Dissemination of Combat Information 27 April 1953

8/3/2019 Dissemination of Combat Information 27 April 1953

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OFFICE. ClflEF O F ARMY FIELD FORCESFor t Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-Z6 350. 05/5(DOCI)(C)(Z7 Apr 53) 27 AprU 1953

SUBJECT: DiSsemination of Combat InformationLIBRARYI..RMY W,.,.f\ CelLLEGE

P E r ~ f r y ) : r' . \ IS < . : ; ; . r T I O l ' ~TO: See distr ibut ionMP,Y 7' 1953:COpy /...................... " . 1. In accordance with SR 525- 85- 5, for

mation, the inclosed EXTRAC TS are forwarded fo r evaluation and necessaryact ion. I t m ay be appropriate , in cer ta in cases , to take actionupon a single extracted i tem; in others , i t may be desirable to developa c ross - sect ion of accumulated extracts on a part icular subject beforeinitiating act ion; and, often, the extracted i tem serves to reaff i rm ourdoctrines and techniques.

Z. Copies are furnished to other mili tary agencies to keep theminformed concerning theater problems from the front line through th elogist ical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from repor ts which a re class i fied SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user , this Office assigns each extracted i tem the lowest classification compatible with secur i ty . No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any port ion of the ext racted r emarks , so that none of the original intent is lost .

4. Combat information EXTRACTS which are applicable to t raining a t the company-bat tery level appear in Army Field Forces TRAININGBULLETINS.

Cc:::,FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES: it: .;:j,.....,DECLASSIFIED BY A U ~ O R j J i . C F~ a 0 ~ ~ O N /9 '2 B Y ~ , __l Inc l

Extracts from sources Lt Col, AGC l r ) 70 6 thru 729 Ass t Adjutant General

DISTRIB UTION:d

Copy No 31 3(Over) CN 50205

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DISTRIBUTION: 3 ACOFS, G-1, DA3 ACOFS, G-2, DA15 ACOFS, G-3, DA

20 ACOFS, G-4, DA2 'The Adjutant General2 Chief of Chaplains

10 Chief Chemical Officer10 Chief of Engineers2 Chief of Finance2 Chief of Information2 The Inspector General2 The Judge Advocate

GeneralCopies furnished:

2

2 Chief of Mili tary History2 Chief, National GuardBureau

10 Chief of Ordnance2 The Provost Marshal

General10 The Quar termaster General2 Executive for Reserve and

ROTC Affairs10 Chief Signal Officer10 The Sur geon General4 Chief of Transportation

13 4

222

1022422222111222122

TAG (40 CG, US Army Forces , Far East (Main); 44 CINC, USArmy, Europe; 10 ea CG's, other major oversea commands)CGtsFirs t ArmySecond ArmyThird ArmyFourth ArmyFifth ArmySixth ArmyArmy AA CommandMili tary Distr ict of WashingtonTactical Air CommandThe Armored CenterThe Arti l lery CenterThe .Infantry CenterMountain & Cold Weather Tng Command

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffChief of Staff, DAChief of Naval Operations, Dept of the NavyChief, Army Advisory Gp, Air Command and Staff ~ c h o o l t A ir UniversityComdt of Cadets, US Military AcademyComdt

Armed Forces Staff College, NOBMarine Corps SchoolUSAF Air-Ground Operations School

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ATTNG-26 350. 05/5(DOCI)(C)(27 Apr 53) 27 Apri l 1953Subject: Dissemination of Combat Information

Copies furnished: (Cont)ComdtZ Counter Intelligence Corps School2 The Provost Marshal General 's School2 Army War CollegeZ CGSC2 Army General School2 The Armored School2 The Arti l lery SchoolZ The Infantry School2 Asst Comdt, The Artil lery School,

AA&GM Branch2 Chief, Army Security Agency1 Officer in Charge, Atlantic Fleet Intelligence Cen,

Attn: Ground Forces Officer1 Director , Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Secyof

Defense, Attn: Col TrainPres

1 A FF Bd No I1 A FF Bd No 2I A FF Bd No 31 A FF Bd No 41 CO, Arct ic Test Branch, AFF

Chiefs1 A FF HRU No 11 A FF HRU No 21 Dir of Special Weapons Developments, A FF

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SOURCE: Command Report - 31st FA BnDATE: November 19S2 Source No 706

(RESTRIC TED)OVERHEAD COVER FOR FIELD AR TILLERY. - Operations in

Korea have clearly demonstrated that the enemy has th e capability ofeffectively massing fires on our ar t i l lery positions. In order to conti.nue effective counterbat tery filje, both mater ie l and personnel mustbe afforded some degree of protection. Tw o types of overhead coverfor the ISS-mm howitzer, which provide this protection, have been constructed.

