Duns Scotus, John - Philosophical Writings

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THE NELSON PHILOSOPHIC L TEXTS

General Edi tor

R a y m o n d K l i b a n s k y

Fro th ingham

Professor o f Logic a nd Me taphys ics

M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y

Honor a r y Fe l l ow o f

the

Warburg Ins t i t u te

Univers i ty of London



N i h i l

o b s t a t :

R o y E f f l e r , o . f . m .

Censor

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E l i g i u s W e i r , o . f . m .

Min is te r Prov inc ia l i s

N i h i l o b s t a t :

P h i l o t h e u s B o e h n e r ,

o . f . m .

Censor Deputatus

Imp r i ma tu r :

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4

J o s e p h u s A l o i s i u s

Episcopus Bujfalensis





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D U N S S C O T U S

P H I L O S O P H I C A L W R I T I N G S

A se lec tion

e d ite d a n d tra n s la te d

by

A L L A N W O L T E R , O .F .M .

P r o fe s s o r o f P h i lo s o p h y a t th e F r a n c i s c a n I n s t i t u t e

S t B o n a v e n t u re , N . T .

N E L S O N

1963



T H O M A S N E L S ON A N D SON S L T D

Parkside

W o r k s E d in b u rg h 9

36 Park Street London

W l

117

La t robe Stree t M e lbou rne C r

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Societe

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d ' £ d i t i o n s

N e l s o n

97 rue M on ge Pa ris

5

© A l la n W o l te r

1962

Reprinted ig6$



P R E F A C E

I n a v o l u m e o f t h e p r e s e n t s i z e , a c o m p i l e r c a n g i v e a

b r o a d e r i f s o m e w h a t p i e c e m e a l v i e w o f a m a n ' s p h i l o

s op h y b y l i m i t in g th e le n g t h o f th e s e le c tio n s , o r h e m a y

s a c r ific e c o m p re h e n s iv e n e ss o f s u b je c t m a t te r i n th e

in te r e s ts o f r e v e a lin g h is th i n k e r a t w o r k . I h a v e c ho se n

t h e l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e , b u i l d i n g t h e p r e s e n t s e l e c t i o n

a r o u n d

five

k e y q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n e d w i t h G o d a n d t h e

h u m a n

s o u l ,

t h e t w o p h i l o s o p h i c a l t o p i c s o f g r e a t e s t

i n t e r e s t t o a n

ex

professo

t h e o lo g ia n l ik e D u n s Sc o tu s .

F o l lo w in g th e A v ic e n n ia n in t e r p r e t a t io n o f A r is t o t e l ia n

m e t a p h y s i c s , l i k e A l b e r t u s M a g n u s , S i g e r o f B r a b a n t ,

A q u i n a s a n d m o s t s ch o la s tic s o f h is d a y , Sc o tu s e n v is io n e d

G o d as t h e g o a l o f a ny r a t i o n a l m e ta p h y s ic w h o se s u b je c t

is b e i n g qua b e in g . T h e tw o s e le c tio n s d e a lin g w i t h th e

e x i s t e n c e a n d u n i c i t y o f G o d ,

t h e n ,

fo r m th e c o re o f h is

"f i r s t p h i lo s o p h y ". Th e y a re in t ro d u c e d b y a fe w sh o r t

se c t i o n s i n w h i c h S c o tu s d e sc r i b e s t h i s " t r a n sc e n d e n ta l

s c i e n c e " a n d t h e t y p e o f c o n c l u s i o n i t p u r p o r t s t o

e s t a b l i s h , f o l l o w e d b y a q u e s t i o n w h e r e i n t h e S u b t l e

D o c t o r a n a l y z e s h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t o f G o d i n

t e r m s o f h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l t h e s i s r e g a r d i n g t h e u n i v o c i t y

o f b e in g . O f th e tw o q u e stio n s a b o u t th e h u m a n sou l ,

o ne to u ch e s o n its s p ir i t u a l i t y a n d i m m o r t a l i t y , t h e o th e r

c o nc e rn s its a b i li ty to a t ta in c e r ta i n k n o w le d g e .

T a k e n f ro m Sc otu s's m o st im p o r t a n t w o r k , h is

Ordinatio

( c a l l e d m o r e f r e q u e n t l y , i f l e s s a c c u r a t e l y , h i s O x f o r d

C o m m e n t a r y

o n th e

Sentences

o f

P e te r L o m b a r d ) ,

t h e k e y

q u e s t i o n s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y , e x c e p t f o r

c e r ta i n m in o r m a r g in a l n ote s in th e m a n u s c rip t t e x t a n d

—where Sc o tu s h a s c o m b i n e d s e v e ra l q u e s tio n s i n t o o n e

—those

p o r tio n s n o t g e r m a n e to th e q u e s tio n se le c te d .

T h e m a n u s c r ip t (C o d e x A s s i s ii, b i b l io t h e c a

c o m m u n -

alis 137)

f ro m w h i c h th e L a t i n te x t is t a k e n , re p r e -



VI

P R E F A C E

s e nts a n e a r ly f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y a t t e m p t a t a c r i t i c a l

e d i t i o n o f t h is w o r k a n d is th e b a s is o f t h e V a t i c a n e d i t i o n

n o w i n p r o g r e s s . W h e r e th e te x t is o b v i o u s l y a t f a u l t ,

h o w e v e r , I h a v e n o t h e s i t a t e d t o a d o p t a b e t t e r m a n u

s c r i p t r e a d i n g f o r t h e t r a n s l a t i o n .

T h e s h o r t b i b l io g r a p h y m a ke s n o a t t e m p t t o d o ju s t ic e

t o t h e flood o f r e c e n t S c o t is t ic l i t e r a t u r e , e s p e c i a l ly i n

f o r e i g n la n g u a g e s , b u t is l i m i t e d t o l a r g e r E n g l i s h m o n o

g r a p h s o n s p e c i f i c a s p e c t s o f S c o t u s ' s p h i l o s o p h y o r t o

w o r k s l i k e t h o s e o f F a t h e r C o p le s t o n o r M is s S h a r p ,

w h e r e i n a f a i r l y b r i e f b u t c o m p r e h e n s i v e a c c o u n t o f

Sc o tu s 's g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t io n s c a n b e f o u n d .

M a y I ta k e th i s o c c a s io n t o e x p re s s m y in d e b te d n e s s

t o t h e l a t e F a t h e r P h i l o t h e u s

Boehner,

o . f . m . , a n d t o

F a t h e r G a u d e n s M o h a n , o . f . m . , o f t h e F r a n c is c a n

I n s t i t u t e , f o r h e l p i n p r e p a r i n g a n d c h e c k i n g th e L a t i n

t e x t . I a m d e e p ly g r a t e f u l a ls o t o P r o fe s so r R a y m o n d

K l i b a n s k y f o r h is p a r t i n b r i n g i n g t h i s v o l u m e t o f r u i t i o n ,

t h o u g h I h a v e n o t b e e n a b le t o a c c e p t a l l h is s u g g e s t io n s .

I ta k e f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y b o t h f o r t h e c o n s t i tu t io n o f t h e

t e x t a n d f o r t h e t r a n s l a t i o n .

A l l a n B . W o l t e r

The Franc iscan Ins t i tu te ,

St Bon aven tu re , N .V.



C O N T E N T S

I n t r o d u c t i o n i x

i

C o n c e r n in g M e ta p h y s ic s

i

ii

M a n 's N a t u r a l K n o w le d g e o f G o d

13

in

T h e E x is te n c e o f G o d 34

iv

Th e U n ic i ty o f G o d 82

v C o n c e rn in g H u m a n K n o w le d g e 96

vi Th e S p i r i t u a l i t y a n d I m m o r t a l i t y o f th e

H u m a n So u l 133

N o t e s 1 6 3

I n d e x e s 1 8 9





I N T R O D U C T I O N

D o c u m e n t a r y d a ta o n th e l i f e o f J o h n D u n s Sco tus a re

s c a n ty . Sc a rc e ly m o r e t h a n h a l f

a

d o ze n d e f in i te c h r o n o

lo g ic a l re c o r d s a r e a v a ila b l e . T h e e a r lie s t d a te m e n

t io n e d i n c o n n e x io n w i t h Sc otu s is f o u n d i n th e C h ro nicle

o f the Sco t t i sh F ranc iscans , t ransc r ibed in the s ix teen th

c e n tu ry b y W . Tw e e d y , a n o t a ry p u b l ic o f H a d d i n g t o n .

A s p re se rv e d i n th e e ig h te e n th -c e n tu r y M o n a stic o n Sc o ti-

canum

o f M a r ia n u s

B r o c k i e ,

o .s . b ., th e c h ro n ic l e s ta te s :

I n th e y e a r

1278

F r ia r

Elias

D u n s ,

gua rd ian o f Dum fries , came

to H a d d in g to n a n d i n th e prese nce o f

the

o the r gua rd ians in a

chapter o f

the

Orde r received the

office

o f v icar genera l o f the

K in g d o m o f Sc o tla n d a n d to o k b ack w it h h i m to D u m frie s

tha t ce lebra ted the o log ian , Jo hn Du ns, ca lled Scotus by

reason o f his c o u n tr y , a n d g ave h im th e h a b it o f

re l ig ion .

F o r

he [Jo hn ] was h is nephew by h is b ro the r N in ia n Duns o f

L i tt le d e an and had a ttended the low er schools

of

H a d d in g t o n ,

where he had g i ven remarkab le i nd i ca t ions o f h i s fu tu re

l ea rn ing.

T h o u g h L . M e ie r , o . f .m . has re c e n tly a t te m p t e d t o d is

c r e d it th e v a l u e o f th i s e n t ry , h is re aso ns d o n o t a p p e a r

to o c o n v in c i n g . U n t i l fu r t h e r p r o o f is fo r th c o m in g , w e

c a n h a r d l y ig n o r e o r re je c t th e te s t im o n y o f this c h r o n ic le

e n t i r e l y .

M o r e c e r ta in , h o w e v e r , is th e n e x t r e c o r d , th a t o f

S c o t u s ' s o r d i n a t i o n t o t h e p r i e s t h o o d b y O l i v e r S u t t o n ,

B i s h o p o f L i n c o l n , o n

17

M a r c h

1291 .

O f th e f o r ty -

e ig h t p r ie s ts o r d a in e d t h a t d a y i n th e p r io r y o f St A n d r e w ,

N o r t h a m p t o n , f iv e w e re F r a nc is ca n s , in c lu d i n g " F r .

Jo h a nn e s D o n s " .

O n 26 J u ly 1300 Sc o tu s w a s a t O x f o r d , fo r w e f in d h is

n a m e a m o n g th e tw e n ty -tw o f r ia r s o f

the

O x f o r d c o n v e n t

w h ose n am e s th e E n g l is h p r o v in c i a l , H u g h o f H a r t le p o o l ,

s u b m itte d to J o h n D a l d e r b y , B is h o p o f L in c o ln , fo r

facu l t i es to hea r con fess ions .



X DU NS SCOTUS

T h e c o l o p h o n o f C o d e x 66 o f M e r t o n C o l le g e , O x f o r d ,

c o n t a in s t h i s n o t e b y a n e a r ly f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y h a n d :

" T h i s is f r o m t h e O rd in a tio o f t h e Ve n e r a b l e F r i a r J o h n

D u n s o f t h e O r d e r o f F r i a r s M i n o r w h o f lo u r is h e d a t

C a m b r id g e , O x f o r d a n d P a r is , a n d d i e d i n C o l o g n e " .

A t t h e e n d o f t h e W o r c e s te r m a n u s c r i p t ( f 6 9 ), o n e o f

t h e e a r l i e s t o f S c o tu s 's P a r i s i a n le c t u r e s o n t h e Se nte nce s,

is t h e r e m a r k t h a t Sc o tu s b e g a n c o m m e n t i n g o n t h e f ir s t

b o o k "a t P a r is i n t h e y e a r o f t h e L o r d 1 3 0 2 , t h e t h i r d

h a v i n g s t a r t e d " , a n d t h a t h e c o m m e n t e d o n t h e f o u r t h

b o o k " i n t h e s tu d y a t P a r is i n t h e y e a r

1 3 0 3 " .

T h e

p h r a s e " t h e t h i r d h a v i n g s t a r t e d " se em s to b e a r e f e r e n c e

to th e a u t u m n t e r m ( f r o m a b o u t 9 O c t o b e r 1302 u n t i l

A p r i l

1 3 0 3 ) .

A c c o r d i n g t o " G a l l i c a n c u s t o m " t h e n e w

y e a r b e g a n o n 2 5 M a r c h , t h e fe a s t o f t h e A n n u n c i a t i o n .

Sc o tu s 's p r e s e n c e i n P a r is a t t h i s t im e is c o n f i r m e d b y

t h e f a c t t h a t w e f in d h is n a m e l i s t e d a m o n g th o s e f r ia r s

w h o o n 2 5 J u n e

1303

r e fu s e d t o s u p p o r t K i n g P h i l i p I V

i n h is a p p e a l t o a g e n e r a l c o u n c i l a g a i n s t P o p e B o n i

f a c e

V I I I .

T h e p e n a l t y f o r s u c h o p p o s i t i o n w a s e x i l e

f r o m F r a n c e w i t h i n t h r e e d a y s .

Sc o tu s w a s e v i d e n t l y b a c k i n P a r is a g a i n b y t h e e n d

o f 1 3 0 4 , f o r t h e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l o f t h e F r a n c is c a n s ,

G o n s a lv u s o f S p a i n , s e n t a le t t e r f r o m A s c o l i i n t h e

M a r c h o f A n c o n a o n

18

N o v e m b e r

1304

t o W i l l i a m ,

g u a r d i a n o f t h e F r a n c i s c a n c o n v e n t a t P a r is . I t re a d s a s

f o l l o w s :

I n re fe re n c e to t h e p r o m o t io n o f F r ia r G ile s o f L i g n y , a b o u t

w h o m I h a ve b e e n in f o r m e d b y y o u r l e tte r s , w e o u g h t , as th e

c u s to m is , to m a k e p r o v i s io n fo r a n o t h e r s i m i la r p r e s e n t a t io n .

Since,

a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a t u t e s o f t h e O r d e r a n d t h e s t a t u t e s

o f y o u r c o n v e n t, th e b a c h e lo r to b e p r e se n te d a t th is t im e s h o u l d

b e lo n g to s om e p r o v in c e o th e r t h a n th e p r o v i n c e o f F r a n c e , I

a ss ig n to y o u F r ia r J o h n Sc o tu s , o f w h o se la u d a b l e l if e , e x c e l le n t

k n o w le d g e , a n d m o st s u b tle a b i li ty , a s w e l l as h is o t h e r r e m a r k

a b le q u a l it ie s , I a m f u l l y i n fo r m e d , p a r t ly f r o m lo n g e x p e r ie n c e

a n d p a r t l y f r o m r e p o r t w h i c h h a s b e e n s p r e a d e v e r y w h e r e —

t o be p re s e n te d p r i m a r i ly a n d i n t h e r e g u l a r c o u rs e a fte r t h e



INTRODUCTION XI

s a id F r i a r G ile s . I e n jo i n y o u n ev e rth e le s s t h a t y o u m a k e s u c h

p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h d u e s o l e m n i t y w i t h o u t much expense . I f ,

h o w e v e r, y o u s h o u ld b e c e r ta i n t h a t th e C h a n c e l lo r b e w i l l in g

to lic e n s e tw o o f o u r f r ia r s a t t h e sa m e t im e , I d e s ire t h a t F r ia r

A l b e r t o f M e t z, i f he s h a ll b e a b le to r e t u r n to th e c o n v e n t , b ep r o m o t e d to g e th e r w i t h t h e sa id F r ia r J o h n . I n w h i c h c ase , I

r u le th a t F r i a r A lb e r t o n a c c o u nt o f his s e n io r ity s h o u ld i n c e p t

f ir s t , F r ia r J o h n i n c e p t in g a fte rw a r d s u n d e r h i m . F a r e w e l l i n

th e L o r d a n d p r a y fo r m e . G iv e n i n th e p la c e o f Ascoli o f th e

p r o v in c e o f th e M a r c h o f A n c o n a , x i v K a l . D e c . 1304.

A f i n a l m e n t io n o f Sc o tu s is f o u n d i n t h e r e c o r d s o f a

p r o v i n c i a l c h a p t e r a t C o lo g n e w h e r e h e s ig n e d as " F r .

J o h a n n e s , le c t o r C o l o n i a e " . T h e d o c u m e n t g iv e s p e r

m is s io n f o r t h e e r e c t io n o f a c o n v e n t a n d is d a t e d m ore

G a llic o ru m 2 0 F e b .

1307

( a c t u a l l y 1 3 0 8 ) .

Th e s e d o c u m e n t s , w h e n v i e w e d a g a in s t th e g e n e r a l

h i s t o r i c a l b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e t im e s , m a k e i t p o s s ib le to

c o n s t r u c t th e f o l l o w i n g m o r e o r le ss p r o b a b l e s k e tc h o f

S c o t u s ' s l i f e .

H i s f a m i ly n a m e w a s D u n s . A t t h e t im e Sc o tu s w a s

i n P a r is th e r e w e r e m o r e t h a n fo r t y o t h e r f r ia r s i n t h e

F r a n c i s c a n c o n v e n t b y t h e n a m e o f J o h n . H e r e h e

r e c e i v e d t h e a d d i t i o n a l t i t l e o f " S c o t u s " b y r e a s o n o f h is

n a t io n a l i t y . A t t h e t i m e w h e n J o h n D u n s s t u d i e d a t

P a r is " S c o t u s " a p p a r e n t ly w a s u s e d e x c l u s i v e ly i n t h e

sense o f " a n a t iv e o f S c o t l a n d " , a n d n o t , as i n e a r l ie r

t im e s , t o d e s ig n a t e i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y I r i s h o r S c o t t is h

a n c e s t ry . T h i s is c o n f ir m e d i f w e a c c e p t t h e te s t im o n y o f

t h e C h r o n i c l e o f t h e S c o t t i s h F r a n c i s c a n s a s r e c o r d e d b y

B r o c k i e .

T h e r e a r e t w o m a i n b ra n c h e s o f t h e D u n s f a m i l y , t h e

D u n s o f D u n s i n B e r w ic k s h i r e , w h o b e lo n g e d t o t h e

n o b i l i t y , a n d t h e D u n s o f M a x t o n -o n - t h e -T w e e d , w h o

i f n o t o f t h e n o b i l i t y o w n e d ra t h e r e x te n s iv e f a r m i n g

l a n d s .

A c c o r d i n g t o E . L o n g p r e , o . f . m . , t h e e s ta te o f

N i n i a n D u n s , t h e f a t h e r o f Sc o tu s , w a s k n o w n a s L i t t l e -

d e a n , a n d is s i t u a t e d o n t h e s o u t h e r n b a n k o f t h e R i v e r

T w e e d a b o u t t w o m i le s d o w n s t re a m f r o m t h e v i l l a g e o f



Xll DUNS SCOTUS

M a x t o n , R o x b u r g h s h i r e . A p o p u l a r t r a d i t i o n , h o w e v e r ,

w h i c h go e s b a c k fo r c e n t u r ie s c l a im s t h a t J o h n b e l o n g e d

t o t h e B e r w i c k s h i r e b r a n c h . H i s f a t h e r w a s t h e y o u n g e r

s o n o f t h e D u n s o f G r u e ld y k e s a n d l i v e d o n a n e s ta te

a d j o i n i n g th e p r e s e n t t o w n o f D u n s . T h e h o u s e w h e r e

t r a d i t i o n m a i n t a in s J o h n w a s b o r n s to o d n e a r t h e m o r e

w e s t e r l y l o d g e , n o w c a l l e d P a v i l i o n L o d g e , o f D u n s

C a s t le . I n t h e c o u rs e o f i m p r o v e m e n t s m a d e i n 1 7 9 0 ,

t h e l a r g e s to n e m a r k i n g t h e s i te o f t h e h o u s e w a s b u i l t

i n t o t h e n e a r b y d y k e a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o lo c a l h i s to r i a n s ,

w a s p o i n t e d o u t f o r g e n e r a t io n s , b u t is n o w a p p a r e n t ly

f o r g o t t e n .

Sc o tu s w a s p r o b a b l y b o r n e a r ly i n

1 2 6 6 .

S in c e B is h o p

S u t to n o r d a i n e d a t N o r t h a m p t o n o n b o t h 2 3 D e c e m b e r

1290 a n d 17 M a r c h

1 2 9 1 ,

A . G a l l e b a u t , o . f . m . a rg u e s th a t

Sc o tu s m u s t h a v e c o m e o f c a n o n i c a l a g e s o m e w h e r e

b e t w e e n th e s e t w o d a te s . T h i s w o u l d p l a c e h is b i r t h

s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n 2 3 D e c e m b e r

1265

a n d

17

M a r c h

1266.

C o n f l i c t i n g w i t h t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , h o w e v e r , is

t h e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e C h r o n i c l e , a b o v e , t h a t S c o t u s ' s u n c l e ,

F r i a r Elias D u n s , t o o k h is n e p h e w w i t h h i m t o D u m f r ie s

a n d "g a v e h i m t h e h a b i t o f r e l i g i o n " . N o w t h e e a r l ie s t

a ge a t w h i c h Sc o tu s c o u l d c a n o n i c a l l y h a v e e n t e r e d t h e

n o v i t ia t e o f t h e F r a n c is c a n s w a s f if te e n . H o w e v e r , i t is

n o t u n l ik e l y , i n v i e w o f t h e c u s to m o f t h e t im e s , t h a t

Sc o tu s w o u l d h a v e s ta y e d a t t h e c o n v e n t a s a p u er ob la tu s

o r p o s t u l a n t , c o n t in u i n g h i s s tu d ie s u n d e r s o m e o f t h e

f r i a r s ,

u n t i l h e w a s o l d e n o u g h t o e n te r t h e O r d e r . O n

t h is s c o re , C a l l e b a u t p la c e s h is e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e n o v i t ia t e

la t e i n

1279

o r e a r ly i n

1280

a n d h is s o le m n p r o f e s s io n o f

v o w s a y e a r l a t e r .

I f Sc o tu s e n t e r e d t h e S c o t t is h b r a n c h o f t h e f r i a r s , i t

m a y s ee m s t r a n g e t h a t h e is r e f e r r e d t o i n s o m e m a n u

s c r ip t s as b e l o n g i n g t o t h e E n g l is h p r o v i n c e , u n le s s w e

r e c a l l t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e G r e y f r i a r s i n Sc o t la n d . I n 1231

t h e F r a n c is c a n f r ia r s , w h o h a d c o m e t o E n g l a n d s o m e

s e ve n y e a r s e a r l i e r , e s t a b l is h e d f r i a r ie s i n S c o t la n d . I n



INTRODUCTION

Xlll

1235

th e se f r i a r i e s w e r e g i v e n th e s ta tu s o f a n in d e

p e n d e n t v i c a r i a t e , b u t s o o n a f te r w e r e re t u r n e d t o t h e

j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e E n g l i s h C u s to d y o f N e w c a s t le . I n

1260 t h e y o u n g K i n g o f Sc o ts , A l e x a n d e r I I I , p e t i t i o n e d

P o p e A l e x a n d e r I V t o r e s to r e t h e in d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e

S c o t t is h f r i a r s . T h e m a t te r w a s r e f e r re d to t h e G e n e r a l

C h a p t e r o f t h e F r a n c is c a n s , w h i c h r e fu s e d t h e r e q u e s t ,

o w i n g i n p a r t t o p re s s u re b r o u g h t to b e a r o n t h e O r d e r

b y th e K i n g o f E n g l a n d . B u t i n 1278 A l e x a n d e r , K i n g

o f Sc o ts , w e n t t o t h e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l o f t h e f r i a r s ,

J e r o m e o f A s c o l i ( la t e r P o p e N ic h o l a s I V ) , w h o g r a n t e d

t h e Sc o ts a n in d e p e n d e n t v i c a r i a t e .

Elias

D u n s , Sc o tu s 's

u n c l e ,

b e c a m e t h e f i r s t V i c a r G e n e r a l , d i r e c t ly r e s p o n s ib le

t o t h e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l o f t h e F r a n c i s c a n o r d e r . I n

1 2 9 6 , h o w e v e r , t h e v i c a r i a t e w a s o n c e m o r e s u b je c te d

t o th e E n g l i s h p r o v i n c e , b u t th e Sc ots w e r e p e r m i t t e d t o

r e t a i n t h e i r V i c a r G e n e r a l a n d w e r e i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e

C u s t o d y o f N e w c a s t le .

W h a t h a p p e n e d b e tw e e n Sc o tu s 's

entry

i n t o t h e

O r d e r a n d h is o r d i n a t io n i n 1291 is a m a t t e r o f c o n

j e c t u r e , as is a ls o t h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n 1291 a n d 1300

w h e n h e w a s a g a i n a t O x f o r d . L . M e i e r , b a s in g h is

s p e c u la t io n o n th e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y ,

s u gg e sts t h a t Sc o tu s d e v o t e d s o m e e i g h t y e a r s t o t h e

s t u d y i n g a n d t e a c h i n g o f p h i lo s o p h y

(1283-91)

i n

E n g l a n d , a n d lo c a te s t h e C a m b r i d g e t e a c h i n g e p is o d e

d u r i n g th i s p e r i o d . T h e n i n e p r e s c r ib e d y e a rs d e v o t e d

t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e o lo g y a t O x f o r d , M e i e r p la c e s b e t w e e n

S c o t u s ' s o r d i n a t i o n a n d

1300.

C a l le b a u t , o n t h e o t h e r

h a n d , s tre sse s th e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r is .

Sc o t u s , a c c o r d i n g t o h is t h e o r y , m u s t h a v e s p e n t a t le a s t

f o u r y e a rs i n t h e s t u d y o f t h e o l o g y a t P a r is so m e t i m e

a f t e r 1 2 9 2 . T h e t e a c h i n g p e r io d a t C a m b r id g e c o u l d

h a v e f o l l o w e d t h i s . I f Sc o tu s d i d g o t o P a r is b e fo r e

1300

i t m i g h t e x p l a i n w h y th e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l , G o n -

s a lv u s o f

S p a i n ,

c o u l d s pe a k o f h a v i n g le a r n e d o f Sc o tu s 's

f itn e s s " p a r t l y f r o m lo n g e x p e r i e n c e ". W h e r e w o u l d t h e



MV DUNS SCOTUS

S p a n i s h f r i a r h a v e m e t t h e y o u n g Sc o t i f n o t a t P a r is ,

w h e r e G o n s a lv u s h a d t a u g h t b o t h as a b a c h e l o r (c.1297)

a n d la t e r a s m a s t e r o f t h e o l o g y

(1302-3)?

A t a n y r a t e , b y 1300 Sc o tu s w a s b a c k a t t h e O x f o r d

c o n v e n t . I n a d d i t io n t o t h e t e s t im o n y o f t h e d o c u m e n t

o f t h e E n g l i s h P r o v i n c i a l m e n t io n e d a b o v e , Sc o tu s 's

p re s e n c e a t O x f o r d is c o n f i r m e d b y t h e f a c t th a t h e t o o k

p a r t as a b a c h e lo r i n t h e Ve spe ries o f F r i a r P h i l i p

B r i d l i n g t o n (o n e o f t h e p u b l i c d i s p u t a t io n s c o n n e c t e d w i t h

t h e l i c e n s in g o f a n e w m a s t e r ). P h i l i p , h o w e v e r , b e c a m e

a r e g e n t m a s te r a t O x f o r d a r o u n d

1300.

T h a t Sc o tu s

w a s c o m m e n t i n g o n t h e Sentences o f P e te r L o m b a r d a t

O x f o r d a r o u n d t h i s t i m e is a ls o a t te s t e d t o b y T h o m a s

S u t to n o . p . , a c o n t e m p o r a r y a n d h o s t i le c r i t ic o f Sc o tu s

w h o w a s a t t h e E n g l i s h u n i v e r s i t y b e t w e e n 1300 a n d

1 3 0 2 .

Sc o tu s n e v e r b e c a m e a m a s t e r a t O x f o r d , f o r h i s

s u p e r i o r s s e n t h i m o n t o P a r i s t o t a k e t h e d o c t o r a t e o r

m a s te rs h ip " o f t h e o lo g y th e r e . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e W o r

c e s te r m a n u s c r i p t w e c a n i n f e r t h a t h e m u s t h a v e a r r i v e d

i n P a r is i n t i m e fo r t h e a u t u m n t e r m o f

1 3 0 2 .

A c c o r d

i n g t o P e l s t e r , s . j . , J o h n D u n s l e c t u r e d o n B o o k I o f t h e

Sentences f r o m 9 O c t o b e r

1302

to a b o u t A p r i l

1 3 0 3 .

H e

t h e n b e g a n i m m e d i a t e l y w i t h B o o k I V a n d f in is h e d h is

le c tu r e s o n i t i n J u n e o f t h a t y e a r . O r d i n a r i l y t h e

b a c h e l o r h a d t o b e g i n o n t h e d a y b e f o r e t h e f e a s t o f

S t D e n i s (10 O c t o b e r ) a n d e n d b y 2 9 J u n e , t h e fe a s t

o f St P e te r a n d St P a u l . I f h e h a d n o t f in i s h e d a l l h i s

l e c t u r e s o w i n g t o s i c k n e s s , a b s e n c e o r t h e l i k e , t h e

s e nte n tia riu s h a d t o m a k e u p d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r a s m a n y

le c tu r e s as h e h a d m is s e d . L e c t u re s o n B o o k s I I a n d I I I

( u p t o D i s t . xvn) m u s t h a v e o c c u r re d b e tw e e n 1303 a n d

1 3 0 4 , f o r o n 18 N o v e m b e r 1304 h e w a s r e c o m m e n d e d

b y t h e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l , G o n s a lv u s , f o r t h e m a s t e r s h i p

a n d m u s t t h e r e f o r e h a v e c o m p l e te d t h e r e q u i s i t e le c t u r e s

o n t h e f o u r b o o k s o f th e Sen ten ce s.

A p p a r e n t l y Sc o tu s 's P a r is ia n l e c tu r e s w e r e i n t e r r u p t e d ,



INTRODU CTION

b y t h e d e c re e o f K i n g P h i l i p t h e F a i r . T h e F r e n c h

m o n a r c h h a d q u a r r e l l e d w i t h P o p e B o n i f a c e V I I I o v e r

t h e t a x a t i o n o f c h u r c h p r o p e r t y t o s u p p o r t P h i l i p ' s

s t a n d i n g a r m ie s f o r h is w a r s w i t h E n g l a n d . W h e n th e

P o p e e x c o m m u n i c a t e d t h e K i n g , t h e l a t t e r a p p e a le d t o

a G e n e r a l C o u n c i l o f t h e C h u r c h t o d e p o se th e P o p e .

H e w o n o v e r t h e F r e n c h c l e r g y , t h e u n iv e r s it ie s a n d o th e rs

t o h is c a u s e . A g r e a t a n t i -p a p a l d e m o n s t r a t io n t o o k

p la c e o n 2 4 J u n e

1 3 0 3 .

M e n d i c a n t s o f P a r is m a r c h e d

i n t h e p r o c e s s io n . B e r t h o l d o f St D e n is , B i s h o p o f

O r le a n s a n d e x -C h a n c e l lo r o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r is ,

t o g e t h e r w i t h t w o D o m in i c a n s a n d t w o F r a n c is c a n s ,

a d d re s se d t h e m e e t in g . T h e f o l l o w i n g d a y r o y a l c o m

m is s io n e r s e x a m in e d e a c h f r i a r a t t h e F r a n c i s c a n c o n v e n t

t o f in d o u t w h e t h e r h e w a s w i t h o r a g a in s t t h e K i n g . So m e

s e v e n ty f r ia r s , m o s t ly F r e n c h , s id e d w i t h t h e K i n g , w h i l e

t h e re s t (s o m e e i g h t y o d d ) r e m a i n e d l o y a l t o th e P o p e .

A m o n g th e l a t t e r w e f in d t h e n a m e o f Sc o tu s . A c c o r d i n g

to r o y a l o r d e r s , t h e P o p e 's p a r t is a n s w e r e t o le a v e F r a n c e

w i t h i n th r e e d a y s . B o n i f a c e c o u n t e r e d w i t h t h e B u l l o f

15 A u g u s t

1 3 0 3 ,

i n w h i c h h e s u sp e n d e d t h e U n i v e r s i t y 's

r i g h t t o g iv e d e g re e s i n t h e o l o g y , c a n o n a n d c i v i l l a w .

T h is b a n w a s w i t h d r a w n b y P o p e B e n e d ic t X i n A p r i l

1 3 0 4 , a n d s h o r t l y a f te r w a r d s t h e K i n g f a c i l i t a t e d t h e

r e t u r n o f s tu d e n t s .

W h e r e Sc o tu s w e n t d u r i n g t h is e x i l e is u n k n o w n .

E n g l a n d ,

B o l o g n a a n d C o l o g n e h a v e a l l b e e n s u g g e s te d .

P e ls te r b e lie v e s t h a t th e e x i le m u s t h a v e b e e n s h o r t a n d

t h a t Sc o tu s w a s s o o n b a c k i n P a r is c o m m e n t i n g o n

B o o k s I I a n d I I I a t le a s t b y 1 3 0 4 . H e e i th e r f in i s h e d h is

le c tu r e s o n B o o k I I I b y J u n e o f t h a t y e a r , o r p e r h a p s

c o n t in u e d t o le c t u re d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r u n t i l t h e f o l lo w

i n g Se p t e m b e r . T h e r e m a i n i n g p a r t s o f B o o k I I I , P e ls te r

m a i n t a i n s , w e r e c o m p l e t e d a t a n o t h e r t i m e i n E n g l a n d .

B e th a t as i t m a y , b y N o v e m b e r 1304 Sc o tu s m u s t h a v e

c o m p l e t e d a l l o f h is r e q u i re m e n t s a s a bachelor f o r m a t us .

I n f a c t , h e w a s th e r e s p o n d e n t i n G i le s o f L i g n y 's d is pu ta tio



XVI DU NS SCOTUS

i n a u l a ( w h i c h f o l l o w e d t h e

vesperies

as a p a r t o f t h e f o r

m a l i t ie s connected w i t h G i le s 's i n c e p t io n as m a s t e r

o f t h e o l o g y ) . T o p a r t i c i p a t e i n s u c h a d i s p u t a t i o n ,

h o w e v e r , S c o t u s h a d t o h a v e c o m p l e t e d h i s l e c t u r e s

o n t h e Sentences b e fo r e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e a u t u m n

t e r m .

P r o b a b l y S c o tu s 's o w n i n c e p t io n as m a s t e r t o o k p l a c e

e a r l y i n

1 3 0 5 .

T h a t t h e c u s t o m a r y i n t e r v a l b e t w e e n t h e

c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e le c tu r e s o n t h e Sentences a n d b e i n g

l ic e n s e d as m a s te r ( fo u r y e a r s a c c o r d i n g t o u n i v e r s i t y

s ta tu te s ) d i d n o t in t e r v e n e w a s d u e p r o b a b l y t o o n e o f

t h e m a n y p r iv i le g e s g r a n t e d t o t h e f r i a r s .

T h e f a c t t h a t w e h a v e b u t o n e Q u o d l i b e t o f S c o t u s

a rg u e s t h a t h e m a y n o t h a v e t a u g h t as r e g e n t m a s t e r f o r

m o r e t h a n o n e y e a r . G l o r i e u x d a te s t h i s 1 3 0 6 - 7 , t h o u g h

i f Sc o tu s b e g a n t e a c h in g i n t h e a u t u m n o f 1305 h i s

r e g e n c y c o u l d h a v e te r m i n a t e d i n

1 3 0 6 .

P e l s te r b e lie v e s

h e r e t u r n e d t o E n g l a n d i n t h a t y e a r a n d c o m p o s e d t h e

L e c tu ra c om p le ta , b u t th i s is l i t t l e m o r e t h a n a s u r m is e . H e

m a y h a v e g o n e d i r e c t l y f r o m P a r is t o C o l o g n e . A t a n y

r a t e ,

t h e la s t r e c o r d o f Sc o tu s 's l i f e i n d ic a t e s t h a t h e w a s

i n C o lo g n e i n F e b r u a r y 1 3 0 8 , a n d i f h e h a d b e e n t e a c h i n g

d u r i n g th e c u r r e n t s e m e s te r, as t h e t i t l e " l e c t o r C o l o n i a e "

in d i c a t e s , h e m u s t h a v e b e g u n a t le a s t b y t h e a u t u m n o f

1 3 0 7 .

V a r i o u s r e as on s h a v e b e e n a s s ig n e d f o r h is p re s e n c e i n

C o l o g n e . C a l le b a u t a n d o th e r s h a v e a r g u e d t h a t t h e

M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l o f t h e F r ia r s s e n t h i m t h e r e t o e s ca p e

th e c o n se q u e n ce s o f h is o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e K i n g 's a c t i o n

a g a i n s t t h e K n i g h t s T e m p l a r s o r t h a t Sc o tu s 's d e p a r t u r e

w a s c o n n e c t e d i n s o m e w a y w i t h h is d e f e n c e o f t h e -d o c

t r i n e o f t h e I m m a c u l a t e C o n c e p t io n a g a in s t i t s D o m i n i c a n

a d v e r s a r ie s . L o n g p r e su gg es ts a m o r e p r o s a ic r e a s o n ,

a n d o n e p e rh a p s n e a re r th e t r u t h , n a m e l y t h e c o m m o n

c u s t o m i n t h e O r d e r o f s e n d in g th e m o r e b r i l l i a n t l e c t o r s

f r o m o n e s t u d y h o u s e t o a n o t h e r i n r o t a t i o n . A t a n y

r a t e ,

Sc o tu s s e r v e d a b r i e f l e c t o r s h i p a t C o l o g n e . T h e

(2,322)



I NTR O D U CTI O N XV11

t r a d i t i o n a l d a t e o f h i s d e a t h i s 8 N o v e m b e r

1 3 0 8 .

H i s

r e m a i n s a r e s t i l l v e n e r a t e d i n C o l o g n e .

I t is d e p l o r a b l e t h a t Sc o t u s 's e a r ly d e a t h le f t a l m o s t

e v e r y o n e o f h i s g r e a t w o r k s i n a n unfinished s t a te . B u t

so g r e a t w a s h is fa m e a n d f o l lo w i n g t h a t h is d is c ip le s

m a d e e v e r y e f f o r t to p u t h is w r i t in g s b e f o re th e p u b l ic .

W i t h a p p a r e n t ly m o r e h a s te t h a n p r u d e n c e , t h e y s h u f f le d

to g e t h e r e a r l i e r a n d la t e r r e d a c t io n s , in s e r t e d p a r ts t o b e

d e l e t e d a l o n g s i d e t h e i r c o r r e c t e d s u b s t i t u t e s a n d i n c o r

p o r a t e d n o t e s f o u n d i n t h e m a r g i n s o r o n s c a t t e r e d s l i p s

s a n d w ic h e d b e t w e e n t h e p a ge s o f t h e m a s t e r . I t is o n l y

a f te r s o m e t h i r t y o d d y e a rs o f in te n s e r e s e a rc h b y m e n

l i k e P e l s t e r , P e l z e r , L o n g p r e , Balic a n d o t h e r s t h a t s o m e

s e m b l a n c e o f o r d e r h a s b e g u n t o e m e r g e f r o m t h e c h a o s .

N o t o n l y h a v e m a n y t re a t is e s b e e n p r o v e d s p u r io u s , b u t

e v e n th e c e r t a i n l y a u t h e n t i c w r i t in g s a p p e a r i n a n e w

l ig h t . T o d a y t h e f o l l o w i n g w o r k s a r e a s c r ib e d to Sc o tu s .

THEOLOGICAL WORKS

I . C o m m e n t a r i e s o n the Sentences

S c o t u s

c o m m e n t e d

o n the Sentences o f P e t e r L o m b a r d a t

l e a s t t w i c e , o n c e a t O x f o r d a n d a g a i n a t P a r i s . F r o m

t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y d o w n t o o u r o w n , t h e s e t w o

c o m m e n t a r i e s w e r e r e f e r r e d t o r e s p e c t i v e l y a s t h e O p u s

oxon iense ( o r O rd i n a t io ) a n d t h e O p u s p a r is i e n s e ( o r R e p o r la t a

p a r is ie n s ia ). M o d e r n re s e a r c h h a s n o t o n l y r e v e a l e d th e

e x is te n c e o f o t h e r u n e d i te d r e p o r t s o f th e s e le c t u re s o n t h e

Sentences b u t h a s re d is c o v e r e d t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e te r m s

o rd in a tio a n d re p o rta tio . T h e o r i g i n a l le c t u r e o f a m a s te r

o r b a c h e l o r a s c o p i e d d o w n b y o n e o f h is s t u d e n ts , o r

s o m e s c r ib e , is k n o w n a s a re p o rta tio . I f s u c h a " r e p o r t e d

v e r s i o n " w a s la t e r c h e c k e d b y t h e t e a c h e r h i m s e l f , i t is

r e f e r r e d t o as a re p o rta tio e x a m in a ta . I n m a n y c ase s t h e

a u t h o r w o u l d re v is e h is o r i g i n a l le c t u r e s b e fo r e p r e

s e n t in g t h e m f o r f i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n . T h i s la s t r e d a c t io n

(2,322)



X V 1 1 1 D U N S S C O T U S

o r fin is h e d p r o d u c t is k n o w n as a n o rd in a tio , in a s m u c h as

i t r e p re s e n ts t h e f in a l d r a f t as o r d e r e d o r a r ra n g e d b y t h e

a u th o r h i m se lf. A s a p p l ie d t o S co tu s 's C om m entary on the

Sentences, the Ord ina tio , to w h ic h the re d a c to r o f the A ss is i

m a n u s c r i p t , u s e d b y u s

(Communalis

137) ,

h a d a c c e ss ,

is a r e v is io n o f th e O x f o r d le c tu r e s . I n t e r n a l e v id e n c e

s u g g e s t s t h a t s o m e p a r t s o f t h e r e d a c t i o n a n t e d a t e t h e

P a r i s l e c t u r e s , w h i l e f o r o t h e r p o r t i o n s S c o t u s m a d e u s e

o f a repo rta tio o f th e la t te r . Th e Opus oxoniense as w e

h av e i t i n t h e W a d d i n g a n d Vives e d i t i o n s i s n o t t h e

p u r e O r d i n a t i o , h o w e v e r , b u t c o n t a i n s o t h e r e l e m e n t s .

O n e o f t h e p r i n c i p a l t a s k s o f t h e S c o t i s t i c C o m m i s s i o n

u n d e r t h e d ir e c t io n o f C a r l B a l ic ,

o . f . m .

a t R o m e i s t o

re c o n s t ru c t t h e t e x t o f

th e

o r i g i n a l O rd in a tio a n d s e p a r a te

i t f r o m th e m a jo r a n d m in o r a d d it io n s ta k e n f ro m o th e r

w r it in g s o f D u n s Sc o tu s . T h e e n o r m it y o f th is ta s k c a n

b e r e a lis e d f ro m th e f a c t t h a t i t w a s o n ly a f te r t w e lv e

y e a r s t h a t B a l i c a n d h i s m a n y c o l l a b o r a t o r s p u b l i s h e d

t h e f i r s t s m a l l f r a c t i o n o f t h e m o n u m e n t a l O r d i n a t i o i n

th e t w o i n i t ia l vo lu m e s o f th e c r i t ic a l Va t ic a n e d i t io n o f

the Opera omn ia o f Sco tus (R om e 1950).

I n a d d it io n t o th e O rd in a tio , w h i c h c o n s t itu te s th e

p r in c ip a l p a r t o f the Opus oxoniense , the re is the Lec tu ra

oxoniensis [Opera om nia , V a t ic a n e d ., v o l . xvi) o n t h e

f i r s t a n d second books o f the Sentences. Som et im es re

f e r r e d t o as P r i m a

lec tura,

i t is b e lie v e d t o b e a re p o rta tio o f

Sc o tu s 's f ir s t le c tu re s a t Ox fo rd . S t i l l a n o th e r re p o rta tio is

t h e L e ctu ra in I I I Se nte ntia ru m ( s t i l l u n e d i te d ). I t is a lso

c a lle d th e L ec tu ra com p leta i n c o n t r a d i s t in c t io n t o t h e

P a r is ia n re po rta tio o f th e t h i r d b o o k w h i c h en ds a b r u p t ly

a f t e r D i s t .

x v n .

A n o th e r set o f q u e s tio n s o n th e f ir s t tw o b o o ks o f th e

Sentences goes by na m e o f Add itiones m agnae. U n l ik e the

"s m a l l a d d i t io n s " c o n s is tin g o f a p a r a g r a p h o r s o, th es e

a r e a s e r i e s o f c o m p l e t e q u e s t i o n s i n t e n d e d b y S c o t u s t o

s u p p l e m e n t h i s p r e v i o u s c o u r s e s o n t h e f i r s t a n d s e c o n d

b o ok s o f

th e

Sentences. Th e f i rs t b o o k o f

th e

Add itiones w as



INTRODUCTION

XIX

e d i t e d b y W a d d i n g a n d Vives a s p a r t o f t h e R e p o r t a t a

p a r i s i e n s i a .

T h e d i f fe r e n t r e d a c t io n s o f t h e re p orta tio n es o f P a r is

l e c t u r e s a r e n o w g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i s e d t o b e d u e t o a

d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e s c r i b e s w h o r e p o r t e d t h e l e c t u r e s o r t o

c h a n g e s m a d e l a t e r , p e r h a p s e v e n a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f

Sc o tu s h im s e l f . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f th e s e re po rta tio ne s

is t h a t a u t h e n t i c a t e d b y Sc o tu s a n d k n o w n as t h e

R e p o r t a t i o m a g n a o r R e p o r t a t i o examinata ( u n e d i t e d ) . O n e

r e d a c t io n o f th e R e p o rta tio p a ris ie n s is w a s e d i t e d a t P a r is

(1517-18)

a n d d i f f e r s c o n s id e r a b ly f r o m t h e v e r s io n f o u n d

i n W a d d i n g a n d V i v e s . T h e l a t t e r is a m i x t u r e o f v a r io u s

e le m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e A d d itio n e s

magnae

a n d e v e n p a r ts

o f t h e O p u s oxoniense (e s p e c i a lly i n t h e t h i r d b o o k ) .

2 .

D i s p u t a t i o n s

S c o t u s h e l d s e v e r a l i s o l a t e d d i s p u t a t i o n s b o t h a s

b a c h e l o r a n d as m a s te r . H e f u n c t io n e d i n t h e f o r m e r

ro le a t t h e Vesperies of P h i l i p o f B r i d l i n g t o n , o . f . m . i n O x f o r d

a s w e l l a s i n t h e d is p u ta tio i n a u la o n t h e o c c a s io n o f G i le s

o f L i g n y ' s p r o m o t io n as m a s te r i n P a r is . T h e d i s p u t e

w i t h P e te r G o d i n , o . p . o n th e p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n

a s w e l l a s t h e Qu a e stio d is p u t a ta

de

f o r m a l it a t e , r e f e r r e d t o

b y A d a m Wodam as L o g ic a Sc o ti, s ee m t o b e t h e w o r k o f

Sc o tu s as m a s t e r . M o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n th e s e is o l a te d ,

a n d fo r t h e m o s t p a r t u n e d i t e d , d i s p u t a t io n s a r e t h e

Quaestiones quod libe ta les a n d th e C o lla t ione s pa ris ienses e t

oxon ienses. T h e f o r m e r c o m p r i s e t w e n t y -o n e q u e s t io n s

( th o u g h t h e r e is so m e d o u b t as t o t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y o f t h e

t w e n t y - f i r s t ) d i s p u t e d b y Sc o tu s as r e g e n t m a s t e r i n

P a r i s , a n d r e p r e s e n t o n e o f t h e l a te s t a n d m o s t m a t u r e o f

Sc o tu s 's w o r k s . T h e C o lla tio n es a r e m u c h s h o r te r q u e s

t i o n s .

L i t t l e a n d P e l s te r c o n s id e r t h e m as "p r i v a t e

d is p u t a t i o n s o f t h e s tu d e n t s i n th e F r a n c i s c a n h o u s e . . .

i n w h i c h t h e b a c h e lo r D u n s S c o tu s , p r o b a b l y a s m a s te r

o f s tu d e n ts , t o o k a l e a d i n g p a r t " . A c c o r d i n g t o Balic



XX DUNS SCOTUS

t h e y a r e f o r ty - s i x i n n u m b e r , n i n e t e e n o f w h i c h w e r e

h e l d i n P a r is a n d th e re s t i n O x f o r d . O n l y f o r t y a r e

f o u n d i n

Wadding-Vives

( o n e b e i n g p r i n t e d a m o n g t h e

i n a u t h e n t i c Q u a e s t i o n e s

miscellaneae de f o r m a l it a t ib u s ,

q . I

V i v e s ,

v . 5 , 3 3 8 - 5 3 ) . O f t h e r e m a i n i n g s i x , f iv e h a v e

b e e n e d i t e d b y H a r r i s {D u n s Sco tu s, v . 2 . , O x f o r d 1927)

a n d Balic l a t e r m a d e a n o t h e r e d i t i o n o f t h e f i r s t t h r e e

Collationes

f o u n d i n H a r r i s

(Bogoslovni

V e s t n i k r x ,

1 9 3 9 ,

1 8 5 - 2 1 9 ) .

P h i l o s o p h i c a l W o r k s

T h e T r a c t a t u s de primo p r in c ip io is a s h o r t b u t i m p o r t a n t

c o m p e n d i u m o f Sc o tu s 's n a t u r a l t h e o lo g y . I t se e m s t o b e

o n e o f h is la t e s t w o r k s a n d d r a w s h e a v i l y o n t h e O rd in a t io .

I t is a v a i l a b l e i n t w o m o d e r n e d i t i o n s , t h a t o f M . M u e l le r ,

o . f . m . ( F r e i b u r g im B r e i s g a u 1941) a n d E . R o c h e , o . f . m .

(St B o n a v e n t u r e , N . Y . , 1 9 4 9 ). A ls o a u t h e n t ic a r e t h e

Qu a estio n es su b t ilis s im a e i n M e t a p h y s ic a m A r i s t o t e l i s , a l t h o u g h

t h e la s t t w o b o o k s ( X a n d X I I ) f o u n d i n th e W a d d i n g

a n d Vives e d i t io n s a r e s p u r io u s . O n c e b e l i e v e d t o b e a n

e a r li e r w o r k o f Sc o tu s , i t se e m s t o h a v e b e e n c o m p o s e d

o r a t le a s t r e v is e d a b o u t th e t i m e S c o tu s w a s w o r k i n g o n

t h e O rd in a t io . L i k e th e la t t e r , t h e te x t o f th e s e q u e s t io n s

as f o u n d i n o u r e d i t io n s is i n a d e p l o r a b l e s t a t e .

S o m e w h a t le ss c e r t a i n is t h e q u e s t io n o f t h e a u t h e n t i

c i t y o f t h e Q u a e s t i o n e s i n l i b r o s A r i s t o t e l i s D e

a n i m a ,

w h i c h

i n a d d i t i o n t o d o c t r i n a l d is c re p a n c ie s w i t h t h e c e r t a i n l y

a u t h e n t ic w o r k s , c o n ta i n s p assa ge s t h a t a r e f o u n d l i t e r a l l y

i n G o n s a lv u s o f S p a i n .

O f t h e l o g i c a l w r i t i n g s f o u n d i n t h e W a d d i n g a n d

Vives e d i t i o n s , t h e f o l lo w i n g a r e g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d as

g e n u i n e w o r k s o f S c o t u s : Qu ae stio ne s su pe r U n i v e r s a lia

P o r p h y r i i ,

Quaest iones in

librum

P raed icam en to rum , Quaes tiones

i n I e t I I l ib r u m

P e r i h e r m e n i a s ,

Opus secundum s ive oc to quaes

t i ones i n duos l i b ros Pe r ihe rmen ias , Quaes t i ones i n l i b ros E l e n -

c h o r u m .

T h e r e a r e s t i l l s o m e d i f f i c u l t ie s c o n n e c t e d w i t h



INTRODUCTION

XXI

th es e w o r k s , h o w e v e r , so t h a t p e r h a p s th e

final

w o r d o n

t h e i r a u t h e n t i c i t y s t i l l r e m a i n s t o b e s a id .

E v e n m o r e d u b i o u s a re t h e Th e ore m a ta . I n t e r n a l

e v id e n c e m i l i t a t e s v e r y s t r o n g ly a g a i n s t th e i r a u t h e n t ic i t y ,

t h o u g h e x t e r n a l re a so n s f a v o u r i t . E v e n i f D u n s Sc o tu s

is d e f in i te l y e s ta b l is h e d as t h e i r a u t h o r , th e p r o b l e m o f

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t i l l r e m a i n s , f o r t h i s s m a l l t r a c t see m s t o

b e s im p l y n o te s o r o u t lin e s o f p r o b l e m s , r a t h e r t h a n a

f i n i s h e d c o m p o s i t i o n .

T h e f o l lo w i n g p h i l o s o p h ic a l w o r k s f o u n d i n t h e

W a d d i n g a n d Vives c o l l e c t i o n s , h o w e v e r , a r e d e f i n i t e l y

s p u r i o u s : Grammatica s pe cu la tiv a ( Th o m a s o f E r f u r t ) ,

Quaest iones in librum I e t I I p r io r u m Analyticorum Aristotelis

( u n k n o w n S c o t is t ) , Qu ae stio ne s i n lib r u m I et

IIposteriorum

A n a ly tic o r u m ( J o h n o f C o r n w a l l ) , E x p o s it io e t qu ae stio ne s i n

V I I I l i b r o s Physicorum A r is to te lis ( M a r s i l i u s o f I n g h e n ) ,

Meteorologicorum libri q ua tu o r ( a u t h o r u n k n o w n ) , E x p o s itio

i n X I I l ib ro s Metaphysicorum A r i s t o t e l i s s e u M e t a p h y s i c a

t e x t u a l i s ( A n t o n i u s A n d r e a s ) , C o n c l u s i o n e s

utilissimae

ex

l ib r i s M e ta p h y s ic o r u m A r is t o t e l is c o lle c ta e ( G o n s a l v u s o f

Spa in ) , Quaes t i ones d i spu ta tae de rerum p r in c ip i o (Vitalis d u

F o u r ) ,

Quaest iones miscel laneae de formalitatibus—except

t h e f i r s t question—(Nicholas o f L y r a a n d W i l l i a m o f

A l n w i c k ) , a n d D e c o g nitio n e D e i tra c ta tu s im p e rfe c tu s .

T h e e d i t io n s m o s t f re q u e n t ly u s e d a r e t h e s e . Ope ra

o m n ia , e d i te d b y L u k e W a d d i n g , o . f . m . ( L y o n s

1639)

i n

tw e l v e v o l u m e s . I n a d d i t io n to t h e t e x t , t h i s e d i t io n

c o n ta i n s n o t e s , s u m m a r ie s a n d c o m m e n t a r ie s b y fa m o u s

S c o t i s t s . T h e Vives e d i t i o n ( P a r i s 1891-5) i n t w e n t y -

f o u r v o lu m e s is p r a c t i c a l l y a r e p r i n t o f W a d d i n g w i t h o u t

t h e la t t e r 's in d ic e s . T h e n e w c r i t i c a l e d i t io n o f t h e

Op era o m n ia , p r e p a r e d b y t h e S c o t is t ic C o m m is s io n i n

R o m e a n d p u b l i s h e d b y th e V a t i c a n C i t y P r e ss , w a s

b e g u n i n 1950 a n d is s t i l l i n c o m p l e t e . O f t h e s in g le w o r k s

w e h a v e th e t w o m o d e r n e d i t io n s o f th e Tra c ta tu s de primo

p r in c ip io m e n t io n e d a b o v e . T h e e d i t i o n o f R o c h e is

a c c o m p a n i e d b y a n E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t io n . T h e f i r s t t w o



XX11 DU N S SCOTUS

b o o k s

o f t h e

Op u s

o x o n i e n s e

w e r e e d i t e d

b y M .

F e r n a n d e z

G a r c i a , o . f . m . u n d e r t h e t i t l e C o m m e n t a r i a o x o n i e n s i a

( Q u a r a c c h i ,

1 9 1 2 - 1 4 ) a n d t h e

Q u a e s t i o n e s q u o d l i b e t a l e s

o f

th e W a d d i n g e d i t io n are available i n a p h o to -o f fs e t r e p r i n t

b y th e F r a n c is c a n I n s t it u t e (St B o n a v e n tu r e , N . Y . , 1 9 5 0).

S E L E C T B I B L I O G R A P H Y

T h e b e s t b i b l i o g r a p h y t o d a t e i s t h a t p r e p a r e d f o r t h e

S c o t i s t i c C o m m i s s i o n b y O d u l f u s Schafer, o . f. m . , B ib l io -

g r a p h i a

d e

v i t a , o p e r ib u s

e t

d o c t r in a I o h a n n i s

D u n s

S c o l i

D o c t o r i s

S u b t i l i s

a c

M a r i a n i

sa e c u lo ru m X I X - X X , R o m a e :

O r b i s C a t h o l i c u s , H e r d e r , 1955. A ls o re c o m m e n d e d is

th e b ib l io g r a p h y o f C . R . S. H a r r i s , D un s Scotus, v o l . i ,

O x f o r d : C la r e n d o n P re ss, 1927, a n d t h a t o f M a u r ic e

G r a j e w s k i , o . f . m . , " S c o t i s t i c B i b l i o g r a p h y o f t h e L a s t

Decade (1929-39)" , F ranc iscan Stud ies,

v o l s ,

i a n d 11

( 1 94 1 - 2 ) .

B e t t o n i ,

E . , o . f .m . , Duns Scotus : The Bas ic P rinc ip les

of h is Phi losophy, t r a n s , a n d e d . B . B o n a n s e a, o . f .m . ,

W a s h in g to n , D.C. : C a t h o lic U n i v e r s i t y o f A m e r ic a ,

1961.

C a m p b e l l , B . J . , o . f. m . , Th e P ro ble m o f One o r P lu ra l

Substantial Forms

in M a n as

Found

in the W orks o f St Thom as

A qu in as a n d J o hn D u n s Scotus, P h ila d e lp h ia : U n i v e r s i ty

o f P e n n s y lv a n ia , 1940.

C o p le s to n , F . C ,

s . j . ,

A H is to ry o f P h ilo so p hy , v o l .

h

( M e d ie v a l P h ilo s o p h y f r o m A u g u s t in e t o Sc o tu s ),

L o n d o n : B u r n s , Oa te s a n d W a s h b o u rn e ,

1950.

D a y , S . J . , o . f . m . , I n t u i t iv e C o g n i t i o n : A K e y to t h e

S i g n i f i c a n c e

o f

th e L a t e r Sc h o l a s t ic s ,

S t

B o n a v e n t u r e ,

N . Y . :

F r a n c i s c a n I n s t i t u t e , 1947.

G i l s o n , £ . , T h e S p i r i t o f M e d i e v a l P h i l o s o p h y , t r a n s .

A . H . C . D o w n e s. L o n d o n : She ed a n d

W a r d , 1936.



SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Xxili

G r a je w s k i , M . J . ,

o . f .m . ,

Th e F o r m a l D is t in c t io n o f D u n s

Scotus, W a s h i n g t o n , D.C. : C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y o f

A m e r i c a ,

1 9 4 4 .

M i c k l e m ,

N . , R e a so n a n d R e v e la tio n : A Qu e stio n f r o m

D u n s Sco tu s, E d i n b u r g h : N e l s o n , 1953 ; se e a l s o A .

B.

W o l t e r , " D u n s Sc o tu s a n d t h e N e c e s s ity o f R e v e a le d

K n o w l e d g e . P r o lo g u e to th e O rd in a tio o f J o h n D u n s

S c o t u s " , F r a n c i s c a n S t u d i e s , x i , n . 3 - 4 ( S e p t . -D e c . 1951,)

2 3 1 - 7 2 .

S a i n t -M a u r i c e , B e r a u d d e , J o h n D u n s Sc o tu s : A

Te ache r f o r o ur Tim e s , t r a n s . C . D u f f y , o . f . m . , St B o n a -

v e n t u r e , N . Y . : F r a n c i s c a n In s t i t u t e ,

1 9 5 5 .

S h a r p , D . E . , F ra n c is c a n P h ilo s o p hy a t O x f o r d i n th e

Th ir te e n th C e n tu ry , O x f o r d : U n i v e r s i t y P re s s , 1 9 3 0 .

S h i r c e l , C . L . , o . f . m . , Th e U n iv o c ity o f the C on ce pt o f

B e in g i n the P h ilo so p h y o f J o h n D u n s Sc otu s, W a s h i n g t o n ,

D . C . : C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y o f A m e r i c a , 1 9 4 2 .

V i e r , P . C , o . f . m . , E v id en ce a n d I t s F u n c t io n A c c o rd in g

to J o h n D u n s Sco tus, St B o n a v e n t u r e , N . Y . : F r a n c i s c a n

I n s t i t u t e , 1 9 5 1 .

W o l t e r , A . B . , o . f . m . , Th e Tra n sc en d en ta ls a n d Th e i r

F u n c tio n i n the M e ta p h y sic s o f D u n s Sc otu s, S t B o n a v e n t u r e ,

N . Y . : F r a n c i s c a n I n s t i t u t e , 1 9 4 6 .

K l i b a n s k y , R . , C o m m e n ta riu m de E c k a r d i m a g is te rio

(Magistri E c k a rd i Op era L a t i n a , v o l .

x i i i ,

p p .

xxxf.,

L i p s i a e 1936) p r o v i d e s c o n f i r m a t io n o f Sc o tu s 's p re s e n ce

i n P a r is d u r i n g t h e s c h o la s t ic y e a r

1302-03

a n d s h o w s

t h a t i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y S c o t u s , as b ac ca la re us Se n te n tia ru m ,

t o o k p a r t i n t h e fa m o u s d i s p u t a t i o n b e tw e e n t h e

F r a n c is c a n M a s t e r G o n s a lv u s a n d t h e D o m i n i c a n

M a s t e r E c k h a r t .





1

C O N C E R N I N G M E T A P H Y S I C S

Summary

i .

Metaphysics, the science of the transcendentals

2.

Concept and articulation of the transcendental

3. Primacy of be in g among the other transcendentals

4. On the deduction of the attributes of be in g

5. Being as the subject and God as the goal o f metaphysics



DUNS SCOTUS

[ I .

DE m e t a p h y s i c a ]

[ i .

METAPHYSICA,

UT

SCIENTIA TRANSCENDENTIUM]

*

Necesse est esse

a l i q u a m

sc ien t iam un i ve rsa lem, quae

per

se

cons idere t i l ia t rans cend ent ia ,

et

han c sc ien t iam

vocamus metaphys icam, quae d ic i tu r a m e t a , q u o d est

t rans, et

physis scie ntia , q uas i transcenden s sc ient ia,

quia est

de

t ranscend ent ibus.

[ 2 .

DE

TRANSCENDENTIS NOTIONE EJUSQUE D IVISIONE] f

Sed tunc est dub ium, qua l ia sunt

i l i a

p raed i ca ta , quae

d i c u n t u r

de Deo

[ f o r m a l i t e r ] ,

ut

sapiens, bonus,

etc.

Respondeo

:

ens p r ius d i v id i t u r

in

i n f i n i t u m

et

finitum

q u a m

in decern p rae d ica me nta , q u ia

a l t e r u m

i s to rum,

sci l icet

[ens]

finitum,

est

c o m m u n e

ad

decern ge ner a.

Ergo

q u a e c u m q u e

conven iun t en t i ut

ind i f fe rens

ad

finitum et infinitum,

vel

ut est

proprium

enti infinito,

conveniunt sibi non ut

determinatur

ad genus sed ut

prius, et per consequens, ut est transcendens et est extra

omne

genus. Quaecumque sunt

communia Deo

et

creaturae, sunt talia quae conveniunt enti ut est indif

ferens ad finitum et infinitum ; ut enim conveniunt Deo

sunt infinita, ut creaturae sunt finita. Ergo [ilia] per

prius conveniunt enti quam ens dividatur in decern

genera, et per consequens quodcumque tale est trans

cendens.

Sed tunc est aliud dubium, quomodo ponitur sa-

* Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, prol., n. 5

(Vives,

v o l .

v i i ,

5a).

t Opus oxoniense,

1

dist.

v m, q. iii

(Assisi 137,

f.

50va

;

cf. Vives,

v o l .

ix, 597('-598<<).



CONCERNING METAPHYSICS 2

[ I . CONCERNING METAPHYSICS]

[ i . METAPHYSICS, THE SCIENCE OF THE

TRANSCENDENTALS]

There must necessarily exist some universal science

w h ich considers the transcendentals as such. This

science we call m eta ph ys ics , from m e t a , wh ich

means b e y o n d , an d th e science of na tur e .1 I t is, as

it were, the transcending science, because it is concerned

with the transcendentals.

[ 2 .

CONCEPT AND ARTICULATION OF THE

TRANSCENDENTAL]

Now a doubt arises as to what kind of predicates are

those wh ich are predicated form al ly of

Go d ,

for instance,

w i s e ,

g o o d , an d the l ike. I answer tha t before

b e i n g

is divided into the ten categories, it is divided

in to in fin ite an d finite. Fo r the latte r, na m ely finite

being, is com m on to the ten genera. W hatev er pertains

to b e i n g ,

then,

in so far as it remains indifferent to

finite an d in fin ite , or as pro per to the In fin ite B eing , does

not belong to i t as determined to a genus, but prior to

any such determination, and therefore as transcendental

an d outside any genus. W hatev er [predicates] are

common to God and creatures are of such

k i n d ,

perta in

ing as they do to being in its indifference to what is

inf init e an d f inite. Fo r in so far as they pe rta in to Go d

they are infinite, whereas in so far as they belong to

creatures they are finite. T he y belong to b e in g ,

then,

prior to the div is ion into the ten genera. A ny th in g of

this

k i n d ,

consequently, is transcendental.

B ut then another dou bt arises. H o w can wisd om be



3 DUNS SCOTUS

pientia transcendens, cum non sit communis omnibus

entibus, [e t transcendentia v iden tur com m unia o m nibu s] .

Respondeo, sicut de rat ione [generis] generalissimi non

est habere sub se plures species, sed non habere aliud

supraveniens genus sicut hoc

praedicamentum

Qu a n d o ,

quia non habet supraveniens genus, est general issimum,

licet paucas habeat species aut nullas, ita transcendens

quodcumque nul lum habet genus sub quo cont ineatur.

Unde de rat ione transcendentis est non habere praedica-

tum

supraveniens nis i ens. Sed q u o d

ipsum

s it com m une

ad multa inferio ra, hoc acc idi t . H oc p atet ex al io :

quia ens non tantum habet passiones simplices converti-

biles,

sicut

u n u m , v e r u m ,

et

b o n u m ,

sed habet al iquas

passiones ubi opposita dist inguuntur contra se, sicut

necesse esse

vel

poss ibile, actus

vel

poten t ia , et

hu jusm odi .

Sicut

autem

passiones conv ertibiles sunt transcendentes

q uia consequuntur ens inq ua ntu m non de term ina tur ad

aliquod genus, ita passiones disjunctae sunt transcen

dentes ; et utrumque m em br um i l lius d is junc t i est t rans

cendens, qu ia neutrum determinat suum determinabile

ad

certum

genus ; et

tamen

u n u m me mb ru m i l l i u s

d is junct i formaliter est speciale non conveniens nisi uni

ent i ,

sicut necesse esse in ista divisione necesse esse vel

possibi le esse, et inf initum in ista divisione f initum vel

i n f i n i t um , et sic de ali is.

I t a etiam potest sapientia esse transcendens et quod

cumque al iud quod est commune Deo et creaturae, l icet

a l iquod ta le d icatur de so lo Deo, a l iquod autem de Deo

et a l iq ua crea tura. N o n opo rtet au tem transcendens ut

transcendens dici de quocumque ente, nisi sit con-

vert ib i le cum

primo

transcendente, scil icet ente.




considered a transcendental i f i t is not common to al l

beings, for transcendentals seem to be common to all?

I answer th at ju st as it is no t o f the natu re o f a supreme

genus to have ma ny species con tained und er i t, b u t it is of

its nature not to have any genus over and above it (the

category o f w h e n , for instance, is a supreme genus

since it has no genus over and above it, although it has

few, if any, species contained under it), so also whatever

is not contained under any genus is transcendental.

Hen ce, not to have any predicate above i t except b e in g

pertains to the v ery no tio n of a transcendental. T h a t i t

be common to many inferior not ions, however, is purely

i nc identa l .

T his is ev ident too fro m the fact that b e in g

possesses not only attributes which are coextensive with

i t ,

such as o n e , t r u e and g o o d , bu t a lso at tr ibutes

which are opposed to one another such as

possible-or-

necessary , ac t-o r- po ten cy , and suchlike.

But if the coextensive attributes are transcendental

because they pe rtain to b e in g as no t determ ined to a

definite genus, then the disjunctive attributes are trans

cenden tal too. A n d bo th mem bers of the disjun ction are

transcendental since neither determines its determinable

eleme nt to a de finite genus. Nev ertheless, one mem ber

of the disjunction is proper and pertains formally to

one be ing alone , for instance, nece ssary in the dis

jun ct i on necessary-or-possible , or in f i n i t e in the

d isjunct ion f in i te - o r - in f in i te ,and so also w it h the others.

A n d so w is d o m , or an yth ing else, for that m atter,

which is common to God and creatures, can be trans

cendental .

A transcendental, howev er, m ay also be

predicated of God alone, or again i t may be predicated

ab ou t G o d an d some crea ture. I t is no t necessary,

then,

that a transcendental as transcendental be predicated

of every being, unless it be coextensive with the first of

the transcendentals, nam ely b e in g .



4 DUNS SCOTUS

[ 3 . DE

PRIMITATE

ENTIS

RESPECTU CAETERORUM

TRANSCEXDENTIUM] *

Dico quod ex is t is quatuor ra t ion ibus sequi tur , cum

nihil possit esse communius

ente,

et ens non possit esse

commune un ivocum d ic tum in qu id de omnibus per se

in te l l ig ib i l ibus, qu ia non de differentiis u l t im i s , nee de

passionibus

suis,

sequ i tu r qu od n ih i l est p r i m u m ob jec tum

intel lectus nostr i propter communitatem ipsius in quid

ad

omne

per se inte l l ig ib i le.

E t tamen hoc non obstante, d ico quod pr imum objec

tum intel lectus nostri est ens, quia in ipso concurri t

duplex pr imi tas, sc i l icet communi ta t is e t v i r tua l i ta t is .

N a m om ne per se inte l l ig ib i le aut in cl ud i t essential iter

rat ionem ent is, vel con t ine tu r v i r tua l i te r , vel essentialiter

in includen te essentia li ter ra t ion em ent is. O m n ia

enim

genera et species et individua et omnes partes essentiales

generum et ens increatum includunt ens

qu idd i ta t i ve .

Omnes autem

passiones entis includuntur in ente et in

suis inferior ibus v ir tual i ter.

I g i t u r

i l ia ,

qu ibus ens non est un ivocum d ic tum in

q u i d , inc luduntur in illis quibus ens est s ic univocum.

E t i ta patet q uo d ens habet

primitatem

communi ta t is ad

prima intel l ig ib i l ia, hoc est , ad conceptus quiddi tat ivos

generum e t spec ie rum e t ind iv iduorum e t par t ium

essentialium omnium is torum et ent is increat i , e t habet

pr imi ta tem v i r tua l i ta t is ad omnia in te l l ig ib i l ia inc lusa

in

primis

inte l l ig ib i l ibus, hoc est , ad conceptus qual i ta-

tivos

difTerentiarum

e t pass ionum propr iarum.

Q uo d autem supposui, com m un i ta tem entis

dicti

in

quid ad omnes conceptus quiddi tat ivos praedictos, hoc

* Opus oxonwue, ', dist. m, q. iii (Assisi 137, f. 280-291-4 ; cf.

Vives,

v o l . rx ioSfi-ma).




[ 3 . PRIMACY OF BEING AMONG THE

OTHER TRANSCENDENTALS]

A n d I say tha t . . since no th in g can be mo re

common than b e in g , and tha t b e i n g cannot be

predicated univocally and in quid 2 o f a ll th at is o f itself

intel l igible (because it cannot be predicated in this way

of the ult imate dif ferences

3

or of its attributes) ,4 i t

fol lows that we have no object of the intel lect that is

p ri m a ry b y reason o f a commonness in quid i n re gard to

al l that is of i tself intel l igible.

A n d yet , notw i thstanding , I say that b e in g is the

first object o f the inte l lect, because in i t a tw o fo ld pr im ac y

concurs, namely, a primacy of commonness and of

v irtua l i ty.5 For whatev er is o f i tself inte l l igible either

includes essentially the no tion of b e in g or is contained

virtually or essentially in something else which does

inc lud e b e in g essentially. Fo r a ll genera, species,

individuals, and the essential parts of genera, and the

U ncreated Being a l l inc lude

b e i n g

qu idd i ta t i ve ly . A l l

the ultimate differences are included essentially in some

of these. A l l the at t ributes of b e in g are v ir tu al ly

inc luded in b e in g and in those th ings w hich come

under be in g .

Hence, a l l to w hic h b e in g is no t univ ocal in quid are

inc luded in those to w hich b e in g is un ivo cal in th is

way. A n d so i t is c lear tha t b e in g has a prim acy o f

commonness in regard to the primary inte l l ig ib les, that

is , to the quidditative concepts of the genera, species,

individuals, and al l their essential parts, and to the

U ncreated Being. I t has a v i r tu a l pr im acy in regard to

the intell igible elements included in the first intell igibles,

tha t is, i n regar d to the q ua li fyin g concepts of the u lt im ate

differences and proper attributes.

M y supposit ion tha t b e in g is predicated com mo nly

in quid of al l the aforementioned quidditat ive concepts



5 DUNS SCOTUS

probatur de omnibus i l l is, duabus rationibus positis in

pr ima quaest ione hu jus d is t inct ion is ad probandum

communitatem entis ad ens creatum et inc rea tum , q uo d

ut pateat, pertracto eas al iqual i ter.

Primam

sic : de

quocumque enim

p raed ic to rum con -

cep tuum qu idd i ta t i vo rum con t ing i t i n te l l ec tum

certum

esse ipsum esse ens, du bit an do de dif fere nti is co ntr a-

hentibus ens ad

talem

con cep tum . E t i ta conceptus

entis,

u t conveni t ill i conceptui, est alius a conceptibus

i l lis infer ioribu s de q uibus inte l lectus est du bius ; i ta

al ius quod inclusus in utroque inferior i conceptu, nam

differentiae illae contrahentes praesupponunt eumdem

conceptum ent is communem

quem

con t rahunt .

Secundam rat ionem pertracto s ic, s icut argutum est

quod Deus non est cognoscibi l is a nobis natural i ter nisi

ens sit

univocum

creato et increato, i ta potest argui de

substantia et accidente ; cu m e nim sub stantia no n

immute t immedia te in te l lec tum nost rum ad a l iquam

inte l lect io ne m s ui, sed tantum accidens sensibile, sequitur

q u o d n u l l u m co n cep tu m q u id d i t a t i v u m poterimus habere

de ea nisi al iquis tal is possit abstrahi a conceptu

acci-

dent is. Sed nul lus ta lis q uid di ta t iv us , abstrahibi l is a

conceptu accidentis est nisi conceptus entis.

Q u o a d autem est suppositum de substant ia, quod non

immuta t in te l lec tum nost rum immedia te ad ac tum c i rca

se,

hoc pro batu r : q u ia q u id q u i d praesens i m m ut at

intel lectum i l l ius absentia potest natural i ter cognosci ab

in te l lectu,

quando non immutatur, sicut apparet secundo

D e

anima,*

quod visus est tenebrae perceptivus, quando

scil icet lux non est praesens, et ideo tunc visus non

im m uta tu r . Ig i tu r si in te l lec tus na tura l i te r im m uta tur

a substant ia immediate ad actum circa ipsam, sequeretur

quod quando substantia non esset praesens, posset

*

i i ,

cap. x

(420 ,

23).



CONCERNING METAPHYSICS

5

is established by the two arguments used in the init ial

question to prove that being is predicated commonly

of created and uncreated be ing [C f . pp . 2 0 -3 ] . T h at

what I have supposed may be evident, I now explain

these reasons a little.

I ex pla in the first reason thus. O f each of the afore

m en tioned concepts, the intel lec t can be certain that i t is

a being and st i l l be in doubt about the dif ferences which

de l im it b e in g to the concept in q uest ion. A n d so the

concept of being, in so far as it agrees with the concept

in question, is other than the dubious concepts which

come under i t . Bu t i t is other i n such a wa y tha t i t is

included in both of the concepts which come under i t ,

for these li m it in g differences presuppose the same concep t

of be ing which they l imi t .

T h e second reason I e x pla in as follows : W e arg ued

that God cannot be known natural ly unless being is

un iv oc al to the created an d uncreated. W e can argue

in the same way of substance and accident, for substance

does not immediately move our intel lect to know the

substance itself, b u t o n ly the sensible accident does so.

From this i t fo l lows that we can have no quiddi tat ive

concept of substance except such as could be abstracted

fro m the concept of an accident. Bu t the only q uid dit a

t ive concept of this kind that can be abstracted from

that of an accident is the concept of being.

Our assumption that substance does not immediately

move our intellect to know the substance itself, we prove

thus : I f som ething moves the intellec t w he n it is present,

then whenever the intel lect is not so moved, i t wi l l be

able to kn ow n atur al ly tha t this object is absent. Th is is

clear from the De anima, bk . i i , * according to which the

sense of sight can perceive darkness when, presumably,

light is not present, and the sense, in consequence, is not

m oved .

Th erefore , i f substance imm ed iately m ov ed the

intellect naturally to know the substance itself, it would

follow that when a substance was absent, the intellect

C i ? . 2 X 3



O DUNS SCOTUS

cognosci non esse praesens, et ita naturaliter posset cog-

nosci in hostia altaris consecrata non esse substantiam

panis,

quod est manifeste fa lsum. Nu l lus ig i tu r con-

ceptus quiddi tat ivus habetur natural i ter de substant ia

immediate causatus a substantia, sed

tantum

causatus

vel abstractus primo ab accident e, et illud non est nisi

conceptus entis.

Per idem conclud i tur

etiam propositum

de part ibus

essentialibus sub stan tiae. Si enim ma te r ia non immutat

in te l lectum ad actu m c i rca

ipsam , nee

form a substant ia l is,

quaero quis conceptus simplex in intellectu habeb i tu r

de mater ia ve l forma ? Si dicas q uo d al iq uis conceptus

relat ivus, puta part is, vel conceptus per accidens, puta

al icujus proprietat is materiae vel

f o rmae,

quaero quis

est conceptus quidditat ivus, cui iste per accidens vel

re la t ivus at t r ibu i tur

?

E t s i nu l lus q u idd i ta t iv us [h abe tur,

n ih i l er i t , cui at t r ibuatur iste conceptus per accidens,

nullus

autem

qu idd i ta t ivus] potest haber i n is i

impressus

vel abstractus ab illo q u o d movet in te l lec tum, pu ta ab

accidente, et ille erit conceptus entis. E t i t a n ih i l

cognoscetur de partibus essentialibus substantiae, nisi

ens sit commune univocum eis et accidentibus.

Istae

rat iones non includunt univocat ionem ent is in

quid ad differentias ultimas et passiones.

De prima, ostenditur quia aut inte l lectus est certus de

al iquo ta l i quod si t ens, dubitando utrum sit hoc vel

i l l ud ,

tamen non est certus quod si t ens quiddi tat ive sed

quasi predicatione per accidens.

V e l al i ter, et me lius : q ui l ib et tal is conceptus est

simpliciter s implex, et ideo non potest secundum al iquid

concipi et secundum al iquid ignorari , s icut patet per

Philosophum nono Metaphysicae, in fine,* de conceptibus

* ix , cap. ix

(1051'',

25).




D

could kn ow tha t i t was not present. He nce, i t cou ld

know naturally that the substance of bread does not

exist in the Consecrated V ic t i m of the A lta r, w hic h is

clearly false.6 N a tu ra lly ,

then,

we have no qu idd i ta t ive

concept of substance caused immediately by substance

itself . O u r only q uid dita t iv e concept thereof is tha t

caused by , or f irst abstracted fro m , an acciden t, and this

is none other than the concept of being.

By the same token, our conclusion holds for the

essential parts o f substance. Fo r if neithe r matte r n or

form move the intel lect to an act of knowledge about

themselves, I ask W h a t simple concept shall we have o f

m atter or fo rm ? I f you say tha t i t is some relat iv e

concept, for instance, of some part, or that it is an

incidental concept, for instance, of some property of

m atter or for m , then I ask W h a t is the qu iddi tat iv e

concept to which this incidental or relat ive concept is

at t r ibu ted ? A n d i f there is no q u idd i ta t ive concept,

there wi l l be nothing to which th is incidental concept

m ay be at tr ib ute d. Bu t the only q uidd i tat iv e concept

possible is caused by , or a bstracted fr o m , th at w h ic h does

mov e the intel lect, v iz. an accident. A n d this w il l be

the concept of being . Conseq uently, no thin g is kn ow n

o f the essential pa rts o f substance unless b e in g is

un ivoca l ,

common to them and to the accidents.

These reasons do no t im p ly tha t b e in g is pred icated

in quid o f the u lt im ate differences an d attribu tes.

The f irst does not, for the intel lect [according to the

argument] is certain that some such thing is a being

w hile i t doubts wh ether i t is this being or that. T h e

intel lect , however, is certa in that i t [v iz. an ul t imate

di f ference or at t r ibute] is not being quiddi tat ively, but

i t is as i t were b e in g by wa y of accidental pred icat ion.

O r another and better wa y. Ev ery such concept is

i rreducibly s imple 7 an d therefore one pa rt of i t cannot

be conceived while another part remains unknown, as

is evident from the statement of the Philosopher ( in



7

DUNS SCOTUS

simpl ic i ter s impl ic ibus, quod

non

est circa eos deceptio,

sicut est circa quidditatem complexorum ; q uod non

est

intelligendum

quasi inte l lectus simplex decipiatur

formal i ter c irca intellectionem qu idd i ta t is , qu ia in

intel lect ione simplici non est verum vel fa lsum, sed circa

quiddi tatem compositam potest inte l lectus simplex

v i r tua l i ter dec ip i . S i enim ista ratio est in se falsa, tunc

inc lud i t v i r tua l i te r propositionem falsam ; q uod autem

est s impl ic iter s imp lex, no n inc lud i t v i r tu a l i te r pro x im o

nee formal i ter proposi t ionem falsam, et ideo circa ipsam

non est deceptio. V e l en im to ta l i ter a t t ing i tur v e l non

at t ing i tur , e t tunc omnino igno ra tu r. D e nullo ig i tu r

simpliciter simplici conceptu potest esse cert i tudo secun

dum a l iqu id e jus et dubi ta t io secundum

a l iud .

Per hoc etiam patet ad secundam rationem supra

posi tam, q u ia ta le s imp l ic iter s implex o m nino est igno tum

nisi secundum se

totum

concip ia tur .

Ter t io e t iam

modo

potest responderi ad

primam

ra t i onem,

q u o d ille conceptus de quo est certitudo, est

alius ab illis de quibus est dubitatio, et si i l le certus

idem salvatur cum a l terut ro i l lo ru m du bio ru m , vere est

un ivocus, u t cu m a l terut ro i l lo ru m accip i tur . Sed non

oporte t quod ins i t u t r ique i l lo rum in q u i d , sed ut sic,

vel est univocus eis ut determinabil is ad determinantes,

vel ut denominabi l is ad denominantes. Unde brev i ter ,

ens est univocum in omnibus, sed conceptibus non

simpliciter simplicibus est univocus in quid dictus de eis ;

simpliciter simplicibus est univocus ut determinabil is

vel ut denominabi l is , non autem ut d ictum de eis in

qu i d ,

qu ia hoc inc lud i t contrad ic t ionem.

Ex his apparet quomodo in ente concurrat duplex




Metaphysics, b k . i x , nea r the end) th a t there is no decep

t ion regarding irreducibly simple concepts as there is re

ga rding the q uid di t y of w ha t is complex. Th is is not to

be unde rstood as thou gh the simple intel lect

8

is formally

deceived regarding the knowledge of quiddit ies, for in

simple inte l lec t ion there is neither tru th nor falsity. I n

regard to a quiddi ty that is composed, however, the

simple intel lect can be v irt ua l ly deceived. Fo r i f such

a notion is false in itself, then it includes virtually a false

prop osi t ion. Bu t w ha t is i rre du cib ly simple includes a

false proposi t ion nei ther v i r tual ly nor formal ly, and

therefore there is no deception i n its reg ard . E ith er it is

grasped total ly or not at al l , in which case it remains

com pletely un kn ow n. O f no i rred uc ibly s imple concept,

therefore, can we be certain of one part and doubtful

about another.

F ro m th is , it is clear also as far as the second reason

stated above is concerned, that what is so irreducibly

simple remains completely unknown unless i t is grasped

fully as it is in itself.

A third reply is possible regarding the first reason.

This concept of which we are certain is other than those

of w h ic h we are in dou bt. N ow if this same element of

w hi ch we are certain is preserved w it h bo th of the dou bt

ful concepts, it is truly univocal in the sense that it is

grasped w ith bo th of them. I t is no t necessary, how ev er,

that i t be contained in both of them in

quid,

but i t may

either be co ntained in quid or be univ oca l to the m as

determ inable is univ oca l to determ inant, or as wh at can

be deno m inated to w ha t denominates. T o put i t br ief ly,

then ,

b e in g is univ oca l for a l l . B ut for concepts that

are not i rreducibly s imple, i t is predicated of them uni-

v oc ally in quid ; for concepts irre du cib ly s imp le, i t is

univ oca l as som ething determ inable or d enom inable,

but it is not univocal in the sense that it is predicated

of the m in

quid,

for tha t wo uld be a contrad ic t ion.

A n d so i t is c lear how in b e in g there concurs a two -



H DUNS SCOTUS

primi tas, v ide l icet pr imi tas communicabilitatis in qu id

ad

omnes

conceptus

non

s im pl ic i ter s impl ices, et p r im itas

virtual i tat is in se vel in suis inferioribus ad omnes con

ceptus simpliciter simplices.

[ 4 . DE ENTIS PASSIONUM DEDUCTIONE] *

Q u a n t u m a d primum d ico quod is tud d is junc tum

necessarium vel possibile est passio entis circumloquens

passionem convert ibi lem, sicut sunt

talia multa

i l l im i ta ta

entibus. Passiones autem ent is convert ib i les, ut

com-

munius, immediate dicuntur de ente, quia ens habet

conceptum simpliciter simplicem, et ideo non potest esse

med ium in te r ipsum et suam passionem, quia neutr ius

est

definitio

q uae possit esse m e d iu m . Si

etiam

est

al iqua passio ent is non prima, difficile est videre per

quam priorem, ut per medium, possi t concludi de ente,

qu ia

nee

faci le est v idere ordinem passionum entis.

Nee

si ille ordo cognosceretur, v iderentur proposit iones

sumptae ab eis pro praemissis esse

multum

ev ident iores

conclusionibus. I n passionibus au tem disjun ctis, l icet

illud totum dis junctum non possi t demonstrari de ente,

tamen

com m uniter supposito

illo

extremo quod est minus

nobile de al iquo ente, potest concludi i l lud extremum

q uo d est nob il ius de al iq uo ente. Sicut seq uitur : si

a l iquod ens est f in i tum, ergo al iquod ens est inf in i tum ;

et si aliquod est contingens, ergo aliquod ens est neces

sar ium,

quia in ta l ibus non posset ent i part iculari ter

inesse imperfectius extremum nis i a l icui ent i inesset

perfectius ex t remum a quo dependeret .

Sed nee isto modo v idetur posse ostendi extremum

* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xxxix, q. i (Assisi 137, f . gir^-giv ;

cf.

Viv£s,

v o l . x , 625°-626a).




fold primacy, namely, a primacy of commonness in quid

in regard to al l concepts that are not irreducibly simple

and a primacy of v irtual i ty in i tself or in i ts inferiors

regarding al l concepts which are irreducibly simple.

[ 4 . ON THE DEDUCTION OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING ]

I say th at this disju nc tion nece ssary-or-po ssible , l ike

the countless other such found among beings, is an a t t r i

bute of b e in g tha t is eq uivalent to a coextensive

att rib ute . Bu t the coextensive attributes , as som ething

more common, are affirmed immedia te ly o f b e in g ,

because b e i n g is an irre du cib ly simple concept an d

consequently no m iddle term can exist between b e in g

and i ts at t r ibute, for nei ther has a def in i t ion that might

serve as a m idd le te rm . Also , i f there is some a ttrib ute

of b e in g that is not im m ediate, i t is d i f f icul t to see w ha t

prior at t r ibute could be used as a middle term to l ink

it w it h b e in g , for i t is not easy to discern any order

am ong the at t ributes of b e in g . A n d even i f we knew

of such an order among them, any proposit ions about

them we might use as premises seem scarcely more

ev ident th a n the conclusions. I n the disjunctiv e

a t t r i

butes,

however, while the entire disjunction cannot be

dem onstrated fro m b e in g , nevertheless as a unive rsal

rule by positing the less perfect extreme of some being

we can conclude that the more perfect extreme is realised

in some other be ing. Th us it fol lows tha t i f some being

is f in ite , then some being is inf ini te. A n d if some being

is co ntin ge nt, th en some bein g is necessary. Fo r in such

cases it is not possible for the more imperfect extreme of

the dis jun ct ion to be ex istent ia lly predicated of b e in g ,

part icularly taken, unless the more perfect extreme be

existent ia l ly veri f ied of some other being upon which i t

depends.

But we see that the less perfect member of such a



9 DUNS SCOTUS

imperfectius talis disjunctionis ; non enim si perfectius

est in aliquo ente, ex hoc necesse est imperfectius esse in

alio ente ; et hoc nisi ilia extrema disjuncta essent corre-

l a t i va , sicut causa et causatum. Ideo ig i tur non potest

ostendi de ente per a l iquod prius medium hoc dis-

j u n c t u m ,

necessarium vel contingens. Nee etiam ista

pars disjuncti quae est contingens posset ostendi de

aliquo, supposito necessario de al iquo, et ideo videtur

ista : A l i q u o d ens est contingens , esse v era p ri m a et n on

dem onstrabil is prop ter

q u id .

U n d e Philosophus * arguens

contra necessitatem fu tu ro ru m , non deduc it ad a l iq u id

impossibilius hypothesi , sed ad al iquod impossibi le nobis

manifestius, scil icet q uo d no n op ortet con si l iar i . E t ideo

negantes talia manifesta indigent poena vel scient ia vel

sensu, qu ia secundum Av icennam primo Metaphysicae f :

Negantes

primum

p r inc ip ium sunt vapu land i ve l expo-

nend i ign i , quousque concedant quod non est idem

comburi e t non

com bur i ,

vapu la r i e t non vapu la r i .

Ita

et iam is t i , qui negant a l iquod ens cont ingens, exponendi

sunt tormentis, quousque concedant quod possibi le est

eos non torqueri .

[ 5 . ENS UT SUBJECTUM ET DEUS UT FINIS METAPHYSICAE] 1

Hie

sunt t r ia v idenda : P r im o, si pr im us habi tus

natural i ter acquisitus et supremus perficiens in te l lec tum

viator is ,

cujusmodi

est habitus metaphysicae, habeat

Deum pro primo objecto ?.. .

De primo est controversia inter Avicennam et

* De interpretations, cap. ix (18s, 26-35).

t Aristotle, Topica, 1, cap. x i

(105s,

4-5).

Reportata parisiensia,

prol.

q .

ii i,

art. i

(Vives,

v o l .

x x i i,

^ - t f l i ) .




dis jun ctio n canno t be established in this fashion, for if

the m ore perfec t exists i n some be ing , there is no necessity

on this score that the less perfect should exist in some

other being, unless, of course, the two extremes of the

disjunction should happen to be correlatives, such as

cause

and ca us ed . Consequent ly, this d is junct ion

nec essa ry-or- continge nt , cannot be established of

b e i n g

thro ug h some prio r m ed ium . Ne ither could the

contingent part of the disjunction be established of any

thing on the supposition that something necessary exists.

T he proposi t ion : Som e being is co nt ing en t , therefore,

seems to be a primary truth and is not demonstrable by

an a prior i dem ons trat ion, w h ic h gives the reason for the

fact.9 T h a t is w h y the Philosopher, i n arg uing against

the theory that future events are necessary, makes no

attempt to deduce from it som ething even m ore impossible

than the hypothesis, but he deduces from it an impossi

bi l i ty that is more apparent to us, namely, that there

w ou ld be no need to del iberate [abo ut the fu tu re ]. A n d

therefore, those who deny such manifest things need

punishment or knowledge or sense, for as Avicenna puts

it {Metaphysics 1) f : Th ose wh o deny a f irst pr inc ip le

should be beaten or exposed to fire until they concede

that to burn and not to burn, or to be beaten and not

to be beaten, are not id en t ic al . A n d so too, those wh o

deny that some being is contingent should be exposed to

torments until they concede that it is possible for them

not to be tormented.

[ 5. BEING AS THE SUBJECT AND GOD AS THE GOAL

OF METAPHYSICS]

W e m ust first see wh ethe r m etaphysics, the first an d

highest of the natural ly acquired habits perfecting man's

inte llec t i n the present life , has G od as its first ob ject.

On this point there is a controversy between Avicenna



IO DUNS SCOTUS

Averroem. Pon i t

enim

Av icenna q uod D eus

non

est sub-

jectum in metaphysica, qu ia nu l la sc ient ia probat suum

subjectum ; metaphysicus autem p roba t Deum esse ;

ig i tu r, etc. Av erroes repre hen dit

Avicennam

i n u l t im o

Commento primi Physicorum, quia sumpta eadem majori

cont ra Av icennam cup i t p robare quod Deus e t sub-

stantiae separatae sunt subjectum in metaphysica, et

q uod D eu m esse no n pro ba tur in metaphys ica, qu ia

nul lum genus

substantiarum

separatarum potest probar i

esse nisi per m o t u m , quod per t ine t ad

physicam.

Sed v ide tur

mihi

Av icennam mel ius d ix isse

quam

Averroem ; unde arguo sic contra eum : haec proposit io,

Nul la scient ia probat suum subjectum esse, quae com

munis est utr ique, vera est propter primitatem subjecti

ad scientiam, quia si posterius esset, probaret ipsum esse

in

ilia

scient ia, in qua habet rat ionem posterior is, et non

tantum ra t ion em object i adae q uat i . Sed subjectum

magis habet ra t ionem primitatis respectu posterioris

scientiae q ua m respectu prio ris ; ergo si p r im a scientia

non potest probare suum subjectum esse, multo minus

nee

scientia posterior potest.

Vel

sub al ia form a ar g ui tu r sic : Si physicus p otest

pro ba re D e u m esse, ergo D e u m esse est con clusio i n

physica. Sed si m etaphys ica no n potest sic pro ba re

D eu m esse, ergo D eu m esse prae sup pon itur in m eta

physica tamquam

p r i n c i p iu m .

Erg o conclusio in physica

est pr inc ip i um in metaphysica ; ergo physica est pr io r

metaphysica.

I t e m ,

ex

omni

proprietate manifesta in effectu potest

conclud i

causam

esse, si non inest nisi

ration

e talis

causae ; sed no n solum huju sm od i propr ietates effectus

considerantur in phys ica, quae so lum conveniunt Deo,




10

and Av erroes. Av icenn a claims tha t G od is not the

subject of metaphysics, because no science proves [the

existence o f] i ts ow n subject. T h e m etaphy sician, how

ever, proves th at Go d exists. Av erroes reproves A v i

cenna in his final comment on the Physics,

b k . i ,

because

he wishes, by using the same major premise against A v i

cenna, to prove that God and the pure spiri ts are the

subject of metaphysics, and that God's existence is not

pro v ed i n m etaphysics, since it is only b y means of mo t ion,

which pertains to the science of natural phi losophy, that

any kind of pure spiri t can be proved to exist.

I t seems to me , howev er, that of the tw o, Av icenn a has

spoken better . W here fore I argue against Av erroes as

follows. T he prop osit ion they b ot h ho ld , v iz. N o science

proves the existence of its sub jec t is tru e, because of the

priority the subject holds in regard to the science. For if

the sub ject were posterior to the science, th en its existence

would have to be established in some lower science,

where it would be conceived under some inferior aspect

which is inadequate for its role as the object [of the

hig he r science]. N o w a subject enjoys a greater p ri o ri ty

over the lower tha n ov er the high er science. I f the

highest science, there fore, can not pro v e tha t its subject

exists, it is even less possible for a lower science to do so.

Or to put the argument in another way, i f the phi lo

sopher o f natu re can prov e th a t G od exists, the n G od's

existence is a conclusion of na tur al phi losoph y. N o w if

metaphysics cannot prove the existence of God in this

way, then God's existence is presupposed as a principle

in metaphysics. Conseq uently, a conclusion o f na tur al

philosophy is a principle of metaphysics, and therefore

the philosophy of nature is prior to metaphysics.

Aga i n , i f a certain property can exist only in virtue of

such an d such a cause, fro m every such prop erty tha t

appears in the effect, we can infer the existence of the

cause. N o w it is no t ju st such properties o f the effect as

are treated in the philosophy of nature that are possible



DUNS SCOTUS

sed etiam

in metaphysica, quia

non

solum

mo tum

prae-

supponit movens, sed ens posterius praesupponit prius ;

igitur ex prioritate in entibus potest concludi primum

ens esse, et hoc perfectius q u a m ex mo t u concluditur in

physica p ri m um movens esse. U nd e ex ac tu et po ten tia ,

f initate et infinitate, multi tudine et unitate, et ex multis

talibus, quae sunt proprietates et passiones metaphysicae

potest conclud i in me taphysica D eum esse sive p r im u m

ens esse.

