Dissemination of Combat Information 28 December 1951

8/3/2019 Dissemination of Combat Information 28 December 1951

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=.. ! i ~ I } S S I A E D C9253O F F 1 C E ~ CHrEF OF ~ . . R l t y FIELD FORCESFort Lionroe, Virginia

,;"TTNG-64 350.05/34(roCI)(C)(28 Dec .51) 28 J)ccember 19.51SUBJECT: ~ n a t t o O i n ; c o > r ' C C i & ; r A m l m m ~ ~ F - _ ~ ___

ARMY WAR COLLEGEPERIODICALS SECTION J A ~ I ' : i ..... l.::i::fTO: See di s t r i utionFEB 28 1952, COPY .... I.......... ARMY WAR COLLEGE

1 . In accordance ,-r! th SR 525-8.5-5, Processing of Combat Information, tho attached E X T R : ~ C T S are fo:n7arded to Departr.:ent of the ;.m.y,; ~ y rield Forces a ~ d the S e r v ~ c e Schools for evaluation and necessar,yaction. I t may be appropriate, in certain cases, for these agenciesto take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may bedesirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on aparticular subject before in i t ia t ing action; and often, the extracteditem serves to reaffirm ou r doctrines and techniques.{"--- . . . .__ ._..-..... . ~

2. Copies of Dissemination of Combat Information are forwarded,"lei. th DepartOent of the .",:rr;ry approval, to information addressees for usea t the headquarters of the instal lat ion or activity concerned to keepthem informed concerning theatre p ~ b l f f i n s from front l ine through thelogist ical copmand.

3. The.se EXTR.:.CTS are derived fron reports TIhich arc classifiedSECRET. For the greater con,venience of the user, th is Office downgradeseach e x t r a e t e 9 ~ 1 . . t e m " tb_'thelo.west .cla,6sification conpatible I';ith security.No effort i s made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extractedremarks, so that none of the original intent i s los t .4. Generally, the EXTR._CTS ,mch pertain to training appear underthe, claSSification of R ~ T n : r C T E D . For COLlbat information of trainingvalue a t the Company-Batte.ry level , addressees are referred to ;.rrrryField Forces 'l'RiJNING BULLETINS, which are also published under th e

c l ~ s s i f i c a t i o n o f RESTRICTED.FOR THE CHIEF OF ;JUC{ FIELD FORCES:

. DECLASSIFIED BY ~ R i T Y OFg;:O .a2 :ON dij17'l/d!tw.1 i:' t B . ! , < < ~ , . . . . 1';. H. l ~ ! R O R N racS"",!'Om,eo .. II. , .. Lt Col, AGC209 thru n8' ;Asst .\djutant GeneralifDISTRI13U'flQN: l~ ~ v e r ) UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED . . '1' 111 ":: ,yeee :2DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No

1- 34- 67- 2122- 4142- 5152- 6162- 7172- 7677- 8687- 9697-9899-108lO9-118119-120

121122123124-134135-1361 3 7 ~ 1 4 1 142143144

145146147148149150151152153154-156157-158159-160161-16216)-164165-166167-168

169170171172173

Action AddresseesDeartment of the Army

AOOFS, G-l, Pers AOOFS, G-2, Intel ACOFS, G-3, Opn ACOFS, a-4, Log CCMLO COFENGRS 00FORD COFPSYWAR CSlGO COFT h1:S QHG sa TAGOffieet Chief of A ~ F i e l d ForcesDepu If Chief of S rG1G2G3(4)G4RD. Chemical Engineer Medical Ordnance Qu,arte:rmaster Signal Transportation Adjutant General. Budget & Fiscal Chaplain Information Provost Marshal CommandantsAr.my 'a r CollegeCommand & General Staff CollegeThe Armored SchoolThe Artiller,? SchoolThe Infantry SchoolArmy General SchoolAsst Comdt, The Arty School, : J J t G ~ BrPresidentsl.FF Board No 1AFF Board No 2AFF Board No 3AFF Board No 4CO, AFF ~ ' ~ r c t i c Test Branch UNCLASSIFIED

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DISTRIBUTION (oont)Copy No

174-183184-193194-203204-213214-223224-233234-243244-247248-267268269-278279-280281-28228,3-284285-286287-288289...290291-292293...294295-296297-298299-300

Information ;...ddre ssee sEUCOM TRUST USFA FEOOMU S ; & ~ L U S ; ; . R P ~ l . C US..mC.iJUBOffice, Chief of A:mf Field ForcesInspector Secretar1atG3(64)::..G RecordsExtra CopiesCommanding General!3Firs t 1-.rrrrySecond :.rrrryThird ~ ' . . r r r r y Fourth ArmyFifth i..rmySixth :l.rrrrySupt, U S I 1 ~ , :'Vest Point, NYT.:.C, Langley AFB, VaChief, ..i.rrrry :...dvisory Gp, : l ir Comd & Staf f Sch, .:"ir Univ,Max\'mll 11-FB, .