The f i rst type utilized primari ly sawed t imbers , augmented to alesser amount with logs. This construct ion required a complete renovat ion of the existing howitzer emplacement but did combine into one integral s t ructure , protection for personnel , ammunition, and howitzer.

The second type utilized logs throughout with the exception of longspans. The existit;lg parapet walls of the howitzer pit and ammunit ionbunkers were used as they presently existed. The overhead cover wast ied into the parapet with a minimum of change. This construction util izes the existing howitzer position and native mater ia ls to the maxim um , decreases construction time, and affords the same amount ofprotection, Personnel bunkers for the crew m ay be located adjacent tothe howitzer position, thereby consolidating the entire instal lat ion.

Recommend that overhead cover fo r various types of ar t i l le ryweapons be adopted as standard field fortification.

SOURCE: Command Report - 15th FA BnDATE: November 1952 Source No 707

(RESTRIC TED)ENEMY DEFENSIVE MEASURES. - The enemy continues to de

fend in depth the commanding ground to our front. He has emLarked ona program of continued improvement of present defenses and th e building of new and more elaborate tunnels, caves, and other fortifications.The enemy has designed bunkers and caves which will house an entire

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company with room fo r s torage of food and ammunit ion. Mortars andar t i l le ry are well dug-in and camouflaged. The enemy often keeps hismor ta r s in caves except when f ~ r i n g . He will set up the mor ta r , firea few rounds, and then re turn the mor ta r to its cave, leaving the baseplate in position if necessary .

Enemy l ight ar t i l lery pieces a re often placed in bunkers whichopen out on the forward slope of hill masses and ridge l ines. The art i l lery piece is moved to a position where it can fire out of the bunker.After firing, the piece is moved to the back of th e bunker or cave forprotection from our counterbattery fire. Friendly direct fire weaponshave been used to good advantage to destroy such posi t ions.

SOURCE: Command Report - 1st FA Obsn BnDATE: November 1952 Source No 708

(RESTRICTED)ENEMY AR TILLERY TECHNIQUE. - The analysis of th e t ra jec

tory of a CCF howitzer located by th e AN/MPQ-10 radar se t is of bothtechnical and tactical interest . The gun-target range of th e CCF howi tzer is 10,300 yards. The approximate muzzle velocity of 1155 feetper second gave a t ime of flight of 60.05 seconds. Maximum ordinateof the t rajectory was 14,550 feet, using a quadrant elevat ion of 1095mils . The quadrant elevation of 1095 mils is of part icular significancebecause i t indicates the use of high angle fire by the CCF ar t i l le ry .

SOURCE: Command Report - 73 d Tank Bn (M) DATE: October 1952 Source No 709

(CONFIDENTIAL)EFFECTIVENESS OF TANK-MOUNTED 18" SEARCHLIGHTS. Only three of six searchlights presen t actual ly worked when i t was nec

essary to use them. Three of the lights had th e filaments in the bulbsdamaged by the concussion of heavy ar t i l lery shelling. Also, tw o otherl ights failed shortly af ter being turned on and th e third was turned offbecause the smoke and dust caused by intense enemy ar t i l le ry fire andthe firing of 90-mm tank guns made it impossible for the tank crew todistinguish objects when the light was in operat ion.