Ideo dico quantum ad istum

ar t icu lum,

quod Deus

non est subjectum in metaphysica, quia sicut probatum

est supra quaestione prima,* de Deo tamquam ut primo

subjecto

tan tum

est una scientia, quae non est meta

physica. E t hoc pr ob atur sic : D e

omn i

subjecto etiam

scientiae subalternatae statim ex sensibus cognoscitur

quod est sic quod sibi non repugnat esse, ut patet de

subjecto perspectivae ; statim

enim

ex sensibus appre-

hend itur l inea m v isib ilem esse ; sicut en im pr in cip ia

statim apprehenduntur apprehensis terminis ex sensibus,

ita tamen quod subjectum non sit posterius suo principio,

nee

ignotius, oportet subjectum in scientia apprehendi

statim ex sensibus ; sed nu lla ra tio pr op ria D ei con -

ceptibil is a nobis, statim apprehenditur ab intellectu

viatoris ; igitur nulla scientia naturaliter acquisita potest

esse

de D eo sub aliq ua ratione pro pria . Proba tio

minor is

:

Prima ratio Dei quam concipimus de ipso est quod sit

p ri m um ens ; sed haec ra tio non app reh enditu r a

nobis ex sensibus, sed prius oportet a nobis concipi com-

possibilitatem unionis

l s io rum duorum

term inor um ;

unde antequam

sciamus

hanc compossibilitatem, oportet

q uod demonstretur a liq uod ens esse p r im u m ; ig itu r, etc.

Unde concedo cum Avicenna, quod Deus non sit sub

jectum in metaphysica.

Nee

obviat dictum Philosophi

* q. i, art. iv .




11

only on condition that God exists, for the same is true

of the propert ies treated of in metaphysics. N o t only

does motion presuppose a mover, but a being that is pos

ter ior presupposes one th at is p ri o r. Con seq uently, fr o m

the priority that exists among beings the existence of the

First B eing can be infe rre d, and this can be done i n a m ore

perfect way than the existence of a Prime Mover can be

established i n na tu ra l phi losop hy. W e can infer,

then,

in metaphysics from act and potency, finiteness and

inf in i ty , mu l t i tude and un i ty , an d m any other such meta

physical properties, that God or the First Being exists.

So far as this article is concerned,

then,

I say that God

is not the subject of metaphysics, because, as has been

pro v ed abov e in the first q uestion, there is bu t one science

that has God as its f irst subject, and this is not meta

physics.10 A n d this is pro v ed in the fol low ing m ann er.

O f every sub ject, also of a subordina te science, it is

known through the senses that it is of such a nature that

to exist is not repugnant to it, as is evident of the subject

of optics, for the existence of a visible line is grasped

im m ed iate ly fro m the senses. J ust as princip les are

grasped immediately once the terms are apprehended

th ro ug h the m e d iu m of the senses, so likewise i f a subject

is not to be posterior to, or

less

kn o wn

than ,

its principle,11

it mu st needs be grasped th ro ug h the senses. B u t no

proper not ion that we can form of God is apprehended

im m edia tely by man's inte l lect in th is l i fe. Therefore,

we can have no natural ly acquired science about God

und er some no tion prope r to Him self. Pro of of the

m inor : Th e

first

[proper] concept we have of God is

tha t H e is the First Being . B ut this notion is not grasped

th ro ug h the senses, b u t w e mus t first ascertain tha t the

un ion o f these tw o terms is com patible. Before we can

know this compatibi l i ty, however, i t is necessary that we

dem onstrate th at some be ing is f irst. Th ere fore , etc.

Hence, I concede with Avicenna that God is not the

subject of me taphysics. T h e Philosopher's statement



12 DUNS SCOTUS

primo Metaphysicae* dicentis quod Metaphysica est circa

causas alt issimas, quia loquitur sicut locutus est primo

Priorum,\ cum d ic i t : Primum oportet d icere circa quid

et de q uo ; quoniam c i rca demonstrat ionem, et de

discip l ina demonstrat iva, id est , de universal i scient ia

dem onstrandi s ive sy l log izandi . U nd e c i rca pro pr ie

notat c ircumstant iam causae f inal is, sicut et causae

m ate rialis ; un de meta phy sica est cir ca altissimas causas

finaliter, ad

quarum

cogni t ionem terminatur sc ient ia

metaphysical is.

*

i,

cap.

ii ,

passim.

t Analytica

priora, i,

cap. i

(24a,

10 ff.).




12

{Metaphysics, bk.

i)

* that metaphysics is concerned with

the highest causes, presents no dif fic u lty . For he speaks

here as he d id in the P rior Analytics, bk . i , j whe re he says :

First i t is necessary to determine with what [Prior

An alyt ic s] is concerned an d w ha t i t has to do . I t is

concerned with demonstrat ion and has to do with the

demonstrat ive branch of learning, that is with the

general science o f dem ons trat ing or syl log ising . Henc e,

concerned w i t h denotes properly the circumstance of

the fin a l cause ju s t as m u ch as i t does tha t o f the m ater ial

cause.

W here fore, metaphysics is concerned w it h the

highest causes as its en d. I n k no w in g th e m , m eta

physical science attains its

goal.



I I

M A N 'S N A T U R A L K N O W L E D G E

O F G O D

S um m a r y o f th e A rgu m en t

Q u e s t i o n : I s t h e i n t e l l e c t o f m a n i n th i s l i f e ab le t o k n o w

G od n a t u r a l l y ?

P r o

e t

C o n t r a

B o d y

o f t h e

Q u e s t i o n

P r e l im i n a r y ob se r v a t i o n s

T h e o p i n i o n o f H e n r y o f Ghen t

Sco tus ' s own op in ion

First statement

: I t is

possib le

t o

h a v e

a

q u i d d i t a t i v e

con cep t o f God

Second s ta tem ent : Go d is conc e iv ed n ot on ly an a logou s ly ,

bu t a l so un i voca l l y

Th i r d s ta temen t : God ' s essence is no t k n ow n i n t u i t i v e l y

b y m a n

i n

th i s l i f e

Fourth

s ta temen t :

M a n can h a ve m an y p r ope r con cep ts

of God

F i ft h s ta temen t : We kn ow God t h rou g h the i n t e l l i g i b l e

species

o f

c r ea tu r e s

R e p l y

t o t h e

A rg u m e n t s

a t t h e

b e g i n n i n g

R e p l y

t o

H e n r y ' s a r g u m e n t s

(2,32'J)



14 DUNS SCOTUS

[ I I .

COGNITIO

NATURALIS

DE DEO] *

C i r c a tertiam distinctionem quaero primo de cognos -

c i b i l i ta t e D e i . E t q u a e r o p r i m o : Utrum Deus s i t n a tu ra-

liter cognoscibilis

ab in te l lec tu v ia tor is .

[ P r o e t C o n t r a ]

A r g u o q u o d

non

:

P h i l o so phu s in De anima | d i c i t : Phantasmata se

h a b e n t a d

intellectum

s i c u t s e n s i b i l i a a d

s e n s u m .

Sed

se nsu s n o n s e n t i t n i s i s e n s ib i le , e rg o in t e l le c t u s n i h i l

i n t e l l i g i t n i s i c u j u s phantasma p o t e s t p e r s e n s u s a p p r e -

h e n d e r e . D e u s

autem

n on h a b e t p h a n t a s m a

nee

es t

a l i q u i d p h a n t a s m a nee e st a l i q u i d p h a n t a s i b i le ; e r g o ,

e t c .

I t e m

ii Metaphysicae

: s i c u t o c u l u s n o c t u a e a d

lucem

sol is ,

s i c e t i n t e l l e c t u s n o s t e r a d e a q u a e s u n t

m a n i -

festissima n a t u r a e ; s e d i b i es t i m p o s s i b i li ta s ; e r g o e t

h i e .

I t e m i Physicorum * * : I n f i n i t u m i n q u a n t u m i n f i n i t u m

est i g n o t u m .

E t n

Metaphysicae

f j

: I n f i n i t a n o n

contingit

cognosce re ; e rg o nee i n f i n i t u m , q u i a eadem v i d e t u r

esse i m p r o p o r t i o in t e l l e c t u s fin it i a d i n f i n i t u m e t a d

i n f i n i t a , q u i a a e q u a l i s e x c e s s u s vel n o n m i n o r .

I t e m Gre g or iu s Super Ezechie lem | J : Quantumcumque

* Opus oxoniense,

i ,

dist. i n , q . i (Assisi 137, f. 2 5 ^ -2 7 ^ ; cf.

Vive s,

vo l . ix, 8a-38<<).

t

in ,

cap v i i (431", 14).

11, cap . i (9936, 9).

* * 1, cap. iv

(1876,

8). tf

u ,

cap. i i (994*, 22).

J} Sermons on

Ezechiel,

i ,

horn, v i i i ,

n . 30 (Mign e, P .L.,

l x x v i ,

868).



MAN S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 14

[ I I .

man's n a t u r a l knowledge of god]

C o n c e r n i n g th e t h i r d d i s t i n c t i on I a sk firs t w h e t h e r

i t is poss ib le to k n ow God . A n d I ask f ir s t : whether the

intel lect of man in th is l i fe is ab le to know God natura l ly .

[ P r o e t C o n t r a ]

I a r g u e th a t i t c a n n o t

x

:

[ A r g .

1].

T h e P h ilos o p h e r i n De

an ima ,

b k .

i n ,

f says :

"Se n s e im a g e s a r e re l a t e d t o t h e i n t e l le c t i n t h e sa m e w a y

as sense ob jec ts a re re la te d to th e sense s ". B u t t he senses

pe r c e i v e o n l y w h a t is s e n s i b le . The r e f o re t h e i n t e l le c t

is u n a b l e t o g r a s p a n y t h i n g w h o se sense i m a g e c a n n o t b e

k n o w n b y t h e se nse s. O f G o d t h e r e is no sen se im a g e .

N e i t h e r i s H e s u c h t h a t H e c o u l d b e p e r c e i v e d b y s u c h

a sense fa c u l t y . Th e re fo re , e t c .

[ A r g .

n ] . Ag a i n , a c c o r d i n g t o Me ta phy sic s, b k . ii :

"A s t he e yes o f ba t s a r e to t he b l aze o f d a y , so is ou r

i n t e l le c t to th e t h in g s w h i c h a r e b y n a t u r e m os t

e v i d e n t "

B u t i f i t is im po s s i b le t o k n o w s u c h t h i n g s , i t is im po s s i b le

t o k n o w G o d .

[ A r g .

i n ] . A l so , a c co rd i ng to Phys ic s, b k . i * * : " T h e

i n f in i t e as i n f in i t e is u n k n o w a b l e " . A n d a c c o r d in g to

the Me taphys ics , b k , i i

f

f : " I t is n o t pos s ib le t o k n o w a n

i n f i n i t e [ n u m b e r ] o f t h i n g s " . T h e r e fo re , n e i th e r c a n

th e In f i n i t e B e i n g be k n o w n , s in ce a n in f in i te n u m b e r

a n d a n In f i n i t e B e i n g w o u l d s eem t o b e e q u a l ly d is

p r o p o r t io n a t e t o o u r i n t e l l e c t ; for a n I n f i n i t e B e i n g

exceed s t h e po we r s o f o u r in t e l l e c t i n t h e s ame m easu r e

as,

o r c e r t a i n l y to n o less a deg ree

t h a n ,

doe s th e i n f i n i t e

i n n u m b e r .

[ A r g .

i v ] . G r e g o ry , a ls o, i n h i s c o m m e n t a r y o n

Ezech ie l says : " N o m a t t e r h o w fa r our m i n d m a y h a v e



15

DUNS SCOTUS

mens nos t r a i n c o n t e m p l a t i on e p r o fe c e r i t D e i , n o n a d

i l l u d q u od ipse es t, sed a d i l l u d q u od s ub ip so e st a t t i n g i t .

C o n t r a

:

v Metaphysicae * : M e t a p h y s i c a e s t t h e o log i a d e De o

e t c i r c a d i v i n a p r i n c i p a l i t e r , e r g o e t c . E t i n a c t u e jus , f

sc i l i ce t i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n e a c t u a l i

s u b s t a n t i a r u m

s epa r a -

t a r u m p o n i t f e l i c i t a t e m h u m a n a m .

[ C o r p u s Q u a e s t i o n i s ]

[Notiones Praeviae]

I n p r im a quaes tione n on est distinguendum qu od Deus

possit cognosci ne g at ive

vel

a f firm a t iv e , q u i a n ega tio non

cognosc i tur n is i pre affirmationem : n Perihermenias, in

f ine , j

et N

Metaphys i cae . ** Pa te t e t i a m q u o d n u l l a s

nega t iones cognosc imus d e Deo n i s i p e r a f fi rm a t i one s p e r

q u a s r e m o v e m u s a l i a i n co m p o ss i b i l i a a b i l l i s a f f i r m a -

t i o n i b u s .

Ne g a t ion e s e t i a m n o n

s u m m e

a m a m u s .

S i m i l i t e r e t i a m a u t n e g a t io c o n c i p i t u r p r a e c is e a u t u t

d i c t a d e a l i q u o . S i p r a e c is e c o n c i p i t u r n e g a t i o, u t n o n

l a p i s , h oc

a e q u e c o n v e n i t n i h i l o s ic u t

D e o ,

q u i a p u r a

n e g a t i o d i c i t u r d e e n t e e t d e n o n e n t e . I g i t u r i n h o c

n on

m a g i s

i n t e l l i g i t u r D e u s

q u a m

n i h i l v e l c h i m e r a . S i

i n t e l l i g i t u r u t n e g a t io d i c t a d e a l i q u o , t u n c q u a e r o i l i u m

c o n c e p t u m

s u b t r a c t u m

d e q u o

i n t e l l i g i t u r is t a n e g a t io

esse v e ra . A u t e r i t concep t u s

a f f i rm a t i v u s

a u t n e g a t i v u s .

Si e s t a f fi rm a t i v u s , h a b e t u r p r o p o s i t u m . S i n e g a t i v u s ,

q u a e r o u t p r i u s . A u t n e g a t io c o n c i p i t u r p r a e cis e a u t u t

* v , cap . v ii (io64a, 36).

t Ethica

Nicomachea,

x, cap.

v i i i .

X

De interpretations, ca p. xi i i

(22a, 3 3 );

cf. also cap. xiv

in

f ine.

**

iv, cap.

i i

(1004", 10-16).



MAN

S

NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

15

p rog re s s e d i n th e c o n t e m p l a t io n o f

G o d ,

i t doe s n o t a t t a i n

to w h a t H e is , b u t t o w h a t is b e n e a t h H i m " .

T o t h e c o n t r a r y :

Ac c o r d i n g t o Meta ph ys ic s, b k . v * : "Me t a p h y s i c s is a

th e o log y o f G o d a n d is p r i m a r i l y c on c e r n e d w i t h th e

d i v i n e " .

A n d [ A r i s t o t le ] p la c e s m a n 's h a p p in e s s i n th e

a c t u a l po s se s s i o n o f s u c h k no w l e dge , t h a t i s t o s a y , i n

t h e a c t u a l s p e c u l a t ion a b o u t t h e p u r e s p i r i t s .

[ B o d y o f th e Q u e s t io n ]

[P re l im i na r y Observations']

I n t h i s first q u e s t i o n t h e r e i s n o n e e d t o m a k e t h e

d i s t i n c t i on t h a t w e c a n n ot k n o w w h a t G o d is : w e c a n

o n l y k n o w w h a t H e is n ot.2 F o r e v e r y d e n i a l is i n t e l l ig i b l e

o n l y i n t e rm s o f som e a f fi r m a t i o n .

* * I t is a lso c lea r t h a t

w e c a n k n o w n e g a t ion s o f G o d o n l y b y m e a n s o f a ff i r m a

t ion s ; fo r i f w e d en y a n y t h i n g o f G o d , i t is b e c au se w e

w is h t o d o a w a y w i t h s o m e t h in g in c on s is te n t w i t h w h a t

w e h a v e a l re a d y a f fi r m e d .

Ne i t h e r a r e n ega t i o n s t h e o b j e c t o f o u r g r e a t e s t l o v e .

F u r t h e r m o r e , i f s o m e t h i n g is n e g a t e d , e i th e r t h e n e g a

t i o n is co n s id e r e d s im p l y i n i t s e l f o r as p r e d i c a t e d o f

s o m e t h i n g . I f a n e g a t io n , s u c h as " n o t - s t o n e " , is c o n

s i d e r e d s im p l y i n i ts e lf, i t is as c h a r a c t e r i s t ic o f n o t h i n g

as i t i s o f G o d , fo r a p u r e n e g a t i o n is p r e d i c a t e d o f b o t h

w h a t is a n d w h a t is n o t a b e in g . C on s e q u e n t ly , w h a t w e

k n o w t h r o u g h s u c h a n e g a t ion is n o m or e G o d t h a n i t is

a c h i m e r a o r n o t h i n g a t a l l . I f t h e n e g a t io n is u n d e r s t oo d

as m o d i f y i n g s o m e t h i n g , t h e n I i n q u i r e a fte r t h e u n d e r

l y i n g n o t io n o f w h i c h th e n e g a t io n is u n d e r s tood t o b e

t r u e . I t w i l l b e e i th e r a n a f fi rm a t i v e or a n e g a t iv e n o t i o n .

I f i t is a ff i r m a t i v e , w e h a v e w h a t w e s ee k. I f i t is n e g a

t i v e ,

I in q u i r e as I d i d b e fo re . E i t h e r th e n e g a t io n is

c on c e i v e d s i m p l y i n i ts e l f o r as p r e d i c a t e d o f s o m e t h i n g .



16

DUNS SCOTUS

d i c t a d e

a l i q u o .

S i

primo m o d o ,

h oc a e q u e c o n v e n i t

n i h i l o s i c u t D e o . S i u t d i c t a d e a l i q u o , s i c u t p r i u s ; e t

quantumcumque p r o c e d e r e t u r in n e g a t i o n i b u s , vel non

i n t e l l i g e r e t u r D e u s magis quam n i h i l v e l s t a b i tu r i n

a l iq u o a f f i r m a t i v o c on c e p t u q u i e st p r i m u s .

Nee s e cu n d o est d i s t i n g u e n d u m d e c o g n i t io n e q u i a

[re a d q u i d ] e s t e t s i e s t , q u i a i n p r o p o s i t o q u a e r o c o n -

ceptum

s im p l ic e m d e q u o c og n o s c a t u r esse p e r a c t u m

i n t e l l e c t u s c o m p o n e n t i s e t d i v i d e n t i s . Numquam enim

co gno s co d e a l i q uo s i e s t , n i s i

habeam

a l i q u e m c o n -

ceptum i l l i u s extremi de q u o cognosco esse ; e t de illo

c o n c e p t u q u a e r i t u r

h i e .

Nee t e r t i o o p o r t e t d i s t i n g u e r e s i e s t , u t e s t q u a e s t i o

d e v e r i t a t e p r o p o s i t io n i s v e l u t e st q u a e s t io d e e sse D e i ,

q u i a s i p o te s t e sse , q u a e r o d e v e r i t a t e p r o p o s i t io n i s i n

qua es t esse tamquam p r a e d i c a t u m d e s u b j e c t o ; a d

concipiendum veritatem

i l l i u s q u a e s t i o n i s v e l p r o p o s i

t i o n i s ,

o p o r t e t p r a e c o n c i p e r e t e r m i n o s i l l i u s q u a e s t i o n i s ,

e t d e c o n c e p t u s i m p l i c i i l l i u s s u b je c t i s i e st p os s i b il is e st

n u n c q u a e s t i o .

Nee q u a r t o v a le t d is t in g u e r e de c o n c e p t u n a t u r a l i e t

s u p e r n a t u r a l i , q u ia q u a e r i t u r d e n a t u r a l i .

Nee q u i n t o v a le t d i s t in g u e r e d e n a t u r a l i t e r l oq u e n d o

d e n a t u r a a b s o lu t e v e l d e n a t u r a p r o s t a t u i s t o, q u i a

q u a e r i t u r p r a e c i s e d e c o g n i t i o n e p r o s t a t u i s t o .

Nee

se xto v a l e t d i s t in g u e r e d e c o g n i t i on e D e i i n

c r e a t u r a v e l i n s e, q u i a s i c o g n i t i o h a b e a t u r p e r c r e a t u r a m

i t a q u o d c o g n i t i o discursiva i n c i p i a t a c r e a t u r a , q u a e r o

i n q u o

termino

s i s t i t u r is t a c o g n i t i o . S i i n De o i n s e ,

h a b e o p r o p o s i t u m , q u i a i l i u m con cepturn D e i i n s e

q u a e r o. S i n o n s i s t i t u r i n D e o i n se , s ed i n c r e a t u r a ,



m an's n a t u r a l k n o w le d g e o f g od

i 6

I f t he fi rs t be t ru e , the n the neg a t ion app lies to n o th ing

as w e l l as to God. I f i t is conceived as pre d ica ted of

som eth ing , the n I a rgue as be fore . An d no m a t te r how

fa r w e p roceed w i t h nega t ions , e it he r w ha t we know is

no m ore God tha n n o th ing is , or w e w i l l a r r i ve a t some

a ffi rm at ive concep t w h ich is the fi rs t concep t o f a l l .

In the second p lac e , there is no p o in t in d is t ing u ish ing

be tw een a knowledge of H is essence a nd a knowledge of

H is exis tence,3 for I in te n d to seek a s im ple conce pt of

wh ich ex is tence may be a f f i rmed o r den ied by a ju d g

m en t of the in te l le c t . For I never kn ow a n y th ing to exis t

un less I f i rs t have some concep t of tha t of w h ich exis tence

is a ffi rm e d . An d th is is w h at w e seek here .

Th i rd ly , in reg ard to God's exis tence there is no need

to d is t ingu ish be tween the ques t ion of the t ru th o f the

p ropos ition a n d the q ue st ion of H is exis tence.4 For

before the re can be any q ues tion of the t ru th o f a p ro

pos i tion w he re in exis tence is p red ica ted of a su bjec t , i t is

necessary f i rs t of a l l to conceive the terms of th is pro

posit ion.

Now the qu es tion

is

this

:

" Is i t poss ib le to have

a c once pt of the s ub ject [of th is p roposit ion : 'God

exis ts '] b y n a tu ra l m eans? "

Fou r th l y , t he d i s ti nc t ion be tw een a na tu ra l and supe r

n a tu ra l concep t is ou t o f p lace , because we are in te res ted

here on ly in the form er.5

Fi fth ly , in rega rd to the n a tu ra l , the re is no necessity

fo r a d i s t i nc t ion be tween "na tu re , abso lu te l y speak ing "

an d "n a tu re , i n ou r p resen t s ta te " , for we a re in te res ted

on ly in the la t te r .6

S ix th l y , t he d i s t i nc t ion be tween know ing God in

H im se lf and kn ow ing H im i n a c rea tu re is not to the

poin t .7 For i f our kn ow ledg e comes throug h a c rea ture

in the sense tha t the reason ing p rocess beg ins w i th w h at

can be know n f rom a c rea tu re , then I ask "Wh a t do we

kn ow a t the conc lus ion of th is process?" I f i t is God

H im se lf, the n I have w h a t I seek , fo r I a m look ing fo r

a concep t o f God H im se lf. I f i t

is

n ot

God,

b u t

a

c rea tu re ,



17

DUNS SCOTUS

t u n c i d e m e r i t t e r m i n u s e t principium d i s c u r s u s , e t i t a

n u l l a n o t i t ia h a b e b i t u r d e D e o ; s a l te r n n o n e st in t e l le c t u s

i n u l t i m o d is c u rs u s te r m i n o

quam

d i u s i s t i t i n a l i q u o

ob je c t o q u o d est p r i n c i p i u m d i s c u r r e n d i .. .

Es t e r go m ens q u ae s t io n is i s ta : Utrum a l i q u e m

c o n c e p t u m s i m p l i c e m p o s s i t i n t e l l e c t u s v i a t o r i s h a b e r e

i n q u o c o n c e p t u s i m p l ic i c o n c i p i a t u r D e u s .

[Opin io

Henrici]

A d h oc d i c i t quidam do c to r s ic l o q u e n d o : De co g n i t i on e

a c t u s d i s t i n g u i p o t e s t e x p a r t e o b j e c t i e t p o t e s t c o g n o s c i

pe r se

vel

p e r a c c id e n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r i

vel

i n u n i v e r s a l i .

R e a l it e r p e r a c c id e n s n o n c o g n o s c i tu r D e u s , q u i a

q u i d -

q u i d d e i p s o c o g n o s c i t u r e s t i p s e , tamen cognoscendo

a l i q u o d

attributum

e j u s co gno s c imus q ua s i p e r a c c i d e n s

q u i d e st. U n d e d e a t t r ib u t i s d i c i t Damascenus libro

p r i m o ,

c a p i tu l o 4 * : N o n n a t u r a m

dicunt

D e i , s ed q u a e

c ir c a n a t u r a m .

I n u n i v e r s a l i

e t i a m ,

p u t a i n g e n e r a l i a t t r i b u t o ,

c o g

n o s c i t u r

;

n on

quidem

i n u n iv e r s a l i s e c u n d u m p r a e d ic a -

tionem q u o d d i c a t u r d e ip s o i n q u o n u l l u m est velle [s ic

u n i v e r s a l e ], q u i a q u id d i t a s

ilia

e st d e se s i n g u l a r i s , s e d i n

u n i v e r s a l i q u o d tantum a n a l o g i c e c o m m u n e e s t s i b i e t

c r e a tu r a e , ta m e n q u a s i unum a n o b is c o n c i p i t u r p r o p t e r

p r o x im i t a t e m c o n c e p t u u m , l ic e t s in t d i v e r s i c on c e p t u s .

* Mign e , P .G., xc iv , 800.



MANS NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 17

th e n t h e b e g i n n i n g a n d c o n c l u s ion o f t h e r e a s on in g p r o

cess a r e i d e n t i c a l , a n d t h e r e for e I h a v e n o k n o w l e d g e o f

G o d a t

all—or

a t l e a s t G o d i s no t g r a s ped a t t h e e nd o f

t h e r e a s o n in g p roce ss so l o ng as t h e m i n d doe s no t g e t

b e y o n d t h e ob je c t t h a t s e rv e d as t h e i n i t i a l p o i n t of t h e

a r g u m e n t .

T h e m e a n i n g o f t h e q u e s t i o n ,

t h e n ,

is t h i s : " I s i t

p o s s i b l e b y n a t u r a l m e a n s f o r m a n ' s i n t e l l e c t i n t h e

p r e s e n t l ife t o h a v e a s i m p l e c o n c e p t i n w h i c h c on c e p t

G o d is g r a s p e d ? "

[ The Opin ion of H en ry of Ghent]

A c e r t a i n t e a c h e r

8

a n s w e rs t h e q u e s t i on i n t h is w a y :

A n a c t o f k n ow l e d g e c a n b e d i s t in g u i s h e d i n t e rm s o f it s

o b je c t , a n d o n t h i s s core we c a n d i s t i n g u i s h : (a ) a

k n ow le d g e o f a t h i n g t h r o u g h th e t h i n g itself; (b ) a

k n o w l e d g e o f t h e t h i n g t h r o u g h s o m e t h in g i n c i d e n t a l t o

i t ; (c) a k n o w le d g e of t h e t h i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r ; a n d ( d ) a

k n o w l e d g e o f t h e t h i n g i n g e n e r a l.

I n r e a l i t y t h e r e is n o kn ow led g e o f God th rough some

th ing in c iden ta l to H im , fo r w ha te v e r i s k n ow n o f God is

G o d H i m s e l f. N e v e rth e l e s s , w e d o k n o w w h a t G o d is

i n a q u a s i - i n c i d e n t a l manne r when we k no w so me o ne o f

H i s a t t r ib u t e s . H e n c e , Da m a s c e n e says * t h a t t h e

a t t r i

b u t e s " d o n o t b es p ea k th e n a t u r e o f

G o d ,

b u t s o m e t h i n g

a b o u t th e n a t u r e " .

G o d is a lso k n o w n in a general w a y , t h a t is , t h r o u g h s om e

u n i v e r s a l a t t r ib u t e . N o t in d e e d t h a t a n y a t t r i b u t e ,

u n i v e r s a l b y w a y o f p r e d i c a t i o n , i s affirmed o f H i m i n

who m no t h i n g i s u n i v e r s a l , f o r H i s e s s en ce i s s i n g u l a r o f

its v e r y n a t u r e . H e is k n o w n , h ow e v e r , i n a " u n i v e r s a l "

t h a t is o n l y a n a l og i c a l ly c o m m o n to H i m s e l f a n d t o a

c r e a t u r e . T h i s u n i v e r s a l is c o n c e i v e d b y us as t h o u g h i t

w e r e one n o t i o n , be c au se o f t h e c los e re s e m b l a n c e o f t h e

c o n c e p t s i t c o n t a i n s , a l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r i n r e a l i t y a r e

d i v e r s e .



10

DUNS SCOTUS

I n

particular^ non

c o g n o s c i t u r e x c r e a t u r i s , q u i a

c r e a t u r a e st p e r e g r in a s i m i l i t u d o e ju s , s ic q u i a tantum

c o n for m is e i q u o a d a l ia a t t r i b u t a q u a e n o n s u n t

ilia

n a t u r a i n particular^. E rg o c u m n i h i l d u c a t i n c o g n i t i on e

a l t e r i u s n i s i s u b r a t i o n e s i m i l i s , s e q u i t u r , e t c .

I t e m i n u n i v e r s a l i t r i p l i c i t e r c o g n o s c it u r : g e n e r a l is -

s i m e , g e n e r a l iu s , g e n e r a l i t e r .

Generalissime tr e s h a b e t g r a d u s : c og n o s c e n d o enim

q u o d c u m q u e e n s, u t h oc e ns e s t,

indistinctissime

c o n c i p i -

t u r [D e u s q u i a c o n c i p i t u r ] e ns q u a s i p a r s c on c e p t u s , e t

e st p r i m u s g r a d u s ; e t a m ov e n d o h oc e t c o n c i p i e n d o en s

est s e cu n d us g r a d u s . J a m e n i m u t

c o n c e p t u m ,

n o n u t

p a r s , c o n c i p i t u r c o m m u n e a n a l o g u m D e o e t c r e a t u r a e .

Q u o d si d i s t in g u a t u r c on c e p t u s e n t is q u i D e o c o n v e n i t ,

p u t a c o n c i p i e n d o e n s indeterminatum n e g a t i v e , i d e s t

n o n d e t e r m i n a b i le , a c o n c e p t u e n t is q u i c o n v e n i t

a n a l og ic e , q u o d est ens i n d e t e r m i n a t u m p r i v a t i v e , j a m

e s t t e r t i u s g r a d u s . Primo modo i n d e t e r m i n a t u m a b s tr a -

h i t u r , u t f o r m a a b

omni

m a t e r i a u t i n s e s u b s is te n s e t

[ im jp a r t i c i p a b i l i s . Se c u n d o m o d o i n d e t e r m i n a t u m e st

velle [s ic / ] vel u n i v e r s a l e abstractum a p a r t i c u l a r i b u s

q u o d e st a c t u

participatum

i n

i l l i s .

P o s t i s t o s t r e s g r a d u s g e n e r a l i s s i m e c o n c i p i e n d i

c o n

c i p i t u r De u s g e n e r a l iu s c on c i p ie n d o q u o d c u m q u e

a t t r i -

butum n o n s i m p l ic i te r u t p r i u s , se d c u m p r a e e m in e n t ia

s u m m a .

G e n e r a l i t e r autem c o n c i p i tu r c o n c ip i e n d o q u o d c u m q u e



man's natural knowledge of GOD 18

God is n ot k n ow n in par ticu lar from creatures , because

a c rea tu re bears on ly an exte rn a l likeness to H im , s ince

i t resemb les H im on ly i n those a t tr ibu tes w h ich do no t

cons t itu te H im as th is p a r t i cu la r na tu re . Now s ince one

th ing can be known th rough ano the r on ly by reason o f

the s im i la r i ty ex is t ing be tw een the tw o, i t follow s tha t

God is no t kn own in p a r ti cu la r t h roug h c rea tu res .

Fu r t he rmo re , t he re a re t h ree ways i n wh i ch we may

have a gen era l know led ge of God : (a) i n a most ge ne ra l

w ay , (b ) i n a

less

gen era l w ay , an d (c ) in the least gen era l

manne r .

(a) The most genera l knowledge we have of God

com prises three s tages. To kn ow an y be ing as " th is

b e i n g " i s a l ready to conce ive God in a very ind is t inc t

w ay ; for "b e in g " is i nc lude d , as i t w e re , as pa r t o f the

conce pt . This is the

first

step. Th e second step consists

i n r em ov in g th e " t h i s " a n d conce iv in g s im p ly " b e i n g " .

For " b e i n g " , i n

so

fa r as i t is a concep t a nd no t s im p ly a

par t o f a concep t , i s a l ready conce ived as ana log ica l l y

com m on to God and c rea tu re . We a re in the th i rd stage,

i f the concep t o f "b e in g " w h ich pe r ta ins to God is d is

tingu is hed from the concept o f " b e i n g " w h i ch pe rta in s

analogical ly to creatures, i f , for instance, God is

con

ce ived as a be ing that is negat ive ly undetermined, that

is ,

i ncapab le o f be ing de te rm ined , wh i l e a c rea tu re i s

conceived as a be ing that is pr iva t ive ly undetermined.9

In the fi rs t ins tance , "un d e te rm ine d " is conce ived

abs t rac t ly as someth ing

self-subsistent

and incapab le o f

be i ng p a r t ic i pa t ed

i n ,

l ik e

a

fo rm tha t lacks a l l m a t te r . I n

the second , "unde te rm ined" i s a un ive rsa l abs t rac ted

from pa r ticu la rs an d n ot ac tua lly shared by them.10

(b) In add i t ion to these three s tages of most genera l

kn ow led ge , God is grasped in a less genera l an d m ore

spec ific w ay , w hen any g iven a t tr ib u te is conce ived n ot

i n a n unq ua lifie d m anne r

as

b efore, b u t

as

ex is t ing in the

h ighest degree of

perfection

poss ib le to such an a t t r ib u te .

(c)

God is k n ow n in the least general manner, how ev er,



19

DUNS

SGOTUS

a t t r i b u t u m esse i d e m c u m s uo primo a t t r i b u t o , s c i l i c e t

esse,

p r o p t e r s i m p l i c i t a t e m .

Nee p e r s p e c i e m propriam c o g n o s c i t u r , q u i a n i h i l e s t

e o s i m p l i c i u s , sed a d modum a e s t i m a t i v a e p e r s p e c i e m

aliquam alienam e x c r e a t u r is . E t h oc o m n i b u s t r ib u s

modis

p r a e d i c t i s . . .

[Opin io Scoti]

R e s p on d e o a l i t e r a d primam quaestionem e t i n q u ib u s -

d a m ,

s c i l ic e t i n q u i n q u e , contradicam p o s i t i on i p r a e -

d i c t a e .

R a t i o n e s meae p o s i t i on i s os t e n d e n t o p p o s i t u m

hu j u s pos i t i o n i s . . .

[ P r i m a Sentent id] . D i c o e rg o p r i m o q u o d n o n tantum

h a b e r i p o t e s t c o n c e p t u s n a t u r a l i t e r i n q u o q u a s i p e r

a c c id e n s c o n c i p i t u r D e u s , p u t a i n a l iq u o d a t t r i b u t o , s ed

etiam

a l iq u is c o n c e p tu s i n q u o p e r se e t q u i d d i t a t i v e

c o n c i p i a t u r D e u s .

P r ob o : q u i a c o n c ip i e n d o s a p i e n te m c o n c i p i tu r p r o -

p r i e t a s , s e c u n d u m

e u m , vel

q u a s i p r o p r ie t a s i n a c t u

s e c u n d o perficiens

n a t u r a m .

E rg o i n t e l l ig e n d o s a p ie n t e m

o p o r t e t p r i u s i n t e l l i g e r e a l i q u o d q u i d , q u i a c u m i n t e l l i g o

i s tu d q u a s i p r o p r i e t a t e m in e ss e , e t i t a a n t e c on c e p tu s

o m n i u m passionum v e l q u a s i p a s s i o n u m , o p o r t e t q u a e -

re re c on c e p t u m q u i d d i t a t i v u m c u i i n t e l l i g a n t u r is ta

a t t r i b u i ; e t is te c on c e p tu s a l iu s e r a t quidditativus d e

D e o , q u ia i n nullo a l io po tes t esse s ta tus .

[Secunda Sente nt id]. Se c u nd o d ic o q u o d n o n t a n t u m i n

c o n c e p t u a n a l o g o c o n c e p t u i c r e a t u r a e c o n c i p i t u r D e u s ,

s c i lic e t q u i omnino s i t a l i u s a b illo q u i d e c r e a t u r a d i c i t u r ,

s ed i n c o n c e p t u a l i q u o u n i v o c o s i b i e t c r e a t u r a e .



M NS N TUR L KNOWLEDGE OF GOD ig

when the m in d , on the basis o f God's s im p l ic i t y , ide n t ifies

any o f H i s o t he r a t t r i bu t es w i t h H i s p r ima ry a t t r i bu t e ,

n a m e ly, being itse lf.

S ince no th ing i s s imp le r t han God , He i s known no t

t h roug h a species p rope r to H im , bu t , i n a m anne r

remin iscen t o f the opera t ion of the es t imat ive power

th roug h a species, a l ien to H im , de r ived from c rea tu res .

An d th is ho lds fo r a l l th ree of the a forem ent ioned ways

o f kn ow in g God.

[Scotus's own op in ion]

M y answer to the fi rs t qu es tion is d i ffe re n t . I sha ll

con t rad ic t the p reced ing v iew on five po in t s . The

reasons I g ive for m y p os i tion w i l l refu te the othe r .

[First Statem ent]. In the firs t p lace , th en , I say th a t i t is

na tu ra l l y poss ib le to have no t on ly a concep t i n wh ich

God i s k nown i n c i den t a l l y , a s i t

were—for

ins tance,

under the aspect of some

attribute—but

also one in

w h i c h H e is conceiv ed b y H im se lf and qu i dd i t a t i v e l y .

Th is I p rove as follow s . Acc ord ing to [H e n ry o f

Ghen t ] , b y conce i v i ng "w i se " we g rasp a p rope r t y o r

quas i -p roper ty wh ich per fec ts the na tu re a f te r the

m anne r of

a

secondary ac t. In order to conce ive "w is e " ,

the refore, i t is necessary to have a conc ep t ion of som e

pr io r sub jec t , because I unders tand th is p roper ty to be

verified ex is ten t ia l ly . An d so w e m us t look b eyond a l l

our ideas of a t t r ibutes or quas i-a t t r ibutes , in order to

fi nd a qu i dd i t a t iv e concep t to w h i ch the form e r m ay be

a t t r i b u t e d .

Th is othe r concep t w i l l be a q u id d i ta t ive

n ot ion of

God,

for our quest for a quas i-sub jec t w i l l n ot

cease w i th any othe r k in d of concep t.

[Second Statem ent]. Second ly, I say th a t God is con

ce ived not on ly in a concept ana logous to the concept

of

a

c rea tu re , tha t i s , one w h ich is w h o ll y othe r tha n tha t

wh ich i s p red ica ted o f c rea tu res , bu t even in some

concep t un ivoca l to H im se lf an d to a c rea tu re .



2 0 DUNS SCOTUS

E t n e fia t c o n t e n t i o

de

n o m in e u n i v oc a t io n is ,

univocum

c o n c e p t u m d i c o q u i i t a e s t u n u s q u o d e j u s u n i t a s sufficit

a d c o n t r a d i c t i o n e m

afErmando

e t n e g a n d o

ipsum

d e

e o d e m ,

s u f f i c i t etiam p r o m e d i o s y l l o g i s t i c o , u t e x t r e m a

u n i t a i n m e d i o s i c u n o s i n e f a l l a c i a

aequivocationis

c o n -

c l u d a n t u r i n t e r se u n i r i e t u n i v o c a t i o n e m s ic intellectam

p r o b o q u a d r u p l i c i t e r .

[ A r g . i ] . Primo

s ic :

omnis

i n t e l l e c t u s c e r t u s d e u n o

c o n c e p t u e t d u b i u s d e d i v e r s i s h a b e t c o n c e p t u m d e q u o

es t c e r t u s alium a c on c e p t ib u s d e q u i b u s e s t d u b i u s , s u b -

jectum i n c l u d i t p r a e d i c a t u m . Se d in t e l le c t u s v i a t or is

p o te s t esse c e r t u s d e D e o q u o d s i t e ns d u b i t a n d o d e e n t e

f in i to

vel

i n f i n i t o , c r e a t o

vel

i n c r e a to ; e r go con ce p t u s

en t is d e Deo e s t a l iu s a co n ce p t u is t o e t

i l l o ,

e t i t a n e u t e r

e x s e, e t i n u t r o q u e

illorum

i n c l u d i t u r , i g i t u r u n i v oc u s .

P r o b a t i o

majoris

: q u i a n u l lu s i d e m c on c e p tu s est

c e r tu s e t d u b i u s ; e r g o v e l a l i u s , q u o d e st p r o p o s i t u m ,

v e l n u l lu s , e t n u n c n o n e r i t c e r t i t u d o d e a l i q u o c o n c e p t u .

P r o b a t i o

minoris

: Q u i l i b e t

Philosophus

f u i t c e r t u s

i l lud q u o d p os u i t primum p r i n c i p i u m esse e n s, p u t a u n u s

d e i g n e e t a l i u s d e a q u a , c e r t u s e r a t q u o d e r a t e n s .

N o n autem f u i t c e r t u s quod esse t ens creatum v e l in c r e a -

t u m , p r i m u m v e l n o n p r i m u m . N o n enim e r a t c e r t u s

q u o d e r a t p r i m u m , q u i a tu n c fu is s e t c e r tu s d e

f a l so ,

e t

falsum no n e s t s c i b i l e ; nee q u o d e ra t ens n o n p r i m u m ,

q u i a t u n c n o n p o s u i s s e n t o p p o s i t u m .

C o n f i rm a t u r e t ia m : n a m a l iq u i s v id e n s

Philosophos



MAN

S

NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 20

A n d le s t t h e r e be a d i s p u t e a b o u t th e n a m e " u n i v o c a -

t i o n " , I d e s ig n a t e t h a t con ce p t u n i vo c a l w h i c h possesses

s u ffic i e n t u n i t y i n i ts e lf, so t h a t t o a f fi rm a n d d en y i t o f

on e a n d th e s am e t h i n g w o u l d b e a c o n t r a d i c t i on . I t

a ls o h a s s u ffi c ie n t u n i t y t o s e rv e as t h e m i d d l e t e rm o f a

s y l l o g i s m ,

so t h a t w h e r e v e r t w o e xtre m e s a r e u n i te d b y a

m i d d l e t e r m t h a t is on e i n t h i s w a y , w e m a y c on c lu d e to

th e u n i o n o f t h e tw o e xtre m e s a m o n g th e m s e lv e s . U n i v o -

c a t i o n i n t h i s s e n s e I p ro v e b y t h e f o l l o w i n g f o u r

a r g u

m e n t s .

[ A r g . i ] .

Th e fi r s t is t h i s . Eve r y i n t e l le c t t h a t is

c e r t a i n a b o u t on e c on c e p t , b u t d u b i ou s a b o u t oth e r s h a s ,

i n a d d i t io n t o t h e c on c e p ts a b o u t w h i c h i t is i n d o u b t ,

a n o th e r c on c e p t o f w h i c h i t is c e r t a i n . ( T h e s u b je c t

in c l u d e s t h e p r e d i c a t e . ) N o w , i n th i s l ife a l r e a d y , a m a n

c a n b e c e r t a i n i n h is m i n d t h a t G o d is a b e i n g a n d s t i l l

b e i n d o u b t w h e t h e r H e is a f i n i t e o r a n i n f in i te b e i n g , a

c r e a t e d o r a n u n c r e a t e d b e i n g . C on s e q u e n t ly , th e

c o n

c e p t o f " b e i n g " as a ff i r m e d o f G o d is d i ffe r e n t f r o m t h e

ot h e r t w o c on c e p ts b u t is i n c l u d e d i n b o t h o f t h e m a n d

t h e r e fo re is u n i v o c a l .

P r oo f o f t h e m a jo r . O n e a n d th e sa m e c on c e p t c a n n o t

b e b o t h c e r t a i n a n d d u b io u s . T h e r e f or e , e i th e r t h e r e is

a n o th e r c on c e p t ( w h i c h is o u r c o n t e n t i on ) , or th e r e is

n o c o n c e p t a t a l l , a n d c on s e q u e n t ly n o c e r t it u d e a b o u t

a n y c o n c e p t .

I p r o v e t h e m i n o r . E v e r y p h i los o p h e r w a s c e r t a i n t h a t

w h a t h e p os t u l a t e d as a fi rs t p r i n c i p l e w a s a b e in g ; fo r

i n s t a n c e , o n e w a s c e r t a i n t h a t f i r e w a s a b e i n g , a n o t h e r

t h a t w a t e r w a s a b e i n g . Y e t h e w a s n o t c e r t a in w h e t h e r

i t w a s a c r e a t e d or a n u n c r e a t e d b e i n g , w h e t h e r i t w a s

first o r n o t fir s t. H e co u l d n o t b e c e r t a i n t h a t i t w a s

t h e f i rs t b e i n g , for t h e n h e w o u l d h a v e b e e n c e r t a in

a bo u t so me t h i n g f a l s e , a n d wha t i s f a l s e i s no t s t r i c t l y

k n o w a b l e .1 1 N e i t h e r w a s h e c e r t a i n th a t i t w a s n o t

fi r s t ; fo r t h e n h e w o u l d n o t h a v e c l a i m e d t h e o p p o s it e .

Th i s r eason is c on f i rm e d as fol low s : Som eone



21

DUNS SCOTUS

d i s co rda re , po te s t e s se

certus

d e

quocumque

q u o d D e u s

[read q u i l i b e t ] posui tpr imum principium esse e n s , e t tamen

p r o p t e r contrarietatem opinionum e o ru m , p o t u i t d u b i t a r e

u t r u m s it h oc ens vel

i l l u d .

E t t a l id u b i t a n t i , s i f i e r e t d e m o n -

s t r a t i o c o n c l u d e n s v e l d e s t r u e n s aliquem conceptum i n -

f e r i o r e m , p u t a q u o d i g n i s n o n e r i t e n s p r i m u m , s e d

aliquid

ens pos te r i u s

primo

e n t e , n o n d e s t r u e r e t u r

ille

c on c e p t u s p r i m u s s i b i c e r tu s q u e r n h a b u i t d e e n t e , s ed

s a l v a r e t u r i n

illo

c o n c e p t u p a r t i c u l a r i p r o b a t o d e ig n e ;

e t p e r h o c p r o b a t u r p r op o s i t io s u p p o s it a i n u l t i m a

c on s e q u e n t ia r a t io n i s , q u a e f u i t q u o d i l le c on c e p tu s c e r tu s

q u a e est e x se n e u t e r d u b i o r u m i n u t r oq u e i s t or u m

s a l v a t u r .

Q u o d s i n o n c u re s d e a u c t o r i t a t e ilia a c c e p t a d e

d i v e r s ita t e o p i n i o n u m p h i lo s o p h a n t iu m , se d d ic a s q u o d

q u i l i b e t h a b e t d u o s c o n c e p t u s i n i n t e l l e c t u s u o p r o -

p in q u o s , q u i p r o p t e r p r o p i n q u i t a t e m a n a l og ia e v i d e n t u r

esse u n u s c on c e p t u s . C o n t r a h oc v i d e t u r esse q u o d t u n c

e x i s t a e v a s i o n e v i d e r e t u r d e s t r u c t a

omnis

v i a p r o b a n d i

u n i t a t e m a l i c u j u s c o n c e p t u s

u n i v o c a m .

S i enim d i c i s

hominem

h a b e r e

unum

c o n c e p t u m a d S o c r a t e m e t

P la t on e m , n e g a b i tu r t i b i e t d i c e t u r q u o d s u n t d u o , se d

v i d e n t u r u n u s p r op t e r magnam s i m i l i t u d i n e m .

P r a e t e r e a , ill i d u o c on c e p t u s s u n t s i m p l ic i t e r s i m p l ic e s ,

e r g o n o n i n t e l l i g i b i l e s n i s i d i s t i n c t e e t t o t a l i t e r , e r g o s i

n u n c n o n v i d e n t u r d u o , nee pos t .

I t e m ,

a u t c o n c i p i u n t u r u t

omnino

d i s p a r a t i e t

mirum

quomodo v i d e n t u r u n u s , a u t u t c o m p a r a t i s e c u n d u m

a n a log i a m a u t s e c u n d u m s i m i l i t u d i n e m v e l d i s t i n c t i on e m ,



MAN

S


21

p e r c e i v in g t h e d i s a g re e m e n t a m on g p h i los op h e r s c a n s t i l l

b e c e r t a i n t h a t a n y o f t h e th i n g s t h a t th e y h a v e a c c la i m e d

as t h e fir s t p r i n c i p l e is a b e i n g . Neve r t h e le s s , i n v i ew o f

t h e c o n t r a r i e t y o f o p in i on s , h e c o u l d b e i n d o u b t w h e t h e r

th is o r t h a t b e in g is p r i m a r y . N o w i f w e c o u ld d e m on

s t r a t e f o r s u c h a n i n d i v i d u a l t h e t r u t h o r f a l s i t y o f o n e

o f these a l t e r n a t i v e s , fo r exam p le t h a t fir e is n o t th e fir s t

b e i n g , b u t is p os t e r ior t o t h e f ir s t b e i n g , w e w o u l d n o t

des t ro y h i s first c e r t a i n n o t io n o f i t as a b e i n g , b u t t h i s

n o t io n w o u l d s u r v iv e i n th e p a r t i c u l a r c on c e p t ion w h i c h

w e h a d p r o v e n a b o u t fir e . A n d t h i s a ls o p r ov e s t h e p r o p o

s i t i on s t a t e d a s t h e fin a l co n c l u s i on o f t h e a r g u m e n t ,

n a m e l y t h a t t h is c e r t a i n c on c e p t , s in c e as s u c h i t is

n e i t h e r o f t h e do ub t f u l no t i o n s , i s p r e s e r v e d i n bo t h o f

t h e m .

Y o u m a y n o t r e c o g n i s e t h e f o r c e o f t h i s a r g u m e n t

b a s e d o n t h e d i v e r s i t y o f o p i n i o n a m o n g t h e p h i l o s o -

p h i s e rs , b u t in s is t t h a t e a c h ha s i n h is m i n d t w o c on c e p ts

c los e ly r e s em b l i n g e a c h o th e r . Ye t be c au se o f t h e v e r y

c loseness o f t he a n a log y , t h e y seem to be one conce p t .

T h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n , h o w e v e r , m a y b e u r g e d

ag a i n s t t h i s . B y s u c h a n e v a s i on a l l po s s i b i li ty o f p ro v i n g

t h e u n i t y o f a n y u n i v o c a l c o n c e p t w o u l d b e d e s t r o y e d .

F or i f y o u sa y th a t " m a n " is on e c on c e p t a p p l ic a b l e t o

b o t h Soc ra te s a n d P l a t o , som e one w i l l d e n y i t , a s s e r tin g

t h a t t h e r e a r e t w o c o n c e p t s , b u t t h e y s e e m t o b e o n e

b e ca u se o f t h e i r g r e a t s i m i la r i t y .

F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s e t w o c o n c e p t s a r e i r r e d u c i b l y

s i m p l e . U n le s s , t h e r e for e , t h e y a r e k n o w n d i s t in c t l y

a n d in

toto,

t h e y c a n n o t b e k n o w n a t a l l . C on s e q u e n t ly ,

i f th e s e con cep t s a r e n o t p e r c e i v e d as tw o con cep t s n o w ,

t h e y w i l l n o t b e p e r c e i v e d a s t w o l a t e r on .

A g a i n , e i t h e r th e se tw o con cep t s a r e co n ce iv e d as

o p p o s e d t o e a c h o t h e r , a n d t h e n i t i s s t r a n g e h o w t h e y

a r e p e r c e iv e d as on e . O r t h e y a r e c o m p a r e d a c c o r d i n g

t o a n a l og y , or a c c o r d i n g t o s i m i l a r i t y o r d i s t i n c t io n , i n

w h i c h ca se t h e y a r e c on c e iv e d a s d i s t i n c t e i t h e r p r i o r to

2 , 3 2 2 ) 5



22 DUNS SGOTUS

e t t u n c simul vel p r i u s concipiuntur u t d i s t i n c t i , e r g o n o n

v i d e n t u r

u n u s .

I t e m ,

p o n e n d o d u o s c o n c e p t u s , ponis d u o o b j e c t a

fo r m a l ia c o g n i ta , q u o m o d o s u n t d u o c o g n i ta fo r m a l ia

e t n o n u t d i s t i n c t a .

P r a e te r e a , s i i n t e l l i g e r e t s i n g u l a r ia s u b p r o p r i i s

r a t i o n i b u s q u a m v i s c o n c e p t u s duorum e j u s d e m s p e c i e i

e sse nt s i m i l i m i , n o n e st dubium t a m e n , q u i n multo

s im i l i o r e s

quam

i s t i d u o i n p r o p o s i t o , q u i a i s t i d u o

d i ffe r u n t s p e c ie , a d h u c in t e l le c t u s b e n e d i s t in g u e r e t i n t e r

ta le s c on c e p t u s s i n g u l a r i u m . . .

[ A r g .

n ] . Se c u n d o p r i n c i p a l i t e r a r g u o s ic : N u l l u s

c on c e p t u s r e a l is c a u s a t u r i n i n t e l l e c t u v i a t or i s n a t u r a l i te r

n i s i a b

his.quae

s un t n a t u r a l i te r

motiva

i n t e l le c t u s n o s t r i .

Sed ilia s u n t phantasma v e l ob j e c t u m re lu c e n s i n p h a n -

t a s m a t e e t i n t e l l e c t u s a g e n s , e r g o n u l l u s c o n c e p t u s

s i m

p l e x n a t u r a l i t e r f i t i n i n t e l l e c t u n o s t r o modo n i s i q u i

po t e s t f i e r i v i r t u t e i s t o r u m , s e d co n cep t u s q u i no n e s s e t

u n i v o c u s o b j e c t o r e l u c e n t i i n p h a n t a s m a t e , s e d

omnino

a l i u s p r i o r a d q u e r n ille habeat a n a l o g i a m , n o n p o t e s t

f i e r i v i r t u t e i n t e l l e c t u s a g e n t i s e t p h a n t a s m a t i s , e r g o t a l i s

c o n c e p t u s a l i u s a n a l o g u s q u i p o n i t u r n a t u r a l i t e r i n

i n t e l

l e c t u v i a t o r i s numquam e r i t e t i t a n o n p o t e r i t h a b e r i

n a t u r a l i t e r a l i q u i s c o n c e p t u s d e D e o , q u o d e s t

f a l s u m .

P r ob a t io a s s u m p t i : O b je c t u m quodcumque s i v e r e

lu c e n s i n p h a n t a s m a t e s iv e i n s p ec ie in t e l l ig i b i l i c u m

i n t e l l e c t u a g e n t e v e l p o s s i b i l i c o o p e r a n t e s e c u n d u m

u l t i m u m s ua e v i r t u t i s fa c i t s ic u t effectum s i b i a d a e q u a t u m

c o n c e p t u m

suum

p r o p r i u m e t c on c e p t u m o m n i u m

e s s e n t ia l i te r v e l v i r t u a l i t e r in c l u s o r u m i n e o. Se d i l l e

a l iu s c o n c e p t u s , q u i p o n i t u r a n a l og u s , n o n e st e s se n -





23

DUNS SCOTUS

t i a l i t e r

nee

v i r t u a l i t e r

inclusus

i n i s t o ,

nee etiam

es t i s te ,

e r g o i s t e n o n f i e t a b a l i q u o t a l i m o v e n t e .

E t

confirmatur

r a t i o , q u i a o b j e c t u m p r a e t e r

c o n -

ceptum s u u m p r o p r i u m adaequatum e t inclusum i n i p so

a l t e r o

duorum

m o d o r u m

praedictorum

n i h i l p o t e s t

cognosci ex is to objecto n i s i p e r d i s c u r s u m , se d discursus

p r a e s u p p o n i t c o g n i t i o n e m i s t i u s simplicitatis a d q u o d

discurritur.

Formetur i g i t u r r a t i o s ic : q u i a n u l l u m o b je c t u m fa c i t

conceptum simplicem

p r o p r i u m i n i s t o i n t e l l e c t u c o n -

ceptum s i m p l ic e m p r o p r i u m a l te r iu s o b je c t i n i s i c on -

t i n e a t illud aliud o b j e c t u m e s s e n t i a l i t e r vel v i r t u a l i t e r ,

o b j e c t u m

autem

c r e a t u m n o n c o n t i n e t i n c r e a t u m

e s s e n t ia l it e r v e l v i r t u a l i t e r , e t h oc s u b e a r a t i on e s u b q u a

s i b i a t t r i b u u n t u r , u t p os te r iu s e s s e n t ia l i te r a t t r i b u i t u r

p r i o r i e s s e n t i a l i t e r , q u i a c o n t r a r a t i o n e m p o s t e r i o r i s

e s s e n t i a l i t e r e s t i n c l u d e r e v i r t u a l i t e r s u u m p r i u s e t p a t e t

q u o d o b j e c t u m c r e a t u m n o n e s s e n t i a l i t e r c o n t i n e t i n

c r e a t u m s e c u n d u m a l i q u i d omnino s i b i p r o p r i u m e t n on

c om m u n e , e rg o n o n fa c i t c on c e p t u m s i m p l ic e m e t p r o

p r i u m e n t i in c r e a t o. . .

[ A r g .

i n ] . T e r t i o a r g u i t u r s ic : C on c e p t u s p r o p r i u s

alicujus s u b j e c t i e s t sufheiens r a t i o c o n c l u d e n d i de illo

s u b j e c t o o m n i a c o n c e p t i b i l i a q u a e s i b i n e c e s s a r i o i n s u n t .

N u l l u m a u t e m c on c e p t u m h a b e m u s d e D e o p e r q u e rn

sufficienter p os s u m u s c o g n os c e re o m n i a c o n c e p t a a

n ob is q u a e ne c e ss a rio s i b i i n s u n t . P a t e t d e T r i n i t a t e , e t

aliis c r e d i t is necessa r iis ; e r g o , e t c .

M a j o r p r o b a t u r , q u i a i m m e d i a t a m q u a m l i b e t c o g n o s -

c i m u s ,

i n q u a n t u m t e rm in o s c og n os c im u s . I g i t u r p a t e t

m a j o r d e

omni

i l l o c o n c e p t i b i l i q u o d i m m e d i a t e

in

es t

c o n c e p t u i s u b j e c t i , q u o d s i i n s i t m e d i a t e , fie t i d e m




i nc lud e d in it.13 C onse que nt ly , i t cann ot a rise by any

such m ov ing fac tor .

An d th i s a rgum en t is con firm ed by the fac t t h a t excep t

th rou gh a reason ing p rocess the m ind can know n o th in g

from th is ob jec t bes ides the p roper an d adequ ate concep t

o f t he ob jec t i t se l f and wha teve r i s i nc luded the re in in

one of

the

tw o aforem en tione d w ays . B u t such a reason

ing process presupposes a know led ge of the s im ple th in g

tow ards w h ich one reasons .

Consequen t l y , t he a rgumen t may be fo rmu la ted as

follow s : No ob jec t w i l l p roduc e a s im p le a nd p rope r

concep t o f i t se l f and a s imp le and p roper concep t o f

another object , unless i t contains th is second object

essen tia lly or v i r tu a l ly . No created objec t , howe ver ,

con ta ins the "Uncrea ted" essen t ia l l y o r virtually—at

least i n the w ay tha t the tw o a re a c tua lly

r e la ted ,

n am e ly

as w ha t is by na tu re seconda ry is re la ted to w ha t is by

na tu re p r ior . For i t is con t ra ry to the very n o tion of

what is essen t ia l l y secondary to inc lude v i r tua l l y what

is p r ior to i t . I t is a lso obvious th a t the crea ted does n ot

conta in , as par t of i ts essence, someth ing that is not

mere ly common, bu t i s exc lus i ve l y p rope r to the 'Un

c rea t ed " .

There fore , i t p roduces no s im p le an d p rope r

concep t o f the "Un c re a te d " a t a l l .

[A rg . i n ] .

The t h i r d a rgum en t is th is . The p rope r

concept of any subjec t prov ides suf f ic ient ground for

conc lud ing to every th ing conce ivab le wh ich necessar i l y

inheres in tha t sub jec t . We have no concep t o f God,

however , that enables us to know every necessary

a t t r i

bu te w h ich w e conce ive o f H im , as is ev iden t from the

fac t o f the Tr in i t y , and the o ther necessary a t t r ibu tes

th a t w e k n ow of H im b y fa i th . The refore, e tc .

P roof o f the m a jor. We know an y im m ed ia te p ropos i

t ion in so fa r as w e kn ow its te rm s . C onseq uen tly , the

m ajor c lea r ly holds fo r every concep t tha t is im m ed ia te ly

ve r i fied e xis te nt ia l ly of the sub jec t-conce pt . I f i t is a

ques t ion of a n o tion tha t is on ly m ed ia te ly ve r ified , our



24 DUNS SCOTUS

argumentum de m e d i o c om p a r a t o a d id e m s u b je c t u m ,

e t

ubicumque

s t a b i t u r , h a b e t u r p r o p o s i t u m d e i m -

m e d ia t is , e t u l t r a p e r illas s c i e n t u r m e d i a t a e .

[ A r g .

i v ] .

I t e m , q u a r t o p o te s t s ic a r g u i . A u t a l i q u a

p e r fe c t io s i m p l i c i t e r h a b e t r a t i on e m

communem

Deo e t

c r e a t u r a e , e t h a b e t u r p r o p o s i t u m , a u t

n o n ,

se d tantum

propriam c r e a t u r a e , e t t u n c r a t i o e j u s n o n c o n v e n i e t

formaliter

D e o , q u o d e st in c o n v e n i e n s . A u t h a b e t

r a t i o n e m omnino p r o p r i a m D e o , e t t u n c s e q u i tu r q u o d

n i h i l a t t r i b u e n d u m e st D e o , q u i a es t p e r fe c t i o s i m p l ic i t e r .

N a m h o c n i h i l e s t aliud d i c e r e , n i s i q u o d q u i a r a t i o e j u s

u t c o n v e n i t D e o , d i c i t perfectionem s i m p l ic i t e r , . id e o

ipsum

p o n i t u r i n De o , e t i t a p e r i b i t d o c t r i n a

Anselmi

Monologion,*

u b i vult q u o d praetermissis r e l a t i on i b u s i n

o m n i b u s aliis q u i d q u i d es t s i m p l i c i t e r m e l iu s i p s u m quam

n o n i p s u m , a t t r i b u e n d u m est D e o, s ic u t q u o d c u m q u e

n o n t a l e , est a m o v e n d u m a b ip s o . Primo e rg o s e c u n d u m

i p s u m a l i q u i d c o g n o s c i tu r esse t a l e e t s e c u n d o a t t r i b u i t u r

D e o .

E r go n o n e st t a l e p r a e c i s e u t i n Deo .

H oc etiam c o n f i r m a t u r q u i a t u n c n u l l a p e r fe c t io

s i m p l i c i t e r esset i n c r e a t u r a . C o n s e q u e n t ia p a t e t , q u i a

n u l li u s t a l is p e r fe c t io n is e t ia m c on c e p tu s a l iq u i s c o n v e n i t

c r e a t u r a e n i s i c on c e p t u s a n a l og i c u s e x h y p o t h e s i . T a l i s

s e c u n d u m s e, q u i a a n a l og i c u s , e st im p e r fe c t u s e t i n nullo

es t e ju s r a t i o melior n o n ip s o , q u i a a l ia s s e c u n d u m illam

r a t i o n e m a n a l o g i c a m p o n e r e t u r i n D e o .

C o n f ir m a t u r e t ia m h a e c q u a r t o r a t i o s ic :

Omnis

Cap.

xv (Migne ,

P.L.

c l v i i i ,

162-3).




a r g u m e n t w i l l c o n t in u e to a p p l y to t h e m i d d l e te r m i n

r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s u b j e c t - c o n c e p t u n t i l w e h a v e w h a t w e

a re seeking—some i m m e d i a t e p r op o s it ion s . T h r o u g h

th ese im m e d i a te t ru t h s ,

t h e n ,

t h e m e d i a te t r u th s w i l l be

k n o w n .

[ A r g .

i v ] . A fo u r t h a r g u m e n t c a n a ls o b e a d d u c e d .

E i t h e r s om e p u r e p e r fe c t io n

14

h as a c o m m on m e a n i n g as

a p p l i e d t o G o d a n d c re a t u re s ( w h i c h is o u r c o n t e n t io n ) ,

o r n o t . I f n o t , i t is e i t h e r because it s m e a n i ng does n o t

a p p l y f or m a l ly t o G od a t a l l ( w h i c h is in a d m is s i b l e ) , or

e lse i t h a s a m e a n i n g t h a t is w h o l l y p r o p e r t o G o d , i n

w h i c h case n o t h i n g n e e d b e a t t r ib u t e d t o Go d b e ca u se

i t is a p u r e p e r fe c t io n . Fo r s u c h a n a s s u m p t ion is

e q u i v a l e n t t o s a y in g t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f s u c h a p e r fe c t io n

i n so fa r as i t a p p l ie d t o G o d , is a p u r e p e r fe c t io n a n d

t h e r e f or e is a ff i rm e d o f G o d . B u t t h i s is t o b r i n g t o

n ou g h t w h a t Anselm t e a c he s i n t h e

Monologion,*

n a m e l y

t h a t , w i t h r e g a r d to e v e r y t h i n g e xc e p t re l a t ion s , w h a t e v e r

is u n c o n d i t i on a l ly b e t t e r th a n s om e t h in g w h i c h is n o t i t ,

m u s t b e a t t r i b u t e d t o G o d , e v e n as e v e r y t h i n g n o t o f t h is

k i n d [ i. e . e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is n o t b e t t e r t h a n a n y t h i n g

p o s it iv e t h a t is i n c o m p a t ib l e w i t h i t ] m u s t b e d e n ie d o f

H i m .

A c c o r d i n g to A n s e lm ,

t h e n ,

w e f i r s t k n o w s o m e

t h i n g t o b e a p u r e p e r f e c t i o n a n d s e c o n d l y w e a t t r i b u t e

t h i s p e r fe c t i o n t o G o d . The r e fo r e , i t is n o t a p u r e p e r

fe c t ion p r e c i s e l y i n so fa r a s i t is i n God .

Th i s is a lso co n fi rm e d b y th e f a c t t h a t ot h e rw is e n o

p u r e p e r fe c t io n w o u l d e xis t i n c r e a t u re s . T h e con s e

q uen ce i s e v i d e n t , f o r i n t h i s h y po t h e s i s o n l y s u c h

c o n

cep ts a s exp re ss such p u re p e r fe c t ions an a logous l y ca n be

a p p l ie d t o a c r e a t u r e . B u t s u c h a n o t io n i n it s e l f is

im pe r fe c t s in c e i t is o n l y a n a logo us t o th e p u r e p e r fe c

t i o n . A n d th e r e for e , n o t h i n g is a n y b e t te r fo r h a v i n g

t h i s a n a l o g o u s p e r f e c t i o n t h a n i t w o u l d b e i f i t d i d n o t

h a v e i t , fo r ot h e r w i s e s u c h a p e r f e c t io n w o u l d b e a f fi r m e d

o f God .

Th i s fo u r t h r e a so n is a lso co n fi rm e d as fo ll ow s . Eve r y



25

DUNS SCOTUS

inquisitio metaphysica d e D e o s ic p r o c e d i t , c o n s id e r a n d o

formalem r a t i on e m a l ic u j u s e t a u fe r e n d o a b ilia r a t i o n e

f o r m a l i i m p e r f e c t i o n e m

quam habet

i n c r e a t u r i s e t r e -

s e r v a n d o illam r a t i o n e m f or m a l e m e t a t t r i b u e n d o s i b i

omnino summam

p e r f e c t i o n e m e t s i c a t t r i b u e n d o

illud

Deo . Exemplum

d e f or m a l i r a t i on e s a p i e n t ia e

vel

i n t e l le c t u s v e l v o l u n t a t i s . C on s id e r a t u r enim i n s e e t

s e c u n d u m s e, e t e x h oc q u o d i s ta r a t i o n o n c o n c l u d i t

formaliter i m p e r f e c t i o n e m a l i q u a m nee l i m i t a t i o n e m ,

r e m ov e t u r a b ip s a im p e r fe c t ion e s q u a e c o n c o m i ta n t u r

e a r n i n c r e a t u r i s e t r e s e r v a t a

eadem

r a t i on e s a p ie n t ia e

e t v o l u n t a t i s a t t r i b u u n t u r is t a D e o p e r fe c t is s i m e , e rg o

omnis

i n q u i s i t i o d e D e o s u p p o n i t i n t e l l e c t u m h a b e r e

conceptum eundem

u n i v o c u m

quem

a c c e p i t e x c r e a t u r i s .

Q u o d s i d ic a s a l ia e st fo rm a l i s r a t i o eorum q u a e

c o n v e n i u n t D e o , e x h oc s e q u i tu r in c o n v e n i e n s , q u o d ex

n u l la r a t i on e p r o p r i a e o r u m p r o u t s u n t i n c r e a t u r is

p os s u n t c o n c l u d i d e D e o , q u i a o m n i n o a l ia e t a l ia r a t i o

i l lorum e st e t is t o r u m . Immo n on magis c o n c l u d e t u r

q u o d D e u s e st s a p ie n s f or m a l i t e r e x r a t i o n e s a p i e n t ia e

q u a m a p p r e h e n d i m u s e x c r e a t u r i s q u a m q u o d D e u s e s t

fo r m a l i t e r l a p i s . P o te s t e n i m c o n c e p t u s a l iq u i s a l iu s

a c on c e p t u la p i d is c r e a t i fo r m a r i a d q u e m c o n c e p t u m

l a p i d i s u t est id e a i n D e o h a b e t is te la p is a t t r i b u t i o n e m ,

e t i t a fo r m a l i t e r d i c e r e t u r De u s e st la p is s e c u n d u m istum

c o n c e p t u m a n a l o g i c u m v e l a n a l o g u m , s i c u t s a p i e n s

s e cu n d u m i l i u m c on c e p t u m a n a l og u m .

Q u a l i s autem s it u n i v oc a t io e n t is , a d q u a n t a e t a d

q u a e d i c e t u r m a g i s i n q u a e s t i o n e d e

primo

ob j e c to

i n t e l l e c t u s . *

\Tertia

Sen tent id\.

T e r t i o d ic o q u o d De u s n o n c og -

Opus oxoniense,

i ,

dist.

u i ,

q . i i i .




m e t a p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y a b o u t G o d p roc e e d s i n th i s fa s h ion :

t h e fo r m a l n o t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g is c on s i d e r e d ; t h e i m

p e r fe c t i o n a s soc ia te d w i t h t h i s n o t i o n i n c r e a t u r e s is

r e m o v e d ,

a n d

t h e n ,

r e t a i n i n g t h i s sa m e fo r m a l n o t io n ,

w e a s c r ib e t o i t t h e u l t im a t e d e g re e o f p e r fe c t io n a n d

t h e n a t t r i b u t e i t t o G o d . T a k e , for e x a m p l e , th e f or m a l

n o t i on of " w i s d o m " or " i n t e l l e c t " or " w i l l " . S u c h a

no t i o n i s co n s i d e r e d f i r s t o f a l l s imp l y i n i t s e l f a n d

ab so lu t e l y . B e cau se t h i s n o t i o n in c l u d e s f orm a l l y n o

i m p e r fe c t io n n o r l i m i t a t i o n , t h e i m p e r fe c t io n s a s s oc ia te d

w i t h i t i n c re a tu re s a r e r e m o v e d . R e t a i n i n g t h is s am e

n o t io n o f " w i s d o m " a n d " w i l l " , w e a t t r i b u t e th e se t o G od

—but i n a m os t p e r fe c t d e g r e e . C on s e q u e n t ly , e v e r y

i n q u i r y r e g a r d i n g G o d is b a se d u p o n th e s u p p os i tion t h a t

t h e i n t e l l e c t h a s t h e s a m e u n i v o c a l c o n c e p t w h i c h i t

o b t a i n e d f r o m c r e a t u r e s .

I f y o u m a i n t a i n t h a t t h is is n o t t r u e , b u t t h a t th e fo r m a l

c on c e p t o f w h a t p e r ta i n s t o G o d is a n o t h e r n o t i o n , a

d i s c o n c e r t in g c on s e q u en c e en su es ; n a m e l y t h a t f r o m t h e

p r o p e r n o t io n o f a n y t h i n g f ou n d i n c r e a tu r e s n o t h i n g a t

a l l c a n b e i n f e r r e d a b o u t G o d , fo r th e n o t io n o f w h a t is

i n e a c h is w h o l l y d i ffe r e n t . W e w o u l d h a v e n o m or e

r e a s on t o c o n c lu d e t h a t G o d is f or m a l l y w is e fr o m t h e

n o t io n o f w is d o m d e r iv e d f r om c re a tu re s t h a n w e w o u l d

ha ve r e a son t o con c l u d e t h a t G o d is f orm a l l y a s tone .

Fo r i t is poss ib l e to fo rm a n o th e r n o t ion o f a s tone to

w h i c h t h e n o t i on o f a c r e a t e d s ton e b e a rs som e r e l a t i o n ,

fo r in s t a n c e , ston e as a n id e a i n G o d . A n d so w e c o u l d

s ay f or m a l l y , " G o d is a s t o n e " , a c c o r d i n g t o th i s a n a l o

g ou s c o n c e p t , j u s t as w e s a y , " H e is w i s e " , a c c o r d i n g t o

a n o t h e r a n a l o g o u s c o n c e p t .

W h a t k i n d o f univocation is a s c r ib e d t o b e i n g a n d h o w

fa r a n d t o w h a t i t e x te n d s , w i l l a l l b e d is cu s se d m o r e a t

l e n g t h i n a s ub s e q u e n t q u e s t ion on t h e p r i m a r y ob je c t

o f t h e i n te l le c t .15

[ Th i r d

Statem en t].

T h i r d l y , I s ay t h a t G o d is n o t k n o w n

n a t u r a l ly b y a n y o n e i n t h e p re s e n t l ife i n a p r o p e r a n d



2 6 DUNS SCOTUS

noscitur n a t u r a l i te r a v i a t o r e i n p a r t i c u l a r i e t p r o p r i e ,

ho c e s t , s u b r a t i o n e h u j u s e s s en t i a e u t h a e c e t i n s e .

Se d r a t i o ilia p o s i t a a d h oc i n p r a e c e d e n t i o p i n i o n e n o n

c o n c l u d i t . C u m enim a r g u i t u r q u o d n o n c o g n os c i tu r

a l i q u i d n i s i p e r s i m i l e , a u t i n t e l l i g i t p e r s i m i l e d e

s i m i l i -

t u d i n e u n i v oc a t io n i s a u t i m i t a t i o n i s . S i primo

m o d o ,

i g i t u r n i h i l c og n o s c it u r d e D e o s e c u n d u m

illam

o p i n i o -

n e m ,

q u i a i n

nullo

h a b e t s i m i l i t u d i n e m u n iv o c a t ion i s

s e c u n d u m i l i u m m o d u m . S i s e c u ndo m od o , e t c r e a t u r a e

n on

tantum

i m i t a n t u r i l l a m e s s e n tia m s u b r a t ion e

g e n e r a lis a t t r i b u t i , se d etiam e s s e n t i a m h a n c u t e s t h a e c

e s s e n tia s iv e u t n u d a i n se e st e x is t e n s , s e c u n d u m eum ;

s i c e n i m

magis

e s t i d ea

vel

e xe m p la r q u o n i a m s ub

r a t i o n e g e n e r a l is a t t r i b u t i ; e r g o p r o p t e r talem s i m i l i

t u d i n e m p o s s e t c r e a t u r a e s s e

principium

c o g n o s c e n d i

e s se n tia m d i v i n a m i n se e t i n p a r t i c u l a r i .

E s t e r g o a l i a r a t i o h u j u s q u a e s t i o n i s , v i d e l i c e t q u o d

D e u s u t h a e c e s se n tia i n se n o n c o g n o s c i t u r n a t u r a l i t e r

a n o b i s , q u i a s u b r a t i o n e t a l i s c o g n o s c i b i l i s e s t o b j e c t u m

voluntarium n o n n a t u r a l e n i s i r e s p e c t u s u i i n t e l l e c t u s

t a n t u m ,

e t id e o a n u l l o i n t e l l e c t u c r e a t o p o te s t s u b

r a t i o n e h u j u s e s s e n t i a e u t h a e c e s t n a t u r a l i t e r c o g n o s c i .

Nee a l i q u a e s se n tia n a t u r a l i t e r c o g n o s c ib i lis a n o b is

s u f f i c i e n t e r o s t e n d i t h a n c e s s e n t i a m u t h a e c ,

nee

p e r

s i m i l i t u d i n e m u n i v o c a t i o n i s nee i m i t a t i o n i s . U n i v o c a t i o

e n i m n o n e st n i s i i n g e n e r a l ib u s r a t i o n i b u s , i m i t a t i o

e t i a m d e f i c i t , q u i a i m p e r f e c t a , q u i a c r e a t u r a i m p e r f e c t e

e u m imitatur.

Utrum autem s it a l ia r a t i o h u ju s i m p o s s i b i l i t a t i s ,

v i d e l ic e t p r o p t e r r a t i on e m

primi

o b j e c t i , s ic u t a l i i p o n u n t ,

d e h oc i n q u a e s t ion e d e p r i m o o b je c t o . *

[Quarta Sentent id] .

Q u a r t o d i c o q u o d a d

multos

c o n -

Opus oxoniense, I, dist.

i n ,

q .

i i i ,



man's natural knowledge of god 26

pa r tic u la r m anne r ; t ha t is to say , we do no t k now H im

in H is essence itse lf pre cisely as this essence.

B u t the reason g iven fo r th is in the p reced ing op in ion

is no t conc lus ive . For , w he n [H e n ry ] a rgues th a t one

th in g can be know n from ano the r on ly b y reason o f w ha t

is s im i la r , w e can on ly und ers tand th is likeness to be one

of un ivoca t ion or o f im i ta t ion . I f the fi rs t is m ea nt , the n

noth ing is known about God, fo r accord ing to th is

opin ion the re is no likeness of u n ivoca t ion betw een God

and c rea tu re s w he reb y H e m igh t b e k now n b y us. I f the

second is m ea nt , then c rea tu res w ou ld no t im i ta te God's

essence m ere ly un de r the aspect of some g ene ra l a t t r ib u te ,

bu t a lso p rec ise ly as " th is essence" , unve i led and as i t

ex is ts in i tse l f , for in th is way i t is more an idea or

exempla r than i f i t were conce ived under some genera l

a t t r ib u te . By reason of th is s im i la r i t y , the re fore , a c rea

t u r e , a c cord ing to h im , cou ld be a p r in c ip l e of k now ing

the d iv ine essence in i tse l f and i n pa r tic u la r .

There is , however, another reason for th is conclus ion

t ha t God H im se l f

as

th is

essence is

n ot

an

objec t of n a tura l

kn ow led ge for us ; for i f

He

b e k nown i n th is w ay b y an y

in te l lec t othe r t han H is ow n , it is as a vo lun ta ry an d no t

as a na tu ra l objec t.16 Therefore H e c an not be kn ow n

na tu ra l l y by any c rea ted in te l l ec t p rec i se l y as " t h i s

essence". Ne i th e r is the re an y essence n a tu ra l ly kn ow -

able to us tha t w ou ld su ffice to reve a l " th is essence" as

" th is essence" w he the r by reason of a likeness of un ivoca

t ion or o f im i ta t ion . For there is u n ivoca t ion on ly w here

gene ra l no tions a re concerned . Im i ta t ion too is defic ien t

because i t is imperfec t , for c reatures only imperfec t ly

im ita te H i m .

Whether there is another reason for the imposs ib i l i ty

o f such know ledge based on the na tu re o f t he p r imary

ob jec t o f the in te l lec t , wh ich some c la im to be the

q u idd i t y o f a m a te r ia l t h ing , w i l l be dis cussed in the

que s tion on the p r im a ry ob jec t o f the in te l le c t .

[Fourth

Statement]. Fou r th ly , I say tha t we can a rr ive



27

DUNS

SGOTUS

ceptus p r o p r i o s D e o possumus p e r v e n i re q u i n o n c on -

v e n i u n t c r e a t u r i s .

Gujusmodi

s u n t c on c e p tu s o m n i u m

p e r f e c t i o n u m s i m p l i c i t e r i n s u m m o , e t p e r f e c t i s s i m u s

c o n c e p t u s i n q u o q u a s i i n quadam d e s c r i p t i o n e p e r -

f e c t i s s ime co gno s c imus

Deum

e st c o n c i p i e n d o

omnes

p e r -

fe c t ion e s s i m p l ic i t e r e t i n s u m m o . Tamen c o n c e p t u s

p e r f e c t i o r simul e t s im p l i c i o r n o b i s po s s ib i lis e st co n cep t u s

en t i s i n f i n i t i .

Iste enim

e st s i m p l i c i o r

quam

c o n c e p t u s

en t i s

b o n i ,

e n t is v e r i , vel a l io r u m s i m i l i u m , q u i a i n f in i t u m

n o n est q u a s i a t t r i b u t u m v e l p a ss io

e n t is ,

s iv e e ju s d e q u o

d i c i t u r , s e d d i c i t modum i n t r i n s e c u m i l l i u s e n t i t a t i s , i t a

q u o d c u m d ic o i n f i n i t u m e ns , n o n h a b e o conceptum

q u a s i p e r a c c i d e n s e x s u b je c t o e t p a s s i on e , s e d c o n c e p t u m

p e r se s u b j e c t i i n c e r to g r a d u p e r fe c t io n i s , s c i lic e t i n f i n i -

t a t i s , s i c u t a l b e d o i n t e n s a n o n d i c i t c o n c e p t u m p e r a c c i

d e n s s i c u t a l b e d o v i s i b i l i s ;

immo

i n t e n s i o d i c i t

gradum

i n t r i n s e c u m albedinis i n se e t i t a p a t e t s i m p l i c i t a s h u ju s

c on c e p tu s en s i n f i n i t u m .

P r o b a t u r p e r f e c t i o i s t i u s c o n c e p t u s , t u r n q u i a i s t e

c o n c e p t u s i n t e r o m n e s n o b i s c o n c e p t i b i l e s c o n c e p t u s

v i r t u a l i t e r plura i n c l u d i t , s ic u t e n i m ens i n c l u d i t v i r t u a -

liter verum

e t

bonum

i n s e, i t a e ns i n f i n i t u m i n c l u d i t

verum i n f i n i t u m e t b o n u m i n f i n i t u m e t omnem p e r -

fectionem

s i m p l i c i te r s u b r a t io n e i n f in i t i . T u r n q u i a

d e m on s t ra t ion e q u i a u l t i m o c o n c l u d i tu r esse d e e n te

i n f in i t e , s i c u t a p p a r e t e x q u a e s t ion e p r i m a s e cu n d ae

d i s t i n c t i o n i s . Il ia autem s u n t p e r fe c t i or a q u a e u l t i m o

c o g n o s c u n t u r d e m o n s t r a t io n e q u i a ex e is , q u i a p r o p t e r

eorum remotionem a c r e a t u r i s difficilimum es t ea ex

c r e a t u r i s c o n c l u d e r e .

S i d ic is d e s u m m o b o n o v e l s u m m o e n t e q u o d is t u d




a t m a n y c on c e p ts p r o p e r t o G od i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y

do n o t a p p l y t o c r e a t u r e s . Su ch a r e t h e con cep t s o f a l l

t h e p u r e p e r f e c t i o n s w h e n t a k e n i n t h e h i g h e s t d e g r e e .

A n d t h e m o s t p e r fe c t c on c e p t o f a l l , b y w h i c h w e k n o w

G o d m o s t p e r fe c t l y , as i t w e r e , i n a d e s c r i p t i v e so rt o f

w a y , i s o b t a i n e d b y c o n c e i v i n g a l l t h e p u r e p e r f e c t i o n s

a n d e a c h i n t h e h ig h e s t d e g r e e . N o w a less p e r fe c t b u t

s im p l e r co n ce p t is pos s ib le t o u s , n a m e l y t h e co n ce p t o f

a n in f in i t e b e i n g . F or th i s is s i m p l e r t h a n th e c on c e p t o f

" g o o d b e i n g " o r " t r u e b e i n g " o r o t h e r s i m i l a r c o n c e p t s ,

s in c e i n f in i t e is n o t a q u a s i -a t tr i b u t e o r p r o p e r t y o f

" b e i n g "

o r o f t h a t o f w h i c h i t is p r e d i c a t e d . R a t h e r i t

s ig n ifie s a n in t r i n s i c m od e o f t h a t e n t i t y , so t h a t w h e n I

sa y " I n f i n i t e B e i n g " , I d o n o t h a v e a c on c e p t c om p os e d

a c c i d e n t a l ly , as i t w e r e , of a s u b je c t a n d it s a t t r i b u t e .

W h a t I d o h a ve is a co n cep t o f w h a t is e s s en t ia l ly one ,

n a m e l y o f a s u b je c t w i t h a c e r t a i n g r a d e o f p e r fe c t io n —

i n f in i t y . I t is l ik e " in t e n s e w h i t e n e s s " , w h i c h is n o t a

n o t i o n t h a t i s a c c i d e n t a l l y c o m p o s e d , s u c h a s " v i s i b l e

w h i t e n e s s " w o u l d b e , f o r t h e i n t e n s i t y i s a n i n t r i n s i c

g r a d e o f w h ite n e s s it s e l f. Thu s t h e s im p l i c i t y o f t h i s

c o n c e p t " I n f i n i t e B e i n g " i s e v i d e n t .

No w t h e p e r f e c t io n o f t h i s con ce p t is p ro v e d fi r s t f r o m

t h e f a c t t h a t i t v i r t u a l l y i n c l u d e s m o r e t h a n a n y o t h e r

c on c e p t w e c a n c on c e iv e . As " b e i n g " v i r t u a l l y in c lu d e s

th e " g o o d " a n d th e " t r u e " , so " I n f i n i t e B e i n g " in c lu d e s

th e " i n f i n i t e l y g o o d " , th e " i n f i n i t e l y t r u e " , a n d a l l p u r e

pe r fe c t i on s u n de r th e a s pe c t o f i n f i n i t y . I t is a lso p ro ve d

from t h i s fa c t . W i t h a d e m ons t r a t i on o f fa c t,17 t he

e xis te n c e o f a n I n f i n i t e B e i n g , o r th e fa c t t h a t s o m e t h i n g

ha s i n f i n i t e b e i n g , is t h e l a s t co n c l u s i on t o b e e s t a b lis h e d .

Th i s i s c l e a r f r o m D i s t . n , q . i.18 T h e m o re p e r fe c t ,

h o w e v e r , a re t h e l a s t to b e e s ta b l is h e d b y a d e m o n s t r a t io n

o f fa c t w h i c h b e g in s w i t h c r e a tu r e s . F or t h e i r v e r y

r e m o t e n e s s f r o m c r e a t u r e s m a k e s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e m

f r o m c r e a t u r e s m o s t difficult o f a t t a i n m e n t .

B u t i f y o u sa y t h a t "h i g h e s t g o o d " o r "H i g h e s t B e i n g "



28 DUNS SCOTUS

d i c i t

modum intrinsecum

e n t is e t

includit virtualiter

a l ios

conceptus : r e s p on d e o , q u o d s i summum i n t e l l i g a t u r

c o m p a r a t i v e , s i c d i c i t

respectum

a d e x t r a , s e d

infinitum

d i c i t c o n c e p t u m a d se. Si autem i n t e l l i g a s a b s o l u t e

s u m m u m , ho c e s t , q uo d ex n a t u r a r e i no n po s se t e x c ed i ,

p e r f e c t i o

ilia

e x p r e s s i u s c o n c i p i t u r i n r a t i o n e

infiniti

e n t i s .

N o n enim s u m m u m bonum i n d i c a t i n s e utrum

s i t i n f i n i t u m vel f i n i t um.

E x h oc a p p a r e t i m p r o b a t i o i l l iu s q u o d d i c i t u r i n

p r a e c e d e n t i o p i n i o n e , q u o d

perfectissimum

es t cognos-

c ere a t t r i b u t a r e d u c e n d o

ilia

in esse

divinum

p r o p t e r

simplicitatem

d i v i n a m .

C o g n i t io e n i m esse d i v i n i s u b

r a t i o n e i n f i n i t i e st p e r fe c t io r c o g n i t i on e e ju s s u b r a t i on e

s i m p l i c i t a t i s , q u i a s i m p l i c i t a s communicatur c r e a t u r i s ,

in f in i ta s a u t e m n on s e c u n d u m m o d u m q u o c on v e n i t D e o.

[Qu i n t a

Sentent ia] , Quinto

d i c o q u o d i s ta q u a e c og -

n o s c u n t u r d e D e o c o g n o s c u n t u r p e r sp e cie s c r e a t u r a r u m ,

q u i a s i v e u n i v e r s a l i u s e t m i n u s u n i v e r s a l e c o g n o s c a n t u r

p e r eandem speciem m i n u s u n i v e r s a l i s s i v e utrumque

h a b e a t s p e c ie m s u i i n t e l l ig i b i l e m . Si propriam s a l t e r n

i l lud

q u o d p ote s t im p r i m e r e s p e c ie m m in u s u n i v e r s a l is

i n intellectu po t e s t etiam c a u s a r e s p e c i e m c u j u s c u m q u e

u n i v e r s a l io r is e t i t a c r e a t u r a e q u a e i m p r i m u n t p r o p r ia s

sp ecie s i n i n t e l le c t u p os s u n t e t i a m i m p r i m e r e s pe cie s

t r a n s c e n d e n t iu m q u a e c om m u n i te r c o n v e n iu n t e is e t

D e o .

E t t u n c in t e l le c t u s p r o p r i a v i r t u t e p ote s t u t i

multis

spec i ebus simul a d c o n c i p i e n d u m ilia simul q u o r u m

sun t i s t a e s p e c i e s , p u t a s p e c i e bo n i e t s p e c i e summi e t

sp ec ie a c tu s a d c o n c ip i e n d u m a l i q u i d s u m m u m b o n u m

e t a c t u a l is s i m u m , q u o d a p p a r e t p e r lo c u m a m i n o r i .

Im a g i n a t iv a e n i m p ote s t u t i sp e c ie b u s d i v e r s o r u m



man's natural knowledge of god

28

expresses an in t r ins ic mode of be ing and inc ludes other

concep ts v i r t ua l ly , I rep l y t ha t i f "h ig h e s t " be taken in a

com pa rat ive sense, the n i t inc ludes a re la t ion to som eth ing

ext r ins ic to the be ing, whereas " i n f in i te " is an absolu te

concep t. B u t i f "h igh e s t " is und ers tood in an absolu te

sense , i.e . as m ea n ing tha t the very na tu re o f the th ing is

such tha t i t can not be exceeded, then th is pe r fec t ion is

conce ived even m ore express ly in the n o tion of an in f in i te

be i ng ,

because "h igh es t g ood" does n o t ind ica te as such

w he the r i t is in fin i te o r fin i te .

This obv ious ly refu tes the asser t ion made in the

p rev ious op in ion [of H e n ry ] , nam e ly t ha t the m os t pe r

fec t knowledg e we have of

God

is to know H is a t t r ibu tes

as i de n t ified w i t h t he d iv i ne be ing i n v ir tue of His s im p l i

c i ty . A know ledge of the d iv ine be ing as in fin i te is ,

how eve r , m ore pe r fec t t han a know ledge of H im as

s im p le , fo r s im p l ic i ty is shared w i th c rea tu res , whereas

in f in ity , as God possesses i t , is n ot.

[Fifth Statement]. In the f i fth p lac e, I say th a t w h a t w e

know of God is known th rough in te l l ig ib le spec ies o f

c rea tu res . Wh ethe r the m ore un iversa l an d less un ive rsa l

have each the i r own proper in te l l ig ib le spec ies , o r

whe the r bo th a re known t h rough one and t he same

spec ies , namely tha t wh ich is less un ive rsa l , th is in any

case is t rue . Wha teve r ca n im p r in t or cause a species of

w h a t is less un ive rsa l, can a lso cause a ny spec ies of tha t

w h ich is m ore un ive rsa l . Thus i t is t ha t crea tu res w h ich

im press th e i r ow n proper species on the in te l le c t can a lso

impress the spec ies of the t ranscendenta ls which are

com m on to them selves an d to God.19 Th e n , the in te l lec t

i n v i r tu e of its ow n pow er can m ake use of m any such

species s im ul tan eous ly , in orde r to conceive a t one t im e

those th ing s of w h ich these are the

species.

For ins tan ce,

i t can use the species o f "g ood " , the species of "h ig h e s t " ,

the species o f "a c t " , to conce ive the "h igh es t good w h ich

is pu re ac t " . Th is is c lear from an ins tance of the d ia

lec t ica l ru le a

minori,20

for the im a g ina t ion is ab le to use



29 DUNS SCOTUS

s e n s ib i l iu m a d im a g i n a n d u m c om p o s it u m e x illis d i v e r s i s ,

s i c u t a p p a r e t i m a g i n a n d o

montem a u r e u m .

E x h o c a p p a r e t improbatio i l l i u s q u o d d i c i t u r i n

p r a e c e d e n t i o p in i on e d e ilia s u f f o s i o ne , q u i a s u f f o d i e n do

numquam illud q u o d non s ubes t suffosioni i n v e n i t u r

p e r s u ffo s io nem . No n

autem

s u be s t c o n c e p t u i c r e a t u r a e

a l i q u i s c o n c e p t u s

vel

s pe cie s r e p r a e s e n t a n s a l i q u i d

proprium D e o q u o d s i t omnino a l t e r i u s r a t i o n i s a b e o

q u o d c o n v e n i t c r e a t u r a e , u t

probatum

e st p e r s e c u n d a m

rationem i n s e c u n d o a r t i c u l o . E r g o p e r s u f fo s ion e m

n u l l u s t a l i s c o n c e p t u s i n v e n i t u r .

E t q u o d a d d u c i tu r s im i le d e a e s t im a t i v a , d i c o q u o d

v i d e t u r a d d u c i falsum a d confirmationem a l t e r i u s f a l s i ,

q u i a s i

maneat

ov i s i n

eadem

n a t u r a e t i n

eodem

a f f e c t u

n a t u r a l i a d a g n u m , imitaretur [ read mutaretur] tamen u t

esse t s im i l i s lupo p e r m i r a c u l u m i n om n i b u s a c c id e n t ib u s

s e n s ib i li b u s , p u t a c o lo r e , fig u r a e t s on o e t c a e t e r is h u ju s -

m o d i ,

a g n u s f u g e r e t ovem s ic mutatam s i c u t f u g e r e t

l u p u m .

E t t a m e n i n ov e s ic

mutata

n o n e s s e t i n t e n t i o

n o c i v i , se d c o n v e n i e n t is . E r g o a e s t im a t iv a a g n i n o n

suffoderet a d i n v e n ie n d u m i n t e n t i on e m c on v e n i e n t is s ub

s p ec ie b u s s e n s i b i l ib u s , s i p r a e c is e i t a m o v e r e t u r s e c u n d u m

appetitum s e n s i t i v u m s ic u t a c c i d e n t ia s e n s i b i l ia m o v e -

r e n t .

S i d ic a s q u o d i b i i n t e n t i o c on v e n i e n t is n o n multiplicat

se q u i a n o n s u n t talia a c c i d e n t i a c o n v e n i e n t i a t a l i

i n t e n t i o n i ,

e t i n t e n t i o c on v e n ie n t is n o n m u l t i p l i c a t u r

s in e a c c id e n t ib u s c o n v e n i e n t ib u s , h oc n i h i l e s t, q u i a s i

a g nu s fu g e r e t l u p u m p r o p t e r p e r c e p t ion e m n o c i v i c on -

ceptam

a b a e s t im a t iv a e t

ilia

n o n m u l t i p l i c a t u r c u m

a c c i d e n t i b u s i s t i s s e n s i b i l i b u s q u i a n o n e s t c u m e i s



MAN S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 20,

t h e s p ec ie s o f d i ffe r e n t t h i n g s p e r c e p t i b l e t o th e senses a n d

t h u s im a g i n e a co m po s it e o f th e s e d i ffe r e n t e l em en t s , as is

a p p a r e n t , fo r in s ta n c e , w h e n w e i m a g i n e a g o ld m o u n t a i n .

Th i s o b v i o u s l y r e f u t e s t h e a s s e r t i o n made i n t h e

p r e v i o u s o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o c e s s w h e r e b y t h e

i n t e l le c t b u r r o w s b e n e a t h t h e c on c e p t o f c r e a t u re s . F or

b y s u c h a p roc e ss , w e c a n u n e a r t h o n l y w h a t lie s b e n e a t h

t h e s u rfa c e . I n t h e c on c e p t of a c r e a t u r e , h o w e v e r , n o

n o t i o n o r s pe cie s w i l l b e fo u n d t o re p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g

p r o p e r t o G o d w h i c h is w h o l l y d i ffe r e n t i n n a t u r e f r om

a n y t h i n g p e r t a i n i n g t o a c r e a t u r e , as w e h a v e p r ov e d i n

t h e s e cond r e a son f or t h e s e cond s t a t e m en t . C onse

q u e n t l y , w e s h a l l n e v e r d i s c o v e r s u c h a c o n c e p t b y t h i s

b u r r o w i n g p r o c e s s .

