of the Parisian Reportatio examinata is still not available.However, there does exist an extensive and recent art icle of A.B . Wolte r on14

4 THE STRUCTURE OF LECTURA I 39The following survey of the structure of Lectura I 39 corresponds to

the main divisions arranged by the editors of the critical text. We addedthe three-fold division that shows the traditional structure of the'quaestio' (indicated by capitals in the margin): A) arguments pro andcontra ( 1-17); B) exposition of Scotus' own theory ( 18-68); C)discussion of the arguments mentioned in A) ( 69-87). A final groupof six paragraphs (88-93) do not fit into this three-fold structure; theymust be considered an addit ion.

A 1-3 QUESTION 1: 'Whether God has determinate knowledge ofthings according to every aspect of the ir existence , as accordingto being in the future'Arguments contra

4-5 QUESTION 2: 'Whether God has infallible knowledge of thingsaccording to any aspec t of the ir existence'Arguments contra

6-9 QUESTION 3: 'Whether God has immutable knowledge 'Arguments contra

10-14 QUESTION 4: 'Whether God necessa rily knows a ll mutability inthings'Arguments pro

15-16 QUESTION 5: 'Whether the contingency of things i s compatiblewith God's knowledge'Arguments contra

dis tinctions I 38-39 of this Reportatio examinata (this article contains manyquotations in footnotes): A.B. Wolter, 'Scotus' Paris Lectures on God's knowl-edge of future events' , in: A.B. Wolter, The philosophical theology of John DunsScotus, M. McCord Adams (ed.), Ithaca/London 1990,285-333.


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17 AGAINST THE ARGUMENTS MENTIONED IN THE FIVE QUESTIONS:quotation from Scripture

B I THEORIES OF OTHERS18 First theory (three-fold representation of God's ideas)19-22 Refutation23-26 Second theory (flowing time as a whole present to God)27-30 Refutation

IISCOTUS' OWN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS

31 Two main themes:A) contingency in what isB) how the certainty of God's knowledge is compatible with thecontingency of future things

32-61 A) Contingency in what is32-34 A theory of others (departing from the distinction

be tween first and proximate cause)35-37 Refutation

38-404142-61

Scotus ' own theory:a) There i s contingency in thingsb) God is the cause of contingency in thingsc) God's will is the cause of contingency in things

42 Is God's wiII or his intellect the cause of contingency inthings?God's intellect is not ( 44: theory of the neutral prop-osition)

43-44

45-46 How the human will is the cause of contingency inthingsThree kinds of freedom; the difference between thedivine and the human will

16

47 Two kinds of contingency and possibility with respectto the freedom of the willDiachronic poss ibil ity and contingencySynchronic possibility ( 49-50) and contingency( 51), applied to the freedom of the human will( 52); new application of the divided and compositesense ( 51-52)

4849-52

53 How God's will is the cause of contingency in thingsDiachronic freedom of GodSynchronic freedom of God (God's free will as the4cause of contingency in things)

55-57 Three objections58-60 Refutat ion61 Conclusion: God's wiII is the cause of contingency in

things

62-68 B) How God's certain knowledge is compatible with the contin-gency of (future) things62-66 In reply to questions 1-4 (theory of the neutral proposi-

tion)67-68 In reply to question 5 (implicative necessity in God's

contingent acts of knowing)

C III DISCUSSION OF THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS TO THE FIVE QUES-TIONS

69-70 Refutation of the arguments to question 1 ( 1-3) . 69: necessity of the past71-72 Refutation of the arguments to question 2 ( 4-5)73-76 Refutation of the arguments to question 3 ( 6-9)77-79 Refutation of the arguments to question 4 ( 10-14)80-81 Refutation of the arguments to question 5 ( 15-16)

IV DISCUSSION OF THE ARGUMENTS TO THE THEORY OF OTHERSABOUT CONTINGENCY IN WHAT IS

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82-83 Refuta tion of the arguments mentioned in 32-34

V DISCUSSION OF THE ARGUMENTS TO THE SECOND THEORY84-87 Refutat ion of the arguments ment ioned in 23-26

VI ADDITIONAL EXPOSITION AND DISCUSSION OF THREE NEWOBJECTIONS AGAINST SCOTUS' OWN ANSWER

88-90 Three new objections against Scotus' theory91-93 Refutat ion of the arguments ment ioned in 88-90

5 THE TARGET OF LECTURA I 39In Lectura I 39 Scotus poses a very important problem which has been

extensively discussed in Christian theology, namely that of God'sknowledge of future and cont ingent sta tes of a ffa irs (,futura contingen-tia'). This problem traditionally functions as a focal point of centralquestions and it is he re that Christian theology most impressively stampsits unique character, as distinct from the philosophical thought of theancient world.Lectura I 39, formulating five closely rela ted questions, inquires intothe nature of God's knowledge, the nature of reality known by him andtheir interdependence. As will be shown, we can summarise these fivequestions in this single one: Does God have knowledge (,scientia') ofcontingent future? Starting from the anc ient ideal of knowledge , whichdemands the highest possible certainty, then the knowledge of thehighest possible be ing, God, wil l sat isfy this requi rement. The questionposed, however, must be answered negat ively: God cannot have knowl-edge of contingent things. For, according to Aristotl e - the philosophicalauthori ty for medieval thinkers - true knowledge (,scientia ') i s necessaryknowledge of necessary states of affairs".