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SOURCE: Command Repor t 7th Div ArtyDATE: October 1952 Source No 710

(RESTRIC TED)FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION. - The direct ' support battalioDmust have its command post governed by one factor control of the firingbatteries. Fire support coordination at regimental level proved to be

most effective during heavy action when the direct support battalioncommander personally acted as coordinator in direct contact with theregimental commander. At infantry battalion level, the arti l lery liai son officer acting as a staff officer of the infantry battalion commanderworked most effectively as fire support coordinator. Where an infantryofficer acted as fire support coordinator the weight of heavy weaponsupport devolved too often on the art i l lery, many t imes on targets moresuited to attack by infantry mortars and recoilless rifles. Heavier emphasis on role of the artil leryman as fire support coordinator is desir able at service schools and a much more comprehensive course incapabilities and limitations of aJi weapons would be desirable at TheArtillery School.(RE5TRIC TED)

FDe OPERA TIONS. - It is highly desirable that the 53, and pos sibly his assistants in the direct support battalion, reconnoiter terrainin his sector . He should use his knowledge in assigning missions tomost effectively attack targets indicated by th e forward observer.

With all th e art i l lery available. i t was still necessary to have bat teries firing on more than one mission at a time to try to halt the (,tideof enemy attacks. It was mandatory that each battery have data pre pared for all prearranged fires so that 53's could merely designate thebattery, or platoon within the battery, to shoot.

Artillery fires could be shifted most rapidly by use of the "hotloop" 'between division art i l lery and all art i l lery units baving capabilit iesin the zone of action. Even in the case of battalions reinforcing th e direct support battalion it was found to be much faster, when th e requiredfires exceeded fire power available to the direct support battalion, toput ~ l l ,battalion fire direction centers on a single circuit . An incidentaladvantage accrued from a rapid relay of information to all i ~ t e r e s t e d agencies.

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Battalion 53's must be extremely cautious in calling for close-inf i res in hilly terrain. Elevations to clear friendly crests with VT a.ndquick fuze must be computed. In the attack minimum elevations mustbe computed ahead of time for hills to be occupied. Dead space chartsmust be constructed both of th e zone of action and in contingent zones.(RESTRIC TED)

'OBSERVED FIRE PROCEDURES. - Observed fire procedures werenot followed in many cases during heavy actions. To expedite deliveryof fire and gain maximum effect from ammunition expended, it is necessary for the observers to give the complete fire mission' as outlinedin Department of the Army publications. Fur thermore, piecemeal mes sages calling for fire denies th e information that should be passedthrough intelligence c hannels.

Forward observers must act as advisors to their supported commanders . All too often th e forward observer merely repeated the sentiments of the infantry commander when a few sound words from an a rt i l lery viewpoint might have suggested a much better tactical decision.

One of th e important functions of a forward observer or Haisonofficer is to keep information moving back to his own battalion and higherfriendly elements. Frequently this was done. The excuse of securi tyrestr ict ions is not valid. Operation codes were available.

Requests for countermortar and counterbattery fires must be accompanied by as much shell reporting information as possible. A request citing only a cardinal direction of the compass resul ts in uselessexpenditure of ammunition and poor results . Shell reports should beobtained, including shell fragments.(RES TRlC TED)IMPROPER USE OF BARRAGES AND DE FENSlVE FIRES. - Barrages and defensive fires were not in al l cases used proper ly.

a. Barrages should be called down only when attack is imminentand lifted as soon as the danger is past . Too often barrages a re left onfor hours a t a t ime as a morale factor rather than a casualty producingagent.

b. Barrages should not be used as H and I f i res. In some instances defensive barrages were fired with th e rate reduced to one roundevery 60 to 120 seconds. This served no useful purpose, and t ied up afire unit that could have been used elsewhere.

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c. Barrages must be shot in as soon as the objective is taken.Forward observers and company commanders must confer on locationof defensive fires.

d. Infantry leaders must know locations of cri t ical fires and howto cal l for them.

e. The ar t i l lery S3 should expedite the adjustment of barragesand defensive fires as soon as th e action appears to be localized.