A n d as t o t h e a n a l og y o f t h e e s t im a t iv e p o w e r , I w o u l d

s ay t h a t h e se ems t o a d du ce one fa ls e in s t a n c e t o c o n f irm

a n o th e r . F or i f a s he e p w e r e to r e m a i n t h e s a m e i n

n a t u r e a n d t o r e t a i n its n a t u r a l a f fe c t io n tow a r d s a la m b ,

a n d y e t b y s om e m i ra c l e w e r e to b e c h a n g e d a c c i d e n t a l ly

so as to re se m b le a w o l f i n a l l it s s ens ib le m an i fe s t a t ions ,

fo r i n s t ance i n i t s co lou r , i t s s hape , i t s c r i e s , and a l l t h e

re s t of i t , a l a m b w o u l d fle e f r o m s u c h a s he e p j u s t a s i t

w o u l d fle e fr o m a w o lf. A n d s t i l l s u c h a s he e p h a s on l y

fr ie n d l y , a n d n o t h a r m fu l , in t e n t ion s tow a r d s th e l a m b .

C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e e s t i m a t i v e p o w e r w o u l d n o t d i g

b e ne a t h t h e s ense im age s t o d i s cove r t h e f rie n d l in e s s , i f

i t w e r e m o v e d a c c o rd i n g t o th e sense a p p e t it e i n t h e

p re c is e w a y t h a t t h e s e n s ib le a p p e a r a n c e s m ov e i t .

I t does no t he l p a t a l l t o say t ha t t h i s f r i e nd l i n e ss i s

n o t con v e ye d s e n s ib l y i n s u c h a ca s e, s in c e t h e e x t e r n a l

m a n i fe s t a t ion s d o n o t ag re e w i t h t h e i n t e n t i n q u e s t io n ,

a n d t h a t i t is o n l y w h e n t h e t w o a g re e th a t t h e fr i e n d l y

i n t e n t w i l l b e c on v e y e d i n a p e r c e p t ib l e m a n n e r . F or i f

t h e l a m b fle e s fr o m t h e w o l f o n l y b e c a u s e , b y i t s e s t im a

t iv e p ow e r , i t pe rc e iv e s s o m e t h i n g i n i m i c a l , a n d i n t h e

p r e s en t c a s e t h e i n t e n t i o n [ o f f r i e n d l i n e s s ] i s no t t r a n s

m i t t e d p e r c e p t ib l y w h e r e t h e s e ns ib le m a n ife s t a t ion s a re

2 , 3 2 2 ) 6



30 DUNS SCOTUS

[injtentio c a s u , e r go h ae c e s t suffosio agni a d intentionem

n o c i v i , q u a e n u l l a e s t , a u t s i hie n o n fu g i t p r o p t e r s u f-

f o s s ionem ,

e r g o

nee

a l ia s .

[ A d

Argumenta

P r i n c i p a l i a ]

A d a r g u m e n t a i s t i u s

quaestionis

:

A d

primum

d i c o q u o d

ilia comparatio

d e b e t i n t e l l i g i

q u a n t u m a d primam m o t io n e m i n t e l le c t u s a b ob j e c t o,

i b i

enim

p h a n ta s m a c u m i n t e l l e c t u a g en te h a b e n t

vicem

o b j e c t i primi m ov e n t is , sed n o n d e b e t i n t e l l i g i q u a n t u m

a d omnem a c t u m sequentem p r i m a m m o t i on e m . P ote s t

e n i m i n t e l l e c t u s a b s t r a h e r e

omne

ob j e c t u m i n c l u s u m i n

o b j e c to primo m o v e n t e , e t c o n s i d e r a r e illud a b s t r a c t u m

n o n c on s i d e r a n d o i l l u d a q u o a b s t r a h i t e t c o n s id e r a n d o

i s tu d a b s t ra c t u m s ic c on s id e r a t c o m m u n e s e n s ib i li e t in s e n -

s i b i l i ,

q u i a i n illo c o n s i d e r a t u r in s e n s i b i le i n u n i v e r s a l i s ic u t

e t s e n s i b ile , e t p o te s t c on s i d e r a re i l l u d a b s t r a c t u m e t

aliud

a b s t r a c t u m i n q u o s it p r o p r i u m a l t e r i , s c i l ic e t in s e n s i b i li ;

s e d s en su s n o n e s t a b s t r a c t i v u s , e t id e o i n omni a c t u t a r n

p r i m o

quam

se cu nd o r e q u i r i t ob je c t u m a l i q u o d p r o p r i u m

movens quomodo n o n se h a b e t p h a n t a s m a a d

in t e l le c t u m .

A d s e c u n d u m d i c o q u o d C o m m e n t a to r e xp o n i t i l l u d

s i m i l e P h i l o s o p h i d e

difficili

e t n o n d e i m p o s s i b i l i , e t

r a t i o s u a e s t q u i a t u n c n a t u r a f e c i s s e t o t i o s e illas s u b

s t a n t ia s a b s t ra c t a s i n t e l l ig i b i l e s , e t n o n p os s ib i le s i n t e l l i g i

a b a l i q u o i n t e l le c t u . Se d is ta r a t i o e ju s n o n v a l e t ; t u r n



m an's n a t u r a l k n ow le d g e o f g od

30

those [o f a w o l f ] , i t follow s tha t the lam b une ar ths a

non-ex is ten t in ten t ion of enmi ty ; o r i f the lamb does

no t fl ee in v i r t ue o f w ha t i t d is cove rs by such a b u r row

ing p rocess in the p resen t ins tan ce , the n n e i the r does i t

do so in oth e r cases.

[Rep ly to the Argum en ts a t the B eg inn ing ]

As to the a rgum en ts a t the be g inn ing o f this qu es tion :

To the irs t ,21 rep ly th a t the P hi losopher 's c om pa r ison

app l ies to the in i t ia l movement o f the in te l lec t by the

obje ct , for in th is case the sense im ages toge the r w it h the

ac t i ve in te l l ec t f unc t ion in t he ro le o f p r ima ry mov ing

objec t . I t m ust n ot be un de rs tood, howe ver , of a l l the

ac tions w h ich follow th is in i t ia l m ovem ent . For the

in te l lec t can abs trac t any ob jec t w h ich is inc lud ed in t ha t

w h ich p roduces the in i t i a l m ovem en t. I t is ab le to

con

s ide r the form er w i th ou t cons ide r ing tha t from w h ich i t

was ab s t rac ted . Now w he n the in te l lec t cons iders som e

th in g tha t has been abs trac ted in th is w ay , i t g rasps wh a t

is com m on to b oth sensib le an d inse ns ib le . In its con

s ide ra t ion the in te l lec t ca n u n i te a second abs t rac t n o tion

w i th the fi rs t so tha t the la t ter becom es prope r to som e

th ing e lse , nam ely to the insen s ib le , fo r in the ab s trac ted

are cons idered both the insens ib le ( in the un iversa l ) as

w e l l as the sens ib le . The sense fa c u l ty , how ev er , is

inca pa b le of m a k ing abs trac t ions . There fore , in a l l its

ac ts , w he the r they be p r im a ry or seconda ry , it r equ ires

som e ob jec t to fi rs t p u t i t in m ot ion . B u t th is is no t

the w ay tha t the sense im age is re la ted to the in te l le c t .

To the second,22, I re p ly th a t the C om m en tator re s tric ts

th is compar ison of the Phi losopher to what is d i f f icu l t ,

b u t no t im poss ib le , to kn ow . An d h is reason is tha t

o therw ise na tu re wou ld have made these separa te sub

s tances in te l l ig ib le in v a i n , fo r no in te l lec t w ou ld be ab le

to know them . B u t t h is reason is i nv a l i d , fir s t o f a l l ,



31

DUNS SCOTUS

q u i a

non

e s t f i n i s i s t a r um

substantiarum inquantum

i n t e l l i g i b i l e s s u n t u t intelligantur a b i n t e l l e c t u n o s t r o ,

e t ideo s i ho c no n co n ven i r e t e i s , no n p ro p t e r ho c e s s en t

fr u s t r a i n t e l l ig i b i le s ; t u r n q u i a n o n s e q u i tu r : n o n s u n t

i n t e l l i g i b i l e s a b i n t e l l e c t u n o s t r o , e r g o a

n u l l o ,

possen t

enim i n t e l l i g i a s e ip s is , e t id e o e st i b i fa l l a c i a co n seq ue n t is .

U n d e l ic e t m u l t i p l i c i t e r p os se t e x p o n i a u c t o r i ta s

P h i l o -

s o p h i , d i c o q u o d oc u lu s n o c tu a e n o n h a b e t c o g n i t i on e m

n i s i i n t u i t i v a m e t n a t u r a l e m , e t q u a n t u m a d i s t a s d u a s

c o n d i t i o n e s p o t e s t e x p o n i a u c t o r i t a s P h i l o s o p h i d e

i m p o s s i b i l i t a t e , q u i a s i c u t e s t impossibile illi oculo i n t u i

t i v e co n s i d e r a r e objectum i s t u d , s i c i n t e l l e c t u i n o s t r o e s t

i m p o s s i b i l e n a t u r a l i t e r e t etiam i n t u i t i v e c o g n o s c e r e

D e u m .

A d

t e r t i u m ,

d i c o q u o d in f i n i t u m p o t e n t i a l e est

ignotum

q u ia u n u m q u o d q u e est c og n os c ib i le i n q u a n t u m est i n

a c t u .

N o n

tamen

es t i g n o t u m s e q u i tu r [re a d s ic ] q u o d

r e p u g n e t s i b i i n t e l l i g i a b i n t e l l e c t u i n f i n i t o , s e d n o n

p o t e s t i n f i n i t u m c o g n o s c i a b a l i q u o i n t e l l e c t u

c o g

noscen te

ipsum

s e c u n d u m

modum

s u a e i n f i n i t a t i s .

M o d u s e n i m s u a e i n f i n i t a t i s e s t a c c i p i e n d o alterum

p os t a l t e r u m , e t i n t e l le c t u s q u i c og n o s ce r e t h oc modo

a l t e r u m p o s t a l t e r u m , c og n os c e re t s e m p e r fin itu m e t

n u m q u a m i n f i n i t u m , in t e l le c t u s t a m e n in f in i t u s p o te s t

cognosce re

totum il lud s i m u l ,

n o n p a r t e m p o s t p a r t e m .

C u m e t ia m a r g u i t u r d e s e c u n d o Me ta ph ysica e d e i n f i n i t i s

e t i n f i n i t o , d i c o q u o d n o n e st s i m i le q u i a c o g n i t io o b je c -

torum

i n f i n i t o r u m n u m e r a l i t e r c on c lu d e r e t

infinitatem

p o t e n t i a e c og n o s c e n t is , s ic u t p a t u i t i n q u a e s t ion e p r i m a

se cundae distinctionis a r g u m e n t o s e cu n d o a d i n f i n i

t a t e m ,

q u i a v i d e l ic e t i b i p l u r a l i t a s e x p a r t e ob j e c t i c o n -



m a n's n a t u r a l k n ow le d g e o f g od 31

because we cannot say that the so le purpose or reason

for the in te l l ig ib i l i t y o f these subs tances is th a t we m ay

know the m . C onsequen tly , even i f w e cou ld know

no th ing abou t t hem, we s t i l l cou ld no t say they a re

in te l l ig ib le to no pu rpose. Second ly , i t does n ot fo llow

that jus t because these substances are un in te l l ig ib le to

our m ind s , they a re u n in te l li g ib le to a l l m ind s , for t hey

cou ld be in te l lig ib le to them se lves . There fore , we have

the fa l la cy of a ffi rm in g the consequent.23 Whe refore I

say t ha t e ven though the re a re m any ways i n w h i ch th i s

c i ta t ion of the Ph i losopher cou ld be exp la ined , s t i l l the

eye o f t he ba t has on l y a na t u ra l and i n t u i t i v e know

ledge. An d on the bas is of these tw o cha rac ter is t ics the

Ph i losopher ' s words can be exp la ined even in te rms of

im p oss ib i l ity . For ju s t as i t is im poss ib le for the eye of

the ba t to cons ide r such an ob jec t na tu ra l l y and in

tu i t ive ly , so i t is a lso imposs ib le for our in te l lec t to

possess a n a tu ra l a nd in tu i t ive know led ge of God.24

To the th ird,25 I reply that the potent ia l ly inf in i te is

unknown, because on ly to the exten t tha t someth ing is

in ac t i t is know ab le . B u t i t is no t so un kn own th a t i t

w ou ld be im poss ib le for a n in f in i te in te l lec t to know i t .

Never the less the [po ten t ia l l y ] in f in i te cannot be known

by an i n te l le c t w h i ch p roceeds to know i t i n the w ay t ha t

i t is in fin i te . For i t is in fin i te on ly in so fa r as the m in d

in cons ide r ing on ly one th in g a fte r an othe r never comes

to a n e nd . Now the m ind w h i ch cons ide rs on ly one t h i n g

af ter another in th is way a lways cons iders someth ing

fin i te a nd never som eth ing in fi n i t e . An in f in i te i n te llec t ,

howeve r , can know the who le t h ing a t once , and no t

s im p ly one p a r t a fte r anothe r . An d to the a rgum en t

from Metaphysics, b k . i i , conce rn ing in f i n i t e numbers

and the " I n f i n i t e " , I r ep ly t ha t the re is no p a r it y be tween

the tw o, for a kn ow ledg e of

an

in fin i te nu m be r o f ob jec ts

w ou ld im p ly t ha t the fac u l ty o f know ledge itse lf is

in f in i te (as is c lea r from q . i of d is t .

11

r ega rd i ng t he

in f in i ty of God),26 s ince one can infe r a greater powe r of



32 DUNS SCOTUS

c l u d i t majoritatem v i r t u t i s i n i n t e l l e c t u , s ed intel l e c t i o

a l i c u j u s i n f i n i t i

non

c o n c l u d i t

i n f i n i t a t e m ,

q u i a

non

o p o r t e t a c t u m h a b e r e talem modum r e a l e m , qualem

h a b e t

o b j e c t u m ,

q u i a a c t u s s u b r a t i o n e fin i ti po t e s t esse

a d o b j e c t u m s u b r a t i o n e i n f i n i t i n i s i e s s e t a c t u s c o m p r e -

h e n s i v u s , e t c on c e d o q u o d ta l e m a c t u m c i rc a o b je c t u m

i n f i n i t u m n o n h ab e m u s

nee

p o s s i b i le e st h a b e r e .

A d Gregorium d i c o q u o d n o n d e b e t i n t e l l i g i q u o d

c o n t e m p l a t i o s i s t a t s u b D e o i n a l i q u a c r e a t u r a , q u i a h o c

e sse t f r u i u t e n d i s , q u o d e sse t

summa

p e rv e rs ita s s e c u n d u m

Augustinum LXXX1II Quaes t ionum, quaes t ione xxx . *

Sed con c ep t u s i l l i u s e s s en tia e s u b r a t i on e e n t is e s t

imper-

f e c t i o r co n cep t u i l l i u s e s s en t i a e u t h a e c e s s en t i a e s t , e t

q u i a e s t imperfectior i d e o i n f e r i o r i n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t a t e ,

c o n t e m p l a t i o

autem

d e le g e c o m m u n i s ta t i n t a l i

c o n

c e p t u c o m m u n i , e t id e o s ta t i n a l i q u o c o n c e p t u q u i e st

m i n o r i s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t a t i s quam Deu s i n s e , u t e s t h a e c

e s s e n tia . E t id e o d e b e t i n t e l l i g i a d a l i q u i d q u o d e st s u b

D e o , h o c e st a d a l i q u i d s u b r a t i on e i n t e l l ig i b i l i s c u ju s

i n t e l l i g i b i l i t a s e st i n fe r i or i n t e l l i g i b i l i t a t e D e i i n s e, u t

h a e c e s s en tia s i n g u l a r i s .

[Ad Argumenta pro Opinione

Henrici]

A d a r g u m e n t a p ro p r i m a op i n ion e , c u m a r g u i t u r q u od

De u s n o n p ote s t i n t e l l ig i i n a l i q u o c o n c e p t u c o m m u n i

s i b i e t c r e a t u r is u n i v o c e , q u i a e st s i n g u l a r i t a s q u a e d a m :

c o n s e q u e n t ia n o n v a l e t . Soc ra te s

enim inquantum

Soc ra t e s e s t s i n gu l a r i s e t tamen a So c r a t e plura possun t

a b s t r a h i p r a e d i c a t a , e t i d e o s i n g u l a r i t a s a l i c u j u s n o n

*

M igne,

P. L.,

x l ,

20.



MAN

S


32

i n t e l l e c t fr om a g r e a t e r n u m b e r of ob je c ts k n o w n . B u t

a k n ow le d g e o f s o m e t h i n g i n f in i t e d oe s n o t i m p l y t h a t

t h e a c t o f k no w l e dge i t s e l f i s i n f i n i t e u n l e s s i t b e a n a c t

w h i c h f u l l y co m p r e h en d s t h e ob j e c t , fo r i t is no t n ec e ss a ry

t h a t t h e a c t a n d o b j e c t s h o u l d h a v e t h e s a m e m o d e o f

r e a l i t y , s in c e a n a c t w h i c h b y n a t u r e is fin i te c a n b e

r e la t e d t o a n ob je c t w h i c h b y n a t u r e is i n f in i t e . I a d m i t ,

h o w e v e r , t h a t w e n e i t h e r h a v e , n o r c a n h a v e , s u c h a

c om p r e h e n s iv e a c t o f k n o w l e d g e i n r e g a r d t o a n i n f i n i t e

ob jec t .

To the \Jourth~\ a rg um en t ,27 [ t h a t ] o f G r eg o r y , I r e p l y

t h a t w e s h o u ld n ot t h i n k t h a t c o n t e m p l a t i on t e rm in a t e s

i n s om e c re a t u r e b e n e a t h G o d , fo r th i s w o u l d b e t o e n joy

as a n e n d w h a t is to b e u s e d as a m e a n s . A c c o r d i n g t o

A u g u s t i n e , * t h is w o u l d b e t h e g re a te s t p e r v e r s ion . B u t

t h e c on c e p t o f G od 's e sse nce u n d e r t h e a s p e c t o f " b e i n g "

is le ss pe r fe c t t h a n t he conc ep t o f t h e sam e essence a s

" t h i s e s senc e " . Because i t is le ss p e r f e c t , i t fa l l s be low

th e l a t t e r c on c e p t i n i n t e l l ig i b i l i t y . B u t th e c on t e m p l a

t i o n t h a t is c h a r a c t e r is t ic o f t h e o r d i n a r y d i s p e n s a t ion

re s ts w i t h ju s t s u c h a n [ im p e r fe c t o r ] c o m m o n c o n c e p t ,

a n d h e n c e w i t h on e of i n fe r i o r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y t o G o d

H i m

s e l f co n s i d e r e d as t h i s e ss en ce . C o nse qu en t ly " t o w h a t is

b e n e a t h G o d " m u s t b e u n d e r s t ood i n te r m s o f b e i n g

i n t e l l i g i b l e , [ t h a t is t o s ay i t re fe r s t o a co n ce p t ] w hose

i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y is le ss t h a n t h a t o f G o d c on s i d e r e d i n H i m

s e l f as t h i s s i ngu l a r e s sence .

[A Reply to the Argum ents in Support of H e n ry]

To t h e a r g umen t s f o r t h e f i r s t o p i n i o n

28

I r e p l y t h a t

w h e n i t is a r g u e d t h a t G o d b y re a s on of H i s u n iq u e

s i n g u l a r i t y c a n n o t b e k n o w n t h r o u g h s om e c on c e p t

u n i v oc a l ly c o m m o n t o H i m s e l f a n d c r e a tu r e s , th e con se

qu en ce is i n v a l i d . Fo r Soc ra te s , i n so fa r as h e is Socra tes ,

is s i n g u l a r . Neve rth e l e s s s e v e r a l p r e d i c a t e s c a n b e a b

s t r a c t e d f r o m Soc r a te s . C o nseq ue n t l y , t h e s i n g u l a r i t y



33

DUNS SCOTUS

i m p e d i t , q u i n a b e o q u o d s i n g u la r e e s t, p os s it a b s t r a h i

a l iq u is c on c e p t u s c o m m u n i s . E t l ic e t q u i d q u i d i b i i n r e s it

s i n g u l a r e e x se i n e x is t e n d o i t a q u o d n i h i l c o n t r a h i t

aliud

i b i a d s i n g u l a r i t a t e m , tamen illud i d e m p o t e s t c o n c i p i

u t h o c i n r e ,

vel quodammodo

i n d i s t i n c t e , e t i t a u t

s i n g u l a r e v e l c o m m u n e .

Q u o d d i c i t p r o ilia o p i n i o n e d e c o g n i t i on e p e r a c c id e n s ,

n o n op o r t e t i m p r o b a r e , q u i a q u a s i p e r a c c id e n s c og n os -

c i t u r i n a t t r i b u t o , s ed n o n p ra e c is e s ic u t p r o b a t u m e s t.




o f a t h i n g i s n o i m p e d i m e n t t o t h e a b s t r a c t i o n o f a

c o m m on c on c e p t. T h o u g h i n r e a l it y e v e r y t h in g in G o d ,

s ince i t ex i s t s o f i t se l f , i s s ingu la r , so tha t one th ing does

n o t c o n t r a c t a n o t h e r t o s i n g u l a r i t y , n e v e r t h e l e s s o n e a n d

t h e s a m e t h i n g c a n b e c o n c e i v e d i n d i s t i n c t l y o r a s " t h i s

t h i n g e xis t in g i n r e a l i t y " , a n d th u s i t c a n b e c on c e i v e d

e i t h e r as c o m m o n o r as s i n g u l a r .

T h e r e i s n o n e e d t o r e f u t e w h a t h e s a y s r e g a r d i n g a n

i n c i d e n t a l k n o w l e d g e o f G o d , b e c a u s e G o d i s k n o w n i n

a q u a s i -in c i d e n t a l m a n n e r i n a n a t t r i b u t e . H ow e v e r ,

t h is is n o t t h e s ole w a y H e c a n b e k n o w n , as h a s b e e n

p r o v e d a b o v e .



I l l

T H E E X I S T E N C E O F G O D

Summary of

the

Argument

Question : Among beings does one exist which is actually

infinite ?

Pro e t Cont ra

Body of the Question

Article I. Relative properties of God

Part I. The triple primacy

u.

Primacy o f efficient causality

b.

Primacy

of finality

c. Primacy of pre-eminence

Part II . Inte rre lation of the three primacies

Part

in.

Uni ty of the divine nature

Ar ticle I I . Absolute properties of God

Part I. Intellect and w ill

Part

i i .

The infin ity of the First Being

a. First proof

b. Second proof

c. Third proof

d. Fourth proof

e. An ineffective proof

Solution of the Question

Reply to the Arguments at the beginning



35

DUNS SCOTUS

f i l l . DE ESSE DEl] *

Circa secundam d is t inct ionem quaero primo de his

quae pert inent ad

unitatem

De i , e t p r imo,

utrum

in

entibus sit aliquid existens actu infinitum.

[Pro et Contra]

Quod non, s ic argu i tur :

Si

unum contrariorum

esset actu inf in i tum, nih i l s ib i

co ntr ariu m esset in n atu ra ; ergo si a l iq uo d bonum sit

ac tu in f i n i tum , n ih i l

mali

esset i n un iverso . Resp on de tur

qu od ma jor est vera de con trari is form al i te r ; sed n ih i l

m alu m con trar ia tur Deo form al i ter . Co ntra : sive

formal i ter s ive v i r tua l i ter contrar ie tur , s i est in f in i tum,

n ih i l pat i tur contrar ium su i e f fectus, qu ia propter in f in i -

tam v i r tu tem destruet omne incompossibi le suo effectui ;

ergo est m ajor vera de con trario v ir tu a l i te r, s icut for

m al i ter. E xe m plu m : s i sol esset inf in i t e cal idus v ir

tua l i ter , n ih i l re l inqueret f r ig idum in un iverso s icut

nee

si esset inf inite cal idus formaliter.

I t e m ,

corpus in f in i tum nu l lu m

aliud secum

com pat i tu r ;

sicut nee ens in f in i tu m a l iqu od a l iu d ens cu m eo. Pro-

batio consequentiae : turn quia sicut repugnat dimensio

d imension i , i ta v idetur actua l i tas actua l i ta t i repugnare ;

turn quia s icut corpus al iud ab

i n f i n i t o ,

faceret cum illo

a l iqu id

majus

in f in i to , i ta ens a l iud ab in f in i to v idetur

facere al iquid majus inf in i to.

Praeterea, quod ita est

h ie,

quod non

a l ib i ,

est

* Opus oxoniense, I, dist.

n,

q. i (Assisi

137,

f.

I4r*- i8r6;

cf.

Vives,

vo l . vii i,

393&-486a).



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 35

[ I I I . THE EXISTENCE OF GOD]

First I inquire about those things which pertain to the

unici ty of God, and

/

ask firs t whether in the realm o f

beings

something exists which is actually infinite ?

[Pro et Contra]

To prove that no such thing exists the fol lowing

argu

ments are cited 1 :

[A rg .

1]. I f one o f tw o contraries were ac tually

inf in i te, then no thing co ntrary to i t wo uld exist in nature ;

therefore i f some good were actually inf inite, nothing

ev il w o u ld exist in the universe. On e answer given to

this objection is that the major is true only of formal

contraries, and evi l is not formally contrary to God.2

T o the co ntrar y : I t makes no difference whe ther

con

t rar ie ty be vir tu al or form al. I f something is inf in i te, i t

wil l not tolerate anything contrary to its effect, since by

reason of i ts inf inite power, i t wi l l destroy anything

inco m patib le w it h i ts effect. The refore, the m ajor is just

as true of virtual contraries as it is of formal contraries.

Fo r examp le : i f the sun were inf inite ly hot either

v irt u a l ly or form ally , in either case it w ou ld leave

nothing cold in the universe.

[A rg .

11]. A ga in, just as an inf in i te body w ou ld not

permit the coexistence of another body, even so an

infinite being would not tolerate the coexistence of any

othe r be ing . Proo f of the consequence : A c tu a li ty seems

to be opposed to actuality in the same way as dimension

is opposed to dime nsion. Fu rthe rm ore , i f a being other

th a n the infi ni te co uld exist, it w o u ld seem to increase the

inf inite just as to add another body to an inf inite body

would produce something greater than the inf inite.

[Arg. 111].

Fu rtherm ore, anyth ing present in th is



36 DUNS SCOTUS

in f in i tu m respectu ub i ; et qu od nunc est i ta , qu od non

alias, est finitum respectu qua ndo , et sic de singu lis.

Quod i ta ag i t hoc, quod non

a l i ud ,

est f initum qu a nt u m

ad act ionem ; ergo qu od est i ta hoc al iq u id , qu od non

a l iud , est finitum secund um en tita te m . Deus est summe

hoc, qu ia ex se sing ular itas ; ergo non est infin itu s.

I t e m ,

vn i Physicorum,* virtus infinita, si esset, moveret

in non-tem pore ; nu l la v ir tus potest movere in non-

tempore

; qu ia si sic,

motus

esset in in st a n ti ; ergo nu lla

est inf inita.

Contra :

Ib idem Phi losophus

vm

Physicorum

f

p roba t

primum

movens

esse potentiae inf initae, quia

movet motu

in f in ito ; sed haec conclusio no n potest in te l l ig i tantum

de inf in i ta te dur at ionis, quia prop ter

infinitatem

p otent iae

pro ba t qu od no n possit esse in m ag nitu din e ; no n

repugnat autem magn i tud in i , secundum

e u m ,

q uo d in eo

si t potent ia inf in i ta secundum durat ionem, sicut poneret

de

caelo.

I t e m ,

in

Psalmo

| : Ma gnus Dom inus et laudab i lis

nimis.

I t e m ,

Damascenus, l ib. 1, ca p. iv * * : Est pelagus, etc.

[Corpus

Quaestionis]

A d

primam

quaestionem sic procedo, quia de ente

infinito sic non potest demonstrari esse demonstratione

propter qu id qu an tum ad nos, l icet ex na tura terminorum

* vm, cap. x (266 ,

24-266*,

6). f loc. cit. (266*, 6).

% Ps. xlvii.

2 ;

cxliv.

3.

* * Defide orthodoxa,

1,

cap. ix (Migne, P.G., xciv , 835).




place in such a wa y tha t i t is nowh ere else, is l im ite d w it h

rega rd to i ts whereabo uts. W h a t exists at jus t this m om ent

and no other, is f in i te with regard to temporal durat ion.

A n d so on w it h the single categories. W ha tever does

just th is and no thin g else, is finite in its ac tion . Th ere fore,

wh atever is jus t this th in g and no othe r, is l im ite d in i ts

en t i ty. N ow G od above al l is a th is , for H e is s ingu

la r i ty o f H is very nature. Therefore, G od is not inf in i te.

[A rg .

i v ] .

A g a in , acc ord ing to Physics, bk . v i i i , *

i f an inf inite force existed i t would move or act instan

taneously ; b u t no force can move things instantaneous ly,

for i f i t could movement would take place in an instant.

Consequently, nothing is inf inite.

To the contrary :

[A rg .

1]. I n the same place in Physics, bk .

vin,f

the

Philosopher proves that the First Mover is inf inite in

power because He moves with an inf inite movement.

But this conclusion cannot be understood of power that

is inf init e only in du ra tio n. T h e reason w hy it cannot is

this. A ris totle proves tha t because this pow er [ o f the First

Mover] is inf in i te, i t cannot reside in a [ f in i te] magni

tude.

Bu t i t is not contrad ictory, according to h im , that

a power inf inite merely in duration should reside in a

[finite] magnitude, for he assumes this to be the case

with the heavens.3

[Arg. 11].

Als o, in the Book of Psalms

j

: Grea t

is

the

Lord and exceedingly to be praised .

[ A r g .

i n ] . A lso, in the fo u rt h chap ter of the first

book of Damascene * * : H e is a sea [of inf in ite per

fect ions] .

[Body of the Question]

M y reason for proceed ing as I do in this first ques tion

is th is. A l th ou gh the prop osi t ion A n inf in i te being



37

DUNS SCOTUS

pro po sit io est demonstrabilis p rop ter q u i d . Sed qu antu m

ad

nos

bene proposit io est demonstrabil is quia ex crea-

tur is. Proprietates autem infiniti entis relat ivae ad

creaturas immediatius se hab ent ad ilia quae sunt media

i n

demonstratione

qu ia

quam

proprietates absolutae, i ta

quod de illis proprietat ibus relat iv is concludi potest

immediatius esse per ista quae sunt media in tal i de

m onstrat ione qu am de pro prie tat ibu s absolut is ; na m

immediate ex esse unius relativi sequitur esse sui corre-

l a t i v i . I deo , primo

d eclarabo esse de pr op rie tat ib us

relat iv is ent is inf in i t i , quae sunt primitas et causalitas.

Et secundo declarabo esse de infinito ente, quia illae

re lativae proprietates sol i en t i in f in i to conve niunt. E t

i ta erunt duo art icul i pr incipales.

[Articulus

Primus. De Proprietatibus Relativis ]

Q u a n t u m a d p r i m u m , dico : prop rietates relat ivae

entis inf init i ad creaturas aut sunt proprietates causali-

tat is aut eminentiae. Gausalitatis dupl ic is, aut efRcientis

aut f inis. Q u o d ad di tu r de causa exemplari no n est aliud

genus causae ab efficiente, quia tunc essent quinque

genera causarum ; und e causa exem plaris est qu od da m

efficiens, quia est agens per

intellectum distinctum

contra

agens per

naturam

; de qu o alias.

In p r imo ar t icu lo p r inc ipa l i , t r ia p r inc ipa l i te r os ten-

dam : pr im o ergo ostendam quod a l iqu id est in efFectu

in ter ent ia quod est s impl ic i ter pr imum omni p r im i ta te

quae no n inc lud i t a l iqu am imp erfect ionem . Pars enim

est imperfectior toto et

tamen

pr ior ; pars en im part i -

c ipat entitatem totius et non est ipsum t o t u m . Aliae

autem sunt pr imi ta tes quae non inc ludunt a l iquam



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

37

exists can , by the ver y na tur e of i ts terms, be de m on

strated by a demonstrat ion of the reasoned fact,4 we are

no t able to dem ons trate i t in this w ay . Nevertheless, we

can demonstra te the propos i t ion by a demonstra t ion o f

fact be gi nn in g w i t h creatures. Ho we ve r, those propert ies

of the in f in i te being which refer to creatures are re lated

more c losely than the absolute propert ies to what we

mu st use as m id d le terms in a de m on stra t ion of fact , so

that in v i r tue o f such a demonstra t ion the re la t ive

propert ies are establ ished pr ior to the absolute propert ies,

for the existence of one term of the relat ion impl ies

im m ed ia t e ly tha t o f i ts cor re la t ive . Conseq uent ly , I sha l l

show first the existence of such relative properties of the

in f in i t e be in g as pr im ac y an d causa l ity . Second ly , f r om

these I shall show that an infinite being exists, because

these re lat ive propert ies per ta in exclusive ly to a being

tha t is in f in i t e . A n d so there w i l l be tw o p r in c ip a l

art icles.

[A rt ic le I . Relative Properties o f God]

As to the first article, I say that the properties of the

inf in i te being which refer to creatures are e i ther of

causa l i ty or of pre-e min enc e. Tho se of causal i ty in t u rn

are twofold, the propert ies of eff ic ient and f inal causal i ty.

What is added about the exemplar does not involve

another cause d i f ferent in k ind from the ef f ic ient, for

the n there w o u ld be five kind s o f causes. W he ref ore , the

exemplar cause is a certain kind of eff ic ient cause, namely

an in te l l igent agent in contrad is t inc t ion to a natura l

a g e n t ; bu t m ore of th is e lsewhere.6

I n the first ma in ar t i c le , I shal l set fo r t h three pr in ci pa l

poin ts : first, in the rea lm of beings so m eth ing ac tu al l y

exists w h ic h is sim ply first b y every pr im a cy th at inc ludes

no im pe rfe ct io n. Fo r a pa r t , th ou gh pr io r to , is less

perfect than, the whole, since the part shares in the unity

o f the w ho le a nd yet is no t the w ho le i tself . O th e r

(2,322;

7



38

DUNS SCOTUS

imperfect ionem; ut pr imi tas eminent iae et t r ip l ic is

causalis inde pen den tiae ; scilicet efficientis, form alis vel

exe m plaris, et f inalis. P rim itas autem eminent iae non

est primitas causalitatis ; non enim ex hoc quod unum

ens praeeminet alteri est causa i l l ius, nam pr imum et

summum

in quol ibet genere praeeminet a l ter i posterior i

in

illo

genere, et

tamen

no n est causa i l l iu s. P rim itas

etiam exemplaris non dist ingui tur a primitate ef f ic ient iae,

qu ia

principium

exemplans al ia in esse in te l l i g ib i l i no n

est nisi principium eff iciens per intel lectum ; sicut enim

naturale eff iciens non dist inguit eff iciens sed continetur

sub eo, sic nee exemplaris d is t ing ui tu r ab ef f ic iente. Sunt

ergo duae causalitates c on tra se dis tinc tae , scil icet causae

efficientis et f ina lis. E t

omnes illae

primitates quas

attribuimus

D e o ,

nullam

imper fec t ionem inc ludunt .

U n d e primo ostendam quod est a l iquid in ef fectu inter

ent ia s impl ic i ter pr imum secundum ef f ic ient iam et

a l iqu id est quod et iam est s impl ic i ter pr imum secundum

rationem f in is , e t a l iqu id quod est s impl ic i ter pr imum

secundum em inen t iam . Secundo ostendo quod

illud

quod es t p r imum secundum unam ra t ionem p r im i ta t i s ,

idem est p r i m u m secundum alias prim itate s. E t tert io

ostendo quod

ilia

t r ip lex pr imi tas un i so l i naturae con-

venit , i ta quod non pluribus naturis d i f ferent ibus specie

ve l qu idd i ta t ive. Et i ta in pr im o art icu lo pr inc ipa l i erunt

tres art icul i part iales.

[Pars Prima. De Tr ipl ici Primitate]. Prim us art ic ulu s

i l lo ru m inc lud i t t res conclusiones

principales

per

triplicem

pr im i ta tem. Quae l ibe t au tem i l l a ru m tr ium conc lu -

sionum habe t tres ex qu ibus depend et. P rim a est qu od

al iq uid s it p r i m u m . Secunda est qu od i l lu d est incausa-

bi le. T e rt ia est qu od i l lu d actu exist i t in ent ibus. I ta q ue

in pr imo art icu lo sunt novem conclusiones, sed tres

principales.




primacies, howe ver, includ e no im pe rfection . Such is

the primacy of pre-eminence and of independence in

regard to the three kinds of causes, viz. efficient, formal

or exemplar, and

final.

Th e prim acy of pre-eminence,

how ever, is no t a pr im ac y of cau sality. For ju s t because

one thing is more perfect than another, it does not follow

th at the form er is the cause of the latter ; for the first

and most perfect in any given genus is more perfect than

any othe r o f its k in d an d yet is not th e cause of the others.6

Ne ither is the prima cy of exemplarity to be dif ferentiated

fro m th at o f efficiency, for the prin cip le w hic h copies wh at

exists in thought is nothing else than an intell igent

efficient

cause. Fo r ju st as a n a tu ra l efficient cause

7

is

not considered as distinct from efficient cause but rather

as a subdivision thereof, so also the exemplar cause.

Consequently, we have but two causalit ies distinct from

one another, that of the efficient cause and that of the

fin al cause. A n d none of these primacies wh ich we

a t t r i

bute to G od include any imp erfect ion. W herefore, I

shall show that in the realm of beings something indeed

exists which is simply first according to efficiency, and

also tha t s om ething exists wh ich is sim ply first i n the

order of ends, and that something exists which is simply

first by reason o f pre-em inence . Second ly, I shall show

that what is f irst in virtue of one kind of primacy is

also f irst in virtu e of the others. A n d th ir d ly , I shall

show that this tr iple primacy pertains to but one nature,

so as not to be found in several specifically or essentially

differe nt natures. Thi s first ar ticle ,

then,

wi l l conta in

three subordinate parts.

[Part I. The Triple

Primacy],

Th is f irst pa rt com

prises three principal conclusions corresponding respec

tive ly to the three fold pr im ac y. Ea ch of these three

conclusions in tu rn depends u po n three others : (i)

Something is f irst, (2) It cannot be caused, (3) It actually

exists i n the re alm o f beings. A n d so the first pa rt

con

tains nine conclusions, three of which are

p r inc ipa l .



39

DUNS SCOTUS

{a.

De

Primitate

Efficientis]. Prima

autem

conclusio

istarum

novem

est ista, quod aliquod

effectivum

sit

simpliciter primum, ita quod nee sit effectibile nee

virtu te alterius a se effectivum. Probatio : quia aliquod

ens est effectibile ; aut ergo a se aut a nih ilo vel ab

aliquo alio. Non a n ih ilo , quia nu llius est causa illud

quod nihil est.

Nee

a

se,

quia nulla res est quae

seipsam

faciat vel gignat, I De Trinitate.* Ergo ab alio. Il lu d

aliud

sit A . Si est A p rim um hoc

modo

exposito, pro-

positum habeo. Si non est prim um , ergo est posterius

effectivum, quia effectibile ab alio vel a virtute alterius

effec[ti]vum, quia si negetur negatio, ponitur afnrmatio.

Detur illud alteram et sit B de quo arguitur sicut de A

argutum est. Et ita aut proceditur in in fin itum quorum

quodlibet respectu prioris e rit secundum ; aut statur ir

aliquo non habente prius. Infinitas autem impossibilii

est in ascendendo. Ergo,

primitas

necessaria, quia non

habens

prius, nullo

priore se est posterius, nam circulum

in causis esse est inconveniens.

Contra istam rationem sic instatur primo quod petat

stare in causis ; secundo quod procedit ex contingentibus

et ita non fit demonstratio. Secundum probatur, quia

praemissae

accipiunt esse de aliquo causato et

omne

causatum

contingenter est. S im iliter , procedit ex

contingentibus quia ex rationibus productis et producti

qu i

tantum

sunt te rm ini contingentes. Primum con-

firmatur

per hoc quod secundum philosophantes

infinitas

est ascendendo, sicut ponunt exemplum de generationi-

bus infinitis, quorum nullum est primum sed quodlibet

De Trinitate, i,

cap.

i (Migne,

P.L.,

xl i i ,

820).




[a . The Primacy o f Efficient Causality]. N o w the first

of these n ine conclusions is th is : Among beings which can

produce an effect one is simply first, i n the sense tha t i t neith er

can be produced by an efficient cause nor does it exercise

its eff icient causali ty in virtue of anything other than

itself. P roo f : Some being can be prod uce d. Th erefore ,

i t is either produced by i tself or by nothing or by some

th in g other tha n itself. N ow it cannot be produ ced by

noth ing,

for wh at is no thin g causes no thin g. Ne ither

can it be prod uce d by itself, for as Au gus tine p oints o ut

in his work De Trinitate, bk.

i , *

nothing ever makes itself

or begets itself. Th erefore i t can on ly be prod uce d by

another. N ow let this other be cal led A . I f 4̂ is first

in the way we have described, then I have what I seek

to prove . But if it is no t f irst, then it is some posterior

agent—either because it can be produced by something

else or because it is able to produce its effect only in

vir tue of som ething other than itself. T o deny the

negation is to assert the

af f i rmat ion.

Le t us assume th at

this being is no t f irst and cal l i t B. T h en we can argue

o f B as we d id o f A. A n d so we shall either go on ad

infinitum so th at each th in g i n reference to w hat precedes it

i n the series w i l l be second ; or we sha ll reach som ething

tha t has no thing prio r to i t . How ever, an inf in i ty i n the

ascending orde r

8

is impossible ; hence a pr im ac y is neces

sary because whatever has nothing prior to itself is pos

terior

to no thi ng pr io r, for a circle in causes is inadm issible.

Against this argument, it is objected, f irst, that the

argu m en t assumes an end in the series o f causes ;

secondly, that it begins with contingent propositions and

hence is no t a de m on stratio n. This second ob jection is

arg ued in this way . T h e premises assume the existence

of som ething th at has been caused, an d ev ery thing caused

exists con tingen tly. T he f irst objection is confirm ed fr om

the admission of those who philosophise that an infinity

is possible in an ascending order, as for instance, when

they assume infinite generations, where no single one is



40

DUNS SCOTUS

secu ndum , qu ia secundu m eos, no n est inconveniens

procedere in in f in i tu m in prod uct ion ibu s e jusdem rat ion is

ub i nu l lum es t primum sed quodl ibet secundum, et

tamen hoc ab eis sine circulo ponitur.

A d

primam instantiam primo

exc ludendam dico quod

phi losophi non posuerunt inf in i tatem possibi lem in causis

essentialiter ordinatis, sed

tantum

in accidental i ter

ordinatis, sicut patet per Avicennam sexto Aletaphysicae,

cap. v , ub i loqui tur de in f in i ta te ind iv iduorum in specie .

Et ad proposi tum mel ius ostendendum sciendum quae

sunt causae essential i ter et accidental i ter ordinatae, ubi

no tandum quod aliud est loqui de causis per se et per

accidens ; et a li u d est lo q u i de causis per se sive essen

t ia l i ter et accident ia l i ter ordinat is, nam in prima est

tantum operat io unius ad

u n u m ,

scilicet causae ad causa-

t u m ,

et est causa per se quae secundum naturam p ro -

p r i am , et non secundum aliquid sibi accidens, causat ut

subjectu m est causa per

se

respectu suae pr op ria e passionis

et in aliis ut a lbu m disgregat et aed if icator aed if icat ;

sed causa per accidens econverso ut Polycletus aedificat.

In secundo est

comparatio

d u a r u m

causarum

inter se in

quantum ab eis est causatum.

E t differunt causae per se sive essentialiter ordin ata e

a causis per accidens sive accidentaliter ordinatis in

t r ibus.

P rim a dif fe re ntia est, qu od in per se ord inatis

secunda in q u a nt um causa dependet a p rim a ; in per

accidens no n , lice t i n esse vel a l iquo modo al io de pendeat.

Filius enim

l icet secundum esse dependeat a patre, non




40

first b u t each is second to some othe r. Fo r they find

nothing inconvenient about proceeding to inf in i ty with

productions of the same

k i n d ,

where nothing is first and

every member [of the series] is second [to some other

m em ber ] .

A n d st ill they assume no circle i n causes.

To exclude this first objection, I say that the philos

ophers do not assume the possibil ity of an infinity in

causes essentially ordered, but only in causes accidentally

ordered,

as is evident from Avicenna's Metaphysics,

bk .

v i , c. v, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals

in a species. T o u nders tand better wh at we have in

m i n d ,

one should know that some causes are essentially

ordered and others acciden tal ly ordered. He re i t should

be noted that it is one thing to speak of incidental causes

(causae per accidens) as contras ted w i th those w h ic h are

intended by their nature to produce a given effect (causae

per se). I t is qu ite anoth er to speak o f causes w h ic h are

orde red to one ano the r essentially o r o f themselves (per se)

and those which are ordered only accidentally (per

accidens). For i n the first instance we have m erely a

comparison one-to-one, namely of the cause to that

which is caused. A per se cause is one which causes

a given effect by reason of its very nature and not by

reason o f som ething inc ide nta l to it. Fo r instance, the sub

jec t is a per se cause of its pro pe r attr ibu tes . O th e r such

instance's are w h ite d i l a t i n g 9 or a bui lder bui l d

i n g . O n the contrary, Polyc le tus b u i ld in g wo uld be an

in c id enta l cause.10 I n the second instance, tw o causes are

compared with each other in so far as they are causes of

the same thing.

Per se or essentially ordered causes differ from acciden

ta lly ord ere d causes in three respects. T h e first difference

is that in essentially ordered causes, the second depends

up on the first precisely i n its act of

causation.

I n acciden

tally ordered causes this is not the case, although the

second may depend upon the first for its existence or in

some other w ay . Thu s a son depends upo n his father for



41 DUNS SCOTUS

tamen in causando, quia patre mortuo potest agere sicut

ipso viv o. D iffe re nt ia secunda est, qu od in per se

ordinatis est causalitas alterius rationis et alterius

ord inis, qu ia superior est per fectior ; in ac cide nta l i ter

autem

ordina t is no n. E t d i f fer en t ia haec su m itur ex

pr im a ; na m n ul l a causa a causa ejusdem rat ionis de-

pendet essentiali ter i n causando, qu ia i n causatione

a l icu-

ju s sufRcit unum unius rat ion is. T e rt ia est, q uo d omnes

causae essentialiter et per se ordinatae simul necessario

requi runtur ad causandum, a l ioquin a l iqua causal i tas

essentialis et per se deesset effec tui ; in ac cid en ta lite r

autem ordinat is non est s ic, quia non requir i tur simultas

eorum

in causando, qu ia qu ael ibet ha bet

suam

perfectam

cau salitatem sine alia respectu sui effectus. SufRcit enim

quod successive causet una post

a l iam.

Ex his ostenditur

p ropos i tum,

sci l icet quod infinitas

essentialiter

ordinatorum

est imp oss ibi l is. S im il i te r

secunda inf in i tas accidental i ter ordinatorum est im

possibil is, nisi ponatur status in ordinatis essentialiter.

Ergo

omni modo

est impossibil is infinitas in essentialiter

ordinat is. Si etiam negetur ordo essentialis, adhuc

inf initas est imp ossibi l is. Erg o o m n i m od o est al iq uo d

primum necessario et simpliciter e f fec t ivum . Is ta ru m

trium propositionum assumptarum, p rop ter b rev i t a tem,

prima dicatur A, secunda B, tert ia C.

Probat io

i l l a rum ,

primo A, sci l icet quod essential i ter

or din ato ru m inf in i tas est impos sibi lis . Probo turn quia

in causis essential i ter ordinatis ubi ponit adversarius

in f in i ta tem secunda in quantum causat , dependet a

p r i m a ,

ex p ri m a dif fer en tia. Si ig it u r essent causae




existence but is not dependent upon him in exercising

his own causality, since he can act just as well whether

his fathe r be liv in g or dea d. T h e second difference is

that in essentially ordered causes the causality is of

another nature and order, inasmuch as the higher cause

is m ore perfect. Such is no t the case, however, w i t h

accid en tally o rde red causes. T h is second difference is a

consequence of the first, since no cause in the exercise of

its causality is essentially dependent upon a cause of the

same nature as itself, for to produce anything one cause

of a give n k in d suffices. T h e th ir d difference is tha t a ll

per se and essentially ord ered causes are simultaneou sly

required to cause the effect, for otherwise some causality

essential to the effect w o u ld be w a nt in g. I n acc identa lly

ordered causes this is not so, because there is no need of

simultaneity in causing inasmuch as each possesses

independently of the others the perfection of causality

w i t h rega rd to its ow n effect. Fo r it is enough tha t one

cause after the other exercises causality successively.

From all this we propose to show that an inf inity of

essentially ord ered causes is impossible ; second ly, th at

an in fi n it y o f accide nta lly ordered causes is also impossible

unless we admit a terminus in an essentially ordered

series ; there fore an in fi n it y i n essentially o rde red causes

is impo ssible in a ny case ; th ir d ly , even i f we deny the

existence o f an essential order, an in fin ity of causes is s til l

impossible . Co nse que ntly, in every instance, o f necessity

some first be ing able to cause exists. For the sake o f

brevity, let us call the first of these three assumptions A,

the second B and the third C.

Proof of the first of these propositions, A (namely that

an in fi n it y of essentially ordered causes is impossible) : I

prove this first, because in essentially ordered causes

where our opponent assumes an infinity, the second of

the series depends upon the firs t. Th is is a consequence

of the first difference between essentially and accidentally

ord ere d causes. N o w i f these causes were in fin ite so



42 DUNS SCOTUS

inf in i tae i ta quod non solum quaelibet posterior sed

quaelibet al ia dependet a sua causa proxima prior, ergo

universitas

causatorum

est ab al iqu a causa p ri o ri . N o n

ab al iqua causa quae est al iquid tot ius universitat is,

qu ia tun c esset causa su i. T o ta

enim

universitas depen

det et a

nullo

i l l ius universitat is et hoc voco

primum

eff iciens. Si ig itu r sunt in f in ita e , adh uc depen dent ab

aliqua quae non est i l l ius universitat is.

Turn quia si causae inf initae ordinatae essential i ter

co nc urra nt ad pr od uc tio ne m alicujus effectus ; et ex

tert ia d i f ferent ia omnes causae essentialiter ordinatae

sunt

s imul ,

sequi tur quod infinita sunt simul ad causan-

dum hunc

ef fectum,

quod nu l lus philosophus poni t .

Turn ter t io , qu ia pr ius est pr inc ip io prop inquius,

qu into Metaphysicae.* Erg o u b i n u l l u m [ M S unum]

principium

nihi l essential i ter prius.

Turn quarto, quia superior causa est perfect ior in

causando ex secunda dif fer en tia ; ergo i n in f in it u m

superior est in in f i n it u m perfectior ; ergo

[.MS1

in ] inf in i ta e

perfectionis. E t n u lla talis est causans de v ir tu te alterius

quia quaelibet talis est imperfecte causans, quia est

dependens incausando ab alia.

Turn qu in to , qu ia e f fec t ivum

nullam

imper fec t ionem

po n it necessario ; ergo potest esse i n a liq uo sine imper-

fectione, qu ia quo d nih i l im perfect ionis in clu di t potest

po ni inte r e ntia sine imp erfec tione ; sed si n ul la causa

est sine dependentia ad prius, in nul lo est sine imper

fectione ; ergo ef fectibili tas inde pen den s potest inesse

al icui naturae, et ilia simpliciter est pr im a . Ergo

effectibi l itas sim plic iter p ri m a est possibil is. H oc

* v, cap. xi

(10186,

9-11




42

that not only would each single cause be posterior to

som ething b ut every other cause w h ich precedes it w o u ld

be dependent in turn upon the cause that goes before it,

then whole series of effects would be dependent upon

some p rio r cause. N ow the la tte r can not be a cause tha t

is part of the series, for then it would be its own cause.

The series as a whole, then, is dependent on something

which does not pertain to the group that is caused, and

this I ca ll the first efficient cause. Even i f the grou p of

beings caused were infinite, they would sti l l depend upon

something outside the group.

T h e n ,

too, i f an inf inite number of essential ly ordered

causes concurred to produce some effect, it would follow

that an inf inite number would simultaneously cause this

effect, for it follows from the third difference that

essentially ordered causes must exist simultaneously.

Now no philosopher assumes this.

T h e n ,

thirdly, to be prior, a thing must be nearer to

the beginning.11 * Co nsequ ently, whe re there is no be gin

n ing ,

nothing can be essentially prior to anything else.

T h e n ,

fourthly, by reason of the second difference, the

higher cause is more perfect in its causality, therefore

what is inf initely higher is inf initely more perfect, and

hence of inf in i te perfection. N ow noth ing inf in i te ly

perfect can cause something only in virtue of another,

because eve ryth ing o f this k in d is im perfec t i n its causality

since it depends on another in order to cause its effect.

T h e n ,

fifthly, inasm uch as to be able to produ ce some

thing does not imply any imperfection, i t fol lows that

th is abi l i ty can exist in something without imperfect ion,

because that which implies no imperfection can be

asserted of beings w ith o u t im pe rfec tion . Bu t i f every

cause depends upon some prior cause, then efficiency is

never foun d w ith ou t impe rfect ion. Hence an indepen

dent power to produce something can exist in some

na tur e, an d this na ture is simply first. Th ere fore , such

an efficient power is possible, and this suffices, for later



43

DUNS SCOTUS

suff ici t , quia inferius ex hoc concluditur quia tale efficiens

p r i m u m ,

si est pos sibile, est i n re . E t sic q uinq ue

rat ionibus patet A.

B probatur, sci l icet quod inf in i tas in accidental i ter

ordinatis sit impossibil is, nisi ponatur status essentialiter

ord inatorum, qu ia in f in i tas acc identa l is , s i poni tur , hoc

non est s imul , patet, sed successive t a n t u m , u t a l te rum

post a l terum, i ta quod secundum al iquo

modo

fluit a

pr io re ,

non tamen dep end et ab ipso in causan do. Potest

enim causare, illo non existente, sicut illo existente ;

sicut

Alius

generat, patre

mortuo

sicut ipso vi vo . Ta lis

infinitas successionis est impossibil is, nisi ab aliqua

natura inf in i te durante, a qua tota successio et quidl ibet

ejus dependeat ; nul la enim

difibrmitas

perpetuatur, n is i

in v ir tute al icujus permanent is quod nih i l est i l l ius

successionis, quia omnia successiva illius successionis sunt

ejusdem rationis, et quia nulla pars successionis potest

permanere cum tota successione eo quod tunc non

esset pars ejus. Sed est a li q u id prius essentialiter, qu ia

quidlibet successionis dependet ab ipso, et hoc in alia

ord inat ione

quam

a causa proxima, quia est a l iquid

illius successionis.

Omne

ig i tur quod dependet a causa

accidental i ter ordinata, dependet essential ius a causa

per se et essentialiter o rd in a ta .

Imo

negato ordine

essential i negabitur ordo accidental is quia accidentia

non habent ord inem n is i mediante f ixo et permanente,

nee

per consequens habet

multitudinem

in i n f i n i tum.

Patet ergo B.

Proba tu r etiam C, quod sci l icet si negetur ordo

essentialis, adh uc infin itas est impo ssib il is. Pro bo :




we sha ll prove th at i f such a first efficient cause is poss ible,

then it exists in re ali ty. A n d so

A

becomes evident from

these five arguments.

N ow B (namely, that an in f in i ty of accidental ly ordered

causes is impossible unless we admit that the essentially

orde red series has an end) is pro ve d in this way . I f we

assume an infinity of accidentally ordered causes, it is

clear that these causes do not exist simultaneously but

only successively, one after the other, so that what

follows flows in some way fro m w h at precedes. S til l the

succeeding cause does not depend upon the preceding

for the exercise of its causality, for it is equally effective

wh ethe r the prec eding cause exists or not. A son in tu rn

m ay beget a ch i ld jus t

as

w ell whe ther his father be dead or

alive.

Bu t an in fin ite succession o f

such

causes is impos

sible unless it exists in virtue of some nature of infinite

d ur a tio n fro m w hic h the who le succession and every p art

thereo f depends. Fo r no change of form is perpetuated

save in virtue of something permanent which is not a

par t of the succession. A n d the reason for this is tha t

everything of this succession which is in flux, is of the

same nature and no part thereof can be coexistent with

the entire series for the simple reason that it would no

longer be a pa rt of the latte r. So m ething essentially p rio r

to the series then exists, for everything that is part of the

succession depends upon it, and this dependence is of a

different order from that by which i t depends upon the

im m ed iate ly preceding cause where the latter is a pa rt of

the succession. Th ere fore , wh atever depends up on an

acc iden tally orde red cause depends mo re essentially up on

an essentially ord ere d cause. In dee d , to deny the essen

tial order is to deny the accidental order also, since

accidents do not have any order save in virtue of what

is f ixed an d perm anen t. Consequ ently, neither w il l an

inf in i te m ult i t ud e exist. B,

then,

is evident.

Proposition C (namely that if an essential order is

denied,

an infinity is sti l l impossible), also is proved.



44

DUNS SCOTUS

quia cum ex pr ima rat ione hie adducta, sci l icet quod a

nullo n ih i l potest esse, sequatur q uo d a l iqu a na tu ra sit

effectiva . Si ne ga tur or do essentialis

ac t ivo rum ,

ergo

ilia

in nul l ius alterius virtute causat, et l icet ipsa in al iquo

singulari

ponatur causata,

tamen

in al iquo est non

causata, qu od est propo si tum de natu ra vel s i in quo l ibet

ponatur causata,

statim

impl icatur contrad ic t io negando

ordinem essent ia lem, quia nul la natura potest poni in

quolibet causata, i ta quod sit ordo accidental is sub ipsa

sine or din e essentiali ad

aliam

na tura m [s icut patet ex B ] .

Ad secundam instant iam supra posi tam, quae dic i t

quod rat io procedit ex cont ingent ibus et i ta non est

demonstrat io, cum dico al iqua natura vere est

effecta,

ergo al iq u id est efficiens, respondeo q u o d posset sic ar g ui :

a l iqua natura est ef fecta quod al iquod

subjectum m u t a -

lur,

et i ta terminus mutationis incipit esse in subjecto, et

ita ille terminus ve l com posi tum pro du ci tu r s ive efficitur ;

ergo est aliquod efficiens, per naturam correlativorum ;

et tunc potest esse secundum v er ita te m p ri m a contingens,

sed m anifesta. Potest tam en sic ar gu i pr ob an do

primam

conclusionem sic. Hae c est vera : al iq ua na tu ra est

effectibilis ; ergo al iq ua est effect iva. Antecedens pr o -

batu r : qu ia al iqu od subjectum est m uta bi le , qu ia a l iquo d

entium est possibile, definiendo possibile contra neces-

sarium ; et sic pro cede ndo ex necessariis. E t tu nc

probat io primae conclusionis est de esse q u id d ita tiv e sive,




44

Proof:

F ro m the first reason addu ced here, viz . that

nothing can come from nothing, i t fo l lows that some

na ture is capable of causing effectively. N ow , i f an

essential order of agents be denied, then this nature

capable o f causing does no t cause in vir tu e of some other

cause,

and even if we assume that in one individual i t is

caused,

nevertheless in some other it will not be caused,

and this is what we propose to prove to be true of this

na ture . Fo r i f we assume tha t in every in d iv id u al this

natu re is caused, then a con tradict ion fo l lows imm ediately

if we deny the existence of an essential order, since no

nature that is caused can be assumed to exist in each

indiv idual in such a way that i t is included in an

acci

dental order of causes without being at the same time

essentially ordere d to some other natu re. This follows

from proposi t ion B.

Then we come to the second objection cited above,12

nam ely tha t wh en I argue : So m e nature is capable of

producing an effect, therefore something is an efficient

cause ,

the argument is not a demonstration, since it

proceeds fro m con tingen t propo sitions. I rep ly tha t I

co uld inde ed argue th at some nature is prod uce d because

some subject undergoes a change and therefore the term

of the change comes into existence in the subject, and

consequently this term or the composite [i.e. the subject

an d ter m ] are produced or effected. Hence by the

nature of the correlatives, some efficient cause exists.

Formulated in this fashion, this f irst argument would be

based upon a contingent but manifest proposit ion.

However, to prove our conclusion the argument can be

refo rm ula ted i n such a wa y tha t it proceeds fro m necessary

premises. Th us i t is tru e tha t some na ture is able to be

produced, therefore something is able to produce an

effect. T h e antecedent is pro ved fr o m the fact th at

something can be changed, for something is possible

( pos sible being defined as con trary to nece ssary ).

In this case, the proof for the first conclusion proceeds



45

DUNS SCOTUS

de esse possibili,

non autem de

existentia ac tu ali . Sed

de quo nunc ostenditur possibi l i tas ultra in conclusione

tert ia ostendetur actualis existentia.

Secunda

conclusio

de

primo effectivo

est

ilia

quod

simpl ic i ter

primum

ef fect ivu m est incausa bi le. H oc

probatur, quia est inef fect ib i le independens ef fect ivum.

Hoc patet pr ius, quia s i s i t v i r tute al ter ius causat ivum,

vel ab al io effect ibi le, ergo vel processus in

i n f i n i t um ,

vel c irculus, vel status in a l iquo [ in]ef fect ib i l i indepen-

dente effective ;

i l lud

d i co p r imum, e t

aliud

patet quod

no n est p r im u m ex dat is tu is. Ergo ul ter ius

concluditur,

si i l lud primum est inef fect ib i le, ergo incausabi le, quia

no n est f in ib i le,

nee

ma ter iab i le ,

nee

fo rma b i le . Pro batur

consequentia prima, sci l icet quod si est ineffectibi le, ergo

est infinibile quia causa finalis non causat nisi quia

causa movet m etaphor ice ipsum efEciens ad efRciendum ;

nam a l io modo non dependet entitas finit i ab ipso ut a

pr io r i .

N ih i l a ute m est causa per se nis i u t ab ipso

tamquam a priore essent ia l i ter dependet causatum.

Duae autem

aliae

consequentiae, scil icet quod si est

ineffectibi le, ergo est

immateriabile

e t in fo rmab i le ,

p roban tu r simul ; q ui a cujus n o n est causa extrinse ca,

nee

intrins eca ; qu ia causalitas causae extrinsecae d ic it

per fectione m sine im pe rfection e. Causali tas vero causae

intrinsecae necessario dicit imperfectionem annexam,

quia causa intrinseca est pars causati. Igitur ratio causae




from what the thing is or from its possible existence, but

no t fr o m its ac tua l existence. T h e actua l existence of

this being which up to now we have shown to be merely

possible, however, wil l be established in the third

con

clusion.

T h e second conclusion about the first possible effic ien t

cause is th is . Among those things which can produce an effect

that which is simply first is itself incapable of being caused.

Proof:

Such a being cannot be produc ed an d is inde

pe nd ently able to produce an effect. Th is was prove d

above, for i f such a being could cause only in virtue of

something else or i f i t could be produced, then either a

process ad infinitum or a circle in causes would result, or

else the series would terminate in some being which

cannot be produced and yet independently is able to

produce an effect. Th is being I cal l f i r s t , and fro m

what you grant, i t is clear that anything other than this

is no t f irst. Th ere fore , the fur the r conclusion follows

th at i f such a be ing ca nno t be pro du ce d, it has no causes

whatsoever, for it cannot be the result of a

final,

mater ia l

or fo rm a l cause. P ro of o f the first consequence, viz . tha t

i f such a being cannot be produced, neither can it have

an y fina l cause. A final cause does not cause at a ll unless

in a metaphorical sense it moves the efficient cause to

prod uce the effect. O n ly in this wa y does the en tity o f

what exists for the sake of an end depend on the end as

p rio r. N o th in g , however, is a per se cause unless the

thing caused depends upon it essentially as upon some

th in g pr ior . N o w the other two consequences are proved

simultaneous ly. I f som ething cannot be prod uced , then

it can be the result neither of a material nor of a formal

cause.

T h e reason is this. I f som ething has no extrinsic

cause,

neither does it have an intrinsic cause, for while

to be an extrinsic cause does not imply imperfection but

perfect ion,

to be an intrinsic cause necessarily includes

some imperfection since the intrinsic cause is a part of

the th in g it causes. Fo r this reason, the very n ot io n o f

2 , 3 2 2

8



46 DUNS SCOTUS

extrinsecae est natural i ter prior rat ione causae

i n t r i n -

secae ; negato ig i tur pr ior i , et negatur et posterius.

Probantur

etiam eaedem

consequentiae, quia causae

intrinsecae sunt causatae ab extrinsecis vel secundum

esse earum ve l in quantum causant composi tum ve l

u t roque

m odo ,

quia causae intrinsecae non seipsis sine

agente co ns tituu nt com po situm . Ex ist is dict is satis

patet conclusio secunda.

Tert ia conclusio de primo effectivo est ista : primum

effectivum est in actu existens, et al iqua natura vere

existens ac tu al ite r sic est effec tiva. P ro b at io istius :

Cujus rat ioni repugnat esse ab al io, i l lud si potest esse,

potest esse a se ; sed ra ti o n i primi effectivi s impl ic i ter

repugnat esse ab alio, sicut patet ex secunda conclusione.

Simi l i ter e t iam ipsum potest esse, sicut pa tet ex p ri m a

ubi pos i ta est qu in ta probat io ad A, quae minus v idetur

concludere et

tamen

hoc conclud i t .

Aliae autem

p ro -

bationes ipsius A possunt tractari de existentia quam

propon i t

haec

tert ia conclusio, et sunt de cont ingent i -

bus, tam en manifest is : ve l ac cip i tu r A de na tur a et

qu id di ta te et po ssib i l i tate, et sunt ex necessariis. Erg o

effec tivum s im plicite r p r im u m potest esse ex se ; qu od

non est a se, non potest esse a se quia tunc non ens pro-

duceret al iquid ad esse, quod est impossibi le, et

adhuc

tun c i l l u d causaret se, et it a n o n esset inca usa bile

omn ino .

I l lud u l t imum, sc i l icet de ex is tent ia pr imi e f fect iv i




an extrinsic cause has a natural priority over that of

intrin sic cause ; to de ny wha t is pr io r is to deny also

what is posterior.

Another way of proving these same consequences is

this.

In tr in s ic causes are caused by ex trins ic causes

either in their very being or in so far as they cause the

com posite, or in bo th o f these ways, for the intr insic causes

of themselves and without the intervention of some agent

can not constitute the composite. Thi s suffices to make

the second conclusion evident.

The third conclusion about this being capable of exercis

in g eff icien t cau sa lity is th is. Such a being actually exists

and some nature actually existing is capable of such causality.

Proof:

A n y th in g to whose nature i t is repug nant to

receive existence from something else, exists of itself if it

is able to exist at al l. T o receive existence fr o m some

thing else, however, is repugnant to the very notion of a

being which is first in the order of efficiency, as is clear

fro m the second conclusion. T h a t it can exist, is also

clear from the f irst conclusion [namely A ] , where the

fifth argument, which seems to be less conclusive than

the othe rs, establishes this m uc h at least.13 How ever ,

the other proofs of proposition A can also be used to

establish the existence of this being as proposed by this

third conclusion, but in this case they are based on con

t ingen t tho ug h manifest propos itions. I f A, however, is

understood o f the nature, the qu id dit y a nd the po ssibi l i ty,

then the conclusions proceed from necessary premises.

From all this it follows that an efficient cause which is

first in the un qu alif ie d sense of the ter m can exist o f itself.

Consequently, it does exist of itself, for what does not

actually exist of itself, is incapable of existing of itself.

Otherwise a non-existent being would cause something

to exist ; bu t this is impossible, even apa rt fro m the fact

that in such a case the thing would be its own cause and

hence could not be entirely uncaused.

Another way to establish this last conclusion, viz. the



47

DUNS SCOTUS

ali ter declaratur, quia inconveniens est universo

deesse

supremum gradum possibilem in essendo.

Juxta tres conclusiones ostensas de effectivo

p r imo ,

nota coro l lar ium quoddam quod quasi cont inet t res

conclusiones probatas, quod, scil icet

primum effectivum

non tantum est prius ali is, sed eo prius aliud esse includit

con t rad ic tionem. S ic in qu an tum pr im u m , ex is ti t, p ro -

batur ut praecedens ; nam in rat ione tal is

primi maxime

inc lud i tu r incausabi le, pro ba tur ex secunda ; ergo si

potest esse, qu ia no n contra dic i t en t i ta t i , u t pro ba tur

ex prima, sequitur quod potest esse a

se,

et ita est a se.

\b. De Primitate

Final i tat is] .

J u x ta tres conclusiones

primas

de causa effectiva, propono tres conclusiones

similes de causa finali. A li q u o d

finitivum

est simpliciter

p r i m u m , hoc est nee ad a l iud ord inabi le nee in v i r tu te

alterius

natum finire

a l ia . E t p rob atur qu inque proba-

t ionibus simi l ibus illis quae ponebantur ad pr imum

conclusionem de primo effect ivo.

Secunda est qu od p r im u m finit ivum est incausa bile.

Probatur, qu ia in f in ib i le , a l ias non pr imum, et u l t ra ,

ergo ineffect ib i le. Haec consequentia pr ob atu r, qu ia

omne

per se agens agit p ro pt er f inem, ex secundo

Physicorum,* ubi etiam hoc vult Phi losophus de natura,

de qua minus v idetur

quam

de agente a pro po sito. Sed

cujus non est aliquod per se efneiens, i l lud non est

ef fect ib i le, quia in nullo genere potest per accidens esse

p r i m u m ,

sicut patet in proposito specialiter de causis

II,

cap. v

(196 ,

17-212).




47

existence of this first efficient cause, would be to argue

from the impropriety of a universe that would lack the

highest possible degree of being.

A k in d of co rolla ry co nta ine d, as it w ere, in these three

conclusions concerning the first being able to exercise

efficient cau sality, is the fo llo w ing . N o t only is such a

cause p rio r to al l the others, bu t i t w ou ld be co ntra dicto ry

to say tha t anothe r is p ri o r to it. A n d , in so far as such

a cause is first, it exists. Th is is prov ed in the same wa y

as the preced ing. T he very notion o f such a being imp lies

its ina b il i ty to be caused (w hic h is pro ved fr om the second

con clusion ). Th ere fore , i f it can exist, ow in g to the fact

tha t to be is no t co ntr ad icto ry to i t (as the first con clusion

proves), then it follows that it can exist of itself, and

consequently that it does exist of itself.

\b. The Primacy of Fin ality ]. Co nce rning the fina l

cause,

I propose three conclusions similar to the first

three conclusions about the being which is able to

prod uce som eth ing. T h e first conclusion is th a t some end is

simply ultimate, tha t is, it can ne ithe r be orda ine d to some

thing else nor exercise i ts f inal i ty in virtue of something

else. T his is pro ve d by five argum ents sim ilar to those

advanced for the first conclusion concerning the possi

bil ity of a first efficient cause.

T h e second conclusion is tha t the ultimate end cannot be

caused in any way. Th is is prove d fr o m the fact th a t it

cannot be ordained for another end ; otherwise i t would

no t be ult im ate . I t fol lows in ad dit io n that i t cannot be

caused by a n efficient cause. T h is lat te r consequence is

prov ed f ro m the fact th at every agent per se acts for the

sake of an end as is said in Physics, bk.

i i , *

where the

Philosopher understands this proposition to hold also of

n a tu r e wh ere it seems to ap ply less th an i n the case

o f an agent who acts acc ording to purpose.14 N o w a

th in g ca nn ot be prod uced i f no per se efficient cause of i t

exists, for the first of any given kind of cause is never an

in c id enta l cause {causa per accidens). T h is is clear fr o m



48

DUNS SCOTUS

agentibus per accidens, quae sunt casus et fortuna quae

secundum Aristotelem, secundo Physicorum* reducuntur

necessario ad causas per se agentes ut priores, scilicet

ad naturam et intellectum u t propositum ; cujus igi tu r

non est aliquid per se agens ejus nullum erit agens,

sed cujus n o n est finis, ejus n on est ali qu od p er se

agens ; ergo ipsum erit ineffectibile ; n am finibile ex-

cell itur a fine in bonitate et per consequens in perfectione.

Et ultra, ut supra ostensum est de causa efTectiva

pr ima.

Tert ia conclusio est, quod primum finitivum est ac tu

existens, et alicui naturae actu existent i convenit ilia

pr im i tas. Prob atur u t pr im a v ia de ef f ic ient ia .

Sequ i tu r quod pr imum est i ta p r imum, quod

impossi-

bile est aliud prius esse. E t pr ob at ur u t corollarium in

via priori.

[c. De

Primitate

Eminentiae]. Conc lusion ibus tribu s de

utroque ordine causali tat is extrinsecae ja m posit is , pro-

pono tres simi les de ordine em inent iae. A l iq u a na tur a

eminens est s im pl ic i ter p r im a secundum perfec t ionem .

H oc pa tet qu ia in te r essentias ordo essentialis, qu ia secun

dum Ar i s to te lem,

formae

se

habent

sicut

n u m e r i ,

octavo

Metaphysicae.] I n hoc ord ine sta tur. Q u od p rob atur

illis qu inque rationibus quae de statu in effectivis sunt

superius.

Secunda conclusio est quod suprema natura est in-

causabilis. P rob atu r, qu ia est in f in ib i l is , ex praece-

dentibus [nam finibi le excell i tur a f ine in bonitate et per

consequens in perfe ct ione ]. Ergo ineffec t ib i l is . E t u l t r a ,

* n, cap. vi

(198 ,

5-13 .

t

vm,

cap. ii i

(1043*,

33).




what is said

in

part icular of incidental causes, which are

chance and fortun e. These, according to Ar istot le in

Physics, bk . 11,* must be reduced respectively to the prior

causes of n a tu r e and in te l le c t as purpose, nei ther

o f w h ich are inc ide nta l causes. He nce, wha tever has no

per se efficien t cause has no efficien t cause w hatsoever.

But whatever has no end, also has no per se efficient

cause. Therefore, i t w i l l not be something that co uld

be produced, for whatever could be the result of a f inal

cause will be surpassed in goodness, and consequently

in perfec tion, by the end. Fu rthe r, as has been shown

above of the first potential

efficient

cause [such a being

wi l l have no materia l or formal cause ei ther] .

The third

conclusion

is tha t the being which

can be

an ultimate

end actually exists and that this primacy pertains to some actually

existing nature. T h e p ro o f for th is is like th a t used in th e

first way from efficiency.15

It follows that such a being is first in the sense that it is

impossible tha t any thin g should be pr ior to i t . Th is is

proved in the same fashion as the preceding corollary

about the efficient cause.

[c. The Primacy o f Pre-eminence]. H a v in g alread y

established three conclusions of each of the two orders

of extrinsic causality, I submit three similar conclusions

con cerning the order o f pre-em inence . T h e first conclusion

is that some eminent nature is simply first

in perfection.

Thi s is

evident because an essential order exists among essences,

for as Aristotle puts i t , f forms are l ike num bers. A n d in

such an order an ult ima te natu re is to be fou nd . T his is

proved by the five reasons given above for a first being in

the order of efficient causality.

T h e second conclusion is tha t the supreme nature cannot be

caused. T his is prove d fro m the fact tha t i t cannot be

ordained to an end, for whatever is ordained to an end

is surpassed in goodness, and therefore also in perfection,

by the end. Bu t i f i t is no t orda ined to an end ,

then,

i t

cannot be caused by an efficient cause, and consequently



49

DUNS SCOTUS

ergo incausabil is. Il lae duae consequentiae sunt pro-

batae ex secunda conclusione de

effectivis.

I t e m ,

quod suprema natura si t inef fect ib i l is probatur.

N a m

omne

ef fect ib i le habet a l iquam

causam

essentialiter

ord ina tam,

sicut patet ex probatione ipsius B in con

clusione prima de

primo

effect ivo. Causa

autem

essential iter or din at a exc ell i t effectu m . [I g it u r , si esset

effectibil is, non esset suprema.]

Tert ia conclusio est quod suprema natura est a l i -

quod actu existens et probatur ex praecedentibus.

Corollarium : al iq ua m esse n at u ra m eminentiorem vel

superiorem ipsa inc lud i t con trad ic t ione m . Pro batu r u t

coro l la r ium de efficiente et fine.

[Pars Secunda. De primitatibus ad invicem comparatis].

Quantum ad secundum articulum d ico quod primum

efficiens

est u l t im us f in is. Pr ob at io, qu ia om ne

efficiens

per se agit pr op ter f ine m et prius eff iciens p ro pt er finem

pr io rem.

Ergo p rim u m effic iens pro pte r ult imum finem.

Sed propter n ih i l

aliud

a se pr inc ipa l i ter et u l t im a te agi t .

Ergo ,

prop ter se sicut pro pte r finem. Erg o p r im u m

efficiens est pr im us finis. Si enim ageret per se propter

finem

alium

a se, tunc al iquod esset nobil ius primo

eff iciente, quia f inis qui est al iquid remotum ab agente

intendente f inem nobil ius eo.

Simi l i ter, pr imum eff ic iens est pr imum eminens.

Probatur, quia primum eff ic iens non est univocum res-

pectu al iarum naturarum efFect ivarum, sed aequivocum.

Ergo

eminentius

et nob il ius eis. Er go p r im u m efficiens

est eminentissimum.

[Pars Tertia . De divinae naturae

unitate].

Q u a n t u m a d

tert ium art icu lum d ico quod cum s i t idem cui inest




i t can no t be caused in any way . These last tw o

con

sequences are proved from the second conclusion about

the efficient cause.

Another consideration proves that this supreme nature

cannot be an effect. E ve ryth ing wh ich can be produce d

has some essentially ordered cause, as is evident from

the proof of the proposit ion B in support of the f irst

conclusion about the possibil ity of a first efficient cause.

N o w a n essentially ordered cause excels its effect ; the re

fore, i f i t could be produced, i t would not be supreme.

The third conclusion is tha t the supreme nature actually exists,

and this is proved from what we have said above.16

C oro llary : I t is con trad ictory that any natu re should

be m ore excellent or higher th an this natu re. T his is

proved in the same way as were the corollaries about the

efficient and final cause.17

[Pa rt I I . Interrelation o f the Three Primacies]. R egard

in g the second pa rt, I say th a t the first cause is the ultimate

end.

P ro of : Eve ry per se efficien t cause acts fo r the sake

of an end , an d a p rio r cause acts for a p ri o r end ; there

fore,

the first cause acts for the sake of the ultimate end.

Now the first efficient cause does not act primarily or

ult imately for the sake of anything dist inct from

itself;

hence,

it must act for itself as an end ; therefore, the first

efficient cause is the ult im a te e nd . I f it were to act per

se

for the sake of any end other than itself, then something

would be more noble than the first efficient cause, for if

the end were anyth ing a part f ro m the agent inten ding the

end,

i t would be more noble than the agent.

N o w the firs t efficient cause is also the supreme

nature. Proof:

The first efficient cause is not a univocal cause with

reference to the other efficient causes but rather an

equi

vo ca l cause. Such a cause, there fore, is m ore excellent

an d noble th a n they. Consequently, the first efficient

cause is the most excellent.18

[Part I I I . Unity o f the Divine Nature]. Regard ing

the third part, I say that since this tr iple primacy is



50

DUNS SCOTUS

trip lex primitas, quia cui inest una, insunt et

aliae

; et

etiam est ibi tr iplex identitas, i ta quod primum efficiens

est tantum unum secundum quidditatem et na t u ram .

Ad q u o d ostendendum ostendo primo q u a md a m co n -

clusionem praeambulam et secundo principalem con -

clusionem. Praeambula autem est quod efficiens quod

est p r im u m hac t ri p li c i p ri m it a te , est necesse esse ex se.

P rob at io, qu ia est penitus incausabile ; na m con tra-

dict ionem includit al iquod esse prius eo in genere causae

efficientis vel finis, et per consequens in genere cujus-

cumque causae ; ergo est omnino incaus abile. Ex hoc

arguo : n ih i l potest no n esse, nisi cui a l i q u id

i ncom-

possibile pos itive ve l p riv a tiv e potest esse. E i aute m

quod est a se et penitus incausabile, non potest al iquid

esse quod ei sit incompossibile

-

posi t ive ve l pr iva t ive ;

ergo etc. M ajo r patet qu ia n u l lu m ens potest de strui ,

nisi per incompossibi le sibi vel posit ive vel privative.

Mino r p roba tu r , qu ia i l lud incompossibi le aut potest

esse a se au t ab a lio . Si a se et e rit a se. E r it i g it u r du o

incompossibi l ia

s imul ,

ve l neutrum est , qu ia u t rumque

de struit esse alte rius . Si ab a lio , co ntr a : n u lla causa

potest destruere al iquod ens propter repugnant iam sui

effectus

ad

i l l ud ,

nisi suo

effectui

perfectius et intensius

esse det quam sit esse il l ius alter ius de struc tibil is :

null ius entis ab alio est nobil ius esse a causa sua quam

sit esse necessarium a se, qu ia omne causatum habet esse

dependens, sed quod est ex se habet esse independens.

Ex hoc u l t r a ad prop osi tum , pro ba tur un i tas [M S

Veritas] naturae

p r imae ,

quae est pr incipale intentum in

hoc tert io art iculo, quod ostenditur t r ibus rat ionibus.

P rim o sic : q u ia si dua e n atur ae sunt necesse esse,

al iquibus rat ionibus propri is real ibus dist inguuntur ; et

d icantur A et B.

Ulae

rat iones aut sunt formaliter neces-




fou nd together (fo r where one is, there also are the o the rs),

i t fol lows further that this tr iple identity is such that

there is but one irst efficient cause according to essence and nature.19

To show this, I wi l l f i rst establish a prel iminary

con

clusion and only afterwards the principal conclusion.

N o w the p re lim in a ry conclusion is this . The efficient cause

which is first by this triple primacy is of itself necessarily existent.

Proof:

I t is com pletely incapa ble of be ing caused, for

i t is co ntra dicto ry tha t i t should have an yth ing prio r to i t

in the order of efficiency or f inality, and consequently in

any causal orde r. He nce, it is w h ol ly incap able of be ing

caused.

F ro m this I argue, no thin g can be non-existent

unless something either positively or privatively incom

patible w it h i t can exist. N ow n oth ing can be posit ively

or pr ivat ively incompat ib le with a being which exists of

itself an d is tota lly uncaused ; therefore, etc. T h e m ajo r

is clear, inasmuch as no being can be destroyed except

by something posi t ively or pr ivat ively incompat ib le with

i t .

T he m ino r is prove d as follows. W h a t is inco m pa tible

cou ld exist either o f itself or in vir tu e o f some other b eing .

If it can exist of itself, then it will exist of itself.

Con

sequently, two incompatible entit ies will coexist or rather

neither will exist because each will destroy the other.

But can this incompatible enti ty exist in virtue of another

being? N o , for no cause is able to destroy som ething b y

reason o f

an

effect inco m pa tible w it h the thin g to be de

stroyed unless it is able to give a mo re perfect an d intense

existence to its effect than that which the thing to be de

stroyed possesses.

Now

the existence w h ic h a cause im pa rts

to a being is never as perfect as that of a self-existent

being,

lor

the existence of what is caused is dependent

whereas that of the self-existent being is independent.

N ow to proceed to what we pr im ar i ly intended to prove

in this third part, the unity of this f irst nature.

Three reasons are adduced by way of proof, the first

o f w h ic h is this . I f tw o necessary natures existed, some

reali ty proper to each would dist inguish one from the



51

DUNS SCOTUS

sariae,

aut

non .

Si sic, ig itu r

utrumque

duabus ra t ion i -

bus formalibus erit necesse esse, quod est impossible,

qu ia cum n eut ra i l la r um ra t io nu m per se inc ludat

a l iam,

utr aq ue is ta ru m c irc um sc rip ta, esset necesse esse [ M S

om.

per alteram, et ita esset aliquid necesse esse per i l l ud ,

quo

c i rcumscr ip to ,

non m in us esset necesse esse]. S i

vero per illas ra t iones qu ibus d is t inguuntur neutrum

sit formaliter necesse esse, igitur illae rat iones non sunt

rat iones necessario essendi, et i ta neutrum includitur in

necesse esse, quia quaecumque entitas non est necesse

esse est de se poss ibilis ; sed n ih il poss ibile in c lu d it u r in

necesse esse.

Secundo probatur, quia duae naturae eminent issimae

n o n possunt esse in u nive rso ; ergo nee duo pr ima

effectiva. P rob atio anteced entis, q u ia species se ha be nt

sicut

num er i ,

ex octa vo Metaphysicae* et per consequens

duae non possunt esse in eodem ord ine . Ergo multo

minus

nee

duae

primae vel

duae eminentissimae.

H o c etiam patet tert io per rat ionem de rat ione f inis,

quia duo f ines

ult imi

si essent haberent duas coordina-

tiones entium ad se, i ta quod ista entia ad ilia n u l l u m

ord inem haberent , qu ia nee ad finem i l lo ru m ; na m quae

ord inantur ad

unum

f inem u l t imum non possunt ord inar i

ad a l i um , quia ejusdem causati duas esse causas totales

et perfectas in eodem ordine est impossibile ; tunc enim

aliquid esset in al iquo ordine per se causa, quo non

posito, nihi lominus causatum i l lud [aeque perfecte esset].

*

vm,

cap. ii i

(10436,

33).




other. L e t us ca ll these rea l differences A and B . N o w

either A and B are formally necessary or they are not.

If we assume them to be necessary, then each necessarily

existing nature will possess two formal reasons for its

necessary existence, for in addition to A or B, each is

formally necessary by reason of that part of its nature in

w h ic h it is l ike the other. N o w this is impo ssible, for

since ne ithe r o f the tw o reasons o f itse lf includes the oth er ,

if either be excluded, the being would sti l l exist neces

sarily in v irt u e of the other. I n such a case the be ing

would exist necessari ly in virtue of something which, i f

e l im inated,

would sti l l leave the nature existing as

necessarily as before. O n the other ha nd , i f ne ither

nature is formally necessary in virtue of these real differ

ences, then the latter are not of the essence of necessary

existence and consequently neither is included in a

necessary be ing. Fo r any en tity w h ich is no t of itse lf

necessary be ing is on ly possible being.20 N o th in g m ere ly

possible, however, is included in what exists necessarily^

Second proof: T w o pre-eminent natures canno t exist

i n one universe ; therefore neither can tw o beings firs t

i n the order of

efficient

causali ty. Proo f of the antec ed en t:

Species are li ke numbers (Metaphysics, bk.

vni)

* an d hence

no two occu r i n the same orde r. S til l less co uld two be

first or pre-eminent.

This is also evident in the third place from the fact

th at this Be ing has the character o f an end. N o w if there

were tw o u ltim ate ends, the n we should have tw o separate

series of co-ordinated beings where the members of one

group would have no relat ion to the other inasmuch as

they are no t orde red to the same end . Fo r w ha t is

ordered to one ult im ate end cannot be ordered to an other,

as it is impossible to have two total and perfect causes of

the same ord er causing one an d the same th in g . I n such

a case, som ething co uld be

a

per

se

cause i n a given ord er,

although its effect would exist no less perfectly even

sho uld this cause never have existed. Th ere fore , things



52 DUNS SCOTUS

Ord ina ta e rgo ad unum

finem nullo modo

o rd inan tu r

ad a l i um , nee per consequents ad ilia quae ord inantur

ad alium, et ita ex eis non fieret

un ivcrsum.

Hoc etiam confirmatur in

c o m m u n i ,

qu ia nu l la duo

possunt esse terminantia to ta l i ter dependentiam alicujus

ejusdem, quia tunc illud terminaret dependent iam, quo

subtracto, non minus

terminaretur ilia

dependentia, et

ita no n esset dep end entia ad i l l u d ; sed ad efHciens et

eminens

et ad finem depen dent al iq ua [ M S al ia] essen-

t ial i te r. Erg o nu llae duae natu rae possunt esse primo

terminant ia a l iqua [MS a l ia ] ent ia secundum illam

triplicem de pe nd en tiam . Praecise ig itu r est al iq ua una

natura terminans ent ia secundum i l lam t r ip l icem depen

den t iam, et ita habens istam t r ip l i ce m p r im i t a te m .

\_Articulus

Secundus. De Proprietatibus Dei

Absolutist

Ostenso esse de proprietatibus relativis primi entis,

u l ter ius ad ostendendum i l l ius primi

i n f i n i t a t em ,

et per

consequens esse de ente in fi n it o , procedo sic : P rim o

ostendo quod

primum efficiens

est intelligens et volens,

i ta quo d sua inte l l ige nt ia est in f in i to ru m d ist incte, et quo d

sua essentia est repraesen tativa i n f in it o ru m , quae quidem

essentia est sua in te ll ig e n tia . E t ex hoc secundo conc lud e-

tu r sua inf inita s. E t sic cu m tr ip l ic i p rim ita te ostensa,

er i t quadruplex medium ad ostendendum ejus in f in i

t a tem. . . .

[Pars Pr ima. De Intellectu et Voluntate P rim i Entis ].

[Conc lus io P r im a] . Q uo d

autem

sit intelligens et volens

arguo sic : A l i q u o d agens est per se p r im u m agens, qu ia

omni causa per accidens prior est aliqua causa per se,

secundo Physicorum,* ubi hoc

vult

de natura de qua

* II, cap. vi

(ig8a,

8-9).




orde red to one end cannot be ordered to another. N eith er

then ,

can they be ordered to things which in turn are

orde red to som ething else. Con sequently, they w ou ld

not form one universe [with the lat ter] .

This is also

confirmed

in general because one and the

same thing cannot be total ly dependent upon two things.

For then i t would be dependent upon something which,

i f removed, would st i l l leave the thing in question as

dependent as before. He nce, the th in g w ou ld not real ly

be dependent up on it at al l . N ow some things depend

essentially upon an efficient cause which is also

pre

em inent and they depend essentially upon an end . Th ey

cannot,

then,

be dependent upon two natures in this

tr ip le way . Co nsequ ently, some one natu re is the term

of this triple dependence, and thus enjoys this triple

pr imacy.

[Article I I . Absolute Properties o f God]

Having shown the existence of the relative properties

of the First Being, we go on to prove that this Being pos

sesses in fin ity a nd , consequen tly, tha t an In fin ite Be ing

exists. I proceed as follow s : First I show that the first

efficient cause is endowed with will and possesses such

intell igence that this cause understands an infinity of

distinct things and that its essence, which indeed is its

intell igen ce, represents an in fin ity of things. Secondly,

I go on fro m this to infer the in f in ity o f this Being. T his

approach coupled with the tr ip le primacy which we have

established provides four ways of showing the infinity of

this Being. . . .

[Part I. Intellect and W il l] . [F irs t Con clus ion ]. I

argue th a t this being is intelligent and endowed with w i l l as

follows :

Some agent is per se and first, for ac co rd ing to Physics,

bk . 11,* every incidental cause is preceded by one that is

not incidental but per

se.

I n this passage the Ph ilosopher

applies this to nature where it would seem to hold sti l l



53 DUNS SCOTUS

minus v ide tur. Sed omne agens per se agit propter

f inem. Et ex hoc arg u i tur du pl ic i te r : Primo sic :

Omne agens naturale, praecise

consideratum

ex neces

sitate et aeque ageret si ad nullum f inem alium ageret,

sed sit inde pe nd en ter agens ; ergo si no n a git nis i

propter f inem, hoc est quia dependet ab agente

amante

finem ; ta le est primum efficiens ; ergo etc.

I t e m ,

s i pr imum agens agi t propter f inem, aut ergo

finis ille movet p r i m u m efficiens u t amatus ac tu vo lun

tat is, aut u t tantum na tura l i ter am atus. Si ut amatus

actu vo lun tat is , habe tur prop osi tum . Si ta nt um amatus

natural i ter, hoc est

falsum,

qu ia non na tura l i te r amat

al ium f inem a se, u t grave centrum, e t mater ia

f o rmam.

T u n c

enim

esset aliquo

modo

ad f inem, qu ia inc l inatus

ad i l i um . S i autem tan tum natura l i te r amat f inem qu i

est ipse, hoc nihil est nisi

ipsum

esse

ipsum.

Ho c en im

non est salvare duplicem rationem in ipso.

I tem argu i tu r quas i confirmando [ M S conferendo]

ra t ionem jam

factam

s ic. Ips um p r im u m effic iens

di r ig i t e f fectum suum ad f inem ; ergo vel na tura l i te r

dirigit , vel cognoscendo et amando ilium f inem . N on

natural i ter, quia non cognoscens nih i l d ir ig i t n is i in

v ir tu te cognoscentis : sapientis en im est p ri m a o rd in a tio ,

p rim o Metaphysicae* Sed p ri m u m eff iciens nu ll ius

al ter ius v ir tute dir ig i t , s icut

nee

causat ; tunc e nim no n

esset p r im u m ; ergo, etc.

I t e m ,

a l iq uid causatur cont ingenter ; ergo p ri m a

causa co ntin ge nte r causat ; ergo volens causat. P ro ba tio

*

i,

cap. ii

(982°,

17-16




53

less [t h a n of a de libe rat e cause ]. N o w every per se

agen t

acts for the sake o f an end. F r o m this I d ra w a do ub le

argument : F i rst , that every natura l agent, considered

precisely as natural, acts of necessity

21

and w ou ld act

just as i t does now even i f i t had no other end but was

a n ind epe nde nt agent. Th ere for e, i f i t acts on ly because

of an end, this is so only because it depends upon an

agen t w h i c h loves the en d. B ut the f i rst eff ic ient cause

is such an agent, therefore, etc.

[Secondly,] i f the first agent acts for the sake of an end,

then this end moves the first efficient cause inasmuch as

it is loved ei ther natural ly or by an act of the

w i l l .

I f

the la tte r be the case, y ou gr an t wh a t I seek to pr ov e.

I f you assume that the end is loved natura l ly , the assump

tion is false, for the f i rst agent loves natural ly no end other

th an i tse lf , as m at te r , for instance, na tu ra l ly loves f o rm

or the heavy object the centre [of the ea r t h] . I f i t d id ,

th e first ag ent w o u l d be or ie nt ed t o i t as a n en d, since i t

is in cl ine d to i t by i ts very na ture . B ut i f th is end w h ic h

i t loves natura l ly is noth ing other than i tse l f , then we

assert n o th in g m or e th a n th at the th in g is itself .22 I n

such a case, how ev er, th e tw of ol d [ca usal] aspect w o u ld

not be saved.

I n co nf i rm at i on o f the argu me nt jus t g iven we c ou ld

argue that the first efficient cause directs its effect to some

end . N o w , i t d i rects i t e i ther na tu ra l ly or by consciously

lo v in g th is end . T h e first a l te rna t ive is un ten abl e, inas

m u c h as wh ate ve r lacks know led ge c an d i rec t its ef fect to

some end only in vir tue of something which does possess

know ledge , fo r t o o rde r u l t i m a t e l y pe r ta ins to w isd om

ac co rd in g to Metaphysics, bk . i . * N o w ju s t as the f i rst

efficient cause does not cause in virtue of something else,

neither does this cause direct i ts effect to an end by reason

of something other than i tse l f , for otherwise i t would not

be first; th er ef or e, etc .

A no th er pro of is th is. So me thin g causes co nt in

ge n tl y. T he re fo re , the first cause causes

c o n t i n g e n t l y ;

(2,322)

9



54

DUNS SCOTUS

primae consequentiae : quaelibet causa secunda causat

in quantum movetur a prim a ; ergo si prim a necessario

movet, quaelibet alia necessario movetur et quidlibet

necessario causatur. Ig itu r, si aliqua causa secunda

contingenter movet, et prima contingenter

movebit,

quia non causat causa secunda nisi in virtute primae

causae, in quantum movetur ab ipsa. Probatio secundae

consequentiae : nullum est principium contingenter

operandi nisi voluntas, vel aliquid concomitans volun-

tatem, quia quodlibet

aliud

agit ex necessitate naturae,

ita et non contingenter ; ergo etc.

Contra

istam

rationem instatur, et

primo

contra

primam

consequentiam arguitur sic : qu ia nostrum

velle

posset adhuc aliquid contingenter causare, et ita

non requiritur quod prima causa illud contingenter

causet. Ite m , Philosophus antecedens concessit, scilicet

quod aliquid contingenter causatur, et negavit conse-

quens, intelligendo de velle scilicet quod prima causa

contingenter causet ; ponendo

contingentiam

in in-

ferioribus, non propter contingenter Deum velle , sed ex

motu

qui necessario causatur in quantum uniformis,

sed

difformitas

sequitur ex partibus ejus, et ita con-

tingentia.

Contra secundam consequentiam : si causat contin

genter, ergo volens, non videtur tenere, quia aliqua

naturaliter

mota

possunt impediri, et ita

oppositum con

tingenter et violenter potest evenire.

A d primum dicendum, quod si Deus est primum

movens

vel

efficiens

respectu voluntatis nostrae, idem

sequitur de ipsa quod de

aliis,

quia sive immediate

necessario movet earn, sive aliud immediate, et illud

necessario

motum

necessario

moveat

earn, quia movet




conseque ntly, it causes vo lu n ta ril y. Proo f of the first

consequence : Eve ry secondary cause causes in so far as

i t is m ov ed by the first cause. I f the first cause moves

necessarily,

then,

every other cause will be moved

necessarily and everything will be caused necessarily.

Co nsequ ently, if any secondary cause moves co ntin ge ntly,

the first cause also moves contingently, since the

secondary cause can cause only in so far as it is moved

by the first. P roof o f the second consequence : T he on ly

source of contingent action is either the will or something

accompanied by the w i l l . E ve ryth ing else acts w it h a

natural necessity and, consequently, not contingently ;

therefore, etc.

One objection to this argument is directed against the

first consequence, namely that our vol i t ion would st i l l be

able to cause something contingently and therefore it is

unnecessary t h a t the first cause sho uld cause co ntin ge ntly .

