Korean War Dissemination of Combat Info 10 June 2

8/7/2019 Korean War Dissemination of Combat Info 10 June 2

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UNCLASSIFIED OFFICE, C ~ OF ARMY FIELD FORCES Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-64 3!;O. 05/48(DOCI)(C)C.0 Jun 52) 10 June 1952~ - ' ~ ~ - - . - ~ "----_ .. ,SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat InfOI' tif%) , '

TO: See distribution, '.... ,

:.i ;

1. In' 'accordance with SR 525-85.5, Processing of CombatInformation, thelnclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded to Departmentof the Army, ' .Aimy' Field Forces and'the service schools for evaluation and n ~ ' c e s s a r Y action. It may be appropriate, in certain


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QQNIiM 18Er., IAL- UNCLASSIFiED

2DISTRiBUTION:3 I ACOFS, 0 .. 1, DA 10 The Quar termaster

3 ACOFS, G-2, DA General15 ACOFS. 0 ...3, DA 2 Executive for Reserve20 ACOFS, 0 ..4, DA and ROTC Affairs2 The Adjutant General 10 Chief Signal bff icer

2 Chief of Chaplains 10 The Surgeon Gener


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" ' ~ = = = = - I a f i M I i I t " ' " OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCESFort Monroe, Virgir.ia

, .EXTRACTS OF 'COMBAT': INFORMATION"

, ;. -- ,-- ,------- .- . . ; . ; . . . --------. " ~ ' 'SOURCE:C o ~ a n 4 , R e p o 1 , " ~ ~ - 1 7 ~ ~ J r H ,DATE: 'February 1952" Source No 329OPERATION "CLAM UP."

The purpose of this o peration was to decoy the enemy intothinking we had made a withdrawal. All daylight activity ceasedin areas under enemy o.bservation. Each man was made ,fullyaware of the pr imary mission: to hold fire and capture theenemy. I f friendly positions became threatened, fire was to becontrolled so a s to kill a maximum1number of the enemy., . . . _.__ ._ ..". -_........--"......_.,The enemy was observed building up a large striking forcein front of 3d Battalion p6'sitions>'Ni:;t'a ~ f i - i ~ d l y shot was fireduntil the leading 'enemy e r e r 6 e h i $ : b ~ ( F ~ J t - : - a ' p ~ t h : f f i : t r i ~ g h the t ~ c t ical wire' less than thit-t'y ~ 3 0 ) ia.r\:is' i n ~ f r o r i i r , 3d ~ a : t ~ l i o r i ' positions: then, 'at . O'31Z'h6u'rs" . t ~ ( i i ~ ~ n a l ' w a ~ : ~ i v e n ~ ~ 6 ; , o J ? ~ n fire.The enemy attack'iitas: thrOwn intb' C:dnfusion. ' ,'-', ' ..

At 0320 ho\U's the -s-ecoll


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..

i r l i i i ' f Q E N i j g ~>.". .. . .--._' ':f>1Ir< . , . , . l ! " ' ; >.,41Z UNCLASS\F1EO

in some cases to a depth of t h ~ , r y (30) inches. After a snowfall.the snow gradually melts during periods of sunshine in the.middle of the day, but th . resulting slush and water f r ~ , e ~ e s , atnight. The present thirteen (13) to n high-speed Tractor , M5,does not have adequate traction to negotiate on this frbzenground and ice. " ,

Recommend that either a yrider t rack be used on th e M5Tractor , or that some type of device be p r o v i ~ e d for use onthe present tracks during periods when the 'ground is frozen orcovered with ice. (RESTRICTED) ;, l ' , ' , . ,',. ! . -. :. ,.; ..SOURCE:DATE:

SOURCE:DATE:

Command Report 15th AAA A W Bn (SP) - 7th ln f Div'"F"eoruary 1952 Source No 331POWER CHARGER FOR MOUNT, MULTIPLE GUN, CAVt50"M4SD. ' j - 5 III'i , It is recommended that a larger type power charger bestandard equipment for Mount, Multiple Gun, Caliber 50.: M45D, employed by this unit. ' With the present power 'charger,, i t is sometimes necessary to -deadlilie' !tactical weaporis a' s 'a;'-result of constant breakdowns .. '(RESTRICTED) . : . , r ' f:'/ . . ' : ; , " .-Command Report 31 s t Inf - 7th Inf DivFebruary 195Z Source No 33ZRATING OF SERGEANT FOR CHAPLAINS' ASSISTANTS.