SOURCE: Command Report - I CorpsDATE: October 19S2 Source No 711

(RESTRIC TED)TANK CHEVRON TRACK BLOCKS. - The 1st Marine Tank Bat

talion experimented with two-inch chevron track blocks in an at tempt to.increase the traction in th e one-inch chevron tank t rack. The two-inchchevron blocks were spaced every fifth block on the one-inch chevront rack. The resulting vibration set up in the tank, when moving along aroad, was so severe that brackets and other smal l welded objects in thetank broke loose from their mountings. Continued vibration would havehad a weakening effect on oil and gas l ines. Because of this the twoinch chevron t rack block was considered an unsatisfactory method of increasing the t rack traction.(RESTRIC TED)

ISS-MM GUN MALFUNC TIONING. - Investigations were made todetermine the cause of the malfunction of the IS5-mm gun fi.ring mechanism. Excessive chamber pressure was found to be the cause of th emalfunction. Normal chamber pressure for the ISS-mm gun is from38,000 to 40,000 pounds per square inch. The investigations recordedchamber pressures up to 42,865 pounds per square inch which is 2, 865ppunds per square inch in excess of the breech ring and tube design. Tocor rec t this malfunction, a deeper hole was drilled in th e firing lockhousing which prevented the t ransmission of shock waves to th e firingmechanism safety latch pin.

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SOURCE: Comma.ndReport - 937th FA BnDATE: November 195Z Source No 11Z

(RESTRIC TED), REQUIREMENT FOR RECTIFIER RA83A IN FA BN. - A rectif ier

is essential to convert power from issued generators 3KW for dismountedradios. Radios issued field art i l lery units are dependent upon the operat ion of a vehicle and the subsequent source of power from the vehicle batte ry . Power Equipment PEZIO is issued only to headquarters bat tery,while the battalion is required to operate four fire direction centers .Not only is this equipment inadequate in quantities issued, but is inferior in the necessary qualities of durability and ruggedness . By usingthe rectif ier with issued generators it is possible, with the use of banksof wet cel l batter ies , to maintain a charge ad.equate for the continuedoperation of dismounted radios.

SOURCE: Command' Repo r t - Zd Inf DivDATE: November 195Z Source No 113

(RESTRIC TED)M4 TANK. - For this type warfare in rugged terrain, the M4A3E8

tank is an excellent weapon. The fire control and optical equipment inthis tank are excellent, but since all the firing i s a t pin point targets anda t long range. a better sight is needed. An excellent substitute is theZO-power scope used for observation and to ass is t in adjusting fire.

With the tanks of the tank battalion operating in direct support ofinfantry units and firing from prepared emplacements along the MLR,and because much of the tank firing is done a t night using the range card,i t is necessary and proper that the tanks be a par t of the infantry battalion FSCC.

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UNCLASSIFIED "s_:t:riit'SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth ArmyDATE: August 1952 Source No 71 4

(CONFIDENTIAL)"HIGH HERMAN" MINE EXPLODER. - I Corps bas conducted a

number of tests and demonstrations with the T -1E6 Mine Exploder,which bas acquired the name "High Herman." Primary object ives wereto t rain the tank crews in operation of th e vehicle and determine its utUi ty against Soviet TMD-B AT box m ~ n e s on typical Korean roads .

Tw o roads were selected for the test . one with a thick rock baseand the other dir t . Both were compacted by heavy tank traffic. Thevehicle 's rol ler detonated the mines laid to depths of 6 inches in the rockbase road, but failed to detonate mines a t a depth of 4 inches in the dirtroad. I t was concluded that the "High Herman" wil l detonate about 75per cent of mines laid 2 to 6 inches deep on compacted dirt or rock roadsand will withstand the explosion of a single or two stacked Soviet minesof the type tested. The vehicle can negotiate most roads but bogs downeasi ly in mud and r.equires a large open space or road junction in orderto make a 180 degree turn.

SOURCE: Command Rel>ort - IX CorpsDATE: September 1952 Source No 715

(RES TRIC TED)AR TILLERY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING. - Target-gett ing a s s u m e ~

equal importance with the ability to shoot in a combat situation. Therebas been an acute lack of aggressive target- seeking on the par t of the battalion 52's . While most personnel assigned to intelligence work appearto be professionally competent. they seem to flounder in confusion intheir pr imary duty of finding targets for th e ar t i l lery. For a battalion52 to be effective, he must be aggressive from th e f irs t day of his assignment, and he must have a basic knowledge of intelligence principles.Training in locating targets (artil lery intelligence) should be as thoroughas that of field ar t i l lery gunnery. The ar t i l lery officer should come tocombat equipped with these tools:

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1. Ability to locate a tai 'get.Z. Ability to place the firepower of the ar t i l lery on the target .Recommend that greater s t ress be placed on ar t i l lery intell igence

in officer training courses so that officer s charged with intelligencematters will be able to accomplish thei r missions effectively and quickly.