Fu rtherm ore, the Phi losopher

23

concedes the antecedent

(that something is caused contingently), yet denies the

consequent (that the first cause causes contingently).

He places contingency in the lower beings and not in the

fact tha t G od wil ls things con tingen tly. Con tingenc y

arises fro m m o tio n , w h ic h , tho ug h it is caused necessarily

in so far as it is uniform, gives rise to

difformity

owing to

its parts.

The other objection is to the second consequence.

Just because something causes contingently, it does not

seem to follow that therefore this cause is endowed with

a

w i l l ,

for even what is moved natural ly can be impeded.

Hence, the opposite can happen either contingently or

vio lent ly.

To the f irst objection we must reply that i f God is the

first mover or efficient cause with regard to our w i l l ,

then the same holds of our wil l as of other things.

Whether God moves our wil l immediately with necessity

or whether He first moves something else necessarily

and this latter in turn moves our wil l with necessity,



55 DUNS SCOTUS

non n is i ex hoc qu od m ovetur, sequitur tand em quo d

pr ox im um vo lun ta t i necessario moveat vo lu n ta te m , etiam

s i prox imum voluntat i s i t ipsamet vo luntas, e t i ta

necessario vo le t, et e ri t volens necessario. E t seq uitu r

ulterius

impossibi le,

quod necessario causat quodlibet

causatum

[ , et non est a l iquid cont ingens].

Ad secundum dico, quod non voco hie contingens

quodcumque non necessarium,

vel

no n sem pi ternum , sed

cujus oppositum posset f ieri quando i l lud f i t . Ideo

d ix i : a l iquod

contingenter

causatum, et non a l iquod

est contingens. N un c dico , qu o d Philosophus n o n potest

consequens negare salvando antecedens per motum ;

quia s i

ille

totus

motus

necessario est a causa sua, quaeli-

bet pars ejus necessario causatur quando causatur, id

est, inevi tabi l i ter, i ta quod oppositum non potest tunc

causari.

E t u l ter ius , qu od causatur per

quamcumque

pa rte m m otus, necessario causatur et in ev ita bi l i te r. V e l

ig i tu r n ih i l fit cont ingenter, id est , evi tabi l i ter, vel

primum

sic causat immediate, quod posset et iam non

causare.

A d

tertium

dico, quod si al iqua causa potest impedire

istam, hoc non est nisi in virtute superioris causae, et sic

usque ad

primam causam

quae si

immediatam causam

sibi necessario movet, usque ad

ult imam

erit necessitas ;

ergo necessario impediet, et per consequens, non potest

al ia causa natural i ter causare.

Sic ergo v idetur t r ip l ic i v ia ostensum quod pr imum

agens est intelligens et volens.

Quarum

prima est quod

natura agi t propter f inem, et non nis i quia dependens




in any case the wil l would be necessari ly moved by

whatever is pro xim ate to i t . T his wo uld be true even

if this proximate cause were i tself

w i l l .

T h e

w i l l ,

there

fore,

would wil l necessari ly and would be a necessary

vo lun tary agent. A n d there is st i l l another absurdi ty

that would fol low, viz. that i t would cause necessari ly

anything that is caused, and there would be nothing

cont ingent.

As to the second objection, let me say that by c o n

t in g e n t I do no t m ean som ething tha t is no t necessary

or which was not always in existence, but something

whose opposite could have occurred at the time that this

actu ally di d . T h a t is w hy I do not say tha t something

is contin gent, b u t th a t som eth ing is caused contingently.

Now I maintain that the Philosopher cannot deny the

consequent and sti l l save the antecedent through the

expedient of motion, because if the motion as a whole

proceeds from its cause in a necessary manner, every

single part of it is caused necessarily at the time it occurs.

In other words, it is inevitable, so that the opposite effect

cou ld no t possibly be caused at ju st this m om ent.

Furthermore, whatever is caused by any part of this

m o tio n is caused necessarily an d ine vita bly . Th erefo re,

either noth ing ever happens unav oida bly or con tingen tly,

or the first cause im m ed iately causes w hat i t was also able

not to cause.

To the third objection, I say that if any cause can

imped e a na tur al cause, i t can do so only in virt ue of a

higher cause, and so we are forced back again to the first

cause.

I f this firs t cause necessarily moves the cause

immediately below it , this necessity wil l continue down

to the last cause, which will consequently be necessarily

im pe de d in its ac tion . As a result, this last cause co uld

not cause anything natural ly.

There appears to be three ways,

then,

of proving that

the f irst agent is intel l igent and endowed with w i l l . The

first of these is that nature acts on account of an end,



56 DUNS SCOTUS

et directa a cognoscente finem ; secunda est q u o d ipsum

primum agens ag it pro pte r f inem; et ter t ia qu od

aliquis effectus contingenter f i t quando causatur.

[Conclusio Secu nda]. U l ter iu s quo ad quaestionem

praeambulam ad in f in i ta tem, probo secundo quod e jus

intellectio et vo lit io est id em q u o d ejus essentia. E t

primo

de vol i t ione sui ipsius ut objecti , i ta quod

primam

causam amare est idem essentialter cum natura causae

et

omnis

actus vo lun ta tis ejus. P ro ba tio : causalitas et

causatio causae finalis est simpliciter prima, secundum

Avicennam sexto Metaphysicae [cap. v], dicentem quod si

de qualibet causa esset scientia, ilia quae esset de causa

finali esset no bilis sim a ; ipsa enim quantum ad causal i -

tatem praecedit causam ef f ic ientem, qu ia movet eum ad

agendum,

et ideo causalitas

pr imi

finis et ejus causatio

est penitus incausabilis secundum quamcumque causa-

tionem

in qu olib et genere causae. Ca usalitas

autem

finis

primi est efficiens p r i m u m movere sicut

a m a t u m .

I d e m

autem est pr imum f inem movere primum eff ic iens ut

am atu m ab ipso et p r i m u m effic iens amare pro pte r finem,

qu ia n ih i l aliud est objectum amari a vo lun ta te quam

voluntatem amare objec tum ; ergo pr im u m effic iens

amare primum finem est penitus incausabile, et i ta per

se necesse esse, et i ta eri t idem naturae

p r i m a e .

E t quasi

co nv er t i tur ra t io ex opposito conclusionis ; qu ia si

pr imum amare est a l iud a natura prima, ergo est

causabile, et per consequens effe ctib ile. I g it u r ab

aliquo per se efficiente

amante

finem ; ig i tu r p r im u m

am are se esset causa tum ex a liq uo amore finis priore isto

causato ; quod est impossible.

Hoc ostendit Aristoteles, duodecimo Metaphysicae*

de in te l l igere qu ia a l i ter pr imum non er i t opt ima

*

xii,

cap. ix (1074&, 28-29).




and it does this, only because it is dependent upon and

dire cte d by someone who knows the en d. T h e second is

th at this first agent acts for the sake o f an end. T h e t h ir d

is th a t some effects are caused co nt in ge n tly . But let us

proceed with the prel iminaries to the proof for inf in i ty.

[Second Co nclu sion ]. T he second conclusion I establish

is th is : the knowledge and volition of this First Being is the

same as its essence. T h is is true , fir s t, o f its vo li ti o n of

itself as object, so that to love the first cause is something

essentially identif ied with the nature of this cause, and

the same holds for every act of its

w i l l . Proof:

The

causality and causation of the final cause is simply first

acco rdin g to A vice nna's Metaphysics,

b k . v i ,

where he says :

I f we had scientific know ledge o f any cause,

that of

the

fin a l cause w o u ld be the most exce llent . T h e reason is

this.

T h e f ina l cause fro m the standp oint of causality

precedes the efficient cause inasmuch as it moves it to

act. The refore, the causality of the ult im ate end an d

its causation is completely incapable of being caused in

any wa y. N o w the causality of the ult im ate en d consists

in this. By be ing loved it m oves the first efficient cause.

But it is one and the same thing whether the ultimate end

moves the first efficient cause by being loved by this

cause or whether the first efficient cause loves for the sake

o f an en d. Fo r an object being loved by the w il l means

the same as a w i l l lov ing an object. Henc e, the love by

which the first efficient cause loves the ultimate end is

com pletely incap able of being caused. Th ere fore, it

exists necessarily and consequently is the same as the

first natur e. O r to use the argu m ent in reverse, i f this

first love is directed towards anything other than the first

nature itself, it can be caused and therefore produced,

and this by some per

se

efficient cause which in turn loves

some end . Con sequen tly, this first love of itse lf w o u ld be

caused by some pr io r love of an e nd, wh ich is impossible.

Aristotle in his Metaphysics, bk. x i i , * proves that the

knowledge which the First Being possesses is the same as



57

DUNS SCOTUS

substantia, quia per intel l igere est honorabile ; secundo

qu ia alias laboriosa erit ejus co nt inu at io . I t e m si no n

sit

i l l ud ,

er i t in potent ia contrad ic t ion is ad

i l l ud .

A d

illam naturam sequitur labor, secundum ipsum.

Istae

rat iones possunt ra t ion e de cla ra ri. P rim a sic :

cu m

omnis

entis in actu

primo

perfectio ejus ult ima sit

in actu secundo quo conjungi tur opt imo, maxime si sit

act ivum et non

tantum

fac t i vum.

Omne autem

in te l l i -

g ib i le est act ivum, et pr ima natura est inte l l ig ib i l is ex

praemissa, sequitur ergo quod ult ima ejus perfectio eri t

in actu secundo. Ig i t u r si ille non sit ejus substantia,

substantia ejus non est optima, quia aliud est suum

o p t i m u m .

Secunda ra t io potest de clar ari sic : po ten tia

so lum-

modo rece ptiva est po ten tia contra dict ion is ; ergo cum

hoc non sit h u j u s m o d i ; ergo etc. Sed qu ia secundum

Ar is to te lem,

nee

ista est rat io demonstrat iva, sed tantum

probabi l is, a l i ter proposi tum ostendatur ex ident i tate

po ten tiae et ob jec ti in se ; ergo actus er it eis id e m . Sed

consequentia no n va let. Patet ins tan tia : qu ia angelus

intel l igit se et amat se, et tamen actus angel i amandi et

intel l igendi non sunt idem substantiae ejus.

Haec conclusio, videl icet, quod essentia divina sit

eadem quod vol i t io sui ipsius, foecunda [A1S ve ra ] est

ex coro l lar i is . N a m sequi tur pr im o quo d vo luntas est

idem

primae

naturae ; qu ia

velle

non est n is i vo lun

tatis ; ergo ilia voluntas cujus velle est incausabile, est




57

its essence, first, because it would not be the best

substance, were such not the case, since this is the most

excellent of substances precisely because of the knowledge

it possesses. A n d secondly, because otherw ise the F irs t

Being would grow weary i f i t cont inued to th ink, for i f

its thought were not its substance, the latter would be in

potency of contradict ion 24 to th in k ing , and th is w ou ld

produce weariness according to Aristotle.

These argum ents fro m au tho rity can be established by

reason. As to the first, every bein g w h ich is in first act

f inds i ts ult imate perfection in i ts second act, through

w hi ch it is un ite d to tha t w h ic h is best for it.25 This

is true especially if this being is capable of acting in the

proper sense of the term and not merely in the sense of

pr od uc ing or fashion ing some exte rna l object.26 N o w

wh ateve r is int el l ig ible is active in the prop er sense o f the

t e rm,

an d the first nature is inte l l igible fr om w ha t we said

above.

The refore, i t follows that the ult im ate perfection of

this Be ing w i l l be i n its second act. But if this act is not the

substance itself, the latter wil l not be the best inasmuch

as its ult im ate p erfec tion is som ething other th an itself.

[Aristotle's] second reason can be put in this way.

Only a receptive potency is in potency of contradict ion.

But this Be ing has no receptive potencies ; there fore, etc.

Since Aristot le, however, did not consider his proof

demonstrat ive but merely probable, some27 wou ld

prove the thesis in another way, viz. since the faculty

and the object are identical, therefore the act is identif ied

w it h them . Th is inference, however, is in va l id as is clear

from the case of an angel, which knows and loves itself

and nevertheless, its acts of loving and knowing are not

identical with i ts substance.

T h is conclusion, viz. th at the div ine essence is id en tical

w it h its vo l i t io n, is fr u it f u l because of i ts corol laries. First

o f a l l , i t follows tha t the w i l l is the same as the first n atu re ,

because w il l in g is a fun ctio n on ly of the w il l ; wherefore,

if the volit ion itself is uncausable, the same is true of the



58

DUNS SCOTUS

etiam incausabilis ; ergo, etc. E t s im i l i ter velle in te l l i -

g i tur quasi posterius voluntate ;

tamen

velle est idem

i l l i naturae ; ergo magis vo luntas.

I t e m ,

secundo sequ itur q uo d inte l l igere se est idem

i l l i na tu rae , qu ia n ih i l

amatur

nisi co gn itu m ; sicut si

amare se ex se est necesse esse, sequitur quod intelligere

se est necesse esse ex se.

E t si est inte l ligere p ro pin qu ior i l l i n atura e quam ve l le,

ideo sequitur ulterius quod intel lectus sit idem i l l i

naturae, sicut prius de voluntate ex vel le argutum est.

Seq uitur qua rto et ia m qu od rat io in te l l ig en di se sit

idem sibi quia necesse esse est ex se, si intelligere sit ex

se necesse esse, et ratio intell igendi se quasi praeintell i-

g i tur ips i in te l lectu i .

[Conclusio T e r t i a ]. Ostenso de inte l l igere se et vel le

se quod sint idem essentiae

p r i m i ,

ostendo propositum

ex

ali is,

scil icet de om n i inte ll ige re et velle ; et sit

con

clusio te rti a ista : n u ll u m in tell ig ere potest esse accidens

primae naturae . Pro bat io, qu ia de ilia na tu ra p r ima

ostensum est esse in se primum effe ct ivu m . Erg o ex se

habet unde posset quodcumque causabile causare cir

cumscripta al io quocumque, sal tern ut pr ima causa

il l ius causabilis ; sed circu m scr ipta cog nit ione ejus, no n

habet unde possit i l lud causabile causare ; ergo co gn itio

cujuscumque al ter ius

non

est

aliud

a na tura sua. Pro

batio assumpti, quia nihi l potest causare nisi ex amore

f inis volendo

i l l ud ,

quia non potest aliter esse per se

agens, quia nee agere pro pter f inem ; nun c autem ipsi




w il l to w hi ch i t belongs ; consequently [ the w il l is id en ti

fied w it h the na tur e] . Fu rthe rm ore , since the act of the

will is conceived as though it were posterior to the

w i l l ,

i f the former is identical with that nature, then the latter

wil l be al l the more so.

Secondly, it follows that this self-knowledge is identical

with that nature, for nothing is loved unless i t is known.

He nce it follows th at jus t as this self-love exists necessarily

in virtue of itself, so also this self-knowledge.

Then too, knowledge, as it were, is more closely

con

nected w it h that nature than is vo l i t i on . Therefore, it

follows in the third place that the intellect is the same

th in g as th at na ture . W e prove this in the same wa y as

we previously established the identity of the wil l from

the act of wi l l ing.

Fourthly, i t fol lows that whatever is required for this

nature to know itself is also identical with the nature,28

for i f the knowled ge exists in vi rtu e of itself, the n the same

is true of the reason for knowing, because the latter, as

it were, must f irst be known to the intel lect.

[T h ir d Conclusion]. H av ing proved that th is self-

knowledge and self-love of the first being are the same as

its essence, I go on to show the same to be true of other

acts, namely of all its knowledge and all its acts of

vo l i t ion . L e t the th ird conclusion be th a t no knowledge can

be an accident of

the

first nature. P ro of : T h e first na tu re

has been shown to be first in the order of efficiency, and

therefore has of itself and apart from anything else, the

abil i ty to produce whatever can be produced, at least

in so far as it is the first cause of that which can be

produced.

Bu t w ith ou t a knowledge of the lat ter, the

first nature would be unable to produce what can be

produced.

Hence, the knowledge

of

any of these other

beings is not something dist inct from its own nature.

Pr oo f o f the last assum ption : N o th in g can cause an

effect except by w il l i n g i t for the sake o f an end . O the r

wise it w o u ld no t be a per se age nt, since it w o u ld n ot



59 DUNS SCOTUS

velle alicujus propter f inem praeintelligitur intel l igere

ipsum.

An te ig i tu r

pr imum s ignum,

in quo in te l l ig i tur

causans sive volens A, necessario praeintel l igitur intel l i -

gens A, ita sine hoc non potest per se

e fficere,

et i ta de

aliis.

I t e m proba tur idem : qu ia omnes intellectiones ejus-

dem

inte l lectus habent s imi lem

habitudinem

ad

in te l -

lectum secundum identitatem essentialem vel acciden-

ta lem,

sicut patet de omni intel lectu creato et ejus

in te l -

lect ionibu s, qu ia v id en tu r perfectiones ejusdem generis.

Ergo si a l iquae habent

recep t i vum,

et omnes ; et si

aliq ua est accidens, et qu ae libe t, Sed aliq ua n o n potest

esse accidens in

p r i m o ,

ex praecedenti quaestione, quia

no n inte l lec t io sui ipsius ; ergo nu lla e ri t ib i accidens.

I t e m ,

intell igere si quod potest esse accidens recipietur

in inte l lec tu ut in subjecto ; ergo et in illo inte l l igere

quod est idem intel lectui , et i ta perfect ius inte l l igere eri t

in potent ia recept iva respectu imperfect ions [quod est

absurdum] .

I t e m ,

idem intell igere potest esse

plurium objectorum

ordinandorum ; ergo qu anto perfectius tan to pl u r iu m ;

ergo perfectissimum, quo incompossibi le est perfectius

i n te l l ig i ,

e r it idem om niu m in te l l ig ib i l ium . In te l ligere

primi sic est perfectissim um ; ergo id em est o m n iu m

in te l l ig ib i l ium, e t

i l lud

quod est sui est idem

s ib i ,

ex

prox ima praecedente ; ergo inte l l igere om ni um est

idem. E t eandem conclusionem volo inte l l ig i de vel le.




be act ing for an end . B ut before an yth ing can be w i l le d

for the sake of an end , i t must be kn o w n. He nce, before

we can even conceive of the First Being as wil l ing or

causing A, we must conceive i t as kn ow ing A , for w ith o ut

such knowledge the f irst cause would not be properly a

cause. A n d the same holds true of eve rythin g else i t

could produce.

Another proof of the same is that al l the acts of know

ledge of any given intellect are related in the same way

to that intellect, so that either all are accidents or all are

o f the essence o f tha t intelle ct. Th is is clear in reg ard to

all created intellects and their respective acts of know

ledge,

all of which seem to be of the same kind of perfec

t i on .

Th ere fore , i f some o f the acts are received by the

intelle ct, a ll the acts are, a nd i f one of the m is an accident,

the rem ainder are l ikewise. Bu t fro m the preceding

conclusion, the self-knowledge of the first being cannot

be an accident ; therefore none of its know ledge w i ll be

accidental to i t .

Furthermore, i f some act of knowledge can be an

accident, it wil l be received by the intellect as by its

subject. I n such a case, how ever, the act of know ledge

which is ident ical wi th the inte l lect and is the more

perfect of the two acts of knowledge, would itself be the

recipient of the less perfect, which is absurd.29

Furthermore, the same act of knowledge can embrace

several interrelated objects, and the more perfect this

act is, the greater can be the nu m be r o f objects. Conse

qu en tly, an act that is so com pletely perfect tha t i t w ou ld

be impossible to have an yth ing m ore perfect, w il l embrace

al l that can be kno wn . N ow the understanding of the

Firs t Being is o f such perfe ction ; therefore there is bu t

one act for al l that can be kn ow n. N ow , fro m the pre

ceding conclusion, self-knowledge is identical with its

very be ing ; consequently, a ll know ledge is iden tical

w i t h its bein g. Th is same conclusion I w ish to be unde r

stood of the act of vol i t ion.



60 DUNS SCOTUS

I t e m ,

iste

intellectus

non est nisi

quoddam

intel l igere ;

sed iste intel lectus est ide m o m n iu m et i ta q uo d no n

potest esse alicujus alterius objecti ; ergo nee intel l igere

aliud ; ergo ide m intel l igere est o m n iu m . Fa l lacia est

accident is ex ident i tate al iquorum inter se concludere

identitatem respectu te r t i i , respectu cujus extraneantur,

et patet in

simili

: inte l l igere est ide m q uo d

velle

; si

ergo intel l igere ipsum est alicujus, ergo et velle est

ejusdem ; no n sequ itur, sed tan tum m od o seq uitur qu ia

est velle, quod quidem vel le est a l iquid ejusdem, quia

intel l iger e est ejusdem ; i t a qu o d di vis im inf e rr i potest,

n o n conjunctim propter accidens.

I t e m ,

intel lectus primi habet actum unum adaequa-

tum

sibi et coaeternum, quia intel l igere se est idem

sibi.

Ergo non potest a l iquem habere a l i um . Consequentia

non va le t. Ex em plum de beato, q u i

simul

v ide t

Deum

et a l iud et iamsi videat De um secundum u l t im um

capacitatis suae, ut de anima Chr is t i pon i tu r , e t adhuc

potest v idere al iud.

I t e m a rgu i tur : inte llectus iste habet i n se per ide nt i

ta tem perfectionem m ax im am in te l l igen di ; ergo et

omnem a l i am. Respondeo : non seq uitur, qu ia al ia

quae minor est, potest esse causabilis, et ideo

differre

ab

incausabi li ; m axim a autem non potest.

[Conclus io Q u a rt a ] . Q ua rta conclus io pr inc ipa l is de

intel lec tu et vo lunta te D e i est ista : inte l lectus p ri m i

intel l igit semper et dist incto et actu et necessario quod-




60

It is also said that this intellect is nothing more than

a certain ki n d of kn ow ing ; bu t this intel lect is the same

for al l things so tha t it cann ot differ for differe nt objects.

Therefore, neither is the act of understanding dif ferent.

Hence, one act of understanding suffices for all objects.

However, to argue in al l cases from the identity of two

things among themselves to their identity with relat ion

to a third object dist inct from

bo th ,

as this argument

does,

is to co m m it the fallacy of acciden t. Fo r instance,

just because an act of understanding is identified w i t h

the act of wil l ing, i t does not fol low that whatever is

known by the act of knowledge is also loved by the

w i l l .

All that fol lows is that an act of vol i t ion exists and that

this act of wil l is something which is related to object

known [not indeed by a relat ion of love] but in so far as

it is also an act o f know ledge. T h e inference can be

made only in d is junct ion, not in conjunct ion, for only

an incidental relation exists between the two.

Another argument advanced is that inasmuch as the

First Being's act of self-knowledge is identical with itself,

its intellect has one coeternal and completely adequate

act, an d therefore can have no othe r. T he inference is

i nva l i d . Ta ke the examp le o f one w ho is bea tif ied. H e

has an intel lectual vision of God and of other things as

wel l .

Ev en tho ug h he sees G od to the utm os t of his

abil ity, as we assume to be the case with the soul of

C hr ist, he can s ti l l see som ething else.

S til l ano ther arg um en t em ployed is this. Since this

intel lect is identif ied with the most perfect knowledge

possible [viz. knowledge of the supreme nature itself], it

also possesses a ll other know ledge . I reply tha t this does

not follow, for this other lesser knowledge could be

caused,

and therefore i t could be dif ferent from the most

perfect self-knowledge, which is uncaused.

[F o u rt h C on clu sio n]. T h e fou rth principal conclusion

w hi ch concerns the intel lect a nd w il l o f G od is this :

the intellect of the First Being knows everything else that can be



61 DUNS SCOTUS

cumque in te l l ig ib i le , pr ius naturaliter quam illud sit

in se.

Prima pars probatur, quia potest cognoscere quod-

cumque inte l l ig ib i l e, sic : hoc enim est perfectionis in

in te l lectu, posse distincte et actu cognoscere

quodcum -

que in te l l ig ib i le .

Imo

hoc ponere est

necessarium

ad

rationem

inte l lectus, quia

omnis

intelle ctus est totiu s entis

sumpti communiss ime, u t determinabi tur d is t inct ione

ter t ia . * Nullam autem intellectionem

potest habere

intellectus primi nisi eamdem sibi, ex proxima ; ig itu r

cujusl ibet inte l l ig ib i l is habet inte l l igere actuale et

d is t inctum, e t hoc idem

s ib i ,

et ita semper et necessario.

Secunda pars, de pr io r i ta te , pr ob atu r sic : quia

quidquid est idem

sibi ,

a se est necesse esse, sicut patuit

pr ius. Sed esse a li o ru m non a se est no n necesse esse ;

ergo necesse esse ex se est prius natura omnium non

necessario. A li te r p ro ba tu r, qu ia esse cu jus libe t alterius

dependet ab ipso ut a causa, et ut causa est alicujus

causabil is, necessario includitur cognit io ejus ex parte

causae ; ergo ilia cognit io eri t pr ior natural i ter ipso

esse cog n iti . Secunda pars

etiam

conclusionis probatur

al i ter, quia art i fex perfectus dist incte cognoscit

omne

agendum antequam fiat ; al ias non perfecte operaretur,

qu ia cognit io est mensura ju x ta qu am ope ratur ; ergo

Deus est om niu m pr od uc ib i l iu m a se habens n o t i t i a m

dist inctam et actua lem, vel sa l tern habi tua lem, priorem

eis. Cont ra

istam

instatur de arte, quia ars universal is

sufficit ad unive rsal ia ; ergo, etc. Responsionem

quaere.

* Opus oxoniense, I, dist.

in,

q . iii .




61

known with a knowledge that is eternal, is distinct, is actual, is

necessary and is prior by nature to the existence o f

these

things in

themselves.

Proof o f the

f i rs t

pa r t . T o be able to kn ow ac tua l ly

and d ist inct ly each and every other th ing that can be

k no w n is som ethin g tha t per ta ins to the per fec t ion of

know ledge. Ind ee d, the very no t ion o f an in te l lec t

makes it necessary to assume the possibi l i ty of such know

ledge, for every inte l lec t (as w i l l be de te rm ine d in dis

t in ct io n three) has to do w i t h a l l be in g in gene ral . Bu t

the in te l lect of the Fi rst Being can have no knowledge

that is not one wi th i tse l f ( f rom the preceding conclusion).

There fore , i t knows every th ing in te l l ig ib le actua l ly and

dist inct ly. Since th is kno wled ge is ide nt i f ie d w i t h the

First Being, i t is eternal and necessary.

T h e second pa rt abo ut the p r i or i t y of th is kno wledg e

is pr ov ed as fol low s. As we hav e m ad e clear above , wh a t

ever is id en tic al wi t h this Be ing , exists necessarily. B ut

the existence of other things which are not self-existent

is n ot necessary. Necessary be in g, ho we ve r, is p ri o r b y

nature to everything that does not necessari ly exist.—

A n ot h er pr oo f is th is. E ve ry be ing other th an the f i rst

depends u p o n the la tte r as u p o n a cause. N o w to be a

cause of something, i t must necessari ly possess a know

ledge of w h a t i t can cause. Con seq uen tly, this know ledg e

wi l l be natura l ly pr ior to the existence of the th ing known.

— S t i l l

another proof for the second part of this conclusion

is the fo l lo w in g. T h e perfect ar t isan has a d ist inct kn ow

ledge of ev er yt hi ng to be don e before he does i t . O th er

wise he would not act perfectly, for knowledge is the

n o r m w h ic h regulates h is w or k. G o d , therefore, has

some previous d ist inct knowledge, e i ther actual or at

least hab i tua l , o f every th ing tha t he can

m a k e . — A g a i n s t

this last argument, the objection is raised that the posses

sion of some univ ers al ar t suffices for the pr od uc ti o n of

b o th the unive rsal an d the s ingular . Fo r the solu t ion to

this o bj ec ti on , see w h a t I ha ve said elsewhere.30

(2,322) 10



62 DUNS SCOTUS

[Pars Secunda. De Infinitate Primi Ends] . H is ostensis

praeambul is , arguo infinitatem

quatuor v i is :

primo

per

viam ef f ic ient iae ubi ostendetur proposi tum dupliciter:

pr imo qu ia ipsum est primum eff iciens o m n iu m ; secundo,

quia efficiens, puta distincte cognoscens omnia

fact i -

bilia

: te rt io ostendetur

infinitas

per v iam

finis

: et

quarto per v iam eminent iae.

[ V i a P r i m a ] .

Primam

viam ex parte causae tangit

Philosophus, octavo Physicorum * et duode cimo Meta-

physicae,\ quia movet motu infinito ; ergo habet po ten-

tiam

in f i n i tam.

Haec ra t io rob or atu r qu an tum ad antecedens sic :

aeque concludi tur proposi tum si possi t

movere

per

i n f i n i t u m ,

s icut s i moveret per inf in i tum, quia aeque

opor te t eum esse in actu ; sicu t i l lud posse patet de primo

q u a n tu m est ex se ; l icet ig itu r no n

moveat

m o tu in f i n i to

sicut inte l l ig i t Aristoteles, tamen si accipiatur antecedens

istud quod quantum est ex parte sua potest movere,

habetur antecedens

verum

et aeque

sufficiens

ad inferen-

dum p ropos i tum.

Con sequen tia pr ob at ur sic : qu ia si ex se no n vi rt u te

al ter ius movet motu inf in i to, ergo non ab al io accipi t

sic mo vere, sed in v ir tu te sua activa hab et totum effectum

suum s imul , qu ia indep ende nter ; sed qu od simul habet

in v i r tu te in f in i tum ef fectum est in f in i tum ; ergo, e tc .

A l i te r rob oratu r pr i m a consequent ia sic : p r i m u m

movens s im ul habet in v ir tu te sua omnes effectus

*

vin,

cap. x (266 ,

10-24).

T x , cap. vii

(1073 *,

3-13 .




[Part I I . The Infinity of the First Being]. Now that

these preliminary conclusions have been established, I

argue in four ways for the infinity | of the First Being].

The notion of efficiency really provides two of the

argu

ments, the first of which is drawn from the fact that this

Being is the first efficient cause of a ll other things ; the

second,

that as efficient cause, this Being has a distinct

knowledge o f a ll that can be made. The th ird way is

that of finality ; the fourth , that o f eminence.

[a.

First P roof]. The Philosopher treats of the first

way from efficient causality in Physics, bk. v i i i , * and his

Metaphysics, bk.

xn,f

where he argues that the First Being

has infinite power, because it moves with an endless

movement.

The antecedent can be reinforced inasmuch as the

desired conclusion follows equally well from the fact that

the First Being can cause such motion as it would if it

actua lly d id so ; for in either case, the actual existence

of such a being wou ld be necessarily required. Now it

is clear that, so far as the First Being exists in virtue of

itself, it has this ability to produce endless movement.

Therefore, even though such a being may not actually

cause an endless movement as Aristotle thought, still the

proposed conclusion can be inferred with equal validity

if the antecedent be understood of the ability of the first

cause to produce such movement.

The proo f of the consequence is this. I f the First

Being,

by itself and not in virtue of another, moves with

an infinite movement, then it has not received such

power of movement from another. Hence it has in its

power at one and the same time the totality of its effect,

because it has this power independently. But, whatever

has an infinite effect in its power at one and the same

moment is infin ite ; therefore, etc.

Another way to reinforce the first consequence is this.

A t one and the same moment, the First Mover has in its

power all the possible effects to be produced by motion.



63 DUNS SCOTUS

possibiles produci per motum ; sed i l l i sunt i n f i n i t i , si

motus infinitus

; ergo, etc.

Contra istas declarationes Aristotelis : q u i dq u id s it

de antecedente, tamen consequent ia pr ima non v idetur

bene pro ba r i . N on primo

m o d o ,

qu ia dura t io ma jor

n ih i l perfect ionis ad dit ; na m albedo quae uno anno

manet

n on est perfectior

quam

si

tantum

uno d ie m an ere t ;

ergo motus quantaecumque durat ionis non est perfect ior

effectus quam motus unius

d ie i .

Erg o ex hoc, qu od

agens habet in virtute sua activa simul movere motu

i n f i n i t o , non conclud i tur major perfect io hie q u a m i b i ,

nisi quod agens diut ius movet et ex se ; et i ta esset

ostendendum quod aeternitas agentis concluderet ejus

infinitatem

; alias ex

infinitate

motus non posset con-

c lud i .

Tunc ad formam, u l t ima proposi t io i l l ius roborat ion is

negatur, n is i de inf i n i ta te du rat ion is. Secunda rob ora t io

etiam consequentiae improbatur qu ia non major per-

tect io intensiva concludi tur ex hoc quod agens quod-

cumque ejusdem speciei potest producere successive

quotcumque quamdiu manet , qu ia quod po tes t in

tempore uno in unum tale, potest eadem v i r tu te in mille

ta l ia , si m il le tem po ribus ma ne at. E t n o n est possibil is

apud phi losophos inf in i tas nis i numeral is ef fectuum pro-

duc i b i l i um ,

per motum sci l icet generabilium e t corrup-

t i b i l i u m ,

quia in speciebus finitatem po ne ba nt ; ergo

non magis sequitur inf initas intensiva in agente ex hoc

quod potest in inf in i ta numero successive, quam si posset




I f the motion is without end, however, these effects are

infinite ; therefore, etc.

Ag ains t these statements of A ris totle : W ha tever is to

be said of the antecedent, the first consequence still does

no t seem to be va l id ly established. C erta inly no t in the

first way fo r a pe rfectio n does no t increase sim ply because

i t endures for a greater len gth o f t im e. Whiteness w h ic h

exists for a year does not become any more perfect than

if i t existed ju st for a day. The refore, mo vem ent w h ic h

continues for howsoever long a time , is no t a more perfect

effect than the movement which lasts for a day.

Con

sequently, just because at one and the same moment an

agent virtually possesses infinite movement, we cannot

conclude to any greater perfection in this case than in

any other—except that here the agent moves by itself

an d for a longer t ime . A n d so we w ou ld have to prove

tha t the etern ity of the agent im pl ied i ts in f in ity ; other

wise,

the latter could not be inferred merely from the

endlessness of the movement.

As to the form of the argument, the last proposit ion

of the reinforced argument [viz. that whatever has an

endless effect virtually is infinite] may be denied if used

to prove anyth ing more than an in f in i ty o f durat ion.

Also the second reinforcement of the consequence breaks

down , inasm uch as we cann ot conclude to greater

intensive perfection merely from this that an agent, i f i t

remains in existence long enough, can produce succes

sively any nu m be r whatsoever of the same species. Fo r

what an agent can do in one moment to one thing, by

the very same pow er it can do to a thousa nd in a thousa nd

such mo m ents , if it exists for such a leng th o f t ime . H o w

ever, according to the philosophers, who assumed only a

finite number of species, the only infinity possible is the

numerical inf inity of effects that come into existence and

go ou t o f existence thr ou gh m ot io n . Hence , there is no

more reason for concluding that the agent is intensively

in f in i te 31 ju st because it can do an in f inite num ber of



64 DUNS SCOTUS

in duo t a n t u m , tantum enim est possibilis infinitas

num eralis secund um philosophos. Si quis autem probet

in f in i ta tem

specierum

possibi lem, probando al iquos

motus coelestes esse incommensurabiles, et ita numquam

posse red i re ad un i formi ta tem,

etiam

s i per in f in i tum

durarent, et inf initae conjunctiones specie causarent

inf in i ta generabi l ia specie, de hoc, quidquid s i t in se,

n ih i l tamen ad in ten t ionem Ph i losoph i , qu i in f in i ta tem

specierum negaret.

Ul t ima probabi l i tas quae occurr i t pro consequent ia

Ph ilosophi declaran da est ista : q u id q ui d potest i n al iq ua

multa simul

quo rum quod l ibe t requ i r i t

aliquam

per-

fect ionem s ib i propr iam,

illud

concluditur esse perfectius

ex p lura l i ta te t a l i um , i ta v idetur de primo agente esse

concedendum , quo d si posset causare sim ul in f in i ta , qu od

esset ejus virtus infinita, et per consequens si primum

agens s imul habet v i r tu tem causandi in f in i ta , quantum

est ex se simul posset ea producere, l icet natura effectus

non pe rmi t ta t , adhuc sequitur inf in i tas v ir tut is e jus.

Haec consequent ia u l t i m a pro ba tur : qu ia potens causare

albedinem

e t n igred inem, non est minus perfectum quia

no n sunt s im ul causabi l ia. Haec en im no n simultas est

ex repugnan t ia

eorum

et non est ex defectu agentis.

E t ex isto probo in f in i ta te m sic : s i p r im u m haberet

omnem

causal i tatem

formaliter

simul, l icet non possent

causabi l ia s imul poni in esse, esset inf initum, quia simul,

quantum est ex se, posset inf inita producere, et posse




things successively (for only a numerical infinity is pos

sible according to the philosophers) than there would be

if i t cou ld do b ut tw o. Bu t suppose someone should

prove that an infinity of species is possible by proving

that some heavenly movements are incommensurable

and so the same arrangement would never recur even

tho ug h the m ovem ent should con tinue ad infinitum. T he

inf in i te variety of [p lanetary] conjunct ions, then, wou ld

cause an infinite variety in the effects that can be pro

duced. W hatev er is to be said of this view , however, it

is definitely not the posit ion of Aristot le, who denies the

infinity of the species.32

The f inal probable interpretat ion advanced to

re in

force the Philosopher's reasoning may be put in this way.

If an agent can do many things at once, where each of

the things in question needs some perfection proper to

itself, then the greater the number of such things, the

greater the perfection o f the agent. A n d so it seems tha t

we must concede that i f the power of the First Agent

could produce an infinity of effects at one and the same

t ime ,

i t must be inf in i te . Th is conclusion w ou ld fo l low

even where the nature of the effect was such as to make

its simultaneous existence in an inf inite number impos

sible,

provided that, so far as the causal power of the

agent was concerned, i t cou ld produce sim ultaneously an

in f in i te multitude.—This last inference is proved as

follow s. A n agent th at can cause b o th whiteness and

blackness is not less perfect because it cannot cause the

two simultaneously, for this inabil i ty to exist simultane

ously arises from the repugnance of the effects to each

other, and not from any defect in the agent.

F ro m this I prove in f in ity i n this wa y : I f the First

Be ing a t one a nd the same tim e formally possessed a ll

causal power, even though the things which i t could

cause could not be given simultaneous existence, it

would be in f in i te ,

because—as

far as it is

concerned— •

i t has power enough to produce an inf inite number al l



65

DUNS SCOTUS

plura simul conc lud i t ma jorem potentiam intensive ;

ergo si habet perfectius quam si haberet omnem causali-

tatem

formal i ter ,

magis

sequitur

infinitas

inten siva . Sed

habet om nem causal i tatem cu jusl ibet re i secundum totum

quod est in re ipsa eminentius quam si esset formaliter.

L icet ergo omnipotent iam propr ie

dictam

secundum

intent ionem theologorum tantum creditam esse et non

natura l i ra t ione

credam

posse probari, sicut dicetur

dist inct ione x l i i et

Quodl.

q .

v n , *

tamen p roba tu r na tu ra l i -

ter inf in i ta p ote nt ia , quae sim ul, qu an tu m est ex se, habet

omnem causali tatem, quae simul posset in inf inita, si

essent simul fact ibi l ia.

Si obj icis,

primum

non potest ex se simul in inf inita,

quia non est probatum quod si t tota l is causa inf in i torum,

hoc nihi l obstat, quia si haberet simul unde esset total is

causa,

nihi l perfectius esset quam nunc sit , quando habet

unde sit p r im a causa : tu rn qu ia illae secundae causae

non requi runtur propter perfect ionem in causando, qu ia

tunc remotius a prima esset perfectius, quia perfectiorem

requireret causam, sed si requiruntur causae secundae

cum prima, secundum phi losophos, hoc est propter im -

perfectionem ef fectus, ut pr imum cum al ia causa imper

fecta posset causare imperfectum, quod secundum ipsos,

no n posset im m ed iate causare : tu rn qu ia perfectiones

totae secundum Aristotelem eminent ius sunt in primo

quam si ipsae

formalitates earum

sibi inessent, si possent

inesse. Q u o d pr ob at ur , qu ia causa secunda proxima

Opus oxoniense,

1,

dist.

x l i i ,

q.

unica;

Quodlibet, q. v ii.




at once, and the more one can produce simultaneously,

the greater the pow er in inten sity. B ut i f the First

Being possessed such power in an even more perfect

way than i f i t had i t formal ly [as Avicenna, for instance,

assumes],

i ts intensive inf inity fol lows a fort ior i . Bu t the

ful l causal power that each thing may have in i tself , the

First Being possesses even more perfectly than if it were

formal ly present.

Therefore, although I bel ieve that the omnipotence

in the proper sense of the word as the theologians under

stand it ,33 cannot be proven by natural reason, but is

on ly b el ieved (as w il l be show n in dist. x m and Quodlibet

q . vii),* nevertheless we can establish naturally the exis

tence of an infinite power which on its part possesses

simultaneously the fulness of causality and could produce

an inf inite number of things at once, i f only they were

capable of existing simultaneously.

It is objected that the First Cause on its part cannot

cause an infinite number of effects at one time, so long

as i t is no t prov ed t ha t i t is the to ta l cause o f these effects.

This objection, however, presents no obstacle, since the

requirements to be a total cause would not make it any

more perfect than it would have to be i f i t were the First

Cause. T h is is clear, first of a ll , because secondary

causes are not required simply to supply some addit ional

perfection to the causality, for if that were the case, the

more remote effect would be the more perfect inasmuch

as it w o u ld req uire a m ore perfect cause. B ut if secondary

causes are needed in addition to the First Cause, the

reason, according to the philosophers,34 lies in the fact

th a t the effect is im pe rfect. T h a t is to say, the F irst

Cause, which immediately would be unable to cause

an yth ing imp erfect , could do so in co njunc t ion w it h

ano ther im perfect cause. A lso , the First Be ing, acco rd

ing to Aristot le, contains al l the perfections in a more

perfect manner than if they were formally present, were

this latte r possible. T h e pr oo f of this lies in the fact tha t



66

DUNS SCOTUS

primae totam

perfect ionem

suam causativam

habet a

sola prima ; ergo totam perfect ionem i l lam eminent ius

habet causa prima quam secunda causa habens ipsam

formaliter. Consequent ia pa tet , qu ia p rim a respectu

illius causae secundae est causa totalis et aequivoca.

Consimiliter

quaeratur de tertia causa respectu secundae

vel

respectu prim ae . Si respectu prim ae , hab etur p ro-

pos i tum. Si respectu secundae, se qu itur secundam

eminenter cont inere perfect ionem totalem quae est

form al i ter in ter t ia. Sed secunda habet a p ri m a qu od

sic co ntin et pe rfec tione m te rti ae , ex praeostensa ; ergo

prima eminent ius habet cont inere perfect ionem tert iae

q ua m secunda ; et sic de om nibu s aliis usque ad u l t i -

mam

; quare [c on clud i tur ]

primam causam

habere

eminenter to ta lem perfect ionem causat ivam omnium

et perfectius quam si haberet causalitatem o m n i u m

form al i ter, si esset possibile. V id e tu r ju d ic io

meo

posse

concludere rat io Aristotel is de substantia

i n f i n i t a ,

quae

accipitur ex octavo Physicorum * et duo decim o Meta-

physicae f superius posi ta .

Ju x ta istam viam efKcientiae argu i tur quod habeat

po ten t iam

i n f i n it am ,

na m virtu s quae potest super

extrema

distant ia in

i n f i n i t u m ,

est in f in ita . Sed virt us div ina est

hu jusm odi in creatione. In te r

enim

extrema creationis

est inf in i ta d istant ia, s icut inter a l iquid et

n ih i l .

Sed

hoc antecedens ponitur tantum c red i tum, e t verum est

de creatione in ordine

rea l i ,

ita scilicet quod non-esse

quasi du rativ e praecederet esse reale existentiae cre aturae .

N o n tamen est minor credi ta de creat ione qua ordine

naturae esse sequitur non-esse, quo

modo

loqu i tu r

Avice nn a de creatione q u in to [read sexto] Metaphysicae % ;

sed est suff icienter de m on stra ta qu ia saltern p r im a na tura

* vni, cap. x

(266a, 10-24).

t

xii)

cap. vii (1073s, 3-13 .

X Metaphysial,

vi,

cap. ii.




the secondary cause closest to the first receives all of its

causal perfec tion exclusively fr o m the f irst. Con sequen tly,

the First Cause has the who le o f this perfection in a mo re

eminent way than the second cause, which possesses it

fo rm a lly . T h e consequence is ev ide nt, since the first

is the tot a l eq uivo cal cause of the second. W e can argue

the same way regarding the relat ion of the third cause

to the second or first cause. I f we take it i n rela tio n to the

first, we have the proposed conc lusion. I f we take it i n

relation to the second, then it follows that the second

cause contains the total perfection found formally in the

t h i rd .

B u t as we have sho wn, the second cause owes this

a ll to the Firs t Cause ; therefore , the Fir st Cause mu st

contain the perfect ion of the th ird in an even more

perfect w ay t ha n does the second. A n d the same is true

w it h al l the other causes do w n to the very last. Th ere

fore, we conclude tha t the First Cause contains em inently

the total causal perfection of all the other causes, and

this in a way tha t is even m ore perfect th an i f i t contained

this causali ty for m ally , were tha t possible. T o m y m in d ,

it seems th at A ristotle's arg um en t for an in fin ite substance

i n Physics, bk . v i i i , * and Metaphysics, bk .

x i i , |

can be m ade

to hold.

Using this way of efficiency, some 3B argue tha t the

First Cause has infinite power, because any power which

can bridge the distance between infinite extremes is

itself

in f in i te .

T he div ine power in creat ion, however,

is of such a nature, for between the extremes of creation

(i.e.

between nothing and something) an inf inite distance

intervenes. I f existence be unde rstood as true o f the real

order where non-existence precedes existence by a

pr io r i ty o f

du ra t i on ,

the n the antecedent is an assum ption

based on fa ith alone ; whereas if we take c rea tion as

Av icenna

does

in Metaphysics, bk.

v i , % in

the

sense

that

non

existence precedes existence merely by a priority of

nature, then the antecedent is no longer an assumption of

faith.36 Fo r it is sufficiently dem onstrated tha t the first



67 DUNS

SCOTUS

post Deum est ab ipso et non a se, nee accip it esse aliq uo

praesupposito. Ergo

i l lud

crea tur. N a m si est

primum

e f fec t i vum,

quod l ibe t aliud ab eo totum esse suum capit

ab eo, quia al i ter secundum al iquid ejus non dependet

ab eo, nee i l lu d esset tunc p ri m u m effect ivum . Sed qu od

sic cap it tot u m esse suum ab al iq uo , i ta qu od per na tu ra m

suam ha be t esse post non-esse, crea tur ; erg o, etc. Sed

sic accipiendo prius natura

tam

esse

quam

non-esse,

non sunt ext rema mulat ion is [MS univocat ion is ] quam

causet ista virtus,

nee

i l l u d

effici

re q u i r it

m u t a r i .

Sed quidquid s i t de antecedente, consequent ia non

probatur ; quia quando inter extrema nul la est d istant ia

media ,

sicut est in continuo cujus extrema sunt duo

pu nc ta, ista dic un tur praecise distare rat ione extremorum

inte r se ; ta nt a ergo est dis tan tia q u a n tu m est

majus

ext remu m . Ex em plum : Deus d ista t in in f in i tu m a

creatura etiam suprema possibi l i , non quidem propter

aliquam

d is tant iam

mediam

inter extrema, sed propter

inf in i t at em unius extre m i ; s ic ergo co ntrad ictoria no n

dis tant per a l iqua media, qu ia contrad ic tor ia sunt

immed ia ta , i t a quod quan tumcumque

parum recedit

al iqu id ab uno ext remo, statim est sub a lte ro ; sed

dis tant [M S d i f fer un t ] propte r ext rema in se. T an ta

ergo est d is tant ia is ta quantum est i l lud ext remum quod

est pe rfectius : i l l u d est finitum ; ergo , etc. Gon-

firmatur,

qu ia posse to ta l i ter super terminum posi t ivum

hujus distantiae est posse super distantiam sive super

tra ns itu m ab extrem o in ex tre m um ; ergo ex posse super

istum

t ransi tum non sequitur inf in i tas, n is i sequatur ex




67

nature after God does not exist of itself but is dependent

upo n H i m ; nei ther is an yth ing [v iz. m atte r] presupposed

in ord er to give it existence. Co nsequ ently, it is created.

For i f a first efficien t cause exists, ev eryth ing else receives

its to ta l bein g fr o m it. Oth erw ise, these other beings

would not be dependent upon it , nor could i t real ly be

the first efficien t cause. B u t anyt h in g th a t receives its

total being from another so that by i ts nature i t has

existence after non-existence, is created ; there fore, etc.

I f we understand nature as being prior to both existence

and non-existence in this [viz. ontological] sense, then

existence and non-existence are not termini of a change ;

ne ither does t o be pro du ce d i n this w a y necessarily

im ply to be chan ged .

Whatever is to be said of the antecedent of this

argu

m en t, the consequence remains un pro ved . W he n there

is no interval between the extremes as is the case in a

continuum, whose extremes are two points, i t is how one

extreme compares with the other that determines how

d is ta n t i t is said to be. Consequ ently, i t w i l l be as

distant from, as it is greater

than ,

the other. G od , for

example, is inf initely distant from even the greatest

creature possible, not indeed because of any interval

between the two, but because of the inf inity of the one

extreme. A n d so I argue tha t contrad ictories are distant

from one another in virtue of the extremes themselves,

and not by reason of some interval between them, for

contradictories are imm ediate. N o m atter how l i t t le

something departs f rom one extreme, i t immediately

comes un de r the othe r. I n the present instance, then,

there w i l l be as m uc h dis tan ce as there is [en t i ty] in

the m ore perfect extrem e. But the latt er is f inite ;

therefo re, etc. Th is is co n firm ed, inasm uch as to possess

com plete powe r over the posit ive te rm of this dis tan ce

is to have power over the distance or the passage from

one extreme to the other. In f i n ity , therefore, cann ot be

inferred from the power of the agent to effect this transi-



68

DUNS SCOTUS

posse to ta lit e r super

terminum

ejus

pos i ti vum .

Terminus

ille est finitus ; ergo posse super transitum ad istum ter

m inum non conc lud i t v i r tu tem

activam infinitam

demonstrat ive.

Q u o d autem d ic i tu r communiter, contrad ic tor ia d is-

tare in in f in i tu m , potest sic in te l l ig i , id est, indete rm inate ;

quia s icut nul la est i ta parva distant ia quae non

sufficiat

ad contradictoria, s ic nul la est i ta magna, etiam si

esset major maxima possibi l i , quin ad ilia contrad ic tor ia

se extende re. Est ig it u r

eorum

distant ia inf in i ta, id est ,

indeterminata ad quamcumque sc i l icet magnam vel par-

v a m .

E t ideo ex ta l i inf in i tate distant iae, id est, indeter

m ina ta , no n sequitur consequens de in f in i ta po tent ia

intensive, sicut nee sequitur ad minimam d i s tan t i am, in

qua salvatur s ic inf in i ta d istant ia, id est , indeterminata

;

et quod non sequitur ad antecedens, nee ad consequens.

Contradictoria ergo maxima distant ia est et opposi t io,

sed pr iva tive et ind ete rm ina te ; con trarietas vero est

maxima posi t ive, s icut patet decimo Metaphysicae*

[V ia Secun da]. Ostenso propo si to per

viam primae

eff icientiae, quia ilia p r i m a efficientia in fe r t in f in i ta tem,

sequitur secunda via ex hoc quod est intel l igens dist incte

om nia fact ib i l ia , ub i arguo sic : In te l l ig ib i l ia sunt

in f in i ta , e t hoc actu in in te l lectu omnia in te l l igente.

Ergo intel lectus ista

simul

actu intel l igens est inf initus.

Talis est intel lectus

p r i m i .

Hujus enthymematis probo antecedens et conse-

quen t i am .

Quaecunque sunt in f in i ta in po ten t ia , i ta

quod in acc ip iendo a l teram post a l terum nul lum possunt

habere finem,

ilia

omnia, s i s imul actu sunt, sunt actu

in f in i ta . In te l l ig ib i l ia sunt hu jus m odi respectu

in te l -

* x, cap. iv

(1055°,

9).




t i on ,

unless it is already implied by its power to produce

the po sitive extre m e. B ut the latt er , in the present case,

is f inite ; consequently, it is not demonstratively estab

l ished that inf inite power is required to effect such a

t ransi t ion.

Sti l l ,

the com m on saying that con tradictories are

inf in ite ly d ista nt can be understood in the sense of

ind ete rm ina te ly . For just as no d is ta nce is too smal l

to prod uce a co ntr ad ict io n, so l ikewise, none is too great,

even i f it were greater th a n the greatest possible. The re

fore this d is ta n ce is in fin ite in the sense th at it is no t

determined to any definite interval, howsoever great or

smal l . Such an in f in i ty or indeterminateness, then, does

not imply the consequent about a power that is inten

sively inf in ite , jus t as the m in im u m distance characterised

by such an in f in ity does not im p ly i t . For wha t does no t

fol low from the antecedent, does not fol low from the

con

sequent. Con tra dic tor ies , therefore , are at the greatest

di st an ce an d in the greatest opp osit ion to each other,

bu t pr iva t ive ly and indeterm inate ly . Posi tive ly, how

ever, the greatest d is ta n ce is betwe en con traries, as is

clear from Metaphysics, bk. x.*

[b. Second P ro of ]. H a vi n g established the proposed

conclusion by the first way of efficiency inasmuch as the

first

efficient cause implies infinity, we proceed to the

second, where, from the fact that the First Being knows

dist inct ly everything that can be made, we argue as

follows : T h e things tha t can be kn ow n are inf in ite in

num ber. Bu t they are al l actua l ly kn ow n by an intellect

w hi ch knows a l l things . The refore, tha t intel lect is

infinite

w h ic h , at one an d the same mo m en t, has actua l

know ledge of a l l these things . N o w such is the intel lect

of the First Being.

I pro ve the antecedent an d consequence of this en thy-

meme.

Th ing s po ten tial ly inf in ite or endless in nu m be r,

i f taken one at a t im e, are ac tually

infinite

i f they actually

exist simultaneously. N o w wh at can be kn ow n is of such



69 DUNS

SCOTUS

lectus creati. Satis pa tet. Et in inte llectu div ino sunt

simul omnia actu intellecta quae ab intellectu creato

successive sunt inte llec ta. Ergo ib i sunt

infinita

actu

intellec ta. Hu jus syllogismi probo majorem, licet satis

evidens videatur, quia omnia

talia

acceptibilia quando

sunt simul existentia, aut sunt actu finita aut sunt actu

in fin ita . Si actu finita, ergo accipiendo alteram post

alterum, tandem omnia possunt esse actu accepta.

Ergo si non possunt esse omnia actu accepta, si talia actu

simul sunt, sunt actu infinita.

Gonsequentiam primi

enthymematis sic probo : quia

ubi pluralitas requirit

vel

concludit majorem perfec-

tionem quam

paucitas, ibi infinitas numeralis concludit

infinitam perfectionem. Exemplum : posse ferre decern

majorem perfectionem requirit virtutis motivae quam

posse ferre quinque : ideo posse ferre in fin ita concludit

infinitam virtutem m otivam. Ergo in proposito, cum

intelligere A sit aliqua perfectio, et intelligere B sit

similiter alia perfectio, numquam intelligere idem est

ipsius A et B et aeque distincte, ut duo intelligere essent,

nisi perfectiones [MS perfectiores] duorum intelligere

includuntur in

illo

uno eminenter, et sic de tribus, et

ultra de infinitis.

Consimiliter

etiam

quia de ipsa ratione intelligendi

argueretur sicut de inte llec tu et actu argutum est : quia

major perfectio concluditur in actu intelligendi ex

pluralitate illorum quorum ratio intelligendi distincte,

quia oportet quod includant eminenter perfectiones

omnium

propriarum operationum

intell igendi,

quarum

quaelibet secundum propriam rationem aliquam per

fectionem ponit ; ergo infinitae concludunt inf in itam .

Secundo, juxta istam viam de intelligere primi pro-

positum sic ostendo ; causa p rim a, cui secundum




69

a nature so far as a created intellect is concerned, as is

suff iciently clear. N o w al l tha t the created intel lect

knows successively, the divine intellect knows actually

at one an d the same t im e. The refore, the div ine inte l lect

knows the actu ally inf ini te . I prove the m ajo r of this

syl logism,

alth ou gh it seems eviden t eno ugh . Consider

these po ten tial ly in f in ite things as a w hole . I f they exist

al l at once, they are either actually inf inite or actually

f in i te.

I f f inite, the n i f we take one after the other ,

eventual ly we shal l actua l ly kn ow the m a l l . Bu t i f we

cannot actual ly know them al l in th is way, they wi l l be

actual ly inf in i te i f known simultaneously.

The consequence of this first enthymeme, I prove as

fol low s. W hene ver a greater num ber implies or requires

greater perfection tha n does a smaller num ber , nu m eric al

in f in i ty im pl ies inf in i te perfection. For exam ple, greater

m ot ive pow er is requ ired to carry ten th ings th an to carry

f ive. Th erefore , an inf init e m otiv e powe r is needed to

carry an inf in i ty o f such th ings. N o w in the po int at

issue,

since to know A is one perfection and to know B

also is another perfection, it follows that A and B as two

equally dist inct objects wil l never be known by one and

the same act of knowledge unless the latter includes in a

m ore eminen t wa y these tw o perfections. T he same holds

for three objects, an d so ad infinitum.

A similar argument to that based on the intel lect and

the act of knowing could be constructed in regard to the

reason for knowing (ratio

intelligendi) .37

For the greater

the number of th ings known dist inct ly through th is

medium of knowledge, the more perfect is the act of

knowing since the act by which al l things are known

must include in a more eminent way the perfections of

each proper act of knowledge, where each of these in

cludes some perfe ction pro pe r to itself. W here the latter

are inf inite, therefore, inf inite perfection is required.

A second proof from the knowledge of the First Being

in su pp ort o f ou r thesis is this . Suppose a secondary

2 , 3 2 2 11



70 DUNS SCOTUS

ult imum suae causali tat is causa secunda aliquid per-

fect ionis addit in causando,

non

videtur sola posse ita

perfectum

effectum

causare, sicut ipsa cum secunda, qu ia

causalitas sola primae diminuta est respectu causali tat is

am ba rum ; ergo s i

i l lud

q u o d

natum

est esse a causa

secunda et prima simul sit multo perfectius a sola prima,

secunda ni h i l perfectionis a dd it pr im ae ; sed omne

finitum

omni

finito addit

aliquam perfectionem

; ergo

talis causa prima est

i n f m i t a .

A d p ropos i tum, no t i t i a

cujuscum que n ata est gi gn i ab ipso sicut a causa pr ox im a,

et

maxime ilia

quae est visio sive intuit iva intel lect io

;

ergo si ilia al icui intel lectui inest sine actione quacumque

tal is objecti ,

tantummodo

ex vir tute al ter ius object i

pr ior is ,

quod natum est esse causa superior respectu talis

cognit ionis, sequitur quod i l lud objectum superius est

in f in i tum in cognoscib i l i ta te , qu ia

inferius

n ih i l s ib i addi t

in cog nosc ibi li tate : tale objec tum superius est na tur a

p r i m a , quia ex sola praesentia ejus apud intel lectum

p r i m i , nullo

al io objecto concomitante, est not i t ia

cujuscumque o bjec t i in in te l le ctu ejus ; ergo n u l lu m

aliud

inte l l ig ib i le a l iquid s ib i addit in cognoscibi l i tate ;

ergo est inf initum in cognoscibi l i tate sic, ergo est in

en titate , qu ia un um qu od qu e sicut se ha bet ad esse, sic

ad cognoscibil itatem, ex secundo Metaphysicae*

[V ia Te rt i a ] . I te m , ter t ia v ia , sc ilicet ex parte finis

arg ui tu r sic : voluntas nostra om ni fin ito a l iq uid al iu d

majus potest appetere et

amare,

s icut inte l lectus inte l l i -

gere ; et vid et ur qu od plus est in cl i na tio na tura l is ad

summe amandum bonum in f in i tum ; nam inde argu i tu r

incl inat io natural is ad al iquid in voluntate, quia ex se,

i i,

cap. i (9936, 30-31)




]0

cause can add some perfection to the causality of the

First Cause, even when the latter acts to the utmost of its

powe r. I n such a case, if the First Cause were to act

alone,

its effectiveness would seem to be less perfect

th an tha t of the tw o causes together. Th ere fore , if

something which a secondary cause can produce together

with the First Cause, can be done much more perfectly

by the First Cause alone, the secondary cause adds no

perfe ction to the first. But a finite th in g always adds

some pe rfec tion to w hat is finite. He nce, a first cause

whose causality can not be perfected is in fin ite . T o a pp ly

this to the que stion at issue. K no w led ge o f any object

is by its very nature apt to be engendered by that object

as its proximate cause, and this is especially true of in

tuit ive knowledg e or visio n. Th erefore , i f some intel lec t

possesses such knowledge without any action on the part

of the object known, but solely in virtue of some prior

object which by nature is a higher cause of such know

ledge,

i t fol lows that the higher object is inf initely intel l i

gib le, because the lower object adds nothing to it in the

w ay of cog no scibi l i ty. N ow , the supreme natu re is such

a superior object, since in the absence of all other objects

by the mere fact that it is present to the intellect of the

First Being, it gives to that intellect a knowledge of every

object w ith o u t exce ption. Th erefore , no th ing else tha t

can be known adds anything to this nature in the way of

cog nosc ibi l ity. Consequently, i t is inf in itely inte l l igible ;

therefore, its entity is also infinite, for a thing can only

be known to the extent that i t has entity, according to

Metaphysics, b k.

i i . *

[c. T h i r d P ro of] . T he fact that the First Being is also

the ul t imate end provides a th ird way of arguing to

in f in ity . O u r w il l can always love an d seek som ething

greater than any finite being, even as our intellect is

always able to kn ow m ore. A n d , wh at is m ore, there

seems to be a natural incl ination to love an inf inite good

to the greatest degree possible, because the free will of



71

DUNS SCOTUS

sine habi tu , prompte et

delectabiliter vult illud

voluntas

l ibera : i ta v idetur quod exper imur actu amandi bonum

in f in i tum : imo non videtur voluntas in a l io perfecte quie-

t a r i .

E t quomodo n on i l l u d na tu ra l i te r od iret , s i esset

objectum sui objecti , sicut natural i ter odit non esse,

secundum

A u g u s t i n u m ,

De libero arbitrio, l ibri [ te r t i i ]

cap i tu lo [oc tavo ] * V ide tur

etiam

s i in f in i tum repug-

naret bono, quod nullo modo quietaretur in bono sub

rat ione

i n f i n i t i , nee

in i l lud fac i l i ter tenderet , s icut

nee

in repugnans suo ob jecto. C on f i rm ab i tur ilia ra t io in

sequent i v ia de intel lectu.

[V ia Q u a r t a ] . I t e m q u a r to propositum ostenditur

per

v iam eminentiae

et arguo sic :

eminentissimo i ncom-

possibile est aliquid esse perfectius, sicut prius patet.

F in i to autem non est incompossibile esse aliquid per

fectius ; q uare, e tc . M in o r pro batu r qu ia in f in i tu m non

repugn at en t i ; sed om ni f in i to magis est in f in i tum.

A d istud al i ter a rg ui tu r, et est idem : cu i no n repugn at

inf initum esse intensive, i l lud non est

summe

perfectum

nisi s i t inf in i tum, quia s i est f in i tum potest excedi vel

excel l i ,

qu ia in f i n i tu m esse sib i no n repugnat : en t i non

repugnat

infinitas

; ergo

perfectissimum

ens est infini

t u m . M in o r hu jus quae in praecedent i argum ento

ac cipi tu r, no n vid etu r a p rio r i ostendi ; qu ia s icut

contrad ic tor ia ex ra t ion ibus propr i is contrad icunt , nee

potest per a l iquid manifest ius hoc probari , i ta non

repugnant ia ex ra t ion ibus propr i is non repugnant ,

nee

videtur posse ostendi, nisi explicando rat iones ipsorum :

in ,

cap. v i, viii

(Migne,

P.L.,

xxxn,

1280, 1282).




i tse l f and wi thout the a id o f any habi t prompt ly and

delightful ly loves this good, so that we seem to experi

ence an act of love for an

infinite

go od . Ind ee d it seems

that the wil l is not perfectly satisf ied with anything else.

And if such an inf inite good were really opposed to the

natural object of the w i l l , why is i t that the wil l does

not na tur al ly hate an inf in i te go od , jus t as i t na tur al ly

hates non-existence, according to Augustine in De libero

arbitrio, ru, vii i

?

* Fo r i t seems that i f in f i n i t e and

g o o d

were incompat ib le, then there would be no way

in which the wi l l could be sat isf ied in such a good, nor

cou ld i t re ad ily te nd tow ards such a go od ju s t as i t

cannot readi ly tend towards anything which is opposed

to i ts proper object . Th is argum ent w i l l be conf i rme d i n

the fo l lowing by a s imi lar argument f rom the intel lect .

\d.

F o u rt h P ro o f] . T h e thesis is shown also by the

wa y of eminence, an d here I argue tha t i t is inco m pa tible

w it h the idea of a most perfect being tha t an yth ing should

excel it in perfection, as has been previously explained.

Now there is nothing incompat ib le about a f in i te th ing

being excelled in perfection ; therefore, etc. T he m in o r

is prove d fro m this, tha t to be inf in i te is not inc om pat ib le

w it h be ing ; bu t the in f in ite is greater tha n any f inite

being.

Another formulat ion given to the same argument is

this. T h a t to w hic h intensive in f in i ty is no t repugn ant

is not all perfect unless it be infinite, for to be infinite is

com pa tible w it h i t . A n d if i t is f inite , i t can be exceeded

or excelled. N o w in f in ity is no t repu gna nt to being ,

therefore the most perfect being is inf init e. T h e m ino r

of this proof, which was used in the preceding argument,

ca nn ot, i t seems, be prov en a prio ri. Fo r, ju st as co ntra

dictories by their very nature contradict each other and

their opposi t ion cannot be made manifest by anything

m ore eviden t, so also these terms [viz. b e in g an d

in f i n i t e ] by their very nature are not repugnant to

each othe r. Neith er does there seem to be any wa y o f



72 DUNS SGOTUS

ens per nul l ius notius explicatur ; i n f i n i tum intelligimus

per f in i tu m , hoc vu lgar i te r s ic expono : in f in i tu m est

q u o d

aliquod

f initum d a tu m secundum

nullam hab i -

tudinem finitam praecise ex ce dit, sed u lt ra omnem talem

habitudinem

assignabilem adhuc excedit.

Sic tamen propositum suadetur : s icut qu idl ib et pone n-

dum est possibi le, cujus non apparet impossibi l i tas, i ta

et compossibi le cujus non apparet incompossibi l i tas.

Hie

incompossibi l i tas nul la apparet quia de rat ione ent is non

est finitas,

nee

apparet ex ratione entis quod sit passio

convert ib i lis cum ente ; a l te rum is to rum req ui r i tur ad

repugnant iam praedictam : passiones enim primae entis

et convertibiles satis videntur notae sibi inesse.

I t e m sic suadetur : in f in i tu m suo modo non repugnat

quan t i t a t i ,

id est, in accipiendo pa rte m post par tem ;

ergo nee in f in i tum suo modo repugnat ent i ta t i , id est in

perfectione simul essendo.

I t e m ,

si quantitas virtut is est simpliciter perfectior

quam quant i tas mol is , quare eri t inf in i tum possibi le in

m ole et no n in v ir tu te ? Q u o d si est possibi lis, est in

actu ,

s icut ex tert ia conclusione patet supra de primitate

effectiva et

etiam

in fer ius probabi tur .

I t e m ,

quare [MS quia] inte l lectus, cujus objectum est

ens,

nu l lam inven i t repugna nt iam in te l ligendo a l iquod

in f in i tum ; imo v i d e tu r perfect iss imum in te l l ig ib i le ?

Mirum

est

au tem,

si

null i

inte l lectui ta l is contradict io

patens fiat circa

pr imum

e jus ob jectum, cum

discordia

in sono fac i l i ter offendat a u d itu m ; s i en im disconveniens




proving th is except by explain ing the meaning of the

notions themselves. B e in g cannot be explained by

any th ing better kn ow n than itself. In f i n i t e we under

stand by means of fin ite. I exp lain in f i n i t e in a pop ular

de finit io n as follows : T h e inf init e is that w hi ch exceeds

the finite, not exactly by reason of any finite measure, but

in excess of any measure that could be assigned.

The fol lowing persuasive argument can be given for

w ha t we inten d to pro ve. Just as eve rything is assumed

to be possible, if its impossibil ity is not apparent, so also

all things are assumed to be compatible, i f their incom

pa t ib i l i ty is not manifest. N ow there is no inco m pa t i

bi l i ty apparent here, for i t is not of the nature of being

to be fin ite ; no r does finite appear to be an a ttri b ute

coextensive w it h being . Bu t i f they were m u tu a lly

rep ug na nt, it wo u ld be for one of these reasons. T h e

coextensive attributes which being possesses, seem to be

sufficiently evident.

A no the r persuasive argu m ent adduced is this. In f i n it y ,

in i ts ow n way , is no t opposed to q ua n tity (tha t is, where

pa rts are tak en successively) ; the refo re, ne ithe r is

inf in i ty, in i ts own way, opposed to ent i ty ( that is,

where perfection exists simultaneously).

Aga i n ,

i f the quantity characterist ic of power is simply

more perfect than that characteristic of mass, why is it

possible to have an infinity [of small parts] in an [ex

tended] mass and not an inf inite power ? A n d i f an

infinite power is possible, then it actually exists, as is

evident from the third conclusion about the first efficient

cause,

and will also be proved again later.38

Aga i n ,

w h y is it th a t the intellec t, whose object is be ing ,

does no t f ind the notio n of som ething inf in ite repug nant?

Instead of this, the infinite seems to be the most perfect

th in g we can kno w . N ow , i f tonal d iscord so read i ly

displeases the ear, it would be strange if some intellect

did not c learly perceive the contradict ion between

infinite and its f irst object [viz. being] if such existed.



73 DUNS SGOTUS

statim

u t perc ip i tu r

o f fend i t ,

cur

nullus intellectus

ab

in te l l ig ib i l i infinito natural i ter refugi t s icut a non con-

veniente,

suum

i ta

primum

ob jec tum

destruentem

?

Per i l lud potest colorari ilia ra t io Anselmi de summo

bono cogitabil i, Proslogion,* et intell igenda est ejus

des cript io sic. Deus est qu o co gn ito sine con trad ict ion e

majus cog itar i non potest s ine co ntra dict io ne . E t quo d

add end um si t co ntra dict io ne , pate t : na m in cujus

cognit ione vel cog i ta t ione inc lu d i tu r co n t rad ic t io , i l lud

dic i tur non cogitabi le, quia sunt tunc duo cogitabi l ia

opposita

nullo modo

faciendo

unum

cogitabi le, quia

neutrum determinat a l te ram, u t quod homo s i t i r ra -

t ionalis est inc og itab i le. U nd e sicut in rebus n ih i l est

nis i s i t s implex vel compositum ex potent ia et

ac tu ,

i ta

in conceptibus. C on trad ic tor ia autem n ih i l f ac iun t u nu m

nee

s implex,

nee

compos i tum.

Summum cogi tab i le praedic tum, s ine contrad ic t ione

potest esse in re . H oc pro b a tu r primo de esse quiddita-

t ibo : quia in ta l i cogi tabi l i summo quiesci t inte l lectus ;

ergo in ipso est ratio primi objecti intel lectus sci l icet

entis,

et hoc in summo.

Et tunc argu i tur u l t ra , quod i l lud s i t loquendo de

esse existentiae.

Summe

cogitabi le non est

tantum

in

inte l lec tu co gitan te, qu ia tunc posset esse, q ui a cog itabi le

possibile, et non posset esse, quia repugnat rationi ejus

esse ab aliqua causa, sicut patet prius in secunda con-

clusione de vi a efficien tiae. M aju s ergo co gita bile est

Cap.

iii (Migne, P.L.,

c lv i i i ,

228).




For if the disagreeable becomes offensive as soon as it

is perceived, why is i t that no intel lect natural ly shrinks

fro m the inf in i te ly in te l l ig ib le as i t wo uld f rom some thing

out o f harmony

w i t h ,

and even destructive of, its f irst

object ?

I n this same wa y Anselm's argument in the Proslogion *

about the highest conceivable good can be touched up.

H is des cript ion m ust be und erstood in this wa y. G od is

a being conceived w ith ou t c on trad ict ion , wh o is so great

that i t would be a contradict ion i f a greater being could

be conceived. T ha t the phrase w i th o u t co ntra d ic t ion

m ust be added is clear, for an yth ing , the very kn owledge

or thought of which includes a contradict ion, is cal led

inconceivable , for i t includes two conceivable notions

so opposed to each other that they cannot in any way

be fused into a single conceivable object, since neither

determines the other. Thu s m a n is i r ra t i o n a l cannot

be conceived. He nce, jus t as in the w o rl d o f rea l i ty

nothing exists that is not either simple or at least com

posed of act [ the determining element] and potency [the

dete rm inab le elem en t], so also w it h concepts. C on tra

dictories, however, do not form a unity, be i t simple or

composed.

I t fol lows

then,

that the greatest object conceivable

w itho ut contra dict ion can actual ly exist in real i ty. Th is

is proved first of its essential being, for in such an object

the inte llec t is fu lly satisfied ; therefore, in it the pr im a ry

object of the intel lect, viz. b e in g , is verif ied and this

in the highest degree.

I t is further argued,

then,

that this being actually

exists because the highest conceivable object is not one

which is merely in the intel lect of the thinker, for then

it both could exist, because as something possible it is

conceivable, and yet could not exist, because the idea of

existing in virtue of some cause is repugnant to its very

na ture. T his latte r was show n above in the second con

clusion o f the p ro of fr o m efficiency.39 Th erefore , wh at



74 DUNS SCOTUS

quod est in re quam quod est tantum in in te l lec tu . No n

est

autem

hoc sic inte l l igendum, quod idem si cogi tetur

per hoc sit majus cogitabile si existat, sed omni quod est

in in te l lectu tantum est majus a l iquod quod ex is t i t .

Vel al i ter c olo ratu r sic : m ajus co gitab i le est qu od

existit, id est perfectius cognoscibile, quia visibile sive

in te l l ig ib i le in te llect ione in tu i t iv a. C u m [read Q uo d

autem] non ex is t i t ,

nee

in se,

nee

in nob i l io r i , cu i n ih i l

ad di t , no n est v is ib i le. V is i b i l e aut em est perfect ius

cognoscibi le non vis ib i l i , sed tantum modo in te l l ig ib i l i

abs tractive ; ergo

perfectissimum

cognoscibi le exist i t .

De di f ferent ia inte l lect ionis intu i t ivae et abstract ivae et

quo m odo in t u i t iv a est perfect ior , tange tur d is t inct ione

tert ia * et a l ias quando locum habebit .

[ V i a Ine f f i cax] . U l t i m o os tend i tu r propositum ex

neg atione causae extrinsecae [read intrinse ca e] ; qu ia

mater ia finitur per f o r m a m , s icut potent ia per actum et

perfectione m et esse form ae ejus. E t e converso fo rm a

f in i tur per materiam sicut actus per

po t en t i am .

Fo rma

ergo quae n o n est na ta esse in m a te ria est in fi n it a ;

cujusmodi est Deus.

Haec rat io non valet, quia secundum ipsos angelus

est im m ate rial is ; ergo in na tu ra est inf in itus . N o n pos-

sunt dicere, quod esse angeli f iniret essentiam ejus, quia

secundum eos est accidens essentiae et posterius natura-

liter ; et sic in primo signo na tura e essentia secu ndu m se

u t pr io r esse, vid et ur in f in ita intensive, et per consequent

in secundo signo naturae non erit f initabil is per esse.

* Opus oxoniense,

i,

dist.

m,

q. iii.




74

exists in reality is conceivably greater than what exists

only in the inte l lect . Th is is not to be understood, how

ever, in the sense that something conceived if it actually

exists, is, by the fact of existing, conceivable to any

gjeater extent. T h e m ean ing is tha t wha tever exists is

greater than whatever is solely in the intel lect.

Or the argument could be retouched in th is way.

Whatever exists is conceivable to a greater extent [than

w ha t does n o t] ; th at is to say, i t can be kn ow n m ore

perfectly, because it is intuit ively intel l igible or visible.

What does not exist either in i tself or in something more

noble to which i t adds nothing, is not capable of being

i n tu i t ed .

N o w w ha t can be seen is able to be kn ow n

mo re perfectly than what can not be in tu i ted , but kn ow n

on ly abstrac tively. Th erefo re, the mo st perfect th in g

tha t can be kn o w n exists. T h e difference between in

tu i t iv e and abstractive know ledge, and the supe rior i ty of

the former over the lat ter, wi l l be treated in dist inct ion

three and elsewhere as occasion offers.40

[e.

A n Ineffect ive P ro of ] . Fin al ly, some

41

argue to

the proposed conclusion fro m the absence of any intrins ic

cause, for matter is determined by form as the potential

is determined by act, perfection, and the existence of

i ts fo rm . Conversely, the fo rm is l im ite d by m atter as

act is l im ite d by potency. A n y form incapable of

be ing in ma tter, therefore, is inf in ite. G od is of such

k ind .

T h is reason does not ho ld , fo r a ccord ing to these men,42

the angel is im m at er ia l ; therefore, i ts na ture is inf ini te.

They cannot avoid this conclusion by saying that the

existence of the angel l im its its essence, for they m a in ta in

that existence is accidental to the essence and naturally

pos terior to it . A n d so i n the first instance of nature,43

the essence, considered in its own right and as prior to

existence, seems to be intensive ly in fin ite . Co nsequ ently,

it cannot be limited by existence in the second instance

of nature.



75

DUNS SCOTUS

Brevi ter respondeo ad argumentum : nam quael ibet

entitas habet intrinsecum sibi gradum suae perfectionis,

i n quo est f initum, si est f initum, et in quo in fi n it u m , si

potest esse inf initum, et non per al iquid accidens

sibi.

A r g u i t u r etiam : si form a f initur ad m at e ria m , ergo

si non ad

i l l a m ,

no n finitur. Falla cia consequentis :

sicut corpus finitur ad corpus ; ig it u r si no n ad corpus,

er i t in f in i tum ; u l t imum ergo coelum e r i t ac tu in f in i tu m ;

sophisma est istud tertio

Physicorum,*

quia sicut prius

corpus in se prius f in itu r pro pri is

terminis

an tequam ad

a l iqu id aliud finiatur, ut de

coelo,

ergo i ta forma f in i ta

prius est in se finita quam f iniatur ad m a te ria m , qu ia est

tal is na tu ra in entibus qu od f initur, id est an teq ua m un ia-

tu r materiae ; nam secunda f initas praesupponit primam

et no n causat earn ; ergo in ali qu o signo na tur ae erit

essentia [an ge li] finita ; ergo non finitur pe r esse ; ergo

in secundo signo non finitur per esse. Bre vi ter d ico unam

proposit ionem, quod quaecumque essentia absoluta

finita i n se, est f inita u t p ra e in te ll ig itu r omni compara-

tione sui ad

aliam

essentiam.

[Solutio Quaestionis]

Ex dict is patet solut io quaestionis : n a m ex primo

art iculo habetur quod al iquod ens existens est simpliciter

primum t r ip l ic i pr imitate, v idel icet ef f ic ient iae, f in is et

eminent iae, et i ta s impl ic i ter quod incompossibile est

a li q u id esse priu s ; et in hoc p ro b a tu m est esse de De o

quantum ad proprietates respect ivas Dei ad creaturam,

vel

in quantum determinat dependent iam respectus

crea turarum ad ipsum. Ex secundo art ic ulo habe tur

in ,

cap. iv

(2036,

20-22).




75

Brief ly,

then,

I reply to the argu m ent. I f an en tity is

finite or infinite, it is so not by reason of something

incidental to itself, but because it has its own intrinsic

degree of f inite or infinite perfection respectively.

I t is also argu ed that,44 if fo rm is l im ite d w it h reference

to matter, where there is no matter, there the form is

in fin ite . T h is is the fallac y o f asserting the consequent,

jus t as is the fo l lo w in g : a bod y is l im ite d w i th reference

to a bod y ; therefore, i f a bod y is no t l im ite d w it h refer

ence to an other bo dy , i t w i l l be inf init e ; hence, the

outermost heaven w i l l be actua l ly inf in i te. Th is is the

fallac y o f Physics, bk . h i . * Fo r, ju st as a bo dy is f irst

l imited in i tself by i ts own proper boundaries before i t is

l imited with respect to anything else (as is the case with

the heavens), so the finite form is first l imited in itself

before i t is l im ite d w it h respect to m atter. T h a t is to

say, i t is of such a nature that i t is l imited, and this,

prior to any union with matter ; for the second l imita

ti o n presupposes, an d does no t cause, the first. The

finite ch arac ter o f the ange lic essence, then, is something

th at is p ri o r by na ture to its existence. Co nseq uently,

it is not its subsequent existence that makes such an

essence l im ite d . T o pu t the argum ent brief ly in one

sentence, I say tha t every f in ite essence is such ab solu tely

an d pr io r t o a ny reference it m ay have to ano ther essence.

[Solution of the Question] 46

The solut ion to the question,

then,

is clear from the

foregoing,

for the first article establishes the existence

of some being that is simply f irst by the triple primacy of

efficiency, finality an d em inence, an d is first i n such an

un qu ali f ie d sense tha t i t w ou ld be impossible for an yth ing

to be p ri o r to it. T his is to establish the existence o f G od

so far as the divine properties that have reference to

creatures are concerned, or in so far as creatures are

dependent up on h im . T he second art icle shows in fou r



76 DUNS SCOTUS

quadrup lex v ia quod i l lud primum est in f in i tum : primo

v ide l icet , qu ia pr im u m effic iens ; secundo, qu ia p r im u m

agens omnia fact ib i l ia, secunda via continet quatuor

conclusiones de intell igere primi ; te rt i o, qu ia f inis

ul t imus ; quarto, quia eminens.

Ju x ta primam exclusa est quaedam v ia inu t i l is de

creat ione. Ju xt a secundam tan gitu r a l ia v ia de

perfectione p r i m i ob ject i e t in te l lectua l i ta te . Ju xta

quartam exponitur rat io Anselmi, Proslogion, Deus est

quo

majus

cog i tar i no n potest. U l t im o exc lud i tur v ia

inut i l is ex immater ia l i ta te in ferens in f in i ta tem.

Ex praemissis conclusionibus probatis et ostensis,

arg ui tu r s ic ad quaest ionem : a l iq uo d ens tr ip l ic i te r

pr imum in ent ibus ex is t i t in actu et i l lud t r ip l ic i ter

p r im u m est in f in i t um ; e rgo a l iquod in f in i tu m ens

exist i t in

ac tu ,

et istud est perfectissimum conceptibi le et

conceptus perfectissimus absolutus quem possumus

habere de Deo natural i ter quod si t inf in i tus, s icut d ic i tur

dist inct ione te rt ia .* E t sic pr ob at um est Deum esse

quantum ad conceptum

vel

esse ejus perfectissimum

concept ib i lem vel possibi lem haberi a nobis de Deo.

[Ad Argumen ta Pr inc ipa l ia ]

A d argumen ta hu jus quaestion is : ad p r i m u m dico

quod causa inf inita activa ex necessitate naturae non

compatitur

a l iqu id s ib i co ntr ar ium , s ive s it e i c on trar ium

a l iqu id fo rma l i te r [ M S om. id est, secundum al iq uo d quo d

convenit sibi essential i ter] sive virtual i ter, id est, secun

du m ra t ione m effectus su i quem v i r tu a l i t er inc lud i t ;

u t roque enim modo impedire t quodl ibet incompossib i le

suo effectui, sicut argutum est

pr ius.

Co ntra : nu m qu id ph i losoph i ponentes D eu m agere

ex necessitate na tura e n on po neb ant esse a l iq u id m a lu m

* Opus oxoniense,

1,

dist.

in,

q . i.





77

DUNS SCOTUS

in universo? Respondeo, sicut patuit probando Deum

esse agens per cognitionem,

non potuerunt

salvare

ali-

quod malum fieri posse contingenter in universo, sed

tantum

unus ordo causarum produceret aliquid quod

esset

receptivum

alicujus perfectionis ; alius

autem

ordo

de necessitate produceret oppositum illius perfectionis,

ita quod ista perfectio non posset tunc induci concur-

rentibus omnibus causis, licet absolute

productum

ab

aliquibus [M,S aliis qu ibus], consideretur secundum ratio-

nem

suae speciei, esset receptivum illius perfectionis,

cujus oppositum necessario evenit ; ergo secundum eos

sicut causae

efficientes

in una coordinatione necessario

agunt, ita causae efficientes

impedientes

in alia coordina

tione necessario agunt

impediendo.

Unde aequali neces

sitate qua sol agit ad dissolvendum, agit Saturnus ad

condensandum. Cum ergo

omnis

defectus materiae

reducatur ad causas efficientes quae sunt defectuosae in

virtute, si quaelibet causa efficiens agit necessario, tunc

nihil defectus

vel

monstruositatis

vel

malitiae erit in

universo quin necessario accidat. Q u id autem possunt

philosophi dicere de libero arbitrio nostro et

malitia

moris, dicendum est alias.

Ad secundum dico , quod consequentia non valet. Ad

probationem

ostendo quod non est consimilis incom-

possibilitas dimensionum in replendo locum et essen-

tiarum in simul essendo ; non enim una entitas ita replet

totam naturam

entis qu in cum ea posset stare a lia entitas.

Hoc autem non debet intelligi de repletione locali, sed

quasi commensuratione essentiali ; sed una dimensio

replet

eumdem

locum secundum

ultimum

capacitatis

suae, itaque una entitas simul potest esse cum cum

alia,




his na tur e, also ad m it the existence of ev il i n the universe?

As I have already made clear in proving that God acts

w it h knowledge,48 I rep ly th at they co uld not consistently

explain the contingent character of the evi l in the

un i

verse.

A l l they could m ain ta in w ou ld be that one order

of causes could produce something capable of receiving

a given perfection, whereas another order of necessity

w ou ld produ ce the opposite of this perfec tion. I n other

wo rds, i f we considered a ll the causes ac tua lly co nc ur rin g

at that t ime, this perfection could not be induced at this

pa rt icula r m om ent. Abso lutely speaking, however, i f we

consider not this part icular event, but one similar in

k ind ,

then a thing produced by some of these causes

could also be the recipient of a perfection which de facto

was necessarily absent at this pa rt icu lar t im e. A cc or din g

to th em , there fore, ju s t as the efficient causes in one gro up

act necessarily, so the impeding efficient causes of the

other grou p act necessarily. T h e sun dissolves som eth ing,

then,

with the same necessity with which Saturn

con

denses it . The re fore, since every defect o f m at te r

is due to a deficiency in the strength of the efficient

causes, if each efficient cause acts necessarily, then

every defect, monstrosity, or evil in the universe occurs

necessarily. W h a t the philosophers ca n say of ou r free

w i l l and mora l

evi l ,

however, wil l have to be treated

elsewhere.

To the second

argument,*9

I say that the consequence is

i nva l i d . As to the pr oo f addu ced i n its favo ur, I show that

there is no parity between the impossibi l i ty of several

extended things filling the same place and several

essences ex isting sim ultane ous ly. For no en tity so fills

the whole nature of being as to render impossible the

coexistence of ano ther. Coe xiste nce in this latte r case,

how eve r, should no t be und erstood i n the sense o f filling

a place, bu t rather as a kind of essential commensuration.60

T h e extension of one th in g , how ever, f i lls any place to the

utmo st of i ts capa city. M or e tha n one en tity, therefore,

2 , 3 2 2 12



78 DUNS SCOTUS

sicut posset respectu loci cum corpore replente locum esse

aliud

corpus

non

replens loc um . S im i l i ter a l ia conse-

qu en t ia non vale t , quia corpus in f i n i t u m si esset cu m al io,

fieret totum majus u t roque rat ione d imensionum, qu ia

dimensiones alterius corporis essent

aliae

a

dimensionibus

corporis inf init i et ejusdem rationis cum eis, et ideo totum

esset majus propter d imensionum diversi tatem, et totum

non majus, quia dimensio inf in i ta non potest excedi.

Hie autem tota quant i tas infinitae perfectionis nullam

addit ionem recipi t in rat ione ta l is quant i tat is ex coexis-

tent i a l icujus

f init i

secundum

talem

qua l i t a tem.

Ad tert ium dico, quod consequent ia non valet , n is i

i l lud

quod demonstratur in antecedente, a quo al ia

sepa rantur, sit f i n i t um . E xe m plu m : s i esset a l iq uo d ub i

inf in i tum per impossibi le, et corpus infinitum rep le t i l lud

ub i , no n seque retur : hoc corpus est

h ie,

i ta quod non

a lib i ; ergo est f initum secundum ubi , qu ia ly hie non

demonstrat n is i in f in i tu m . I t e m , secundum Philoso-

p h u m ,

si motus esset infinitus et tempus in f i n i tum, non

seq uitur : iste m otus est in hoc tem po re et n o n in alio ;

ergo

est f in i tu m secundum tempus. I t a ad pro pos i tum ,

oporteret probare i l lu d qu od d em ons tratur per ly hoc esse

f i n i t um . Q uo d si assumatur, pe t i tu r conclusio in prae-

missa.

Ad u l t imum dico, quod Phi losophus in fer t moveri in

non-tempore ex hoc antecedente, quod potent ia inf in i ta

est in magnitudine, et inte l l ig i t in consequente moveri

propr ie , u t d is t ingui tur contra mutat ionem, et hoc modo

consequens includi t contradict ionem, et

etiam

antece-

dens, secundum

eum.

Q ua l i te r au tem teneat ilia conse

qu en tia, sic declaro : si po te ntia est in f i n it a et agit ex




can exist at once, even th ou gh one bod y c ann ot fil l a place

alrea dy occupied by ano ther. T h e other consequence is

also invalid, for i f an inf inite body were to coexist with

another body, the reason the combination of the two

would be greater than either taken singly l ies in the

nature of

extension,

for the dimensions of this other body

would be di f ferent f rom those of the inf in i te body and

sti l l they w o u ld be qu ali ta t ive ly the same. The refore,

the union of two extended bodies implies an increase in

extension because of the distinct dimensions and yet the

sum total could not represent an increase, because an

in fin ite extension can not be exceeded. I n ou r case,

however, the total amount of inf inite perfection is not

increased quantitatively by the coexistence of some

quali tat ively similar f inite enti ty.

To the third

51

argument, I say that the consequence does

not hold unless, in the antecedent, the thing singled out

fr o m all the others is som ething f inite . For exam ple,

to assume the imp ossible, i f an in fin ite place were o ccu pied

by an inf in i te bo dy, i t st i l l w ou ld not fo l low tha t this body

is h e r e i n such a w ay tha t it is now here else, because

the w o rd h e re , i n this case, on ly designates w ha t is

in fin ite . T h e n too, acc ord ing to the Philosopher,52 if

m ot io n and t ime were inf in i te, f ro m the propo si t ion th is

motion is at this t ime and not at another , i t does not

fol low that m otio n is finite in du ra tio n. Consequendy,

if the desired conclusion is to be established, it would be

necessary to prove that whatever is designated by the

w o rd t h i s is f init e. T o assume it sim ply begs the

quest ion.

To the last

53

argument, I say that the Philosopher argues

that i f the antecedent be true (viz. that some power is of

inf in i te m ag nitud e), i t w ou ld move instantaneously, where

he understands m o v e s in the prop er sense as dif ferent

fro m mu ta t io n . I n th is sense, according to h im , the

con

sequent as w e ll as the antecedent is se lf-con trad ictory . I

w il l show, however, ho w this consequence cou ld be made



79

DUNS SCOTUS

necessitate na tur ae , ergo ag it in no n-te m po re. Q u ia si

agat in te m pore , s it

i l lud

A , et ac cip iatu r al ia vir tus finita

quae i n tem pore f inito ag it, sit i l lu d B ; et aug m ente tur

virtus f inita quae est B secun dum pr op or t io n em illam

quae est B ad A . P uta , si A [ M S B] est centuplum vel

milletuplum

ad B [ M S A ] , acc ip ia tur v i rtus centup la ad

i l lam v i r tu te m fin itam da t am , ve l m i l le tup la . Ig i tu r ilia

virtus sic

augmentata movebit

in A tempore, et i ta

virtus ilia e t in f in i ta in aequal i tempore movebunt ,

quod est impossibi le, s i v i r tus inf in i ta movet secundum

u lt im u m pote ntiae suae et necessario. Ex hoc ergo qu od

virtus est inf inita sequitur quod si agat ex necessitate,

agi t no n in tem pore. Ex hoc

autem

quod pon i tu r in

antecedente, quod est in magnitudine sequitur s i agi t

c i rca corpus quod proprie

moveat

i l lud corpus, quod

loq uitu r de vi r tu te extensa per accidens. Ta l is autem

virtu s si ageret circa corpus, habe ret partes hujus corporis

divers imo de distantes respectu ejus : p u ta unam pa r tem

corpor is prop inquiorem et aliam remot io rem ; habet

etiam

resistentiam

aliquam

in corpore, c irca quod agi t ,

quae duae causae, scil icet resistentia et diversa approxi

mate

pa r t i um mob i l i s ad

ipsum

movens, faciunt succes-

sionem esse in motu et corpus proprie m ove r i . E rgo ex

hoc quod in antecedente

illo

pon i tu r v i r tus in magn i

tud ine sequi tur quod propr ie movebi t , e t i ta jungendo

ilia

duo s imul , sci l icet quod est inf in i tum et quod est in

magn i tud ine , sequ i tu r quod [MS om. p ropr ie ] in non-

tempore m ove bi t , qu od est co ntra d ic t io . Sed is tud non

sequi tur de v i r tu te in f in i ta quae no n est in m ag ni tud ine ,

ipsa enim l icet in non-tempore agat , s i in non-tempore

agit , quia hoc sequitur

i n f i n i t a t em , tamen

non propr ie




79

to

h o l d .

I f a pow er is in fin ite an d acts by necessity of

na ture , the n it acts instantaneously. I f i t were to act in

t ime , let us ca l l this t im e A. N o w take another f in ite

powe r, w hic h acts in the f in i te t ime B. T he n let the

finite power, which acts in B t ime, be increased by the

amount that A exceeds B, e.g.

i f

A is one hu nd re d or one

thousand times as great as B, let the finite power be

increased a hundred—or a thousand fo ld . N ow , th is

increased pow er w ou ld act in A t im e. Cons equently,

this f inite power would act in the same t ime as the in

f in i te,

which is impossible i f the inf inite power moves

necessarily an d to the utm ost of i ts ab i l i ty . The refore,

if an infinite power acts necessarily, it follows that it

acts instantaneous ly. O n the other ha nd , however, i f

we assume, as the antecedent does, that this power has

magnitude, i .e. is extended accidental ly, then it fol lows

tha t i f i t acts on a bod y, i t moves this bod y i n the proper

sense o f m ov in g. B ut i f such a pow er acted up on a

body, i t would be at unequal distance from the dif ferent

parts of this body, that is, one part of the body would

be closer, whereas another would be farther away.

T h e n ,

too, this power would meet with some resistance

in the bo dy on w h ic h it acts. N o w these tw o causes

(viz. resistance and the difference in distance between

the mover and the various parts of the thing moved)

give rise to succession in motion and, therefore, cause

the body to be moved in the proper sense of that term.

From the fact ,

then ,

that we assume in the antecedent

a power with magnitude, i t fol lows that i t moves in the

proper sense, and thus by combining these two notions

simultaneously, namely that i t is inf inite and that i t has

magnitude,54 it follows that it moves in the strict sense

of the term and, nevertheless, does so instantaneously,

w hic h is a con tradict ion . Th is con tradict ion, however,

does not fo l low fro m the no t ion of an inf in i te power w hic h

has no m agn itude. For a l though i t wou ld act instan

taneously, were it infinite and necessarily acting, sti l l i t



80 DUNS SCOTUS

moveb i t ,

quia non habebit in passo

illas duas

rationes

successionis. Non igitur vult Philosophus q u o d infinita

poten t ia p ropr ie

moveat

in

n o n - t e mp o re ,

sicut

argu-

mentum procedi t , sed quod in f in i ta potent ia in

magn i -

tud ine propr ie moveat e t non in tempore, quae sunt

co ntr ad icto ria. E t ex hoc sequ itur qu od ta l is antecedens

inc lud i t con t rad ic to r ia , sci l . quod v i r tus in f in i ta s i t in

magn i tud ine .

Sed tunc est du bi ta t io : cum po ten t iam m ot iva m

ponat in f in i tam et natura l i ter

agentem,

v idetur sequi

qu od necessario ageret in non -tem po re ; l icet no n m oveat

in non-tempore ;

imo

tunc n ih i l moveb i t

aliud

propr ie

loquendo. E t qu od hoc sequatur pate t : qu ia

illud

probatum fu i t pr ius per rationem potent iae inf in i tae

necessario agentis.

Respondet Averroes duodecimo Metaphysicae* quod

praeter primum

movens,

quod est inf in i tae potent iae,

requir i tur movens conjunctum potent iae f in i tae, i ta quod

ex primo movente sit inf initas motus et ex secundo sit

successio, quia aliter non posset esse successio nisi con-

curreret i l l u d fin itum, qu ia s i solum in f in i t u m ageret,

ageret in non-temp ore. I l lu d improbatur distinctione

octava quaestione

u l t i m a , |

ubi in hoc argui tur contra

philosophos, qui ponunt primum agere ex necessitate

quid l ibet quod immediate ag i t .