It is recommended that Chaplains' assistants have therating of sergeant.

With only the rating of corporal to offer, Chaplains are, severely handicapped in their efforts to obtain an assistantwho mU$t ,not only be a man of high moral character who can... 1 '. " a s s i s ~ , with religious services and aid in various human relationproblems. but must be a jeep driver, maintenance man andtypist also. At present there are many men who are jeepdrivers and nothingelse who possess the rating of corporal .(RESTRICTED)

UNCLASSIFrEDfufT'IB!P ;"t'pBM@" 'i i'Form No -" . " ..(Revised 15 Oct .J . f l i i l l i 1 k ' ' ' I / ~ ~ : .


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UNCLASSIFIED Command Report - 9th lnf RegtOURCE:

M :. ",+ , ..

DATE: February 195Z . ' ,.. C O M B A ~ , . T ~ S ' I , O F ARMORED VEST.

;:'". ..1; ,:.; . T ~ t : a Z ' s t real prCfo';of tile value


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~ : r . < ~ g Y i IfllfjltlP .. ( . UNClASS\F\EO

patrol group, utilizing Ranger personnel, to' develop an 'organi.zation capable of o p ~ r j t i n g as a: unit or by squads or smallergroups to make deeppatrols.,_ _ ~ l t e prisoners , set ambushesGr, make raids in" o p e i ~ a t i o n s 'requiring training'or abilitY, .bliYQnQthat of a norm'al rifle squad. These velunteer RaIder Group.;were housed and t r . a ~ n e ~ separately and treated in such a mannerto. d e , v ~ l o p . ~ . ~ i g h . . ~ ~ P ~ l ~ decorp.s.. D e ~ a i J e d . ~ ~ g u . ~ . z ~ t i o n . ~ f .the Raidel" Greups was left to the battalion commanders withgroups ranging'between 12 andZ4 men. (RESTRICTED)

. l'

SOURCE:

Source No 336ATE:. i : .~ U l ? P L Y EGONOMY.

CGst consciousness and. supply ecoJ,lomy is being em,:plta.sized by all echelens of command from GHQ down to smallf r o n ~ line units. Front line units are engaged in battlefieldrecovery of weapons and equipment. Teams were observed

.1 ...." ... ' . . . . . . _""" "'''reeovel"ing Cf1'lttati'catbarb1!C!"'WlYe--:-D!f!!llte"prol!'a;rrrs i o r - - " - ~ - ' renovation of'winter clething have been established . The r e ~ build program of vehicles is saving milliens of dollar(RESTRICTED)' , ;.,' '. . :.'. ._-SOURCE: Command Repor t . 2d In f Div

". r .. :.:"7. \ .."D.ATE: January 195Z ,; ;. . S o . u r c e . N ~ 337'. " '.

DIFFICULTY-IN OBTAINING ENEMYl.pW'S,,qjThe reconnaissance patrels were 'very' successful-insecuring information pertaining to dispositions but the prisonercapturing effort was not toe successful. The enemy displayed

almost no de$ir.e to surrender as evidenced by the fact thatonly one prisoner out o( five (5) t a k ~ n wa$ a ~ < 1 e . . e ' l ' t e r and Gne.patrol leader reported seeing two (Z) enemy shoot each otherin what appeared to be a mutual suicide pact in order to avoidc a p ~ ' : 1 r e .