37 This very influential ancient ideal of knowledge has been characterised byVos as 'absolute evidentialism'. For an analysis of this ideal and the ontology18

In Lectura 139, however, Scotus maintains that God does have knowl-edge of contingent future. His theory, developed for this defence, notonly renounces Aristotle's thesis that science as such (,scientia') isnecessary knowledge, but it also demonstrates, against Aristotle andAvicenna, that created reality is contingent. Thus Lectura I 39 is thefinal stage of the emancipation of Christian theology from ancientnecessitarianism, and this on two main points: 1) Scotus presents aconsistent ontology of contingent reality; 2) he disengages from anabsolute ideal of knowledge in which knowledge and necessity aretightly linked. This outline of Scotus' theory in Lectura I 39 also pro-vides a framework for other elements of his doctrine of God and hisanthropology.In Lectura I 39 Scotus' new ontology of contingent real ity is the most

important of the two points just mentioned, as is evident from the verystructure of this distinction. It is in connection with the fi fth question,which asks whether the contingency of things is compatible with God'sknowing them that Scotus devises his own theory. In order to answerthis quest ion in the affi rmative , he fi rst shows that real ity i s contingent( 32-61). Formally as well as materially these paragraphs form theheart of the distinction. Next, Scotus demonstrates that God's knowl-edge and the contingency of things are indeed compatible, since God'sknow ledge is determinate", infallible, immutable, but not necessary( 62-68). By the way in which he structures his argument, Scotusmakes clear that the main question is not: Does God have knowledge ofthe future anyway? He departs from the assumption that God has. Themain question is: Is the future contingent and is God's knowledge of itcompatible with its contingency? ,Studying Lectura I 39 we need to realise that Scotus does not explicit-

ly treat the question of how God has knowledge about the contingentfuture?". The main point he makes for the theory of knowledge here is

closely linked up with it, see: Vos, KN, especially XIII-XVII, 1-2, 35-40,98- 106, 131-134 and 245-278. .38 'Determinate' means: bearing the t ruth-va lue 'true' or 'false'. Cf. our

comments at Lectura I 39, I.39 As studies of Schwamm, Langston, Craig and Hoenen incorrectly assume.Cf. H. Schwamm, Das gottliche varherwissen bei Duns SCOfllS und seinen erstenAnhiingern, Innsbruck 1934,29-30,78-91; D.C. Langston, God's wiiling knowl-edge, The influence of Scotus' analysis of omniscience, University Park (Penn-

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the logica l compatibi lity of the cont ingent na ture of (future) reality withmajor characteristics of God's knowledge of this contingent reality(characteristics such as determinateness, infallibility, certainty andimmutability)".In Lectura I 39 Scotus, working on the basis of his own theory,

refutes some Aristoteli an paradigms which are presupposed in 1-16,and which all imply the necessity of reality. These are:- The so called 'principle of plenitude': every genuine possibility willbe actualised'".- The equivalence of immutability and necessity as well as the equiva-lence of mutabil ity and contingency.- True knowledge as determinate, infallible, immutable and necessaryknowledge of necessary states of affairs.Scotus also criticised alternative Christian theories which had been

formulated in defence of the view that God has knowledge of the contin-

sylvania) /London 1986, 39-52, 119-128; w.L. Craig, The problem of divineforeknowledge andfuture contingents from Aristotle to Suarez, Leiden/New York/Copenhagen/Cologne 1988 , 136-139 , 144 f.; M.1.F.M. Hoenen, Marsilius vanInghen (+ 1396) over het goddelijke weten, Zijn plaats in de ontwikkeling valldeopvattingen over het goddelijke weten ca. 1255-1396, Ni jmegen 1989 (VolumeI: Studies; vo lume I I: Tex t- ed ition o f: Marsiliu s van Inghen, Quaestiones superQuattuor Libros Sententiarum, Lib. I Quaestt. 38 and 40), 164-166. Also see ourcomments a t Lectura I 39, 62-63.40 Cf. Wolter's conclusion with respect to this point in the Reportatio exami-

nata: "What is left open, of course, is the question as to how God knows how tocooperate in the specific way he does at the moment the creature acts. Scotusdoes no t attemp t to o ffer any answer in the way that Banez and Molina later triedto do. [ ... J What begins to look like an explanation of how God knows what heknows, (a demonstration of the reasoned fact) ends up as a simple proof that heknows (a demonstration of th e simple fact)." A.B. Wolter, 'God 's knowledge offuture event s' , 333.41 This term 'principle of plenitude' and its definition stem from A.O.