Sed Christ ianis non est argumentum di f f ic i le, qui

d icun t Deum contingenter agere. Ipsi enim possunt

faci l i ter respondere, quia l icet virtus inf inita necessario

agens agat secundum ul t imum sui, et i ta in non-tempore,

qu idqu id immedia te ag i t , non tamen v i r tus in f in i ta

con tinge nter et l ibere agens ; sicut en im est in potestate

ejus agere

vel

non agere, ita est in potestate ejus in

*

xn,

com.

41.

f Opus oxoniense,

1,

dist.

vm,

q. v, nn . 3, 8 ff.




would not move, properly speaking, since the two reasons

for succession would be absent in that on which it acts.

T he Philosopher, therefore, does no t m ean tha t an in f in ite

pow er w ou ld move instantaneously as the argu m ent

assumes, but that a power inf in i te in magnitude, though

it is not in time, nevertheless moves in the proper sense,

w hic h is a co ntra dict io n. F ro m this i t fo llows that such

an antecedent includes contradictory notions, namely a

power in f in i te in magni tude.

Bu t a do ub t arises. Since an inf init e m otive pow er

acting of necessity is assumed, it would seem to follow

necessarily that this power acts instantaneously, even

tho ug h it m ay no t move instantaneously. Consequently,

i t fol lows further, that no agent wil l move another

pro per ly speaking. T h a t th is w ou ld fo l low is c lear f ro m

w ha t was jus t pro ved above regarding an inf in i te

necessarily acting power.

Averroes i n Metaphysics, bk. x i i , * replies that it is not

enough simply to have an inf in i te ly powerful First

M ov er. W ha t is furth er requ ired is tha t th is First

Mover and some addit ional f in i te power co-operate in

such a way that the inf inity of the motion is due to the

First Mover, whereas the succession is due to the other.

W it h o u t the co -op eration o f some finit e m ove r, succession

w o ul d be impossible ; for i f only the inf inite agent acted,

i i w ou ld act instantaneously. Th is solut ion w il l be dis

pro ve d i n the last question of dist inc t ion eight

f

where the

philosophers who assume that whatever the First Cause

does immediately, it does with necessity, are attacked.

B ut for Ch ristians, w ho say th at G od acts c onting ently,

the o bje ctio n presents no d iff icul ty, since they can answer

it w it h ease. Fo r, even if an inf in ite powe r w h ic h acts

necessarily and to the utmost of its power, does instan

taneously whatever it does immediately, this is not true

of an inf inite power which acts freely and contingently.

As it is in the power of such an agent either to act or not

to act, so it has the power either to act in time or to act



OI DUNS SCOTUS

tempore agere vel i n no n-te m po re agere ; et i ta faci le

est salvare

primum movere

corpus in tempore, l icet sit

infinitae potentiae, quia non necessario agit nee secun

dum ul t imum potent iae quantum sci l icet posset agere,

neque in tarn brevi tempore in quam brevi posset agere.




instantan eou sly. Co nseq uen tly, it is easy to defend the

posit ion that the First Cause moves a body in t ime even

if it be of infinite power, for it does not act necessarily

neither to the ful l extent of i ts power nor in as short a

t ime as i t could.



I V

T H E U N I C I T Y O F G O D

Summary of the Argument

Question : Is there but one God ?

Pro e t Cont ra


First opinion : The unicity of God is known only by fa ith

Scotus's opin ion : Natural reason can prove the un icity of

God

First proof

:

From the infinite intellect

Second

proof:

From the infinite w ill

Third proof : From the infin ite goodness

Fourth proof

:

From the infinite power

Fifth proof : From absolute infinity

Sixth proof

:

From necessity of existence

Seventh proof : From the omnipotence

Reply to the arguments for the first opinion




83 DUNS SCOTUS

[ IV . DE UNIT ATE DEl] *

Quaero utrum sit tantum unus Deus ?

[Pro et Contra]

Et quod

non

argu i tur :

Q u o r u m dicuntur multi domini et d i i multi.f

I t e m ,

si Deus est, ergo d i i sunt. P ro ba tur conse quen tia,

qu ia singulare et p lurale idem sign i f icant , l icet d i f ferant

in modo significandi ; ergo idem in c lu d i t praed icat io

pr op ort io na l i ter accepta ; ergo sicut s ingulare inc lud i t

s ingulare, i ta p lur ale in clu di t p lu rale . Pr ob atu r secundo

[MS tert io] , quia s icut Deus est quo majus cogi tar i non

potest, i ta di i sunt quibus majores cogitari non possunt.

Ilia autem

quibus majora cogitar i non possunt sunt in

effectu.

Q uo d vid etu r, qu ia s i no n essent in

effectu,

possent cogitari majora eis ; ergo, etc.

Praeterea, omne ens per participationem reduci tur ad

al iq ui d ta le per essentiam. In d iv id u a in quac um que

specie creata sunt ent ia per part ic ipat ionem, al ioquin

non essent

multa

; ergo reducuntur ad al iquid ta le per

essentiam. E rgo est aliq uis h o m o, aliq uis bos per essen

t i a m ,

etc. Q u id q u id au tem est per essentiam, no n per

pa rt ic ipa tio ne m , est Deus ; ergo, etc.

I t e m ,

plura bona sunt paucioribus m el i or a. Sed quae-

cumque

m elior a sunt ponen da in universo ; ergo, etc.

I t e m ,

quidquid si est, est necesse esse, est simpliciter

* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. n, q. i i i (Assisi 137, f. i8r*-ig r& ; cf. Viv£s,

vo l . vm ,

487 -50ia). f I Cor.

vm.

5.



UNICITY OF GOD

83

[ I V .

THE

UNICITY

OF GOD]

/ ask whether there is but one God ?

[Pro et Contra]

Some argue there is not merely one God 1 :

[Arg. 1 ]. For indeed there are many gods and many

lords .

[Arg.

n ]. Also, if

God

exists, then gods exist. Proof of

the consequence :

(1)

Singular and plural signify the

same, although they differ in the way in which they do

so. Therefore, the predication proportionately implies

the same. As the singular mode then implies a singular

thing, so the p lu ra l implies several things.2 (2) Just as

God is tha t greater than which nothing can be conceived,

so gods are those greater than which nothing can be

thought. Things that could not be conceivably greater,

however, actually exist. Th is is clear from the fact that

i f they d id not actua lly exist, we could think of something

greater than they. Therefore, etc.

[Arg.

in ] .

Furthermore, everything wh ich is a being

by participation can be traced back to something which

is such by its very essence.3 Now the individuals in any

created species are beings by partic ipat ion ; otherwise

more than one individual per species would not exist.

Therefore, they can be traced back to something wh ich is

such

by its very essence. Consequently, there is

some

man

who is by his essence, some ox which is by its essence, and

so on . Now whatever is by its essence and not by par

ticipa tion is God. Therefore, etc.

[Arg.

i v ] .

Likewise, a greater number of

good

things

is better than a lesser number.4 But we should assume

the best to exist in the universe. Therefore, etc.

[A n add itiona l argument].5 Also, whatever is a





UNICITY OF GOD

84

necessary being, if it exist, is necessary being without

q u a lif ic a tio n . B ut i f ano ther G od exists, H e is a necessary

being.

Th erefo re, etc. Proo f of the m ajo r :

I f

you gran t

the opposite of the predica te (v iz. [ i t ] is no t necessary

being without qual i f icat ion ), the opposi te of the subject

follows ( viz . I t is no t necessary b u t on ly possible be ing,

i f i t exists ).—Reply : The opposite of the subject which

is to be inf er re d is this. I t is no t a necessary be ing , i f it

exists. Here, then , the re lat io n between antecedent an d

consequent may be denied.

To the contrary :

I n Deuteronomy * we rea d : H e a r

O Israel ,

the L o rd our

God is one L o r d , and in Isaiasj : T h e re is no Go d

besides m e .

[Body of the Question]

In this question, the conclusion is certain.

[First Opinion]

Some say,6 howe ver, th at the un icity of God c annot be

demonstrated but is accepted only on fa i th . A n d in th is

they fo l low the au tho ri ty of R a b bi Moses [Maimonides] J

who says that i t is known from the Law that God is one.

Reason supports this view, for i f the mind by i ts natural

powers could know that God is one, then it could also

kn ow na tur al ly tha t G od is s ingular. I n th is case, na tur al

reason could know the singularity of God and could also

know the essence of God as singular, which is false and

contradicts what was said in the question about the

subject of theology.7

[Scotus's

Opinion]

Nevertheless, it seems that natural reason could estab

l ish the unic i ty of God by arguing from (1) the inf inite



85

DUNS SCOTUS

inte l lectu ;

secundo

ex

infinita

volun tate ; tert io ex

infinita bon itate ; qu ar to ex rat ion e infinitae potent iae ;

quinto

ex rat ione

infiniti

abso lute ; sexto ex ratio ne

necesse esse ; septimo ex ra t ione omnipotent iae.

[Prima Via] , Ex pa rte inte l lectus in f i n i t i ar gu i tu r sic

p r i m o .

Intel lectus inf in i tu s cognoscit in te l l ig ib i le qu od -

cumque perfectissime qu an tu m est in te l l ig ib i le in se ;

ergo si sunt d ii , sint A et B. A cogno scit B perfectissime ,

quantum scil icet B est cognoscibile : sed hoc est impos

s i b l e . P rob atio : qu ia au t cognoscit B per essentiam B,

au t no n . Si n o n , et B est cogno scibile per essentiam,

ergo non cognoscit B perfectissime et quantum scil icet

est cognoscibile. N ih i l

enim

cognoscibile per essentiam

perfectissime cognoscitur, nisi cognoscitur per essen

t iam suam, vel per al iquid perfectius includens essentiam

suam quam

ipsa sit i n se. Essentia

autem

B i n

nullo

perfectius includitur quam in B, quia tunc B non esset

Deus.

Si au te m cognoscit B per essentiam ipsius B, ergo

actus ipsius A est posterius naturaliter essentia ipsius B,

et i ta A no n erit Deus. Q u o d aut em actus ipsius A sit

posterior ipso B probat io, quia

omnis

actus cognoscendi

qui non est idem objecto est posterior objecto

;

neque

enim prior neque simul natura est actus cum aliquo al io

ab

actu ,

quia tunc actus posset intell igi sine objecto, sicut

econverso.

Si d icatur quod ilia intel l igit B per essentiam ipsius A,

quae simi l l ima est ipsi B, s ic v idel icet quod A intel l ig i t B

in rat ion e speciei com m unis ipsi A et ipsi B. C on tra :

neutra salvat responsio quod A intel l igat B perfectissime,

et per consequens non est Deus, quia cognitio al icujus in

simili t a n t u m , et in universal i non est cognit io per-

fectissima

et intuit iva ipsius rei, et i ta A non cognosceret

B in tu i t i ve nee perfect issime, quod est proposi tum.



UNICITY

OF GOD 85

in te l lec t , (2 ) the in f in i te

w i l l ,

(3) the inf in i te goodness,

(4) the in f in i t e po we r, (5) the no t io n of in f i n i t y considered

absolutely, (6) the nature of necessary being, and (7)

omn ipo tence .

[Fi rst

Proof ] ,

T h e first argu m en t, based on the in f in i te

inte l lec t , is th is. Su ch an in te l le ct knows wh ate ver can

be known in the most per fect way tha t i t cou ld be known.

Suppose then that two gods existed, let us cal l them A

a n d B. A , therefore , w o u ld k n o w B as per fec t ly as B

co u ld be kn o w n . Th is , howeve r , is imposs ib le . P r o o f :

E ith er A know s B t h ro ug h the essence o f B or no t. I f not ,

and B can be known through i ts essence, then A knows B

nei ther in the most per fect manner nor to the extent that

B can be kn ow n. For no th in g tha t can be kn ow n th ro ug h

its essence is perfectly known unless it be known either

through i ts essence or through something which includes

the essence in a more perfect way than the latter exists

i n itself. B u t th e essence

o f

B is no t inc lud ed in an yt h in g

more perfect than B, for i t i t were, B would not be God.

But i f A knows B through the latter 's essence, then A's

act o f kn ow le dg e is po ste rior to th e essence o f B a n d

therefore

A

wo u ld no t be G od . I prove th at in such a

case A's act w o u l d be pos ter ior to B in this fash ion. E ve ry

act of knowing not ident ica l wi th i ts object is poster ior

to th at object . Fo r an act by na tur e is s imul taneous on ly

w i t h i tself . N ei th er is i t p r i o r to i ts obje ct, for the n the

act could be known wi thout the object and v ice versa.

But suppose we say that A through its own essence

knows B because of the great s imi lar i ty between the two,

so that A knows B through some nature common to

A a n d B . T o the co nt ra ry : T h is answer saves ne ith er

o f these tw o poin ts : viz . (1 ) th at A know s B most per

fec t ly , a nd therefore , (2) th at A is G od . F or an y such

knowledge that is merely general and in v i r tue of some

l ikeness is nei th er per fect no r in tu i t iv e. Cons equen t ly,

A wou ld not know B in tu i t i ve ly or most per fect ly , wh ich

is what we set out to prove.

(2,322j

13



86 DUNS SCOTUS

Secundo ex parte intellectus arguitur sic, unica

inte l -

lect io

non

potest habere duo objecta adaequata, A est

ob jec tum adaequatum suae intel lect ioni , quia A habet

pro objecto adaequato essentiam suam ; ergo no n hab et

essentiam B pro obje cto ada eq ua to. Esset au tem B

objectum adaequatum intel lect ioni A, s i posset simul

in te l ligere perfecte A et B. M a jo r patet , qu ia al iter

actus adaequatur objecto, quo abstracto, non minus

quietaretur et adaequaretur, et i ta frustra esset tale

ob jec tum.

[Secunda Via ] . Q ua ntu m ad secundam viam a rgu i tu r

sic : V olu nta s

infinita

est recta ; ergo di l igit quodlibet

d i l ig ib i le quantum est d i l ig ib i le , e t quanto

amore

potest

si sit i n f i n i t um . B aute m est d i ligendus in in f in i tu m cum

p o n itu r esse alius De us. E t pe r consequens sit

bonum

in f in i tu m et inf in i te a vo lun tate sic poten ter d i l igere

dil ige nd um ; ergo voluntas A di l ig it B inf ini te : sed hoc

est impossible, quia A natural i ter di l igit plus se

quam

B.

Probat io : qu i l ibet enim na tu ra l i te r plus [ M S pr ius ] esse

suum

q u a m esse alter ius , cujus no n est pars

vel

effectus.

A autem nihil est ipsius B

nee

u t pars

nee

ut effectus ; ergo

plus d i l ig i t A se na tura l i ter qua m ipsum B. Sed volun tas

l i bera ,

quando est recta , conformatur vo luntat i natura l i ,

al io qu in volun tas na tur al is non esset semper recta ;

ergo A si habet istam voluntatem rec tam, actu el ic i to

plus di l ig i t se quam B, ergo non B inf in i te.

Secundo sic de vo lun tate : aut A fr u i tu r B aut u t i t u r.

Si u t i tu r eo, ergo habet A vo lu nta tem ino rd ina tam . Si

fruitur B et fruitur A, ergo A est beatus in duobus

object is, quorum neutrum dependet ab al io, quia s icut

A beatus est in se, sic et in B ; sed consequens est im -

possibile, quia nihil potest esse actu beatum in duobus



UNICITY OF GOD 86

A second arg um en t based on the inte llect is this. O ne

and the same act of intel le ct ion cannot have tw o adequate

objects. N ow A is i ts ow n adequate object of intel lec t ion ,

for the essence of A is the adequate object of A's intellec

t ion. Co nse que ntly B's essence is no t its adequate ob ject.

But i f A could know perfectly both i tself and B at

one and the same t ime, then B would be an adequate

object of 4̂'s intel le ct ion . T he ma jor is evident, for

otherwise the intellect could be perfectly satisfied and

have all that it is capable of even though its adequate

object were non-e xistent. Such an objec t, consequently,

would be useless.

[Second P ro o f]. A second w ay is this. A n y w i l l tha t

is inf inite wil ls things the way they should be wil led.

Therefore, it loves whatever is lovable to the extent that

it is lova ble. I f the object is in fin ite ly lova ble, the n such

a w il l loves it to the utm ost of its a bi l ity . But since B

is assumed to be another God, it must be loved infinitely.

Consequently, B inasmuch as i t is inf initely good must

be loved inf initely by any power capable of inf inite love.

The wi l l o f A ,

then,

loves B in fin ite ly. N o w this is

impossible since A naturally loves itself more than

B.s

Proof: Ev ery thing na tura l ly loves its ow n being more

than any other if it is neither a part nor an effect of this

other. But A is neither a pa rt n or the effect of B ; there

fore A loves i tself na tur al ly m ore tha n B. Bu t a free w il l

that loves things as they should be loved conforms itself

to th is na tura l w i l l ; otherwise the na tura l w i l l w ou ld

no t always be as it sh ould be. Th ere fore, i f A w ills as it

should,

then it elicits a greater act of love for itself than

for B and hence does not love B infinitely.

A second argument based on the will runs as follows.

E ith er A finds its happiness in B or it sim ply uses B . I f

it me rely uses B , then A's love is inordina te.9 I f it finds

its happiness in B as well as in itself, then A is beatified

by two dist inct objects, neither of which depends upon

the othe r, fo r A is made ju s t as ha ppy by B as it is by itself.



87 DUNS SCOTUS

objectis

beatificantibus

to ta l ibus. Pro bat io : qu ia

utroque destructo ,

nihilominus

esset bea tus ; ergo in

neutro est beatus.

[Tert ia Via]. De te rt i a vi a, sci licet de rat ion e infiniti

[ b o n i ] ,

arguitur sic : voluntas ordinate potest appetere

majus bonum et magis amare majus b o n u m . Sed plura

bona inf in i ta , s i s int possibi l ia , p lus inc lud un t bon itat is

quam unum in f in i tu m ; ergo vo luntas ord inate p lus

posset amare p lura in f in i ta quam unum, et per con-

sequens in nullo uno objecto in f in i to qu ietare tur. Sed

hoc est contra rat ionem boni quod si t inf in i tum et non

quietat ivum cujuscumque vo luntat is .

[Quarta Via ] . Q ua n tu m ad qu ar tam viam de potent ia

in fi n it a arguo sic : n o n possunt esse duae causae totales

ejusdem effectus in eodem ord ine causae ; sed inf i n ita

potentia est causa totalis respectu cujuscumque effectus

in rat ione primae causae ; ergo nu ll a a lia potest esse in

ratione causae primae respectu alicujus effectus, et ita

nul la a l ia causa inf in i ta in potent ia.

Primam

proposi-

tionem pro bo : q u ia tun c posset a li q u id esse causa

alicujus a quo i l lud no n dependeret. Pr ob at io : a nu l lo

al iquid dependet essential i ter, quo non existente,

n ih ilo m in us esset ; sed si C h ab et duas causas totales

A et B, et in eodem ord ine , utro qu e

eorum

non existente,

nihilominus esset ipsum C ab a l tero e orum , qu ia non

existente A, nihi l minus est ipsum C ab ipso B et non

existente B, nihi l minus est G ab A.

Juxta i l lud argu i tur de un i ta te cu juscumque primi

i n quacumque pr im i ta te p raed ic ta . N ih i l enim est

excessum a duobus

primo

excede ntibus ;

vel

finitum

essentia liter ord ina tur [M S or di na nt ur ] ad duos primos

f ines. Esset [ M S essent] e nim a liq u id a d finem, qu o non



UNICITY

OF GOD

8 ]

But the consequent is impossible, for nothing finds its

complete happiness in each of two objects.10

Proof:

Either object could be destroyed and nevertheless the

being wou ld still be happy. Therefore in neither object

is it completely happy.

[Th ird Proo f]. The th ird way, based on the notion of

the infin ite good, is this. I t is proper for a w il l to seek

the greater good and love it more ardently. But if more

than one thing could be infinitely good, then together

they would contain more goodness than a single infinite

good. An orderly

wil l ,

consequently, could not be

perfectly satisfied w ith but one inf inite good. Yet to be

unable to satisfy perfectly any w il l whatsoever contradicts

the very notion of an infinite good.

[Fourth Proof]. M y fourth argument, from infinite

power, is this. Two causes of the same order cannot each

be the total cause of the same effect. But an inf in ite

power is the total primary cause of every single effect

that exists. Therefore, no other power can be the total

prim ary cause of any effect. Consequently, no other

cause is inf inite in power. M y proof of the first proposi

tion : I f this proposition did not hold, then a thing

could be the cause of something which does not depend

upon it. Proof: Nothing depends essentially on any

thing i f i t could exist even when this other is non-existent.

But if C has two total causes, A and B, each of which is

in the same order, then either could be non-existent and

still C would continue to exist in virtue of the other.

For if A were non-existent, C would still exist by reason

of B and if B were non-existent, C would exist by reason

of A.

This argument can be used to establish the unicity

of any of the primacies mentioned above [viz. efficiency,

finality and eminence].11 W hat exists for the sake of an

end is never essentially ordered to two ultimate ends,

for then, as we argued above, it would exist for the sake

of something which, as non-existent, would still be the



88

DUNS SCOTUS

existente, n ih il m inus esset f initum, u t prius a rg u tu m

est ; et excessum esset essentialiter ab a liq u o , quo non

existente, nihil minus haberet essentiale excedens, quo

mensuraretur essentialiter et a quo acciperet suam

pe rfection em essentialiter : q uo d est imp ossibile ; ergo

impossibile

est

aliquorum duorum infinitorum

duos esse

fines primos vel du or um excessorum duo pr im a e m inent ia .

[Quinta V ia ]. De qu in ta v ia d ico, quod in f in i tu m non

potest exced i, et arg uo sic ; qua ecu m qu e perfe ctio potest

numerari

in diversis plus perfectionis habet in pluribus

quam in uno, s icut d ic i tur vin De Trinila te, c. I * ; ergo

in f i n i t u m

omnino

in p lur ibus numerar i non potest .

[Sexta V ia]. De sexta v ia primo arg uo sic : species

pluri f icabi l is sci l icet in indiv iduis non determinatur ex

se ad

certum numerum

ind iv iduorum, sed quantum es t

ex se com pat i tur in f i n i ta te m in d i v id uo ru m , s icut patet

in speciebus om nibus co rru pt ib i l ib us ; ergo si ra t io

necesse esse sit plurif icabil is in individuis, non determi -

nat se ad cer tum n um eru m , sed co m pa t i tur in f in i ta tem

q u a n tu m est ex se. Sed si possent esse in fi n it a necesse

esse, sun t in fi n it a necesse esse ; ergo , etc . Consequens

est

falsum

; ergo et antecedens ex qu o se qu itur .

Ista rat io in a l ia forma f iat ex rat ione primitatis sic :

Unum

u nius ratio nis se habens a d

plura

un ius

rationis

non de termina tur ad illam plural i tatem sive ad deter-

mina t ionem certam i l lo ru m . N o n est instant ia in natu ra

respectu

suppositorum nee

in causa respectu causatorum,

nisi instes in propo sito. Sed deitas erit u n u m unius ra-

viii,

cap. i (Migne, P.L.,

x l i i ,

947-948).



UNICITY OF GOD

OO

end for whose sake the oth er exists. N ei th er is an y th in g

excel led to the u l t imate degree by two most per fect

beings, for then something could be non-existent and

sti l l excel something ei ther as i ts essential measure of

pe rfe cti on or as th a t f r o m wh ic h i t receives i ts essential

per fe ct ion . T hi s, how ever, is imp oss ib le. I t is no t pos

sible,

then, tha t two in f in i te be ings shou ld be u l t imate

ends, or that of two more perfect beings, both should

be the most excel lent .

[F i f t h P ro o f] . As to the fifth w ay , I say th at w h a t is

absolute ly in f in i te , can not be excel led. A n d I argue thus.

Any per fect ion tha t can ex is t in numer ica l ly d i f fe rent

things is more perfect i f i t exist in several than if i t exist

merely in one, as [Augustine] points out in De Trini tate,

bk .

v i n ,

c. i . * Th ere for e, w h a t is absolute ly in f in i te

cannot be found in several numer ica l ly d i f ferent th ings.

[Sixth P r o o f ] . T h e si xt h w ay th at I argu e is this. A

species which can be mul t ip l ied in more than one

ind iv idua l , i s no t o f i tse l f de termined to any cer ta in

nu mb er o f i nd iv idua ls bu t is com pat ib le w i t h an in f in i ty

o f ind iv i du als . T hi s is evide nt in the case of a l l per is h

able species. Th er ef or e, i f th e per fec tion of necessary

ex is tence can be mul t ip l ied in more than one ind iv idua l ,

i t is not of i tse l f restr ic ted to any cer ta in number, but is

co mp at ib le w i t h in f in i ty . B ut i f an in f in i ty o f necessary

beings can exist, the y do exist. Th er efo re, etc. T h e

cons equence is false ; henc e the an tec eden t is also false.

This argument can be reformulated on the basis of

[Go d 's ] p r im ac y as fo l lows. O ne th in g o f a g iven k in d

is not related to others of i ts kind in such a way that

i t is l i m i t ed to ju st th is p l ur a l i t y or to a ce r ta in nu m be r

of such th in gs. Th ere is no th in g in the na ture i tse l f

w h i ch requ i res tha t there be ju st so m an y ind iv id ua ls ,

nor in a cause that says there must be only so many

things caused, unless you insist on what we seek to prove

[v iz. that the nature is such that i t be found in but one

ind iv i du a l ] . Bu t d e i t y is one g iven k in d o f th in g , an d



89 DUNS SCOTUS

tionis et per te se habe t a d

plura

unius rationis, ergo ex

se non determinatur ad certain pluralitatem s ingu la r ium

nee

potest

determinari

al iunde, quia hoc repugnat

p r i m o ,

ergo deitas est in suppositis infinit is. Ista rat io

videtur quod fundatur super hoc quod primitas est de

se ind eterm inata.

Secundo arguo sic et juxta istam v i am . Si sint plu ra

necesse esse, aliquibus perfectionibus realibus

d ist in-

guuntur. Sin t illae A et B. T u n c sic : au t ilia duo

distincta per A et B sunt formaliter necesse esse per A et

per B, aut no n. Si no n, ergo A n on est ra t io

formalis

essendi necessario, nee B. Per consequens, nee ergo ea

includens est necessarium p r i m o , qu ia inc lud i t aliquam

entitatem quae non est formaliter necessitas essendi,

nee

necessaria ex se. Si autem ilia sint formaliter necesse

esse per A et B, et prae ter haec

utrumque

est necesse

esse per

illud

in quo convenit

unum

cum al io, ergo

utrumque habet in se duas rat iones, quarum u t rumque

fo rm a lite r est necesse esse. Sed hoc est im po ss ibile , qu ia

neutra i l la ru m inc lu d i t a l teram ; u t raq ue ergo illarum

circumscripta, esset tale necesse esse per reliquam, et ita

a liq u id esset fo rm al ite r necesse esse per ra tio n e m a liq u a m ,

qua circumscripta, nihilominus esset necesse esse, quod

est im po ssibile.

[Septima V ia ]. De septima v ia, sci l icet omnipotent ia,

v idetur quod non s i t per ra t ionem naturalem

demon-

strabi le, quia omnipotent ia, ut a l ias patebi t , non potest

conclud i ra t ione natura l i , u t catho l ic i in te l l igunt

o m n i -

po ten t iam,

nee

con clud i tur ex ra t ione

infmitae

potent iae.

Tamen ex omnipotent ia credita argu i tur s ic proposi tum.

Si A est omn ipotens, ergo potest facere circa qu o d-



UNIGITY

OF GOD

89

according to you is found in more than one indiv idual of

its k i nd . Th ere fore , de ity as such is no t de term ined to

any certain number of individuals nor can it be so

dete rm ined by a ny thin g other tha n itself , for this w ou ld be

repu gna nt to w ha t is tr u ly f irst. Th erefore , deity exists

in an inf in i te num ber of indiv idu als. Th is argum ent, as

we see, is based up on the no tio n tha t pr im ac y of itself is

indetermined.

The second argument I give, based on this way, runs

as follow s. I f several necessary beings existed, they

would be dist inguished from one another by some real

perfections. Le t us ca ll these A an d B. T h e n I argue,

either these two necessary beings which differ by A and B

are necessary formally in virtue of A and B, or they are

no t. I f no t, then A is no t a fo rm al reason for necessary

existence, an d the same is true o f B. He nce , whateve r

includes A or B is not primarily a necessary being,

because it includes some entity which is neither its

necessity of existence nor is i t necessary of itself. If ,

however, these two beings are formally necessary in

virtue of A and B, in addit ion to being necessary by

reason of what they have in common, then each being

contains two reasons w h y it is fo rm a lly necessary. T hi s,

however, is impossible for neither of these two reasons

includes the other, and hence if either of the two were

absent, the being would sti l l exist necessarily in virtue

o f w ha t remains. I n such an impossible situa tion , some

thing would owe its formal necessity to what could be

removed and still leave the being a necessary being.

[Seventh P ro o f] . As regards the seventh way , fro m

omnipotence, it seems that the thesis cannot be demon

strated by na tur al reason, for omnipotence—as Catholics

understand the term—cannot be demonstrated from

natural reason, nor does it fol low from the notion of

inf inite power, as wil l be shown later.

St i l l ,

i f omn i

potence be accepted on

fa i th ,

then one can argue that if

A is omnipotent, i t can make everything other than itself



go DUNS SCOTUS

cumque aliud ipsum esse vel non esse, et it a posset

destruere B, et i ta faceret B null ipotentem, et sic sequi-

tur quod B non est

Deus.

Ista rat io non valet , s icut quidam respondent ad earn,

qu ia B non est ob jectum omnipotent iae, qu ia

o m n i -

po ten tia pro objecto respicit possibile ; B autem pone-

ba tu r

necessarium

sicut A.

Ideo

argu i tur a l i ter dec larando s ic ra t ionem Richard i

secundo De Trinitate, cap. x v i i vel u lt im o ,* u b i dic it sic :

facile efficere poterit quisquis omnipotens fueri t i ta quod

omne

al iud nih i l possi t , s icut omnipotens per

suum velle

[ M S add ve l sicut om nipote ns suo ve lle] potest prod ucere

quodcumque

possibi le, i ta suo nolle potest impedire vel

destruere om ne possibile. Sed si A est om nipo tens ,

potest velle omnia alia a se esse et ita suo velle ipsa in

esse pro du ce re. N o n necesse est a u te m qu od B

velit

omnia ilia esse quae vult A , qu ia vo luntas B co nt in-

genter se habet ad

i l ia ,

sicut voluntas A ad ilia quae B

v u lt, si est Deus. Si au tem B

nolit ilia esse,

ergo nu l lu m

i l -

lorum est. Ergo si sint duo om nipoten tes, ute rqu e illorum

faceret

alium

nu l l ipotentem, non destruendo i l ium sed

prohibendo per suum nolle esse

volitorum

ab al io.

Quod si dicas quasi sophist icando quod concordent

in voluntate sua, quamvis nulla sit necessitas, sed quasi

fecer in t pactum,

adhuc

probo quod neuter

eorum

erit

om nipotens ; na m si A est om nipo tens, potest pro

ducere suo vel le quodcumque producibi le vol i tum a l iud

a se. Ex hoc sequitur quo d B nu l lu m p ote ri t producere

suo vel le, et i ta non est om nipo tens . Q uo d aute m hoc

sequitur, patet ex quarta via, quia impossibi le est duas

*

i,

cap. xxv (Migne,

P.L.,

cxcvi,

902),



UNICITY OF GOD 9<D

come in to existence o r go out o f existence. Co ns eq uen t ly ,

it can destroy B and thus render B impo tent. From this

it follows that B is not God.

Some

12

object that this reason does not hold since B

is not an object of omnipotence, for omnipotence has as

its object only what can, yet need not, exist, whereas B

is assumed to

be

just as necessary as A.

Wherefore, we must reformulate the argument of

Richard [of

St

V ic to r] in his work De Trinitate* where he

says : Whoever w il l have been omnipotent, w il l easily

be able to make everything else impotent . Just as an

omnipotent being

can

produce whatever is possible simply

by willing that it should be, so also he can impede or

destroy everything that is possible by w ill ing that it should

not be. But if A is omnipotent, he can w il l everything

other than himself and so, by his

wil l ,

cause everything

to exist. I t is not necessary, however, that B w il l every

thing which A wills because the will of B is related only

contingently to what A wills, even as the will of A is

related contingently to what B wills, assuming here that

each is G od. But i f B wills tha t none of these things

should exist, then none w il l exist. Consequently, i f two

omnipotent beings exist, each w i ll make the other im

potent, not indeed by destroying the other, but because

one by his positive w il l could keep non-existent what the

other wills should exist.

And if you say, to argue sophistically, that they

voluntarily agree on a common way of acting through

some sort of

pact,

even though there is really no in trinsic

necessity that they do so, still I prove that neither will

be omnipotent. For

if

A is omnipotent, by w illin g he can

produce every possible thing that can be produced and

thus B can produce nothing by willing and hence will

not be omnipotent. That this follows is clear from what

was said in the fourth way. For it is impossible that two

total causes should produce one and the same effect,



91

DUNS SCOTUS

causas esse totales unius effectus, quia ex quo total i ter

causatus est ab una, impossibile est quod sit ab alia.

[A d Argumenta Pro Prima Opinione]

Ad argumenta

primo enim

ad

ilia

quae sunt pro al ia

opinione respondeo ad auctoritatem Rabb i Moys i e t

dico quod

Deum

esse

unum

credi tur in Lege quia enim

populus fu i t rudis et pronus ad idolatr iam. Ideo

indigui t instru i per Legem de uni tate Dei, l icet per

naturalem

rationem posset

demonst rar i . I ta etiam

acceptum est a Lege qu od Deus s it : E xo d. in * : Ego

sum qui sum, et Apostolus ad Hebraeos,f dic i t quod

oportet accedentem ad Deum credere quia est, et

tamen

non negatur D eu m esse dem onstrab i le. Erg o pari

rat ione

nee negandum

est posse de m on stra ri per rat io ne m

D e um esse u n u m , l icet accepta sit a Lege. I l ia et iam

possunt demonstrari ut i le est communitat i t radi et iam

per

viam

auctori tat is et propter negl igent iam

com-

munitatis in inqui rendo veritatem e t e t iam propter

impotentiam inte l lectus, et propter errores inquiren

dum per demonstrat ionem, qu ia ver i ta t ibus su is

multa

falsa permiscent, ut dicit Augustinus xvm De Civitate

Dei,l et ideo quia simplices sequentes tales demonstra-

tores possent dubitare, cui esset asserendum vel assentien-

d u m .

Ideo tu ta est via et stabi l is et com m unis , au cto ri-

tas certa [ M S add. circa] quae no n potest fallere

nee fa l l i .

Ad secundam rat ionem de singulari dico q u o d aliud

est

singularitatem

esse conceptam vel ut objectum vel

ut partem objecti , al iud singularitatem esse praecise

modum

concipiendi s ive sub quo concipi tur objectum.

Exem plum cum d ico un ive rsa le [A/5 v e l l e ] , ob jectum

conceptum est plural i tas, sed modus concipiendi, id est

modus sub quo co nc ipitu r, est singu laritas. I t a in

* Exodus, in. 14. f Heb. x i. 6.

X

xvm,

cap. xli (Migne, P.L.,

x l i ,

601).



UNICITY OF GOD

g l

for what is caused completely by one cannot be caused

by the other.

[Reply to the arguments fo r the First Opinion] 13

First I answer the arguments for the other opinion,

rep lying first to the au tho rity of R ab bi Moses. I say

that the reason God's un icity was a m atter of bel ief in

the Law is to be found in the fact that the people were

unedu cated an d prone to ido latr y. Consequen tly, they

needed the Law to tel l them that there is but one God

even thou gh th is t r u th c ould be demonstrated by na tura l

reason.

T h e fact tha t Go d exists is also kn ow n fro m the

L a w , for instance, Exodus, i n * : I am who a m , and the

Apostle to the Hebrews f : F o r he who comes to G od

must believe tha t G od exists . Nevertheless, we do no t

deny that G od's existence is dem onstrab le. O n the same

grounds,

then,

we must not deny that reason can dem on

strate tha t there is b u t one G od ju s t because this is

accepted from the La w . Indeed it is good tha t m an y

things demonstrable in themselves be transmitted to the

human race by way of authority also because of man's

weakness of intellect, his neglect to seek the truth and

because of the mistakes he makes when he tries to

dem onstrate some thing. As Au gus tine says in the City

ofGod,X m uc h fa ls i ty is m ixed w ith t r u th , and since simple

people fol lowing such demonstrators could st i l l be in

doubt about what they must assent to, the

f i rm ,

safe and

com m on w ay is by means of au tho rity so cer tain i t can

neither deceive nor be deceived.

As for the second reason about the singular, I say that

it is one thing to conceive singularity as an object or part

o f an object. I t is qu ite another thin g to have sing ularity

as a mode of con cep tion or as the aspect unde r w hi ch the

object is con ceived . Fo r exa m ple, whe n I say a un i

versa l , the object conceived is plural i ty, but singularity

is the mode of conception, that is, it is conceived as a

singular th in g. So also w it h logical intent ions. W hen



g2

DUNS SCOTUS

intent ionibus logic is, cum dico s ing u la re , quod con-

cip itu r est singularitas, sed mo dus sub quo co nc ipitur

est universal i tas, quia quod concipi tur ut concipi tur

habet indifferentiam ad

p lu ra .

I ta dico in proposi to,

quod essentia divina potest concipi ut singularis, i ta quod

singularitas sit concepta vel u t ob jectum vel ut pars

object i .

N o n

tamen

sequitur quod essentia possit cog-

nosci ut est singularis, ita quod singularitas sit modus

concept i . Cognoscere enim sic aliquid ut singulare est

i l lud

cognoscere ut hoc sicut a lb u m vi de tu r ut hoc. E t

hoc modo praedictum est quod non cognoscitur essentia

div ina sub rat ione singulari tat is, et ideo in argumento

est fa l lacia figurae d ict ion is, com m utan do rem in

m od um .

[Ad Argumenta Pr inc ipa l ia ]

Ad rat iones principales, d ico quod Apostolus loquitur

de idol is et ideo de di is nu nc up ativ e, et sub dit i b i *

Nobis autem unus est Deus, quia omnes d i i gen t ium

daem onia. ]'

Ad secundam dico quod consequent ia non valet , quia

numerus non est talis modus cognoscendi grammaticus

sicut a l i i m od i gram m aticales, q u i praecise dic un t m od um

concipiendi rei absque al iqua reali tate correspondente

tal i modo concipiendi ; unde [nee] dicunt praecise a l i

quid in re, a quo moveri possit intellectus ad talem

modum conc ip iendum, quamvis i l lud mot ivum non s i t

a l iqu id in re (masculinitas en im non requ i r i t a l iqu id

masculinum

in re sed al iquid correspondens

mascul i -

n i t a t i ,

scilicet potentiam activam ve l a l iqu id hu jusmodi) .

Sed numerus vere includi t rem substratum [MS sub-

t r ac t am ] .

U nd e sequi tur H om ine s cu rru nt , ergo p lures

homines c u rr u n t . Sed no n sic de aliis consignificatis

* i Cor.

vii i.

6. f Ps. xcv. 5.



UNICITY OF GOD Q2

I say s in g u la r , i t is sing ular ity th at is conceived, bu t

the mode of conception is that of a universal, for what

I conceive is ind if fere nt to being m ore than one. A n d so

m y answer to their assu m ption is this. T h e divin e essence

can be conce ived as singu lar in the sense tha t s ing ula rity is

conceived either as the object or pa rt of the object. F ro m

this, however, it does not follow that the divine essence

can be known as singular in such a way that singularity

is the mode of conception, for to know something as

singular in this w ay is to kno w it as a th is jus t as a w hite

ob jec t is seen as this w h ite object. As we said above,14

the divine essence is not known under the aspect of

s ingu lari ty in th is m anner. Therefore, the argum ent

involves a fallacy of speech by substituting the mode for

the th ing.

[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]

To the in i t ia l arguments,15 I say that the Apostle is

speaking of idols a nd hence of so-called g o d s , for in

the same passage he adds : Y e t for us there is on ly one

G o d ,

fo r a ll the gods of the Gentiles are de vils .

T o the second argument,16 I declare the consequence to

be invalid inasmuch as number is not l ike some of the

other grammatical modes which express precisely a mode

of conception without any reali ty that corresponds to the

conceptual mode, and consequently do not express pre

cisely something in real i ty by which the intel lect could

be m ov ed to conceive a th in g the wa y it does, even where

tha t m otive be not something in the th in g as such. For

a noun to be masculine, for instance, it is not necessary

tha t the th in g designated by the no un be itself mascu line.

It suffices if it have something resembling masculinity,

nam ely some active powe r or some such th ing . N um be r,

on the contrary, includes the underly ing th ing.

Con

sequently , f rom the proposit ion M e n are ru n n in g i t

follows th at several m en are ru n n in g . Such is no t the



93 DUNS SCOTUS

nomin is

vel

verb i , qu ia

non

[ M S bene] sequitur : De us

est, ig i tur Deus est mascul inus , quia ad mascul in i tatem

suff ic i t a l iquid in re a quo

ille

modus concipiendi possit

accipi ,

pu ta act iv i tas. D ico ergo quo d illud solum

D i i conceptum sub modo p lu ra l i inc lud i t con t ra -

dict ionem, quia modus concipiendi repugnat e i quod

con cip i tur sub m odo. C um ig i tu r pro ba tur consequentia ,

quia idem includi t s ingulare et p lurale, d ico quod

singulare includi t i l lud sub modo concipiendi convenient i

ipsi concepto sed plurale includi t i l lud sub modo im -

possibi l i

i l l i

concepto, et ideo singulare includi t rat ionem

quasi in se veram p rou t inc lud i t conceptum e t modum

con cipiend i ; p lur ale autem prout includi t is ta duo

includi t rat ionem quasi in se

falsam

; et ideo no n

sequitur quod plurale s i t verum de p lu ra l i , s icut s ingulare

de sin gu la ri, qu ia de eo cujus est ra tio in se falsa n ih il

est ve ru m . Per i l l u d patet ad

aliam

p robat ionem, quo

majus cogitari non potest, quia non sunt di i cogitabi les

sine contradict ione, quia modus repugnat re i conceptae,

et ideo major est glossanda sicut prius est dictum in

quaestione prae cede nti. A d sensum autem et veritatem

requi r i tur quod rat io subject i non inc lud i t contra-

dict ionem, sicut dictum est in quaestione secunda hujus

dist inct ionis.*

Ad te r t iam d ico quod ilia major proposi t io non est

p r i m a ,

sed reduci tur ad

is tam,

omne imper fec tum

redu ci tur ad pe rfec tum . Et qu ia omne ens per pa rt i -

c ipat ionem est imperfectum, et tantum illud ens est

perfectum quod est ens per essentiam, ideo sequitur

Opus oxoniense,

i,

dist. n, q. i i , n. 5.



UNICITY OF GOD 93

case,

however, with the other co-significates of a noun

or verb, for f ro m the propo si t ion G o d is [where the

noun God or

Deus

is masculine gender] it does not follow

that God Himself is masculine, for it suffices for a noun

to be masculine if there is something about the reality

tha t w o u ld jus t i fy this gender, for instance, ac tivity . I

say, therefore, tha t the subject g o d s conceived in the

plural form includes a contradict ion since the mode of

conception is repugnant to what is conceived under this

mode. As for the proo f of the consequence, viz . tha t

the singular and plural include the same thing, I reply

that the singular includes it in a conceptual mode that

is in ha rm on y w it h the thin g conceived whereas the

plural includes it in a conceptual mode that is incom

pa tible w it h the th in g conceived. So far

as

the conceptual

mode and the thing conceived are concerned, then, the

singular includes a notion that is, as it were, true in itself,

whereas the p lu ra l includes a no tio n th at is, as it were,

false in itself. Co nse que ntly, it does no t fo llow th a t the

plural is true of several as the singular is true of one, for

no th in g is tru e that is false i n itself. A n d in this wa y

we can answer the other p ro o f fo r the consequence based

on the prop osi t ion : T h er e is som ething in comparison

w i t h w hich no th ing greater can be conceived. For

g o d s

is not something conceivable without contradic

t i on ,

since the mode of conception is repugnant to the

th in g conceived. Con sequen tly, the m ajo r m ust be

glossed the way it was in the previous ques tion. Fo r

if the proposition is to be true or to make any sense,

it is necessary that the notion of the subject includes no

inherent contradict ion, as has been pointed out in the

second question of this dist inct ion.*

To the third

argument17

I reply that its major premise is

no t a pr im ar y t ru th bu t is reduced to th is : E ve ry th in g

impe rfect is trace d back to something perfect .18 Since

every being by part ic ipat ion is imperfect and only that

be ing w h ic h is such b y its essence is perfec t, there fore this

2 , 3 2 2 ;

1 4



94 DUNS SCOTUS

proposi t io

i l ia ,

sci l icet quod omne ens per part icipa-

tionem reducitur ad ens per essentiam quod est per-

f e c tu m .

U t ig itu r vere possit sequi conclusio, haec

autem

major de [imjperfecto sic habet d is t ing ui . A l i q u id est

imperfectum

secundum perfect ionem simpl ic i ter, quae

non necessario habet imperfect ionem concomitantem

quia non inc lu d i t in se l im i ta t io ne m , s icut ho c b o n u m ,

h o c

v e r u m ,

ho c ens , e t

hujusmodi

imperfect io re

duc i tu r ad perfectum ejusdem ra t ion is , sc ilicet b o n u m ,

e n s , e t v e r u m , quae im po rtan t perfectiones s impl i

c i ter . A l iq u id autem est imp erfectum secundum per

fect ionem non simpl ic i ter, quae de rat ione sui includi t

l imitat ionem et ideo necessario habet imperfect ionem

annexam,

u t

hie

h o m o ,

hie

asinus , et hujusm odi

imperfecta non reducuntur ad perfectum per essent iam

absolute ejusdem rationis sicut ad

rationem specificam

quia ipsa adhuc inc lud i t imperfect ionem, qu ia l imi ta

t ionem ; sed redu cun tur ad perfectum primum quod

continet ea

supereminenter

et aequ ivoce. Q u od ergo

imperfectum est primo

m o d o ,

reduci tur ad perfectum

simpl ic i ter secundum perfect ionem i l l ius rat ionis, quia

a l iqu id secundum

istam

rat ionem potest esse simpliciter

perfectum. Q uo d autem est imp erfec tum secundo m odo

non reduci tur ad a l iqu id perfectum secundum per

fect ionem ejusdem rat ionis, quia enim ilia imperfec

t ionem inc lu d i t . Ideo ilia non potest esse perfectum

simpl ic i ter propter

illam

l im i ta t ion em . Sed reduc i tu r

ad a l iqu id s impl ic i ter perfectum aequivocum, eminenter

inc ludens i l la m perfectionem. Et ideo bo nu m im per

fectum reduci tur ad perfectum bonum, sed lap is , qu i

est imperfectus, non reduci tur ad lapidem perfectum

simpliciter, sed ad

summum

ens et ad

summum

b o n u m ,

quae inc ludunt v i r tua l i ter i l lam perfect ionem.



UNICITY OF GOD 94

prop osit ion follows : E ve ry being by pa rt icip atio n is

traced back to a perfect being that is such by its essence .

Hence in order that the conclusion fol low, the major

premise rega rding the im pe rfe ct must be dist inguished

as follows. So m ething is imp erfec t according to pure

perfect ion.

A p ure perfection inasm uch as it includes no

limitation in itself does not necessarily include some

con

com itant imp erfect ion. Som ething imperfect according

to pure perfection, for instance, w o ul d be th is go o d ,

th is t rue th in g , th is b ei n g . Such imperfect th ings

are reducible to something perfect of the same character,

namely to the G oo d , the Tr u e , B e in g , a l l o f

w hic h im ply pure perfect ion. O the r th ings, however, are

imperfect according to m ixed perfect ion. A m ixed per

fect ion is one which includes some l imitat ion and there

fore necessarily has some added im pe rfec tion . T h is

m a n ,

th is d on ke y , and such l ike, w ou ld be imperfect

in this w ay . Such things are no t reduce d specifically

to something which possesses the same perfection abso

lut ely by its essence, for the latte r w ou ld s ti l l be im pe rfect

because it is l im it e d . The y are redu ced , however, to a

perfect First Being which contains them in a more perfect

and equivocal m anner. W h a t is impe rfect in the f irst

way ,

then,

is reduced to a pure perfe ction of the same

for m al cha racter, for som ething of this kin d can be simp ly

perfect. W h a t is imp erfec t in the second way , however,

cannot be reduced to something perfect of the same

formal character, for the latter includes imperfection.

Such a th ing by reason of th is l imitat ion,

then,

cannot

be simply perfect, but i t is reduced to something which

is sim ply perfect an d w hic h is of

a

dif ferent cha racter, bu t

includes the perfection of the imperfect being in a more

excellent w ay . Con seque ntly, an imp erfec t good is

reduced to a perfect good, but an imperfect stone is not

reduced to a stone which is simply perfect, but to the

Highest Being and the Greatest Good which vir tual ly

include this perfection.



95 DUNS SGOTUS

A d ult imum d ic i tu r quod plura bona f in i ta sunt

meliora

paucioribus bonis finit is, non

autem

p lura bona

inf in i ta . Sed hoc no n vid et ur respondere ad

argu-

m e n t u m ,

qu ia quaecumque si essent meliora essent,

videntur ponenda esse in entibus, et

maxime

in ente

supremo quod est necesse esse, quia ibi quidquid posset

esse bonum est, et necesse est i b i esse. Sed p lu ra b ona

inf in i ta

si

essent essent m eli or a. V id e tu r ig itu r qu od plu ra

bona in f in i ta sunt ponenda in natura summi

bon i .

A d i l lud respondeo, quod cum d ic i tur in majori il ia

quae si essent essent m e lio ra , sunt p one nda i b i , dico

quod aut per

ly

s i im pl ica tu r posi t io possibilis aut

posi t io incom pos sibi l ium. Si primo modo d ico quod

major est vera et minor falsa, quia

implicatio ilia

in

minori no n possibilis sed inco m po ssib i l ium. Si autem

ly s i imp l icet pos i tionem incom possib i l ium , tunc m inor

est vera et major falsa, quae

enim

non essent meliora

nisi ex posit ione incompossibi l ium, non essent meliora,

nee etiam sunt bona, sicut i l lud quod non est nisi ex

posi t ione incompossibi l ium,

omnino

non est, sicut

nee

i l lud posi tum a quo dependet.



UN1GITY OF GOD 95

T o the last,19 some say 20 that a greater number of f inite

goods is better than a lesser number, but that the same

is n ot tru e o f in fin ite goods. T hi s, how ever, does no t

seem to answer the diff iculty, for it seems that whatever

is better, if it can exist, should be assumed to exist in

some being and in part icular in that being which is

suprem e an d exists necessarily, for wh ateve r can be a goo d

exists there an d it is necessary tha t it exist there. N o w i f

several infinite goods existed, this would be better.

Therefore in a nature of the highest good it seems that

more than one infinite good must be assumed to exist.

To this I reply that when the major premise declares

th at those things are to be assumed to exist w h ic h

w ou ld be better i f they d id exist , the term i f impl ies

the assum ption o f som ething possible or so m ething im

possible. I f the first, the n I say the m ajo r is true an d the

m in o r false, for wh at the m in or implies is no t possible bu t

includes inc om pa tible notions. Bu t i f the

term,

i f

implies the assumption of the impossible, then the minor

is tru e an d the m ajo r false. Fo r if some things are better

only inasmuch as they assume the coexistence of in

compatible notions, then they are not real ly better, nor

for tha t m atte r are they rea l ly goo d. I t is the same w it h

something that can exist only if we assume the coexistence

of inco m pa t ib le not ions. Such a th i ng is s imp ly non

existent, and the same is true of the impossible basis

postulated for i t .



V

C O N C E R N I N G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E

Summary of the Argument

Qu estion : Can any certain and unadulterated tru th be known

naturally by the intellect of

a

person in this life without the

special illum ina tion of the Uncreated Ligh t ?

Pro e t Cont ra


The opinion of Henry of Ghent

Scotus's critique of Henry (in six articles)

Artic le I . Henry's arguments lead to scepticism

Article I I . Rejection of scepticism

u. Certitude of first principles

b. Experimental knowledge

c. Knowledge of our own acts

d. Certitude of

sense

knowledge

Article I I I . Reply to Henry's arguments

Article IV . Concerning Henry's conclusion

Artic le V . Solution of the Question


Ar ticle V I . To what extent Henry's arguments hold



97 DUNS SCOTUS

[ V . DE COGNITIONE HUMANA ] *

U l t imo q u a n tu m a d ma te r i a m istam cognoscibi l i tat is,

quaero an aliqua Veritas certa et sincera possit naturaliter

cognosci ab

intellectu

viatoris absque

lucis

increatae

special

illustratione.

[Pro et Contra]

Arguo quod non :

ix

De Trinitate, cap. ul t im o sexto

vel decimo

qu in to

f

:

I n t u e a m u r inviolabilem ver i ta tem ex qua definiamus

qualis esse mens hominis sempiternis rationibus debeat.

Et ib idem, cap. dec imo quinto :

Aliis

supra

nos

regulis

manentibus ve l approbare ve l improbare conv inc imur

quando al iquid recte vel non recte probamus ve l

im -

probam us. E t ib id em , cap. decimo sept imo :

Artem

ineffabiliter pu lchram super aciem ment is s impl ic i

inte l l ige ntia capientes. E t

eodem,

cap. octavo vel

undevigesimo

J : I n

ilia

veri tate ex qua

temporalia

sunt

facta omnia formam conspicimus, atque inde conceptam

no t i t i am

tamquam verbum

apud nos habemus.

I t e m ,

libro duod ecimo , cap. secundo * * : Su bl imioris

rat ionis est ju di ca re de istis corp ora l ibus secundum

rationes sempiternas.

I t e m ,

in eodem duodecimo, cap. decimo quarto vel

trigesimo secundo f f : Non so lum rerum sensibilium in

locis positarum

stant

incommutabiles

ration es, etc. E t

quod intel l igat ib i de rat ionibus aeternis vere in Deo,

probatur per hoc quod ib idem d ic i t quod paucorum est

* Opus oxoniense,

i,

dist.

in ,

q. iv (Assisi 137, f.

30vb-33il>;

cf.

ViveS, VOL.

IX, l§'2a-Q.O']b'.

f ix, cap. vi (Migne, P.L.,

x l i i ,

966).

X cap. vii (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 967).

* * xi i, cap. ii (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 999).

f t x ii , cap. xiv (Migne, P.L.,

x l i i ,

ioio).



CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

97

[ V . CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE]

Finally, on the subject of what we can know, I ask

whether any certain and unadulterated truth can be known natur

ally by the intellect of a person in this life without the special

illumination of the Uncreated Light ?

[Pro et Contra]

I argue tha t no such tr u th can be kn ow n

x

:

[ A r g .

1].

F ro m [St Au gus tine] : De Trinitate, bk.

rxf :

"But we gaze upon the indestruct ib le t ruth by reason of

which we may def ine perfect ly what the mind of man

should be acc ordin g to the eternal reasons". A n d again :

" W h e n we accept or reject som ething corre ctly, our

incontestable convict ion arises from other immutable

rules above our m in d s" . A n d again : "G ras ping by

simple intel l igence the unspeakably beautiful art that

lies bey ond the eye of the m in d . . ." . A n d in the same

work %

: " I n the eterna l t ru th f rom w hich a l l tem pora l

things are made, we behold the form . . , and we have

with in us l ike a Word the knowledge of what we have

conceived".

[ A r g .

11]. Also in bk. x i i * * : "B u t i t pertains to higher

reason to judge of these corporeal things according to

eternal reasons".

[ A r g .

in .

A n d in the same bk. x n f f : " A n d n ot

only are there immutable reasons for sensible things

posited in place, etc. . ." . T h a t Au gus tine here is

speaking of the eternal reasons that are really in God is

proved by the fact that he says in the same passage that



98

DUNS SCOTUS

ad

illas

perven ire. Si

autem intelligeret

de

primis

princip i is, non est paucorum pervenire ad ilia sed

m u l t o r u m ,

quia omnibus sunt communia et nota.

I t e m ,

libro decimo quarto , cap. decimo qu in to vel

tr igesimo quarto,* loquens de injusto qui

multa

recte

laudat et v i tuperat in moribus ho m inu m , a i t : Qu ibus

regulis jud ica t , e tc. Et in fine a i t : U b i sunt illae regulae

scriptae nisi in l ibro

illo lucis.

L i b e r

ille lucis

est

in te l

lec ts d ivinus . Ig i tu r vult ut in ilia luce injustus videt

quae sunt juste agenda et qu od in al iqu o impresso ve l per

a l iquod

impressum

ab i l lo videtur, u t ib ide m d ic i t : U nd e

omnis lex justa in cor hom inis no n m igra nd o, sed

t a m -

quam

im prim en do transfertur s icut imago ex an nu lo, etc.

in ceram transit et annulum [ M S . ceram] non re l inqui t .

Ig i tu r in ilia luce v idemus, a qua impr imi tur in cor

homin is just i t ia ;

ilia

autem est lux increata.

I t e m , x i i

Confessionum

f

: S i

ambo

v idemus

verum

nee tu in me nee ego in te, sed ambo in ea quae supra

mentem

est inco m m uta bi l i ver i ta te . M ul ta e autem sunt

auctori tates August in i in

multis locis

ad

probandum

hanc

conclusionem.

Ad opposi tum :

R o m . i I : Inv is ib i l ia D ei a creatura mundi per ea

quae facta sunt intel lecta conspiciuntur.

Istae

rationes

aeternae sunt invis ib i l ia D e i ; ergo cognos cuntur ex

creaturis ; ig itu r ante visionem ista rum h ab etu r certa

cogni t io creaturarum.

* xiv , cap. xv (Migne, P.L., xu i , 1052).

•f x ii , cap. xxv (Migne, P.L.,

xxxn,

840). % Rom.

1.

20,



CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 98

i t is the privi lege o f the few to atta in them . Fo r he w ou ld

not say this if he were speaking of f irst principles, since

the latter are not the privi lege of the few but the many,

inasmuch as f irst principles are common and known to

all .

[ A r g .

i v ] . Also in Book xr v ,* speaking of the unjust

man who correctly praises and blames many things in

the mores of m en , he asks : "B y w h at norms do they

j udge,

etc. . ." . A n d at the en d, he adds

:

"Wh e re

are these rules w rit te n except in th at book o f l ig h t. . " .

That "book of l ight" , however, is the div ine inte l lect .

Therefore, he wishes to say that it is in this l ight that the

unjust man sees what justice demands must be done.

And he sees this in something or by something impressed

upon him by this l ight, for as Augustine says in the same

place : " . . . whence every ju st law is transferred to the

heart of man not by passing from one place to another,

but by being impressed, as it were, even as the image is

transferred from the r ing to the wax without leaving the

r i n g " .

Th erefo re, we see in that l igh t by w hic h just ice

is im p rin te d up on the heart of

m a n .

T his l ig ht, however,

is the Uncreated Light.

[ A r g .

v ] . Lik ew ise , i n the Confessions, bk .

x n f

: " I f

both of us see the truth, you do not see it in me, nor do

I see it in yo u, bu t bo th o f us see it i n th at im m uta ble

t r u th w hic h is above the m in d " . No w there are ma ny

other places where statements of Augustine could be

found to support this conclusion.

To the contrary :

Romans I

%

: "F o r since the creation of the w o rld , God's

invisible attributes are clearly seen . . . being under

stood th ro ug h the things that are m ade. . ." . N o w the

invisible things of God are these eternal reasons.

Con

sequently, they are kn ow n fro m creatures. Th erefore ,

even be fore these ete rn al reasons are

seen,

we have certain

knowledge of creatures.



99

DUNS SCOTUS

[Corpus Quaest ionis]

[Opinio Henrici]

In ista quaestione est opinio una tal is quod intentiones

generales habent inter se

ordinem na t u ra l em .

D e duabus

quae sunt ad propositum, videl icet de intentione entis et

ve r i [MS ub i ] loquamur.

In tent io pr ima est ent is , quod probatur per i l lud De

causis* proposit ionis qua rtae : P rim a

rerum

creatu-

rarum est esse, et in com m ento primae propositionis : Esse

est

vehementioris

adbaeren tiae. E t ra t io est qu ia entitas

est abs oluta ; Veritas decit respectum ad exem plar. Ex

hoc sequitur quod ens possit cognosci sub ratione ent i -

tat is,

l icet non sub ratione veritatis, et per consequens

ipsum quod est verum potest cognosci antequam cogno-

scatur ipsa Veritas.

Haec etiam conclusio probatur ex parte intel lectus,

qu ia ens potest co ncip i sim plic i

intelligentia

et tunc co nci-

p i tu r i l lu d quo d ve ru m est ; sed rat io veri tat is non

concipi tur n is i inte l l igent ia componente et d ivide nte ;

composit ionem et d iv is ionem

praecedit

s implex inte l l i

gentia.

Si autein qua eratu r de no tit i a entis, sive ejus quo d

verum est, dicitur quod intel lectus ex puris natural ibus

potest sic inte l ligere ve rum . Q uo d pro ba tur, qu ia incon-

veniens

est naturam esse expertem propriae operationis

secundum Damascenum,| e t hoc magis inconveniens est

in natura perfect ior i secundum Phi losophum, n De

caelo

et mundo,

\

de stel l is, quia magnum inconveniens

esset Stellas habere virtutem progressivam et non habere

instrumenta ad progrediendum ; ig i tu r cum prop r ia

* Liber

de causis, prop,

i, iv.

t Defide orthodoxa, n, cap. xxiii (Migne, P.G., xciv, 949).

X n, cap. vi ii

(290*,

30).




99

[Body of the Quest ion]

[The opinion o f Henry o f Ghent]

One op in ion 2 reg ard ing this question m aintains tha t

a na tu ra l order exists am on g general notions. Le t us

discuss two of these which are relevant here, viz. the

not ion o f "be ing" and the no t ion o f " t rue" ,

That "being"is the f irst of these notions is proved from

the fourth proposit ion of the Liber

de

Causis* : " T h e first

of created things is b e in g " ; an d in the com m entary on

the f irst pro po sit ion : "B e ing is of stronger adh eren ce".

The reason for this is that entity is something absolute,

whereas tr u th imp l ies a re lat ion to an exemplar. Fr om

this i t fol lows th at a th in g can be kn ow n as an e ntity even

tho ug h its tr u th value is as yet un kn ow n. Conseq uently,

the thing which is true can be known before i ts truth is

known.

T he w ay the m in d functions provides a fur the r proof.

A be ing can be grasped by a n act of simple un ders tanding ,

an d in such a case the thin g wh ic h is true is kn ow n. Bu t

the tr u th value i tsel f is kn ow n on ly by an act of jud gm en t.

Simple understanding, however, precedes an act of

judgment .

Now if we ask about our knowledge of a being or of

the thing which is true, they tel l us that the intel lect by

reason of i ts purely natural powers can know the " t rue"

i n this sense. T h e pr oo f is this. I t is h ar d ly fitting th at

any nature exist wi thout i ts proper act iv i ty, as Damas

cene

says.f

T he m ore perfect the na ture in question the

less fitt ing that it should lack such operation, as the

Philosopher points out in speaking of the stars in De caelo

et mundo, bk . n . % For i t w ou ld be hig hly imp rop er for the

stars to have the powe r o f progressive mov em ent an d s t i l l

lack the means necessary for loc om ot ion . I f the proper



100 DUNS SCOTUS

opcratio intellectus sit intelligere ve rum , v idetur incon-

veniens

quod natura non concesseri t inte l lectui

ilia

quae

suff iciunt ad hanc operat ionem.

Sed si loquamur de cognit ione veritat is, respondetur

quod sicut est duplex exemplar, creatum et

increatum,

secundum Platonem in Ti tnaeo* v idel icet exemplar

factum et non factum, s ive creatum et non creatum

(exemplar creatum est species universalis causata a re,

exemplar increatum est idea in

mente

d iv ina), i ta duplex

est conformitas ad exemplar et duplex Veritas ; una est

conformitas ad exemplar creatum et isto

modo

posuit

Aristotel is, veritates rerum cognosci per conformitatem

earum ad speciem in te l l ig ib i lem ; e t i ta v ide tur Augus-

tinus ponere

vin°

De Trinitate, cap. vii \ ubi

vult

quod

re rum notitiam generalem et specialem ex sensibus collec-

tam h abem us, secundum quam de quocumque occurrent

veritatem

jud icamus, quod

ipsum

sit tale

vel

tale.

Sed quod per tale exemplar acquisitum in nobis

habeatur omnino certa et infa l l ib i l is not i t ia veri tat is de

re,

hoc vide tur o m nino impossibile et hoc p rob atur

tr i p l ic i rat ione secundum istos. P rim a sumitur ex parte

rei de qua exemplar est extractum, secunda ex parte

subjecti in quo est, et tertia ex parte exemplaris in se.

Prim a ra t io est ta lis : O bje ctu m i l lud a quo abstrah i tur

exemplar est

mu tab i le .

I g it u r no n potest esse causa

al icujus immutabi l is , sed certa not i t ia a l icujus de al iquo

sub rat ione veri tat is in eo habetur per rat ionem

im -

m uta bi lem ; ig i t ur non hab etur per ta le exem plar.

Haec d ic i tur ra t io August in i Octoginta Ires quaestionum,

quaestio ix , J u b i d ic it qu od a sensibus n o n est

* Timaeus, 28.

f vnI>

cap. vi (Migne,

P.L.,

x l i i , 966).

} q. ix (Migne, P.L.,

x l ,

13).




100

operation of the intel lect, however, is to know the thing

which is true, i t seems hardly f i t t ing that nature should

not endow the intel lect with what is prerequisite for such

an operat ion.

But as for knowing the truth i tself , they tel l us that

there are two exemplars, one created, the other un

created.

Th is is in accord w it h Plato, who mentions in

the Timaeus* one exem plar tha t is m ade , i.e. created , an d

one th at is no t m ade , i.e. unc reate d. T h e created

exemplar is the species of the universal caused by the

th ing .

T he uncrea ted exem plar is the idea in the divine

m i n d .

Consequently, a two fold t r u th and twofold

co nfo rm ity to an exem plar exists. On e is the con form ity

to the created exemplar, and it was in this sense that

Aristot le maintained that the truths of things are known

through their conformity to the intell igible species.3

Augustine, also, seems to hold this view in his work

De Trinitate, bk.

vin,f

where he m aintains that the know

ledge of things gleaned fr o m the senses is bo th of a general

an d of a pa rt icula r na ture. I n v ir tue of such knowledge

we jud ge the tr u th of any occurrence to be such or

such.

But it seems wholly impossible that such an acquired

exem plar should give us infa l l ible and com pletely certain

knowledge of a th ing . T he advocates of this op inion

give three reasons for such a con clusion . T h e first is

based upon the thing from which the exemplar is

abstracted, the second upon the subject in which the

exemplar inheres and the third upon the exemplar itself.

T h e first reason runs som ething like this. T he object

from which the exemplar is abstracted is i tself mutable ;

therefore it cannot be the cause of something unchange

able. B ut i t is only in virtue of some im m uta ble reason

th at someone can be certain that something is true. A n

exe m plar such as this,

then,

provides no such knowledge.

They claim this to be Augustine's argument in his

Eighty-three Questions, q. ix,J where he tells us not to look



101

DUNS SCOTUS

expectanda Veritas, quia sensibil ia sine intermissione

mu ta n tu r .

Secunda ratio talis est : Anima est ex se mutabilis et

passiva erroris ; ig itu r per n ih i l

mutabilius

ea potest

ratificari sive regulari ne erret. Sed tale exe m plar in ea

est mu tab i l ius quam ipsa an im a si t. Ig i t u r i l lud exemplar

non perfecte regulat

animam

ne erre t. R e qu ir i t ur ergo

specialis influentia superior . Haec d i c i t ur ra t io Augus-

tini De vera religione * : Lex om niu m a r t i u m , etc.

Tert io ra t io : notitiam veri tat is nul lus habet certam

et infal l ibi lem nisi habeat unde possit

verum

discernere

a

ver is im i l i ,

quia si non possit discernere verum a falso

[MS secundo] vel a veris imi l i , potest dubitare se fal l i .

Sed per exemplar

praedictum

creatum non potest d is-

cern i ve ru m a ve ris im i l i ; ergo, etc. Pro ba t io minoris :

Species talis potest representare se tamquam se vel alio

modo

se tamquam objectum, sicut est in somniis, si

repraesentet se ta m q u a m ob je ctu m , falsitas est, si se

tam qu am se, Veritas est. Ig it u r per

talem

speciem non

habetur sufficiens d ist inct ivum quando repraesentat se ut

se vel u t ob jec tum , et i ta nee suff iciens dist inct ivum veri

a falso.

Ex ist is concludi tur quod certam scientiam et infa l l i

b i lem veri tatem si cont ingat hominem cognoscere, hoc

non convenit ei aspiciendo ad exemplar a re per sensus

acceptum quantumcumque s i t depuratum et un iversa le

f ac tum,

sed re qu ir i t ur qu od respic iat ad exemplar

incre atu m . E t tunc modus pon end i est iste : Deus no n

ut cog nitum habet rat ion em exemplaris ad qu od

aspi

ciendo cogn oscitur sincera Veritas. Est

enim

cogni tum

* cap. xxx (Migne, P.L., xxxiv ,

147).




for truth from the senses, for what the senses perceive

constant ly undergoes change.

T h e second reaso n goes l ik e this. O f i tsel f the soul is

chang eable an d sub jec t to er ror . N o w a th in g w h ic h is

even more changeable than the soul i tsel f cannot correct

th is co nd i t i on or pre ven t the sou l f r o m er r in g. Bu t the

exemplar which inheres in the sou l i s even more mutab le

th a n the soul i tself . Co nse que nt ly , such an exe mp lar

does not regulate the soul so perfect ly that i t makes no

mis take . Som e specia l h ig he r inf lu en ce, th en , is re qu i re d.

T h i s , t he y say, is the ar gu m en t Au gu st i ne uses i n h is w o rk

De vera rel igione* : "S in ce the la w o f al l a r ts " , etc.

The third reason is that no-one possesses certain and

in fa l l ib le knowledge of the t ru th un less he can d is t ingu ish

the t ru th f rom what has on ly the appearance o f t ru th ,

for i f he is unable to tel l the true from the false or from

w h a t ap pears to be t ru e, he can st i l l be i n d o u bt w he th er

he is be in g dece ived or no t . N o w tr u t h can no t be dis

t ingu ished f rom what mere ly appears to be t rue by means

o f the aforesaid exe mp lar . Th er efo re , etc . Pr oo f o f the

m i n o r : Su ch a species ca n ei th er represe nt i tsel f as

species or, as happens in dreams, present i tself as an

ob jec t. I n the la tt er case, w e hav e fals i ty ; i n the fo rm er ,

t r u t h . T h e re is n o th in g ab ou t such a species th en th at

suff ices to di f ferent iate the f i rst mode of representat ion

from the second and thus to d is t inguish the t rue f rom the

false.

F r o m a l l th is they conc lude tha t i f m a n can kn ow the

infa l l ib le t ruth and possess certa in knowledge i t is not

because he looks upon an exemplar der ived f rom the

thing by way of the senses, no matter how much such an

ex em pla r m a y be pu r i f i ed a nd universa l ised. I t is neces

sary th at he look u po n the un crea ted exem plar . A n d

th e w a y the y assume this to ta ke pla ce is this.4 G o d does

not funct ion as exemplar in the sense that He is the object

kn o w n so tha t un adu l te ra ted t r u th is kn o w n by look in g

at H i m . Fo r G o d is kn o w n on ly un de r some genera l

(2,322) 15



102

DUNS SCOTUS

in genera l i at tr ibute Sed est ratio cognoscendi ut

nu du m exemplar e t pro pr ia ra t io cognoscendi u t nu du m

exemplar et propria rat io essentiae creatae.

Qua l i t e r autem possit esse ratio cognoscendi et non

cogni tum poni tur exemplum, qu ia s icut rad ius solis

qua ndo quo de riva tur quasi ob l iqu ato aspectu a suo fonte

quandoque d i recte. Q uo d v ide tur in rad io

primo modo

derivato, l icet sol s i t rat io v idendi, non tamen ut visus in

se.

Ejus au tem q uo d vid etu r secundo m odo in rad io, sol

est i ta ra t io cognoscendi qu od etiam est cogn itus. Q ua nd o

igi tur ista lux increata inte l lectum quasi d irecto aspectu

i l lustr at , tun c u t v isa est ra t io v id en di a l ia in ipsa.

I n te l

lec tum autem nostrum pro s ta tu v iae quasi ob l iquato

aspectu i l lustrat, et ideo est intel lectui nostro rat io

v ide nd i non v isa.

Poni tur autem qual i ter habeat triplicem ra t i onem

respectu actus videndi, sci l icet lucis actuantis, speciei

immutant is, et caracteris s ive

exemplaris

conf igurant is.

Et ex hoc concludi tur u l t ra quod requir i tur special is

inf luent ia, quia s icut

ilia

essent ia non videtur natural i ter

a nobis in se, ita ut

ilia

essentia est exemplar respectu

alicujus essentiae n at ur al i te r non vi de tu r. Secund um

Augustinum

De videndo D e u m * I n ejus

enim

potes-

tate est v id er i ; s i v u l t , v id etu r ; s i no n v u l t , no n vide

tur . U l t im o ad di tu r qu od perfecta no t i t ia ver i ta t is est

quando duae species

exemplares

concurrun t in

mente,

una inhaerens, scil icet creata, alia i l lapsa, scil icet non

creata ; et sic co nting im us

verbum

perfecte veritat is.

(Arguo contra

istam opinionem

i n se, secundo c on tra

rationes fundamentales adductas vel econverso. Primum

inc lud i t quartum art icu lum, qu i est quasi ad hominem

cap.

vi (Migne, P.L.,

xxxni,

603).




attr ibu te. Bu t God is the reason w hy we kno w inasmuch

as He is the sole exemplar and the proper reason for the

created essence.

The fol lowing example is used to explain how God can

be the reason why we know and yet not be known in

Him self. Some su nlig ht is reflected w hil e other rays come

dire ctly fro m the ir source. A n d even tho ug h the sun is

the reason why we see something by reflected sunlight,

the sun itself is no t seen. But for an object i l l u m in e d by

direct l ight, the sun is a reason for knowing that is also

k n o w n . I n s imi lar fashion,

then,

when the Uncreated

Light as i t were i l lumines an intel lect by a direct glance,

then this Light as seen is the reason for seeing the other

things i n it. I n the present l ife, however, this Unc rea ted

L ig h t i l lum ines our inte l lect ind irec t ly as i t were.

Con

sequently, though unseen itself, it is the reason why our

intellect sees.

Now they claim that the uncreated exemplar is related

to the act of vision in three ways, viz. as a st imulating

light, as a transforming species, and as the character or

exemplar which produces a l ike form [ in the inte l lect ] .

From this they conclude further that a special inf luence

is re qu ire d. Fo r ju st as na tu ra lly we do not see this

essence in

itself,

neither do we see it naturally as the

exem plar o f any essence. As Aug us tine puts it in his

work De videndo

Deum

* : " I t is in H is power to be seen.

I f he wishes it , He is seen ; if He docs no t wish it , He is

no t seen ". F in al l y, they ad d that perfect knowledge of

truth results when the two exemplar species concur in

the mind, viz. the created exemplar which inheres in the

soul and the uncreated exemplar which enters from

w itho ut. A n d i t is in th is wa y that we have the w or d of

t ruth perfect ly.

(First

5

I argue against the opinion in

itself;

secondly

I refute the reasons adduced in its favour or turn them

to m y advantage. U nd er the f irst hea ding falls the fo ur th

art icle.

I t is an argumentum ad

hominem,

as it were , whereas



103 DUNS SCOTUS

et ter t ium qui est ad rem, secundum inc lud i t primum

articulum hie

e t te r t ium e t

sextum.

Q uin tus ergo

articulus est solutio quaestionis.)

Cont ra istam op in ionem, primo ostendo quod istae

rationes non sunt rat iones fundamentales alicujus op i -

nionis verae,

nee

secundum in ten t ionem

Augus t i n i ,

sed

sunt pro opinion e A ca de m ico rum . Secundo ostendo

quomodo

ilia

op in io Academicorum, quae v ide tur con-

cludi per istas ratione s, falsa sit. E t te rti o respondeo ad

rationes istas quatenus m inus co nclu du nt. Q ua rto arguo

contra conclusionem ist ius opinion is. Q u in to

solvo

quaestionem . Sexto ostendo qu om od o rat iones istae

quatenus sunt August in i concludunt i l lam in ten t ionem

Augus t in i ,

non i l lam ad

quam hie

i nducun tu r .

[Articu lus Primus. Rationes Henrici sunt pro Opinione

Academicorum]. P rim o, istae ratione s v id e n tu r con cludere

imp ossibi l i tatem certae cogn it ionis natu ral is. P rim a,

quia s i ob jectum cont inue mutatur nee potest haberi

a l iqua cert i tudo de ipso sub rat ione immutabi l is . Immo

nee in quocumque lumine posset cert i tudo haberi, quia

non est cert i tudo quando objectum al io modo cognos-

c i tur qu am se habet . Ig i tu r

nee

est certitudo cognos-

cendo m utab i le u t im m uta bi le . Patet etiam quod ante-

cedens hujus rat ionis, videl icet quod sensibi l ia continue

mu ta n tu r ,

falsum

est. Ha ec

enim

est opinio quae

impon i tu r Herac l i to iv Metaphysicae*

Sim i l iter , s i propter m uta bi l i t a te m exemplaris, quo d est

in

anima

no stra, no n posset esse ce rt i t ud o, cu m q u id q u id

po nitu r in anim a subject ive sit m uta bi le , et iam ipse actus

in te l l igendi , sequi tur quod per n ih i l in an ima rectificatur

anim a ne erre t. [N on Dun s]

8

(Sequ itur et iam qu od ipse

actus in te l l igen di cum s it m uta bi l io r q ua m ipsa an im a in

qua est, numquam eri t verus

nee

ver i ta tem cont inebi t . )

*

iv ,

cap. v

(ioioa,

6).




103

the t h ir d ar ticle is ad rem. T h e second hea ding includes

the m ate ria l in the th ir d an d sixth art icles. T he f if th

art ic le ,

therefore, is the solution to the question.)

Against this opinion, in the f irst [art icle] I show that

these arguments are not a basis for any true opinion.

Neither are they in accord with the mind of August ine.

Instead they lead to the view of the Academicians.6

In the second [art icle], I show how the view of the

Academicians, which seems to follow from these reasons,

is false. I n the t h i r d , I answer these arguments in so far

as they are inconc lusive. I n the fo u rt h , I argue against

the conclusion of th is op inion [of H e n ry ] . I n the

fifth,

I solve the ques tion. I n the six th, I show ho w these

reasons, in so far as they are Augustine's, prove what

Augustine intended to prove rather than what they are

here used to prove.

[Article I . Henry's Arguments lead to

Scepticism].

First,

these reasons seem to imply the impossibil ity of any

ce rtain na tu ra l knowledge. Consider the f irst.7 I f an

object is co ntin ua lly chan ging we can have no cert i tude

abo ut i t by any ki n d of l igh t, for there can be no cert i tude

w he n an object is kn ow n in some wa y other th an the w ay

in wh ic h i t is. Ne ither is there any cert i tude in k no w ing

a changeable thi n g as uncha ngea ble. I t is also clear tha t

the antecedent of this argument is false, viz. that what

the senses can perceive is co nt inua lly c ha ng ing . This is

the op inion at t r ib ute d to Hera cl itus

in

Metaphysics, bk.

i v . *

Likewise, i f the mutabil i ty of the exemplar in our soul

makes cert i tude impossible, then it fol lows that nothing

in the soul could prevent i t f rom err ing, for everything

inhering in such a subject is also mutable—even the act

o f und ersta ndin g itself.8 ( I t fol lows furthe r tha t, inas

much as the act of understanding is even more mutable

th an the soul in w hi ch i t resides, i t w i l l never be tru e

nor contain t ruth.)



104 DUNS SCOTUS

Simi l i ter , secundum istam opinionem species creata

inhaerens concurri t cum specie i l labente,

sed

quando

al iqu id concurr i t quod repugnat cert i tud in i , non potest

cert i tudo haberi , s icut enim ex altera de necessario et

altera de contingenti non sequitur conclusio nisi de

cont ingent i , i ta ex certo et incerto concurrent ibus ad

al iquam cognit ionem, non sequitur cognit io certa.

Idem pate t etiam de tertia ratione, quia si species ipsa

abstracta a re concurrat ad

omnem

cognit ionem et non

potest ju d i ca r i quando ilia repraesentat se tanquam se et

quando se tam qua m objectum ; ergo quo dcu m que aliud

concurrat , non potest haberi cert i tudo per quam dis-

cernatur verum a ver is im i l i . Istae ig i t ur rat iones vid en tur

concludere omnem incert i tud inem et op in ionem Acade-

m i co rum .

Q u o d

autem

ista conclusio non sit secundum inten-

tionem

Au gus t in i probo. August inus n

Soliloquiorum

* :

Spectabil ia discipl inarum quisque verissima esse nulla

du bita t ion e conce dit. E t Boethius De

hebdomadibus f

:

Communis animi conceptio est quam quisque probat

aud i tam. E t Philosophus n Metaphysicae \ : P rim a

pr inc ip ia sunt omnibus nota. Ex h is t r ibus au cto r i ta t i -

bus, arguitur sic quod convenit omnibus al icujus speciei,

sequitur

naturam speci f icam.

Ig i tu r cu m quisque habet

cer t i tud inem in fa l l ib i lem de

primis

pr incip i is et u l t ra

cuilibet est natural i ter evidens forma syl logismi perfecti

i

Pr iorum,**

scient ia autem conclusionum non dependet

nis i ex evident ia princip i i et ex evident ia i l la t ionis

syl lo-

gisticae, ig itu r c ui l ib et na tu ra l i te r scita potest esse quae-

cumque

conclusio demonstrabil is ex principi is per se

notis.

*

i i,

cap. xi (Migne, P.L.,

xxxn,

893-894).

t (Migne, P.L., lx iv , 131

i).

t 11, cap. i

(9936,

4).

* * Analytica

priora,

1,

cap. i i

(24'',

22-26).




I04

Likewise, according to this opinion, the created species

which inheres in the soul concurs with the species that

enters fr o m w ith o u t. But no ce rtitud e is possible whe re

something incom pat ib le w it h cert i tude concurs. For just

as we can infer only a contingent proposit ion from a

necessary and a contingent proposit ion combined, so

also a concurrence of what is certain and what is un

certain does not produce certain knowledge.

The same reasoning clearly applies to the third

arg um en t. Fo r i f the species abstracted fro m the thin g

is a concurrent factor in al l knowledge, and if we cannot

judge when such a species represents itself as such and

when it represents itself as object, then it makes no

difference w h at concurs w it h such a species. W e shall

never have a certain norm for dist inguishing the true

fr o m wh at me rely appears to be true . These arguments

then seem to lead to the conclusion that all is uncertain,

the opinion of the Academicians.

T h a t such a conclusion is no t w ha t Augustine intende d

I prove fro m the second book of his Soliloquies * : "E ve ry

one concedes without hesitation that the proofs of the

sciences are mos t tr u e " . A n d Boethius says in De hebdo-

madibus\ : A common concept ion of the mind is that

w hic h is conclusive for anyone w ho hears i t " . A n d

the Philosoph er i n Metaphysics, bk .

i i , J

says : "F ir s t

principles are kn ow n to a l l . . ." . O n the basis of

these three testimonies, the following argument is

con

structed. W hateve r pertains to al l the members o f a

given species, springs from the specific nature itself.

Now since the knowledge of conclusions depends solely

upon the evidence of f irst principles and of the syllo

gist ic inference, then if everyone has infal l ible cert i tude

abo ut f irst principles and furthe r, i f the fo rm of the perfect

sy llogism as de fined i n Prior Analytics, bk. i , * * is natural ly

evident to everyone, then anyone can know natural ly

any con clusion dem onstrable fro m self-evident principles.



105

DUNS SCOTUS

Secundo apparet quod August inus concedit

cer t i -

tud inem

eorum

quae cognoscuntur per experient iam

sensuum. U nde d ic i t x v De

Trinitate,

cap. x i i i vel xx x i i * :

Absit ut ea quae didicimus per sensus corporis vera esse

dubitemus

per ea quippe did ic imus caelum et

terram

et

ma re et om nia quae in eis sunt. Si no n dubita m us de

veri tate eo rum et no n fa l l im ur , u t patet ; ergo cert i

sumus de cognit is p er viam sensus. N a m ce rt i tu do habe-

tur quando exc lud i tur dubi ta t io e t decept io .

Patet etiam ter t io quod August inus concedi t

cer t i -

tud in em de actibus nostr is , ib ide m x v , cap. x i i ve l xx x i

f

sive dormiat s ive vig i let v iv i t , quia et dormire et in

somniis videre viven tis est. Q u o d si dicas : vivere non

esse actum secundum sed

p r im u m ,

sequitur ib idem : Si

al iquis dicat, scio me scire, me vivere, falli non potest,

e t iam

quotiescumque reflectendo

super p r imum

scitum

;

et ib id em : Si quis d ica t, volo esse beatus, quomodo non

impudenter respondetur, forte fal leris, et ibi ref lectendo

in in f in i tum sc io me velle etc. Ib id e m : Si quispiam

dicat errare nolo, nonne

eum

errare nolle

verum

est.

Et a l ia , inqui t , reper iuntur quae contra Academicos

valent qui n ih i l scir i ab homine posse concedunt.

Sequitur ibidem De tribus contra Academicos libris

\

quos qu i in te l lexer i t , n ih i l eum contra perceptionem

veri tat is

argumenta

eorum

multum movebun t .

I t em

eodem xv , cap . v i i i ve l xxxv i i i * * : I l ia quae sciuntur ut

numquam excidere possint et ad naturam ipsius animae

pert inent cujusmodi est i l lud quod nos vivere scimus.

(Notandum quod quat tuor sunt cogni t iones in qu ibus

est nobis necessaria certitudo, scilicet de scibilibus

* xv , cap. xi i (Migne, P.L., x l i i ,

1075).

t loc. cit. (1074).

t Libri tres contra Academicos (Migne, P.L., xxxii, 905-958).

** xv , cap. xv (Migne,

P.L.,

x l i i ,

1078).



CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IO5

Secondly, it is clear that Augustine concedes the

cert i tude of those things kn o w n t hr ou gh sense experience.

Hence he says in De Trinitate, bk . x v * : "F a r be i t

that

w e

shou ld do ub t abo ut those things w hic h we learn to be true

th ro u g h o ur bo di ly senses, for t hr ou gh these we learn the

heavens, the earth, the sea and al l that are in them".

If then we are not deceived nor in doubt about the truth

of these things, as is clearly the case, we are certain of

things known through the senses, for where doubt and

deception are excluded, we have cert i tude.

Thirdly, i t is c lear that in the same work August ine

also concedes that we have certitude regarding our

actions, f " H e is alive whe the r he be asleep or awake,

for it is a pa rt of l iv in g also to sleep and to see in dre am s".

And if it be objected that to l ive is not a second act but

a first act,9 he adds in the same place : " I f anyone sh ould

say, ' I know tha t I kno w or tha t I l iv e' , he cannot be

deceived, no matter how often he reflect on this first

know ledge". A n d in the same p lace : " A n d i f one says,

' I am ha pp y' , how can one say w itho ut being imp ude nt,

'Perhaps yo u are deceived'? A n d i f I reflect ad infinitum,

I kno w that I w i l l , an d so o n " . A n d i n the same place :

" I f anyone says I do no t wish to err, w il l i t not be true

tha t he does no t wish to err. . ." . " A n d other arg um ents ",

he says, "can be found which hold against the Acade

mic ians, wh o m ainta in that noth ing can be kno wn by

m a n " .

A n d in the same w or k : " I f anyone has read our

Contra

Academicos,X

the arguments against the perception

of t ru th g iven by the Academic ians w i l l not move h i m " .

Likew ise, in the same book * * : "Th ose things w hi ch are

kn ow n in such a wa y tha t they can never sl ip fro m the

mind but pertain to the nature of the soul i tself , of such

k in d is the knowledge tha t we l ive. . . " .

(Note 10 tha t there are fou r kinds of knowledge of

w hic h we are necessarily ce rtain, viz.

( i )

things knowable



106

DUNS

SGOTUS

simpliciter

; de

scibilibus

per

experientiam

;

de

act ibus

nos tris ; et de co gn itis a nob is u t n un c pe r sensus ;

exemplum tr iangulus habet t res, etc. ;

luna

eclipsatur ;

v ig i lo ; i l lud est a lbum. Primum et tertium tantum

egent sensu ut occasione, quia simpliciter est certitudo

si

omnes

sensus errarent, secundum et quartum tenent

per

i l l u d ,

sci l icet quod frequenter evenit a non l ibero

habet i l lud pro per se causa natural i , ex hoc sequitur

proposi tum tarn in secundo

quam

in quarto a l iquando

ad ditu r prop osi t io necessaria. I ta qu e auctori tates

Augus-

t i n i

dimittas

usque ad art iculum secundum, qui est ad

re m vel q u i est solut io). (P rim um est m anifes tum , ter

tium conceditur esse per se n o t u m , a l ias non jud icaretur

q u id esset per se n o tu m . Secun dum et q u a rt u m haben t

infinitas per se notas quibu s ju n g u n t al ias ex plurib us

sensibus).

Sic patet pr imum

quomadmodum

rat iones i l l ius non

concludunt et quod hoc falsum s it e t contra A ug us t inum .

[Articulus Secundus. Reprobatio Scepticisms]. Q u a n tu m

ad secundum art iculum ut in nul l is cognoscibi l ibus

locum habeat error Academicorum, v idendum est

qua l i -

ter de tribus cognoscibi l ibus praedict is

dicendum

est,

videl icet de prin cip i is per se notis et de conc lusionibus,

et secundo de cognit is per experientiam, et tert io de

actibus nostris,

utrum

possi t natural i ter haberi cert i tudo

infal l ib i l is .

[a.

De Notitia Princip iorum]. Q u a n tu m ergo ad

cert i tud inem de pr inc ip i is d ico s ic . T e rm in i p r i n

cipiorum per se

notorum talem

habent iden t i ta tem u t

alter evidenter necessario alteram includat, et ideo

intel lectus componens illos terminos, ex quo apprehendit



CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE Io6

in an unquali f ied sense, (2) things knowable through

experience, (3) our actions, (4) things known at the

present tim e thro ug h the senses. A n exam ple [o f each] :

(1) A tria ng le has three [angles eq ual to tw o right ang les],

(2) The moon is eclipsed, (3) I am awake, (4) That is

whi te .

T h e first an d th ir d req uire the senses m ere ly as

an occasion, because even if all the senses erred, there

w ou ld st i l l be cert i tude purely and simply. Th e second

an d fo ur th hold in v ir tu e of th is proposi t ion : 'Whatever

happens frequently through something that is not free,

has this som ething as its n a tu ra l per se caus e". F ro m

this principle cert i tude fol lows in the second and fourth

cases w he n the other pr op os ition is necessary. Th ere fore

you can let the arguments f rom the au tho ri ty of Augus t ine

go u n ti l the second art icle , w h ic h is ad rem, or to the [f i f th

art ic le] w h ic h is the solut ion.) (Th e u first is manifest,

the t h ir d is conceded to be self-evident ; otherwise we

co uld no t jud ge wh at is self-evident. T h e second an d

fourth have an inf inity of self-evident truths to which

others are added which are based on the testimony of

several senses.)

And so the first article is clear, viz. that the reasons

[of Henry] are inconclusive, that his opinion is false and

not in accord with the mind of August ine.

[Ar ticle I I . The Rejection o f Scepticism]. As regards

the second article, lest the error of the Academicians be

repeated in regard to any of those things which can be

k n o w n , we must see what is to be said of the three types

of knowledge m ention ed above, viz. wh ether i t is possible

to have infal l ib le cert i tude natural ly :

(1)

of self-evident

principles and conclusions, (2) of things known by ex

perience, and (3) of our actions.

[a. Certitude of First Principles]. As to the cert i tude

o f prin cip les , I have this to say. T h e terms of self-

evide nt principles are so ide ntica l tha t i t is evident tha t

one necessarily includes the othe r. Con seque ntly, the

intel lect unit ing these terms in a proposit ion, from the



107 DUNS SCOTUS

eos,

habet

apud

se necessariam

causam

conformitat is

i l l ius actus componendi ad ipsos terminos quorum est

composit io, et

etiam

causam evidentem tal is conformi

tat is,

et ideo necessario patet sibi ilia conformitas cujus

causam evidentem appre hend i t in term in is . Ig i tu r non

potest in

intellectu

apprehensio esse terminorum et

composit io eo rum, quin stet conformitas i l l ius

com-

posit ionis ad terminos, sicut stare non potest album et

a l b u m ,

qu in s te t s im i l i tudo. Haec

autem

conformitas

compositionis ad terminos est Veritas compositionis.

Ergo non potest stare composit io

talium

t e rm in o ru m

q u in sit vera . E t i ta no n potest stare perce ptio i ll ius

composit ionis et percept io terminorum, quin stet per

ceptio conformitat is composit ionis ad terminos, et i ta

percept io veri tat is quia prima percepta evidenter

inc ludunt perceptionem ist ius veritat is.

Confirmatur rat io ista per simile per Philosophum rv

Metaphysicae* ubi

vult

quod opposi tum pr inc ip i i non

potest in in te l lec tu al icujus ven ire, sci licet hujus m od i im -

possibile idem esse et non esse, quia tunc essent opiniones

contrariae

simul

i n

mente

; quo d ut iqu e

verum

est de

opinionibus contrari is, id est repugnant ibus formal i ter,

quia opinio opinans esse de aliquo et opinio opinans

non esse de

eodom,

sunt form al i te r repugnantes. I t a

arguam in proposi to , repugnant iam aliquam intel lec-

tionum

in m ente, l icet no n form alem ; s i

enim

stat in

intel lectu not i t ia tot ius et part is, et composit io eorum,

cum ista includant sicut causa necessaria conformitatem

composit ionis ad terminos, si stet in intel lectu haec

opinio, quod ipsa composit io sit falsa, stabunt noti t iae

repugnantes ; no n form al i te r, sed no t i t ia una stabi t cum

*

iv ,

cap. ii i

(1005', 23-24).




107

very fact that it grasps these terms, has present to itself

the necessary cause, an d w ha t is

more—the

ev ident cause,

of the conformity of th is proposi t ion with the terms that

compose i t . Th is con form ity,

then,

the evident cause of

which the intellect perceives in the terms, cannot help

bu t be evident to the intel lect. T h a t is w hy the intel lect

could not apprehend these terms and unite them in a

proposi t ion without having th is re lat ionship of

con

formity arise between the proposit ion and the terms, any

m ore tha n tw o wh ite objects could exist w ith ou t a rela t ion

ship of sim ilar i ty arising between them . N o w it is pre

cisely this conformity of the proposition to the terms that

constitutes the tr u th of a jud gm en t. Such terms then

cannot be combined in a judg m en t w i tho ut be ing true,

an d so i t is th at one canno t perceive this prop os ition an d

its terms without also perceiving the conformity of the

proposit ion to the terms, and therefore, perceiving the

t r u th .

For w h at is f irst perceived evid en tly includes

the perception of the truth of the proposit ion.

I n Metaphysics,, bk.

r v , *

the Philosopher confirms this

reasoning by a simile. Th ere he points ou t tha t the

opposite o f a first pr in cip le such as " I t is impossible th at

the same th ing be and not b e ", cannot enter the m in d of

anyone because then the mind would possess contrary

opinions simultaneously. Th is is indeed true of co ntrar y

opinions, that is, propositions formally opposed to each

other. Fo r the opinions a ttr ib ut in g existence and

non

existence to one and the same th in g are fo rm all y opposed.

And so in the question at hand, I argue that there is

some kind of repugnance existing between intellections

in the mind, even though i t is not exact ly a formal

opposi t ion.

For i f the in te llect possesses the kno wledg e

of "who le" and o f "par t " and combines them in a p ro

posi t ion, since they include the necessary reason for the

conformity of the proposit ion to the terms, i f the intel lect

were to th ink th is proposi t ion fa lse, two mutual ly repug

nant acts of knowledge would coexist, even though the



108

DUNS SCOTUS

al ia, et tamen erit causa necessaria oppositae notitiae

ad

i l l a m ,

qu od est impo ssibi le. Sicut enim impossibile

est a lbum et n igrum

simul

stare, quia sunt contraria

formaliter, i ta impossibi le est simul stare album et illud

quod est praecise causa

n i g r i ,

ita necessario quod non

potest esse sine eo absque contradictione.

Habi ta cert i tud ine de pr inc ip i is

primis

patet quomodo

habebitur de conclusionibus i l lat is ex eis propter evi-

dentiam

syl logismi perfecti , cum cert i tudo conclusionis

tantumodo dependeat ex cert i tudine

principiorum

et ex

evident ia i l la t ioais.

Sed numquid in is ta not i t ia pr inc ip iorum et con-

c lus ionum non errab i t intellectus si sensus omnes deci-

piantur c irca

terminos

? Respondeo qu an tum ad

istam

no t i t i am , quod intellectus non habet sensus pro causa,

sed

tantum

pro occasione, quia intel lectus non potest

habere not i t iam simplicium nisi acceptam a sensibus.

I l ia tamen accepta vir tute sua potest s imul componere

sim plicia , et si ex ra t ion e

talium

s im pl ic ium s it com plex io

evidenter vera, inte l lectus vir tute propria et terminorum

assentiet i l l i complexioni non virtute sensus a quo

accipi t terminos exterius. E xe m plu m : s i ra t io tot ius

et rat io majoritatis accipiatur a sensu et intellectus

componat istam :

Omne totum

est

majus

sua parte, in

tel lectus virtute sui et istorum terminorum assent iet

indubi tanter is t i complex ion i e t non tantum quia v id i t




opp osit ion is no t precisely fo rm al . T h e one act of kn ow

ledge would be co-present with the other even though

the first is the necessary cause of the very opposite of the

second,

w h ic h is impo ssible. For ju s t as it is impossible

for white to be at the same time black because the two

are formally contraries, so it is also impossible to have

the white where you have the precise cause of blackness.