UNCLASSIFIEDOCAFF Form No - ..(Revised 15 Oct


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UNCLA.SSIFIED' - ' ' ' ' T h i s ' - ~ e i ~ ~ a n c e ' ; t o surrender on the p a r ~ ~ f - t h e e n e m y ~ ..

was susp ected to:be ca'used by closer political surveillanceaild increa.$ed p ~ . p a g a n d a c q n c e r n j ~ harsh treatment of"?W l s cC)upled w ~ t ~ : a . , . p J : " a c ; t i c a l , f e a r of friendly artille!y_ . . Ther-:._was also ,some inlcation that friendly troops were t ~ l n d i n g toopen fire too early and at extreme ranges causing the enemyto become more wary. ' Nilht.patroJs' and ambush points were. hindered in their -.\(ficiency by the, extreme cold .- Bulky c l o t h ~ ing makes stealth difficult and complete immobility for longperiods is not po.aible with the present equipment.(RESTRICTED) :. " .' . . . . . < . ~ ~ . ' ~ . : :.

' .. : ,< ; .\SOURCE: ~ o m m a n d .Report.. } . . ' ' okura GeJ?eral b . ~ p o l ' , ... . .

nATE: F ~ } > r u a : ryn' i"," .. p

195Zw.

:," 'Source No 338STACKING TELEPHONE POLES." .Ii

The Signal Supply S e c t i o ~ devised anew' method of '"tacking'telephone poles a . they came off the rail cars . Comp ~ t e unlC)ading and .tacking of ' . c a 1 " ' ~ a f t . n ~ b e accomplishedili 'twenty (ZO) to thirty (30) minutes as compared with one hour,'1' --"1ISm,' the oid m e t h o d ~ ' PreYiously the "'ft'a."Ck was 'built 'one Cl.!'I with--the"poles parallel to the car, the next t ier with the polesI p ~ r ~ e ~ ~ c u l a r the car ~ n d so.on. This required the turning

I a . r o W i a o f t h e ~ e v e i i ' o t h e r t ier by meallS of a crane. Inl ' 'the'ue-w- s v s t e M s 1 d d s a r f ! f " p l a ~ ~ c t ' ' ' g a i r i s t t h e ear . aDd all t iers. have the. poles rolled into position parallel to the car. Skidsare also used r a i s ~ the poles onto; e ~ p . s . u c c e s s i v e t ier .Posts are set in the ground at ,.bac;:k ~ , . t ~ e s ~ ~ k to keep ,thepoles from, rolling off.and dunnage is , , ! ~ ; ~ ~ * . 9 . ~ t e ~ ~ y { ' . a n d support each t ier , and, keep the s t a ~ k \ D . ' l i f c ? ~ I J } ~ " W : ~ e R ( ~ p e stackbecomes too h i g h , f o r m a n u a ~ rolling, - - . , c . ~ ~ ~ " i ~ , , e P l p l o y e d tobuild "+P. the, ,emaining tiers.. Wh.en l o ~ i ~ , ~ l . ~ . a ~ : J ~ ~ o m a,stack the process is u.ed in reverse. (RESTRICTED)

.,:i.J: ........ , .....

Over5." .... , ''''}f:iI,,''''''!''

Form No 73 i 9 P ~ F I D E i < J i iAt(Revised 15 Oct 51)


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8>.; S ; Q ~ t t I ~ a l ' = & u I ~ . . , . , . . ...~ - t i ' . " - .-1 for ..6UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: Command Report - 10th FA BnDATE: February 1952 . Source No 339..... : ,. , ".

CAVITIZED 10S-MM HE AMMUNITIONI t is re:cornmehded'that"uUimately all '105-mm HE am

munition 1s's\ied be of t h ~ c a v i t i z . ! 4 ' t y p e and issued unfuzedand that fUze$ of various t y p e $ l b ~ ' d r a w n by battalion ammunition offiee'is' as required. Such a"procedure w6uldobviate: . the n e c e s ~ i t y o f registering wfth more' t h ~ n one type of am munition"and also save time ctha ~ i l . r i a . p f J r ~ c i a b l e amount of'ammunit ion. (RESTRICtED)' ,:.'), ~ ; : ,

w. - . . ! ~ : r - 1 '.I. ." i

SOURCE: ,' t tCom;mand:R.eport - ':x. Corps .ArtyDATE: February 1952' . ':f!' , Source No 340

8" HOWITZER (SELF-PROPELLED) IN DIRECT FIREAGAINST FORTIFICATION'S.