SOURCE: Command Report - 10th AAA GroupDATE: October 1952 Source No 716

(CONFIDENTIAL)NONDIVISIONAL AAA ORGANIZA TION IN KOREA. - The efficiencyof administrative and tactical supervision of the nine AAA battalions a ttached to this headquarters continues to be inlpaired by lack of an ade quate command s t ructure for nondivisional AAA in Korea. The expectedar r ival of one additional AAA battalion further emphasizes the need foractivation of an AA A brigade headquarters and headquarters battery.

SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps

DATE: October 1952 Source No 717

( C O ~ F I D E N T I A L ) SUPPLY DIFFICULTY & COMMUNICA TrONS. - While there were

few instances of short supply, the supply platoon was hard pressed tomee.t the expanded gasoline and ammunition demands now required withthe substi tution of the heavier M4 6 tank for the M4A3E8 in the regimentaltank company, and the extended employment of armor . The radio con tinued to be the communications mainstay, as wire frequently was brokenby hostile art i l lery. Radio nets required numerous relay stations, how ever I and message traffic was slow.(RES TRIC TED)

ENEMY CONSTRUCTION. - Evidence of extended engineer activitywas noted as descript ions of the hostile shel ters and gun positions werereceived from prisoners and from friendly troops who assaul ted theseposit ions. Enemy posit ions were tunneled extensively; one type of shel ter

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was designed for squad- size groups while another type accommodatedplatoon-size units . Hand tools. supplemented by smal l amounts of explosives, were used in the construction of these troop shel ters whichwere connected by an elaborate communicat ions t rench system. Whilenot designed as fighting bunkers, the floors and ent rances were constructed so as to make i t difficult to at tack troops in the shel ters withgrenades; niches were cut into the walls to provide protect ion agains tsmal l a rms f i re .

CC F ar t i l lery posit ions received the same attention in their construction; some gun pits were roofed with logs and said to be sufficient lystrong to withstand a t least one direct hit by an 8-inch shell ; other posit ions consisted of caves with the entrances built up, aUowing only roomfor elevating and t raversing the gun tube. StiU another posit ion, requiring a great deal of effort but pract ical ly impregnable when completed,consisted of a tunnel through a spur or smal l hill with the gun a t the ent rance of the tunnel , an aper ture of minimum size.

Road construction, according to a prisoner . was res t r ic ted toareas in rea r of regimental headquarters and a ll supply forward of thisarea was by hand carry . However, communicat ion t renches connectedforward areas with company and sometimes to battalion; the t rencheswere said to be deep enough to afford concealment and cover .

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Div ArtyDATE: November 1952 Source No 718

(RESTRICTED)TRAINING FA BA TTERY OFFICERS. - Tw o division art i l lery

schools were init iated during the period, one for executive officers andanother for battery commanders. Phase I of the f i rst school , consisting of fifteen hour s of instruction, was designed to ref resh the executiveofficers on the fundamental techniques of firing battery work, e. g. ,measur ing and reporting minimum elevation, laying and referr ing andaccuracy measures . Phase II, also of fifteen hours duration, consistedof instruct ion in fire direction procedure. The courses of instruct ionproved of such benefi t that four additional cycles were init iated. By theend of the month all firing battery commanders , executives, assistantexecutives and tw o chiefs of firing battery from each art i l lery firingbattery in division art i l lery had attended.


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The fifteen hour course of instruction for all battery commandersin division ar t i l le ry was underway before the end of the period. Thiscourse included instruction in ~ e s s managemen4 supply procedures ,preventive motor maintenance and cold weather trc:.ining.