Lovejoy: The great chain of being, A s tudy of the his tory ofan idea, Cambridge(Massachusetts)/London 197814, 52 . Lovejoy stated (op. cit., 55) that Aristo tledid not hold the principle of plenitude, but J. Hintikka showed that he did anddemonstrated how this principle is related to his view of contingency, see J.Hintikka in: Time & necessity, Studies in Aristotle's theory of modality, Oxford1973, 93-113; Aristotle Oil modality (In collaboration with U. Remes and S.Knuut ti la ), Acta phi losophica Fennica, col . 29, no. I , Amsterdam 1977; 'Ar istot -le on the realization o f possibilities in time', in: Knuu ttila ( ed .), Reforging thegreat chain of being, 57-72. Cf . a lso sect ion 6a of thi s int roduct ion.20

gent future (see 18-22,23-30, 32-37). At least one of these theoriescan be recognised as that held by Thomas Aquinas, but according toScotus they too amount to necessi tarianism.By way of summary, we can say that the main target of Lectura I 39

is anc ient necessita rianism. The view that everything is fundamentallynecessary is called the 'fundarnentum' shared by the philosophies ofAristotle and Avicenna (so Scotus in distinction I 8). To Scotus thelatter is the most important representative of Islamic philosophy. It isthis foundation which is at stake in the debate between ancientAristotelian and Islamic philosophy on one side and Scotus' Christianphilosophy on the other".To some modern readers all this may seem like fighting a front which

no longer exists in the twentieth century, because theology and philos-ophy no longer pretend to search for eternal and necessary truths evenwhere they continue to demand systematic ways of thinking. Modern (orpost -modern) thinking has placed its idea l at the opposit e extreme fromthe anc ient concept of knowledge and its ontology of a necessary reali ty.Now everything, both at the level of knowledge and at the level ofreality, is contingent. This would certainly apply to our world but, inthe eyes of many systematic theologians, it would also apply to God andhis knowledge.Seen in the perspective of the whole development from ancient down

to (post) modern rationality and its views on reality, Scotus can be sitedexactly in the middle, which is not at all the same as saying that headopts a compromise position. He frees himself decisively from theframework of antiqui ty without moving into the opposit e of an extremeor libertarian contingency. Elements and structures of ancient necessi -tarianism become an integral part of his theology and ontology in twoways. First of all, theology too has to deal with a reality which issimply necessary: God and his essential properties". Created realityis as contingent as God's knowledge of it; but God's existence andessence are necessary and so is his knowledge of them. The second'dimension of necessity, from which theology and philosophy derivetheir truly scientific status - even judged by Aristotelian criteria-,

42 Cf. Lectura I 8, 235, 237.43 For the meaning of the terms 'essential' and 'accidental', see section 8 of

this introduction.21


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concerns the impl icat ive necessity (' necessity of the consequence'). Thisspecific kind of necessity defines necessary relations between states ofaffai rs which can be contingent themse lves". For instance, the rela tionbetween all future states of affairs and God's knowing them is neces-sary, although the related terms are themselves contingent. So evensome of the contents of our knowledge of the contingent reality can benecessary!"Ifwe look a t some twentie th century paradigms wi th Scotus' positionin mind, we should give his thought a very different objective from the

one his work in fact has. Itwould demand a different argumentation tore-phrase and re-answer the questions of Lectura I 39 in view of theguiding ideal of knowledge in (post)modernism. Such an argumentationwould have to culminate in the question of whether the contingency of(future) things is not only compatible with a contingent mind knowingthem, but also with a necessary one (God's) and with necessary objectswhich can be known. To both questions Lectura I 39 implici tly providesan affirmative answer: they are compatible. God can be - and can bethought of as - a necessary being which nevertheless has contingentknowledge as well, and although this knowledge is contingent, by thatvery fact it not-necessarily is mutable and temporal. So in Lectura I 39we find Scotus formulating a wonderful example of his well-balancedmiddle position.In the modern era since the fourteenth century we can de tec t, roughly,

two main tendencies of thought. One resumes systematically ancientconceptual patterns (as Spinoza and Hegel do), the other takes thesepatterns as far as possible the other way, into the monopoly of extremeor libertarian contingency. In addition to that, there is often an opposi-tion between these tendencies. With regard to the first main movementScotus stil l offers us a convinc ing counter posit ion by refuting (ancient)necessitarianism. With regard to the second onewhich we discuss now- his contribution is no less a counter position although in a different,yet indispensable, way.In short: Scotus agrees with those contemporary philosophers and

theologians who protest aga inst an al l-over matrix of eterna l and neces-sary truths, a matrix in which our existence is completely fixed.

44 Cf. also the explanation in section 8 of th is in troduction.45 Fo r a brief exposition of th is theme, see: H. Veldhuis, Een verzegeld boek,

Het natuurbegrip in de theologie van 1.G. Hamann (1730-1788), Sliedrecht 1990,357-364.22

Although sharing this protest, he does not adhere to the assumption thatsuch truths do not exist at all. There is a necessarily existing God andthere are innumerable necessary relations; together they open up anddefine the room for contingent dynamic and creativity of God andcreation.

6 SCOTUS' THEORY OF CONTINGENCYAs has already been noticed Scotus' theory of contingency is the

heart of Lectura I 39. This section will be a brief exposition of thistheory in our own words and with the help of our own logical tools. Asan extension to this we shall briefly discuss the most important conse-quences for anthropology, epistemology and the doctrine of God.Finally we present a brief description and evalua tion of Scotus' specifi capproach to the problem and his conceptual tools; some of the'obstacles' of distinc tion I 39 will be indicated.a Synchronic contingencyIf we want to acquire a correct understanding of Scotus' theory of

contingency, we must first di scuss two more models of modal ontology.They appear in ancient philosophy in the thought of Parmenides andAristotle. Their theories of contingency, which are representative ofanc ient thought and which greatly influenced Chri st ian theology, are thebackground from which Scotus frees himself in Lectura I 39.According to Parmenides, being is immutable and necessary. He

dec lares that change and cont ingency are phenomena of sense decept ion('doxa '). This Parmenidian ontology can be transposed in the followingmode l, in which p designa tes the only possible sta te of affai rs'":