TheSM"HoWitzer (self-propelled) of the 180th Field_ ,A.r:tille.ry.,Battalion employed during January in the sector of-. the 7th US"Infahtry Division was moved to the 1st Marine. __ ._ p,ivitsion. SedDr. During ,February a tptal of 368 rounds were:, expended with the following' results reported: 34 bunkers

destroyed. 5 bunkers damaged. On 24 February 1952. the( gunner was:woU1'lded by small arms. fire and evacuated. Ashield was constructed,bv_Or.dnance..a.nd.Ela.k.v.ests suppliedby the 11th Marine Regiment. An average of 9 .4 roundswas requil.'ed for the destruction of each bunker attacked.(RESTRICTED) , . \ ...

SOURCE: Command Report, ... 1s t FA:' Bn ... 7th IDf Div.", ...... .

DATE: . .January 1 ~ 5 2 Source No 341t". -: ..T RAINING IN PRECISiON MisSIO'NS. ,.,

') " , .-----" '----The greater majority of the observed fire missions fired

by this Battalion are precision fire missions against such ta r gets as bunkers, art i l lery pieces, mortars , and houses. A

UNCLASSIFIED1 . ~ s , " ? ' T X , 's'SePP' H'Olw Form No .

{Revis'ed 15 Oct 2!..~ . ~ 4 . F . t f ' - f f . f f J , A , C


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UNCLASSIFIED

great number of these precision missions are fired by ail 'observation. The nature of ~ h e . t ~ r r a i n and the lack of man made features such, as r o ~ d s , bUildings, etc, increase thedifficulty of accurate map reading by th e a ir observer. Acontinuing program training is necess ary to develop quali fied a ir observers within t ~ e unit.

It is recommended that all 'officers receive more t ra in in g in the conduct of precision ' r r i i ~ ~ i o n s ' and the duties of thea ir observer. All o f f i c e r ~ : s ~ h o ~ l d be'allowed'to conduct aprecision mis.ion as af t 'air.9bserver. , (RESTRICTED). " '" .

SOURCE: Command Report .. 8010th Arn;ty UnitTrans Military Railway Service 'DATE: February 1952 Source No 342

COST C O N S C I O U S N E S S ~ I N D O C T R I N A T I O N . In order to assure c o m p l e t ~ and thorough indoctrination

of a ll military and civi.l.ian membfts . of .tbi.s o r g a n i ~ t i O l l matters pertaining to the Cost Consciousness Program andsupply discipline,a five (5) hour indoctrination course hasbeen prepared in Cost Consciousness and Supply Economy.This course is designed.. to point out individual responsibilities;the effect on the national economy; proper care, maintenanceand security of e q t i i p m ~ i i t : and loss through carelessness andwaste. Training aids, 'charts, and films 'have been incorpo rated in the course to broaden 'the sCope of instructiOD,jUlli t o ' ~ . \insure a thorough indoctrina.tion in cost conaeiousnes;s and acomplete understanding of supply discfliline. Instru

\ ..,', .. '

.' 1:.... iOver7 UNCLASSIFIED

ltos,,; iT INFORMATIONForm No 73(Revised 15 Oct 51)


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UNCLASS\F\D 8_________ 0' 0 , _ , , , .___ 0. , . __ ~ _ __ ._. __ .. o.___ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0__ -SOURCE Command Report .. SIS.7th Army Unit

Oppama Ordnance ShopsDATE: February 195Z Source No 343

SHEET METAL SALVAGE.;,

A program is in effect to r ~ c o v e r the maximum quantity

SOURCE:DATE:

.. ._. , .... .,

of sheet metal usable for manufac,tul"ing p u r p o s ~ s from itemsthat have been declared not econdmically' repairable. Pneumatic: chisels and power hammer:s are in operation in the Salvage Yard for this purpose. bUl'ing the month 'of February.20.000 pounds of sheet steel were shipped from salvag4b' tothe Manufacturing Division. (RESTRICTED) . ~ ~ , .