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e.a.3iSt2 .UNCLASSIFIED C 925')- , ~ ) OFFICEr. CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES

For t Monroe p Virginia

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATIONS O U R C E ~

DATE;Command Report - 25th In! DivMarch 1951 Source No. 209

TACTICAL DECEPTIONTo further this secrecy and deception, a cover plan was putinto effect five (5) d a y ~ in advance of the actual crossing. Thisplan provided for the two (2) front line Regiments holding the mainline to make a t a n k - i ~ f a n t r 1 reconnaissance each morning to the

river crossing sites and nth-ocr sites along'the river. This wascarried out constantly each and at f irs t drew considerablefire from the enemy. As i t _$ continued each day, the enemybecame accustomed to these "Morning patrols" and ceased fire onthem. Thus, when the morning for the assault crossing arrived,the same movement was initiated toward the river bank. But thistime the assault boats were brought forward hitched to tanks.I t is believed that this COVGr plan contributed materially to thesurprise achieved during ' ~ h e crossing. (CONFIDENTIAL)

* i ~ * * * * * - r . - * * INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS

In compliance 'with an Eighth Amy T'l.JX, a survey on "Inadequacyof the Carbine and Pistol, caliber 45, in Combat" was conductedvdthin three (3) Infantry Regiments and Tank Battalion. Thefollowing comments were submitted:1. Carbine

a. One company indicated that the carbine was too lightand was c o n s i d ~ r e d inadequate, as.i t does not have sufficientstopping. power.b. All units agreed that the weapon ~ ~ s unsatisfactorydue to malfunction when moving parts became dirty and when used incold weather.c. One regiment commented that th e carbine was inaccuratewhen fired at ranges CJVer two hundred (200) .yards, and that

INC(Over)

sum UNCLASSIFIED..... dC="; ae QUWFori'm"No 73 .... .. r 8 ~ G G c ~ ~ i5 OC11:51) .


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190'" II' . itil smur_UNCLASSIFIED - :5ECRET ...

a m m u n : i ~ o n supply creates a problem. because the type of magazineused i s not available for replacement as are clips and bandoliersfor the ~ t h e r weapons.2. ,. P:Lstol, caliber 4 5 ~

a . One regiment indicated the pistol to be adequatefor the purpose for which it was intended, as a defensive weaponfor close-in fighting.b. Two (2 ) regiments indicated that the pistol 'Vras tooheavy and too complicated for field maintenance. Oue of thesetwo (2) regiments recommended that the carbine and pistol bereplaced with a l ight sub-machine gun. (RESTRIC'I':W) ,

SOURCE: Command Report - 23d Inf RegtMay 1951 Source No. 210ATE:INFANTRY }fATERIEL lDSSES

Operations during the "Battle of th e SOYANG" presented atremendous supply problem. Vehicles used in supply transportwere kept mobile-loaded 'within th e battalion perimeters. Thetact ical situation resulted in a large scale enemy road blockbeing established to the rear of two (2) b a t t a l i o n ~ ivhich deniedth e use of the MSR as an avenue of wi thdravra1.This resulted incomplete loss of seventy two (72) quarter ton, sixteen (16)three-quarter ton and fourteen' (14) tvro and a half ton vehicleswith numerous quarter ahd.' one to n t rai lers . These vehiclescarried the organic loads, kitchens, P&A equipment, communicationsequipment, battalion ammunition s u p p l ~ etc, to include tyro (2)full platoons of 4.2 mortars. This costly operation clearlyindicates the necessity for logist ical operation from a regimentaltrains area established ....lithin reasonable supply radius in roarof regimental soctor. (COnFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED OCAFF Form N o ~ . . ' 7 3 "!tec:r: PI hOi ".i1l r tV".(Revised 15 Oct . ) 7 ~ E "


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UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE:

DAT.8:

Connnand Report - Hq 8th US Army Korea (EUSAK)Sec I I : Supporting DocumentsBook 8: ArtilleryMay 1951 Source No. 211

ARTILLERY Y.ATERIEL LOSSESThe combat losses of art i l lc17 pieces duo to dircct enemyaction have reached a to tal of 408 for a ll calibers. As hashappened in previous a t t ~ c k s , the enemy inf i l t ra ted to the roarof the art i l lery positions and pIeced a fire block on each sideof the road, making it impossible for tho art i l lery to move i t svehicles and weapons through the road. The loss by US Artillery

units has been 212 weapons and by Korean Army units 196 weapons.(C'ONFIDENTIAL)**********

HIGH ANGLE FIREThe percentages of high-angle missions of the various typeunits are q.s follows:1 . D:i.vision Artil lery

1st Marino Division105-mm 14.5%1.(-115S-mm 1 .4,:0

7th Div ArtylOS-nun 4 . 0 ; ~ lSS-mm 2.0;s

2d Div ArtylOS-mmISS-rom

1st Cav Div Artylo5-rom155-mm

UNCLASSIFIED 3 .1.1111 F iii! Db J OCAFF Form No 73 SEt"ZfIRevised 15 Oct 51)


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sfIMi,,: ; tt3' om: 2_ t ~ W f p ..UNCLASSIFIED

24th Di v Arty1% of all missions to 31 Dec 50. 8% of all missions from 1 Jan 51 to 28 Apr 51.

25th Div Arty3 ; ~ of all missions.

3d Div Arty5% of a l l missions

2. Non-Divisional Units17th FA Bn (8" H TD) 0%955th FA Bn (155 H TD) 0%936th FA Bn (lS5 H TD) 0%96th FA Bn(155 H TD) 10%196th FA Bn (155 H TD) 0%

3. All SP units 0%OOMMENT: Except for 24th "Div Arty, source does not giveperiod from vmich above percentages are taken. {RESTRICTED):

**********

The M-37 is extremely difficult to keep operational andthere are insufficient replacement parts on hand. Further, i ti s not the proper equipment for a direct support battalion ofan infantry division. The troop basis proposod by EUSAK toCINCFE recommends reorganizing the 58th FA Bn into a105-mmHovdtzer Battalion (towed). (CONFIDENTIAL)

**********TRACK LAYING VEHICLES

1. Recommend that twelve (12) 2t ton trucks be authorizedin lieu of t',-mlve (12) M44 vehicles uti l i ty , armored, for eachself. propelled 105-mm and l55-nun unit. Conditions under w'hichSP battalions operate in Korea make ~ h e 2t ton truck a bettervehicle for carrying ammunition. .An importC'.nt factor is thegreat distance to ASP's.

bCAFF Form Nc '}(Revised 15 Oct :>1)
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UNCLASSIFIED' - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - -

" .. \, , r',2. Recommend t b a ~ tbe . 1st !FA Observation.. ;Battalipn be .'authorized eight (B)f'our (4) ton cargo trucks'm lieu of .

nineteen (19)-"M$ '?actors . ""The 1st FA Observation Battalion hasseyen (7) radar sets 'and s e v ~ n (7) generators. One 4 to n t:nMk. ..:.. ean--be-tt"3'ed ' i ~ . - 1 . ~ e U ' ,,f""'bwo ...(2-l,.M5.. - t r a ~ r s as"tn.,-gene r a ~ r " C a n ... - ... ..... be: placed on the truck and the radar sets .mch ar.e on tra;i1ersCan be tOl".rcd by the truck. The M5 tractor has proven unsatis",factpry, an? wheeled v e h i 4 e ~ have proyed more. suitable. overthe terrain' encountered 'in Korea.' " . ,

..\. , ... "",' "3. Recommend l55-mm gun battalions SP, be authorizedtwenty-four. (24) 2t top trucks and twenty-four (24) MlO trai lersin l ieu of thirteen (13) Me' tractors. There are no MB tractors . available. ; ~ e s e units are equWped.with M4 .tractors (authorized.substi tutEl for' MB tractors), w h 1 . : e ~ ;:1re unsatisfactory as " .

ammunition resupply vehicles primarily because they will not.. ~ a f t d u p - " W ' l ~ t h e - J . o n g hauls to -ASP's 'over the poor ' K o r e a n ~ " , . .,.: ."'''",- . rof-ds. ( C O N f . I ~ ~ T I A L ) ...,.. .. ------- - - - .. ~ ~ ~ ~ - . - . - - - - - - -

~ , ' . . . I '. eonimand Report .. -14th Engr -6 'Bn-'OURCE:DATE: April 1951

I.

~ - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - ~ - - - - ~ . OOMMUNICATIONS '." ; ~ . : ,

In adqiiion to the -lack of trained radio operators and . : " , .repaimen,the. communication sistem has . 1 ) e ~ n ; continua1:1.y hamP'ered'by the m o u n t ~ ' l i n o u s teITain and' th e t a c ~ i c a l cti.spositions of. . .' '.th e companies far beyond the capabilities. of'the presontlyauthorized SCR 694.. I t i s fe l t that ih K o r e a ~ the SCR 694should be repiaeed'''by-::t;;he SCR 193 for the Engineer Combat Troops.(OONFIDENTIAL) '.

OOURCE:~ , . : .: '". .. " . ." .......

DATE: 2 0 ~ c t o b e r . 1951 . S o * ~ : ~ ~ } r ~ ~ . . ? 1 3: ,'" ... . 1"

..

A fu l ly c o y ~ r ~ ' armored persohhel cab-i.er i s ne:eded that"can go anywhere" ';dth tanks. The laCk of ' o'V'Grhead protection onI:JNCLASSIFIED 5

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. . . . ."' . l ivP' , , ; ' " ' l 4 I I i , : " " " " ' ' ' ' * ' ' ' ~ ~UNCLASSIFIED 6 '-the half tracks r e q u i r e d t h ~ TFCommander to leave his diSmounted elements behind sinde' theY. were unable to run the, g a u i i t l ' i , r ; ; r . c ; l i e m y ~ f i r e 1 n ~ e n / h 4 f t r ~ c k s . Also, the need forarmored infant-rv l.n K c n , ' A ; ! , . . ! m f , , ' O ~ J l a ~ ' n , c l s e q ~ ~ Y ~ n . s : t . . t : a t . e d . . , . ~ . .,." ....._ ,_"

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a A_In, S2 UtE' a "MZr ....UNCLASSIFIED

Propellent charges 'V19re the f irst to be off-loaded. The projectiles 'were at the bottom of the ship and couldn't be offloaded at the srune time. As a result the charges were sentforward to Taegu, to be held there until the projectiles wereoff-loaded. Then.oamplete trains were made up and fOT\varded.This caused a rail t i e ~ u p which lasted for approximately fifteen(15) days. (ltFSTRIOTED)

O O U R C ! ~ : Command Report - Hq 8th Us Arrrr:r Korea (EUSAK)DATE: March 1951 Source No. 216

ARTILLERY pEFEllSEArtillery battalions in Korea have p:raven to be a primarytarget for enemy troops. Present T / o ~ ' s do not authorizesufficient automatic ~ r e a p o n s for adequate defense; Therefore,

i t is recol11l1lended that twelve (12) machine guns and twelve (12)Browning Automatic Rifles be issued to each field artillerybattalion above T/OM!. allowances. (CONFIDENTIAL)**********

HIGH ANGLE FIRECarriages motor M7 and M37 are not capable of high anglefire. Maximum elevations that can be fired are '33 and 45 degreesrespectively.Because of the rugged terrain encountered in Korea, theseweapons, with their limited maximum elevations, introduceconsiderable dead space in the close support role. This aggravatesthe already difficult problem of finding sui table gun positions.I t is recommended that a program for the modification ofcarriages motor M7 and M37, so as to penni high angle fire, beinitiated at an early date and that this program be given a

high priority. (RESTRIC'lED). \. "

UNCLASSIFIED 7 Form No 73 -' '7(Revised 15 Oct 51) 2 7


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G56T '6i'PMscf l ,UNCLASSIFIED 8

SOURCE: Comnand Report - 555th FA BnJanuary 1951 Source No. 217ATE:

~ U T B n . t t A W A L TECHNIQUEIn this withdrawal, the ar t i l l e ry was f i rs t displaced totemporary positions from which they could support the l ta thdraml.A battalion of infantry was sent to secure these t e ~ p o r a r y posit ions. Under cover of artil ler,y f i re a s e c o ~ d battalion ofInfantry, regimental combat team headquarters and the separatecompany units were \v.ithdrawn from the l ine, leaVing one battalionto hold. As this second group passed the art i l lery temporaryposi t ions, they were joined by the art i l ler ,f battalion (-) andthe battal ion of infantry securing the posit ions. One batterywas l e f t to support the battalion s t i l l holding the l ine . Whenthis. l a s t battalion withdrew, the battery of art i l lery supporting

it pulled out with them to , the newly established friendly l ines.(OONFIDENTIAL)