The necessity in this case is of such a kind that i t would

be a contradict ion to have the one [viz. the knowledge of

the terms and the pro pos i t ion] w ith o ut the other [v iz. the

knowledge of the conformity between the two].

Once we have cert i tude of first principles, it is clear

how one can be certain of the conclusions drawn from

such principles, since the perfect syllogism is evident,12

and the certitude of the conclusion depends solely upon

the certitude of the principles and the evidence of the

inference.

But wil l the intel lect not err in i ts knowledge of

principles and conclusions, if all the senses are deceived

ab ou t the terms? I re ply th at so far as this k in d of kn ow

ledge goes, the senses are not a cause but merely an

occasion of the intellect's knowledge, for the intellect

cannot have any knowledge of the terms of a proposit ion

unless it has take n the m fr o m the senses. B u t once it

has them, the intel lect by i ts own power can form pro

posit ions w it h these terms. A n d if a prop osit ion be

evidently true by reason of the terms involved, the

intellect by its own power will assent to this proposition

in vi rtu e o f the terms an d no t b y reason of the senses fro m

w hi ch i t externally received the terms. T o give an

example : I f the not ion of "w h o le " and the not ion of

"greater

t h a n "

be take n fro m the senses an d the inte llect

form the proposi t ion "Every whole is greater than i ts

part" , the inte l lect by i ts own power and in v ir tue of the

terms wil l assent to this proposit ion without the shadow

of doub t. A n d i t does no t assent to this because i t sees

these terms verif ied in some thing, as it does when it



log DUNS SCOTUS

term inos conjun ctos i n re, sicut assentit isti : Sortes

est a lbus, quia v idet terminos in re un i r i .

Immo d ico quod si omnes sensus essent falsi a quibus

accip iuntur ta les termin i vel quod plus est ad decep-

t ionem,

aliqui sensus falsi et aliqui sensus

ve r i ,

intel lectus

circa talia p r inc ip ia non deciperetur, qu ia semper hab eret

apud se terminos qui essent causa veritatis, utpote si

a lic u i caeco na to essent impressae [ M S om. miraculose in

somniis] species albedinis et nigredinis et illae remanerent

post in v ig i l ia, inte l lectus

abstrahens

ab eis componeret

is tam : a lb um n on est n ig ru m , et c i rca istam n o n

deci

peretur inte l lectus, l icet termini accip iantur a sensu

errante, quia rat io

formalis terminorum

a d

quam

deven-

tum est, est necessaria causa veritatis hujus negativae.

[b . De cognitis per experientiam]. D e secundis , sci

l icet de cognit is per experientiam, dico quod l icet expe-

rientia non habeatur de omnibus singularibus, sed de

pluribus, neque quod semper, sed quod pluries, tamen

expertus infal l ibi l i ter novit quia i ta est et semper et in

omnibus, et hoc per istam proposit ionem qui est quies-

centem in anima : Q ui dq ui d evenit u t in p lur ibu s ab

aliqua causa non libera, est effectus naturalis i l l ius

causae, quae propositio nota est intellectui l icet acce-

pisset term inos ejus a sensu er ran te. Q u ia causa no n

l ibera non potest producere ut in p lur ibus

effectum

non

libere ad cujus opposi tum ord inatur, ve l ad quem ex

sua form a no n or din at ur . Sed causa casualis or di na tu r

ad producendum oppositum effectus casual is, vel non

ad i l iu m pro duc en du m . Erg o, n ih i l est causa casualis

effectus frequenter producti ab eo, et i ta si non sit l ibera

erit causa natural is.

Iste autem

effectus evenit a tali




log

assents to the proposition "Socrates is white", because it

saw the terms united in real i ty.

I ndeed , if the senses from which these terms were

received were a ll false, or w ha t is m ore deceptive, if some

were false and others true, I st i l l maintain that the in te l

lect would not be deceived about such principles,

because the terms which are the cause of the truth would

always be present to the intellect. And so i t would be

if the species of whiteness and blackness were impressed

m iraculous ly in s leep up on one w ho was b l in d fro m b ir th

and they rem ained af ter he awoke. Th e intel lect cou ld

abstract f rom these and form the proposi t ion "White is

not b la ck " . A n d i t w ou ld not be deceived w i t h regard

to this proposit ion even if the terms were derived from

erring senses, because the formal meaning of the terms

at which the intellect has arrived is the necessary cause

of th is negat ive truth.

\b. Experimental

Knowledge].

As for w ha t is kn ow n

b y experience, I have this to say. Ev en th ou gh a person

does not experience every single individual, but only a

great many, nor does he experience them at all t imes,

but only frequently, st i l l he knows infal l ibly that i t is

always this way an d holds for all instances. H e knows

this in v irt u e of this pro po sition reposing i n his soul :

"Whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause

th a t is no t free, is the n a tu ra l effect of th at cause ". This

pro po sit ion is kno w n to the intel lect even if the terms are

derived from erring senses, because a cause that does not

act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that

is the very opposite of what i t is ordained by i ts form to

pro du ce . T h e chance cause, however, is ord aine d either

to produce or not produce the opposite of the chance

effect. Con seque ntly, if the effect occurs freq ue ntly it

is not produced by chance and its cause therefore will be

a n a tu ra l cause i f it is no t a free agen t. But this effect

occurs th ro ug h such a cause. Th ere fore , since the latte r

2 , 3 2 2 ) 16



110

DUNS SCOTUS

causa, ergo i l lud est causa naturalis effectus frequenter

product i ab eo, qu ia non est casualis.

Iste enim

effectus

evenit

a tal i causa ut in pluribus,

hoc acceptum est per experientiam, quia inveniendo

talem naturam

nunc cum ta l i acc idente nunc cum ta l i

inventum est quod quantacumque esset diversitas

accident ium, semper istam naturam sequebatur ta l is

effectus, igitur non per al iquod accidens ist i naturae

sed per naturam ipsam in se se qu itur talis effectus.

Sed ulterius

notandum

quod quandoque acc ip i tur

experientia de conclusione, puta quod luna frequenter

eclipsatur, et tunc supposita conclusione quia ita est,

inquiri tur causa tal is conclusionis per viam divisionis, et

quandoq ue deve nitur ex conclusione experta ad pr inc ip ia

nota ex terminis, et tunc ex ta l i pr incip io noto ex

terminis potest conclusio, priu s tantum secundum experi

entiam nota, certius cognosci, scil icet primo genere cogni-

t ionis,

qu ia u t deducta ex prin cip io per se no to, s icut

istud est per se n o t u m , q u o d opacum interpositum

in ter

perspicuum

e t lumen,

impedit

mu l t i p l i ca t ionem

lum inis ad ta le perspicuum ; et s i in ve nt um fueri t per

div is ionem quod terra ta le est corpus interposi tum

inter

solem

et

l u n a m ,

scietur cert issime demonstrat ione

prop te r

q u i d ,

qu ia per causam e t non tantum per ex

perientiam, sicut sciebatur ista conclusio ante inventio-

nem p r inc ip i i .

Quandoque autem est experientia de principio i ta

quod non cont ingi t per v iam div is ionis invenire ul ter ius

pr in c ip ium no tum ex term in is , sed sta tur in a l iquo uno

ut in pluribus cujus extrema per exper imentum scitum

est frequenter

u n i r i ,

pu ta quod

haec

herba talis speciei



C O N C E R N IN G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E

I 10

is not a chance cause, it is the natural cause of the effect

it frequently produces.

That such an effect occurs frequently through such a

cause is a fact gathered from experience. For once we

find such a nature associated at one time with this

accident and at another with that, we have discovered

that despite the accidental differences, such an effect

inva riably follows from this nature. Hence, such an

effect is not the result of what is merely incidental to

such a nature but is rather the effect of this nature as

such.

It should be noted further that at times we experience

[the tru th ] of a conclusion, such as : "T he moon is

frequently eclipsed". Th en , granting the va lidity o f this

conclusion because it is a fact, we proceed by the method

of divis ion to discover the reason for this. And sometimes,

beginning with a conclusion thus experienced, a person

arrives at self-evident princ iples. I n such a case, the

conclusion which at

first

was known only by experience

now is known by reason of such a principle with even

greater certainty, namely that characteristic of the first

kind of knowledge, for it has been deduced from a self-

evident princ iple . Thus for instance, i t is a self-evident

principle that when an opaque body is placed between

a visible object and the source of light, the transmission

of ligh t to such an object is prevented. Now, i f a person

discovers by way of division that the earth is such an

opaque body interposed between sun and moon, our

conclusion w il l no longer be known merely by experience

as was the case before we discovered this princip le. I t

will be now known most certainly by a demonstration

of th e reasoned fact,13 for i t is known through its cause.

Sometimes, however, we experience a princ iple in such

a way that it is impossible to discover by further division

any self-evident princ iple from wh ich i t could be derived.

Instead we must be satisfied w it h a pr inciple whose terms

are known by experience to be frequently united, for



I l l

DUNS

SGOTUS

est calida

nee

i nven i tu r m ed ium

aliud

pr ius per quod

demonstretur passio de subjecto propter qu id , sed statur

in isto sicut

primo

noto propter experient ias, l icet tunc

ce rt i tud o et infa l l ib i l i ta s [read inc er t i tu do et fa l l ib i l i tas ]

removeantur per istam p ropos i t ionem : effectus ut in

plu rib us al icujus causae no n l iberae , est na tur al is effectus

ejus ; tamen iste est ult imus gradus cognitionis scienti-

f icae et forte ibi non

habetur

cognit io actual is unionis

ext re m oru m sed ap t i tud in a l is . Si enim passio est alia

res absoluta a subjecto, posset sine contradictione sepa-

ra ri a subjecto, et expertus no n haberet cog nit ion em qu ia

ita est, sed quia ita

aptum natum

est esse.

[c. De actibus nostris]. D e te rti is co gn itio nibus ,

scili

cet de actibus nostris, dico quod est cert i tudo de multis

eorum sicut de

primis

et per se notis, quod patet

rv

Meta-

physicae* ubi dicit Philosophus de rat ionibus dicentium

omnia apparentia esse vera, quod

illae

rat iones quaerunt

utrum nunc v ig i lemus an dormiamus, possunt autem

idem omnes dubi ta t iones ta les omnium enim rationum

h i i

dignificant

esse, et sub dit , ra t ion em qua eru nt qu oru m

no n est ra t io ; dem onstrat ionis en im p rin c ip i i non est

dem onstrat io. Ergo per ipsum ibi nos vigilare est per se

n o t u m ,

s icut pr inc ip ium demonstrat ion is .

Nee obstat quod est contingens, quia sicut dictum est

alias ; ordo est in con t inge nt ibu s, qu od al iq ua est p r im a

et immedia ta , vel esset processus in infinitum in con

t ingent ibus, vel al iquod contingens sequeretur ex causa

necessaria, quorum

utrumque

est impos sibile. E t sicut

IV, cap. vi

( i o n " ,

6-13 .



CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE I I I

example, tha t a certain species of herb is hot. Neither

do we find any other prior means of demonstrating just

why this attribute belongs to this particular subject, but

must content ourselves with this

as

a first principle known

from experience. Now even though the uncertainty and

fallibility in such a case may be removed by the pro

position "What occurs in most instances by means of a

cause tha t is not free is the natura l effect of such a cause",

still this is the very lowest degree of scientific knowledge

—and

perhaps we have here no

knowledge

of the actual

union of the terms but only a knowledge of what is apt

to be the case. For i f an attribute is an absolute entity

other than the subject, it could be separated from its

subject w ithout involving any con tradiction. Hence, the

person whose knowledge is based on experience would

not know whether such a thing is actually so or not, but

only that by its nature is it apt to be so.

[c. Knowledge o f Our Own Acts]. Regarding the th i rd

type o f knowledge, v iz . o f our acts, I say that we are

as certain o f many o f these as we are of the first and

self-evident propositions,

as is

clear from Metaphysics,

bk . i v . * There the Philosopher says

to the

arguments

o f

those who say that a l l that appears is true that they look

for proofs o f whether we are no w awake or asleep. " A l l

these doubts, however, amount to the same thing, for

they

a l l

th ink tha t there is

a

reason

fo r

everything."

A n d

he adds

:

"T h ey seek the reason

fo r

things of wh ich there

is

no

reason,

fo r

there

is no

demonstration

o f

a principle

of demo nstrat ion". Accord ing

t o h im ,

then,

the

fact

that we are awake is as self-evident as a pr inciple o f

demonstration.

That such a th ing is contingent matters not, fo r as we

have pointed

ou t

elsewhere, there

is an

order among

contingent propositions.14 Some proposition

is

first

and

immediate. Otherwise,

we

should have

an

infinite

regress i n contingent propositions o r something con

t ingent would fol low from

a

necessary cause, both

o f



112

DUNS SCOTUS

est ce rt i tu do de vig i la re , sicut de per se no to , i ta

etiam

de

multis aliis act ibus qui sunt in potestae nostra, ut me

intel l igere, me audire, et de al i is, qui sunt actus perfecti .

L ice t enim non s it cer t i tudo quo d videam a lbum extra

pos i tum, vel in ta l i subjecto, vel in ta l i d istant ia, quia

potest f ieri i l lusio in medio vel organo, et mult is al i is vi is,

tamen ce rt i tu do est qu od video etiams i i l lusio f iat in

organo, quae maxime i l lusio v idetur, puta quando actus

fit in ipso organo non ab objecto praesente, qualis natus

est f ieri ab objecto praesente, et ita si potentia haberet

act ionem

suam

posita tali positione vere esset

i l lud

ib i

quod visio dicitur, sive sit actio sive sit passio sive

u t rumque . S i autem i l lusio f ieret non in organo proprio

sed in a l iquo p rox im o quo d v ide tur org an um , s icut s i non

fieret i l lusio in concursu nervorum, sed in ipso oculo

fieret impress io speciei qu alis n ata est fieri a b a lbo,

adhuc visus videret quia talis species, vel quod

natum

est

v ideri in ea, v ideretur quia habet sufncientem d is tant iam

respectu organi visus quod est in concursu nervorum

i s to rum,

sicut apparet per Augustinum xi De Trinitate,

cap. i i , * quod re l iqu iae visorum remanentes in oculo

oculis clausis vi d en tu r. E t per

Philosophum

De sensu el

sensato,\ quod ignis qui generatur ex elevatione oculi

violenta et multiplicatur usque ad palpebram clausam,

v idetur.

Istae

verae sunt visiones licet n o n perfectissimae,

quia hie sunt sufficientes d istant iae specierum ad org anu m

principale visus.

(Nota : no t i t ia pr inc ip i i est immutabilis a veri tate in

fa ls itatem, no n al i ter, quia s im pl ic i ter co rru pt ib i l is est ;

* xi, cap. ii (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 987).

t cap. i i

(437",

23-24).



CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE I

12

w hic h are impossible. A n d ju st as ou r cert i tude o f being

awake is l ike that of self-evident propositions, the same

is true of m an y other acts i n ou r pow er such as " I und er

s t and " ,

or " I he ar ", a nd other such acts w hic h are being

performed.

For even though there is no cert i tude that I see white

located outside, either in such a subject or at such a

distance (for an i l lusion can be caused in the medium

or in the organ or in a number of other ways), st i l l for

a ll tha t there is ce rtitud e th at I see even w he n the il lu sio n

is in the organ itself, which seems to be the greatest of all

i l lusions (for instance, when the same kind of act takes

place in the organ w ith ou t a ny object present as nat ur al ly

should take place only when such an object is present).

In such a case, i f the faculty should act, that which is

cal led vision would truly be present whether vision be

action or passion or bo th . Bu t i f the i l lusion were no t

caused in the organ proper but in something near which

seems to be the organ, for instance, if the il lusion did not

take place i n th e b un dle o f nerves b u t i n the eye, a species

simi lar to that which natural ly resul ts f rom an object

w o u ld be impressed. I n such a case there w o ul d st i l l be

an act of v is ion, for we would see such a species or what

is to be seen therein because it is sufficiently distant from

the orga n of sight i n the bu nd le of those nerves. Thi s is

evident from Augustine in De Trinitate, bk. x i , c . i i , *

because after-images of vision are seen when the eye is

closed. I t is also evide nt fro m the Philosoph er in De

sensu et sensato,^ because the flash o f fire prod uc ed by vio

lently elevating the eye and transmitted as far as the

closed eyelid is seen. A lt h o u g h these are no t the most

perfect, they are true visions, for in this case a sufficient

distance intervenes between the species and the principal

organ of v is ion.

(Note 15 : Kno wledge of a pr inc ip le is im m utab le in

the sense th at i t cann ot change fro m tr u th to falsity. I t

is not unchangeable in the other sense, for it is simply



I 13 DUNS SCOTUS

sic species intelligibilis, non phantasma, est debilis, sed

immutabi l is a vera

repraesentatione

in

falsem

; sed

objectum l icet corrupt ibi le tamen est immutab i le a vera

entita te in falsam, et ideo est co nfor mat ivum no tit iae

sibi

seu causativum

notitiae sive veritati in essendo, quia

enti tas vera immutabil is in falsam virtual i ter continet

not i t iam

veram

immutabi l i ter, id est , conformem ent i tat i

verae.) (N ota : secundum

Augus t inum verum

neces-

sarium sive im m ut ab ile est supra men te m, inte ll ige : in

ratio ne verit atis ev identis , qu ia hanc de se causat in

mente, non autem secundum ejus evidentiam subest

ment i

ut possit apparere vera

vel

falsa, sicut subest verum

probabile menti, ut ipsa possit facere

i l l ud

apparere

verum vel falsum, quaerendo rationes h inc inde per quas

prob etur et imp rob etu r. Sic

in te l l igendum

est quod

mens non judicat de vero

immutab i l i ,

sed de

aliis,

quia

dictatio quod hoc sit verum, quae est actus judicandi, est

in potestate mentis respectu probabil is, non autem

respectu necessarii, nee tam en minus perfecte asserit de

necessario quod

ipsum

sit ve rum ; et haec assertio apu d

Aristotelem potest dici judicium, sed Augustinus

vul t

judicium esse in potestate judicantis, non quod statim

necessario de te rm ine tu r ab ali o. Sic pa te t qu om od o de

conclusione necessaria mens ju d ic a t qu ia n on est stat im

ex se ; ideo no n de termina t ex se ad evi de nt ia m sui ipsi

menti.

Potest

et iam

mens rationes sophisticas adducere



C O N C E R N IN G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E II3

perishable. Thus the intellig ible species, not the image,

is weak. Nevertheless, i t is unable to change from a

true to a false representation. But the object, although

perishable, cannot change from something true to

something false. As a result, it is able to conform

knowledge to itself or to cause knowledge or tru th

by being what it is, for a true entity, unable to be

come something false, virtually contains true know

ledge immutably, that is, knowledge conformed to true

entity.) (Note 16 : Accord ing to Augustine, necessary

or immutable truth is "above the

mind —understand

"taken precisely as evident tr u th " . For what is neces

sarily and immutably true causes this evident knowledge

of itself in the mind, As evident, such a tru th is not

subject to the mind so that it could appear either true

or false in the way that a probable truth is subject to the

m ind inasmuch as it is in the power of the m ind to make

it appear true or false by looking here or there for reasons

that prove or disprove it . I n this way w e must understand

the statement that the mind judges about other things

and not about immutable tru th . For it is only in the case

of something probable and not in the case of something

necessary that the assertion of its

truth—an

act of

judg

ment—lies

w ith in the power of the m ind. Bu t this does

not mean that the mind asserts the truth of a necessary

proposition in a less perfect manner. According to

Aristotle , the latter can be called a "judgm ent", whereas

Augustine understands judgment as something that is in

the power of the

o n e

jud ging and not as something that

is immediately and necessarily determined by a factor

beyond one's control. And so it is patent how the m ind

"judges" about a necessary conclusion that is not im

mediately evident of itself and therefore does not force

itself upon the m ind as something evident. The m ind

can even bring up sophistical reasons against the

con

clusion in question and on the basis of

these

reasons refuse

its assent. But this i t cannot do w ith something that is



I 14 DUNS SCOTUS

contra earn per quas dissentiat. N o n sic con tra p r imum

notum, i v

Metaphysicae * : I n

mentem

venire, etc.)

[d . De cognitis quae subsunt sensibus]. Sed quomodo

habetur

cert i tudo eorum

quae subsunt actibus sensus,

puta quod al iquid extra est album, vel cal idum, quale

appa ret? Respondeo : aut circa tale co gn itu m eadem

opposita apparent diversis sensibus aut non, sed

omnes

sensus cognoscentes i l l ud , habent ide m ju d ic iu m de eo.

Si secundo modo, tunc certitudo habetur de veritate talis

cogniti per sensus et per istam proposit ionem praece-

dentem : Quod evenit in plu ribu s ab aliq uo i l lu d est

causa na turalis ejus, si non sit causa libera. Ergo cu m

ab isto praesente ut in pluribus evenit talis immutat io

sensus sequitur quod immutatio vel species genita sit

effectus naturalis talis causae, et ita tale extra erit album,

vel cal idum, vel tale al iquid quale na tum est praesentari

per

speciem

genitam ab ipso ut in pluribus.

Si

autem

diversi sensus habeant diversa judicia de

aliquo viso extra, puta visus dicit bacu lum esse f ractum

cujus pars est in aqua et pars est in aere, visus semper

dici t

solem

esse

minoris quant i tat is quam

est, et

omne

visum a remotis esse minus quam sit, in talibus est certitu

do quid

ve rum

sit et quis sensus erret per propositionem

quiescentem in

an ima

ce r t i o ra r i

o mn i

judicio sensus, et

per actus p lu r i um sensuum

concurrentes,

ita quod semper

al iqua proposit io

recti f icat

mentem vel intel lectum de

actibus sensus quis sit verus et quis falsus, in qua pro-

positione intellectus non dependet a sensu, sicut a causa,

sed sicut ab occasione. Exemplu m : inte llec tus

habet

istam proposit ionem quiescentem : Nullum durius frangi-

tu r in ac tu alicujus moll is sibi cedentis. Haec est it a per

* iv, cap. ii i (10056,

15

ff.).




114

f i rst known [v iz. a primary princip le] according to

Metaphysics, bk.

i v ) . *

[d.

Certitude o f Sense Knowledge]. Bu t how can a

person be certain of those things which fal l under the

acts of the senses, for instance, that something outside

is w hi te or h ot in the way tha t i t appears to be ? I reply :

Regarding such an object, either the same things appear

opposite to different senses or they do not appear so but

ra th er a ll the senses kn ow in g such an object ju dg e the

same ab ou t it . I f the latt er be the case, the n we have

certitude of this thing perceived by the senses in virtue

of the aforement ioned prin cip le, v iz. "W h a t occurs in

most instances by means of something that is not a free

cause is the na tu ra l effect of this th in g " . Th erefore , i f

the same change repeatedly occurs in the majority of

cases when such an object is presented, it follows that the

transformation or image produced is the natural effect

o f

such

a cause, and thus the external thing wil l be white

or hot or such as i t natural ly appears to be according to

the image so frequently produced.

B ut i f the ju d g m e n t of differe nt senses differs in rega rd

to w ha t is seen outside ; for instance , if sight says th at

the staff w hic h is pa rt ly i n the wa ter and p ar t ly in the air

is bro ke n, or i f sight says, as it in va ria bl y does, th a t the

sun is smaller in size than it really is, or in general, that

everything seen from a distance is smaller than it is in

reality, in all such instances we are sti l l certain of what

is true an d kn ow w h ic h sense is in e rror. Th is we kno w

by reason of some proposition in the soul more certain

th an a ny sense ju dg m en t together w it h the co ncurren t

tes timon y o f several o f the senses. Fo r the re is always

some pro po sit ion to set the m in d or intel lect ar igh t regard

ing which acts of the senses are true and which

false—a

proposition, note, which the senses do not cause but

m ere ly occasion i n the inte llec t. Fo r instance, the

intel lect has this pro pos it ion reposing in i t : " T h e harder

object is not bro ken b y the touch o f som ething soft w hic h



115 DUNS SCOTUS

se nota ex term inis q uo d etiamsi essent accepti a sensibus

errant ibus, non potest intel lectus dubitare de

i l ia .

I m m o ,

opposi tum inc lu d i t con trad ic t ione m . Sed quo d baculus

sit durior aqua, et aqua sibi cedat, hoc dicit uterque

sensus tam visus quam tactus. Sequitur, ergo baculum

non est fractus sicut sensus judicat

ipsum f r ac t um ,

et ita

quis sensus erret et quis non circa fractionem bacu l i ,

inte l lectus judicat per cert ius

omni

ac tu sensus. S im i

l i ter , ex a l ia parte quod quantum applicatum quanto

omnino est aequale sibi , hoc est notum in te l lec tu i quan-

tum cum que n ot i t ia te rm ino ru m accip ia tur a sensu

errante. Sed qu od ide m qua nt um possit ap pl ica ri v iso

propinquo et

remoto ,

hoc dic i t tam visus quam tactus.

Ergo,

quantum visum sive a prope sive a remotis est

aequale ; ergo visus dicens hoc esse m inu s errat . Ha ec

conclusio con clu ditu r ex pr inc ipi is per se notis et ex

actibus

duorum

sensuum

cognoscentium

ut in p lur ibus

esse ita, et ita ubicumque ra t io jud ica t sensum errare,

hoc jud ica t non per a l iqua m no t i t ia m praecise acquis itam

a sensibus ut causa, sed per a liq u a m n o t it ia m occasio-

natam a sensu in qua non fal l i tur etiam si omnes sensus

fai iantur, et per a l iquam

aliam

no t i t iam acqu is i tam a

sensu vel a sensibus u t i n plu rib us quae s ciu ntu r esse vera

quae sciuntur esse vera per

propositionem

saepe allega-

t a m ,

sci l icet : Quod in pluribus evenit, etc.

[Tertius articulus. Solutio ipsius

Henrici ] .

Q u a n t u m a d

tert ium art iculum ex ist is est respondendum ad

illas

rationes tres.

A d

primam

: ad

i l lud

de mutat ione ob ject i , ante-

cedens est falsum ; no n enim sensibi l ia sunt in continuo

m o tu .

Im m o pe rmanen t

eadem

in a l iqua dura t ione ,

nee




gives w ay before i t " . So evident is this prop osit ion u po n

analysis of its terms that the intellect could not call it in

doubt, even if i ts terms were derived from erroneous

senses. In de ed , the opposite of this pro po sitio n includes

a con trad ict ion. N ow b oth sight and touch attest that

the st ick is harder than the water and that the water

gives way before the stick. I t follows therefore tha t the

stick is no t brok en as the sense o f sight judg es. Hen ce ,

in the case of the " br o ke n sta ff" the intel lect judges by

something more certain than any testimony of the sense.

A n d so too w it h the other cases. Even thou gh the terms

be de rive d fr o m e rrin g senses, the inte llec t knows t ha t the

measure used to m easure remains perfectly equ al to itself.

Now the sense of sight as well as that of touch tell us that

the identical measure can be applied to a nearby object

of vision an d to a distant object. The refore, the actual

size of the object is equal whether seen from near by

or fr o m afar. Sigh t errs, consequen tly, whe n it declares

the size to be less. Th is conc lusion is in fer re d fro m self-

evident principles and from the repeated testimony of i ts

tr u th by tw o senses. A n d so w he n reason judges tha t the

senses err, it does so in vi rt u e o f two kind s o f know ledg e.

The first is a knowledge for which the intellect requires

the sense on ly as an occasion and no t as a cause—a know

ledge in which i t would not be deceived even if al l the

senses were deceived. T h e othe r is a know ledge acqu ired

by the oft-repeated testimony of one or more senses

which are known to be true by reason of the proposit ion

so frequently quoted, viz. "Whatever occurs in most

instances, etc.".

[Article I I I . Reply to Henry's Arguments]. I n this

third art icle, we must answer the three arguments [of

H e n r y ]

17

in the l igh t of w ha t has been

said.

As fo r the first argument (viz . th a t based on the change i n

the object) the anteced ent is false. Fo r sensible things

are not in co nt inua l m ot io n ; indeed, they rem ain the

same for some tim e. N eith er is this the op ini on o f



t 16 DUNS SCOTUS

est opinio Augus t i n i , sed error Heracl i t i et d iscipul i sui

Cra ty l i ,

qu i no lebant

loqui

sed

movere digitum

u t

d ic i tu r iv Metaphysicae* E t conseque ntia non valet,

dato quod antecedens esset verum quia adhuc secundum

Aristotelem, posset haberi certa cognito de hoc dato

quod omnia cont inue moverentur.

Non sequi tur etiam : s i objectum est mutabi le, ig i tur

quod gignitur ab eo non est repraesentativum alicujus

sub rat ione immutabi l is , qu ia mutabilitas in objecto non

est rat io gignendi, sed natura ipsius objecti , quod est

mu tab i le ,

vel

quae na tura est im m uta bi l is . Ge ni tum

ig itu r ab ipso repraesentat n a tu ra m per se. Ig it u r si

na tura, unde natu ra habeat a l iquam

immutabilem hab i -

tud inem ad a l iqu id , illud aliud per suum exemplar et

natura ipsa per suum exemplar repraesentatur ut i m m u -

tabi l i ter uni ta, et i ta per duo exemplaria generata a

duobus mutab i l ibus , non inquantum mutab i l ia , sed in

quantum naturae, potest haber i not i t ia immutabilitatis

unionis

eorum.

(Quamv is non in quan tum mutab i le

signif icat,

si

tamen est m uta bi le , quom odo ejus a d al i ud est hab itudo

immutab i l i s ?

Respond

eo : ha bit ud o est im m ut ab il is sic

quia inter

extrema

non potest esse opposita habitudo,

nee non esse ista positis extremis, sed per destructionem

extrem i ve l ext re m orum destru i tur . Co ntra : Quom odo

propositio necessaria affirmatur s i ident i tas extrem orum

potest destrui ? Respondeo : qu an do res n o n est, no n

est ide ntita s ejus realis ; sed tunc si est i n in te ll e c tu , est

identitas ut est objectum intel lectum, et necessaria

secundum

q u i d ,

quia in tali esse extrema non possunt

esse sine ta l i ide ntit ate . T a m e n

ilia

potest non esse sicut

*

iv ,

cap. vi

( iona,

4-13).



CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE I 16

Aug ustine. I t is rathe r the error of He racl i tus and his

disciple Cratylus, who did not even wish to speak but

only move his ringer, as Metaphysics, bk . i v , * relates. But

even if the antecedent were true, the consequence would

st i l l be in va l id , for as Aristot le pointed out, wc could st i l l

be certain of this truth, viz. that al l things are in

con

t inuous mot ion.

Likewise, it does not follow that just because an object

is mutable, therefore the knowledge produced does not

represent an yth ing unde r an im m uta ble aspect. For i t

is not precisely this mutability in the object that causes

the kno w ledg e ; it is the nature of this muta ble o bject th a t

does so, an d this natu re is im m ut ab le. Hen ce, the know

ledge pro du ce d by it represents the na ture itself. A n d if

i t is the nature, th is nature may have an immutable

relat ion to something, and then both this nature and the

other thing to which i t is related, each by i ts own

exem plar, are represented as im m ut ab ly un i ted. A n d

so by means of two terms produced by two mutable

things (though not in so far as they are changeable, but

in so far as the y are natures) it is possible to have a kn ow

ledge of their immutable union.

(Even 18 tho ug h som ething muta ble is not signified i n

so far as it is m uta ble , how is it th at its re latio n to anothe r

th ing is immutable

?

I reply that the relat ion is im

mutable in this sense, that the opposite relation could

no t exist betwee n the extremes ; neithe r co uld this

re lat ion be non-existent, given these extremes. By the

destruction of one or both extremes, however, this

re lat io n is also destroyed. T o the con trary : H o w can

we assert that the proposition is necessary if the identity

of the extremes co uld be destroyed? I rep ly : W h e n a

thing is non-existent, i t has no real identity, but in such

a case, if it is in the mind it has an identity inasmuch as

it is an object known, and this identity is necessary only

in a qualified sense inasmuch as the extremes cannot exist

in thou gh t w ith o u t possessing this ide ntity . Ne verthe-



I I

7

DUNS SCOTUS

extremum potest esse no n in te lle ct um . Ergo , propos itio

necessaria in

intel lectu

nostro secundum quid, quia

im mu tabil is in falsam. Sed s impl ic i ter necessaria non

nisi in intel lectu divino, sicut

nee extrema

habent ident i -

tatem simpliciter necessario in aliquo esse, nisi in i l lo

esse intellecto.)

Patet

et iam

quod repraesentatum in se mutabi le,

potest repraesentare aliquid sub ratione immutabil is,

quia essentia Dei sub ratione immutabil is repraesenta-

bi tur intel lectui per al iquid

omnino

mutabi le sive

i l lud

sit species sive actus. Hoc pa te t per sim ile , qu ia per

f initum potest repraesentari al iquid sub rat ione

inf ini t i .

Ad secundum, dico quod in an ima potest intell igi

duplex mutabi l i tas, una ab

af f i rmatione

in negationem,

et econverso, puta ab ignorantia ad scientiam,

vel

a non

intel lect ione ad inte l lect ione m. A l i a quasi a contrario

in contrarium, puta a rect i tudine in decept ionem, vel

econverso. A d quaecumque au tem objecta est muta-

bilis

anima prima mutabi l i tate, et per nihi l formal i ter in

ea existens to ll i t u r ab ea talis im mut ab il i ta s. Sed no n

est mutabi l is secunda mutabi l i tate, nisi circa i l ia com-

plexa

quae non habent

ev ident iam

ex terminis . Circa

i l ia

vero quae sunt evidentia ex terminis,

mu t a r i

non

potest secunda mutabil itate, quia ipsi termini appre-

hensi sunt causa necessaria et evidens conformitatis

com-

positionis factae ad ipsos term inos . Ergo si an im a est

mutabi l is a recti tudine in

errorem

absolute, non sequitur

quod per nihi l

a l iud

a se potest

rect i f icari .

Saltern



C O N C E R N I N G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E I

17

less,

this identity need not exist, even as the term need

not be known. Therefore, the proposition in the m ind is

necessary only in a qua lified sense inasmuch as it cannot

become false. But it w ou ld only be necessary in an

unqualified sense in the divine intellect, for the terms

have an ident ity tha t is simply necessary in no other fo rm

of existence save that which they possess by being known

by God.)

It is also evident that something can be represented

under an immutable aspect even if that which does the

representing is something mutable in itself. For the

essence of G o d is represented to the intellect as something

immutable by means of something that is radically

changeable, whether the la tter be the species or the act o f

knowing. This is evident from a similar case, for some

th ing can be represented

as

infinite through what

is

finite.

As to the second, this changeability of the soul can be

understood in a twofo ld sense : one from a ffirmation to

negation and vice

versa,

such as from a state of ignorance

to a state of knowledge or from a lack of understanding

to understanding ; the other from one contrary as it

were to another, such as from being right to being

deceived, or vice versa. The soul, however, is changeable

w ith regard to any object only in the first sense of muta

bility, and there is nothing which exists formally in the

soul that w il l remove this kin d of mutability. But the

soul is not mutable in the second sense except in regard

to such propositions as are not evident from their terms.

But with those propositions that are evident from their

terms,

the soul cannot be altered in the second way for

the terms which are apprehended are themselves the

necessary and evident cause of the conformity of the

judgment involv ing the aforesaid terms. Therefore, even

i f the soul is mutable in the sense tha t absolutely speaking

it can pass from the state of being correct to a state of

error, i t does not follow that it can be set arigh t on ly by

something other than itself. A t least i t can be set aright

2 > 2 2 ) 17



l DUNS SCOTUS

rect i f icari

potest circa

i l ia

objecta circa quae

non

potest

intellectus errare apprehensis terminis.

Ad te r t ium, dico quod si a l iquam apparent iam

haberet,

magis

concluderet contra

opin ionem i l lam

quae

negat

speciem

intel l igibi lem, quae est opinio ponentis

istam op in ionem hie, qu ia i l ia species quae potest

repraesentare sensibile

tamquam objectum

i n

somniis

esset pha ntasma, non species in te ll ig ib il is . Ig i t u r si

intellectus solo phantasmate utatur per quod objectum

est sibi praesens et non aliqua specie intelligibili, non

videtur quod per al iquod in quo objectum sibi relucet

posset

discernere verum

a ve ris im ili ; sed ponendo

speciem in intellectu, non valet ratio, quia intellectus

non potest uti i l ia p ro se ut pro objec to, quia non

cont ingi t u t i

i l ia

in dormiendo.

Si objicis : si phantasma potest repraesentare se u t

objectum, igitur intel lectus per i l ium errorem virtutis

phantasticae potest errare

vel

saltern potest liga ri ne possit

operari ,

ut patet in somniis et phreneticis, potest

dici

quod etsi legetur quando est talis error virtute phan-

tastica, non tamen tunc errat intellectus, quia tunc non

habet al iquem actum.

Sed quomodo sciet vel erit tunc intellectus certus

quando non errat virtus phantastica

quam

tamen non

errare re qu ir it ur ad hoc quo d intellectus no n erret ?

Respondeo

: ista Veritas quiescit in in te lle ct u quod

potentia

non errat circa objectum

p ropor t iona tum

nisi

indisposita, et no tum est intellectui v i r t u tem phantasti-

cam

non esse

indispositam

in vigil ia tali indispositione



C O N C E R N IN G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E I 18

in regard to those objects about which the intellect cannot

err once the terms are grasped.

To the third argument, I say that if it held at all, it

would rather be valid against that opinion which denies

the intelligible

species—the

view of the man who has

advanced the opposing theory [viz. Henry of Ghent].19

For the species which is able to represent the sensible in

dreams as though it were an object would be the sense

image or phantasm and not the intelligible species.

Therefore, if the intellect were to use the sense image

alone so that the object would be present to the mind

through the sense image and not in virtue of any in

te llig ible species, there seems to be no way of distinguish

ing between what is true and what merely appears to be

true by means of something in which the object itself

appears. But i f w e assume the existence of a species in

the intellect, the argument does not hold, because the

intellect is unable to use such a species as though it were

an object in itself for the simple reason that i t is not able

to use such a species in sleep.

You may object that if the sense image can represent

itself as object, then it follows that the intellect could err

by reason of this error in the faculty of the imagination,

or at least, as is the case in dreams or w ith madmen, the

intellect could be so bound that it could not operate.

I t can be said in reply that i f

th e

intellect is bound when

there is such an error due to the imaginative faculty,

then the intellect does not err for the simple reason that

it does not act.

But how will one know or how will the intellect ever

be certain that the imagination does not err when the

latter faculty must be free of error if the intellect is not

to err? I reply that the follow ing tru th reposes in the

mind. " A faculty does not err in regard to an object that

is properly proportioned to it unless the said faculty is

indisposed". Now it is known to the intellect that the

imaginative faculty is not indisposed during a waking



119

DUNS SCOTUS

quae faci t phantasma repraesentare se tamquam objec-

t u m , quia per se notum est intel lectui quod intel l igens

vig i la t , i ta quod v i r tus phantast ica

non

est l igata in

vigi l ia sicut in somniis.

Sed adhuc instatur contra certitudinem dictam de

actibus hoc

modo

: V i d e tu r

mihi

quod

videam vel

audiam u b i tamen nee v ideo nee audio. Ig i tu r , de

hoc no n est ce rt i tud o. Respondeo :

Al iud

est contra

negantem aliquam pr op os itio ne m ostendere earn esse

veram ; a l iu d est al ic ui admittenti earn ostendere

quomodo

s it vera. E xe m plu m :

iv

Metaphysicae*

contra negantem primum principium non induci t

Phi losophus istud inconveniens, quod opiniones con-

t rar iae

simul

essent in

an i m a .

H o c ipsi concederent

sicut praemissam, sed inducit eis al ia inconvenientia

manifestiora

eis, l ice t n o n i n se ; sed rec ipien tibu s

p r imum p r inc ip ium os tend i t quomodo s i t no tum, qu ia

i ta notum est quod oppositum ejus non possi t venire in

m e n t e m ,

quod probat quia tunc possent opiniones con-

trariae simul stare, tal is conclusio est ibi magis incon

veniens quam hypothesis.

I t a

h ie ,

si concedis nullam esse per se notam nolo

d isputare tecum quia constat quod protervus [MS pro-

tervis] et non es persuasus, sicut patet in actibus tuis,

quomodo objicit Philosophus rv Metaphysicae,^ som-

nians

enim

de a l iquo quasi in prox imo

consequendo

sive

obtinendo et postea evigilans non prosequeris illud

sicut prosequeris vel prosequereris, si ita esses

proximus

in v ig i lando ad i l lud consequendum.

Si

autem

admit t is a l iquam proposi t ionem esse per se

n o t a m , et c i rca quamcumque potest potent ia indisposi ta

errare, sicut patet in somniis, ergo ad hoc ut al iqua cog-

*

rv,

cap. iii (1005&, 25 ff.). f iv> cap. v (1010&, 10).



C O N C E R N IN G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E Iig

state to such an extent that the sense image w ou ld repre

sent itse lf

as

an object, for it is self-evident to the inte llect

that when it knows, it is awake, and that, consequently,

the imagination is not bound in a waking state as it is in

sleep.

But there is still another objection to the aforemen

tioned certitude about our actions. I t runs as follows.

I seem to see and to hear, whereas in reality I neither

see nor hear ; consequently, I have no certainty on this

po int. I reply that i t is one th ing to show someone who

denies a given proposition that it is true and quite

another to indicate to someone who admits the given

proposition how i t is true. For example in Metaphysics,

bk. iv ,* the Philosopher does no t adduce the inconsistency

that "contrary opinions would be present in the soul at

one and the same time" against those who deny the first

principle [viz. of contradiction], for they indeed would

concede this as a premise. Instead he brings out other

inconsistencies which are more manifest to them though

they are not more evident in themselves. But he does

show those who grant this first principle how this princ iple

is known. For it is known in such a way that its opposite

could not even enter the mind. This he proves from the

fact that otherwise contrary opinions could exist simul

taneously in the m ind. Such a conclusion

i s ,

in this case,

even more inconsistent than the hypothesis.

So i t is in our case. I f you hold that nothing is self-

evident, I w il l not argue w ith you for i t is clear tha t you

are a quibb ler and are not to be convinced. This is

apparent from your actions, as the Philosopher indicates

in Metaphysics, bk. rv,f for if you dream of obtaining or

going after some nearby object, after you awake you no

longer seek i t as you would do, or w ould have done, had

you been that close to getting it while awake.

If, however̂ you admit that some proposition is self-

evident and that a power indisposed can err w ith regard

to anything, as is clear in the case of dreams, then from



120

DUNS

SCOTUS

noscatur per se esse no t a , oportet quod possit cognosci

qua ndo po ten tia est disposita et qu an do n on . E t per

consequens potest haberi noti t ia de actibus nostris,

quod potent ia est i ta d isposi ta quod ilia est per se nota

quae apparet sibi per se nota.

Dico tunc ad

formam

hujus cavi l lat ionis, quod sicut

apparet somnianti se vid er e, it a posset sibi a ppa rere

oppos itum unius pr in c ip i i per se n o t i speculabi lis , et

tamen non sequ i tu r qu in i l lud principium sit per se

notum et ita non sequitur quin sit per se notum audient i

quod audiat , quia c irca

utrumque

potest potent ia indis-

posita errare ; no n autem disposita. E t qu an do sit

disposita et qu an do n o n , hoc est per se n o tu m ; alias

non posset cognosci

aliquam aliam

esse pe r

se n o t a m ,

qu ia

non posset cognosci quae foret per se nota, utrum ilia

cu i

intellectus

sit dispositus

vel cui

sic assentiret.

[Articulus Quartus. Contra conclusionem Henrici \ . Circa

q u a r t u m articulum contra conclusionem opinionis arguo

sic . Quaero qu id in t e l l ig i t per veritatem certam et

sinceram, aut ver i ta tem in fa l l ib i lem absque dubi ta t ione,

scil icet, et decep tione, et

probatum

est prius et de clara tum

in art iculo secundo et tert io, quod ilia potest haberi ex

puris natura l ibus. A u t in te l l ig i t de ve ri tate quae est

passio entis, et tunc cum ens possit natural i ter intel l igi,

ergo et verum ut est passio ejus, et si verum ig i tur e t

Veritas per abstractionem quasi, quia quaecumque

forma potest inte l l ig i ut in subjecto, potest inte l l ig i ut in

se et in abstracto a subjecto. A u t a l io modo in te l l ig i t

per veri tatem

conformitatem

ad exemplar, et si ad

creatum, patet prop osi tum . Si aute m ad exemplar




120

the fact that something can be recognised as self-evident

it follows that a person can tell when a faculty is disposed

an d w he n it is no t. Con sequently, in regard to our

actions it is possible to know that a faculty is so disposed

that what appears to be self-evident is actually so.

As to the form of this sophist ical argument,

then,

I say

this.

Ju st it appears to the drea m er tha t he sees, so also

the opposite of some self-evident speculative principle

m ig ht appear to h im . Bu t f ro m this i t st i l l does not

fol low th at such a pr inc iple is no t self-evident. Likewise

it does not follow that it is not self-evident to the hearer

th at he hears. Fo r i f a pow er th a t is indisposed can err

with regard to either truth, a power that is disposed

can no t. A n d it is self-evident w he n i t is disposed an d

w he n it is no t. Othe rwise, no thi ng else w ou ld be

recognised as self-evident, for one could never tell what

would be self-evident, or whether this is something to

w h ic h the inte l lect is disposed or to w h ic h i t w o ul d assent

in this way.

[Article I V . Concerning Henry's Conclusion]. I n the

fourth art icle I argue against the conclusion of [Henry's]

v iew 20 as fol low s : W h a t, I ask, is meant by certa in an d

una dultera ted tru th? Eithe r i t means infal l ib le t r u th ,

that is, a truth which excludes al l doubt and deception.

And in this case, we have proved and declared already

in the second and third articles that such truth is possible

on pure ly natu ra l grounds. O r by such tr u th he means

tr u th as an at tr ib ute of " b e in g " . I n w hic h case, s ince

we can know "being" we can also know i ts at t r ibute

" t r u e " . A n d i f we know " t r u e " we can also know t r u th

by a ki n d of abstract ion. For any for m that can be

recognised in a subject can also be known in itself and in

the abstract ap art fro m the subject. O r t r u th is to be

understood in st i l l another way, as t ruth of conformity

to an exem plar. I f the exem plar in question is taken to

be created , we have w ha t we seek to pro ve . I f

con

for m ity to an uncreated exem plar is mean t, wh y such .



121 DUNS SCOTUS

i nc rea tum,

conformitas ad i l lud no n potest int e l l ig i n is i in

illo exemplari

cognito, quia relat io non est cognoscibi l is

nisi cognito extrem o ; ergo falsum est quod ponitur

exemplar aeternum esse rationem cognoscendi et non

cogn i tum.

Praeterea secundo sic : Int elle ctu s sim plex , omne

qu od in te l l ig it confuse, potest cognoscere definit ive ,

inqu i rendo definitionem i l l ius cognit i per viam divisionis.

Haec cognit io definitiva v ide tu r perfectissima pertinens

ad in te l lectum

s impl icem.

Ex ta l i

autem

cogni t ione

perfect issima terminorum, potest inte l lectus perfec-

t iss ime in te l l igere pr inc ip ium et ex pr inc ip io conclu-

sionem,

et in hoc compleri v idetur not i t ia inte l lectual is

ita quod non videtur cognit io veritat is necessaria ultra

veritates praedictas.

I t e m t e r t i o , aut lux aeterna quam dicis necessariam

ad habendum sinceram ve ri ta te m , causat a l iq ui d prius

na tura l i ter actu aut non . Si s ic, aut ig i tu r in objecto aut

in in te l lectu . N o n in ob jecto, qu ia objectum i n quan tum

habet esse in in te lle c tu , no n ha bet esse

reale,

sed

tantum

inte ntio na le. Ig it u r no n est capax al icujus accidentis

realis. Sed in in te l lec tu , ig i tu r lux increata no n imm uta t

ad cognoscendum sinceram veri tatem nis i mediante

effectu suo, et i ta aeque perfecte videtur opinio com

munis ponere not i t iam in lumine increato, sicut ista

posit io ; qu ia po nit esse v id e ri in int el lec tu agente qu i

est effectus luminis increatae et perfectior quam esset

i l l u d lum en accidentale crea tum . Si au tem n ih i l causat

ante actum, aut ergo sola lux causat actum, aut lux cum




conformity cannot be recognised unless the exemplar

itself is known, for unless the term of a relat ion is known

the rela t ion itself cann ot be kn ow n. Conseq uently, i t is

false to assume th at an e terna l exem plar is the reason w h y

we know something when this exemplar i tself remains

unknown.

Secondly, I argue further that simple intel l igence

21

can know by way of def in i t ion al l that i t knows in a

con

fused manner by the simple expedient of discovering the

de f in i t ion of the th ing kn ow n by wa y of d iv is ion. Th is

definit ive knowledge seems to be the most perfect kind

of know ledge th at pertains to simple intel ligence. F ro m

this most perfect knowledge of the terms, however, the

intel lect can unde rstand the pr inc iple most perfectly ;

and fro m the prin cip le, the conclusion. Inte l lec tual

knowledge seems to be complete with this, so that no

further knowledge of truth over and above the afore

mentioned truths seems necessary.

I n the th i r d p lace, e ither the Eterna l L ig ht , w hic h y ou

say is necessary in order to have unadulterated truth,

causes som ething na tu ra l ly p rio r to the act or no t. I f i t

does,

then this thing is produced either in the object or

in the intel lec t. Bu t i t cannot be prod uce d in the object,

because the object, in so far as it exists in the intellect,

has no real existence but only intentional existence.

Th ere fore, i t is incapa ble of any real accident. I f this

th ing is produ ced in the inte l lect , then the Ete rna l

Light t ransforms [ the mind] to know pure truth only

th ro u g h the m e diu m of its effect. I f this be the case,

then it seems that common opinion attributes knowledge

to the Uncreated Light to the same extent as does this,

for the common view assumes that knowledge is seen in

the active intel lect, which is the effect of the Uncreated

Light, and indeed is a more perfect effect than this

acci

den tal created L ig h t w o uld be.22 I f th is Un created Li gh t

does not cause anything prior to the act, then either the

Light alone causes the act [of knowledge], or the Light






w it h the intel le ct an d object do so. I f the L ig h t does so

alone, then the act ive inte l lect has no funct ion whatso

ever i n k no w in g pure tr u th . B ut this seems inconsistent

because the latter is the most noble function of our

intel lect . T he act ive inte l lec t ,

then ,

which is the most

noble [ facu l ty o f knowledge]

23

in our

soul,

must concur

in some way in this action.24

And

the inconsistency here inferred also follows from

the aforesaid op inion in another wa y. For acc ording

to the one who holds this opinion, any agent using an

instrument is incapable of performing an act ion which

exceeds the ac tion of the ins tru m en t. Th ere fore , since

the power of the active intel lect could not arrive at the

knowledge of pure truth, the Eternal L ight using the

active intel lect could not produce this knowledge or have

any th ing to do w i t h the act whereby pure t r u th is kno wn

and st i l l have the active intel lect function as an instru

m ent. A n d i f yo u say tha t the Un crea ted Lig h t causes

this unadulterated truth together with the inte l lect and

the object, this is the co m m on o pin ion w h ich assumes th at

the Uncreated Light acting as the remote cause produces

al l certa in t r u th . Consequent ly, e i ther th is op inion [of

Henry] is inconsistent or i t is not at variance with the

common v iew.

[Article V. Solution o f the

Question].25

As to the

quest ion, then , I say that because of what Augustine has

said, one should concede that infall ible truths are seen

in the eternal ru les, where the term " i n " can be taken in

the sense of " i n an ob jec t". Th ere are four ways i n

which this could be done :

( i )

either as in a p rox im ate

object, or (2) as in th at w h ic h contains the p ro x i

mate object, or (3) as that in virtue of which the



123 DUNS SCOTUS

con t inen te ob jec tum p rox imum, vel sicut in eo virtute

cu jus ob jec tum prox imum

movet ,

vel sicut in objecto

remote

[P r im a V ia ] . A d i n te l le c tu a l

p r i m i ,

dico quod omnia

int el l i g ib i l ia a ctu inte l lectus d iv in i habent esse int el l i -

gib i le ,

et in eis

omnes

veritates de eis relucent, ita

qu od intel lectus inte ll igens ea, et v i r tu te eorum in te l l i -

gens necessaria veritates de eis, videt in eis sicut in

objectis istas veritates necessarias.

Il ia autem

i nquan -

tum sunt objecta secundaria intel lectus divini, sunt

veritates quia conformes suo exemplari, intel lectu sci l icet

div ino ; et sunt lu x qu ia man ifestae ; et sunt

i m m u t a -

biles i b i et necessariae. Sed aeternae sunt secundum

q u i d ,

quia aeternitas est condit io existentis, et

ilia

non

habent existent iam nis i secundum

q u i d .

Sic ig itu r

primo possumus dici videre in luce aeterna, hoc est in

objecto secundario intel lectus divini, quod est Veritas et

lux aeterna modo exposito.

[Secunda V i a ] . Secundus modus patet s imi l i ter, quia

intel lectus d ivinus co ntine t istas veritates quasi l ibe r,

sicut

ilia

auctori tas August in i d ic i t De

Trinitate

x iv ,

cap. xv * : quod istae regulae scriptae, scriptae sunt in

libro lucis

aeternae, id est, in in te l le ctu d iv ino inq ua ntu m

continet istas veritates et l icet

ille

l iber non videatur,

v iden tur tamen illae veritates quae sunt scriptae in l ibro

illo

primo, et eatenus posset dici intellectus noster videre

veritates in luce aeterna, hoc est, in l ibro i l lo sicut in

continente objectum26 (et hoc secundum secundum

modum

vel in

illis

veritat ibus quae sunt lux aeterna

secundum

q u i d ,

sicut in objectis videmus secundum

primum

mo d u m) .

E t a l ter isto rum m od or um vid etu r esse de intel le ctu

xiv , cap. xv

(Migne,

P.L.,

x l i i ,

1052).




123

pro xim ate object moves [th e in te l le ct] , or (4) as in a

remote object.

[T he First W a y ]. I n explanat ion of the f i rst , I say that

al l the inte l l ig ib les have an intel l ig ib le being in v ir tue of

the act of the div ine intel lect. I n these intel l igibles a l l

the tru ths th a t can be aff irm ed abo ut the m are visible so

that the intel lect knowing these intel l igibles and in virtue

thereof understanding the necessary truths about them,

sees these tru ths in th em as i n an objec t. N o w these

intell igibles inasmuch as they are secondary objects of

the divine intel lect are "truths" because they are

con

form ed to their exemplar, v iz. the div ine inte l lect . L ik e

wise,

they are a " l i g h t " because they are m anifest. A n d

there they are im m uta ble a nd necessary. B ut they are

eternal only in a qualif ied sense, because eternity is

characteristic of something really existing, and these

intel l igibles " e x is t" on ly in a qu ali f ied sense. Th is then

is the first way in which we can be said to see in the

E ter na l Li g h t, i.e. as in the secondary object of the divin e

intel lect , which object is t ruth and eternal l ight in the

sense explained.

[T h e Second W a y ] . T h e second wa y is also clear,

because the divine intellect contains these truths like a

boo k, as Au gu stine testif ies in De Trinitate, bk . x iv , c. xv * :

"These ru les are wr i t ten in the book of Eterna l L ight" ,

that is, in the divine intel lect inasmuch as i t contains

these tru ths . A n d alth ou gh this book itself is no t seen,

nevertheless those tru ths are seen w h ich are w r it te n i n

this boo k. A n d to this extent, ou r intel lec t co uld be said

to see tru ths in the Et er na l L ig h t, i .e. to see things w hic h

are in that book as in something which contains the

object.26

And August ine's statement in De

Trinitate,

bk . xn ,



124

DUNS SCOTUS

August in i

xn

De Trin i tate, cap. x iv,* quod rat io quadrat i

corporis manet incorrumptibil is e t im m uta bi l is , e tc . Non

autem

manet tal is nisi

ut

est ob jectum secundarium

inte l lectus d iv in i .

Sed co ntra

primum modum

est

d u b i u m .

Si

enim

non

videmus istas veritates ut sunt in intel lectu

d i v i no ,

qu ia

non v idemus d iv inum in te l lec tum, quomodo d icemur

videre in luce increata ex hoc quod videmus in ta l i luce

aeterna secundum q u i d , quae habet esse in luce increata

sicut in intel lectu cognoscente.

[T er t ia V ia ] . H uic respondet ter t ius mod us, q u i ta lis

est : ilia u t sunt ob jectum secundar ium in te l lectus d iv in i

no n habe nt esse nisi secu ndum q u id ; op era tio au tem

al iqua vera real is non compet i t a l icui praecise ent i

secundum quid v ir tute sui , sed si a l iquo modo compet i t

sibi ,

hoc oportet esse virtute alicujus cui competit esse

simpliciter. Ig it u r ist is objectis secundari is no n co m pe tit

movere

intel lectum praecise nisi virtute esse intel lectus

d iv in i qu od est esse sim plic iter, et per qu o d ista habe nt

esse secundu m q u i d . Sic ergo in luce aetern a secundum

q u i d ,

sicut in objec to pro xi m o videm us ; sed in luce

aeterna increata v idemus secundum tert ium modum

sicut in causa proxima cujus vir tute objectum proximum

movet .

Juxta hoc etiam po tes t d ic i quod quantum ad te r t ium

modum videmus in luce aeterna sicut in causa object i in

se.

N a m intel lectus div inus prod uc i t is ta ac tu suo in

esse in te ll ig ib il i, et ac tu suo da t h uic objec to esse tale et

i l l i

tale, et per consequens dat eis

talem rationem

objecti

per quas rationes post m ove nt inte l le ctu m ad cog nit ione m

xi i ,

cap. xiv (Migne, P.L., x l i i ,

i o i i ) .




124

c. x iv ,* that the me aning o f "square b o d y " remains in

co rrup t ib le a nd im m uta ble , and so on , can be understood

seem ingly in eithe r of these tw o ways. Fo r the me an ing

of a square body remains incorrupt ib le and immutable

only inasmuch as it is a secondary object of the divine

intel lect.

B ut there is a do ub t about this f irst wa y. W e do no t

see these truths as they are in the divine intellect, because

we do not see the div ine intelle ct itself. H o w th en can

we be said to see th ings i n the U ncrea ted Lig ht— thin gs ,

which exist indeed in the Uncreated Light as objects

kn ow n by tha t inte l lect , b ut w hic h we see on ly in some

thing which is the eternal l ight in a qualif ied sense.27

To this the third way gives the fol lowing answer.

[T he T h i r d W a y ]. These intell ig ib les in so far as they

are secondary objects o f the div ine inte llec t have existence

on ly in a qu alif ied sense. B ut som ething tha t exists on ly

in a qualif ied sense, to the precise extent that it "exists"

in this way, is incapable of any truly real operation.28

If such an operation pertains to it at all, it does so only

in v ir tue of something which exists in an unqual i f ied

sense. The re fore, these secondary objects do not enjoy

the pow er to move the inte llec t, to speak precisely, except

by virtue of the existence of the divine intel lect, which

exists in an unquali f ied sense and through which the

inte ll igible s ha ve existence in a qu alif ied sense. A n d

so we see in the e terna l l ig h t in a qu alif ied sense as i n the

pro xim ate object . Bu t according to this th ir d wa y we

see in the Unc rea ted L ig h t as in the imm edia te cause by

vir tue of w hi ch the proxim ate object moves [ the inte l lect ] .

We can also be said to see in the Eternal Light in this

th ir d w ay ina sm uch as this L ig h t is the cause of the object

i tself. Fo r the div ine intel lect produces this inte l l igible

in existence and by its act gives to this object one type

of being and to another a second type of being.

Con

sequently, the divine intel lect gives them such intel l igible

co nte nt as they possess as objects of know ledg e. N o w



125 DUNS SGOTUS

certain, et quod proprie posset d ic i inte l lectum nostrum

videre in luce, qu ia lu x est causa ob jec ti . A pp ar et per

s imi le : qu ia pro pr ie d ic im ur in te l ligere in

lumine

intel lectus agentis, cum tamen illud lumen non sit nisi

causa activa, vel faciens objectum in actu suo, vel v i r tu te

cu jus ob jectum movet , ve l u t rumque.

Ista

ig i tur duplex causal i tas inte l lectus div in i , quod

est vera lux increata, v idel icet quae produci t objecta

secundaria i n esse in te l l i g ib i l i , et qu od est i l lu d vir tu te

cujus secundaria

etiam

ob jecta produc ta movent

actual i ter inte l lectum, potest quasi integrare unum

tertium modum ve l membrum p rop te r quod d icamur

vere videre in luce aeterna.

Et si obj iciatur contra istos duos modos integrantes

ter t ium m em bru m de causa, qu ia tun c

magis

v idetu r quod

diceremur v idere in Deo volente, vel in Deo ut voluntas

est , qu ia vo luntas d iv ina est immediatum pr inc ip ium

cujusl ibet actus ad extra, respondeo : intel lectus divinus

inquan tum a l iquo modo pr ior actu vo luntat is d iv inae

pr od uc it ista objecta i n esse in te l l i g ib i l i , et i ta respectu

istorum

vi de tu r esse causa m ere n atu ra l is, q u ia Deus non

est causa l ibera respectu al icujus nisi quod praesupponit

ante se al iquo m odo v olu nta tem sive actu m v olu n

tat is,

et s icut inte l lectus ut pr ior actu voluntat is produci t

objecta i n esse in te l l ig ib i l i , i ta ut p rio r causa vid etu r

cooperari

illis

in te l l ig ib i l ibus ad

effectum eorum

na tu ra -

lem,

scil icet ut apprehensa et composita causent appre-

hensionis

conformitatem

ad se. V id e tu r ergo quo d

contrad ic t ionem inc lud i t in te l lectum

aliquem talem

compositionem form are et com posit ionem n o n esse con -




i t is through their inte l l ig ib le content that they af terward

move the inte l lect to certa in knowledge. A n d , prop erly

speaking, it could be said that our intellect sees in the

L ig h t, because the Li g h t is the cause of the object. This

is clear fro m a sim ile : for we are said to un derstan d

properly in the l ight of the act ive inte l lect , a l though th is

l ight is nothing more than the active cause

(i.e.,

that

which makes the [potent ia l ] object actual , or that in

virtue of which the object moves, or both).

The fact then that the div ine inte l lect , the true Un

created Light, has a twofold causal i ty (v iz. that i t pro

duces objects in intell igible being and that it is also that

in v irtu e o f w h ic h the secondary objects produ ced actu ally

move the

intellect)—this

fact can supply as it were a

th ir d type or mo de of interp reta t ion as to how we can be

said to see tr u ly i n the Ete rn al L ig h t.

But suppose someone should object to these two ways

of supply ing a th i rd in terpretat ion on the fo l lowing

ground s. W e should rath er be said to see in G od w il l in g

or i n G od i n so far as H e is

w i l l ,

for the divine wil l is the

immediate principle of every act directed towards some

thing outside Himself.

I re ply th at th e div ine in telle ct, as far as i t is i n some

way prior to the act of the divine will,29 produces these

objects in intell igible being, and thus the intellect seems

to be a pu rely na tu ra l cause in their regard . Fo r G od

is not a free cause of an yt hi n g unless vo lit i o n as an elicited

act somehow precedes the th in g in question. N o w , inas

m uc h as the intel lec t produces objects in in tel l ig ible being

prior to the act of the w i l l , it would seem to co-operate

as a prior cause with these intel l igibles in the production

of the i r natura l

effect—which

effect consists in this

:

Once

these intel l igibles are grasped and formulated in a pro

posit ion they cause the conformity of what is grasped

[viz. the proposition] to themselves [as terms]. Con

sequently, i t seems to involve a contradict ion that an

intel lect should form such a proposit ion and st i l l not

2 , 3 2 2 ) 18



126

DUNS SCOTUS

formem terminis, l icet possibi le s i t

illos

terminos non

componere vel no n concipere. Q u ia licet Deus vo l un -

tar ie coagat ad hoc quod intel lectus terminos componat

ve l non componat , tamen cu m composuer i t , u t ilia

composit io sit conformis terminis, hoc videtur necessario

sequi rat ionem terminorum quam habent ex inte l lectu

Deicausante

i llos terminos in esse in te l l ig ib i l i na tur al i te r.

Et ex isto apparet qualiter non est necessaria specialis

i l lust ra t io ad v ide nd um in regulis aetern is , qu ia A ugu st i -

nus non ponit in eis videri nisi vera quae sunt necessaria

ex v i ter m ino ru m , et in ta l ibus est m ax im a (natura li tas

vel) necessitas tarn causae remotae quam prox imae

respectu effectus, puta tarn intel lectus divini ad objecta

movent ia quam

illorum objectorum

a d

veritatem com-

plexionis de eis, et

etiam

l icet non tanta si t (natural i tas

vel) necessitas ad perceptionem (alius vel) alicujus ver i -

tat is quod

oppositum

con t rad ic t ionem inc ludat , tamen

(naturalitas vel) necessitas est a parte causae proximae

coassistente sibi causa

remota ,

qu ia termin i apprehensi

et composit i sunt nat i natural i ter causare

evidentiam

conformi ta t is compositionis ad term inos etsi po na tur qu od

Deus coagat terminis ad hunc ef fectum

influentia

general i ,

no n tam en necessitate n a tu r a l i . Sed sive sit

influentia generalis sive quod plus est necessitas naturalis

influendi

termin is ad hunc ef fectum, patet quod non

requir i tur i l lustrat io special is.

Assumptum de in ten t ione August in i pa te t per ipsum




have th is proposi t ion conform to the terms even though

it is possible that the intellect should not grasp the terms

or form ulate them in a prop osi t ion. For even thou gh G od

freely co-operates with the intel lect when it combines or

does not combine these terms, sti l l once the terms have

been formed into a proposi t ion, the conformity of the

latter with the terms seems to follow as a necessary con

sequence fr o m the ver y m ea ning of the terms—a meaning

which they have by reason of the fact that the intel lect

of G od has na tur al ly prod uced these terms i n inte l l ig ib le

being.

From al l th is, i t is c lear why a special i l luminat ion is

no t re qu ire d in ord er to see i n the etern al reasons, for

Augustine assumes that we see in them only such truths

as are necessary i n vir tu e o f the ir terms. N o w i t is in ju s t

such truths that we have the greatest necessity between

the effect and bo th i ts prox im ate an d rem ote causes (tha t

is ,

bo th on the part o f the div ine inte l lect in i ts re la t ion to

the objects wh ic h move [our inte l lect ] and on the pa rt of

the objects in relat ion to the truth of the proposit ions

ab ou t the m ). Ev en tho ug h the necessity of perce iving

such a truth is not so great that not to perceive i t would

include a contradiction, sti l l there is a necessity present

which arises from the proximate cause [viz. the intel l igi

bil ity of the terms] assisted by the remote cause [viz. the

divine intel lect which gives such ideas their intel l igi

b i l i t y ] . Fo r once the terms are grasped an d form ed in to

a proposi t ion, they are natural ly able to make evident

the co nfo rm ity tha t exists between the prop osit ion a nd its

terms even though it be granted that God co-operates

with these terms in producing their effect, not by a

natural necessity, but by a general [free] influence.

B ut wh ethe r i t be by a general inf luence, or wh at is m ore ,

by a natural necessity, that God co-operates with the

terms in producing their effect, i t is quite clear that no

special i l luminat ion is required.

The assumption as to what Augustine meant is clearly



127

DUNS SCOTUS

iv De Trin itate, cap. xx xv ,* lo qu i tu r de philosophis dicens

n o n n u l l i eorum po te run t aciem ment is u l t ra omnem

creaturam

levare et

lucem incommutabilis

veritat is

quantulacumque ex parte at t ingere qui Christ ianos

m ultos ex sola fide viventes nondum posse de rid en t. Ergo

vult

quod Chr is t ian i c red i ta

non

v iderunt in regul is

aeternis, sed philosophi vident in illis necessaria mu l ta .

I d e m

etiam ix

De Trinitate, cap. vi

f

: N o n qualis unius-

cujusque hominis mens, etc., quasi diceret contingentia

non videntur ibi, sed necessaria et in eodem i v , capi tu lo

x x x v i | arg uit con tra istos philosophos,

numquid

quia

verissime disputant aeternis rat ionibus omnia tempora-

liter f ieri p ro pte r ea, po te ru nt i n ipsis ra t ion ibu s aspicere

quot sunt an imal ium genera, quot

semina

s ingulorum in

exordi is, etc. No nn e ista om nia no n per i l lam i n c om m u -

tab i lem sc ient iam, sed per locorum ac temporum inst i tu -

tionem

quaesierunt et ab

aliis

experta atque conscripta

cred iderun t. Ergo in te l l ig i t qu od per regulas aeternas

non cognoscuntur

ilia

cont ingent ia quae

tantum

per

sensus cognoscuntur, vel per historias creduntur, et

tamen special is i l lustrat io magis re q u ir i tu r in credendis

quam

in cognitis necessariis.

I m m o ,

i b i

maxime

remove-

tur i l lustrat io special is et sufficit sola generalis.

Co ntra : Q u id ig i tu r d ic i t August inus x i i De Tr in i

tate, cap. x iv * * : qu od paucorum est m en tis acie pe rven ire

ad rationes intelligibiles, et Octaginta tres quaestionum,

quaestio xlvi f f : non nisi purae animae ad illas pert ingu nt .

Respondeo : Ista pu ri tas no n debet in te l l ig i a v i t i is ,

quia xi v

De Trinitate, cap.

xv ,j +

vu l t quod

Justus

v idet in

regulis aeternis quid justum faciendum si t vel quid in h is

* rv,

cap.

xv (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 902).

t

ix , cap. vi (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 966).

X

iv ,

cap. xvi (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 902).

* * x ii , cap. xiv (Migne, P.L., x l i i ,

ioio).

f t

q-

xlvi (Migne, P.L., x l , 30).

XX xiv , cap. xv (Migne, P.L., x l i i ,

1052).




127

jus t i f ied b y w ha t he says o f the inf id el phi losophers in De

Trinitate, bk .

i v ,

c. xx xv * : "S om e o f the m have been able

to see thr ou gh an d beyond al l creat ion and w it h their

mind's eye to reach at least in some degree the light of

immutab le t ru th , a th ing wh ich they r id icu le many

Christ ians, who l ive meanwhi le by fa i th a lone, for not

being able to d o " . H e wishes to say, therefore, that

Christians do not see in the eternal rules the things they

believe and yet the philosophers see many necessary

truth s there in. A n d the same w it h De Trin itate, bk. i x ,

c. v i f : " N o t o f wh at sort the m ind o f one pa rt icu lar

m an happens to be, etc. —as i f he were to say : " I t is no t

contingent but necessary truths that are seen there".

And in the same work he argues against those philos

ophers : "Ju st because they argue most tr u ly th at al l

that happens in time takes place on account of eternal

reasons, are they therefore able to perceive therein how

many kinds of animals exist or how many seeds of each

there were in the be ginn ing, an d so on . . . . H ave they

not sought all these things not by that unchangeable

knowledge, but by the history of places and t imes, and

have they n ot bel ieved the w rit te n experience of othe rs? "

Consequently, he means that contingent truths known

by the senses alone or believed on the account of others

are no t kn ow n thr ou gh the eternal rules. A n d yet special

i l luminat ion is required even more for what must be

believed tha n for necessary tru ths . Ind ee d, this special

i l lumination is least needed in the case of the latter ;

general i l lumination alone suff ices.

On the contrary, Why then does August ine say in De

Trinitate, b k. x i i , c. xi v : " I t is on ly for the few to a tta in

the inte l l ig ib le reasons w it h the ir m ind's e ye", and in the

Eighty-three Questions, q.

xlvi

: " O n ly the pure of soul

reach

th e m " ? I rep ly

that

he does not mean by this

purity a freedom from vices, for in De Trinitate, bk. xiv,

c. xv, he holds that the unjust man sees in the eternal

rules wha t a jus t m an m ust do and how he must regard



Iil8 DUNS SCOTUS

sentiendum sit. E t iv l ibro cap. praeallegato,* vu l t quod

plures non

v ident

veritatem in regulis aeternis sine fide.

Et quaestione eadem,

f

vult quod nullus potest esse

sapiens sine cognitione idearum, eo

modo

quo Platonem

concederent forsan

sapientem

esse. Sed ista pur itas

debet intel l igi elevando intel lectum ad considerandum

veritates ut relucent in se, non t a n tu m ut relucent in

phantasmate.

Ubi considerandum est quod res sensibilis extra causat

phantasma confusum et

u n u m

per accidens in virtute

phan tan tica , repraesentans scil icet rem secundum qua nti -

tatem, secundum figuram, et colorem, et alia accidentia

sensibilia. E t sicut phantasma repraesentat ta n tu m

con

fuse et per accidens, ita

m u l t i

percipiunt tantum ens per

accidens. Veritates

autem primae

sunt praecise tales ex

propria ratione te rminorum in quantum i l l i termin i

abstrahuntur ab omnibus per accidens conjunctis cum

eis. N o n

enim

haec propositio :

Omne to tum

est

majus

sua pa rte ,

p r imo

vera est ut totum est in lapide

ve l

l igno,

sed ut t ot u m abs trahitur ab omnibus quibus conjungitur

per accidens. E t ideo intellectus q u i nu m qu am intell igi t

totalitatem nisi in conceptu per accidens, puta in totali-

tate lapidis vel l ign i , numquam in te l l ig i t

sinceram

veri

tatem hujus pr in cip i i , quia nu m qu am in tel l i g i t praecisam

rat ionem termini per

quam

est Veritas. Pau co rum ergo

est pertingere ad rationes aeternas, quia paucorum est

habere intellectiones per se et multorum est habere con-

ceptus tales per accidens. Sed ist i pa uc i no n dicu nt ur

dist ingui ab aliis proter specialem i l lustrat ionem sed vel

propter mel iora natural ia, quia habent intel lectum

magis

abstrahentem et magis perspicacem, vel prop te r

majorem

* iv, cap. xvi (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 902). f loc. cit.




128

th ings in their l ig ht . A n d in the fo ur th boo k, in

the chapter c i ted above, he maintains that the phi lo

sophers saw truth in the eternal reasons even though

they lacked

fa i th .

A n d in the same que stion, he holds

that no one can be wise without a knowledge of the

ideas in the way, for instance, that they would concede

Plato to be wise. B ut this p u ri ty mu st be unde rstood of

the elevation of the intel lect to the co ntem plation of these

truths as they are in themselves and not as they appear

in the sense image.

He re we must rem em ber tha t the sensible thin g outside

causes a confused sense image, something with only an

inc identa l un i ty in the facu l ty o f imaginat ion, which

represents the thing according to i ts quantity, colour and

other sensible acciden ts. A n d ju s t as the sense imag e

represents things only confusedly and according to an

incid en tal u ni t y, so m an y perceive only such incide ntal

combinat ions. N ow , pr im ar y t ru ths are pr im ary pre

cisely because their terms are grasped in their proper

nature an d ap art f ro m al l tha t is me rely incide ntal to

t hem. N o w this prop osi t ion, " T h e who le is greater than

its part", is not primari ly true of the whole as real ised in

a stone or in wood, but of "whole" in the abstract , i .e.

apart f rom everything with which i t merely happens to

be jo ine d. Consequently, the m in d w hic h never

con

ceives totality except in an incidental concept such as the

total i ty of a stone or the total i ty of wood, never real ly

understands the pure truth of this principle, because it

never grasps the precise nature of the terms to which the

prin cip le owes its t r u th . I t is only w it h in the power of

the few to attain the eternal reasons, because it is only

the few that have an understanding of the essentials,

whereas the many grasp things merely in incidental

concepts such as those m en tione d above. But these few

are not said to be distinguished from the others by a

special i l luminat ion, but by better natural powers, s ince

they have a sharper and more abstractive mind, or be-



129

DUNS SCOTUS

inquisitionem

per

quam

aeque ingeniosus pervenit ad

cognoscendum illas quidditates quae al ius non inquirens,

non cognoscit.

Et isto modo in te l l ig i tu r illud Augus t in i ix De Tr in i -

tate,

cap. v i , * de v idente in

monte

et vidente inferius

aerem nubilosum et superius lucem s inceram. Q u i enim

tantum

intel l igit semper conceptus per accidens eo modo

quo phantasma repraesentat objecta

talia

quasi entia per

accidens, ipse est quasi in valle circumdatus aere nebu-

loso.

Sed q u i separat qu iddita tes inte l l igen do praecise

eas conceptu per se quae tamen re lucent in phantasmate

cum multis aliis accidentibus adjunctis, ipse habet

phantasma inferius quasi aerem nebulosum, et ipse est

in monte inquantum cognosci t illam veritatem et videt

verum

supra u t i l lam ver i ta tem

superiorem

in v i r tu te

intel lectus increati, quae est lux aeterna.

[Q ua r ta V ia ] . U l t im o modo potest concedi quod

cognoscuntur veritates sincerae in luce aeterna sicut in

objecto remoto cognito, quia lux increata est primum

principium entium speculab i l ium et ultimus finis rerum

practicarum

et ideo ab ipso sumuntur pr incip ia prima

tam speculabil ia qu am pract ica. E t ideo cogn it io en t ium

tam

speculab i l ium quam

practicabilium

per pr inc ip ia

sumpta

a luce aeterna ut cognita est perfectior et prior

cognit ione sumpta per princip ia in gen ere p ro p rio sicut

d ict um est in quaestione

ilia

de subjecto th eo log iae , et est

em inent ior a l ia quacu m que. E t hoc mo do cogni t io

om niu m pert inet ad theolog um . Ho c m odo s incera

Veritas cognosci dicitur quia per i l lud cognoscitur quod

est tantum Veri tas non habens al iquid permixtum non

veri tat is quia per primum ens, a quo cognito sumuntur

principia sic cognoscendi ;

aliud autem

quodcumque a

* ix , cap. vi (Migne, P.L.,

x l i i ,

966).




cause of greater research which enables one person to

know those essences which another equally talented

individual does not discover because he does not investi

gate them.

And in this way we can understand Augustine's state

m ent in De Trin itate, bk . ix , c. v i , * rega rding the in di v i

du al on the m ou n ta in w ho sees the pure l ight above an d

the m ist below. Fo r whoever grasps no thin g bu t

inci

dental notions in the way that the sense image represents

such objects, viz. as a kind of accidental aggregate, is

l ike one in a va l ley surro und ed by m ist. Bu t by grasping

just what things are of themselves, a person separates the

essences from the many addit ional incidental features

associated w i t h th e m in the sense ima ge. Such a one,

as it were, has the sense image in the mist beneath him,

but he himself is on the mountain to the extent that in

virtue of the uncreated intel lect , the Eternal L ight, he

knows this truth and sees what is true from above, as a

more un iversa l t ru th .

[T he F ou rth W a y ]. A n d finally, we can concede that

pur e truths are kn ow n in the Etern al L ig ht as in a re

m otely kn ow n object. For the Un created L ig ht is the

first source of speculat ive things and the ult imate end

of pra ctic al things. T he first speculat ive an d pra ctica l

princip les,

then,

are derived fro m i t . Henc e, the know

ledge of speculat ive and practical things by means

of

princip les derived from the Eternal L ight, where the

latter is known,30 is more perfect and prior to knowledge

derived from principles from the respective class of things

as such, as has been pointed out in the question on the

subject o f theology. Such knowledge is m ore em inent

th an any other. N o w it is in this w ay that the knowledge

o f al l things pertains to the theolog ian. I n this wa y pure

truth is said to be known, s ince truth alone without

admixture of anything else is known, for i t is known

thro ug h the First Being. A n d once th is Being is kn ow n,

the principles for kn ow ing in this perfect w ay are d erived



130 DUNS SGOTUS

quo su m un tur p rin c ip ia cognoscendi in genere est

verum

defect ivum.

H oc modo solus Deus cognoscit omnia sincere quia ut

dictum est in quaestione de subjecto theologiae,* solus

ipse novit omnia praecise per

essentiam suam. Omnis

autem intel lectus moveri potest ab objecto alio ad cog-

noscendum veritatem aliquam v ir tu te ejus. E t hoc

modo

cognitio

omnium per t ine t ad

t heo logum,

sicut

dictum est in quaestione ilia de subjecto theologiae, et

est eminent ior a l ia quaecumque.

Gognoscere enim

triangulum habere tres ut est quaedam part ic ipat io Dei

et habens talem ord inem in un iverso quod quasi per-

fect ius exprimit

perfectionem

Dei, hoc est nobi l ior i

modo cognoscere tr iangulum habere tres quam per

rat ione m tr i an gu l i . E t i ta cognoscere qu od temperate

vivendum

est propter beat i tud inem u l t imam conse-

quendam quae est att ingendo essentiam Dei in se, per-

fect ius est cognoscere istud cognoscibi le practicum quam

per pr inc ip ium a l iquod in genere

mor i s ,

puta per hoc

quod honeste vivendum est.

Et isto modo loquitur August inus de luce increata ut

cogn ita x v De T rinitate, cap. x x v i i , f u b i seipsum alloquens

ait :

Multa

vera vidist i et ea quae discrevist i ab ista luce

qua t i b i lucente vi d i st i ; at to l le oculos ad

ipsam lucem

et eos in ea infige si potes ; s ic en im videbis quom odo

distat nat iv i tas V e rb i D e i a processione D o n i D ei . Et

paulo post : Ha ec et al ia oculis tuis inte rio rib us lux

ista (monstrabit vel) m on str av it . Q uae est ergo causa

cur acie f ixa ipsam videre non poteris n is i ut ique

inf i rmitas, etc.

* Opus oxoniense, prol. q. iii.

t xv , cap. xxv ii

(Migne,

P.L., x l i i ,

1097).




130

therefrom . Bu t any other th in g fro m w hi ch princip les

of knowing something in k ind are derived is defect ive

t ru th .

Only God knows al l things purely in this perfect way,

for as we have said in the question on the subject of

theology,* He alone knows al l things precisely through

H is essence. Nevertheless, every intelle ct can be m ov ed

by some object to know that something is true in virtue

of H i m , and in th is way the knowledge o f a l l th ings

pertains to the the olog ian, as has been said i n the ques tion

on the subject of theology. Fo r to kn ow th at a tr iang le

has three [angles equal to two right angles], in so far as

this is a kind of part icipation of God and that i t has such

an order in the universe that it expresses more perfectly

as it were the perfection of

God,31—this

is a nobler way

of knowing a triangle has three [angles, etc.] than to

know this t ruth f rom the not ion of a t r iangle i tsel f .

Simi lar ly, to know that one should l ive temperately in

order to attain the supreme happiness, which consists

in attaining the essence of God in Himself, is a more

perfect way of knowing th is pract ical t ruth than to be

aware of it through some principle in the class of mores,

for instance, through the principle that one is obl iged

to l ive upright ly.

And i n this ma nne r Au gustine speaks of the U ncre ated

Light as known in De Trinitate, bk. xv, c. xxvii,f where

addressing himse lf, he says : " Y o u have seen man y

things and these you have discerned through that Light

in w hic h yo u saw them shin ing fo r th to you . T u rn

your eyes to the Light i tself and fasten them upon it ,

i f yo u can, for in th is wa y you w i l l see how the na t iv i ty

of the Word of God dif fers from the procession of the

G i f t o f G o d ." A n d a l i t t le la ter : "T h is and other th ings

this L ig h t has revealed to yo ur inner eyes. W ha t then

is the reason with fixed glance you are unable to see the

L ig h t itself, if it is no t inde ed yo ur weakness ? . . . "



131 DUNS SCOTUS

[Ad Argumenta Pr inc ipa l ia ]

Ex dict is patet ad omnes auctori tates August in i ad

oppositum ; et secundum a l iqu em dictorum mo d o ru m

" v ide nd i in " expon i possunt auctori tates Au gu st in i quae

occurrunt de ista materia.

[Articu lus Sextus. Quomodo rationes Henrici

concluduni].

De sexto art iculo v idendum est quomodo tres rat iones

factae pro pr ima opin ione a l iqu id

ver,um

conclud unt in

quantum accip iuntur ab August ino, l icet non concludant

i l lam

conclusionem

falsam

ad

quam

i nducun tu r .

U b i sciendum est [qu o d a sensibi libus, sicut a causa

per se et principali, non est expectanda sincera Veritas ;

quia noti t ia sensus est circa al iquid per accidens, ut

dictum fui t , l icet actus sensuum a l iqu i s in t cert i vel

ve ri ; sed vi rt u te intel lectu s agentis, q u i est pa rt ic ipa tio

lucis

increatae, i l lustrantis super phantasmata, cognos-

citu r qu idd itas re i, et ex hoc ha be tur sinceritas vera . Et

per hoc solv i tur

primum argumentum H e n r i c i ;

et

secundum in tent ionem August in i non p lus conclud i t .

A d secundam

rationem

Henr ic i d ico quod

anima

mutabil is est ab uno actu disparato ad a l iu m , secundum

diversitatem

ob jec to rum, p rop ter

suam

i l l im i ta t ionem e t

im m ate ria l i tate m , qu ia est respectu cujusl ibet entis ;

s imi l i ter ab actu in non actum, quia non semper est in

ac tu ; sed respectu

primorum

p r i n c i p i o ru m, q u o ru m

Veritas nota est ex terminis, et conclusionum evidenter

deductarum ex terminis, non est mutabi l is a contrario

in contrarium, sci l icet a vero in

fa lsum.

Regulae

enim

i n lumine intel lectus agentis intel lectum recti f icant, et




13I

[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]

From all that has been

said,

it is clear how the citations

from August ine to the contrary are to be interpreted.

The texts of Augustine concerning this matter can also

be explained in terms of one of the aforementioned ways

of seeing.

[Article V I . To What Extent Henry's Arguments H o ld ].

As to the sixth article, we must see how the three reasons

adduc ed i n fav our of the f irst op inio n i n so far as they are

taken fro m A ugust ine do prove some tr u th , a l thou gh they

do not establish that false conclusion for which they were

advanced.32

Here we must recognise 33 th at we sho uld no t expect

pure truth f rom sensible th ings as from a primary and

essential cause, for sense kno w ledg e has to do w i th some

thing incidental, as we have pointed out,34 even though

some of the acts o f the senses are ce rta in an d true . B u t

the essences of things are known in virtue of the active

in te l lect , a part ic ipat ion of the Uncreated L ight , which

i l lumines the imaginat ion and in th is way true puri ty [of

tr u th ] results. I n this fashion, the f irst argum ent of

H en ry is solved. A n d according to the m in d of Aug ust ine,

i t proves nothing more.

To the second reason of Henry, I say that the soul can

change in the sense th at i t has no w one act, no w ano ther,

acco rdin gly as objects differ. Fo r the soul is no t m ater ia l

and is unl imited in the sense that i t can know and love

a ny th in g whatsoever.35 Likew ise, it can be active or

ina ctive , for i t is no t always in act. B ut w it h rega rd to

the fi rst pr incip les the tru th o f w hic h is kn ow n from their

terms,

or with regard to conclusions evidently deduced

fr o m the terms, the soul cannot change from one con trary

state to ano ther, i .e. fr o m tr u th to falsity. Fo r rules

36

known in the l ight of the agent inte l lect keep the mind

from erring, and even though the intel l igible species



I32 DUNS SCOTUS

ipsa species intel l igibi l is terminorum, l icet in essendo

sit mutabi l is , in

repraesentando tamen

in

lumine in te l -

lectus agentis immutabiliter repraesentat, et per duas

species intell igibiles cognoscuntur t e rm in i primi p r inc ip i i ,

et ita ilia unio est vera et certa evidenter.

A d tertium d icendum quod conc lud i t con t ra

eum,

quia non poni t n is i

speciem

sensibilem

vel

phan tasma;

n o n autem concludit de specie intel l igibi l i repraesentante

q u id d i t a t e m.

Dicendum autem, quod si potent iae sensi t ivae non

sunt impeditae, species sensibil is veraciter repraesentat

re m ; sed in somno potentiae, sensuum exter iorum sunt

l igatae, ideo virtus imaginativa, conservans species

sensibiles, se cundum diversitatem f luxus humorum capit is,

apprehendit eas tamquam res quarum sunt simil i tudines,

qu ia v im

rerum habent ,

secundum Phi losophum, De

motibus

animal ium*

N o n plus con clud i t ter t ia rat io. ]

* cap. vi i

(7016,

20).




132

of the terms is mutable in its being, sti l l in representing

in the light of the agent intellect, the intell igible species

represents things in an immutable way, and the terms

of a f irst principle are known by two intel l igible species

an d consequently the u ni on [o f the terms in a p ropo sit ion]

is true and evidently certain.

As for [Henry 's ] th i rd argument , we must po in t out

that i t is tel l ing against his own posit ion, since he admits

of no species other than the sense image or sensible

species. B ut the arg um en t is n o t effective whe re an

in te lli g ib le species is h e ld to represent the essence. H o w

ever, i t must be admitted that i f the sensit ive powers

are not impeded, the sensible species truly represents the

thing s. I n sleep, howe ver, the powers o f the external

senses are bo un d. W herefore, the im ag ina tive po we r,

conserving the sensible species according to the different

movement of humours in the head, apprehends those

species as the things themselves of which they are but

likenesses, for they have the force of things, according to

the Philosopher in De motibus

animalium.*

The th i r d

reason proves no more than this.



V I

T H E S P I R I T U A L I T Y

A N D I M M O R T A L I T Y O F

T H E H U M A N S O U L

Summary o f

the

A rgumen t

Q u e s t i o n

:

C a n

i t be

k n o w n

b y

n a t u ra l r e ason tha t t h e re w i l l

be a gen e ra l r e su r re c t ion o f m a n k i n d ?

P r o

e t

C o n t r a

B o d y o f t h e Q u e s t i o n

Pa r t I . A k i n d o f a p r io r i p roo f o f t h e re su r re c t ion

M e t h o d

o f

p ro ce du r e

First proposition : T h e i n t e l l e c t i ve sou l i s t he speci f ic

f o rm

o f

m a n

Proof based o n t e s t im ony o f ph i losophe rs

Proof f rom reason

:

( i )

A n

unsa t is f a c tor y form u la

t i on ; (2) Scotus 's form u la t ion— (a ) p r oof o f t h e

an t e ce de n t ; (b) p ro of o f t he conseq uen t

Second

proposition : The i n t e l l e c t i ve sou l is i m m o r ta l

A r g u m e n t s fo r i m m o rt a l i t y

A r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t i m m o r t a l i t y

Scotus 's opin ion

R e p l y t o t h e a r g u m e n t s fo r i m m o rt a l i t y

Th i rd p ropos it ion : Th e h u m a n sou l w i l l no t rem a in ou ts ide

the body fo rever

A r g u m e n t s for a r e su r re c t ion

Scotus 's opin ion

R e p l y t o t h e a r g ume n t s

E v a l u a t i o n

o f

t h e

a

p r io r i p roof

P a r t I I . T h e a posteriori p roofs o f t h e re su r re c t ion

E v a l u a t i o n o f the a posterior i a rg um e nts

Pa r t I I I . Solu t ion t o t h e Q ue s t ion

R e p l y t o t h e A rg u m e n t s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g

(2,322) 18





THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

134

[ V I . THE

SPIRITUALITY

AND

IMMORTALITY

OF THE

HUMAN SOUL]

I a s k : C an i t be known by n a tur a l reason tha t there w i l l be

a ge ne ra l resu rrect ion

o f

m a n k in d

?

[Pro et Cont ra]

Proof tha t i t can be kn ow n

x

:

[A rg .

1]. A na tu ra l desire cannot be i n v a in . f M a n ,

howeve r, has a na tu ra l des ire to li ve forever , an d i t can

be known by natura l reason that such a des i re exis ts.

The refore, etc. Proof of the m inor : Whe re a n a tura l

aversion for something exists, i t is only because of a

n a tu ra l des ire or love for som eth ing e lse. B ut m a n has

a na tu ra l avers ion for d ea th. Th is is ev iden t both f rom

exper ience an d from w ha t the Apostle says to the

Cor in th ians

%

: "W e do not w ish to be u nc lo the d , bu t

ra the r c lothed ove r".

[Arg.

11].

A lso , i t is na tu ra l ly kn ow n tha t we seek

happ iness by our ve ry n ature . This is c lear from

Nicomachean Ethics, bk .

i , * *

w i t h rega rd to bea t itude i n

gen era l an d f rom

Nicomachean

Ethics , bk.

x , f f

for bea t itud e

in p a r t i cu la r . B u t from n a tu ra l reason i t is kn ow n tha t

bea titud e m ust be e tern a l . Hence, i t is kn ow n from

n a tu r a l reason tha t m an is orda ined to some e terna l

p e rfe c t ion. Proof of

the

m inor : Augu st ine

% %

proves i t

thus : "A n d i f l ife qu i ts h im by h is d y ing , how can a

blessed life r em a i n w i t h h im ? An d w hen i t qu its h im ,

w i th ou t doub t i t e ithe r qu i ts h im u n w i ll in g l y , or w i ll in g l y



135 DUNS SGOTUS

S i n o l e n t e m , q u o m o d o e s t v i t a b e a t a , q u a e i t a e s t i n

v o l u n t a t e , q u o d n o n s it i n p o te s t a t e ? S i autem v o le n t e m ,

q u om od o be a t a v i t a e r i t

quam

f i n i r e v o l u i t q u i h a b e ba t ?

S i d ic as q u o d n e u t r u m , nee

v e l le ,

nee no l l e , s e d nee ilia

b ea t a e s t v i t a quae t a l i s e s t u t quem beatum f a c i t amore

e j u s i n d i g na s i t .

I t e m ,

n a t u r a l i t e r notum e s t q uo d t o t a s pe c i e s no n

c a r e t fin e s u o, q u i n i l i u m i n a l iq u o i n d i v i d u o c on s e q u a t u r .

Se d n a t u r a l i t e r n o t u m e st b e a t i tu d i n e m esse f in e m s p e c ie i

h u m a n a e ; e rg o e t h o m i n e m p osse c on s e q u i i l lam sa l t e rn

i n a l iq u o i n d i v i d u o ; s e d n o n p o te s t e a r n c o n s e q u i i n i s ta

v i t a p r o p t e r multas m i s e r i a s q u a e c o n c o m i t a n t u r vitam

istam u t p o t e v a r i e ta s fo r tu n a e , i n f i r m i t a s c o rp o r is ,

i m p e r fe c t io s c i e n t ia e e t v i r t u t i s , e t i n s t a b i l i ta s e t fa t ig a t io

i n exe r cendo a c t u s pe r f e c t i o n i s , i n tantum u t n u l l a

o p e r a t io , q u a n t u m c u m q u e i n p r i n c i p i o d e l e c t a b i l i s , p os -

s i t co n t i n ue e s se de l e c t ab i l i s ,

imo

p e r

ipsam

f a s t i d i e ndo

d e l e c t ab il e e r i t ce ssare ab ip sa ; e t n o t u m e s t pe r r a t i o -

nem n a t u r a l e m o p e r a t io n e m b e a t if i c a m n o n esse

f a s t i -

d i o s a m ,

nee p o tes t a so la anima s e p a r a ta h a b e r i , q u i a i n

h o c h o m o n o n c o n s e q u e r e t u r f i n e m suum ; e rg o h a b e -

b i t u r i n a l i a v i t a a t o t o c o n j u n c t o , e t p e r c o n s e q u e n s a d

m in u s v id e t u r p e r rationem n a t u r a l e m c o n c l u d i i n q u ibu s

h o m o a d f i n e m s u u m p e r t i n g e t .

I t e m ,

p e r r a t io n e m n a t u r a l e m n o t u m est q u o d omnis

s p e c i e s q u a e e s t d e i n t e g r i t a t e u n i v e r s i , e s t p e r p e t u a ,

q u i a totum i n t e g r u m e s t perpetuum ; sed h om o es t

s pec ie s pe r fe c t is s im a , s a lt e r n i n t e r is t a in f e r i o r a . Nos

enim

a l i q u o

modo sumus

f in is o m n i u m , s e cu n d o

Physi-

corum.*

E r g o , e t c .

II ,

ca p. i i

(1940,

35).




135

or ne ither . I f u n w i ll in g ly , how is the life blessed w h ich

is so w i t h i n h is w i l l as no t to be w i t h i n h is power ? A n d

whereas no one is b lessed who wi l ls someth ing that he

does n ot have, how m uc h

less

is he blessed w ho is q u i tte d

against his

w i l l ,

not by honour, nor by possessions, nor

by a ny oth er th in g , but by the blessed l ife itsel f, since he

w i l l have no life a t

a l l.

. . . B u t ne i the r is th a t a blessed

li fe w h ich is such as to be u n w or thy of h is love w hom

it m akes bles se d".

[A rg . i n ] . Fu r the rm ore , i t is know n na tu ra l ly t ha t

an e nt i re species can not fa i l to a t ta in its en d. A t least

the end m ust be ach ieved in some ind iv idu a ls . B u t i t

i s na tu ra l l y known tha t bea t i tude i s the end of the

hu m an species. Therefore , i t is n a tu ra l ly kn ow n th a t

a t leas t some in d iv id u a l can a t ta in i t . B u t he cann ot

at ta in i t in th is l i fe because of the many concomi tant

miser ies such as the vic issi tudes of for tune, bodi ly in

f irm i t y , im per fec t know ledge a nd v i rt ue , in s tab i lit y and

fat igue in the exercise of even the most perfect acts,

ina sm uch as no opera t ion , be i t ever so d e ligh t fu l i n the

beg inn ing , can con tinu e to be d e l ig h t fu l . Fur the rm ore ,

when such an opera t ion causes wha t i s de l igh t fu l to

becom e d is tastefu l , i t w i l l no long er be pe r form ed . Now

i t is known by natura l reason that the beat i f ic v is ion is

not som eth ing d is tas tefu l . Nei ther is i t som eth ing tha t

the sou l can

possess

a lone in sep arat ion f rom the body , for

i n th is w ay man w ou ld no t a t ta in h is goa l. Consequent ly ,

th is end w i l l be a t ta ine d in another l ife by the w ho le

m a n ,

body a nd soul together. I t seems,

t hen ,

t ha t

n a tu ra l reason can reach th is conclus ion a t least in rega rd

to those ways by w h i ch m an w i l l a t ta i n h is end .