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Inf DivDATE: September 1952 Source No 71 9

(RESTRIC TED)ADDING DEPTH TO DEFENSE. - Successive defensive strong

points mus t be organized to reinforce the MLR even though troops maynot be available for continuous occupancy. There is always some depthin any defensive posit ion, because of th e rnanner in which infantry weapons a re employed. However, the units that a re not employed on theMLR, such as mor ta r platoons, kitchen and supply installat ions, aidstations and unit headquarters must be organized into a tact ical unit, beproper ly equipped with close combat weapons and amm unition, and havea strongly fortified strong point in the immediate vicinity of the instal lation that can and will be automatically manned to ass i s t in blocking anypenetrat ion of the MLR.

SOURCE: Command Report - 223d In! RegtDATE: November 1952 Source No 720

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(RESTRIC TED)COUNTERFIRE PLATOON OPERA TION. - Instead of channeling

a ll operat ions through the 82 and S3 sect ions, the counter fire platoonworked directly with the direct support ar t i l le ry . This method of opera~ i o n has worked successfully and provided the platoon with a much closerl iaison with the group which does most of the firing on plots picked up bythe platoon. On the MLR, five outposts are \lsed instead of four o r six,with sound-powered l ines between teams, and the fifth OP i s an independent team that can work with any of the other four.

The success of this method of operat ion for th e curren t tact icalsituation is borne out by th e figures compiled during this month. The

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platoon has picked up the plots of 167 enemy weapons that have fired ontroops and installations on th e MLR. Of these 16 7 plots, approximately40'0 have been fired upon by the ar t i l lery .

SOURCE: Command Report - 27th In ! RegtDATE: November 1952 Source No 72 I

(RESTRICTED)UNIT ROTATION. - A large loss of key personnel through rotation

during this period out of the l ine has left the regiment with a substant ia ltrai.ning problem on its hands before i t can again reach the -effectivenessit had obtained throughout the la t ter period of its service on l ine. Theconstant state of flux that an organization finds i tse lf in because of individual rota t ion precludes its ever reaching a high state of effectivenessunder present conditions. In a period of l imited mobil izat ion, unit rota t ion as opposed to individual rotation appears to have many desirableaspects .

Recommend that study and experimentation be init iated to determinethe desirabi l i ty of unit rotation in Korea.

SOURCE: Command Report - 187th Abn RCTDATE: August 1952 Source No 722

(RESTRIC TED)SECURITY DURING RELIEF. - The re l ief of units in l ine warrants

considerable attent ion to insure that even the units in the adjacent sec torsare not aware of th e re l ief until notified through proper channels. Members of the unit being relieved were themselves unaware of the re l iefuntil prepa.rations for on-the- spot re l ief were made. The success of theoperation was primari ly due to the application and maintenance of propersecuri ty measures . Pr io r to the closing of the RCT in th e marshall ingarea , the reconnaissance company of the division to be rel ieved screenedthe area , and all intelligence agencies were aler ted to detect any breachof securi ty and to apprehend all unauthorized personnel on or near thearea . No one except special ly designated individuals were permit ted toleave or enter the area .


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SOURCE: Command Report - 32d Inf RegtDATE: D e c ~ p 1 b e r 1952 Source No 72 3

(RESTRICTED)COUNTERFIR;.E TECHNIQUES. - As a logical extensionof1the

FSCC sys(em, the ' regimentai counterf ire officer and c o u n t e r ~ n 4 " e plottingcenter w e ~ incorporated in the regimenta l FSCC. The battaMon counterfire noncQq1missioned officers were similar ly placed in the battalionFSCC's . T.he six.cc;>unterfire OP's were co-located with six of the dir e c t , ~ u p p Q r t ar t i l lery forward observer OP's to provide addit ional supervision for the count;erfire squads on posit ion, mutually strengthen communications, facilitate exchange of information, and minimize administrat ive support . A 'net was established connecting each pai r of counterfire OP's to th e regimental FSCC switchboard and l a tera l l ines to eachOP in addition to the normal wire l ines between the regimental and ba'ttal ion FSCC. Counterfire azimuths were received, evaluated, and plottedin. the regimental FSCC. The usable data was then phoned by di rect linetOt battalion FSCC's capable of taking action and simultaneously to the dir ec t support art i l lery FDC. In addit ion to thei r pr imary duties: the sixcoun. terf ireforward observer OP's were instructed to ac t as regimentalop t s and utilize the counterf ire communication system to render reports .