46 Shaded spaces are states of affairs which have been actualised, emptyspaces are stales of af fairs wh ich are possib le bu t not actualised (emp ty spacesdo no t occur in the Parrnenidian and Aristo telian model).If p i s a mutable s ta te of a ffair s, the following logical formulae (among others)

a re val id within the theory of Parmenides :a -Mipt! & -pit]b Mpt! ~ -M-Pll = Mpn ~ NpnC pt t ~ -Mspr: = pt t ~ Np t t

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time-axis-p

Aristotle did not retain Parmenides' radical necessitarianism; helooked for an alternative ontology, which would leave room for changeand contingency. If we concentrate on contingent states of affairs, thisontology can be transposed in the following model (p designates amutable s tate of affairs) :

time-axis

Ari stotle agrees with Parmenides on the equivalence of necessi ty andimmutability. Holding 'on to this equivalence, yet assuming that thereare mutable states of a ffa irs as wel l, Aristotle a rrives at the equivalenceof mutability and contingency. If we take a closer look at thisAristotelian theory of contingency, however, it turns out that a state ofaffairs p is cont ingent if -p can be the case at a different moment . Thepossibility of the opposite obtains for a later moment, and does notobtain for the same moment a t which p is the case". However, if -p isnot possible for the same moment at whichp is the case, then it must beconcluded that p is necessary for that (same) moment. Likewise for anyother moment at which -p is the case, then -p must be necessary as wel l.So in this Aristotelian model contingency means nothing other thanchange through time; change consists of states of affairs which aresuccessive in time but necessary on their own. But then, even changeitself must be necessary". Because of this change through time we call

d -M(PtJ & -pI2}For the interpretation of the symbols used, see section 8.47 The drawing shows this by the absence of non-shaded alternative spaces(not actualised alternative possibili ties ) over against the shaded spaces ( thepossibilities which are actualised).48 If P is a mutable state of affairs, the following logical formulae (amongothers) are valid within the modal theory of Aristotle:a -M(pIJ & -pIJ}b Mptl => -M-ptl = Mpn => Npu

24

Aristot le 's theory of contingency 'diachronic contingency':". Strictlyspeaking this is not a proper term, because things that change are notcontingent after all .A theory of real contingency was not e laborated on unt il Duns Scotus'

Lectura I 39. In this work he states that a state of affairs p is contingentif -p is possible for the same moment. When we visualise this thesis inanalogy to the models above, we get the following picture (again, p isa contingent state of affairs, changing in the way shown by the lastexample):

p time-axis-p

This drawing 's empty spaces symbolise synchronic alternative poss ibil-it ies which have not been actual ised, yet could well have been actuali sedinstead of their counterparts. Ifwe compare this Scotian" model to itsParmenidian and Aristotelian forerunners, we find that empty spaces- inte rpre ted as possibi lit ies which have not been nor wi ll be actual isedbut which are yet real possibilities - these empty spaces only occur inScotus' model. At any moment factual reality can be different from whatand how it is. In this way the principle of plenitude loses its validityonly in Scotus' mode l of Christ ian thinking, for not al l real possibi liti esare actua lised. Because, as i s shown by Scotus, rea l cont ingency impliesthat the opposite is possible for the same moment, we ca ll this cont in-gency 'synchronic?',

C pt t => -M-ptl = plJ => NPIIe M(P11 & -pI2}Parmenides and Aristotl e share a, band c; significantly different is only d(Parmenides) versus e (Aristotle).49 Cf. Vos, KN, 27 f ., 260-262; Vas, 'On the philosophy of the young DunsScotus', 213; Knuuttila, 'Time and modality', 166-170. Knuuttila characterisesthe Aristotelian theory of contingency and necessity as: "the statistical interpreta-tion of modality" (op. cit., 166).50 Wedistinguish between 'Scotian' and 'Scotist' as follows. 'Scotian' is usedwhen it denotes (extrapolations of) Scotus' theories and 'Scotist' is used to denotetheories of followers of Scotus in medieval times.51 Cf. Vas, 'On the philosophy of the young Duns Scotus', 213. In KN Vasuses the terms real or radical contingency, over against empty contingency; cf.

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The Scotian theory of contingency implies that immutability andnecessity as well as mutability and contingency are disconnected. Animmutable sta te of affa irs can be contingent. The immutable , ye t contin-gent state of affairs p can be visuali sed as fol lows:

p time-axis-p

An example of an immutable, though non-necessary state of affairs isGod's knowledge of contingent reali ty . God immutably but not-necessa-rily (read: contingently) knows the contingent future.The far-reaching impact of the theory of synchronic contingency

becomes clearest in the concept of the will. God's will and man's willact within an ontological frame which embraces innumerable contingentstates of affairs together with necessary states of affairs. The freedomof a will which, willing something at a specific moment, can will some-thing else or the opposite for the very same moment, can only be main-tained within such a contingent universe .

b The theological impact of the theory of synchronic contingencyThe theory of synchronic contingency as developed by Scotus has

major implications for theology. We do not think any theology canescape this fundamental theory 52 - any theology, that is, which hingeson God as that personal being who freely creates and loves, on creationas that contingent rea lity which is embedded in God's c reat ive ac tivi ty,and on man as that creature which freely responds to God's ini tiat ive.The specific na~ure of God, world, man and their inter-relations canonly be understood within the ontological room of contingent being.