"

Command Report - 72d T a n ~ BattalionFebruary 1952 Source No 344USE OF HIGH.CLEAT TRACK ON M4A3ES TANKS 'AS ICEAND SNOW GROUSERS.'

..... ~ , ... .., Our experimental use of the H-Cleat Track Block wasunsatisfac:tory. An a t ~ e r n p t was m . 3 : d ~ to c o m p a . ~ , e _ Q \ l z _ w . e l d & d ~ . on-cleat to this expedient. We wished to ascertain how ~ u c h performance was improved over the regular t rack.

Use of the. H-Cleat track, one to every four (4) regular, , ~ ; t " . a c k blocks .. .was .definitely an advantGt-ge over the r e g u l a ~ t rackin making for sharper turns. steeper climbs. better traction,and f i rmer braking. With every fifth (5th) block having protruding'cleats. it ' allowed us to have at least five (5) H:.Cleatblocks 'on the ground at all t imes. '

:..As a testing ground we used an unused mountain road

where we found a very icy section. The tank with th e modifiedt rack had no ' d i f f i c u l t i e s ~ We could not get the tank with the regular t rack up :the road at a : U ~ . . ,

UNCLASSIFIEDOCAFF Form No ..... :C;St.#18EtJT IAL ',.(Revised 15 Oct !.. _/ ,;


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4 I 326M:: fl'4NFbWAAXloN ..C,OICJF )DEN i IAL wUNCLASSIFIED

C O M M E N T ' ~ " p. : ;"': ~ , ; o ; , ! , ' ! ' ' j , : j : , ,' , , .. l..4. ; 1 ~ . : t;f "":. . . ! ; .: r. i iJ t; .. ,.+ ..... !

The' u ..eo f t h ~ J t - e U ~ a ' t track a$ algrouser, c _ u s ~ ' excessive vibratHsn.' , ' M ~ n Y ' p a r t s a r i d pieces of e q u i p m ~ f t t ~ o R , o u r tanks were' shaken foo.e due t();this v i b r a t i o n . : r h e e ~ e s s i v , e vibration caused the deadline of many, tank.. am i we. w ~ r e , ~ .forced to discontinue'use' of this' e ; t p e d l e a t ~ -., " '. .,, " .... .

, Our w e l d e d - 1 m - c l ~ a t gave apl>l'Oximately the same " ~ ' suits without this v i b n : C f o n ~ , Ttiet.e 'Wlust be closer:1su.pervision of 1st Echelon:' Maintenance when the cleats a:re used.Crews must tigitteft"iiuts. bolls" ailct sc_.e_s continually d)lringoperation of th'e"tank". (RES!J.l'JRI:.r.i:Dt ... , \, ;..," , ... 11 . . . . . . . . ._ .. _. . , .

I. : . ' . . I ' , : r '.' 'SOURCE: C o ~ ~ ~ ~ . ! ~ o _ r . . t . ~ ,Z'79th In! 'Regt .__.._........_............ .....-. 45th Inf Div. -.....,DATE: February 195Z Souree Nd 345

'" '\" " i ;!4j: ~ ~ . ( ry,', nt"';,,U N l t ' . A Y O R . A B J " l i Q N Q J l ' . i 9 r ~ : fOR D ~ Y L I G H T P A T R O I ; - ~ .