-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------Command Report - 1st Cav DavOURCE:February 1951 Source No. 218ATE:

NIGHT Am SUPPORT,5th Cavalry Reeen t , A previously arranged bombing mission,composed of one illU1lll..nation plane and t'wo (2 ) B-2p bombers,struck Check Points 50 and 51 a t 0325 hours. These points received a to ta l of eight (8) napalm and sixteen (16) 250 lbfragmentation bombs, in addition to strafing by .50 cal machineguns. Civilians interrogated from the area reported between300 and 400 CCF troops kil led or wounded as a result of thebombardment. (REST1UCTED)

**********L A T E R ~ roMMUNICATION

During the period the 2d Battalion, adjusting defensivef i re on the flank, delivered mortar f i re into the 1st Battalion-which was s t i l l on the move. The f i r ing had been cleared bythe Battalion Cormnanders concerned. However, l as t minute

UNCLASSIFIED OCAFF Form No ! ! ' ~ - S"f'C'TX "'SmMU6W

......(Revised 15 Oct . I r ..15:VCYEJi


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clearances were not obtained. The basic faul t lay in insuff icientla tera l communication. Greater emphasis must be placed onla tera l communication; radio in a moving si tuatior.. and radio andwire when units halt for an appreciable time. (RESTRICTED)

**********G.ASOLINE OONSU'"fPTI011 FAC'IOR.

Close conformity to the consumption factor guide for Koreaon POL consumption i s being maintained. The consumption quantityfor gasoline on. the number of gallons per man per day for th isDivision ,-;as 1.22 gallons 1dri.ch conforms c1osel..v to the 1.25gallons per man per day as indicated in the tables published bythe Japan area Petroleum Office. (CONTIDENTIjJ.)

SOURCE: Command Report - I US CorpsDATE: February 1951 Source No. 219

VT FUZE FOR EIGHT INCH SHELISThe use of VT (proximity) fuzes in lo5-rom and l55-Im'il shellsproved SO successful that it "Tas desired to use the fuzes in8-inch shells and Brit ish 25-pound shel ls . H o ~ e v e r , the cavity

in these shells yrould not accont.lo:btcthe desired fuze. The taskof providing tools to cavi t ize the 8-inch and 25-pound shells l'TaSgiven to t ~ ' l e 538th Ordnance J4tJvI Company. Al though this \7ClS a newtype of operation for the maintenance personnel, they manufacturedan auger that "\rould do the job. The operation vms very successful on the 8-inch shell but the British 25-pounder did not reacttoo well with the VT fuze. (SIWRET)

SOURCE: Command Report - Section I - Part 4 EUSAKDATE: March 1951 Source No. 220

REPLA.CEEENTSMatching the stepped-up quantity was an improvenent in thequality of replacements. ~ e p o r t s from combat units indicatedthat those recently received from the Zone of the Interior werebetter trained and both phYsically and mentally better suited

Form No 73 UNCLASSIFIED )4e : " .(Revised 15 Oct 51) - ~ ~ . .fi"".iI".r.I!lfii"'-"""",-_


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days. Some personrtelproblema can1'lot be BQlved a t a l l , or onlya f t ~ r _ p + ~ ~ n g .. g r ~ ~ . t , _ : w r ~ n on other i,ndividuals that normallywould not have be'eft :involved. I t i s therefore recommended that,ynit . p ~ r ~ ~ : . m t c ~ ~ f 1 l s ' ~ ~ p _ ~ c ~ q with ~ h e seI"'{ice units of thecommands concerned, and divorced from the rear echelon of division. (RESTRICTED) .

j. SOURCE:n . ~ T E :

-'Command Report' .2d' Engr' CBn ...May 19S.l Source No. 225IUNES

l.. dist inct need was sh01'ln in ' the defensive and counteroffensiveaction for' a better system for' disseminating present minefielddoctrine. The principal arm ~ o n c e r n e d with friendly antipersonnelminefields i s tl\e infantry. I t i s recommended, therefore, thatminefield doctrine be published in anini 'antry .field manual of the"7"series. (RESTRICTED)* * * * . * *-* * *