KN 100, 101, 270, 274.IfP is a mutable state of affairs, the following logical formulae (among others)are valid within Duns Scotus' modal theory:a -M(PII & -PIJ)e M(pIJ & -pI2)f MprJ => M-Ptl = Mpit => -Npitg prj => M-prJ = pit => -Npt t

With Parmenides Scotus only shares formula a, with Aristotle a and e. .52 Vas, KN, 240-393 extensively treats the systematic repercussions of thistheory in theology and philosophy.26

With regard to the doctrine of God, this means that we can think ofhim as having contingent acts and accidental propert ies. The core of thi sdoctrine comprises God's necessary existence and his necessary prop-e rtie s, but the richness of God also conta ins a great varie ty of cont ingentact s and acc idental propertie s. God's goodness and justi ce, for instance,belong to his necessary properties, as does his omniscience. The factthat God has immutable knowledge of our contingent future, however,is one of his accidental properties. It is these accidental propertieswhich enable us to consider God's relation to his contingent creation ingreat detail.For anthropology, Scotus' theory has no less significance. Human

freedom, too, can only exist and be understood against the backgroundof synchronic contingency. Without it , that i s without the awareness thatreality, which is partly actualised by us, could have been different fromwhat it in fact is, our central notions of love, sin, guilt, responsibility,grace and forgiveness lose their essential meaning' :' .Synchronic contingency al so has important implications for a correct

understanding of physical reality. Physical laws can no longer be seenas necessary processes, as ancient physics had assumed. Physical lawsform a created order which could be - and still can be - other than theyare, at any moment, although they are extremely continuous. Theirregularity, therefore, cannot be arrived at deductively, but must bediscovered inductively. Thanks to the applicability of mathematics,modern physics can achieve a very high level of deduction within anessentially inductive framework; and this matter of fact can only bebased on an ontology of synchronic contingency".When we ask from what source Scotus' important discovery of

synchronic cont ingency springs, hi s works reply unambiguously: froma radical reflection on the experience of God's love, which is man's

53 Immediately after Leetura I 39 Scotus' theory of contingency is given animportant application. In distinction I 40 the question whether a chosen personcan be damned ("Utrum praedestinatus posset damnari") is confirmed. For beingchosen or damned is a contingent matter of fact, jus t as persevering in sin. Forthe Reportatio examinata, see: A.B. Wolter, 'God's knowledge of future events' ,313-315.54 Cf. A. Vas Jac.ZII. , Het is de Heer!, de opstanding voorstelbaar, Kampen1990, 15-20.

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- and reality's - free source, and on the specifically Christian faith ofGod's trinitarian character.c Modal conceptual language in Lectura I 39The exposition of Scotus' theory of synchronic contingency is found

in 49-52 and 54 of distinction I 39, Immediately after those para-graphs in which he had discussed diachronic contingency. In Scotus'theory of synchronic cont ingency the 'possibilit as logica' (or: 'potenti alogica '") is the corner-stone . This logical possibi lity denotes the logic -al-ontological possibility of a state of affairs. This possibility is therewhen the proposition at hand does not contain incompatible terms. So,if a proposition about a state of affairs is logically non-contradictory,then that state of affairs is possible.Scotus' next move is the following statement: if a contingent state of

affairs p obtains, then -p is logically possible at the same moment".So for the same moment, p and the possibility of -p obtain, for thecoexistence of p and the possibility of -p do not amount to a logicalcontradiction. It is worth noticing that Scotus does not subscribe to the(contradictory) possibili ty , that p and -p are simultaneously factual".Next Scotus int roduces a new concept (in 51): 'potentia real is' (,real

potency'). By this concept an actually existing potency (a power) ismeant, a potency by which someone or something is able to actualise thepossibilities which are there on the level of the logical possibility. ForGod and man this potency is the will. At this point Scotus is able tomake clear that the divine and human freedom of the will exist thanks

55 Cf. Lectura I 39, 49-50. As we continue our introduction, we will onlyuse the first term used by Scotus: 'possibilitas logica' , because this term expres-ses most accura tely that it does not refer to a 'potency' (unl ike the 'potentiarealis' which will be discussed lateron) but .to a logical possibility. Cf. also:Lectura I 2, 188, 17, 32-34. -56 Cf. Lectura 139, 50: "However.jhis logical possibility is not one accord-ing to which the will has acts successively, but i thas them at the same moment.For a t tbe same moment the will has an act of will ing, at the same and for thesame moment it can have an opposite act of willing". ["Haec autem possibilitaslogica non est secundum quod voluntas habet actus success ive, sed in eodeminstanti: nam in eodem instanti in quo voluntas habet unum actum volendi, ineodem et pro e~~'PQtest habere oppositum actum volendi" J.57 Scotus does not reject the principle of non-contradic tion, but reta insformula a (in accordance with Parmenides and Aristotle), see footnotes 46, 48and 51.28

to the contingent structure of reality. For, by the fact that there arealternative states of affairs on the level of the 'possibilitas logica', it ispossible for the will to will one thing at a certain moment, while it hasthe possibi lity of not-wi lling or wi lling otherwise for that same moment.The dimensions of the 'possibilitas logica' are structured by a logical-ontological matrix, in which a free will can unfold itself".Referring to contemporary modal logic we use the term 'contingent '

to designate a possible state of affairs, the opposite of which is alsopossible for the same moment". So 'contingent' refers to the level ofpossibility as described by Scotus' 'possibilitas logica'. However,Scotus' concept of 'contingens' has an extra element. According to him'contingens' designates a factual state of affairs, the opposite of whichis possible at the same time?". In Lectura I 39 'contingens' not onlycomprises our modern term 'contingent', but also the factuality of thestate of affairs referred to.Likewise, in Lectura I 39 Scotus uses 'possibile', 'possibilis' and