Patrolling 'durina,! daylight was very costly in that theenemy was well dug in ' and supported by register4td fi1"eB ..f:z:omlight and heavy mort.... artillery, 'and seH-propelled guilt He practiced rigid Cite'control. Daylight patrols.JWere .d...........conill1ued on Z5 J a n ~ r y . It was' ( e l ~ t 1 t a t ' ~ n i g h b . p a t r ~ l ~ Jor th epurpose of gaining contact w l i f h , . h e l ~ f t e r n y w ~ ; b e equaUysuccessfUl and less c o s t l y ~ : : (RsST1UG\l"ED)u::-,.. ' ; ' r .r

. f '. ~ 1 . , " "'.; ........ ; J ( ~ ... ~ . l a ~ ; . l t : . t ~ :J! . ~ ! 1 : . . : ~ ; ., I

I , ..ORGANIZATION OF RAIDER PLA


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. . .10 .UNCLASSIFIED\ .. ' ..! !.1 i: ... ,'. ' ~ : " __ ~ . _ o __ .. " -- _.. - . - . , -1.;- . , . ." , > - - , - ~ ~ : :_O':'--':"t":'"fl.' ,

SOURCE:",,..DATE: September 1951 " ' ~ ' ; ' ' ; ' ; : '< . ' ; :


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!I i i ii4P6Ai&a: ISIt a!CDIe. ril,E.UNCLASSIFIED

not received since it was ne,essary to fire this barrage without recent registered data. ft would have been better to openfire using observed fires . (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Logistical CommandDATE: I January 1952 Source No 348 .," '

AWARDS BY COMMANDERS OF LOGISTICAL COMMANDS.i.

J LIt is recommended that AR 600 -45 be amended to the end, that commanders of logistical commands (C) overseas wh9 a . r e ~ in the grade of major general, or brigadier generals who

occupy T/08rE vacancies of major generals, be authorized to . ,'. .. ' .' , awa:rd iiiUita"ry c t e c o t ~ t i o n s to membe'rs Of their commands . ,,- .._.__.__.;.. --(ft!:ST'R:lCTED) ..-.-...-..... ., ........... ".. ...". '" ....... - ~ ....--.--.. . "

. , 1 1. t t" .. , r "'y: t '1.SOURCE; DATE: Source No' 3 4 ~ ' ~ ... . , . ;, . ,

PATROL TECHNIQUE.. ,1:" .:

The 23d Infantry adopted the practice. of sending qut:.:::. reconnaissance patrols daily and establishing at least two(2) ambushes.within the regimenta.l. s e c t : q r ~ a c l i , i i . r g n l ; , : ' : ~ I } i j 1 - i n g the ' latter part of the month these' night ambushes ;e ' re 'continuous-from darkness"te daWil.' Since tIie e x t r e p i ~ J y ~ o ' \ r - ' ~ ~ ' - rr' 'I ' .. . , .' 1.. . , -/ p; ' "' ".weathe'r made it impractical to leave one ambush force ii i .position throughout th e entire night . ~ a ~ ~ ~ r n \ > u s h was rel ~ e y e d a ; ( t ~ r ~ o J ~ t or t h r e ~ (3) hours a r i , d , . ~ ~ p ; t a . c e d by another group. . .. ~ . , .' . .I...$. . . . . . . . . . . , .........__ .................. _ ....... ... - '" ,-"", _.......... . - -.- . "

;. Several raiding patrols were


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l i t , " ~ .. .. " " ' ; ' - . UNCLASSlF1ED lZ , .

3 .5 ROCKET LAUNCHER ON PATROLS.'Recc) lumend ~ ~ a ' l y s ' : ' ~ ~ t launcher be taken OD raid ... .. '. " .. * .' " ',,, t.. " . ' ". . ,

ing and ~ y 1 i g h t r e c o ~ i 8 8 a n c e patrols . 'This w ~ a p o n i$.. "effective for use aga.inst, l ? u n k e ~ e d . positions a n ~ m ay also ,beused for r e c o ~ a i ~ 8 a n c e . b y . f f . r ~ . ( R E S ~ R I C f E D ) ",

SOURCE: Command Report - Hq EUSAK - Sec n - Book I., t Offiee:--of t h ~ Chief'C)f Sia'!f l . ,

~ ~ ) r : , ~ ' ' . i ~ . ~ ' ; : ' . ! '.DATE: August 1951 Sourc.e ;No 3$0

, 9.(. .f c.