[A rg . i v ] .

Fur the rm ore , by na tu ra l reason i t is

kn ow n tha t every species re qu ired fo r the in teg r i ty o f the

un iverse, is e terna l . For the un iverse as an in teg ra l

w hole is ete rna l . Now m a n is the m ost pe r fect spec ies,

a t least am ong terre s tr ia l beings, for , Physics, bk. i i , * " w e

are in some w ay the end of a l l th ing s " . Therefore , e tc .



I36 DUNS SCOTUS

Oppositum :

A u g u s t i n u s , xm De T r in i t a t e , ca p . i x , * loquens de v i t a

i m m o r t a l i

vel sempiterna

d i c i t : H a c

utrum

c a r e a t

humana

n a t u r a ,

nee p a r v a q u e s t io e st. H u m a n is q u i p p e

a r g u m e n t a t i o n i b u s hanc i n v e n i re c o n a n t e s , v i x p a u c i ,

magno

p r a e d i t i i n g e n i o , v a c a n t e s o t i o ,

doctrinisque

subtilissimis e r u d i t i , a d indagandam so l i us animae i m -

m o r t a l i t a t e m p e r v e n i r e p o t u e r u n t .

I t e m ,

A c t . xvi i , j d i c i t u r d e quibusdam Atheniensibus

a u d i e n t i b u s

P a u l u m ,

q u i d i c e ba n t q u o n i a m n o v o ru m

d a e m o n io ru m v i d e b a t u r a n n u n t ia t o r esse, q u i a Je s u m

e t r e s u r re c t io n e m a n n u n t i a b a t e is ; e t t a m e n i l l i A t h e -

n ienses

erant

p h i l o s o p h i ,

multum

v i g e n t e s r a t i o n e

n a t u -

rali ; p a t e t d e D io n y s i o c on v e r s o, q u i f u i t u n u s eorum ;

e r g o i s t u d q u o d v i d e b a t u r e i s i t a remotum a v e r i t a t e ,

non

v i d e t u r esse bene

notum

p e r r a t i o n e m

naturalem

;

u n d e o m n i a q u a e a d d u c i t i b i P a u l u s , n o n s u n t n i s i

q u a e d a m p e r s u a s i o n e s u t p a t e t i b i .

I t e m ,

A c t . xxvi,J c u m d i ce r e t Pau lus : S i pa ss ibilis

C h r i s t u s , s i p r i m u s e x r e s u r r e c t i on e , e t c . Fe s tu s m a g n a

voce d i x i t : In sa n i s ,

Pau l e .

[ C o r p u s Quaestionis]

[Pars Pr im a : Rat io

quodammodo

a

priori]

Hie manifestum e s t q u o d s i a l i q u a r a t i o o s t e n d a t

r e s u r r e c t i o n e m , o p o r t e t q u o d a c c i p i a t u r e x a l i q u o , q u o d

est p r o p r i u m h o m in i s , i t a q u o d n o n c on v e n i a t aliis c o r ru p -

t i b i l i b u s . Ho c

autem

n o n e st m a t e r i a

etiam

i n c o r r u p t i -

b i l i s , nee fo r m a a l iq u a d e s t r u c t ib i l is , q u i a e t s i t a l is s i t

i n

h o m i n e ,

e t e x ce l l e n t i o r

omni

f o r m a b r u t i , t a m e n e x

*

xm ,

cap. ix (Mign e, P.L., x m ,

1023).

t Acts, xvii. 18. I loc. c it. xxv i . 23-34.



THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 136

To the con t ra ry :

[A rg . 1].

Aug us tine , speak ing of the l ife tha t is e te rna l

a nd immo r t a l i n De

Trinitate

bk . x i i i , c. ix ,* says :

"Wh e t he r hu m an n a tu re c an re ce iv e th is . . . is no

sm al l qu es t ion. . . . Assured ly , of those w ho endeavour

to d iscover i t f rom hu m an reasonings, scarce ly a few ,

and they endow ed w i t h g rea t ab ilit ies and aboun d ing

in l e i su re , and l ea rned w i t h t he mos t sub t l e l ea rn ing ,

have been able to a t ta in to the inve s t iga t ion of the im

m or ta l i ty o f the sou l a lon e " .

[A r g .

11].

Fur the rm ore , in Acts xv i i , f i t is re la ted tha t

ce r ta in Athe n ians lis ten ing to Pau l sa id : " 'He seems to

be a hera ld of s t range gods ' , because he proc la imed to

them Jesus an d the re su r rec t ion". Neverthe less, these

Athe nian s w ere phi losophers whose forte was the use

of n a tu ra l reason, as is c lear from the case of the conve rt

Dionys ius, w ho w as one of the m . B u t i t does not

seem tha t w h a t appeared to the m to be so fa r from the

t ru th is kn ow n adequa te ly by n a tu ra l reason . Hence ,

i t i s ev iden t here tha t wha t Pau l adduces in th i s

con

nex ion i s mean t to be no th ing more t han a k i nd o f

persuas ive form of a rg um en ta t ion .

[A rg . h i ]. Fur the rm ore , w he n Pau l sa id in Acts xxvi,%

" that Chr is t was to suf fer , tha t he f i rs t by h is resur rec

t ion [ from the dead was to p roc la im l ig h t to the peop le

an d to the Gent iles . . .] Festus sa id w i th a loud vo ice ,

'Pau l , t hou a r t m ad ' "

[B ody of the Q ue st ion]

[Part I. A Kin d of A Pr ior i Proof]

Th is m u ch is c lea r , i f any a rgum en t p roves the resur

rec t ion, i t m ust be one based on som eth ing tha t is p rope r

to man and does not belong to other per ishable th ings.

Bu t such a t h i ng wou ld no t be ma t te r , no t even i nco r

ru p t ib le m at ter .2 Nei the r is i t some form tha t can be

destroyed. For even i f such a fo rm exis t in m an a nd



137 DUNS SCOTUS

ilia non potest sumi rat io suff ic iens ad probandum

resur rec t ione m tot ius ; e rgo opor te t qu od ac c ip ia tu r a

forma specifica hominis vel ab operat ione conven iente

homini

secundum

illam

form am .

Isto modo

p rocedente ex t r ibus proposi t ion ibus con-

c lud i t u r p ropos i t um, e t s i

omnes illae essent

ra t ione

n a tu ra l i no tae , haberem us p ropos it um . Sun t autem

istae :

Anima

i n te l lec t iva est fo rm a sp ec ifica h om in is" ;

secunda, "An im a i n te l le c t i va est i nc o r ru p t ib il i s " ; ex

qu ibus seq u itu r qu od fo rm a specifica homin is est incor

ru p t ib il is . Ad d i t u r t e r t i a , qu od " fo rm a hom in i s specifica

n on

remanebit

perpetuo ext ra

suum

t o t u m "

; sequi tur

e r go quod a l i q uando r ed ib i t t o t um i dem.

Ista

red i t io

i t e ra ta ,

voca tu r resu r rec t io secundum Dam ascenum l ib .

iv , ca p. xix * : Res urre ct io secunda est ejus, q u od disso-

lutum

est, su rrec t io. De ist is t r ibu s p roposi t ionibus ,

qu a l it e r notae s un t, v ideam us pe r ord inem .

[Propositi/) I . Anim a intellec tiva est form a specifica hom inis].

De p r ima d i c i t u r quod es t r a t i one na t u r a l i no t a , quod

osten d i tu r d u p l ic i te r : uno m odo per au c tor ita tes Ph ilo-

sophorum , q u i hoc assereban t, e t nonn is i tan qu am

ra t i one na t u r a l i

notum

; a l io m odo addu cen do ra t ione s

na tu ra les , ex qu ibus hoc con c lu d i tu r .

De primo : Aristotele s defmit animam n De anima,\

qu od est actus corpor is ph y s ic i , orga n ic i , e tc. Et in

p r i n c i p io

tertii,J

d i c i t de pa r te au tem

an imae ,

q ua

cognoscit et

sap i t ,

ub i v i de t u r pone re an imam i n t e l l e c -

tivam

pa r tem sa lte rn sub jec t ivam an im ae p r ius

definitae

i n c o m m u n i.

I t e m , omnes ph i losoph i t amquam d i f f e ren t i am e jus

p rop r i am commun i t e r posuerun t i n de f i n i t ione homin i s

*

Defide

orthodoxa, iv , cap. xxvi (Migne, P.G.,

xciv,

1220).

t

11,

cap.

i

(412",

28).

%

in ,

cap.

iv (429",

10).




i n deed ,

one even more exce l len t than any bru te fo rm,

s t i l l t h i s wou ld no t p rov ide an adequa te a rgument fo r

the resur rec tion of m an

as

a

w ho le.

Hence , the a rgum en t

m ust be based upon tha t fo rm w h ich is spec ific to m an

or upon some operat ion which man enjoys by reason

of this form .

[Method of Procedure]. Th e m e thod used to establish

the thesis is to proceed from three proposit ions. I f a l l

t h ree of these can be known by na tu ra l reason , the

proposed conclusion w i l l fo l low . The three proposit ions

are these :

(1) The

intellective

soul

is

the

specific form of

man

;

(2) The intellective soul is incorrup tible. From these tw o

i t follow s tha t the spec ific form of m a n is inc orrup t ible.

To these a th ir d is ad de d : (3) The specific form of man

w i l l not remain forever outside the composite. Hence i t

fo llows tha t a t some t im e the same com posite w i l l be

restored.

This second re tu rn Dam ascene ca lls the resur

r ec t i on *

: "Th e res ur rect ion is the second r is ing of w h a t

has been diss olve d". Le t us consider these three proposi

tions in order a nd see to w h at exten t they are ev ide nt .

[Firs t Proposition. The intellec tive soul is the specific fo rm

of

man].

This f irs t p rop osit ion is sa id to be know n by

n a tu ra l reason an d is p roved in tw o w ays. The f ir s t

proof is based upon the test imony of phi losophers who

assert th is as som eth ing kn ow n by n a tura l reason a lone.

The othe r p roceeds f rom na tu ra l a rgum en ts w h i ch lead

to this conc lus ion.

[Proof based on the test imony of the phi losophers].

As to the fi rst , Ar is totle defines the soul in the De anim a,

bk .

n ,

f as " th e ac t o f the n a tu ra l organ ised body " , and

so on. An d in the beg inn ing of bk. h i ,

J

he speaks

of " the par t o f the sou l w i th wh ich the sou l knows and

th inks . . . " , where he seems to make the in te l lect ive

soul a t leas t a su bjec t ive part,3 of w h a t he has prev ious ly

de fine d as the sou l in ge ne ra l.

Fur thermore, a l l ph i losophers commonly ass ign

" r a t i o n a l " as the d i fferenc e tha t p rope r ly defines m a n ,



I38 DUNS SCOTUS

r a t i on a l e , p e r r a t i on a l e i n t e l lig e n t e s

animam

i n t e l l e c -

tivam esse p a r t e m essentialem e jus .

Nee

b r e v i t e r i n v e n i t u r a l iq u i s p h i lo s op h u s n o t a b i li s ,

q u i h o c n e g e t , l i c e t ille maledictus Ave r r o e s i n f i c t i o ne

sua

in

De

a n i m a , *

q u a e

tamen

n o n e s t i n t e l l i g i b i l i s ,

nee

s ib i , nee

a l i i , p o n a t i n t e l l e c t i v a m

quamdam

s u b s t a n t i a m

s e p a r a t a m m e d i a n t i b u s phantasmatibus c o n ju n c t a m ;

quam conjunctionem nee

i pse

nee

a l i q u i s s e q u a x p o t u i t

e x p l i c a r e , nee p e r illam c o n j u n c t i o n e m s a l v a r e h o m i n e m

in t e l l ig e r e . N a m s e c u n d u m ipsum h om o formaliter n o n

esset n i s i q u o d d a m a n i m a l i r r a t i o n a l e e x c e lle n s , p e r

quandam t a m e n a n im a m irrationalem e t s e n s i t i v a m

excellentiorem aliis

a n i m a b u s .

De secundo : a d

propositum

n o n in v e n i t u r fa c i l it e r

r a t i o a p r i o r i n e q u e a p o s t e r i o r i , n i s i e x p r o p r i a o p e r a -

t i o n e h o m i n i s , s i q u i d e m f o r m a i n n o t e s c i t e x p r o p r i a

o p e r a t i o n e , s i c u t m a t e r i a e x t r a n s m u t a t i o n e .

[ 1 .

Rat io

I nadaequa td \ .

E x o p e r a t io n e e r g o i n t e l l i -

g e n d i a r g u i tu r p r o p o s i t u m s ic : i n t e l l ig e r e es t p r o p r i a

o p e r a t i o h o m i n i s ; e r g o e g r e d i tu r a p r o p r i a f or m a ; e rg o

i n t e l l e c t i v a e st p r o p r i a fo r m a h o m i n i s .

S e d i s t a r a t i o p a t i t u r i n s t a n t i a m q u i a i n t e l l e c t u s a d

i n t e l l ig e r e se h a b e t s e c u n d u m eos

tantum

p a s s iv e , e t n o n

ac t iv e ; e r go is t a p r o p o s i t i o, p r o p r i a o pe r a t i o es t a

p r o p r i a f o r m a , n o n p r o b a t i n t e l l e c t i v a m e s s e p r o p r i a m

formam h o m i n i s , s i q u i d e m a b ip s a n o n e st is t a o p e r a t io

s e c u n d u m e o s , s e d a b o b j e c t o i n t e l l i g i b i l i vel s e c u n d u m

a l iq u o s a p h a n t a s m a t e .

[2 .

Ra t io Sc ot i ]. Ideo ex ilia o p i n i o n e , formo




mean ing by " ra t iona l " t ha t t he i n te l l ec t i ve sou l i s an

essentia l p a r t of m a n .

In fa ct , to pu t i t br ie fly , no phi losophe r of an y note can

be found to deny th is except that accursed Averroes in

h is com m en ta ry on De anim a, bk .

i i i , *

where h is fantast ic

concept ion, in te l l ig ib le nei ther to h imsel f nor to others,

assumes the in te l lect ive par t of man to be a sor t of

sepa ra te subs tance un i t ed to man th rough the med ium

of sense im ages. B u t ne ither he nor h is fo llowe rs to the

presen t day have been ab le to exp la in th i s u n ion. Nor

can i t be m a i n ta i ned t ha t i n v ir tue o f such a u n ion m a n

h im se lf unde rs tands , fo r acco rd ing to h im , m an as such

is no th i ng m ore t han a k i nd o f i rr a t i ona l an im a l w h i ch

excels the othe r an im als by reason of

an

i r ra t iona l sensi

t iv e sou l th a t is m ore excellen t tha n othe r sou ls.

[Proof f rom rea son]. As to the sec ond, i t is n ot easy

to find e i the r an

a priori

or a n a poster iori a rgu m en t, unless

i t be based on a fu n c t ion p rope r to m a n, fo r the form is

kn ow n from its p roper fun c t ion , even as m a t te r is kn ow n

from the existence of chan ge.

[1. An Unsatisfactory Form u lation]. On e argument4

based on the funct ion of the in te l lect that is used to

establish the p roposed conc lus ion is th is . To u nd erstan d

is a fu n c t ion p rope r to m a n . The refore, i t has its source

in the fo rm p roper to m an . The i n te llec tive form then is

t ha t p rope r to m an .

Th is a rgu m en t, how ever , is open to c r i tic i sm inasm uch

as those who p ropound i t admi t tha t the in te l lec t has

only a pass ive an d n ot an ac tive re la t ion to in te l le c t ion.

Hence , th is p ropos i tion " A fun c t ion tha t is p roper p ro

ceeds f rom the p rope r for m " rea l ly does not prove tha t

the in te l lec t ive p a r t is the p rope r form of m a n , for this

operat ion does not proceed f rom the form but accord

i ng to t hem 5 i t is caused by the in te l l ig ib le objec t , or

ac cord ing to the v iew of

others

i t proceeds from the sense

image.6

[2.

Scotus's

Form ulat ion]. I p u t th is argu m en t,

then ,



139 DUNS SCOTTJS

r a t i on e m a l i t e r s ic : H o m o i n t e l l i g i t fo r m a l i t e r e t

p r o p r i e ; e r g o

anima

i n t e l le c t i v a e st p r o p r i e f or m a

h o m i n i s .

A n t e c e d e n s videtur sat is manifestum se c u n d u m a u c -

t or i t a t e s A r i s t o te l is t e r t i o De a n im a * e t primo

E t h i -

co rum, \

q u o d i n t e l l i g e r e e s t p r o p r i a o p e r a t i o h o m i n i s .

O p e r a t i o

autem

u t d i s t i n g u i tu r c o n t ra a c t io n e m seu

fa c t i on e m f or m a l i te r in e s t o p e r a n t i , e t n o n est a b

i p s o i n a l t e r u m .

Gonsimiliter decimo Ethicorum J

i n

i n t e l l i g e r e p o n i t f e l i c i t a t e m h o m i n i s , e t m a n i f e s t u m e s t

q u o d ilia fe l ic i ta s in e s t fo r m a l i t e r h o m i n i ; e r go e t ilia

o pe r a t i o i n qua co ns i s t i t .

Se d t e n t a n d u m e st p r o ba r e a n t e c e d e n s p e r r a t io n e m

c o n t r a p r o t e r v u m s i n e g e t , e t h o c i n t e l l i g e n d o i n a n t e -

c e d e n t e i n t e l l i g e r e p r o p r i e d i c t u m p e r q u o d i n t e l l i g o

a c t u m c og n os c e n d i t r a n s c e n d e n te m

totum

genus sens i t i -

v ae co gn i t i o n i s .

P r o b a t u r e r g o i l lud a n t e c e d e n s u n o modo s ic . Hom o

co gno sc it a c t u co gno sc en d i , n o n o rg an i co ; e r go

i n t e l

l ig i t p r o p r i e . C o n s e q u e n t ia p a t e t e x r a t i o n e j a m p o s it a ,

q u i a intellectio p r o p r i e e st c o g n i t i o tra n s c e n d e n s t o t u m

genus sensa t i on i s

; omnis

a u t em sensa t i o e s t co gn i t i o

o rg an i c a ex se cundo De an im a . An te ce de ns h u ju s

enthymematis p r o b a t u r , n a m organum determinatur a d

certum

g e n u s s e n s i b i l i u m e x

n

De a n i m a * * e t h o c id e o

q u i a c o n s i s t i t i n m e d i a p r o p o r t i o n e e x t r e m o r u m i l l i u s

g e n e r is . Se d a l iq u a m c o g n i t i on e m e x p e r im u r i n n obis

q u a e n o n c o m p e t it n o bis s e c u n d u m t a le or g a n u m , q u i a

t u n c determinaretur p ra e c i s e a d s e n s ib il ia d e t e r m i n a t i

g e n e r i s , c u j u s o p p o s i t u m e x p e r i m u r , q u i a c o g n o s c i m u s

* m, cap. m, passim.

f Ethica Nicomachea, i , cap. v i i ( iog8a, 7).

+ x, cap. v i i i

(1178*, 21).

* * n, cap.

v -x ii ,

passim

(4166,

32SS ;

424", 25-26).




i n a nother fo rm . Ma n form a lly

and

properly understands ;

therefore, the intellective soul is the proper form of man.

[a .

Proof of the an tece de nt ]. Th e antecedent seems to

be c lear enough accord ing to the test imony of Ar is to t le

in De

anima,

bk . h i , * a n d Nicomachean Ethics, bk .

i,f

since

to un de rs tan d is the p roper opera t ion of m a n . Now an

operat ion, in cont rad is t inct ion to an act of fashion ing

som eth ing or to an a c t ion , is fo rm a l ly in the one w ho

per form s the opera t ion and is n ot p roduced by the agen t

in s om ething else. Sim ila r ly Ar istot le in Nicomachean

Ethics, bk .

x,J

makes man 's happ iness consis t in under

s tand ing . Now i t is c lear th a t th is fe l ic i ty is form a l ly in

m a n . C onsequen tly the opera t ion in w h ich th is fe l ic i t y

consis ts m ust a lso be in m a n form a l ly .

Never the less, we should t ry to prove the antecedent

by reason lest some contentious in d iv id u a l deny i t . Now

in the an teceden t, I take " to k n ow " or " to un de rs tand "

in the proper sense of the term as an act of knowledge

w h ich transcends every t ype of

sense

knowledge .

[First

p roof ] .

One w ay of p rov in g th is an teceden t ,

t h en , is th i s . M a n knows by an ac t o f know ledge w h i ch

is n ot organ ic ; hence he know s or understands in the

p rope r sense of the te rm . The consequence is ev ide nt

for the reason a l ready g iven, s ince in te l lect ion proper ly

speaking is a knowledge which t ranscends a l l sense

know led ge . A l l sensation, howe ver , is organ ic knowledge

as Ar is to t le shows in De an im a, bk. i i . There the an te

cedent of th is enthymeme is p rove d f rom the fac t tha t

every orga n is de term ine d to a c e r ta in k in d of sensible,7

and th is because i t consis ts in a ba lance between two

extrem es.8 B u t we do experience in ourselves som e

know ledge wh i ch we do no t have i n v i r t ue o f some

organ , fo r i f i t were organ ic , th i s knowledge wou ld be

l im i te d prec ise ly to the sensibles of som e d eterm ine d

k i n d , wh i ch i s t he ve ry oppos i t e o f wha t we ac tua l l y



I40 DUNS SGOTUS

p e r

talem

a c t u m d i f f e r e n t i a l )

cujuscumque

gene r i s

sensibilium a d

a l i u d ,

q u o d n o n e s t a l i q u i d i l l i u s g e n e r i s ;

e r go

cognoscimus utrumque e x t r e m u m .

Pa t e t is t a

c o n s e q u e n t i a s e c u n d u m Philosophum s i c a r g u e n t e m 11

De a nim a * d e s e ns u c o m m u n i .

Sed

hie

i n s t a t u r

p r i m o ,

q u i a c o g n i t i o o r g a n i c a e s t ,

q u a e in e s t s e c u n d u m d e t e r m i n a t a m p a r t e m c orp o ris ;

ilia autem d e q u a a r g u i tu r , q u o d p e r i l lam d i s t i n g u i m u s

se ns ib il ia a n o n se ns ib il ib u s , in e s t t o t i p r im o , e t id e o n o n

est p e r a l i q u o d or g a n u m p r o p r i e lo q u e n d o ; tamen n o n

t r a n s c e n d i t totum g e n u s cognitionis s e n s i t i v a e s e c u n d u m

p e r fe c t io n e m , q u i a in e s t p r i m o

t o t i ,

e t pe r consequens i t a

e st m a t e r i a l e , s i c u t i l lud q u o d in e s t t o t i p e r p a r t e m ; i t a

enim

pas s io tot i u s es t

m a t e r i a l is ,

s ic u t q u o d in e s t t o t i p e r

p a r t e m .

Se c un d o n e g a t u r a s s u m p t u m q u o d

ille

a c t us

n o n i n e s t s e c u n d u m a l i q u o d o r g a n u m , q u i a i n e s t s e c u n

d u m o r g a n u m p h a n t a s i a e

;

c u ju s p r o b a t i o e s t, q u i a

illo

laeso impeditur c o g n i t i o . Nee p r o b a t i o ilia d e d e t e r -

m in a t io n e o rg a n i a d certum g en u s c o n c lu d i t , q u ia

p h a n -

ta s i a e x t e n d i t se a d o m n i a s e n s ib il ia .

Se d p r i m a i n s t a n t ia e xc lu s a es t p e r q u o d d a m i b i

t a c t u m ,

q u i a p e r i l i u m a c t u m d i s c e r n i m u s t o t u m g e n u s

s e n s i b i l i u m a b a l i q u o e x t r a t o t u m g e n u s i l l u d ;

nee il ia

p r o ba t io , q u o d i m p e d i t u r is te a c tu s la e so or g a n o p h a n t a

s ia e c o n c l u d i t ; h o c e n i m e st p r o p t e r o r d i n e m

istarum

potentiarum i n o p e r a n d o , n o n a u t e m q u i a i n t e l le c t io

e x e r c e a t u r m e d i a n t e i s t o o r g a n o .

A l i te r p r ob a t u r a n te c ed e n s p r i n c i p a l e , q u i a a l i q u a

* De

anima, in ,

cap. i

(425°

30 S.).




14O

exper ience. For by such an ac t we know prec ise ly how

one k in d of sens ible d i ffers f rom an othe r , a nd con-

q u e n t ly w e kn ow both extrem es. Th is consequence is

ev iden t f rom the Ph i losopher , who uses th is a rgument

in De anim a, bk. i i , * in reg ard to com m on sense.

B u t to this som e objec t , f irs t of

a l l,

t h a t organ ic know

ledge is th a t w h ich is p resen t in some de term ina te p a r t o f

the body , whereas the a foresa id knowledge by w h ich we

dis t ing u ish sensibles from th ings tha t c an not be pe rceived

by the senses, is present in the body as a w hole an d for

th is reason is n o t had i n v i r tue of some o rgan in the p rope r

sense of the w ord . For a n a t t r ibute of the w hole is as

mater ia l as someth ing wh ich ex is ts in one of i t s pa r ts .

Never the less, th is knowledge does not t ranscend in per

fect ion the whole class of sense knowledge since i t is

p r im a r i ly i n the body as a wh ole an d hence is ju s t as

ma te r i a l i n cha rac te r as t he know ledge i n on l y a pa r t

of the w h ole . Secondly, the y de ny the as su m pt ion tha t

th is act of knowledge is not present in v i r tue of some

orga n because i t is the re by reason of the orga n of the

im a g ina t ion . Proof fo r th i s is foun d in the fac t th a t w hen

th is o rgan i s damaged , such knowledge i s no longer

possible. Ne i th e r is the p roof from the l im i ta t ion of the

organ to a cer ta in k ind of sensible conclusive, because

the im a g ina t ion extends to a l l sensibles.

Th e fi rs t objec t ion, how ever ,

has

a l rea dy

been

exc luded

by w ha t was trea ted above, fo r th rough th is ac t o f know

ledge w e d isce rn the d i fferenc e betw een the w hole class

of sensibles a n d som ething th a t is outside the class as a

w ho le. Nei the r does the a rgu m ent tha t th i s ac t is

impeded by damage done to t he imag ina t ion p rove

any t h i n g .

For th is is due to the fu n c t ion a l re la t ion tha t

exists between these powers and not because the act of

unders tand ing i s exerc i sed t h rough the med ium o f an

organ.

[Second p roof"]. Another p roof fo r the p r inc ipa l an te

cedent

is based on

the fac t tha t

we possess some

im m a t e r ia l



141

DUNS SCOTUS

c o g n i t i o i m m a t e r i a l is e st i n n o bis ; n u l l a s e n s i tiv a p o te s t

esse im m a t e r i a l is ; e r g o , e t c .

Istud

v o c a b u l u m i m m a t e r ia l e e st fre q u e n s i n u s u

Ph i lo -

s o p h i i n p r o p o s i t o , sed v i d e t u r a m b ig u u m . Pote s t enim

a d propositum t r i p l i c i t e r i n t e l l ig i ; vel im m a t e r i a l is , q u i a

i n c o r p o r e a , h o c

m o d o ,

q u i a n o n p e r p a r t e m c o r p o r e a m

e t

o r g a n u m ,

e t t u n c i s t u d e st i d e m c u m p r o p os i tio n e

j a m p o s ita d e n o n o rg a n i c a . V e l a l i o m o d o i m m a t e r ia l is ,

q u i a

nullo

m o d o e x t e n s a , e t t u n c p l u s d i c i t

quam

n o n

o rg a n i c a ; e t s i e n i m omnis o r g a n i c a s i t e x t e n s a , q u i a

r e c i p i t u r i n e x t e n s o , n o n

tamen

so l a , q u i a s i r e c i p e r e t u r

i n t o t o composito

p r i m o ,

c u m i l lud s i t e x t e n s u m , a d h u c

o pe r a t io esset e x te n sa . Te r t i o m o do po te s t i n t e l l i g i

i m m a t e r i a l i t a s e j u s i n c o m p a r a t i o n e a d o b j e c t u m , u t

s c i l ic e t re s p ic i a t ob je c t u m s u b r a t i on i bu s i m m a t e r i a l i bu s ,

u t p o t e i n q u a n t u m a b s t r a h i t u r a b hie e t n u n c e t h u j u s -

m o d i ,

q u a e d i c u n t u r c o n d i tio n e s m a t e r ia l e s . S i

autem

( p r ofe r e t u r v e l ) p r o ba r e t u r i m m a t e r i a l i t a s s e c u n d o m o d o ,

p lu s h a b e r e t u r p r o p o s i t u m q u a m e x p r o ba t io n e e ju s

p r i m o m o d o . Se d n o n v i d e t u r sic p os se p r o b a r i , n i s i e x

c o n d i t i o n i b u s o b j e c t i , q u o d r e s p i c i t ille a c t u s , n i s i f o r t e

ex r e f l e c t i o ne , q u i a

experimur

nos

reflecti

s u p e r a c t u m

is t iu s c o g n i t io n i s ; e t q u a n t u m n o n e st s u p e r se

r e f l e x iv u m ,

e t i de o ab ob jec to is t i u s ac t us fit fina lit e r p roba t i o an t ece -

den t i s .

Sic : H a b e m u s i n n o bis a l i q u a m c o g n i t i on e m o bje c t i

s u b

ilia

r a t io n e s u b q u a n o n p ot e s t esse e ju s a l iq u a c o g n i

t io s e n s i t i v a ; e r g o , e t c . An t e c e d e n s p r o b a t u r , q u i a

e x p e r i m u r i n n o bis q u i a c og n os c im u s a c t u u n i v e rs a l e ;




141

knowledge. No sense knowledge , how ever , can be im

m a ter ia l ; therefore, etc.

Th is w o rd " im m a te r i a l " is fr equen tly u sed by the

Phi losopher in this connexion, but i t appears to be

am biguous . There a re th ree re levan t ways i n w h i ch i t

can be

understood, (a)

E it he r th is know ledge is im

m a te r ia l because i t is in corporea l in the sense tha t i t is

not an ope rat ion th a t invo lves a corporea l p a r t or orga n.

In th is sense, the present proposi tion is the same as tha t

p rev ious ly pos ited w i th regard to non-organ ic knowledge.

(b ) Ano the r way i n wh i ch t h i s know ledge cou ld be

im m ate r ia l w ou ld be tha t i t is n ot extended i n any w ay .

In th is case m uc h m ore is asserted th a n the fac t tha t i t is

n ot

orga n ic .

For a l thou gh ev ery th ing organ ic

is

extend ed

inasmuch as i t i s rece ived in to someth ing extended

[v iz. the org a n ], th is is n ot the on ly

reason.

I t w ou ld s t il l

be extended i f i t w ere rece ived im m ed ia te ly by the com

posite as a w hole, because the com posite is i tse l f exten ded.

(c) Im m a te r i a l i ty can be unders tood i n a t h i r d sense,

na m ely w i th re ference to the objec t , inasm uch as th is

knowledge considers the objec t un de r im m a ter ia l aspects ,

as

for ins tance, abstrac t ing f rom the "he re an d

now '"

a n d

such l ike , w h ich a re sa id to be m a ter ia l cond i tions. I f we

w ou ld p rove th is know ledge to be im m a t e r ia l i n the second

sense an d n ot m ere ly i n the f irs t our proposed conclus ion

w ou ld follow a l l the

m ore .

B u t i t

seems

t ha t the on l y way

we cou ld do th i s wou ld be f rom the cond i t ions wh i ch

cha racter ise the objec t of

such

an act (un less perhaps we

cou ld do

so

on the basis of ref le ct ion , s ince we exper ience

ourselves ref le ct ing on th is a ct of know led ge , for w h a t has

q u a n t i ty is not capa ble of ref le ct ing up on itse lf.) A t a ny

ra te the p roof of the an tecedent u l tim a te ly rests up on the

objec t of this a ct.

Th e p roof is as follow s. We possess som e knowledg e

of an object under an aspect i t cou ld not have as an

object of

sense

know led ge ; there fore,

etc.—Proof

of the

antecedent : ( i) We exper ience i n ourselves th a t we

( 2 , 3 2 2 ) 20



I42 DUNS SCOTUS

e t e x p e r im u r q u i a cognoscimus ens , vel q u a l i t a t e m

[ M S q u a n t i t a t e m ] s ub r a t io n e

aliqua

c o m m u n i o n

quam

s i t r a t i o primi ob j ec t i sens ib i l i s , etiam r e s p e c tu supremae

s e n s i t iv a e . E x p e r i m u r e t i a m q u o d c og n os c im u s

r e l a -

t ion e s c on s e q u e n t e s n a t u r a s

r e r u m ,

e t ia m n o n s e n s ib i l iu m .

E x p e r i m u r e t i a m q u o d d i s t i n g u i m u s totum genus sens i

b i l i u m a b a l iq u o q u o d n o n e st i l l iu s g e n e r is . E xp e r i m u r

e t i a m q u o d c o g n o s c i m u s r e l a t i o n e s r a t i o n i s , q u a e s u n t

s e c u n d a e i n t e n t i o n e s , s c i l i c e t

relationem

u n i v e r s a l i s ,

g en e r is e t s pe c ie i e t co m p o s i t io n i s , e t aliarum i n t e n t io n u m

l og i c a l i u m . E x p e r im u r e t i a m q u o d c og n os c im u s a c t u m

i l i u m q u o c o g n o s c i m u s i s t a , e t

i l l u d ,

s e c u n d u m q u o d

i ne s t no b i s i s t e a c t u s , q uo d e s t p e r a c t um reflexum supe r

a c t u m r e c t u m e t s u s c e p t iv u m e ju s . E xp e r im u r e t ia m

q u o d assentimus c o m p l e x io n ib u s q u i bu s d a m s in e p os si-

b i l i t a t e c o n t ra d ic e n d i v e l e r r a n d i , u t p o t e

primis

p r i n c i p i i s .

E xp e r i m u r e t ia m q u o d c og n os c im u s i g n o t u m e x n o to p e r

d i s c u r s u m , i t a q u o d n o n p o s s u m u s d i s s e n t i r e e v i d e n t i a e

d i s cu r su s , nee c on c lu s ion is i l l a t a e ; q u o d c u m q u e is t o r u m

cognosce re es t

impossibile cuicumque

p o t e n t ia e sen s it iv ae ,

e rgo , etc.—Si q u is autem p ro t e r v e n eg e t is tos a c t us inesse

h o m i n i , nee se e xp e r i r i is tos a c t u s i n s e , n o n e s t u l t e r i u s

c u m e o d i s p u t a n d u m , s e d d i c e n d u m e s t s i b i q u o d e s t

brutum ; s ic u t c u m d ic e n t e , n o n v i d e o colorem i b i , n o n

est d i s p u t a n d u m , sed d i c e n d u m

s i b i,

t u i n d i g e s s e ns u q u i a

caecus e s. I t a q u o d quodam s e nsu , i d e s t , p e r ce p t i one

i n t e r i o r i ,

e xpe r im u r is tos a c t u s i n n o bi s ; e t i d eo s i q u is

i s t o s n e g e t , d i c e n d u m e s t eum n o n esse h o m i n e m , q u ia

n o n h a b e t

istam

v i s ion e m q u a m a l i i

experiuntur.-—

A s s u m p t u m , s c i l i c e t q u o d n u l l u s i s t o r u m actuum po tes t

in esse s e c u n d u m a l iq u a m p o t e n t ia m s e n s i t iv a m , p r ob a t u r ,

q u i a a c t u u n i v e r s a l e c o g n o s c i t u r s u b t a n t a

indifferentia




know t he ac t ua l

un iversa l ,

( i i) We experience tha t we

know be ing or q ua l it y u nder a m ore genera l no t ion t ha n

tha t cha rac ter is t ic o f the p r im a ry objec t o f even the

highest sense

fa cu lt y ,

( i i i ) We exper ience th a t w e a lso

kn ow re la t ions tha t fo llow from the na tu re o f th ing s , even

w he n the la t te r a re no t capab le of

being

perce ived by the

senses, ( iv ) We exper ience tha t w e d is t ing u ish the w hole

class of sensible objects from w h a t is n ot such, (v ) We

experience tha t we k now concep tua l re la tions , w h ich a re

second in ten t ions , such as tha t of the un ive rsa l , the genus,

the species, the ju d g m e n t an d other log ica l in ten t ions.

(v i ) We a lso exper ience tha t we know the very ac t

whereby we know these th ings and we exper ience tha t

th is a ct exis ts w i th in us. This w e do by a n act of reflec

t ion upon the d i r ec t ac t and i t s rec ip ien t , (vii) We

experience th a t w e assent to proposi tions such as the fi rst

pr inc ip les w i th ou t a poss ib ilit y of e r ror or cont ra d ic t ion.

(v i i i) We a lso exper ience tha t

we

l ea r n the un known from

the kn ow n by m eans of d iscu rs ive reason ing , so tha t we

are unable to refuse our assent to the evidence of the

reasoning process or to the conclusion that is inferred.

B u t the kn ow ledge of any of these cann ot be a t t ribu te d

to any sensit ive

fa c u l ty ;

therefore,

etc.—Should

a

con

t en t ious ind iv idua l deny tha t such ac ts a re p resen t in

m a n or th a t he experiences these acts in h im sel f, a person

ough t not to a rgue w i t h h im any fu r the r , bu t he ough t to

be to ld th a t he is a b ru te a n im a l . I t is the same w i t h one

w ho says : " I do n ot see co lour h e re ". We should not

a rgue w i t h such a one bu t s im p ly t e l l h im : "You need

senses because you are b l i n d ". An d so by a c er ta in

"sense" , namely in te rna l percep t ion , we exper ience

these acts w i th in ourselves. Hen ce , i f som eone w ere to

deny the i r exis tence w e w ou ld have to say tha t he is n o t

a m a n because he lacks th is in te r ior v i s ion w h ich others

experience.—The

assu m pt ion th a t a sense fa cu l ty is n ot

the source of

any

o f

these

acts [v iz. ( i ) to (v i i i ) ] is p roved

as follow s : Th e a ctu a l un ive rsa l has such an ind iffere nc e



143

DUNS

SGOTUS

s u b q u a n t a

ipsum

s i c c o g n i t u m e s t

simul

d i c i b i l e

de

o m n i b u s s i n g u l a r ib u s i n q u i bu s s a l v a t u r ; s ic n o n c og n os -

c i t se nsus . Sed de se cundo es t e v i d e n t iu s , q u i a n u l l a

p o t e n t i a p o t e s t c o g n o s c e r e a l i q u i d s u b r a t i o n e u n i v e r s a -

l iori r a t i on e su i p r o p r i i o b je c t i ; s i c u t v is u s n o n cogno sc it

a l i q u i d s u b r a t io n e indifferenti a d c o lo re m e t a d sonum ;

e r g o c o g n i t i o

ilia

est

alicujus

s ub r a t io n e c o m m u n io n

q u o c u m q u e p o s i t o o b j e c t o , etiam supremi sensus non

p o te s t esse a l iq u a s e n s a t io. Q u a r t u m p r o ba t i d e m , q u ia

nu l l a s ensa t i o po t e s t e s se d i s t i n c t i v e

pr imi

ob jec t i sens i -

b i l i s , i .e . c o m m u n i s s i m i , a b eo q u o d n o n e st t a l e , q u i a nee

p o te s t esse u t r iu s q u e e x t r e m i . D e r e l a t i on i bu s c on s e-

q u e n t i b u s a l i a n o n s e n s i b i l i a i n t e r s e vel i n sens i b i l i a a d

se ns ib il ia , p a t e t p e r i d e m q u i a s ensus n o n po t e s t i n is tos

e t

multo magis

p a t e t d e r e l a t i on i bu s is t is , q u a e d i c u n t u r

r a t i on i s , q u i a s en su s n o n p ot e s t moveri a d c og n os c e n d u m

a l i q u i d q u o d n o n i n c l u d i t u r i n o b j e c t o s e n s i b i l i u t s e n s i -

b i l i ; h a b i t u d o r a t io n is n o n i n c l u d i t u r i n a l i q u o u t

ex is tens e s t ; sensus autem ex i s ten t i s es t u t ex i s tens es t ,

e t p e r ho c po sse t p r o b a r i

pr imum

e t i a m d e a c t u u n iv e r

s a l ^ q u i a u n i v e r s a l i i n a c t u r e p u g n a t esse e xis te n s u t

ex is tens es t . Al iud d e reflexione s u p e r a c t u m e t p o te n -

t i a m ,

p r o ba t u r p e r h oc q u o d q u a n t u m n o n es t

reflexivum

su p r a se . A l i a d u o de co m p o s i t io ne e t a s sensione co m

p o s i t i o n ^ e t d e d is c u r r e r e e t a s s e n t ire e v i d e n t i a e d is c u rs u s

p r o b a n t u r e x r e l a t i o n e r a t i o n i s , q u i a i s t a n o n s u n t s i n e

r e l a t i o n e r a t i o n i s .

C on s e q u e n t ia p r i m i e n t h y m e m a t is p r o b a t u r s ic . Si

t a l is a c t u s s it i n n o bis fo r m a l i t e r c u m n o n s it s u bs t a n t ia




143

abou t i t t ha t wha t i s known i n t h i s way can be p red i

ca ted s imul taneously of a l l the s ingu lars of which i t i s

ch ara cter is t ic ; no sense fa c u l ty , howe ver , know s th ings

in th is wa y. The same is even m ore ev ide n t as regards

the

second,

fo r no fac u l ty ca n know som eth ing und er an

aspect m ore un iversa l tha n tha t o f its proper objec t , even

as v is ion perceives noth ing under some aspect common

to co lour a n d to sound. C onse que nt ly , a knowledge of

someth ing i n even more genera l t e rms than tha t cha r

acter ist ic of the f i rst object of even the highest sense

can not be a sensation. Th e same holds t ru e of the

f ou r t h ,

for no sensat ion can d is t ingu ish between the

most un iversa l of a l l sens ib le objects and that which is

not sensible, because i t cannot perceive both extremes.

This is a lso t rue of the re la t ions which exis t between

th ings im p erc ep t ib le to the senses or betw een such th ings

an d those w h ich can be p erceived by the senses, for the

sense fac u l ty has no a bi l i t y to perce ive such re la t ionsh ips .

An d th is is a l l the m ore t r ue o f those re la tions w h ich a re

p u re ly conc ep tua l , since the senses can be m oved to per

ce ive on ly what is inc luded in a sens ib le object as such.

B u t conce p tua l re la t ions a re n o t inc lud ed in any ex is t ing

t h i n g

as

such , whereas the senses have to do w i th e xist ing

th ings as ex is t ing . The same argum ent c ou ld be app lied

to the ac tua l un iversa l , fo r i t i s absurd tha t the ac tua l

un ive rsa l sh ould exis t

as

such. The o the r , rega rd ing our

a b i li t y to re flec t up on the ac t an d the fa cu l ty , is p roved

f rom the fac t t ha t any th ing t ha t has quan t i t y canno t

reflec t up on itsel f. As for the other tw o (v iz. the a ct of

ju d g m e n t a nd the assent to the same or the act of reason

ing and the assent g iven to the ev idence for the same),

what was said of conceptual relat ions proves these acts

do n ot proceed f rom a sense fa c u l ty , for ne ither of these

tw o exis t w i thou t a conce p tua l re la t ion .

\b.

Proof of the c onsequ en t]. The consequence of the

f i rst

enthymeme 9

is p roved as follow s :

[First

p roof"].

I f

we

form a l ly possess such an a ct, since



£44 DUNS SGOTUS

n o s t r a , q u ia q u a n d oq u e in e s t e t q u a n d o q u e non i nes t ,

e r go o po r t e t d a r e

i l l i

a l i q u o d

receptivum proprium

;

n on autem a l i q u o d

e x t e n s u m ,

s i ve s i t pa r s o r gan i ca s i ve

totum c om p o s i tu m , q u i a t u n c ilia op e ra t io esset ex tens a ;

nee

posse t e sse t a l i s qua l i s d i c t a e s t , c i r ca ob jec t a

talia

q u a l ia d i c t a s u n t ; e r g o o p o r t e t q u o d in s i t s e c u n d u m

a l iq u i d n o n e x te n s u m ; e t q u o d

i l lud

s it fo r m a l i t e r i n

nob is ,

i l l u d n o n p o te s t e sse n i s i anima i n t e l l e c t i v a , q u i a

quaecumque a l ia f o r m a e st e x te n sa .

Vel a l i t e r p o te s t p r o b a r i c o n s e q u e n t ia i s ta e u n d o a d

conditionem

o b j e c t i i s t i u s a c t u s , q u i a q u a e l i b e t f o r m a

i n fe r i o r i n t e l le c t i v a , s i habet o p e r a t ion e m , habet p raec i se

r e spe c t u o b j e c t i s ub r a t i o n i b us o ppo s i t i s i s t i s r a t i o n i b us

d i c t i s ; e rgo s i

habemus

op e r a t io n e m c i rc a

objectum

sub

i s t i s r a t i o n i b us , ilia n o n i n e r i t n o b i s s e c u n d u m aliquam

fo rmam aliam a b i n t e l le c t i v a ; e r g o in e s t n o bis s e c u n d u m

i n t e l le c t i v a m ; e r g o i n t e l l e c t i v a f o r m a l i te r in e s t n o bis ,

a l i t e r n o n essemus fo r m a l i t e r o p e r a n te s s e c u n d u m illam

o p e r a t i o n e m .

E x s e c u n d a o p e r a t i o n e

h u m a n a ,

s c i l i c e t v o l u n t a t e ,

p ote s t p r o b a r i i d e m , q u i a h o m o e st

dominus actuum

s u o r u m , i t a q u o d i n p o te s t a t e e ju s es t p e r v o l u n t a t e m

determinare

se a d h oc v e l e ju s o p p o s i t u m , s i c u t d i c t u m e st

d i s t i n c t i o n e x x i i , s e c u n d i v e l

x x i i i , *

q . i i i , e t ho c e st

notum

n on tantum ex f i de sed etiam p e r rationem n a t u r a l e m .

I s t a a u t e m

indeterminatio

n o n p o te s t esse i n a l iq u o

a p p e t i tu s e n s it iv o se u o rg a n i c o v e l e xte n s o q u i a q u i l i b e t

a p p e t i t u s or g a n ic u s v e l m a t e r i a l is d e t e r m i n a t u r a d

certum

g e nu s a p p e t i b i l i u m s i bi c on v e n ie n s , i ta q u o d i l l u d

apprehensum n o n p o t e s t n o n c o n v e n i r e nee a p p e t i t u s

nee

a p p e te r e ; e rg o v o lu n t a s , q u a s ic i n d e t e r m i n a t e

v o l u m u s e s t a p p e t i t u s n o n a l i c u j u s t a l i s f o r m a e , s c i l i c e t

* Opus oxoniense, n , dist. xxv, q . unica (Vives e d .).




i t is not our substance as such—for i t i s not a lways

present in us—it fo llow s, the refore, tha t th is act needs a

prope r subject . Now the la t ter can not be som eth ing

extended , whether i t be a par t o f the organ ism or the

whole composi te , for then th is operat ion i tse l f would be

extende d an d w ou ld lack the p rescr ibed charac teris tics .

Nei the r w ou ld i t be concerned w i th such objec ts as have

been d escr ibed a bove. Hen ce , i t is necessary th a t th is

ac t be i n us i n v i r tu e o f som eth ing unextended and tha t

the la t te r be fo rm a l l y in us . Now th is can be noth ing

else than the in te l lect ive

soul,

for ev ery other form is

extended.

[Secondproof ~\.

Anothe r w ay to prove th is consequence

would be to consider the condi t ion of the object of th is

ac t, for i f an y form in fer ior to the in te llect ive form

fun ct ions, i t is a lw ays w i th reference to an object h a v ing

character ist ics the very opposite of those ci ted above.10

Therefore , i f we have an opera t ion wh ich regards an

object un de r the aforem en tione d aspects , th is w i l l n ot

be p resen t in us in v i r tue of any fo rm o ther than the

in te l lec t ive . Henc e, i t is by reason of th is form tha t i t is

present in us, a nd consequ ent ly the in te l le ct ive form i tse l f

is fo rm a l ly in us , fo r o therw ise w e w ou ld n o t fo rm a l ly

fu nc t ion i n t h i s w ay .

[Thi rdp roof"]. We can prove the same from the second

opera t ion c ha racter is t ic of m a n , nam e ly

v o l it ion ,

for m an

is m aster of his acts to such an exten t tha t i t is w i th in h is

powe r to de term ine h im se lf a t w i l l to th is or to its

opposite,

as has been said

i n

bk .

i i ,

d is t . xxii

or

xxm ,

q .

i i i . *

An d th is is som eth ing kn own by n a tu ra l r eason a nd no t

m ere ly by fa i th . Such a lack o f de term ina t ion , how ever ,

can not exis t in an y organ ic or e xtend ed ap pe t ite , because

every organ ic o r mater ia l appet i te i s de termined to a

certa in c lass of sui table objects so that what is appre

hended cannot be unsu i tab le nor can the appet i te fa i l

to seek i t . Th e

w i l l ,

the re fore , by w h i ch we can w i l l i n

such an i nde te rm ina te way , i s no t t he appe t i t e o f a



145 DUNS SCOTUS

m a t e r i a l is , e t p e r consequens a l ic u ju s e xced en t is omnem

talem formem hujusmodi ponimus i n t e l le c t iv a m , e t tu n c

s i a p p e t i t u s

ille

s i t f or m a l i te r i n n o bis , q u i a e t a p p e t e re ,

s e q u i tu r q u o d fo rm a ilia s i t f or m a n o s t r a .

\Propositio I I . Anima in te l lect iva est im m or ta l is] . De

s e cu n d a p r o p os i tio n e p r i n c i p a l i , q u a e e s t, q u o d a n im a

i n t e l le c t iv a e st i m m o r ta l is , p r o c e d i tu r s ic u t d e p r i m a .

Primo a d d u c e n d o a u c t o r i t a t e s P h i l o s o p h o r u m q u i h o c

sense r un t .

A r is t o te l e s I I De an im a* d i c i t q u o d i n t e l le c t u s s epa r a -

t u r a c a e t e r is , s ic u t p e r p e t u u m a c o r r u p t i b i l i . S i d i c a t u r

q u o d s e p a ra tu r q u a n t u m a d o p e r a t ion e m ;

c o n t r a —

e x h o c s e q u i t u r p r o p o s i t u m , q u i a s i p o te s t s e p a r a r i

s e c u n d u m o p e r a t io n e m e t s e c u n d u m

esse

s e c u n d u m

ipsum

i

De

anima.]

I t e m ,

in De an ima \ p o n i t u r d i f f e r e n t i a i n t e r sensum

e t i n t e l le c t u m , q u o d e xc e lle n s s e n s ibile c o r r u m p i t

s e n s u m ,

e t p r o p t e r h oc p o s t s e n s a tion e m t a lis m in u s

s e n t it m in u s s e n s ibile ; n o n s ic d e i n t e l l e c t u . Imo

p o s t q u a m i n t e l l e x e r i t

summa

i n t e l l i g i b i l i a ,

magis

i n t e l l i -

g i t i n f e r i o r a ; e r g o i n t e l le c t u s n o n d e b i l i t a t u r i n op e -

r a n d o , e t t u n c u l t r a s e q u i t u r , q u o d s it i n c o r r u p t ib i l is i n

essendo.

I t e m ,

x i i Me tapkys i cae , cap . i , * * moven tes causae velut

p r i u s ex i s t e n t e s , q uae

autem

u t r a t i o , i d e s t, fo r m a s u b -

s ta n t a l is s u p p le c u m c a u s a t o u t to t o ; q u a n d o enim

sa na t u r h o m o , t u n c e t s an ita s e s t. S i a u t e m p os t e r iu s

a l i q u i d

m a n e t , perscrutandum

est ; in

quibusdam

e n i m

* n , cap . i i (413&, 25). t 11, cap. i i

(4136, 29-31).

J

m,

cap . iv

(429",

29-429&, 4). * *

xn ,

ca p. i i i

(1070°

21 ff.).




m a ter ia l form , an d in consequence i t belongs to som e

th in g w h ich excels every such fo rm . B u t th i s is ju s t w ha t

we assume the in te l le ct ive form to be. An d therefore, i f

th i s ap pe tite is form a l ly in us ina sm uch as its ac t is in us ,

i t follow s th a t th is form is our form .

[Second Proposition : The intellective soul is im m orta l].

The m ethod of de a l ing w i th the second p ropos i tion , v iz.

tha t the in te l lec t ive sou l is im m or ta l , is the same as tha t

used w i th the f irs t . Th e test im ony of those phi losophe rs

w ho he ld th is is ad duced fi rs t .

[Arguments for im m ortality : u A r g .

i ] .

Ar i s to t le , in De

anim a, bk .

i i , *

says th a t the " in te l lec t d iffers f rom the rest

as w ha t is e te rna l d iffe rs from w ha t is pe r ish ab le". An d

i f som eone objects tha t i t is som eth ing d i ffere nt an d ap ar t

on ly in so far as its operations are concerned, the p ro

posed conclusion st i l l fo l lows, for according to Ar istot le

in De anim a, bk. i,f i f i t can be set ap ar t by reason of i ts

operat ions i t can also exist a p a rt .

[A rg . 11].

Fu r the rm ore , i n

De anim a, bk .

h i ,

%

he

says

t ha t

the senses d i ffe r f rom the inte l le ct , because som ething

th a t st im ulates the sense excessively tends to im p a ir i t

so tha t afterw ards even an objec t th a t does n ot s t im ulate

the sense so strongly is less capable of being perceived,

whereas such is no t the case w i th the in te l lec t . Q u ite

the cont rary , once the h ighest in te l l ig ib les have been

grasped what is less intel l ig ib le becomes even bet ter

k n o wn . The in te l le ct consequ ent ly is not w eakened in

fu n ct ion, an d from th is i t follow s fur th e r , the in te l lec t

is im pe r ish able in its being .

[A rg . i n ] . Also, i n Metaphysics, bk . x i i , c. i , * * he says :

"Th e causes tha t produ ce m ot ion , for instance , exis t

previously whereas those which are the essence, that is,

the su bstant ia l form , exis t s im ultane ously (Add 'w i th the

effec t cons idered as a w h o le ' ) . For w he n a m an is

he a l thy, the n he a l th a lso exis ts. . . . B u t w e m ust

inq u i re w hether an y th ing rem a ins a fte rwa rds. For in

some cases there is nothing to prevent th is, for instance



I4 6 DUNS SCOTUS

n i h i l p r o h i b e t , u t s i anima e s t t a l i s , non o m n i s , sed

i n t e l l e c t u s , e t c .

Vul t

e r go d i c e r e quo d i n t e l l e c t u s e s t

f o r m a manens p os t c o m p o s i tu m , se d n o n a n te .

I t e m ,

xvin De an im a l ib u s * relinquitur s o lu m in t e l le c t u m

de fo ris a d ve n i r e . E r g o n o n a c c i p i t esse pe r gene r a -

t i o n e m ,

s e d a c ausa ex tr in s e c a ; e t p e r consequens n o n

p o te s t a c c i p e r e n o n esse p e r c o r r u p t i o n e m ,

nee

pe r

a l i q u a m causam i n f e r i or e m c o r r u p t i v a m , q u i a e ju s esse

n o n s u b e s t a l i c u i t a l i c a u s a e , c u m s i t a c a u s a s u p e r i o r i

i m m e d i a t e .

I t e m ,

ex d i c t i s

Philosophi

fo r m a n t u r a l iq u a e r a t ion e s ;

est unum principium a p u d

e u m ,

q u o d n a t u r a l e

d es i -

derium n o n e st f r u s t r a ; n u n c autem i n a n i m a e s t

d e s i d e r iu m n a t u r a l e a d s e m p e r esse.

I t e m , vii Metaphysicae,]

v u l t q u o d m a t e r i a e s t, q u a res

p otes t esse e t n on esse. Er g o

i l lud

q u o d n o n h a b e t

materiam s e c u n d u m e u m n o n h a b e t p o t e n t ia m n o n

e ss en di ; i n t e l le c t iv a n o n h a b e t m a t e r i a m s e c u n d u m

e u m ,

q u i a e st f or m a s i m p l e x .

I t e m ,

in Ethicorum % v u l t q u o d f or t is de b e t se expo ne r e

morti

p r o r e p u b l ic a e t i d e m v u l t rx E t h i c o ru m * * e t lo q u i t u r

s e c u n d u m j u d i c i u m r a t io n is n a t u r a l is ; e rg o s e c u n d u m

rationem naturalem p ote s t c o g n os c i i m m o r t a l i ta s

a n i m a e .

P r o b a t i o i s t i u s c o n s e q u e n t i a e , q u i a n u l l u s p r o p t e r

q u o d c u m q u e bonum v i r t u t i s vel i n s e , vel i n a l i o vel

communitatis d e b e t a p p e t e r e v e l p o t e s t omnino n o n

esse

s u u m ,

q u i a s ec u n d u m A u g u s t in u m in De l ibera

a r b it r io , \\ N o n esse n o n p o te s t a p p e t i . N u n c a u t e m s i

a n i m a n o n esset i m m o r t a l i s , m o rie n s a c c ip e r e t t o ta l i t e r

n on esse.

*

De generatione animalium, 11,

cap. i i i

(736*,

28).

f v i i , cap. xv (io39<>, 29).

j Ethica Nicomachea, in , cap. v i i (11174, 8).

* * ix, cap. v i i i (1169", 20).

ft

in ,

cap. v i i i

(Migne,

P.L.,

xxx i i ,

1282).




the sou l may be of th is

sort—not

a l l the

soul,

bu t the

in te l lec t" . Hence , w h at Ar is to t le wishes to say is tha t

the in te l lec t is the form w h ich exis ts after the com posite

ceases to e xist , even thou g h this form does not exist p r ior

to the com posite.

[A rg . i v ] . Also, he says i n his w ork De generatione

an imal ium*

: " I t rem ains for the in te l lec t a lone to enter

from the outs ide ". Hence , the in te l lec t does not receive

exis tence by w ay of ge ne ration bu t ra the r f rom an ex

tr ins ic cause ; conse qu en t ly, i t ca nn ot cease to exist by

pe r ish ing . Nei the r can any in fe r ior cause corrup t the

soul s ince its existence does not com e un de r the powe r of

any such cause, for i t owes i ts existence di rect ly to a

high er cause.

[A rg .

v ] . Also, some argum ents can be constructed

from the d ic ta of the Philosopher . One of

his

p r inc ip les

is tha t a na tu ra l desire is not in vain.12 Now the soul

has a n a tu ra l desire to exist forev er.

[A rg .

v f j.

Also, in Metaphysics, bk . v i i , | he has this to

say : "Ma t te r is tha t i n v i r tue o f

which

a th ing can exis t

or n ot e xis t ". The refore, ac cord ing to h im , w hatever

has no m a t ter lacks the ca pa ci ty to be non-exis tent . Now

the in te l lec t ive soul, acc ord ing to h im , is de vo id o f m at te r

s ince i t is a s im ple form .

[A rg .

v i i ].

Also, in Nicomachean Ethics, bk . m.,% he says

tha t a brave m an m ust expose h im se l f to d ea th fo r the

state.

An d th is he appears to repea t in bk.

ix

of the

same w or k .** Now he speaks acc ord ing to the d ic ta tes

of n a tu ra l reason. C onseque n tly , the im m or ta l i t y o f the

soul can be kn ow n by n a tur a l reason. Proof of th is

consequence : No-one is oblige d or is even able to seek

his com plete non-existence for the sake of some vi r tu ous

good whether tha t good be someth ing in h imse l f o r in

another o r a good of the commun i ty , fo r accord ing to

August ine

a

p erson ca nn ot desire

non-existenc e, f f

I f

the

sou l were n ot im m or ta l , how ever, t he one who is d y ing

w ou ld be a cce pt ing com plete non-exis tence .



147 DUNS SGOTUS

I t e m ,

a r g u i t u n u s D o c t o r q u a s i e x v e r b i s P h i l o s o p h i

sic : Quod corrumpitur a u t corrumpitur p e r c o n t r a r i u m ,

au t pe r d e fe c t u m a l ic u ju s ne ce ssa r io r e q u i s i t i a d esse e ju s .

Sed anima i n t e l l e c t i v a non h a b e t c o n t r a r i u m , nee esse

co r por is e st s im p l i c i t e r n e ce ssa r ium a d e ju s esse, q u i a

hab e t

proprium

esse pe r s e , e t i d e m i n co r p o r e e t e x t ra

co r pus ; nee e s t d i f f e r e n t i a n i s i q u o d i n c o r p o r e

c o m -

m u n i c a t

i l lud

c o r p o r i [ M S c o r r u m p i t u r ] ; e x t r a c orp u s

n o n c o m m u n i c a t .

I t e m ,

s im p l ex n o n po te s t s e p a r a r i a s e ip so ; a n im a e st

s im p l ex ; e r go n o n p o te s t s e pa r a r i a s e ip sa e t p e r conse -

q u e n s nee a s u o esse s e p a r a r i p o te s t q u i a n o n p e r aliam

f o r m a m a se h a b e t e sse . Secus e s t d e co m p o s i t e , q u o d

h a b e t esse p e r f o r m a m , q u a e f o r m a p o te s t s e p a r a r i a

m a t e r i a , e t i t a esse c o m p o s i t i d e s t r u i .

Sed oppositum v i d e t u r Ph i lo so phu s sens is se , q u i a i n

f ine ,

v i i Me taphys i cae*

e x i n t e n t i o n e

vult

q u o d

omnes

p a r t e s , q u a e p o s s u n t s e p a r a t a e manere a t o t o , s un t

e l e m e n t a , i d e s t, p a r te s m a t e r ia l e s , s ic u t ip s e i b i a c c i p i t

e l em en t a ; e t p r a e t e r ta l e s necesse es t po ne r e i n t ot o

aliquam fo rm a m , q u a e totum e st i l l u d q u o d e s t, q u a e n o n

p o s s i t m a n e r e s e p a r a t a a p a r t e m a t e r i a l i , t o to non

m a n en t e . E r go s i conce ss it

animam intellectivam

esse

fo r m a m h o m i n i s , u t p a t e t ex p r o ba t io n e p r op o s i t io n is

p r a e c e d e n t is , n o n p o n i t e a rn m a n e r e

separatam

a m a t e r ia ,

t o t o n o n m a n e n t e .

I t e m ,

p r i n c i p i u m v i d e t u r a p u d eum q u o d i l l u d

q u o d incipit esse , d e s i n i t esse. U n d e I De caelo et

m u n d o , \ c o n t r a P l a t o n e m v i d e t u r h a b e r e p r o i n c o m -

* v i i , cap. xv i i

(10416, 12

ff.).

t

1,

cap . x

(2796,

31-32) ; cap. xi i

(282'',

4).




[A rg . v i n ] . Also, one teacher 13 argues as i t w ere from

the w ords of the Philosoph er as fo llow s : W h a t per ishes,

perishes by reason of

its

con tra ry or because i t lacks some

necessary prere qu is i te for its existence. Th e inte l le ct ive

soul, how ev er, has no c ontra ry. Ne i th e r is the existence

of the body a necessary prerequisi te for the soul 's exist

ence , since the soul possesses its ow n p rope r per se exist

ence.

The la t te r is the same wh ether the sou l is in the

body or out of i t . Th e on ly d ifference is tha t w he n

the soul is in the body, i t communicates i ts existence to

the bod y, w hereas w he n i t is outside i t does not d o so.

[A rg .

i x ] .

Also, w ha t is s im ple can not be separated

from i tse lf. The soul is s im ple ; the refore, i t c an not be

sepa rated from itsel f, n or ca n i t , in consequence, be

sepa rated from its existence, for i t does not h ave i ts

existence in v i r tu e of som e form othe r tha n itself. I t is

otherwise w i th som eth ing com posite w h ich has exis tence

in v i r tu e of the fo rm . Th is fo rm can be separa ted from

m a tter , thus de stroying the existence of the c om posite.

[Argum ents against im m ortality : A rg .

i

] .

Th e Phi los

opher, however, seems to take the opposi te v iew, for at

the end o f

Metaphysics,

bk .

v i i , *

he expresses the op in ion

tha t the on ly par ts w h ich cou ld be separa ted f rom the

w hole are the e lem ents, i.e. the m a ter ia l p ar ts , for in th is

sense he und erstand s elem ents here. I n a d d i t ion to these

elem ents i t is necessary to assume the existence of som e

fo rm in t he who le wh i ch i s t he to ta l i t y o f t ha t wh i ch

exis ts. This form could not exis t in sep aration from the

m a ter ia l pa r t once the w hole no long er exis ts. Hence , i f

he grants tha t the in te l lec t ive sou l is the form of m a n , as

is ev ident f rom the proof of the preced ing proposi t ion,

he does not ad m i t tha t i t exis ts in sep arat ion from m a t te r ,

once the w hole no long er e xists.

[A rg .

11].

L ike w ise, i t seems to be one of his p r inc ip les

th a t w h a t begins to exist ceases to exist. Hen ce , i n his

work De caelo et m undo,\ ag ainst Plato, he seems to con

s ider i t imposs ib le tha t any th ing cou ld have come in to



I48 DUNS SCOTUS

poss ib i l i , q u o d a l i q u i d in c e p e r i t , e t tamen s i t p e r p e t u u m

e t i n c o r r u p t i b i l e ; e t

i l l

Phys icorum, cap. de

i n f i n i t o , *

cu j us es t

p r i n c i p i u m ,

e jus es t f i n i s .

[Opino

Scot i] .

Potes t d id q u o d l i c e t a d istam

s e c u n d a m p r o p o s i t i o n e m probandam sint r a t i o ne s p r o -

bab i l e s ,

non

t a m e n d e m on s t ra t iv a e ,

imo nee

necessar iae .

E t q u o d a d d u c e b a t u r p r o ea s e c u n d u m

primam viam

d e a u c t o r i t a t ib u s p h i lo s o p h o ru m , d u p l ic i t e r p o te s t

so lv i .

U n o modo q u o d dubium e s t q u i d P h i l o s o p h u s c i r c a h o c

sense r i t . Va r i e

enim

l o q u i t u r i n d i v e r s i s

l o c i s ,

e t h ab u i t

d i v e r s a p r i n c i p i a , e x q u o r u m a l iq u ib u s v i d e t u r s e q u i

unum

o p p o s i t u m ,

e x aliis

a l i u d .

Unde p robab i l e e s t ,

q u o d i n i s t a c o n c l u s i o n e s e m p e r f u e r i t d u b i u s , e t n u n c

magis v i d e b a t u r a c c ed e re a d unam p a r te m , n u n c a d

a l i a m ,

j u x t a q u o d t ra c t a b a t m a t e r i a m c on s on a m u n i

p a r t i m a g is quam a l t e r i .

E s t e t a l i a r e s p o n s i o r e a l i o r q u o d n o n o m n i a d i c t a a

philosophis a s s e r tiv e , e r a n t e is p r o b a t a p e r r a t i o n e m

necessariam n a t u r a l e m ; s ed fr e q u e n t e r n o n h a b e ba n t

n i s i q u a s d a m p r o b a b i l e s p e r s u a s i o n e s , vel v u l g a r e m

opinionem p h i lo s op h o ru m p r a e c e d e n t iu m . U n d e d i c i t

Ph i losophus

11 Caeli

et

mundi f

i n c a p . d e d u a b u s q u a e s t.

d i f f i c i l i b u s , t e n t a n d u m e s t d i c e r e q u o d v i d e t u r e s s e

d i g n u m ,

r e p u ta n te s p r o m p t i t u d i n e m m a g is i m p u t a r i

v e r e c u n d ia e , q u a m a u d a c ia e , s i q u is p r o p t e r

philosophiam

s t a r e , e t p a r va s sufficientias d i l i g i t , d e q u i b u s habemus

maximas d u b it a t io n e s . U n d e p a r v a e sufficientiae

f r e

q u e n t e r s u f f e c e r u n t p h i l o s o p h i s , u b i n o n p o t e r a n t a d

majorem p e r v e n i re , n e c o n t r a d i c e r e n t p r i n c i p i is p h i los o -

p h i a e .

E t i n

eodem

c a p . d e [ a l i is ] a s t r is d i c u n t A e g y p t i

*

in ,

c ap. iv

(203'->,

9).

f n, cap. xi i (291*, 25-29 ;

292",

6 ff.).




exis tence an d s t i ll be e terna l an d im pe r isha ble. An d in

the Physics he

says

* : "Wh a teve r has a beg inn ing has an

end " .

[Scotus's Opinion]. I t ca n be stated th a t a lthou g h

there are probable reasons tor th is second proposi t ion,

these are n ot de m onst ra t ive , nor for tha t m at ter are they

even necessary reasons.14

[Reply to the arguments fo r im m orta lity]. Th e testim onies

of the

philosophers—the

f i rs t way used to prove the

proposition—can

be solved in tw o w ays. First of

a l l ,

i t

i s doubt fu l what the Phi losopher rea l ly he ld on th is

poin t , for he speaks d i f ferent ly in d i f ferent p laces and

has d i f fe ren t p r inc ip les , f rom some of wh ich one th ing

seems to fol low w hereas from others the ve ry opposite

can be in fe r re d . Wh erefore, i t is probable th a t he was

a lw ays d ou bt fu l about th is conclus ion a nd a t one t im e

seems to be d ra w n to one s ide a nd a t othe r tim es to the

other dep end ing on w hether the subjec t m at te r he was

t rea t ing a t the m om en t was m ore i n accord w i t h the one

or w i th the othe r .

Another answer , and one more in accord w i th fac ts ,

is that not a l l the s ta tements by the phi losophers were

establ ished by proofs both necessary and evident to

n a tu ra l reason. Freq ue n t ly , w ha t they gave was n oth ing

m ore tha n ra ther persuas ive p robab le a rgum ents or wh a t

was com m only h eld by ea r lier ph i losophers. For th is

reason,

the Phi losopher in De

caelo

et mundo, bk . n,f in

the cha pter on the tw o d i ff ic u l t qu estions, says : "W e

m ust now a t te m p t to s ta te the p robable so lu t ion, for we

reg ard the zea l of one whose thi rst a fter p hi losophy leads

h im to accep t even s ligh t ind ica tions w here i t is very

di f f icu l t to see one's way, as a proof rather of modesty

tha n o f

over-confide nc e".

Hence, in those m atte rs w here

they cou ld f in d no th ing be tte r w i thou t c on trad i c t ing the

pr inc ip les o f ph i losophy, "s l i gh t ind ica t ions" f requen t l y

h ad to suffice for the ph ilosoph ers. As he says in the

same cha pter : "Acc oun ts of othe r stars are g ive n by the



149 DUNS SCOTUS

e t Baby lon i i , a quibus multas c redu l i t a tes habemus de

unoquoque as t ro rum.

Unde

ph i losoph i quandoque

acqu iescunt propter persuas iones probabi les, quandoque

propter asser t iones pr inc ip iorum

suorum

p rae ter ra t io-

nem

nece ssar iam . Et ista responsio

sufficeret

ad

omnes

au ctorita tes, l ice t essent expressae [M S n u l lae ] , qu od non

conc ludun t p ropos i t um. Tamen responder i potest per

o rd inem.

Ad

p r i m u m ,

quod non i n t e l l i g i t

istam

separa t ionem,

n is i p raec ise in hoc quod in te l lec tus non u t i tu r corpore

in operando, e t p rop ter hoc es t incor rup t ib i l i s in ope-

ran do, loqu en do de

ilia

c o rrup t ione , qua v ir t us organ ica

corrumpitur p rop te r corruptionem org a n i ; et ista sola

co r rup t io

competit

po ten tiae organ icae. Secundum

Phi losophum

i

De

an im a *

si senex acciperet

oculum

juv en is , v idere t u t iq u e s icu t juv en is ; e rgo ipsa p o ten t ia

v i s i va non es t deb i l i t a t a s i ve co r rup ta quan tum ad

ope ra tione m ; sed [a d ] organum tantum ; nee t amen

ex is ta incor rup t ione in te l lec tus , qu ia

sci l.

non habet

o r ganum ,

pe r cu jus co r rup t ionem poss i t co r rump i i n

operando, sequ i tu r quod s i t simpliciter i ncor rup t ib i l i s

in operan do, q u ia tun c seq ueretur q u od in essendo esset

incor rup t ib i l i s , s i cu t tunc

argutum

est ; sed ta n tum

sequ i tu r quod non es t cor rup t ib i l i s in operando, illo

modo

quo po ten t ia o rgan ica ; tam en p one re tu r s im p l i

c i te r cor rup t ib i l i s , jux ta illud Phi losophi in De anima.\

In te l lec tus co r rum p i tu r i n nobis

quodam

i n te r io r i cor -

r up to .

E t hoc p ro t an to , qu ia ponere tu r p r i n c i p i um

operand i to t i composito ope ra tione m p rop r i am e jus ;

* i,

cap.

iv (408&, 18-30).

t

in , cap. v (430° 23) ; 1, cap. i (403°

7-10).




E g y p t i a n s a n d B a b y l o n i a n s . . . f r o m w h o m m a n y o f

o u r be l ie fs a b o u t p a r t i c u l a r s ta rs a r e d e r i v e d " . T h e r e

f o r e , t h e p h i l os o p h e r s a g r e e d t o t h i n g s s o m e t i m e s be c a u s e

o f p r o b a b l e p e r s u a s i v e r e a s on s , a t o t h e r t i m e s b e c a u s e

t h e y h a d a ss e r te d as p r i n c i p l e s , p r o p o s i t io n s w h i c h w e r e

n o t n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s . A n d th i s r e p l y w o u l d s u f fi c e f or a l l

t h e t e s t i m o n i e s c i t e d a b ov e ; e v e n i f t h e y c l e a r l y a s s e r te d

t h e p r o p o s e d c o n c l u s i o n , t h e y s t i l l d o n o t e s t a b l i s h i t .

N e v e r t h e l e s s , th e s e a r g u m e n t s c a n be a n s w e r e d i n o r d e r

as fo l l ows .

[ T o

1 ] .

T o t h e f i r s t : A r i s t o t l e u n d e r s t a n d s t h i s

s e p a r a t i o n t o m e a n n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h a t t h e i n t e l l e c t

d oe s n o t u se t h e b o d y i n p e r f o r m i n g i t s o p e r a t i o n , a n d

f or t h i s r e a s o n i t is i n c o r r u p t i b l e as t o f u n c t i o n . T h i s is

t o b e u n d e r s t o od i n t h e s en se t h a t i t is u n l i k e a n o r g a n i c

p o w e r w h i c h p e r i s h e s p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e o r g a n d e c a y s .

T h i s t y p e o f d e c a y p e r t a i n s e x c l u s i v e l y t o a n o r g a n i c

f a c u l t y . F o r a c c o r d i n g t o t h e P h i l o s o p h e r i n D e

a n i m a *

b k . 1 , i f a n o l d m a n w e r e g i v e n t h e ey e o f a y o u n g m a n ,

h e w o u l d i n d e e d see as w e l l as t h e y o u t h . H e n c e , t h e

f a c u l t y o f v i s i o n g r o w s w e a k or d e c a y s o n l y f r o m t h e

s t a n d p o i n t o f i t s o r g a n a n d n o t i n so fa r a s i ts o p e r a t i o n

d i r e c t l y is c o n c e r n e d . F r o m t h e fa c t t h a t t h e in t e l l e c t ,

h o w e v e r , is i n c a p a b l e o f d e c a y i n t h e se ns e t h a t i t h a s n o

o r g a n b y w h i c h i t c o u l d p e r i s h , i t d oe s n o t f o l l ow t h a t t h e

i n t e l l e c t is i m p e r i s h a b l e as t o f u n c t i o n i n a n u n q u a l i f i e d

s e ns e , f o r t h e n i t w o u l d i n d e e d fo l l o w t h a t i t is a l s o

i m p e r i s h a b l e i n be i n g as t h e a r g u m e n t m a i n t a i n s . W h a t

doe s f o l l o w is t h i s . So f a r as i ts a b i l i t y t o o pe r a t e a l o ne

is c o n c e r n e d , t h e i n t e l l e c t is i n c a p a b l e o f d i s s o l u t i o n i n

t h e s a m e s e n s e t h a t a n o r g a n i c p o w e r i s c o r r u p t i b l e .

A b s o l u t e l y s p e a k i n g , h o w e v e r , t h e i n t e l l e c t is a s s u m e d t o

be p e r i s h a b le a c c o r d i n g t o t h e P h i lo s op h e r ' s s t a t e m e n t i n

D e a n i m a , b k . m , f t h a t t h e i n t e l l e c t p e r is h e s i n u s o n c e t h e

i n t e r i o r s en se p e r i s h e s . A n d t h i s is j u s t w h a t on e w o u l d

h a v e t o m a i n t a i n i f h e a s s u m e d t h e s o u l t o b e a p r i n

c i p l e w h i c h h a s a n o p e r a t i o n p r o p e r t o t h e c o m p o s i t e

(2,322) 21



150

DUNS SCOTUS

sed

compositum

est

c o r r u p t i b i l e ,

e r go e t

principium

operativum

e ju s . Q u o d

autem

s it p r i n c i p i u m op e r a n d i

t o t i , e t q u o d o p e r a t io e ju s s i t o pe r a t io t o t iu s , v i d e t u r

A r i s to t e l e s d i ce r e 1 De a n im a *

A d

aliud

d i co , quod exce l l ens sens ib i l e

corrumpit

sensum

p e r a cc id e n s , q u i a c o r r u m p i t o r g a n u m , q u ia

so l v i t illam mediam p r o p o r t io n e m , in q u a c on s is t it bon a

d i spos i t io o r g a n i ; e t pe r

oppositum

in t e l le c t u s , q u i a n o n

h a b e t o rg a n u m , n o n corrumpitur ab exce l l en t i ob jec to ;

s ed e x h oc n o n s e q u i tu r q u o d s it in c o r r u p t i b i l i s n is i

p r o be t u r q u o d n o n d e p e n d e a t i n e ss en do a t o to q u o d e st

c o r r u p t i b i l e .

A d t e r t iu m d e

xn

Me taphys i cae d i c i t u r quod A r i s to t e l e s

po su i t illud s u b d u b i o , q u i a d i c i t fo rs a n . Se d n o n d i c i t

f o r s a n a d i s t u d q u o d i n t e l l e c t u s manet pos t e r i u s , i d e s t ,

pos t

totum

; s ed d i c i t n o n

omnis

a n i m a , s ed i n t e l l e c t u s ;

e t s e q u i t u r : Omne namque impo ss i b i l e f o r s an , ub i

dub i t ab a t a n po ss i b i l e s i t

omnem animam manere

post

c o m p o s i tu m . Se d d e i n t e l l e c t u n o n d u b i ta t n o n d e p e n

de a t i n e s sendo a t o t o q u o d es t c o r r u p t i b i l e . S i e rgo

exp resse hoc a sse r a t, po t es t d i c i qu od

tamen

n o n fu i t p e r

r a t i o n e m n e c e s s a r i a m s i b i d e m o n s t r a t u m , s e d p e r

r a t i o ne s p r o b ab i l e s pe r suasum .

A d a l i u d , valde dubium e s t , q u i d i p se sense r i t d e

inceptione animae

i n t e l le c t iv a e . S i

enim

n o n p o s u i t

Deum a l iq u i d im m e d ia t e d e n ov o a g e re , sed t a n t u m m o d o

motu sempiterno movere c o e l u m ,

e t ho c u t a gens

r e m o t u m ,

a q u o a g e n t e s e p a r a t o p o n e r e t i p s e i n t e l l e c t i -

vam d e n o v o p r o d u c i ? Si e n im d ic a s , q u o d a b a l iq u a

passim.




150

as a w hole. Th e com posite, how eve r, is pe r ish able.

Consequent ly, i ts operat ive pr incip le is a lso per ishable.

Th a t the sou l is the ope rative p r inc ip le of the w hole com

posite an d tha t i ts ope rat ion

is

also th a t of

the

w hole

is

ju s t

w hat Ar istot le seems to say in De

anim a,

bk. i .*

[To

11].

To the n ext , I say th a t an excessively st im u

lat ing object damages the senses only incidenta l ly inas

m u c h

as

i t dam ages the organ by d isrup t in g tha t ba lance

w h ich constitu tes the q u a l ity of being p rope r ly d isposed.

On the othe r h a n d , s ince the in te l lec t has no orga n, i t is

no t dam aged by a m ore h igh ly in te l li g ible objec t . B u t

from this i t does not follow tha t the inte l le ct is im

per ishable unless i t f i rst be proved that i t does not

depend for existence on a composi te being that can

per ish.

[To i n ] . To the t h i rd a rgum en t based on Metaphysics,

bk . x i i , some re p ly tha t Aris tot le assumes this as som eth ing

doubtfu l s ince he uses the word

perhaps .—However,

he does not say "pe rh a p s " w hen he speaks of the in te l le ct

pe rsist ing after the w hole , bu t says : "N ot a l l the soul,

but the in te l lec t ". On ly a fte rw ard does he add : "For

i t is perhaps im possible tha t a l l [ th e p arts of the sou l. . . ] ,

w here he doubts w he ther i t is possible for the e n t ire soul

to ou t l iv e the com posite. Nevertheless, he has no doubts

tha t the intel lec t does not de pend for i ts existence on the

w hole com posite w h ich is pe r isha ble.

If Aristot le expressly asserts this, then i t can be said

tha t he was conv inced of this because o f probable reasons

an d n ot because i t w as a ny th ing dem onstra ted to h im by

necessary reasons.

[To rv ] . As for the othe r , i t is very d oubt fu l w ha t

Ar is to t le held in regard to the or ig in of the in te l lect ive

soul.

For i f

he

assumed tha t God does not im m ed ia te ly

p roduce any th ing new, bu t mere ly moves the heaven

w i th an e te rna l movemen t and th i s on l y as a remote

agen t , t hen by wha t

separate15

agent d id Ar is to t le

assume the sou l was p roduced f rom wi thou t

?

I f you



151 DUNS SCOTUS

I n t e l l i g e n t i a , d u p l e x est in c o n v e n i e n s . Unum q u i a i p s a

n o n po te s t c r e a r e substantiam ex p r i m a d i s t in c t io n e hujus

q u a r t i . * A l i u d ,

q u ia

ilia

n o n

magis

p ote s t a l iq u i d n o v u m

p r o d u c e r e i m m e d i a t e , quam D e u s s e c u n d u m p r i n c i p i a

Philosophi d e im m u t a b i l i t a t e a g e n t is , e t id e o s e m p i te r n i-

t a t e i n a g e n d o .

Nee

p o t e s t i p s e , u t v i d e t u r , s e c u n d u m

p r i n c i p i a s u a p o n e re intellectivam esse terminum agen t i s

n a t u r a l i s q u i a u t v i d e t u r e x

xn Metaphys icae , \

p o n i t

e a r n incorruptibilem e t n u l l a fo r m a q u a e e st t e rm in u s

a g e n t is n a t u r a l is , e st s i m p l ic i t e r i n c o r r u p t i b i l i s . Pote s t

d i c i q u o d p o n i t e a rn i m m e d i a t e a c c i p e re esse e t n o v u m

esse a De o q u i a q u o d a c c i pe r e t e sse sa tis s eq u i tu r e x

p r i n c i p i i s e ju s c u m n o n p o n a t e a r n p e r p e t u o p ra ec es siss e

s i ne co r po r e ,

nee

p r i u s fu is se i n a l io c o r po r e ;

nee

est

p r o b a b i l e s e c u n d u m rationem a quo po ss i t r e c i p e r e t a l e

esse, nullo

p r ae suppo s i t o , n i s i a Deo .

Sed co n t r a : e r go co nced e r e t c r e a t io ne m . Resp o nde o ,

n o n s e q u i t u r , q u i a n o n p os u i t aliam p r o d u c t io n e m

c o m -

p o s i t i , e t

animae

i n t e l l e c t i v a e , s i c u t

nee

i gn i s e t f o rmae

ign i s ; sed illam a n i m a t i on e m c o r p o ris o r g a n i c i p o n i t esse

p r o d u c t i o n e m p e r a c c id e n s ip s iu s a n im a e . N os

autem

p o n im u s d u a s p r o d u c t io n e s ;

unam

a n o n esse a n im a e a d

esse e ju s , e t is t a e s t c r e a t io ; a l i a m a n o n a n im a t io ne

c o r p o r i s a d a n i m a t i o n e m e j u s , e t

ilia

e s t p r o duc t i o co r

po r i s a n i m a t i , e t p e r m u t a t io n e m p r o p r i e d i c t a m . Q u i

*

Opus

oxoniense,

rv ,

dist. 1, q . i, n . 28.

t

x i i ,

ca p. i i i

(1070",

25-28).




I5I

say i t was by one of the In te l lige nc es , the n we encounter

a d ouble d i ff ic u l ty ; one, because an In te l lige nc e c ann ot

create a substance (as I prove in bk. iv , d ist . i ) * ; the

othe r , because such a be ing cann ot im m ed ia te ly p roduce

any th ing new any more t han God cou ld , fo r acco rd ing

to the Ph ilosophe r 's p r inc ip les rega rd ing the im m u ta

b i l i t y of the agent i t fo llow s tha t the a ct ion of such a

be ing is e te rna l . Ne ithe r d o we see any way i n w h i ch

Ar is to t le cou ld c la im tha t the in te l le ct ive sou l is the effect

of

some

n a t u r a l

agent16

w i th ou t v io la t in g h is p r inc i p les ,

because he

seems

to assume the sou l to be im pe r ish able in

Metaphysics,

bk .

xn.f

An d n o form tha t is the effect of a

n a tu ra l agen t is im per isha ble in an u nq ua li fi ed sense.

But i t can be sa id that he assumed the sou l received

exis tence im m ed ia te ly from God and tha t th is exis tence

was som eth ing new . For i t w ou ld fo llow read ily enough

from his p r inc ip les tha t i t w ould have received exis tence,

since A ristot le assum ed no e tern a l bodiless pre-existence ;

ne i ther d id he ho ld tha t the sou l ex is ted p rev ious ly in

some othe r body ; nor does i t seem possible a cc ording

to reason tha t a sou l w h ich presupposes no m a ter ia l

p r inc ip le cou ld have received its exis tence f rom anyone

othe r tha n God.

To the c ont rary : I f th is exp lana t ion w ere t rue , Ar is

to t l e wou ld have adm i t t ed

creation.—I

rep ly tha t th i s

does not follow , for he d id n ot assume a p rodu ct ion of the

in te l lec t ive sou l d is t in ct f rom the p rodu ct ion of the com

posite , ju s t as he d id not assume one p rodu ct ion for f ire

an d anothe r for the fi re form . Wh a t he posited was the

an imat ion of the organ ic body and th is inc iden ta l l y

invo lved the p rodu ct ion of its soul. Now we ad m it tw o

types of p rod u c t ion , one from the soul's non-existence

to exis tence and th is we ca l l c reat ion, the other is the

passage of the body from an ina n im ate to an an im ate

s ta te and th is i s the p roduc t ion of a l i v ing body by a

change in the p rope r

sense

of

the

w ord . I f anyone, there

fore,

w ere to assume m erely the second typ e of p rod uc t ion



152

DUNS SCOTUS

igitur,

p o n e r e t

tantum

s e c u n d a r i a , n u l l a m

creationem

po n e r e t , e t i t a A r i s t o t e l e s .

Se d l ic e t v i te s s e c u n d u m

eum

c r e a t io n e m , q u om od o

tamen p ote s t s a lv a re a ge ns im m u t a b i l e a l iq u i d n o v u m

p r o d u c e r e

?

R e s p o n d e o ,

nullo modo

n i s i p r o p t e r

n o v i -

tatem

p a s si r e c e p t iv i ; q u o d

enim

e f f e c t us to t a l i t e r e t

p ra e c is e d e p e n d e n s a c a u s a a c t i v a , esset n o v u s , r e d u c e -

r e t u r s e c u n d u m A r i s t o t e l e m i n a l i q u a m v a r i a t i o n e m

ips i us causae e f fi c i en t is ; sed q u od e ffe c t us de pen den s ab

a g e n t e e t r e c e p t i v o s i t n o v u s , p o t e s t r e d u c i i n n o v i t a t e m

ip s iu s pa s s i , s in e n o v i t a t e ag en t is e t i t a d i c e r e t u r

hie

q u od

D e u s d e n e c e s s i t a t e n a t u r a l i , t r a n s m u t a t c o r p u s o r g a n i -

cum

a d a n im a t io n e m ,

quam

c i to c o r p u s e s t s u s c e p t iv u m

is t ius

animationis

e t a c a u sis n a t u r a l ib u s f i t a l i q u a n d o d e

n o v o i s t u d s u s c e p t i v u m , e t i d e o t u n c n o v a e s t m u t a t i o

a d a n i m a t i o n e m a b i p s o D e o .

S e d q u a r e r e d u c e n d a e s t i s t a n o v i t a s i n D e u m , s i cu t

i n c a u s a a g e n t e m

?

D i c o q u o d , q u i a s ic u t es t

primum

a g e n s e t i d e o s e c u n d u m A r i s t o t e l e m e s t s e m p e r a g e n s

a l i q u a a c t io n e i n passum s e m p e r eodem m o d o se h ab ens ,

i t a s i a l iq u o d p a s s u m p o te s t esse n o v u m e t s u s c e p t iv u m

a l i c u j u s f o r mae , quae no n po t e s t s ub esse causa l i t a t i

a l ic u ju s c a u sa e s e c u n d a e , D e u s e st i m m e d i a t a c a u s a i ll iu s

e t t a m e n d e n o v o , q u i a

omni

po t e n t i a e pas s i v ae i n e n t e

o po r t e t po ne r e aliam a c t i v a m c o r r e s p o n d e n t e m , e t i d e o

s i p a s s i v a e n o v a e n o n c o r r e s p o n d e t a l i a a c t i v a c r e a t a ,

c o r r e s p o n d e b i t s i b i i m m e d i a t e d i v i n a .

A d

aliud

d e d e s i d e r i o n a t u r a l i r e s p o n d e b i t u r , r e s p o n -

d e n d o a d r a t ion e s p r i n c i p a l e s , q u i a p r i m a r a t io p r i n c i

p a lis e t s e c u n d a e t t e r t i a p r o c e d u n t e x h o c .

A d a l i u d d e vn M e ta p h y s ic a e * d e m a t e r i a , v e r a e st ilia

v n ,

cap . xv

(1039'',

29).




he w ou ld no t thereby postu la te a c rea t ion . An d th is

was the case w i th Ar is to tle.

B u t even i f you av o id asserting a c rea tion acc ord ing to

Ar is to t le , h ow

is

it possible to

save

the idea tha t som eth ing

new i s p roduced by an agen t t ha t i s immu tab le

?—I

r ep l y t ha t the on ly w ay is to exp la i n w ha t is new i n te rm s

of someth ing in the pa t ien t o r rec ip ien t o f the ac t ion .

Accord ing to Ar is to t le , i f a new ef fect depended so le ly

upon the act ive cause, some var ia t ion in the ef f ic ien t

cause it se l f w ou ld be req u i red . B u t a new effec t tha t

depends upon both the rec ip ien t and the agen t can be

accounted for in terms of

something

new i n the rec ip ien t

a lone an d not in the agen t . An d thus we cou ld say tha t

in the present instance God by

a

n a tura l necess ity changed

an orga n ic body in to a l i v in g substance ju s t as soon as the

body was capable of rece iv ing l ife . An d n a tu ra l causes

w i l l de term ine ju s t w hen the la t te r becomes ready to

receive i t , and hence a t th is moment God produces th is

new change so th a t i t com es to li fe .

B u t w hy m us t th is new en t ity be a t t r ibu ted to

God as

to

i ts [ im m ed iate ] effic ien t cause

?—I

rep ly th a t the reason

is this. Just

as

God, the firs t age nt, is c ont inu a l ly operat

ing by some ac t ion on a pa t ien t wh ich rema ins con

stan t ly in the same con d i tion ac cord ing to Ar is to tle , so

l ikewise i f someth ing is capable of receiv ing some new

form which cannot be caused by any secondary cause,

God m ust be its im m ed ia te cause ; an d ye t for a l l tha t

som eth ing new com es in to existence . For i t is necessary

to postu late some act ive potency that corresponds to

every passive poten cy. Now i f there is no such created

cause c orres pond ing to the new passive poten cy, then i ts

im m ed ia te cor respond ing cause w i l l be d iv ine .

[To v ] . The othe r a rgum ent about the na tu ra l des ire

w i l l be answered in the rep ly to the in i t ia l arguments,17

for the fi rs t three proceed f rom th is n ot ion.

[To

v i ] .

As fo r the a rgum ent about m at te r in Meta

physics,

bk .

v i i , *

th is d es cr ip t ion of m at ter h olds n ot m ere ly



153 DUNS SCOTUS

d e s c r i p t i o materiae non tantum i n t e l l i g e n d o q u o d

m a te r i a e s t , q u a re s cu j us ip s a es t pa r s po tes t esse e t non

esse ; sed r e s , s ive cu jus ip s a es t p a r s , s ive q ua e r e c i p i t u r

i n i p s a ; a l i o q u i n fo r m a ig n is n o n p os se t n o n esse, q u i a

m a t e r ia n o n es t p a r s

formae

i g n i s .

A d

aliud

d e f o r t i f i t m a g n a a l t e r c a t io , a n s e c u n d u m

rectam r a t i o ne m de b e t s ic se expo ne r e . Pote s t tamen d i c i

s i c u t

Philosophus

r e s p o n d e t i n

ix *

q u o d

bonum

m a x i

m u m t r i b u i t s ib i i n e xe rc e n d o i l i u m m a g n u m a c t u m

v i r t u t i s , e t h o c b on o p r i v a r e t s e, imo v i t io s e v i v e r e t , s i illo

a c t u

praetermisso

tu n c , s a lv a r e t

suum

esse p e r

q u a n t u m -

cumque ; m e l i u s e st autem s im p l ic i t e r m a x im u m bon u m

e t

momentaneum quam

re m is s u m b on u m v i r t i t i s

vel

v i ta

v i t i o s a p e r m a g n u m t e m p u s .

Unde

e x i l l o p r o b a t u r

e v i d e n t e r , q u o d b o n u m c o m m u n e s e c u n d u m r e c t a m

r a t i o n e m e s t

magis

d i l i g e n d u m q u a m b o n u m

p r o p r i u m ,

q u i a totum b o n u m p r o p r i u m d e b e t h o m o e xp on e re

d e s t r u c t i o n i s i m p l i c i t e r , etiamsi n e s c i a t animam

i m -

m o r t a l e m ,

p r o p t e r b o n i c o m m u n i s s a l v a t i o n e m , e t

illud

m a g i s d i l i g i t u r s i m p l ic i t e r , p r o p t e r c u ju s s a lu t e m esse

a l t e r i u s c o n t e m n i t u r .

A d illas r a tion e s D o c t o r u m . S i i n t e l l i g i t a n im a m

h a b e r e p e r se esse i d e m i n t o t o , e t e x t r a t o t u m , p r o u t p e r

se esse d i s t i n g u i t u r c o n t r a i n esse a c c i de n t i s ; ho c modo

f o rm a i gn i s , s i e sset s ine m a te r i a , ha be re t p e r se esse e t

t u n c p os se t c o n c e d i q u o d f or m a ig n is esset i n c o r r u p t i b il is .

S i a u t e m i n t e l l i g a t d e esse p e r

s e ,

q u o d c o n v e n i t c o m p o s ito

i n gene r e s ub s t an t i a e , s i c

falsum

e s t q u o d

anima

s i ne

co r p o re ha be t p e r se esse, q u i a t u n c esse e jus n on esset

a l t e r i c o m m u n i c a b i l e , q u i a i n d i v i n i s etiam p e r se esse

i s t o m o d o a c c e p t u m e s t

i n c o m m u n i c a b i l e .

U n d e

omni

* Ethica Nicomachea, ix , cap. v ii i

(n6ga, 15-17).




153

i n the sense tha t a th ing w h ich has m at te r as one of its

par ts is able to exist and not exist , but a lso that a thing

composed of mat ter or received in to mat ter is ab le to

exis t an d not exis t . Othe rw ise the form of

fire

c ou ld no t

be n on-exis tent , for m a t te r is n ot a p a r t of the fi re form .

[To

v i i ].

To the othe r about the brave m a n , there is

a great d ispu te w he the r ac cord ing to r ig h t reason one

m ust expose h im se lf to de ath in th is w ay . Be tha t as i t

m ay , one cou ld solve th is objec t ion the w ay the Philos

opher does.* One could say tha t by pe r form in g such a

grea t ac t o f v i r tue , th i s ind iv idua l has obta ined the

highest

good,

whereas i f

he

had saved h is l ife by om i tt in g

th is ac t , he w ou ld have de pr ive d h im se l f o f this good a nd

w ha t is m ore , h is l ife w ou ld be m ora l ly ev i l . Absolutely

speaking i t is bet ter to have this greatest good even

m om en ta r ily tha n to be w i th ou t i t o r to have a long , bu t

a m o ra l ly

e v i l,

l ife . Whe refore, ev iden t proof is had f rom

this that accord ing to r ight reason the common good is

to be pre ferre d to one's in d iv id u a l good, because even i f

a m an is unaw are t ha t h is sou l is im m or ta l , he is s t i ll

bound to expose his ent i re personal good to destruct ion

in order to save the com m on good. An d tha t must be

loved a l l the m ore, a bsolu te ly speak ing, to

save

w h i c h the

existence of an othe r is reg arde d as of l i t t le acc ount.