'possibilia' in a different way from contemporary usage. With theseconcepts Scotus is generally referring to contingent states of affairswhich neither are nor will be factual. In our terminology however,factual contingent states of affairs and necessary states of affairs arecall ed 'possibi lis' as we1161

58 The 'possibilitas logica' also comprises the necessary states of affairs. Allcontingent possible states of affairs and all necessary possible states of affairs arecalled being ( 'ens' ) by Scotus; thus 'ens' s tands for all possible beings.59 A state of affairs p is contingent if for the same moment Mp & M-p obtain.K. Jacobi's definition of 'contingent' in contemporary possible worlds semanticsis not correct: "Kontingent (wahr) =df wahr in dieser Welt und nicht in allen

miiglichen Welten." (p. 4). Being true in the factual world, however, is not acondition for contingency (cf. our commentary, in which we distinguish betweenthe level of factuality and possibility in the concept of contingency, a.o, 18,39). Cf. G.E. Hughes, M.J. Cresswell, All introduction to modal logic (19681 ,1972 revised reprint) London/New York 1982, 22 and 298; Vos, KN, 244 and285; De Libera, op. cit ., 281.60 According to Scotus p is a contingent s tate of affairs if: p & M-p. Cf.Ordinatio I 2, 86: "To the second argument I say,that I do not call 'contingent'

everything which is not-necessary or not-everlasting, but that thing of which theopposite may occur, when it occurs." ["Ad secundum dico quod non voco hiccontingens quodcumque non-necessarium vel non-sempitemum, sed cuius opposi-tum posset fieri quando illud fit",]61 Cf. for 'contingens ' and 'poss ibil is' our comments at Lectura I 39, 18.

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The question of the cause of contingency is an important issue inScotus' own answers to the questions of distinction I 3962. The doublemeaning of the te rms 'cont ingent ia' and 'contingens' which we have justdiscussed, can now help us to interpret this question rightly. For, inasking this question, does Scotus ask for the origin of the possibility:('possibilitas logica') of contingent states of affairs, or does he ask forthe origin of their factuality? In view of his answer, namely that God'swill is the cause of contingency in things (see 61), we must concludethat Scotus is considering the latter question. He does not defend thetheory that contingency of things (understood in the modern sense)results from God's free activity as a Creator. 'Possibilitas logica' is anirreducible ontological quality of things themselves". Only in so faras the aspect of factuality is concerned, God's will is the cause ofcontingent things": In other words we can say briefly: the 'potentiarealis' of God is the cause of the factual existence of contingent beings,and is not the cause of their 'possibilitas logica'.Scotus' theory of synchronic contingency can be regarded as the

cornerstone of so cal led 'possible worlds semantics', which have recent -ly been developed in modal logic". By 'possible world' these seman-tics mean a maximal consistent set of possible states of affairs. Maxi-mal, because every possible state of affairs is true or false in thi s world;consistent, because the states of affairs within one world are logicallypossible simultaneously, that is, they are logically 'com-possible' andas such, they form a consistent world. One possible world is, forinstance, the factual world now existing and consisting of, among otherthings, the Domtoren (cathedral tower) of Utrecht. The same worldwithout the Domtoren is a synchronically possible world: an alt erna tiveto the one factually existing. Similarly there are countless possibleworlds, which are alt erna tives for one another'".

62 Cf. Lectura I 39, 38.63 Cf. L. Honnefelder, 'Die Lehre von der doppelten ratitudo entis und ihreBedeutung fur die Metaphysik des Johannes Duns Scotus' , Deus et homo admentem I. Duns Scoti, Acta Tertii congressus scotistici intemationalis, vindebo-nae, 28 Sept. - 2 Oct. 1970, Rome 1972, (661-671) 667-671.64 Cf. 61. Besides, with respect to the aspect of factuality the human willis also a possible cause of contingent states of affairs.65 For more information about technique and application of possible worldssemantics, see: Hughes, Cresswell, op. cit., 75 f.f.; A. Plantinga, The nature ofnecessity (19741), Oxford 19893; M.J. Loux (ed.), The possible and the actual,Readings in the metaphysics of modality, Ithaca/London 1979; Vos, KN, 240-244.66 Inany case inthe so called S5-model, from which wedepar t here; inother30