SUPPLY OF MU.TESIn the defensive operation, considerable confusion resultedbecause of the prevalent opinion tha t the engineers, avowed

..

special ists in the instal lat ion of activated antitank and antipersonnelmines, were also responsible for the supply of mines for a ll defensiveinstal lat ions of the diYision. (RFSTRICTlD). * * * * * * * * * *

AID,DRED PEROONNEL C1"JmIERS.".. } l ~ , ~ . d was shO'\'1!l for armored personnel carriers to transportengineer personnel through enemy road blocks of small anllS and mortar. f?-;!,e .in: o r ~ r ,t.o a c c o m p ~ friendly a r m o x : - i n f a I 1 : ~ r y thrusts . The ,

bulk of the casualt ies of the 2d Engineer Battalion occurrod. 'ftb.anengineer' elements accompanying friendly' armor-infantry thrusts inthe counteroffensive were caught by enemy f i re , on the road and intrucks. (CDNPIIRNTL..L)

UNCLASSIFIEDForm No 7 ~

15 Oct 51, __


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SOURCE:J1."..TE:

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, Form No 73(Revised 15 Oct 51)

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Command Report - l38th i-Ju't GpMay 1951 Source No. 226

, .USE OF SlDKE IN P ~ ~ I V E : ~ I R DEFENSE.,.1. The use of,chemical smcke as a passive defense measurei s l imited. . ..2 . The use of smoke precludes util iZation of antia;ircraftautomatic weapons in smoked areas, and decreases the efficiencyof antiaircraft gun batteries. (BDTRI01'.ID)

Command Report - 24th In ! Div.d.pril 19,51 Source No. 227

'"'lOW B,:illB .I t i s recommended that two (2) each tov" bars be issued eachplatoon of a tank unit equipped "vith M-46 type tanks, as tn;istank cannot be towed ,.r.t th cables when the engine fa i l s .(REsTRICTED) . ' , , .. ," . . " ,**********

OOMl1UNIc..:.TIONSThe complete reliance' upon telephones'or 1.N/GRC-9 radiosfor contact between various units w.i.thin the Division has proved

l r i a . d e c i U a t e ~ ' This,' combined with the delay caused in receipt ofmessages through a central message center, i s often a great .hindrance. I t i s reoommended that a l l General Staff sections befurnished vehicles in which radio set SCR 193 can be mounted,and that radio sets similar to those in an armored division beadopted. This would enable- more positive control a t ;times,especially during movement, and would make for much grea te r , ",flexibil i ty in establishing a d v ~ c e command p o s t ~ . (RESTRICTED)

**********

UNCLASSIFIED 13
http:///reader/full/BDTRI01'.IDhttp:///reader/full/BDTRI01'.ID


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EXOlL'iNGERecommend that quotas for th e direct exchange of new orr e ~ o n d i t i c n e d vehicles, bet'leen division ordnance units and

..\I'II\V ordnance vehicular pools, be stepped up to reduce the heavyd e a d l i n ~ s in the combat units caused b.Y complete wear' out.(RESTRICTEn) .

**********

It is suggested that "Weasel-type" Vlire laying vehicles,issued on a basis of tiro (2) for each headquarters battery andone toeach .f i r ing battery, 1'1Quld be of inestimable value incarrying out the complex wiring problem of art i l lery units.(RESTRICTIID)

SOURCE: .'Command Report - 82d .. ~ , ; ~ ..'.oW Bn (sp) ~ T E : May 1951 Source 'No. 228

, . R E O O I 4 ! E N D ~ TIONS1 . That l ive (5) power telephones (TP-9) be 'issued over

and above authorized T/Q&E for utilization in battery CP1s and"'\ ." operations sections. "-'.2. That a l l 11-161 s be equipped ".lith armor plate gunners'shields.

, 3. 'Searehllght companies used on batt lef ie ld illuminationmissions should be ~ s s i g n e d to CO'rps :Artillery.That Mark IX Sight on M-16 1 s be replaced b.Y the ReflexSight M-18. .

. . ' . .5. . That an antiaircraftordriance company provide support for ." ... ~ . , .. ..... .. ---.... ' . ," maintenance .ofremo,te control syst.em o! the H-19 and all , s 1 g h ~ i n g devices. ( C O N F I D E N T I i ~ L ) i. ' '. '

,' .

UNCLASSIFIED\

.Form No