AMBUSH FOR ENEMY S M A L ~ tmIT PROBING ATTAtKS.'. ' . f 0' i' (. .., t'! ; '. 5 t .. . , 4/ ; . '~ . ' 'The A r m Y " c S - 6 n \ r r l ~ d e l etated' ~ : h a t r e p ~ l s i ' n g ~ q - & a d platoon s j : ; ~ e d enemy p t o h i n g : ; a t t a c k ~ was wtoilg;'thatwe'.:should

w e l c _ Q m ~ ~ ; b e m


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..

UNCLASS\F\EDS O ~ ~ C E - ' - - - ~ o m m a n d R e p o r t - - ~ ~ 5 d : t ~ - D ~ ~ - - ' - H ' ' ' - ' > ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' - ' ' - ' - ' DATE: January 195Z Source No 35Z

1 S:&iALi,:UNIT 'TACTIc\AL TiWNING. [ . . . . .J... ; ., d ; $ j . ~ , ,/'.;. l : i E x ~ r r e " h c e ' 1 U i . . 'sllown that, due to"the predominantly' , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ j ~ ~ d . s ~ a # p 1 y i r r e g ~ r c l U i r ~ c t e ' i ? s ~ ~ s of the .' ! ' , Korean baitieground,' as wen as the Chinese 'tactIcal pc'efere n c e . f ~ ~ : ~ t p p ' " d e f ~ D ~ e , most engagement. b'reu'up intoplatoon ai)d' rittn 'squad'ac'iiOil.: Emphasi j i,jhoUld I therefore' .be p ~ e ~ i ~ camall Unit 'tacticsand coO'itlinatiOD,df: fire' .:~ h e - ,low.at, levels. ,(REST RICTED)r!; , ' .:/.,'r .. ! ~ ! : . : '. . :' '. '

SOURCE:DATE: Source No 353

~ . .........._._ .................. -- ............ -_ ...._...._..........._--_ . ., ......... ,,"" .... .INSTRUCTION IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.t .1':, :" '... , "'. . . .!. .,' .":':"J. . .. . t' , ,, :....'" It is recommended that service personnel alerted for '.: o v ~ ~ ~ e a . ' u l C ) v ~ m e r ~ . f t o theaters where indigenous employeesa ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d } n militarY' i n s t a l ~ t i ( ) J \ S be "given a d e q u a t e : ~ i i l l 1 t r u c t i o D iri \ o ~ ' r s o D n e l ' m a n a g ~ m e n t ~ e t h o d s prior to arrival ' a t eWe"sea~ ~ t ~ ~ n . :it i ~ 8 - D ' l t e v e d that pci.riteular)a:tiention in- tflfs i*espect'sllo\l1d'be pald to'persc:inDel'of p o r t ~ r i d \ . d e p o t . t Y P e ' s ' e r i i c e ' . i . . units tc; the end that' the'Vi receive aCtiihUm.iim of te'n(U h ~ s of management,training. (RESTRICTED). ..

~ . - - - - - - - - - - . - - ...SOURCE: ' M ~ t h l y ~ ~ a r y G3 AviationHq IX Corps

F ' e b ~ ~ ~ r ' \ i 9 ~ Z . r f . - ,; : : ) ~ r : F!J';-:'


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. - - - . ~ , - - . ~ - - - -j '"

'.1 ' , \. , \ ..... t .. ' . , . 1 ' . ..

> , The Ordnance Light Aviation .Maintenance Ct>mpanies and the'19th OrdDance B a ~ $ . . r e ~ n g every effort't;; eliminatethis difficulty. b u f s ' ( ) ' f ' ~ r i h ~ 1 bYe not been able to determine' , t ~ e exact Cause. (CONFIDEN'tIAL) ." ,--- ......