These possible worlds semantics are a very useful instrument forelaborating the theory of synchronic contingency as developed byScotus. By means of these semantics we classify (sets of) states ofaffairs at the level of possibility ('possibilitas logica' or 'ens') by con-sidering in how many possible worlds they occur. Thus, defining therelevant terms in this way, a state of affairs which is not true in anypossible world is called 'impossible'. A state of affairs is 'possible', ifit is true in at l east one possible world. A sta te of a ffai rs is 'contingent ',if it is true at least in one possible world but not in all possible worlds.A state of affairs which is true in every possible world is properlydefined as 'necessary' .If we compare Scotus' modal-logical tools with this instrument of

modern possible worlds semantics, we observe Scotus making thedecisive move towards a synchronic alternativity of states of affairs byway of his theory of the 'possibi lita s logica': (In doing so he indirect lyemploys the principle of compossibility"). At the same time however,his approach to these synchronic alternatives starts from the factuallyexisting world - a fact which is clearly shown by his presentation of thequestions and of his concepts. As we have seen, according to Scotus,cont ingent states of affa irs belong to the factual world because contin-gency includes factuality. In Scotus ' search for the origin of contingencywe observed a simila r concentrat ion on the factua l world and his inquiryproved to be a question about the factual existence of contingent beings.A third example is Scotus' theory of the 'neutral proposition?". Theparagraphs discussing this theory show that the intellect of God primari-ly knows propositions about contingent states of affairs as neutral , thatis: indeterminate, without truth-value. Not unti l God's will has made itschoice do the proposi tions acquire a t ruth-value and God dete rrninatelyknows them as true or false in the factual world. From this we mustconclude that in Scotus' theory the concepts 'true' and 'false' alsoinclude factuality. 'True' does not mean being true in a possible world,but being possible and factual in the world factually exist ing.In summary: in Lectura I 39 Scotus provides the basis of a modal

theory of synchronic contingency. In the construction of this theory, heshows some limitations when compared with a modern approach,

models 'impossible' would be a relat ive concept . For this S5-model, see forinstance: Hughes, Cresswell, op. cit., 49 f.67 Cf. Lectura I 39, 72 and 92, and our comments at these paragraphs.68 Cf. our comments at 44 and 62-66.11


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because hi s e laborat ion i s focussed on that possible world which is mostrelevant to us: the factual world. In order to evaluate this constructionwe have to consider it against its own background: Scotus breaksthrough tradi tional inhibi tions assoc iated with factua l rea lity (which,according to many people, is the only possible one). It would be verymuch in line with Scotus' position in the history of theology and philos-ophy, when we try to elaborate this breakthrough further. At the sametime, when analyzing Scotus' exposition in terms of modern possibleworlds semantics, we should carefully detect his concentration on thefac tual world, al though it does not lead him into inconsi stencies.

d Contingency of past, present and futureOne important issue to which Scotus did not apply the full-force of his

theory is worth discussing here. In his well-known De interpretatione9, Aristot le states that non-universal propositions aboutjUture sta tes ofaffairs are indeterminate, which means: they do not have a truth-value(yet). With respect to the future we have to say that either state ofaffairs can be(come) actual. However, when a future state of affairs orits opposite has become factual, then the proposition about it is nolonger indeterminate, but determinate: true or false. According toAristotle this also means that the opposite of that state of affairs whichhas become factual, is not possible. Hence, present and past are neces-sa ry; a paradigmat ic expression of Aristotle says: "What is, necessarilyis, when it is "69.If we follow the Scotian theory of contingency, according to which

God has determinate knowledge of the contingent future, we mustconclude that the 'open' future of Aristotle is just an epistemologicalopenness to human beings who do not yet know if some proposition betrue or false. This openness of itself does not make the futureontological ly contingent. Such ontologica l openness can only be main-tained if there i s room for logica l-ontological al ternat ivity - room whichScotus discovered through his theory of the 'possibilitas logica'. Thissynchronic alternativity not only rules the structure of things in thefuture, but also in past and present. This becomes apparent in themodels drawn above which visuali se synchronic contingency. If we wereto move the present-moment point on the time-axis to the right, nothing

69 J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione, Translated withnotes and glossary, Oxford (1963') 1979,52. (De interpretatione, 9, 19a23).32

would change in the logical-ontological structure (the spaces) of thes tate of affairs as visualised.In 69 it becomes evident, however, that Scotus has not suffi cient ly

worked out these consequences of his theory for each dimension oftime. He says that present and future are contingent, but followingAristotle he notes that the past is necessary. Scotus' new theory ofcontingency means a breakthrough in the attempt to overcome theAristotelian logic and ontology. At the same time the influence of thisheritage is so powerful, that the young Scotus does not realise theimpl icat ion of his theoreti cal revolut ion for the dimension of the past?",Nevertheless, although 69 is a block across the path of Lectura I 39,this paragraph does not imply any inconsistencies for the theoryunfolded in the other paragraphs.

7 THE THEORY OF SYNCHRONIC CONTINGENCY AS A KEY TO THELECTURA

The expositions on Lectura I 39 given above can now be completedby seeing this distinction in the Lectura as a whole.The Lectura occupies a special place in Scotus' works. This early

work clearly defined for his entire oeuvre the outlines of a promisingperspective: that of a comprehensive theology in a new style. In LecturaI 39 the theory of synchronic contingency is extensively developed andthis theory also governs the next distinctions 40 and 42-45. Further-more, there is no break between the seven last distinctions (Lectura I39-45) and the first thirty-seven?'. Young Scotus realised that his newtheory occupied a key-position. This is obvious from the fact that thetheory of synchronic contingency, which is not discussed until I 39, isa lready functioning from the prologue onwards as a theore tical schemafor many personal solutions which have become famous as 'Scotist' andwhich were to characterise Scotist thought. They have not been devel-oped, however, from some kind of 'Scotism'. They received such aprofile because, in the reception of Scotus' work, people failed to see

70 In the corresponding paragraph of Appendix A ( [26]) this explicit linkwith Aristotle is missing.71 In Ordinatio I distinction 39 is missing, in Lectura I distinction 38.