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Inf DivDATE: December 1952 Source No 724

(RESTRICTED)TA}'IfK-INFANTRY EMPLOYMENT. - As soon as the ar t i l lery prep

arat ions ~ i f t e d the tanks opened fire from overwatching posit ions. Eachassau l t platoon had one m an with a large panel on his back. The tankskept their f ire jus t ahead of the infantry as they made their assaul t . Att imes tank fire was placed as close as 25 yards in front of lead elements.Having tra,ined with tanks, the infantry was material ly assis ted in retaking the outpost .

Rec;ommend that a,ll in.fantry rifle units be taught to move undertank f i re . Tanks providing lIoverwatching fire" is th e l eas t desirablemethod of tank-infantry employment; however, i t is believed to be ofsufficient importance to warrant addit ional training.

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SOURCE: Conunand Report - I CorpsDATE: August 1952 Source No 72 5

(RESTRICTED)MODIFICATION OF M46 TANK OIL COOLER ASSEMBLY. - Ord

nance has built a redesigned oil cooler assembly as a possible improve ment and replacement for the present oil cooler assembly. The mainmodificat ion is the substi tution


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SOURCE: Command Report - 378 Engr Combat Bn

DATE: November 1952 Source No 727(RESTRICTED)

COMBAT READINESS TRAINING. - The effect Oft the combat read i ness of a unit committed to one specific task, such as a road project ofmagnitude for a long period of t ime is a cause for concern. The individ-

Iua1 soldier and the unit tend to lose sight of the original mission a combat engineer battalion is organized to accomplish. Only by conductinga training program concurrently with assigned mission on such subjectsas tact ical bridging, mine warfare , rigging and smal l unit tactics will acombat battalion maintain combat readiness. The rotat ion of m en further adds to the problem of maintaining such proficiency.

SOURCE: Command Report , 45th Inf DivDATE: October 1952 Source No 728

(RESTRICTED)WIRE STAPLES. - In order to protect front-line tactical field wire

from ar t i l lery and mortar fire, wire staples were fabricated from No 9mechanical wire (stock number IA609.6). The staple is approximatelytwenty-four inches in over -a l l length, and has an open loop at one endinto which cabled WD-l /TT may be inserted. The staples a re driveninto the walls of communications trenches on the MLR and wire is thereby protected from almost everything but a direct arti l lery o r mor ta r hit.Wire consumption by the front-line units will be great ly reduced becauseof the additional protection afforded th e wire. The wire staple s can beproduced a t the rate of 1,000 per day using four laborers . The staplesa re placed a t six to eight foot intervals in th e communications t renchesapproximately eighteen inches above the t rench floor. Where this sizestaple is insufficient fo r heavier cable, ammunition box rods will furnishbetter support . Since this type rod is not easily bent into a loop, thecable is simply laid on and tied to the rod.

UNCLASSIFIED


18/18

UNCLASSIFIED121:dRR15} ,, SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Inf'Div, CmlDATE: August 1952 Source No 729

(RESTRICTED)PHOSPHORESCENCE 9N CLOTHING O F MEMBERS OF PATROLS.

Men on patrols operating forward of our MLR became conspicuous a tnight apparently as a resu l t of their clothing becoming phosphorescentor luminous when passing through areas which had been shelled withwhite phosphorus.

This phosphorescence is norm al, particularly in damp weather orwhen moisture is present in the air .

When th e white phosphorus shell is exploded in the presence ofmoisture . the area upon which the resulting vapors a re condensed mayoften be luminescent even though th e phosphorus has apparently com pletely burned. Some of this mater ia l may easi ly adhere to the clothingof personnel moving through such an area .

In addition, white phosphorus is preserved under water, i . e . , i tdoes not burn when i t is covered by water . Hence, troops should avoidoccupying wet areas or depressions which have been recently shelledwith WP.

15UNC

Documents

Dissemination of Combat Information 27 April 1953