[To

v m ] . As

for the argum ents of ce r ta in teachers, i f the

m ea ning is tha t the sou l has the same per se existence 18

in the composi te as i t has outside the composi te, where

per se existence is un de rstood as c ontrasted w i th the

existence character ist ic of

an

acc iden t, the n the fire form ,

i f i t w ere to exis t ap a r t from m at ter , w ould a lso

have

per

se

exis tence, an d the n w e c ou ld a dm it tha t the f ire form is

im pe r ish able. B ut i f by per se exis tence is m ean t tha t

ch ara cter istic of the com posite in the l in e of substance,

the n i t is false to say th a t the soul has per se existence

outside the body . For were such the case, i t cou ld n ot

communicate i ts being to another , for even in what is

d iv ine , per se being in th is sense is inc om m un ica ble.



154 DUNS SCOTUS

modo

d e f i c i t q u o d

anima

ha be t p e r se esse s ine c o r -

p o r e , q u i a in s e c u n d o intellectu a n t e cedens e s t falsum

e t i n p r i m o c o n s e q u e n t ia n o n v a l e t , n i s i a d d a s i b i , q u o d

n a t u r a l i t e r s i n e miraculo h a b e t p e r se esse p r im o m o do ;

s ed h a e c p r o p o s i t i o c r e d i ta e s t, e t n o n p e r

rationem

naturalem n o t a .

A d

a l i u d ,

n on omnis c o r r u p t i o e st p e r separationem

a l te r i u s a b a l te r o ; a c c i p i e n d o

enim

e sse ange l i , s i

illud

p o n a t u r s e c u n d u m a l iq u o s a l i u d a b e s s e n tia , i l l u d n o n

es t separab i l e a se i pso , e t

tamen

e s t d e s t r u c t i b i l e pe r

su c ce ss i o nem o ppo s i t i a d ipsum esse.

[Proposi t io I I I . Anim a non rem anebit perpetuo extra suum

to tum].

D e t e r t i a p r o p o s i t i on e d i c i t u r e a rn p osse p r o b a r i

e x h o c , q u o d p a r s e x t r a totum es t i m p e r f e c t a ; fo rm a

autem t a r n n o b i l i s n o n r e m a n e b i t p e r p e t u o i m p e r f e c t a ;

e r go

nee

s e pa r a t a a t o t o .

I t e m ,

n u l l u m v i o l e n t u m est p e r p e t u u m s ec u nd u m

Aristotelem i De caelo et m und o* Sep a r a t io a u t em

animae a c o rp o re e st v i o le n t a , q u i a c o n t r a i n c l in a t io n e m

n a t u r a l e m a n im a e ; s e c u n d u m P h i lo s op h u m , q u ia

i n c l i -

n a t u r n a t u r a l i t e r a d p e r fe c i e n d u m c or p u s .

[Opin io Scott]. D e is t a p r o p o s it io n e v i d e t u r q u o d

Ph i l o sophus , s i posu i sse t animam i m m o r t a l e m , magis

po su i s se t e a r n pe r pe t uo

manere

s i n e co r po r e

quam

i n

c o r p o r e , q u i a omne c o m p o s i t u m e x c o n t r a r i i s e s t

c o r r u p t i b i l e .

Nee

r a t io n e s is ta e p r o b a n t . P r i m a

n o n ,

n a m

ilia

m a jo r ,

"P a r s e x tr a t o t u m e st i m p e r fe c t a , " n o n e st v e r a n is i d e

n , cap. i i i

(286", 18).




Hence, there is n o w ay in w h ich the sou l has per se

exis tence w i thou t the body , for i f we take t he t e rm i n t he

second sense the antecedent of the argument is fa lse,

whereas i f

we

tak e i t in the f irs t sense, the consequence is

i n v a l i d , un less you ad d th a t i t has th is exis tence n a tura l ly

and w i th ou t a m irac le . B u t th is la t t e r is som eth ing we

bel ieve , bu t i t is n ot kn ow n by n a tura l reason.

[To i x ] . To the othe r , not a l l de st ruct ion is the resu lt

o f sepa ra ting one th in g from another . Take the be ing

of an angel , and le t i t be assumed as some do that i ts

existence is d is tin c t from its essence.19 Such a being is not

separable f rom i tse l f

and

nevertheless i t can be destroyed

if i ts existence is succeeded by the opposite of existence .

[Th ir d Proposition : The human soul w il l not remain

outside the body

forever.

A r g .

i ] .

They say t ha t the t h i r d

p ropos i t ion can be p roved f rom th is tha t a par t wh ich

exists outside the w hole is im pe rfect.20 Th is form [viz.

the sou l ], how ever , is so noble tha t i t w i l l not rem ain

forever im p erfec t ; the refore i t w i l l not exist a p a rt from

the com posite forev er.

[A rg . 11].

L ike w ise , ac cord ing to Ar is to tle in h is w ork

De

caelo et

mundo,* n o th ing un n a tu ra l is e te rna l. B u t the

sepa ration of the soul from the body is un n a tu ra l , because

i t i s con t ra ry to the na tu ra l i nc l ina t ion of the soul.

For ac cord ing to the Philosophe r the sou l has a n a tura l

inc l in a t ion to per fect the body .

[Scotus's

Opinion]. So fa r as this p roposit ion is

con

cerned,

i t seems th a t i f the Philosopher h a d assum ed the

sou l to be im m or ta l , he w ou ld have he ld t ha t i t

con

t in u e d to exis t outs ide the body ra the r th a n in the body ,

for everything composed can be destroyed by i ts con

t rar ies.

[Rep ly to the a rgu m en ts]. Nei the r do the reasons

g ive n above prove the proposi tion.

[To 1]. The fi rst does not because this m a jor : "Th e

p a r t w i th ou t the w ho le is im p e r fe c t " , is true on ly o f tha t

par t which receives some per fect ion when i t is in the



155 DUNS SCOTUS

p a r te q u a e r e c i p i t a l i q u a m

perfectionem

i n t o to ;

anima

autem n o n r e c i p i t p e r fe c t io n e m sed communicat ; e t sic

po t e s t formari r a t i o a d

o p p o s i t u m ,

q u i a n o n r e p u g n a t

a l ic u i a e q u e p e r fe c t o i n se m a n e r e , l ic e t a l t e r i n o n

c o m -

municet suam p e r f e c t io n e m ; h o c a p p a r e t d e ca u sa

e f f i c i e n t e , c u i n o n r e p u g n a t q u a n t u m c u m q u e m a n e r e

s i ne suo e f fe c tu ; sed anima manet a eq ue p e r f e c t a i n esse

s u o p r o p r i o , s iv e c o n j u n c t a s iv e s e p a r a ta ; i n h o c

tamen

h a b e n s d i f f e r e n t i a m , q u o d s e p a r a t a n o n c o m m u n i c a t

esse

suum

a l t e r i .

Pe r ho c ad

a l iu d ,

q u i a i n c l i n a t i o n a t u r a l is e st d u p l e x :

u n a a d a c t u m primum e t e st i m p e r fe c t i a d p e r fe c t io n e m ,

e t c o n c o m i t a t u r p o te n t ia m

essentialem

a d a c t u m s ec un

d u m .

E t e st a l i a i n c l in a t i o a d a c t u m s e c u n d u m e t est

p e r f e c t i a d p e r f e c t i o n e m c o m m u n i c a n d u m e t c o n c o m i

t a t u r p o t e n t ia m a c c i d e n ta l e m . D e p r i m a

verum

est ,

q u o d o p p o s i t u m e ju s es t v i o l e n t u m , e t n o n

p e r p e t u u m ,

q u ia p o n i t imperf ectionem p e r p e tu a m , quam Ph i l o sophus

h a b u i t p r o i n c o n v e n i e n t i , q u i a p o s u i t i n u n iv e r s o ca usa s

a b l a t iv a s a l iq u a n d o c u ju s l ib e t i m p e r fe c t io n i s . Se d

s e c u n d a i n c l in a t i o , e ts i p e r p e t u o s u s p e n d a t u r , n u l l u m

v i o l e n t u m p r o p r i e d i c i t u r , q u i a nee im p e r fe c t io ; n u n c

a u t e m i n c l i n a t i o animae a d c o r p u s tantum e s t secundo

m o d o . Vel

p o t e s t d i c i s e c u n d u m A v i c e n n a m , q u o d

a p p e t i t u s a n i m a e s a t ia t u s e st p e r h o c q u o d semel p e r f e c i t

c o rp u s , q u i a ilia c o n j u n c t i o e st a d h o c , u t a n i m a mediante

co r po r e , a c q u i r a t s uas pe r fe c t io ne s pe r sensus , q ua s n o n

posse t acqu i r e r e s i ne sens ibus , e t pe r consequens nee s ine




com posite. Now the soul does n ot receive pe rfec t ion bu t

com m unicates pe r fec t ion. C onseq uen tly , one could tw is t

th is arg um en t in fav our of the opposite v iew . For the re

is no th ing absurd about a th ing ex is t ing apar t , even

thoug h i t does not com m un ica te i ts p er fec t ion to an othe r ,

so lon g as i t is eq ua lly per fect exis t ing in th is w ay . This

is c lear f rom the [s im i la r ] case of

an

e fficien t cause. For

i t is not rep ug na nt tha t such a cause should exis t w i thou t

caus ing an effec t . Now the

soul, so

fa r

as

i ts ow n being is

concerned, is eq ua lly pe r fect w he the r i t is separated f rom

or jo ine d to a bod y. The re is, of course, th is d i ffere nc e.

As se parated, the sou l does n ot com m un icate its being to

another.

[To 11]. This a lso answers the other argument , s ince

there a re tw o k inds of n a tu ra l inc lina t ions One regards

the p r im a ry ac t or a c tua lisa t ion , an d th is is the n a tu ra l

inc l ina t ion of the imper fect for i ts per fect ion and is

someth ing that accompanies an essent ia l potency in

re la t ion to its second a ct . B ut there is anothe r inc l in a t ion

tow ards a second act w here the la t ter is a pe r fec tion to be

commun ica ted and th i s i s t he na tu ra l i nc l i na t ion t ha t

accom panies a n acc ide nta l poten cy. O f the fi rs t , i t is

t ru e tha t the opposite of the n a tu ra l in c l in a t ion is som e

th i ng u nn a tu ra l an d no t e te rna l, because i t w ou ld im p l y

eterna l imper fect ion, which the Phi losopher regards as

som eth ing im proper inasm uch as he has postu la ted tha t

causes exis t in the un iverse w h ich w i l l i n t im e do aw ay

w i th any im pe r fec t ion . The second inc l in a t ion , how ever ,

even though i t would be forever suspended, impl ies

n oth ing u n n a tu ra l in the p rope r sense of the te rm s ince

no im pe r fec t ion is invo lved . Now the inc l in a t ion th a t the

soul has for the body is of the second type . Or i t can be

sa id w i th Av ice nn a tha t once the sou l has per fec ted the

body, th is desi re of the soul has been sated, s ince the

purpose of

this

u n ion is t ha t the sou l th rough the m ed ium

of the body m ay acq u i re those of its pe rfections w h ich i t

cou ld n o t acqu ire w i th ou t the senses or w i th ou t a body .



I56

DUNS SCOTUS

co r po r e ; semel autem c o n j u n c t a , acquisivit q u a n t u m

ilia s i m p l i c i t e r a p p e t i t a c q u i re r e illo m o d o .

D i c o e rg o q u o d i s t a r u m trium propositionum e x qu i b us

formatur r a t i o a d r e s u r r e c t i o n e m quodammodo a p r i o r i

q u ia s u m p ta e s u n t a fo rm a

hominis

r e s u s c i t a n d i , p r i m a

e st n a t u r a l i t e r n o t a e t e r r o r e i op p os i tu s q u i p r o p r i u s

es t e t so l i u s Ave r ro i s , pess imus es t , non

tantum

c o n t r a

veritatem

t h eo l o g i ae , s ed

etiam

c o n t r a

veritatem p h i l o -

so ph iae ; d e s t r u i t enim scientiam q u i a omnes a c t us

i n t e l l i g e n d i , u t d i s t i n c t o s a b a c t i b u s s e n t i e n d i , e t o m n e s

ac t u s e l e c t i o n i s , u t d i s t i n c t o s ab a c t i b u s appe t i t u s s en -

s i t i v i ;

e t i t a om n e s v i r t u t e s q u a e n o n g e n e r a n t u r s in e

e l e c t i o n i b us f a c t i s s e cundum

rectam

r a t i o n e m e t p e r

c on s eq u en s t a l is e r ra n s esset a c o m m u n i ta t e h o m i n u m ,

r a t i o n e

utentium

e x te r m in a n d u s .

Sed

aliae

d u a e n o n s u n t

sufHcienter

n o t a e r a t i o n e

n a t u r a l i , l ic e t a d e as s i n t q u a e d a m p e rs u a s ion e s p r o ba -

b i les .

A d

secundam quidem

p l u r e s e t p r o b ab i l i o re s ;

u n d e e t illam v i d e t u r magis expresse sensisse Ph i losop h u s.

A d t e r t i a m a u t e m p a u c i or e s , e t p e r c on s e q u e n s c o n c lu s i o

sequens ex i s t i s non es t su f f i c i en t e r pe r

istam viam

n o t a

r a t i o n e n a t u r a l i .

[Pars Secunda : Rationes a

posteriori]

S e c u n d a v i a a d e a r n e s t a p o s t e r i o r i b u s ,

quarum

a l iq u a e p r ob a bi le s t a c ta e s u n t i n r a t io n i bu s p r i n c i p a l i -

bus , u t p o t e d e b e a t i tu d i n e h o m in i s . A d h oc e t ia m

a d d i tu r d e ju s t i t i a D e i r e t r i bu e n t i s ; n u n c a u t e m in




156

B ut i f a t any t im e the sou l was jo ine d to the body , the n

i t has acqu i red the per fec t ions tha t i t s imp ly des i red to

acqu i re i n th is w ay .

[Eva lua tion of

the

a p r ior i p roof]. O f the three proposi

tions used to const ruct a k in d of a p r ior i a rgum en t

in the sense tha t the p roof

is

based on the na ture of the

form of m an th a t is to be restored, I say tha t the fi rs t is

known by na tu ra l r eason and tha t t he con t ra r y e r ro r ,

which is proper to Averroes on ly , is of the very worst

k i n d . Not on ly is i t opposed to theological t r u th bu t

to ph i losoph ica l t ru th as w e l l. For i t destroys know led ge

i tse l f ina sm uch as i t denies a ny act of knowledg e d is t inc t

from sensat ion or an y act of choice d ist in ct f rom sense

ap pe tite an d hence does aw ay w i th a l l those v ir tue s

w h ich req u i re an ac t o f choice in accord w i th r igh t reason.

One who er rs in th is way, consequent ly , should be

ban i shed f rom the company o f men who use na tu ra l

reason.

The other two proposi t ions, however , are not known

ade qua te ly from n a tu ra l reason even thoug h there a re

a number of probable persuas ive arguments in the i r

favour.21 Th e reasons for the second, ind ee d are m ore

num erous as w e l l as m ore h igh ly probable. For th is

reason,

the Philosophe r appears to have h e ld th is doct r ine

m ore expressly.22 For the t h i r d , however, the reasons

are few er. Th e conclus ion, t hen , wh ich fo l lows f rom

these three propositions is n ot su ffic ie nt ly kn ow n a p r ior i

by n a tu ra l reason.

[Part

I I . The A Poste riori Proofs]

The second way to prove the resur rect ion is by a

posteriori arg um en ts. Som e p robable a rgum en ts of this

k i nd were men t ioned i n t he i n i t i a l a rgumen ts , fo r

instanc e, those conce rn ing the happ iness of m a n . To the

la t te r th i s a rgum en t based on the jus t ice o f a r ew a r d in g

God is add ed . In the present l ife the v i r tuou s suffer



157 DUNS SCOTUS

v i t a i s ta v i r tu o s i

majores

p a t i u n t u r p oe n a s,

quam

v i t i o s i .

E t istud a r g u m e n t u m v i d e t u r A p os tolu s ta n g e re a d

I

Cor.

x v * : S i i n hac v i t a

tantum

spe r an t es

sumus

i n

G h r i s t o , miserabiliores s u m u s o m n i b u s h o m i n i b u s , e t c .

Se d is ta e ra t ion e s a p o s t e r io r i m in u s c o n c l u d u n t , q u a m

ilia a p r i o r i a c c e p ta a p r o p r i a f or m a hominis ; n on enim

a p p a r e t p e r r a t i o n e m

n a t u r a l e m ,

q uo d unus e s t r e c t o r

o m n i u m h o m i n u m s e c u n d u m leg es ju s t i t ia e r e t r ib u t i v a e

e t p u n i t i v a e . E t e sto q u o d s ic d i c e r e t u r q u o d u n i c u i q u e

i n b ono a c t u s uo s i t r e t r i b u t i o s u ffic i e n s , s ic u t d i c i t Aug us -

t i nu s f : Jus s i s t i , Domine e t i t a e s t , u t s i t s i b i poena

omnis p e c c a t o r , i t a q u o d ipsum p e c c a t u m e s t p r i m a

p oe n a p e c c a t i . U n d e p a t e t q u o d S a n c t i a rg u e n te s a

p o s t e r i or i a d p r o p o s i tu m , n o n i n t e n d u n t fa c e r e , n i s i

q uasdam pe r suas i o ne s p r o b ab i l e s , s i c u t G r ego r i u s l i b .

x i v ,

I

po s it is a d ho c qu i bu sd a m pe r su as i on i bus d i c i t :

Q u i p r o p t e r is ta s r a t io n e s n o l u e r i t c re d e r e , p r o p t e r

fid e m c r e d a t . C o n s i m i li te r d o c t r in a

Pauli

A c t . x v i i e t

xxv i * * e t I a d C o r . x v f f p e r e x e m p l u m d e g r a n o c a d e n t e ,

e t p e r resurrectionem Ch r i s t i : S i Ch r i s t u s r e su r r ex i t e t

mortui

r e s u r g e n t , e t p e r r e t r i b u t i o n e m

j u s t a m .

H u j u s -

modi no n sun t , n i s i p e r s uas i o ne s p r o b ab i l e s , vel t a n t u m

ex p r aem is s is c r e d i ti s . Pa t e t d i s cu r r e n d o pe r s i n g u l a .

[Pars Ter t ia :

Solutio Quaestionis]

B r e v i t e r e r g o p o t e s t t e n e r i q u o d nee a p r i o r i p u t a

nee p e r r a t io n e m p r i n c i p i i intrinseci i n h o m i n e , nee a

*

i

Cor. xv ,

19.

t Confessiones, 1, cap. xi i (Mign e, P.L.,

xxxu ,

670).

J Moralia in Job, xiv , cap. xl (Migne, P.L., l x xv ,

1077).

** Acts,

xvn .

31 ;

xxv i .

23. t t 1 C or. xv.




I57

m ore pun ishm ents tha n those w ho a re w ick ed . I t is th is

l in e of a rgu m en t th a t the Apostle seems to have in m in d

in the fi rs t le t te r to the C orin th ian s * : " I f w i th th i s l ife

on ly i n v iew we have ha d hope i n C hr is t , we a re o f a l l

m en the m os t to be p i ti ed , e t c " .

[Evaluation of the a posteriori

arguments].

These a

poster ior i arguments, however, are even less conclusive

tha n the

a

p r ior i p roof

based

on the p roper fo rm o f m an ,

s ince i t is n ot c lear f rom n a tur a l reason th a t there is one

ru le r who governs a l l men accord ing to the laws of re

t r ibu t ive an d p u n i tive justice.23 I t cou ld a lso be sa id

that the good act is i tse l f suf f ic ien t reward for anyone,

as

Aug us tine

says

i n the

Confessions,

bk .

i f

: "For i t

is

even

as Thou has t appo in ted , tha t every inord ina te des i re

shou ld br ing its ow n p u n ish m en t ", so tha t s in it se l f is the

f i r s t pun ishment o f

sin.

I t is c lea r the n tha t w he n the sa in ts a rgued a posteriori

for the proposed conclus ion, the y d id n ot in ten d to g ive

a n y th in g m ore tha n p robable persuas ive proofs. Gregory,

fo r ins tance, ha v ing p u t dow n c er ta in such p roofs

says %

:

"Whoever does not wish to bel ieve because of these

reasons, let h im believe because of fa i t h " . The same is

t rue of Paul's teachings in the Ac ts ** an d in the f irs t

ep is tle to the C orin th ian s f f where he uses the exam ple of

the g ra in th a t fa lls in to the e ar th , or where he a rgues

from the resu r rec t ion of C hr is t tha t i f C hr is t be r isen , the

dead w i l l rise ag a in , or whe re he appea ls to the no t ion

of a ju s t rew a rd . Such a rgum ents a re no th ing else than

probable persuasive proofs, or they are reasons der ived

from prem ises th a t are m atters of belief , as is eviden t

i f we exam ine them i nd i v id u a l ly .

[Part I I I . Solution to the Question]

To pu t i t b r ie f l y , t hen , we can m a i n ta i n t h a t n a t u ra l

reason cannot prove that the resurrect ion is necessary,

ne i the r by w ay o f

a

p r ior i reasons such as those based on

( 2 , 3 2 2 ) 22






158

t he no t ion o f t he i n t r i ns i c p r i nc i p l e i n man , no r by

a

poster ior i arguments, for instance, by reason of some

opera t ion or pe r fec t ion f i t t in g to m an . Hence we h o ld

the resu r rect ion to be ce r ta in on the basis of fa i th a lone .

Fur th e rm ore, as Aug us t ine says in De Tr in ita te, bk.

x m ,

c. ix , * the second p roposi t ion used in the fi rs t [or a p r ior i ]

p roof [v iz . o f the im m or ta l i ty o f the h um an sou l] is no t

held because reason dictates this, but solely because of

the

Gospel f

w here C hr is t te lls us : "D o n ot be a fra id of

those w ho k i l l the body bu t cannot k i l l the s ou l" .

[Rep ly to the Argu m en ts a t the B eg inn ing ]

To the firs t argument

24

: I f the argu m en t is based on

the n otion of

natural

des ire taken in an exac t an d p rope r

sense, an d a n a tu ra l des ire i n th is sense is n ot a n e lic ited

ac t bu t mere ly an inc l ina t ion of na tu re towards some

t h i n g , the n i t is c lear th a t the existence of such a n a t u r a l

des i re for anyth ing can be proved on ly i f we prove f i rs t

tha t the na tu re in ques tion is ab le to have such a th in g .

To a rgue the othe r w ay roun d , therefore , is begg ing the

qu est ion. Or i f n a tu ra l des ire is take n in a less proper

sense, v iz. as an ac t e l ic i ted i n con form ity w i t h the na tu ra l

inc l in a t ion , we a re s t i ll una ble to p rove tha t any e l ic i ted

desi re is natura l in th is sense wi thout f i rs t prov ing the

existence of a natura l desi re in the proper sense of the

t e rm.

B ut suppose tha t som eone we re to argue tha t w hatever

i s immed ia te ly des i red , once i t i s known, i s someth ing

that is desi red natura l ly , s ince such proneness seems to

arise on ly from some na tu ra l inc l in a t ion . One answer

to this object ion would be to deny the f i rst statement ,

s ince a p erson w i th bad ha bits is inc l in e d to des ire

im m ed ia te ly w ha tever is in accord w i th these hab its ju s t

as soon as such a th in g presents i tse lf. How ev er, i f

nothing else intervenes, nature of i tsel f is not v ic ious ;

ne i ther

is

i t

vicious

in everyone.

Consequent ly ,

i f everyone



159 DUNS SCOTUS

illud

a p p r e h e n s u m ,

sequitur

q u o d

i l lud

d e s i d e r i u m n o n

es t v i t i o s u m ; e r go i s t a r e spons io no n est ge ne r a l is .

Ideo po t e s t d id q u o d o p o r t e r e t o s t e n d e r e illam a p p r e -

hensionem esse

s e c u n d u m

rectam

r a t io n e m n o n

e r ro n e a m ;

a l i o q u i n s i a d a p p r e h e n s i o n e m e r r o n e a m statim omnes

a p p e ta n t a c t u e l i c i t o, n o n s e q u i tu r i l l u d d e s i d e r iu m

esse c on s o n u m i n c l i n a t i o n i n a t u r a e ;

imo magis

o ppo s i -

t u m . No n e st autem m a n i fe s t u m p e r r a t io n e m n a t u r a -

l e m ,

q u o d r a t i o o s t e n d e n s

homini

s e m p e r e s s e t a n q u a m

a p p e t i b i l e , s i t r a t i o n o n e r r o n e a , q u i a p r i u s o p o r t e r e t

os te n d e r e q u o d i s t u d p os se t c o m p e t e r e h o m i n i .

B r e v i t e r e r g o omne m e d i u m e x d e s id e r io n a t u r a l i

v i d e t u r esse in e ffic a x , q u i a a d efficaciam e j us opo r t e r e t

os t ende r e vel p o t e n t ia m n a t u r a l e m i n n a t u r a a d is t u d ,

vel

q u o d a p p r e h e n s i o ,

quam

s t a t i m s e q u i tu r i s t u d

d e s i d e r i u m , s i s i t a c t u s e l i c i t u s , s i t a p p r e h e n s i o r e c t a e t

n o n e r r one a ; e t horum primum e st i d e m c u m c on c l u -

s ion e q u a e c o n c l u d i tu r e x d e s id e r io n a t u r a l i . S e c u n d u m

a u t e m difficilius v e l m i n u s notum i s t a con c l u s i one . E t

a d p r o ba t i on e m h u ju s q u o d d e s i d e r i u m hominis n a t u r a l e

est a d im m o r ta l i t a t e m , q u i a n a t u r a l i t e r fu g i t m o r t e m ,

p o s s e t d i c i q u o d i s t a p r o b a t i o c o n c l u d e r e t a e q u e d e

quocumque

b r u t o . E t s i a d d a t u r i l l u d P h i lo s o p h i

n

De

genera tione * : M e l i u s es t i n om n ibus se m pe r esse

q u a m n o n esse, is t u d est a d o p p o s i tu m , t u r n q u i a a e q u e

c o n c l u d e r e t i n b r u t o s i c u t i n

homine ;

t u r n q u i a s u b d i t :

H o c a u t e m i n o m n i b u s i m p o s s i b i l e e x i s t e r e c o n t i n u e

p r o p t e r

longe

a p r i n c i p i o d i s ta r e : id e o r e l iq u o

modo c om -

p l e v i t D e u s n a t u r a m c o n t i n u a m f a c e r e g e n e r a t i o n e m ,

*

De generatione et corruptione, n , c a p .

x

( 2 2 6 * ,

25

ff.).




im m ed ia te ly desires such a th ing as soon as he know s of

i t ,

i t w ould fol low tha t the des ire in th is

case

is not viciou s.

Th e

first

answer to this object ion, then , is n ot adequ ate.

Therefore i t c ou ld be answered l ike th is. We m ust show

tha t such know ledg e is not erroneous bu t is in acc ord w i th

r ig h t reason. Otherw ise , i t does n ot fo llow tha t ju s t

because everyone, on the basis of an erroneous concep

t ion ,

were immedia te ly to e l ic i t on act of des i re , th is

desire is i n acco rd w i t h an in c l in a t ion o f na tu re . Ind ee d ,

i t is ra the r the opposite th a t follow s. Now i t is n ot c lear

by n a tu ra l reason tha t the a rgum ent es tab lish ing e terna l

existence as something desirable is not erroneous, since

m an m ust fi rs t be show n to be capab le of

such

a t h ing .

To pu t i t b r ie f l y ,

t hen ,

every a rgument based on

natura l desi re seems to be inconclusive, for to construct

an eff icacious argument, i t would be necessary to show

ei ther th a t n a ture possesses a n a tu ra l poten cy for ete rna l

l i fe , or tha t the know ledge w h ich im m ed ia te ly g ives rise

to th is des i re , where the la t ter is an e l ic i ted act , is not

erroneous bu t in a ccord w i th r ig h t reason. Now the

first of

these

a l tern at ive s is the same as the conclusion to

be established.25 Th e second is m ore difficult to prove

a nd is even less ev ide nt th a n the conclus ion.

As fo r the p roof tha t man has a na tu ra l des i re fo r

im m or ta l it y because he na tu ra l ly shuns de a th , i t can be

sa id tha t th is p roof app lies to the bru te an im a l as w e l l as

to m a n . An d sh ou ld some one br ing up the s ta tem ent of

the Phi losopher in

De generatione

et corruptione, bk .

i i

* th a t

i t is bet ter for everything to exist forever than not to

exist forever, th is is real ly an argument for the opposi te

view ; f i rst of

a l l,

because i t holds equal ly wel l for both

bru te an d m an , an d second ly , because Ar is to tle h im se l f

adds : "Since i t is im possible, how eve r, for a l l th ings to

exist foreve r because of th e i r g reat d istanc e from the ir

source, therefore God ad opted the re m a in ing a l tern at ive

and comple tes the per fec t ion of na tu re by mak ing

gen era tion con t inuou s" . I t is ju s t

as

i f Ar is to t le w ished to



l6o DUNS SCOTUS

q u a s i d i c a t , c u m d e s i d e r iu m n a t u r a l e s it a d se m per

esse, i n q u i bu s e st ho c impossible i n se ipso , es t illud

s i cu t poss ib ile e s t , s c i li c e t i n c on t i n u a t i one spec i e i

i n d i v e r s is i n d i v i d u i s ; e t i t a c onc ed e r e t de homine

s ic u t d e a l io g e n e r a bi le q u o d h a b e t n a t u r a l e d e s i d e r iu m

a d se m p e r esse, n o n i n u n i c o i n d i v i d u o , se d i n t a l i

success ione.

Se d s e m p e r v i d e t u r s t a r e v is q u o d fu g i e n s

unum

o p p o s i t u m , n o n fu g i t i l l u d n is i p r o p t e r amorem a l t e r i u s .

C o n c e d i p o t e s t q u o d e x h o c s e q u i t u r q u o d c u m f u g i a t

m o r t e m p r o n u n c , amat vi tam p r o n u n c , e t s ic d e q u o l i b e t

n u n c s i g n a t o. Se d n o n s e q u i t u r , e r g o p r o infinite

A d i l l u d A p o s t o l i : re s p on d e o n o lu m u s n os i n s p i r a t i

s iv e c e r t i f i c a t i p e r fid e m , e t u t i q u e n o lu m u s n a t u r a l it e r

s ic , q u o d i s tu d n o l le e st s e c u n d u m i n c l i n a t io n e m n a t u r a -

l e m ,

s e d no n e st

notum

r a t i o n e n a t u r a l i q u o d i s t u d n o l l e

e s t s e c u n d u m i n c l i n a t i o n e m

n a t u r a l e m .

A d s e c u n d u m , c on c e d o q u o d verum e s t b e a t i t u d i n e m

n o n s o l u m i n u n i v e r s a l i , s e d etiam i n s p e c i a l i a p p e t i

n a t u r a l it e r a b h o m i n e , s ic u t in fe r iu s p a t e b i t d is t . x l i x . *

Se d n o n e st n o t u m n a t u r a l i r a t io n e q u o d ip s a i n p a r t i -

c u l a r i ,

q uae s c i l i c e t co ns i s t i t i n

illo

i n q uo no s

credimus

e a rn c on s is te re , a p p e t a t u r n a t u r a l i t e r a b h o m i n e

autem

;

enim op o r te r e t esse n o t u m p e r r a t i on e m n a t u r a l e m , q u o d

esset

ille

a c tu s n o bis c on v e n i e n s t a n q u a m fin is . C u m

e r go p r o b as pe r Philosophum q u o d b e a t i t u d o n o n

tantum i n g e n e r a l i e x i

Eth icorum,

f s ed e t i a m i n s p e c i a li

e x x

%

a p p e t i t u r n a t u r a l i t e r , re s p on d e o :

ilia

r a t i o

b e a t i t u d i n i s quam P h i l o s o p h u s r e p u t a t s p e c i a l e m , q u o d

s c i l i c e t c o n s i s t a t i n s p e c u l a t i o n e a l t i s s i m a r u m c a u s a r u m

pe r f ec t i s s ima , e s t

valde

u n i v e r s a l is ; i n s p e c i a l i a u t e m

* Opus oxoniense, iv , dist. x l ix , q . ix,

nn .

2-3

(Vives ,

v o l . xxi , 318).

f Ethica Nicomachea, 1, cap. v i i

(1097'', iff.).

% x , cap. v i i -v i i i

(117°

I2ff.).




l6o

say that s ince there is a natura l desi re to exist forever,

in those beings incapable of such existence there is a

desire for such cont inued existence as is possible, viz.

t h roug h the c on t in u i t y of

the species

in

diverse

ind iv idu a ls .

And so one cou ld g ran t tha t jus t l i ke the o ther be ings

tha t can be gen era ted , m an too has a n a tu ra l des ire to

exist

forever—not

in deed i n a s ing le i nd i v i du a l , bu t i n a

con t in u a l success ion of ind iv idu a ls.

As for the p r inc ip le tha t one flees from one th ing on ly

because he loves i ts opposi te, however, i t appears that

this is a lways v a l id . We can a dm i t tha t i t follow s from

this pr inc ip le that i f one shuns death now, he loves l i fe

now, and the same can be sa id a t any g i ven momen t .

B u t from this i t does n ot follow th a t he loves to live

forever.

To tha t a rgumen t f rom the Apos t l e , I r ep l y t ha t we

who do not wish [ to be unc lothed or who are averse to

dy ing ] a re w e w ho a re m ade ce r ta i n or insp ired by fa i th .

We a re i ndeed na tu ra l l y ave rse to dy ing i nasmuch as

such an ave rs ion i s i n acco rd w i t h an i nc l i na t ion o f

na tu re. B u t i t is no t kn own to n a tu ra l reason tha t th is

avers ion is in accord w i th an inc l in a t ion of na tu re.

To the second argument : I concede tha t i t is tru e m a n

natura l ly seeks happ iness not on ly in genera l but a lso

i n pa r t i cu l a r , as w i l l be m ade c lea r in d is t inc t ion x l i x . *

B u t i t is not know n by n a tu ra l reason tha t m an na tu ra l ly

des i res that par t icu lar beat i tude which consis ts in what

we believe it to consist,26 for it would be necessary to

know by na tu ra l reason tha t such an ac t per ta ins to us

as an en d. C onseque n tly , w he n you p rove by the

Philosopher tha t n ot on ly is bea t itude in gen era l des ired

na tu ra l l y ( f rom

Nicomachean Ethics ,

bk .

i)

f bu t also bea t i

tud e i n p a r t icu la r ( from

bk . x ) , %

I rep ly tha t the bea t itud e

w h ich the Ph ilosopher cons idered p a r t icu la r , na m ely the

bea t itud e w h ich consis ted in the m ost per fect s pe cu la tion

about the h ighest causes, is in fac t a know ledg e throu g h

universals.27 B y descen ding to p a rt ic u lars ,

then ,

Ar is to t le



l 6 l

DUNS

SGOTUS

d e s c e n d e n d o, ip s e n o n v i d e t u r p roc es sis se u l t r a s p e c u la t io-

tionem perfectissimam i n v i t a is t a . U n d e in q u is i t a is ta

b e a t i t u d i n e

hominis

s u b d i t : O p o r t e t e t co rpu s

sanum

esse,

e t

c i b u m ,

e t f a m u l a t u m esse, n o n tamen aes t i -

mandum multum magnis i n d i g e r e , f e l i c e m . E r go

fe l i c i t as

ilia

spec i a l i s

quam

nos

ponimus speculationem

h o m i n i possibilem longe p e r f e c t i o r e s t q u a c u m q u e p o s s i -

bil i i n v i t a i s t a , ilia n o n e st n a t u r a l i t e r n o t a esse fi n is

nos t e r

nee

n a t u r a l i t e r

notum

e st e a rn n a t u r a l i t e r a p p e t i

a nob i s tanquam f i n e m .

C u m p roba s p e r rationem Augustini b e a t i t u d i n e m n o n

posse esse n i s i s e m p i te r n a m , d a b i t u r i s t u d a b illo q u i

t e n e t b e a t i t u d i n e m humanam po sse hab e r i i n v i t a i s t a ,

q u o d v ole n s a m i t t i t e a r n , q u i a d e b e t s e c u n d u m rectam

r a t i o n e m

velle

c o n d i t i on e m n a t u r a e s ua e . R e c t a

autem

r a t i o o s t e n d i t i s t i n o n h a b e n t i f i d e m , u t v i d e t u r s ib i ,

q u o d c o n d i t i o n a t u r a e s u a e e s t

mortalitas

t a r n

animae

quam co r po r i s , e t i d eo deb e t v e l l e s i c u t e t vitam a m i t -

t e r e , i t a v i t a m be a t a m . E t c u m d i c i s , n o n e st v i t a be a t a

q u a e n o n e r a t

amata

a b h a b e n t e ,

verum

e s t , s i non

esse t ama t a p r o t u n c quando e s t po ss i b i l i s , e t c o n

ven i e n s i l l i a m a n t i , s e d s ic esse co n ve n i e n t em p r o sem pe r

no n e s t

notum

p e r r a t io n e m

n a t u r a l e m .

A d aliud c on c e d i tu r q u o d n o t u m est h o m i n i ipsum

posse consequ i f i nem

suum

i n a l iq u o in d i v i d u o , e t p e r

c o n s e q u e n s , b e a t i t u d i n e m i n i l l o g r a d u i n q u o n o t u m

est b e a t i tu d i n e m esse fin e m h o m i n i s . E t c u m d ic is h oc

im po ss i b ile esse i n v i t a i s t a , d i co q u o d is t a im po ss i bi li t a s

n o n es t n o t a p e r r a t i on e m n a t u r a l e m . G u m a d d u c is

i n fo r t u n a , i n f i r m i t a t e m , im p e r fe c t io n e m v i r t u t i s e t

s c i e n t i a e , r e s p o n d e t u r q u o d h a e c o m n i a r e p u g n a n t

pe r f e c t ae f e l i c i t a t i , qualem n o t u m e s t c o m p e t e r e I n t e l l i -

g e n t ia e , s ed n o n q u a l e m n o t u m e st p osse c om p e t e r e

h o m i n i .



THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL l6l

d id not seem to go beyond the m ost pe r fect specu la

t ion poss ible in th is li fe . Hence , ha v ing in q u i red in to

the na ture of th is happ iness of m a n , Ar is to t le adds

28

:

"To be happy i t i s necessary for man that h is body be

he a l thy , tha t he have food , com pa nions hip , th a t he does

not c rave too m uc h or w an t too m u c h ". Since we assume

th a t m a n is capa ble of a sp ecu la t ion far m ore per fect th a n

anything possible in this l i fe, the specia l happiness

wh ich we pos tu la te i s no t known na tu ra l l y to be

our end , ne i ther i s i t known na tu ra l l y tha t we seek i t

as an end .

Wh en you a rgue from August ine 's p roof tha t happ iness

cannot be an y th ing bu t e te rna l, a person w ho ho lds tha t

hu m a n happ iness is poss ible in th is l ife w i l l re p ly tha t he

does w ish to lose i t . For a cc ording to r ig h t reason, he

m ust w ish w ha tever is the lot o f h is na tu re. B u t to a

person w ho has no

f a i t h ,

r ight reason seemingly reveals

the lo t of our n ature to be m or ta l both in body an d sou l.

The refore, he m ust w ish to lose l ife an d the refore to lose

the h ap py l i fe . An d w hen y ou say tha t such a l ife is not

h a p p y w h i c h h a d n ot been love d by the one w ho possessed

i t ,

th is is t rue on ly i f

such

a li fe ha d not been loved a t a

tim e w hen i t

was

both poss ible a nd f i t t in g to have i t . B ut

i t is n o t know n by n a tu ra l reason tha t to be ha pp y forever

is som eth ing in accord w i th our n a tu re.

As fo r the o the r [o r th ird a rgu m en t ], we g ran t tha t m an

knows he can a t t a i n h i s end i n some ind i v i dua l , and

conseque n tly , tha t he knows he can a t ta in happ iness in

the degree recognised to be m an 's end . Wh en y ou

say th a t such happ iness is n ot possible in this l ife , I rep ly

that th is impossib i l i t y is not known by natura l reason.

Whe n you adduce the m is for tune , bod i ly i n f i rm i t y ,

inp er fec t ion of v i r tue an d know ledg e, the answer is tha t

these are inc onsistent w i th the type of pe rfect happiness

known to be character is t ic of

an

In te lligen ce

29

bu t they

are n ot inconsis tent w i th the happ iness k now n to be

w i th i n the reach o f m an .



162 DUNS SCOTUS

A d q u a r t u m , d i c e r e t u r q u o d is t a sp ec ie s p e r p e t u a b it u r

i n u n i v e r s o p e r

continuam successionem

i n d i v i d u o r u m

quam p o n e r e t P h i los o p h u s p e r genera tionem c o n t in u a m ,

n on autem c on t i n u a b i tu r p e r vitam a l i c u j u s , nee

a l i -

quorum

i n s p e c ie . E x h is a p p a r e t q u a n t a e s u n t g r a t ia e

r e f e r e ndae no s t r e C r ea t o r i q u i no s pe r f i d em ce r t i s s imo s

r e d d i d i t in h is , q u a e p e r t in e n t a d fin e m n o s t r u m , e t a d

p e r p e t u i t a t e m s e m p i te r n a m a d q u a e ingeniosissimi e t

e r u d i t i s s i m i p e r r a t i o n e m n a t u r a l e m q u a s i n i h i l p o t e r a n t

a t t i n g e r e , ju x t a

i l lud

q u o d

adductum

e s t d e A u g u s t i n o

xi i i De T rin i ta t e ca p . i x * : Q u od v i x p a u c i , e t c . S i fide s

ad s i t q u ae e st i n e is q u i bu s d e d i t f il ios De i

f ier i ,

n u l l a

quaes t i o es t qu i a i p se suos c r eden t es i n hoc ce r t i s s imos

r e d d i t .

*

x i i i ,

ca p. ix (Mign e,

P.L.,

x m , 1023).




To the fourth , i t m igh t be sa id tha t in the un iverse i t is

the species tha t w i l l go on forever throu g h the continuous

succession of ind iv id u a ls. I t is th is w h ich the Philosopher

postu la ted by h is doct r ine of continu ous ge ne rat ion. B ut

i t is no t the l ife o f any s ing le ind iv id u a l or ind iv idu a ls

w i th in the species th a t w i l l cont inu e to exis t.

F rom a l l th is i t is appa ren t how m uch thanks m us t be

g iven to our C rea tor , w ho th roug h fa i th has made us

most cer ta in o f those th ings wh ich per ta in to our end

and to e te rna l

life—things

about w h ich the m ost lea rned

and ingen ious m en can know a lm os t no th ing acco rd ing

to August ine's statement in De Tr in i tate, bk.

x i i i ,

c . ix * :

"Sca rcely a few , etc".30 "B u t i f fa i th be there—that

fa i th w h ich is to be foun d in those to w hom [Jesus] has

given the pow er to becom e the sons of God—there is no

quest ion about i t , "

31

for of th is He has m ade those w ho

believe in H im m ost ce r ta in .





NOTES





N O T E S

Section I

1 The mss read either phicos or phycos. The text is faulty here

as it is in so many other instances. Scotus's meaning, however,

seems clear enough.

2 In quid and in quale are two basic modes of

predication.

They

refer prim ar ily to the five predicables of Porphyry, namely, the

genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident,

though Scotus extends the idea of in quid and in quale pre

dication to the transcendental order. Briefly , the difference

between the two is this. To predicate in quid means to predicate

either the entire essence (i.e. the species) or at least the deter

minable part of the essence (e.g. the genus). The term is

derived from quiddity or essence and such predication represents

an answer to the question : What is i t? (Quid est?). To

predicate in quale means to predicate a further determination

or qualifica tion of the essence. This qu alification (quale) may

be either essential (e.g. a specific difference) or non-essential

(e.g. a property or accident). Since the specific difference is

really a part of the essence or quiddity, Scotus sometimes

speaks of i t

as

being predicated in

quale quid

or in

quale

substantiale

in order to distinguish it from properties or accidents which

are said to be predicated either in quale

accidentale

or simply

in quale. To predicate something in quid, says Scotus, it is not

enough that the predicate be an essential note but that it be

predicated per modum subsistentis, which from the viewpoint of

grammar means that it must be predicated as a noun, not as

an adjective or pa rticip le or adverb. Predication in quale,

whether it be an essential qualification or not, is always pre

dicated per modum denominantis, which from the viewpoint of

grammar means it is predicated as a modifier. "Substance",

"whiteness", "rat ionali ty", "rat ional animal", " l i fe", "truth",

"goodness", if used as predicates, would be predicated in quid,

whereas "substantial", "white", "rat ional", " l iving", "true",



166 DUNS SCOTUS

"good" , if

used as predicates, would be predicated in quale.

"Be ing"

(ens) can be used either as a noun or as a particip le.

In the first case it is predicated in quid and is equivalent to

"a b eing " or "a th in g " w ith a singular and plu ra l. I n the second

case,

if used as a pred icate, i t is predicated in quale or denomina

tive. Used as a particip le, "b e in g " always requires a subject

which it modifies.

1

Ultimate differences are denominative terms that are irreducibly

simple. I n regard to concepts that designate rea l things or some

real aspects of real things (first intentions), Scotus distinguishes

those which are irreducibly simple and those which are not.

Irreducibly simple concepts (conceptus simpliciter simplices) are such

as cannot be reduced or broken down into two more simple

concepts that are first intentions, one of which is determinable

and the other determining. The concept of

" m a n " ,

for

instance,

can be

reduced to "a nim al" and "ra t ion al" . "A ni m al "

in tu rn can be broken down into "sentient " and "o rga nism ".

This process, according to Scotus, cannot go on indefinitely.

Otherwise nothing wo uld be known . U ltimate ly we arrive

at intelligible elements or notions that are incapable of further

analysis and hence are irred uc ibly simple. Restricting our

selves to real concepts, that is "first intentions", we can say,

according to Scotus, that there is but one irreducible simple

concept that is determinable or quidditative, and that this is

" t h i n g "

or "b e in g " used as a noun. But there w il l be as

many irreducibly simple differential, determining, or qualifying

concepts as there are different concepts, where different is

taken in the technical Aristote lian

sense.

(Things differ, accord

ing to the Stagirite, only if they have something in common ;

otherwise they are simply diverse. Cf. Metaphysica, x , cap. i i i ,

10546, 23~3°)-

Since Scotus gives as examples of concepts

that are not irreducibly simple that of the individual, the

species and the genus, and since even such concepts must

contain an u ltima te difference, it seems that we can d istinguish

three types of ultimate differences, according to him : (1) the

haecceitas or indiv iduatin g difference ; (2) certain kinds of

specific differences ; (3) transcendental differences, such as

those which limit or contract "being" to the ultimate genera



NOTES

167

or categories, or such notions as " in fi n i te " ,

"necessary11,

"a cc iden ta l" , etc. Accord ing to Scotus, not every specific

difference should be considered to be irreduc ib ly simple.

Since we are speaking of first intentions we must take into

consideration the nature of the rea lity designated by the

concept. Consider the notion "l iv in g bo dy ". Acco rding to

Scotus, " l i v i n g " is derived from and connotes the life pr inc iple

which is a form or substance really distinct from the body

which has its own forma corporeitatis. Since the life princ ip le

can be designated by a determinable or non -di fferent ial

notion (e.g. "substance", " th in g " , "a being") Scotus does

not consider the term " l i v in g " , as applied to an organism or

man , as an irreduc ibly simple concept. Such a specific difference

is not ult imate , though further analysis wi ll eventually yield

a specific difference tha t is irreduc ib ly simple (Cf. Opus

oxoniense, n, d. in , q. vi, n. iq ; 1 d. in , q. i i i , n. 15 ; 1 1 d. xxv,

q. i,

n.

16).

4

Attributes or properties (propria or

passiones)

are those qualifica

tions which are necessarily connected with their respective

subject yet do no t enter in to its essential de fini tio n. " B e in g "

has two types or attributes, those which are simply coextensive,

such as " o n e " , " t r u e " , " g o o d " , and those whic h are coextensive

in disjunction such as "infinite-f inite", "simple-composed",

"necessary-contingent", etc.

B

The primacy of commonness, or better, of common predication,

which Scotus ascribes to being, simply means that "being"

conceived

quiddi ta t ive ly

or as a noun is predicable of anything

that can be grasped by a concept that is not irreducibly simple.

Th e virtual primacy tha t Scotus attributes to " b e i n g " i n reference

to its attributes and ultimate differences does not mean that

the formal concept or ratio "being" contains these notions in

such a way that the latter can be abstracted from the former

by an act of intellectual abstraction or analysis as some have

claimed.

I t simply means th at these other notions or rationes

are predicable by a necessary or per se predication of some

subject that can be designated as "a being" or "a thing".

According to scholastic usage, if the predicate of a necessary

or per se nota propos ition is par t of the essential def in it io n o f

(2,322) 23





NOTES

169

something wit ho ut affirm ing or denying anyth ing of it ;

(2) the act of "composition and division", or immediate judg

ment, whereby the mind affirms or denies some predicate of

some subject ; (3) the act of reasoning or mediate judg men t,

by which the mind infers one proposition from another or other

propositions.

9 D emonstration, according to Aristotle {Analytica

posteriora,

1

cap.

xii i) is of two k inds : dem onstration of the fact (demon-

stratio quia) and demonstration of the reasoned fact

(demonstratio

propter quid). The first mere ly establishes that the conclusion

of the syllogism is true, but the second additionally indicates

the reason why the predicate of the conclusion inheres in the

subject. Fo r the midd le te rm o f a demonstration of reasoned

fact gives the cause or some ontologically prior principle

(e.g.

the essential definition) that can be considered as the

reason or rational explanation why the predicate must be

affirmed of the subject. A demonstration of reasoned fact w il l

always be an a priori fo rm o f demonstration ; an a posteriori

demonstration, on the contrary, will always be a demonstration

of the simple fact.

10

Scotus has previously discussed why G od is the subject o f

theology but not of metaphysics, and to what extent theology

verifies the Aristotelian notion of a science.

11 "Its principle", that is, some self-evident or analytical proposi

tion of which it is the subject.

Sect ion I I

1 For Scotus's reply to these arguments , see pp. 30 ff.

2 The statement of Pseudo-Dionysius that we do not know what

G od is ; we know only wha t he is not (Cf. D e caelesti hierarchia,

11.

Mig ne, P.G., in ,

141

; see also St J ohn D amascene,

Defide

orthodoxa, 1 iv. Migne P.G.,

xcrv ,

800), was often quoted by

the scholastics. Th is

docta ignorantia

was exaggerated by many.

Scotus Eriugena, for instance, suggests that perhaps it might

be more correct to say tha t G od is not good, true , jus t, etc.,



170 DUNS SCOTUS

since any term or concept we might derive from the universe

of creatures is so radically inadequate to express what God

is that it could more truly be denied of God than affirmed of

H im (Cf. De divisione naturae, 1, xiv ff. M igne, P.L.,

cxxn,

462fF.).

Duns Scotus reminds us that this way of speaking cannot be

taken too seriously. I f our knowledge is purely negative, it is

no knowledge of God at all.

3 Henry of G hent makes use of this dis tinction in his Summa,

art. xxi i , q. i ad ii i ; q. iv.

4

He nry of G hent, loc. c i t , q . iv ; St Thomas, Summa theologica,

1, q. i i i , art. iv ad ii i .

5 Henry of Ghent, loc. cit.

R Ibid.

7 Henry maintains that God is already known in a most general

manner in every concept the human intellect forms of

a

created

object as "th is b ein g" . Consequently, he is forced to hold

that we cannot know a creature without at the same time

having some knowledge of G od. This knowledge of God in

creatures, however, must be distinguished from a knowledge

of God as He is in Himself. See Summa, art.

xx i i ,

q. v i.

a

Hen ry, Summa, ar t. xx iv , q . v i. For Scotus's answer to Henry's

arguments, see p. 32.

9 Henry contrasts two rad ically different notions. By pr ivatively

undetermined being, he understands the notion of being that

applies to creatures. As creatures actua lly exist, they are

qualified or determinate forms of

being.

For instance, man is

a rational, sentient, organic, material, substantial being.

Nevertheless, the mind prescinds from all these determinations

to form a simple concept of being, undetermined but determinable.

The concept of being that applies to G od, however, negates

or denies all determination and therefore is called negatively

undetermined being. G od, in a word, is not only being in

an unqualified and undetermined sense, but His being is

incapable of any restriction, limitation or determination.

Therefore, being in this sense is undetermined and indeterminable.

Now determinable and indeterminable beings have nothing positive



NOTES 171

in common ; they agree only in what is denied, namely,

determination. Therefore, our so-called "conce pt" of being as

common to God and creatures is in reality not one concept

but two . But because of their sim ilarity, the m ind fails to

distinguish between the two, even as the eye fails to resolve

two distant objects. This dual "concept" is what H enry

calls the "analogous concept of being".

10 I n scholastic terminology, "ind ete rm ina tion " as applied to G od

is a first intention. I t expresses a perfection o f a rea lly existent

entity, in this case the positive mode of existence, infinity.

Indetermination in the second instance, is characteristic not of

a real ent ity, bu t of our concept of being. I t is a second intention,

since it refers not to some condition of reality but to a character

istic of a concept or ens rationis.

11 Only what is true can be an object of "knowledge" or scientia

in the strict Aristotelian or scholastic sense of

the

term. Hence,

"false knowledge'- is a contradiction in terms. Sim ilarly

certitude, in the technical sense of the term, presupposes that

the proposition to which the mind gives its firm assent is a

true and not a false statement.

12 The intellect, according to the general view of the scholastics,

is a dual faculty comprising the active or agent intellect and

the passive or possible intellect. Th is divis ion is based upon

an obscure passage in Aristotle's De

anima

(in, cap. v ;

430s 18)

and underwent a variety of interpretations. W ith Alexander

of Aphrodisias, as well as with some scholastic interpretations

of Augustinian illumination, the active intellect is identified

w ith G od. W ith Alfara bi and Avicenna, it is a subordinate

intelligence or "angel" somehow connected with the moon.

St Thomas considers the active intellect to be a faculty of the

soul rea lly distinct from the possible inte llect. Scotus also

considers it to be a property of the soul but regards it as only

formally distinct from, but really identical

wi th,

the possible

intellect and the soul's substance. The general function of the

active intellect is to render the potentially intelligible in the

sense image actually inte lligible . The additional specific

refinements Scotus has given to this general function do not

concern us here.



iy2 DUNS SCOTUS

13 Notions perta ining to the essence of the object (generic,

differential or specific notions) are contained "essentially".

Colour, for instance, is contained essentially in redness. A

notion is regarded as virtually contained in a given object, if

the object has the power or virtus of producing the notion in

the mind. I n a broad sense, "v i r tua l" is not opposed to

"essential", since the object has the power to produce a concept

of what i t contains essentially. In addition, however, the

object can be said to contain virtually its necessary properties

(propria) or any effects i t is capable of producing. An object

such as a golf-ball could produce a simple notion proper of

itself as a sphere and also a simple proper notion of a circle,

according to Scotus, for the notion of circularity is virtually

contained in the notion of sphericity. Such an object, however,

could not give rise to a simple proper notion of a triangle or

pentagon.

14 A pure or simple perfection (perfectio

simpliciter)

is one that does

not contain in its formal notion any imperfection or limitation.

As such i t is opposed to mixed perfections (perfectio secundum

quid) wh ich involve both perfection and imperfection. K now

ledge,

volition, existence, wisdom and the like are regarded by

Scotus as pure perfections. Matter, corporeity, sense knowledge

or even knowledge obtained by a reasoning process as con

trasted with intuitive knowledge, all involve limitation and

imperfection in their very notion.

15 For this discussion see above, pp. 4-8.

16 Scotus distinguishes between two types of objects that move

the intellect of a creature to knowledge, one natural, the other

voluntary or supernatural. The natural motivat ing object of

an intellect causes knowledge automatically or necessarily, as

it were, by the very fact that it is what it is and is co-present

to that intellect. Now the d ivine essence is a natural or

adequate motivating object of immediate and intuitive know

ledge only in regard to the divine intellect itself. For any

created intellect, God's essence is a purely voluntary object.

The reason, says Scotus, lies in this fact that God's essence

can

not be related necessarily or automatically, as it were, to any



NOTES 173

creature or part thereof—a corollary of the absolute inde

pendence of the First Being. A l l relationships between G od

and creatures are contingent and dependent upon the divine

wil l ,

the ultim ate source of a ll contingency. Consequently, in

the beatific vision of God in heaven, says Scotus, it is not

the divine essence as

such

that moves the intellect bu t rather the

divine wi l l . In this sense, G od is a vo luntary object. But the

peculiarity of the beatific vision lies in the fact that the divine

will motivates but does not terminate this act of intuition.

And this is something unique in the order of objects and

follows from the fact that God's will is really identical with

God's essence (Cf. Quodlibet, q. xiv).

17

For the distinction between a demonstration of the fact and a

demonstration of the reasoned fact see note 9 above. I n this

particular instance, the demonstration of the fact referred to

is an

a posteriori

argument which proceeds from effect (creatures)

to cause (G od). In such a process, that which is most unlike

creatures, and consequently most distinctive of

G od,

is the last

to be demonstrated.

18 See Scotus's proof for the existence of

G od,

pp. 52 ff.

19 The less universal and more specific the concept, the greater

its comprehension or intension. The concept of man, for

instance, contains the more universal notions of "animal",

"organism", "substance", "being", in its intension.

20

The scholastics list a number of loci from which a dialectitian

may draw his arguments. The locus a minori assumes that

what is within the power of the less perfect, is also within that

of the more perfect. Now the intellect, a purely sp iritual

faculty, is more perfect than the imagination, an organic

faculty.

21 Seep. 14.

22

See p.

14.

23

For a description of this fallacy see Aristotle's De sophisticis

elenchis, cap. v (1676,

1-20).

24 In tu itive knowledge of G od is supernatural. See note

16.



174 DUNS SCOTUS

26

See p.

14.

26

See pp. 68 ff.

27 See p. 14.

28 See p.

17.

Sect ion I I I

x For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see p. 76.

2 This is the solution given by Henry of Ghent, Summa, art.

xxi , q. i.

3

See Aristotle , De

caelo,

1, cap. iii

(270", 12-13)

; cap. x ii

(281*,

18 ff.) ;

11,

cap. iv

(287°,

23-24) ; cap. v i

(289"*,

8-9) ;

Metaphysica, ix , cap. v ii i

(10506,

22-24).

4 See p. 173, note 17.

5 Cf. Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xxxvi, q. unica, n. 5.

6 Cf. St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. ii, art. iii corpus, quarta

via.

7

"Natural" is understood in the technical sense of a cause

that acts by a necessity of nature and not deliberately or freely.

Effic ient causes, according to Scotus, fall in to two classes :

(1) those which possess antecedent rational knowledge and

act deliberately ; (2) those which lack such knowledge and

act autom atically or by a necessity of nature. See Quaest.

in Metaphysicam, ix, q. xv, n. 4

(Vives,

vol. .

vn , 6086

ff.) where

he divides all active powers into either nature or will. Here

he proves paradoxically that according to Aristotle's division

of rational and irrational powers the intellect is "irrational"

in the sense tha t it acts automatica lly in the presence of evident

truth whereas the will is "rational" in the sense that it can

freely choose to love or not to love an object known through

reason or intellect.

" I n an ascending order one progresses by going fro m the posterior

to the prio r ; in a descending order, from the pr ior to the

posterior. For instance, in regard to a series of temporally

ordered causes where one precedes the other in time, many

philosophers (e.g. St Bonaventure) deny the possibility of an



NOTES

I75

infinite regress into the past (an ascending order) and use

this argument to establish a creation in time, yet they admit

the possibility of effects of created causes continuing indef

inite ly into the future (infin ite regress in a descending temporal

order). Scotus, as his answer to the objection that follows

indicates, denies categorically the possibility of an infinite

regress in an ascending order only in regard to essentially

ordered causes. Inasmuch as such causes must exist simul

taneously to produce a given effect, a chain of such causes

will be non-temporal in character.

9

Accord ing to Aristotle's theory of colour borrowed from

Plato (Timaeus, 67E), fine particles penetrate and dilate the

medium whereas large particles compress it producing white

or black colour respectively. Cf. Metaphysial, x , cap. v i i (1057*,

8 ).

Hence "d ila ting " is regarded as a property of anything

white, and "white" may be regarded as a per se cause of the

same.

10 See Aristotle, Physica, 11, cap. hi

(195s,

27 ff.) ; cap. v (196&,

24-29) ;

Metaphyska,

v, cap. ii

(1013&, 2gss).

11 See Aristotle , Metaphyska, v , cap. x i

(1018',

9-11).

12

See p. 39.

13 See

p . 42.

14 Scotus contrasts "nature" as a necessarily acting cause with a

free agent acting w ith purpose or deliberation . See above,

note 7.

15 See p p. 46-7 .

16 Cf. Scotus s third conclusion, p. 46.

17 See p p. 47 -8.

18

A univocal cause is one whose effect is of the same nature as

itself. A father, for instance, is the univocal cause of his son.

An equivocal cause, on the contrary, is of a different nature

from its effect. For instance the artist is an equivocal cause

of his pain ting. Since the less perfect cannot be the total

cause of the more perfect, the total or principal cause, if



176

DUNS SCOTUS

equivocal,

must be more perfect than its effect. Th is argument

seems to presuppose that

efficient

causality involves no imper

fection and therefore w il l be found in the most excellent nature.

Cf. pp. 42 and 45.

19

Scotus is not attem pting to prove num erical or ind ividu al

un ity at this point bu t rather a un ity of nature. To put it in

other words, the triple primacy is characteristic of but one

kind of being. Whether there is more than one ind ividua l of

this kind is not discussed here but in the following question

on the un icity of G od (cf. pp. 82 ff. ). Scotus's intention is

expressed more clearly in the De Primo Principio, chapter iii

of which parallels the present question of the Oxoniense. He

proposes "to demonstrate, if Thou wilt grant it, that some one

nature is simply first. However, I say one nature for this

reason, because in this third chapter the aforesaid three

primacies will be shown, not about a unique singular or one

in number, but about a unique qu idd ity or nature. There

wil l ,

however, be mention of numerical unity later."

[De

Primo Principio, cap. ii i ; Roche translation , p. 39 ).

20 "Possible" is taken as the contradictory disjunc tion of

"necessary". I t designates a being which exists in v irtu e of

another and hence, of itself, is merely possible. Scotus seems

to have been influenced by Avicenna's possibile esse and necesse

e s s e .

n

See note

14.

22

Scotus refers to his theory of "natural appetite" in virtue of

which appetite every nature seeks its own perfection. Th is

"seeking", however, is not to be understood in the sense of a

conscious striving for some known goal but is merely the

ontological relation that exists between a thing and whatever

can perfect. I n this sense, for instance, matter seeks or loves

form and vice versa. In the present case the subject perfected

and that which perfects it (viz. the end) are simply iden tical.

Hence, Scotus argues that if we say the First Agent has a

"natural love" of itself, this is equivalent to saying that it is its

own perfection or it is itself.



NOTES 177

23 See Aristotle, Physica,

v i i i ,

cap. v i (259 *, 32 ff.) ; De caelo,

11

cap. i i i

(286s,

34 ff.) ; De

generatione

et corruptione,

11

cap. x

(336",

23 ff.) ; Metaphyska, xn , cap. v i - v i i (1072s, 9 ff).

24

A subject is said to be in contradictory potency to something

if it can either have it or not have it . Th e argument here is

this. I f thought can either be present or absent so far as the

nature itself is concerned, then to think requires some effort

on the part of the nature and this would eventually produce

weariness.

25 The first act or actualisation of a being is that it exists with

its various faculties or powers. Th us , for instance, so far as

man's body is endowed or informed by the human soul, man

is in first act. When a man actualises his hu man faculties or

powers by acts of seeing, thinking, willing, etc., he is in second

act. For Scotus, a ra tion al nature achieves its highest perfect ion

by loving the highest good.

26 Activum implies an immanent operation, that is one which is

not only initiated by the subject but remains in and perfects

tha t subject. V i ta l activities such as though t, vo lit ion and the

like are imma nent operations. Factivum, on the other ha nd ,

implies that the operation is transient, that is, has a term

outside the agent. Man 's artifacts are produced by a transient

activity.

27 Cf. St Thomas, Sent., 1 dist. xxxv, q. i, art. i ad iii ; Summa

theologica,

1

q. xiv, art. i i.

28 Scotus uses the term ratio

intelligent

(literally "the reason for

kn ow in g" ). The allusion here is probably to the notion of an

"intelligible species", which in human knowledge is supposed

to substitute for the object in such a way as to make universal

concepts possible. Even i f one were to postulate something

analogous to the species in regard to God's knowledge, it

would still be identical with His essence and intellect.

29 Since whatever receives something is perfected by the form

received, it would follow that the more perfect knowledge

would be perfected by the less perfect.

30

See Quaest. in Metaphysicam,

v i i ,

q. xv, n. 9.



178

DUNS SCOTUS

81 "Infinity" is regarded here as a degree of intensity which the

perfection in question possesses. Scotus distinguishes between

intensive and extensive infin ity . A th ing is said to be exten

sively in finite i f there is no pure perfection (cf. p.

172,

note 14)

which it does not possess. Noth ing, however, is said in regard

to the intensity or degree to which such perfections are pos

sessed.

Each pure perfection, however, is said to be inten

sively infinite if it exists in the highest degree possible for that

respective perfection. Thus G od wou ld not be extensively

infinite i f He lacked knowledge and love. But H is knowledge

is intensively infinite if it is a comprehensive knowledge of all

that can be known, including His infinitely intelligible nature.

32

Cf. e.g. Aristotle, Metaphysial, 11, v

(994", 1-2).

33 Scotus distinguishes between the omnipotence of God as an

article of his Catholic creed (omnipotence in the proper sense

of the term) and the infinite power of God (omnipotence in a

qualified sense) as demonstrated philosophically by reason

unaided by fa ith (Cf. Quodlibet, q . v i i ; Opus oxoniense, 1, dist.

xl i i , q . un ica). I n this distinction we see the influence o f the

philosophy of A lfara bi and Avicenna. The latter, influenced

by Plotinus's theory of emanation, maintained that God can

create only one being immediately, viz . the highest Intelligence.

This creature in tu rn produces subordinate Intelligences. The

creation of the earth as well as the heavenly bodies and their

souls is the work of these created Intelligences. Even in this

theory, however, God is the ultimate cause of all things that

emanate directly or indirectly from H im , and therefore the

First Cause in some qualified sense at least is omnipotent.

As a theologian, however, Scotus could not subscribe to this

view, for according to his theology, he believed that whatever

God can do through the medium of the secondary cause He

has created He can do directly or immediately if H e so w illed.

But Scotus makes this much of a concession to Arabic

philosophy, namely, that in our present state we can only

demonstrate that God can create all things either mediately

or immediately and in this sense God's power must be in

finite intensively. We can give only probable arguments for





l8o

DUNS SCOTUS

theoremata de esse et

essentia (Louvain,

1930),

p p.

17

ff., regarding

the particular interpretation to which

Scotus

is referring.

43 In his analysis of a given entity, Scotus often arranges the

various perfections or rationes the mind distinguishes therein

according to an ontological priority, accordingly as one ratio

presupposes the other for its existence but not vice versa.

To conceive the entity under some prior ratio in order to

discover what additional attributes are implied

in

virtue

thereof is to conceive it according to a prior instance of nature.

44 St Thomas, Sent., 11, dist. x l i i i , q. i, art. i ; Summa theologica, 1,

q.

v i i , art. 1.

46 See

p. 35.

46 See

pp. 27-8.

47 See

p. 35.

48 See

p p. 53-4.

49 See

p. 35.

60

Tha t is to say, a kind of one-to-one correspondence exists

between the two by reason of certain essential likenesses or

similarities.

61 See

p. 35.

62

Cf. Aristotle, Physica,

vm ,

cap. i

(251", 8-25211,

4).

63

See p. 36.

64

Magnitude is considered as being finite by nature . Cf. the first

argument in the contra, p. 36.

Sect ion IV

1

For

Scotus s

reply to these argum ents, see pp. o,2ff.

2

Cf. Aristotle,

Topica,

11, cap. x

(1146,

33).

8

Cf. Pseudo-D ionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. v (M igne,

P.G.,

in ,

819) ; St Bonaventure, De mysterio Trinitatis, q. i, art. i



NOTES I01

(Quaracchi, vol. v, 47°) ; Aristotle, Metaphysial,

11

cap. i

(993*. 24-3i)-

* Cf. Aristotle, Topica,

m,

cap. 1

(117",

16); St Augustine,

De

libero arbitrio,

in,

cap. ix, xi (Migne, P.L., xxxn,

1283, 1288).

0 This argument and its accompanying refutat ion have been

added later by Scotus as some manuscripts indicate.

6 William of

Ware,

Sent. 1 dist. ii. q. ii (Muscat ed. in Antonianum,

11 (1927), 344-350). For Scotus's reply, see pp. o,if.

7 Opus oxoniense, prol. q. iii, n.

12.

8 The "natural

w i l l "

and "natural love" according to Scotus are

not elicited acts or operations at al l. They are merely the

ontological relation of perfectibility that exists between what

ever can be perfected and that which perfects it (cf. section i n

note

22).

In this

sense,

everything may be said to love itself, i.e. its

own perfection. Only i f the th ing is a part can it be said to love

the whole more than itself since the whole is the perfection of

the part. Similar ly, God as the ult imate perfection of rat ional

creatures is loved naturally more than the creature itself.

8

To use as a means something that should be loved as an end

is a perversion of love.

10 Beatitude in the technical sense implies that the object exhausts

the potentialities of the rational being so that the latter is

perfectly satisfied and is at rest in the possession of this object.

Such an object is necessary to the happiness of this being and

therefore it could not be destroyed without destroying the

happiness.

11

Cf. the preceding question, pp. 38 ff.

12 St Bonaventure, Sent. 1 dist. ii , art. i, q. i ad iv ; Wi ll iam

of Ware, Sent. 1 dist. ii, q. i.

13

See p. 84.

14 See pp. 25-6, the third statement.

16 See p. 83.

16

See p. 83.



182

DUNS SCOTUS

17 See p. 83.

18

Aristotle, De

caelo,

1, cap. i i

(269", 19-20).

19 See p. 83.

20 St Bonaventure, Sent.

1,

dist. ii, a. i, q. 1 ad i i .

Section V

1 For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 131, 122 ff.

2

Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. i, q. ii.

3 Aristotle, Metaphysica,

in ,

cap. iv (999a). See Henry's inter

pretation of this passage, Summa, ar t. i, q . i i .

4

Scotus summarises the teaching of Henry in Summa, art. i , q . i i i .

G

Note added by Scotus, according to the scribe of the Assisi

manuscript.

6

Scotus, follow ing St Augustine, uses the term Academician

and sceptic as synonyms. The Academicians or Academics

were the adherents of Plato, so called because Plato used to

deliver his discourse in the Academy at Athens. The Academy

continued after Plato's death and was characterised at different

periods of its existence by different philosophical trends.

Scepticism, it seems, was introduced by Arcesilas, the founder

of the M idd le Academy, and later modified by Carneades, who

dom inated the T h ird Academy. Cf. St Augustine, Contra

Academicos.

' See p. 100.

8 A marginal note in the Assisi manuscript indicates that the

subsequent passage is not found in Scotus's own copy.

9 Cf. note 25 o f sect. in . Here the objector argues : By life or being

alive Augustine means nothing more than that the body has

a life principle, viz. the

soul,

which is its primary or first

actualisation. He does not mean that the soul is conscious,

that is, that we are in second act.

10 Note added by Scotus.



NOTES 183

11 Additional note by Scotus.

12 Cf. Aristotle's de fin iti on of the perfect syllogism, whi ch is a

syllogism of the first fi gur e. Analytica priora, 1 cap. ii (24s, 22 ff.),

cap. iv (266, 29 ff.).

13 Cf. note 9 of sect. 1 .

14 Opus

oxoniense,

p ro l . q. i i i , n.

13

; 1 dist.

v i i i ,

q. v, n. 24.


16 An additional note of Scotus.

17 See pp. 100 f.


19

Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, iv, qq. vii,

v i i i ,

xxi i i ; v, q. iv.

20 See

pp .

101

f.

21 Th e acts of " int el l ige nc e" as distinguished fro m "re as on ing "

are o f tw o kinds :

(a)

simple apprehension or intelligence

whereby the mind grasps the meaning of something without

affirming or denying anything of i t, and (b) the act of "com

posit ion and di vi si on ", that is, the act of jud gm en t, i n w hi ch

the mind affirms or denies some predicate of the subject of the

proposit ion.

22 The active intellect, according to Scotus, is not really distinct

fr om the soul. He nce, it is a mo re perfect effect of G od th an

would be the impression or accidental effect produced in the

soul by God, the Uncreated Light.

23

Th is or some sim ila r q ua li fi ca ti on m ust be add ed, because

according to Scotus, the will or faculty of love is more noble

than either the active or possible intellect.

24 The marginal note in the Assisi manuscript, non in libra Scoti,

indicates that the passage in the Latin text within parentheses is

not found in Scotus's own copy.

25

Cf. p. 97 . The elaborate att em pt to "save face " for St

Augustine in this fifth article not only indicates the esteem in

(2,S22) 24



184

DUNS SCOTUS

which Scotus held the saint but it also illustrates the cardinal

princ iple he uses in inte rpre tating other thinkers. " I wish to

give the most reasonable interpretation to their words that I

possibly can" (Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. v i i i , q. v, n. 8 ). The

intricate and subtle explanation that follows is typical of the

reasoning that earned Scotus the ti tle Doctor subtilis.

26 According to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript, the subsequent

section in parentheses in the Latin text is missing in

Scotus s

own copy.

27 Scotus tells us (Opus oxoniense, I, dist. x l i i i , q. unica) that

prior to their actual existence, God knows all possible creatures

whether they shall ever be given existence or not. Absolutely

speaking,

these creatures may consequently be said to "have

an intelligibility 1 or esse intelligibile ; this, however, is dependent

upon the divine intellect so that one can say that God does

not know these things because they are intelligible, but rather

they are inte lligible because G od knows them . For in knowing

the possible, God gives it a kind of "existence", viz. that

characteristic o f the content or object of thought. Even

though the human intellect i n the present life has no immediate

intu itive knowledge o f

G od,

of the divine intellect or its thought

content, it still remains true that the ultimate reason why the

notions derived from created objects are intelligible is because

G od first gave them inte lligib ility i n knowing them. This

intelligibility or meaning can be called the "eternal light" in

a qua lified sense. And al l propositions that are evident fro m

the meaning of the terms can be said to be seen in the eternal

light.

28 Only something that exists in the proper sense of the word

can be an efficient cause. Consequently, we cannot ascribe

any such causality to something that exists on ly in an improper

sense as the content or object of thought. Nevertheless, i t is the

intelligibility of the object that is said to "move" the intellect

to know the thing in question. Scotus argues that we should

rather ascribe that causality which meaning has in regard to

our intellect to the divine mind or intellect which gave to all

created things their meaning or intelligibility.



NOTES 185

29 The priority referred to here is one of nature, not of time.

Cf. note 43 of sect. in.

30

Such knowledge implies a direct vision of God and is not

possessed by man in this life.

31 The triangle is considered the first figure in plane geometry.

Thus it is symbolic of the Triune God who is first in ihe

hierarchy of beings.

32

See pp.

9 9-100.

33

According to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript, Scotus's

personal copy is left incomplete at this poin t. What follows is

supplied from the Vives edition, v o l . ix, 207.

34 Seep.

128.

35

Literally, "It is in respect to every being whatsoever".

86 That is, principles evident from their terms.

Section V I

1 For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 158 ff.

2 The matter of the heavenly spheres was considered to be incor

rup tible in con tradistinction to the corruptible terrestrial matter

of the four elements.

3

Subjective parts are contrasted w ith essential parts. The

latter refer to the order of comprehension or intension ; sub

jective parts refer to the order of extension or class inclusion.

Here the meaning is that the intellective or rational soul is a

member or part of what Aristotle designates by the general

term of the soul or life principle of man.

1 Cf., for example, St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. Ixxv, art. i i .

5

St Thomas maintains that the intellect wh ich is perfected by

the act of knowledge pertains to the category of passive

potencies. This is the so-called intellectus possibilis. Cf. Summa

theologica, 1, q. lxxxv, art. i i . i i i ; in , q . ix, a rt. ii i ; Contra

gentiles,

11,

cap. lxxxv,

xcvi,

xcviii . G odfrey of Fontaines goes



186 DUNS SCOTUS

even further in denying all activity to the possible intellect.

Cf. Quodlibet,

v i ,

q. vi i ;

vm ,

q. ii ; ix , q. xix ; x i i i , q.v.

Cf. also Giles of Rome, Quodlibet, m, q . x i i , xi i i .

6 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, v, q. xiv.

7 Aristotle, De anima, n, cap. ii (424", 30 ff.) ; see also 111, cap. i

(425", 19).

8

Accord ing to A risto tle, the sensory power consists i n "th e

equipoise of contrary qualities in the organ".

(Cf.

De anima,

11,

cap. xii ,

424s,

30 s.)

8 See pp. 138 f., number 2.

10 See pp. 141 ff.

11 Cf. Richard of Middleton, Sent., 11, dist. xix. art. i, q. 1.

12 Cf. for example, Ethica Nicomachea, I, cap. ii (1094", 20-21; ;

also Averroes, Metaphysica, 11, com. 1.

13 Cf. St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. Ixxv, art. vi.

14 According to Aristotle and the scholastics, a demonstrative

proof in the technical sense of the term must have premises

that are both necessary and evident propositions. Premises

known by faith in revelation are not evident and hence are

not technically capable of producing a demonstration. Such

premises, though never evident, may be either necessary or

contingent propositions. For instance, "G od is ju s t" would

be considered a necessary proposition inasmuch as it is based

on the immutable nature of

God

and could never be otherwise.

On the contrary, "Jesus Christ is the redeemer of mankind"

would be considered a contingent proposition because the

whole order of redemption like creation depends on the free

decrees of G od. Now Scotus calls proofs based on necessary

though not evident propositions "necessary reasons". The

arguments for immortality, however, are based on contingent

propositions and hence fail to meet the technical requirements

for an Aristotelian demonstration on two counts.

16 "Separate agent", that is, a pure spirit or Intelligence. Such

celestial beings (the angels of the scholastics) were called



NOTES 187

"separate substances" inasmuch as they subsisted apart from

matter and were not destined by nature to inform or dwell in

a corporeal body like the spiritual soul of man.

16 "N atu ra l agent" is understood here as one which causes

generation and co rrup tion.

17 See pp. 158 ff.

18 Li tera lly, "existence through itse lf". Technically, however,

per se existence or subsistence is used by the scholastics to

designate that mode of being characteristic of substance or

substantial union in contradistinction to per accidens existence

characteristic of accidents or incidental aggregates. Scotus's

reply to the argument plays upon the ambiguity of the term

per se existence as applied to a composite substance such as

man.

Since the component elements of man (body and soul)

are not accidents but substances, albeit incomplete as to

function at least, each could be said to possess per se existence.

But the same is true of any materia l or perishable form . On

the other hand, since man as a whole is not an accidental

aggregate but a composite substance, the union of soul and

body represent a per se mode of existence, but one which the

soul possesses only as long as it is united to the body.

19

Cf. St Bonaventure, Sent.

11,

dist. ii, pars prima, art. i, q. iii ;

St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q . 1, art. ii ad ii i.

20 Confer Henry of G hent, Quodlibet, 11, q. i ii ; St Thomas,

Contra gentiles, TV, cap. lx xix .

81 For Scotus, as for Aristotle and the scholastics generally, a

probable or dialectical proof does not have the same connota

tion as it has for the neo-scholastic. A val id and convincing

proo f may st ill lack the technical requirements of an Aristotelian

"demonstration" as defined by the Stagirite in the Analytica

posterioia, 1, cap. ii

(716, 18-25) or by

Scotus in Opus oxoniense,

prol. qq. i i i-iv lat., n. 26 (Vives, vol. vni , 1836) ; in . dist.

xxiv, q. unica, n.

13,

(xv,

44 )

; Reportata parisiensia,

prol.

q. i, n. 4

(xxi i ,

yb) ; m, dist. xxiv, q. unica, n. 16 (xxm, 454).

If such a probable proof is persuasive, it may even give



22

18b

DUNS SCOTUS

subjective or m ora l certitude in the

sense

that a ll prudent fear of

error is excluded, and yet it will not produce strictly demon

strative knowledge or scientia.

See pp. 145 ff.

23 Though Scotus claims that na tural reason can demonstrate the

existence, un icity and in fin ite perfection of

G od,

he regards the

Christian concept of a just and m erciful G od as a matter of

faith.

Cf. De Prima Principio, cap. iv (ed. Roche p.

146).

24 See p. 134.

25 According to Scotus's theory of natural desire, to admit that

human nature is capable of immortality is to admit that man

has a na tural desire for i t ; for a na tura l desire is not a conscious

act or elicited volition but is rather the ontological relation

that arises between the perfectible and its perfection. Only

in a metaphorical sense can this relation be called "desire"

Cf.

Reportata

parisiensia,

iv ,

dist. xlix, q. ix, nn. 3-5

;

see also

note 22 of sect. h i .

26 N amely, in the beatific face-to-face vision of G od.

27 Cf. the question on man's natu ra l knowledge o f

G od,

especially

the fifth statement, p. 28.

28 Ethica Nicomachea, x, cap. v ii i (1178*, 35 ff.) .

29 Tha t is, a pure spirit or angel.

30 Cf. p. 136 for the complete text.

31 St Augustine, De Trinitate, xm , cap. ix (Migne, P.L.,

n n ,

1023).



I N D E X E S





I N D E X O F P R O P E R N A M E S

Adam Wodam xix

Albert of Metz x i

Albertus Magnus v

Alexander of Aphrodisias

171

Alexander I I I , K ing of Scotland

xiii

Alfarabi

171,

178

Alnwick, see William of Alnwick

Anselm

of Canterbury 24, 73,

76 .

Antonius Andreas xxi

Apostle (St Paul) 91, 92,

132,

136,

155. 158

Arcesilas 182

Aristotle (The Philosopher) 5, 6,

9, 11,

12, 14, 15,

30, 31, 36,

47, 48, 52, 55-7. 62-6, 78, 80,

gg,

100, 104, 107,

i n ,

112,

113, 116,

n g ,

122, 132, 137,

145-56, 159, 160, 166, i6g,

171. iTS-5,

177-9=

182,

183,

185-8

Augustine 32,

3g,

71, 88, 91, 97,

98, 100-06, 112,

113, 116,

122,

123, 126-9, 130, 131, 134, 136,

146, '57. 158, 171,

182,

183,

188

Averroes (The Commentator)

10, 30, 80,

134, 138, 156, 179,

186

Avicenna v,

9-11,

40, 56, 66,

155, '71, «76, 178, 179

Balic, C. xvii, xviii, xx

Benedict X, Pope xv

Berthold of St Denis xv

Bettoni,

E. xxii

Boehner, Ph. vi

Boethius 104

Bonaventure

174,

181,

182,

187

Boniface V I I I , Pope x, xv

Brockie, Marianus ix

Callebaut,

A. xii, xiii, xvi

Campbell,

B.

J .

xxii

Carneades 182

Copleston,

F. C. vi, xx iiCratylus 116

Dalderby,

rce

John Dalderby

Damascene

(St John) 17,

35, 99,

i37> 169

Day, S.

J .

xxii

D ionysius, the Pseudo - Areo -

pagite 136, 169

Duns, Elias

ix, xii, xiii

Duns, Ninian ix, xi

Duns of Berwickshire x i, xii

Duns of Duns xi

Duns of Grueldykes xii

Duns of Maxton-on-the-Tweed

Fernandez Garcia, M. xxii

Festus 136

Giles of Ligny x, x i, xv, xvi, xix

Giles of

Rome 179, 186

Gilson,

E. xxii

G lorieux, P. xvi

Godfrey of Fontaines 185

Gonsalvus of Spain x, xiii, xiv,

xxi

Grajewski,

M .

J. xxii,

xxiii

Gregory I, Pope

14,

32,

157

Harris, C. R. S. xx, xxii

Henry of Ghent 13, 17-19, 26,

32. 96, 99-I03. 106, 115, 118,

120,

122,

131, 170, 171, 174,

179,

182,

183, 186,

187



192

Heraclitus 103, 116

Hugh of Hartlepool ix

Jerome of Ascoli (Pope

Nicholas IV) xiii

Jesus Christ 60,

136,

157,

162,

186

John Damascene,

see

Damascene

John Dalderby ix

John of Cornwall xxi

Klibansky, R. vi

Little,

A. G . xix

Longpr6, E. x i, xv i, xv ii

Maimonides, see Moses Mai-

monides

Marsilius of Inghen xxi

Meier,

L. ix, xiii

Micklem, N. xx iii

Mohan, G . vi

Moses Maimonides (Rabbi

Moses) 84, 91

Mueller, M . xx

Nicholas of Lyra xx i

Oliver Sutton, Bishop of Lincoln

ix, xii

Paul,

Apostle,

see

Apostle

Pelster, F. xiv, xvi,

xvii,

xix

Pelzer, A. xvii

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

Peter Godin xix

Peter Lombard v, xiv

Philip IV , K ing of France x, xv

Philip of Bridlington xiv, xix

Plato

a

1, ioo, 147, 175,

182

Plotinus 178

Porphyry

165

Richard of Middleton

186

Richard of

St

Victor 90

Roche, E. xx, xx i,

176, 188

Saint-Maurice, B. xxi ii

Schaefer, O. xxii

Sharp, D . E. vi, xx iii

Shircel, C. L. xx iii

Siger of Brabant v

Sutton,

see Oliver Sutton

Sutton, see

Thomas Sutton

Thomas Aquinas v, 170, 171,

174. 177.

79, 185,

186,

187

Thomas of Erfurt xxi

Thomas Sutton x iv

Tweedy, W. ix

Vier,

P. C. xxiii

Vitalis du Four xxi

Wadding,

L.

xviii,

xix, xx, xxi

William, G uardian x

William of Alnwick xxi

William of Ware 181

Wolter, A. B. xx iii



I N D E X O F S UB JE CT S

Abstract knowledge, defined 179

Abstraction 30

Academicians 103 ff, 182

Academy of Plato

182

Act, f irs t and second 57,

177

Action,

immanent

and

transient

177

Active intellect 22, 30,

121

f,

— defined 171

Activum,

defined 177

Additiones

magnae

xviii

After-images

112

Agent intellect, see Active intel

lect

Analogy, see Being

Angel 56,

171,

186 f

— destructible 154

— finite 74 f

Appetite, natural

176

Athenians 136

Attribute, defined 167

— of being 167 f

Authority, interpretation of 184

Awake, certitude of being

111

ngf

Babylonians

149

Beatific vision

173,

188

Being, analogous concept of 17 f,

21 f, 171

— as common to God and

creatures

170

f

—

as knowledge

of

God 18, 170

—

as

noun and participle

166

—

as

possible

176

— coextensive attributes of 3,

167

Being, concept of 170

— correlative attributes of 9

Being,

deduction of attributes of

8f

— disjunctive attributes 3, 167

— first object of intellect 4

— not univocal to all predi

cates

4

— primacy of common predi

cation of 4, 167 f

— primary transcendental 2 ff

— properties of 167

— ultimate differences of 4,

166

f

— univocity of

4

f, 20 ff

— virtual primacy of 4, 167 f

Body, relation to soul 149 ff,

•53

«"

Categories, supreme genera 3,

166

f

Cause (s) 10

— accidentally ordered 40 f

— ascending and descending

order

174

f

— chance

as

48 f,

109

— circularity in 39

— contingent and necessary 54

— efficient 37 f, 49

— equivocal 175

— essentially ordered 40 ff

— exemplar 37 f

— final 47 f, 49

— incidental 40

— infinite regress in 39,

41

ff

— nature and w ill as 174

— univocal 175 f

Certitude 97 ff

— contingent propositions and

in

Certitude, disposed faculty

needed for

118,

120



i94

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Certitude, doubt and 20

— experimental knowledge

and 109 ff

— firs t principles and 104 f,

106 ff

— logical relations and 108

— moral 188

— mutability of object and

n6f

—• of being awake 111, 119 f

— of personal actions 105,

i n

ff

— possibility of 96 ff

— presupposes truth

171

— sense knowledge and

105,

i i4f f

Change, implies contingent crea

tion 152

— requires something perma

nent 43

Colour, theory of 175

Common good 153

Concepts, certainty and doubt

implies distinct 20

— different versus diverse

166

— irreducibly simple

166

— real 166

Conjunction, of

planets

64

Contingent propositions, certi

tude of 111

— not inferred from necessary

ones 9, 104

Contingency, defined 55

— implies creation 152

— implies free wil l 54,

173

— mutability and

152

— not implied by necessity g,

104

— primary truth of fact 9

Contemplation of God 14, 32

Contradiction inconceivable 73

Creation,

defined 179

— demonstrable 67, 179

— of soul 150 ff

— temporal 175

De

anima,

Quaestiones xx

De Prima Principio, Tractatus xx f

Death,

obligation to accept 153

Demonstration, a priori and a

posteriori 169

— of fact and reasoned fact 169

— quia and propter quid 169

— requires necessary premises

39

— scholastic notion of

186

Dialectical proof 187

Differentiae ultimae 166 f

Disputatio in aula xv f

Divine intellect, not intuited

172

f,

184

— source of all intelligibility

125 f, 184

Dreams 118 ff

Emanation theory 178

End, see Finis

Ens rationis 171

Esse

intelligibile

184

Essence, limited by existence

74

f

Essential inclusion

172

Eternal, an existential attribute

123

— divine ideas in a qualified

sense are

123

Eternal rules, truth seen in

122

ff

Eucharist 6,

168

Evaluation, instinctive power of

19,

29

Evidence,

see

Certitude

Evil, compatible with God 77

Exemplar, created and uncreated

100

— knowledge requires un

created

102

— truth as conformity to 120

Existence, limitation of essence

— not known without essence

16

— per accidens

and jfwr se

187

Experience, and first principles

111

Factivum 177

Fallacy of asserting consequent

3i» 173



INDEX OF SUBJECTS

95

False, unknowable 20,

171

Finality, primacy of 47 f

Finis,

agent acts for sake of 53

— God as ultimate 47 f

First intention 171

First principles, certainty of

106 ff, 112

Forma corporeitatis

167

Formalitatibus, Quaestio

de

xx

Fortune, an incidental cause

48

Free wi l l , a condition for change

80 f

— opposed to nature 174

God,

absolute perfections of 52 ff

— analogical knowledge of

17

ff

— analysis of concept of

14

ff

—

Anselmian

argument for 73

— as being 170

— as efficient cause 39 ff

— as final cause 47 f

— as most perfect 24 ff, 48 f,

93

f

— as uncreated light , see

Illumination

— being universally predicated

of

5,

19 ff

— demonstration of existence

of 36

ff

— goal of metaphysics 12

— indemonstrable attributes of

89 ff,

178,

188

— infinite power of 66ff,

178

— infinity of

62

ff

— intellect of 52

— knowledge identical with

essence of 58 f

— knows creatures perfectly

60

f

— knows possibles

184

— man's knowledge of 15 ff

— most perfect concept of 26 f,

77

— negative knowledge of 15,

169 f

God, not intuited 25 f,

3 1

172 f,

184

God, not self-evident 11

— not subject of metaphysics

10

ff

— omnipotence of

178

— omniscient 60 f

— pre-eminence of 48 f

— proper concepts of 25 ff

•— possibles distinctly known

by 60 f

— quidditative concept of

19

— relative perfections of 37 ff

— simplicity of 19

— subject of transcendental

predicates 2 f

— triple primacy of 38 ff

— unicity of 81 ff

— univocal knowledge of 5,

19 ff

— virtually all things 94

— voluntary object of know

ledge 26, 172 f

— will of 25, 52 ff

— wisdom of 25

Haecceitas

166

Happiness, end of man 135,

160 ff

— natural desire for 160

Illumination, divine 97 ff, 100 ff,

120

ff,

129

f,

171

— of agent intellect

171

Illusion

112,

119

Immateriality, defined 141

Imperfection, implies perfection

93 ,. .

In quid and in quale predication

165 f

Inclusion,

essential 172

Individual difference 166

Induction, principle of 109

f,

114

Infinity, defined 72

— intensive and extensive

178

— intrinsic mode of being 27,

75 •

— most proper notion 01 Ijoa

27 f, 171

— numerical

3 1

64, 68 f

— of causes 39 ff



ig6

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Infinity, potential 31

— unknowable 14

Intellect, abstractive power of 30

— agent, see Active intellect"

— as passive potency 185

— formally distinct from soul

171

— motivating factor of 22

— of man desires infin ite being

70 f

— possible or passive 171

— voluntary and natural

objects of

172

f

Intellectual knowledge, tran

scends all senses

139

ff

Intellectus agens, see Active

intel

lect

Intellectus possibilis 185

Intelligence, kinds of 183

Intelligences,

see

Angel, Separate

Substances

— emanation from first cause

178

— soul created by 150 f

Intelligible species 28,

118,

177

Intelligibles, primary 4

Intention, first and second 166,

J7 ' .

Interpretation of authority, prin

ciple of

184

Intuit ion,

denned 179

— of G od 25 f,

3 1

172 f, 184

— only o f what is or can he 74

Judgment, defined 112

Knowledge, certitude of, see

Certitude

— contingency of existential

111

— essential and existential 16

— incompatible with falsity 20,

'71

— possibility of 96 ff

— scientific 109 ff, 171

— strict (scieniia) 171

Law of disjunction 8

Ledum completa xvi, xviii

Ledum oxoniensis xviii

Light, uncreated, see Illumina

tion

Locus a minori 173

Logica Scoti xix

Logical writings of Scotus xx f

Love,

natural

176,

181

Man, end of lower creation

135

— highest happiness of 160 ff

Matter, incorruptible 185

Melaphysicam, Quaestiones in xx

Metaphysics, 1 ff

— as theology 15

— G od, the goal of 9 ff

— science of causes 12

— science of transcendentals 2

— subject of 9 ff

Moon,

intelligence of 171

Movement, infinite 36

Natural agent 187

Natural desire

152,

158

ff

— not in vain 30,

146

— theory of

188

Natural philosophy, subject of

1

o

— relation to metaphysics

10

Nature, absolute and in present

state 16

— opposed to will 174

Necessary reasons 186

Negation, knowledge of 15 f

New Year, Gallican custom x

Number, infinite 3 1 64, 68 f

— species like 51

Omnipotence 65 ff, 178 f

One,attribute of being 3

Opus oxoniense xvii

Opus parisiense

xv ii

Order, ascending and descending

174

f

Ordinatio xvii ff, xx

Parts, subjective and essential

185

Passiones 167

Per accidens and per se causes 40

Per se predication 167 f



INDEX OF SUBJECTS

197

Perfection, pure and mixed 24,

93

f» 172

Permanent, condition for change

43.

Physics, see Natural philosophy

Possibles, have esse intelligibile

184

Posterior,

prior not virtually in

cluded in 23

Potency, contradictory 177

Potential, known

through

act

31

Pre-eminence, primacy of

48

f

Predication in quid and in quale

165 f

Predication per

se 167

f

Prima lectura xviii

Primacy, of common predication

167

— of efficient causality 39 f f

— of virtuality 167 f

Principles, certitude of 106 f f

Properties {propria), defined

167

Proprium (passio)

167

Pure spirit, see Separate sub

stances

Quando, as category 3

Quantity, infinite 77 f

Quiddity

165

Quodlibet xvi, xxii

Ratio

Anselmi

73

— intelligendi 69,

177

Rationes aeternae ('eternal reasons

or rules) 97 ff, 122 ff

Relation, unknown unless both

terms known

121

Reportatio xvii f

—

examinata

xiv, xix

— magna xix

—•

parisiensis xvii, xix

Resurrection 132 ff, 137

Sceptic, see Academician

Scepticism

103

ff

Science (scientia), defined

171

— presupposes existence of sub

ject

10

Scotistic Commission xxi

Self-evident (per se notum), see

Principles

Senses, error of

1 0 1

105, 109,

114

f

Sensibles, not in continual flux

i i 5 f

Sentences, Commentary on xiv,

xvi ff

Separate substances

186

f

— intelligible 30 f

Simple intellect 7,

168

f

— intelligence

1 2 1 168

f

Simpliciter simplex 166

Singularity 32 f, 91

Soul 133 ff

— Averroistic theory of 138,

156

— defined

137

— has per se existence 153 f

— immortality of

145

f f

— origin of 150 f

— specific form of man 137 ff

— spirituality of

133

f f

Specific difference

167

Spirits, see Separate substances

Subject, prior to attributes 168

Subjective parts 185

Substance, not known directly 5 f

Syllogism, the perfect

183

Theology, subject of

169

Theoremata xxi

Transcendentals 2 ff

— coextensive attributes 3

— defined 3

— disjunctive attributes 3

Triangle, symbol of Trini ty

185

Trinity 23, 185

Tru e, attribute of being 3

Truth, as conformity to exemplar

99

ff

— certain and unadulterated

120

— knowledge of 96 ff

— senses an

occasion,

not cause

of 108 f

Ultimate differences (differentiae

ultimae) 166 f



i g8

Unicity of God 82 ff

Univocal concept, defined

20

Univocity

of

being, see

Being

Vesperies xiv, xvi

Virtual inclusion 172

Virtual primacy, of being 167 f

Vis

aestimativa 19,29

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Volition

144

f

Will ,

as nature

181

— basis of contingency 54 f

— infinite good as object of

71

— more noble than intellect

183

Wisdom, principle of order 53

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Documents

Duns Scotus, John - Philosophical Writings