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the obj ectivi ty of his theory. With a frank and very concentra ted mentalcapacity Scotus worked out solutions which were urgently required,considering the inner tensions and dilemmas in the 'philosophia chris-tiana'. When Christian fa ith is confronted wi th philosophy in its ancient,non-chri st ian design, a 'system of contradictions' becomes a real threat,especially when all thought tend to be based on the fundamentallyinconsistent necessity of all things. These contradict ions dissolve in thelight of the theory of synchronic contingency. The peculiarities ofScotus' line of thought should not be seen, therefore, as a kind ofpreoccupied Scoti sm; they ask to be seen as an exhaustively systematicreflection on the consistent reality opened by the eye of faith.In logic many things change. As we have seen, the chronological

order loses i ts logical priori ty; the t ightly knit correspondence betweenSein und Zeit is unravelled, because the structures of being are notrevealed to us by time. The structured nature of being demands anapproach in terms of structural moments": The theory of ' instances',which assumes 'ante' and 'post' to be related structurally, stands out asa striking example. If theologians in later times say: "We must notunderstand this order chronologically but logical ly", they appeal to theScotian method of analysis.This new system of structural analysis was already introduced in the

beginning ofthe prologue to the Lectura. Scotus takes the same posit ionas he does in all his works: the philosophical outlook that revelation isindi spensable for systemat ic thinking. He confront s thi s posit ion wi ththe ancient philosophical one which considers revelat ion as superf luous(Lectura, Prologus, 5-51). According to Aristotle and Averroes, allreal potencies actualise inevitably, because otherwise they are not'potential' at all, but powerless and 'impotent', dependent on an exter-nal source (as for instance revelation). That is why the potency to knowhas to actualise necessarily as well (Prologus, 1-3)73. Scotus willrefute this option (Prologus, 12-30 and 35-51); his refutat ion is basedon his new concept of contingency.

72 'natura': 'by nature', i .e. 'structural'; 'instans naturae': 'moment ofnature' , i.e. 'structural moment' . Cf. for example Lectura 1 10, 27; 139, 60 and 90.73 This is a clear illustration of the principle ofplenitude which wediscussedin sections 5 and 6.34

The new modal theory is also presupposed in his analysis of theologyas a science. In his investigation of various kinds of theology, which hepursues by asking how scientific they are, 'contingent theology' playsa major part (Prologus, 111-118). The practical nature of theologyis no less linked with contingency, for the practice (of faith) relates tofree acts. On the other hand, although this prac tical knowledge i s relatedto contingent act s, it can comprise necessary truths (Prologus, 164-179, compare Lectura I 1).Ordinatio I 2 has become famous by way of De primo principia and

the Opus Oxoniense I 2, but the core of these ontological proofs of (theexistence of) God already appears in Lectura I 2. Considered negativelytwo aspects stand out: Scotus' critical attitude towards cosmologicalproofs such as those of Thomas Aquinas; and the scarcity of referencesto the ontological proof in Anselmus' Proslogion. Scotus concentrateson a proof of a different style, a proof in which the key idea is 'essentialorder ' ('ordo essentialis' , compare Lectura I 2, 38-59). By analyzingthe essent ial structures of cont ingent reali ty, Scotus demonst ra tes thatthe factual reality which is (synchronically) contingent cannot rest initself, but is dependent on the creative activity of the necessarily exist-ing Creator.Likewise Scotus' concept of contingency is the hinge of his episte-

mological remarks in Lectura 13, especially Lectura 13, 172-18174One would not expect such modal analyses to funct ion in the doctrine

of Trinity. It becomes apparent, however, in Lectura I 7, 31-33 and7175, that the theory of God and his Trinity indirectly gives rise to thetheory of contingency, which is fundamentally at stake in these theories.In the Aristote lian theory of cont ingency, possibi lity and cont ingencycoincide". This has paradoxical consequences for Chris tian statementslike: 'If it is necessary that God the Father generates the Son, it ispossible that the Father generates the Son.' For a statement as evidentas this one to be analysed consistently, a new concept of 'possible' mustbe developed": This synchronic concept 'possible' comprises syn-chronic contingency on the one hand and (synchronic) necessity on theother.

74 Cf. Vos, KN, 73-81.75 Cf. also Lectura I 19.76 According to Aristotle contingency comes down to mutability, and mutabi-

lity presupposes the coincidence of act and potency.77 This happens in Lectura I 7, 32-33.


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In semantics the lead of synchronic contingency is followed in thefirst half of Lectura I 8 ( 107-110) in which the theory of transcen-dental terms is developed within the context of the theory of God'ssimplicity ('simplicitas Dei'). The need for transcendental terms isevident because of the fact that such terms embrace contingency as wellas necessity. The second half of Lectura I 8 aims at an alternativeconcept of immutability, which is elaborated in Lectura I 3978.When the theory of contingency is worked out, not only do new

solutions appear, but new problems arise as well. The ques

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Duns Scotus 1994 Contingency and Freedom Lectura i 39 9780792327073