"4 'WI to I> ." ... - ..- .... ,S O U ~ C E : Command Report - 430th Engr C Bn

I.DATE: Oetober 1951 Source No 355... .... .............. ... _........-"_ ............ ~ . , ~ ' . < L '.-:': . ; \

" J During the month of Octob"ei! c ; ~ ~ ~ (1), ' ~ i l e of ' ~ ~ i n SupplyRoute)124 was sprinkled daily with t ~ ~ e 750 g a l l o ~ water distr ib ~ t o r . Maintenance' reqUirements ' ( g ' ~ a d i n g , dragging, ands ~ r t a c i n g ) . t h i s test mile were'decreased approxim ately. fiftyper ~ e n t , . (500/0).. Dust was greatly eUminated even wider heavyt r a ~ i , ~ conditions, thus 'reducin'g ' d r i v ~ n g ~ a z a r ~ and,e x c e s s i L v ~ vehicular wear due to dust getting into moving parts .(RESTRICTED) . "., .' .....

I -, - ,," ...... " ..,.. . . . . .. """'" : 1 ' >.. "o 1' . / \

Report 'o{-Opli' ~ L A C R B I R r i .-....s q Y ~ Y i : _ . ;DATE': October 1951 , , ' "q ~ o u r c e No 356

'" . ,..... -... ..HE'LlCOPTER TRANSPORTATION.

! ) .. 1 '.SuppJies can be built up at any s ~ i t a b l e l o c a t i o ~ . at an,e x t r ~ m . e l y . rapid rate provided casualties are not brought out.Usi:f18'.the cargo 'nets, the 'helicopter il$ at the landing spot amaximum of..30 seconds which includes the a p p r ~ c : h and retire ment. I f casua'lties a're to be e v a c u a t e d , ~ o m e ' 3 or 4 mml,ltesper helicopter- are Ileeessary for the lanCling of supplies andloading of the woun4ed. '. Extensive, .. t 1 " a ~ n i n g and practice willeventuallY , r e c i ~ c e this ,by 1 to 2 minutes. (CONFIDENTIAL). . ...-.- .. "',."..... , ".:":

. ,; . ' ) . , .; . '

UNCLASSiFiEDOCAFF Form No(Revised 15 Oct , ,


17/26

...UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: T .. Command Report - I US Corps - Par t IDATE: I August 1951 Source No 357

TANKER'S HELMET.t ' ' ' ;.. .The p r e s e n t r ' S t e e l l u ~ ~ t . with t a ~ e r ' s c;ut-awayhelmet l iner as headgea,r for , c , ~ ' t I s . ; i ~ .. u n ~ ~ i ~ f a c t o r y . It is a bUlky, awkwa1"d.affair for men:.,.,hQ : t . i g h t J ~ o r n t h ~ in side of a t a ~ a n d who re1isJl; what ext,ra I:oom they can h ~ v e

in t b e i r f i g b t i n g . ( v e h ~ l : l e . ,The World, Yiar n "Crash H e l m ~ t . "

SOURCE:DATE:

'.J .

SOURCE:DATE:

football s t y 1 ~ ... is $tiU'agrea 'Javori te.with tank crews becauseof . i t s . d ~ S , d . & n ; hqwev.er, i t offers them little p r o t ~ c t i o n fr,@mshell fra/lrrtleat:s:..: (RESTRICTED) . ".

.. - (.I - . , .. '" ' ' . " !. !C o ~ n d , . R . e ~ ~ ' . ~ 55th T ~ a r i s Trk Bn, . ;' . ','. !"1.( . , . . f T I July 1951' . ; - : : - - - : - ~ ; " 7 . - : : - - ; : : - : 7 : ' , Source No 358

. . I ~ . l J. (1 .} ..... t 'l "'\ _. . -.-_11 ......___ .,... _." ' ~ . During W ; ~ : r ; f d Yfp.r ~ ~ , as , ~ ~ N as in this, Korean action, ithas been observed thai t ruck Wilts are invar'iab1y called uponto operatetwenty";four ' ( 2 4 ) n o u i ' s ' a c m y ~ " - S e ' V ' e n t 7 ) 'days a week

during the "fighting" phase regardless of whether or not thet ruck companies have ..tigmented f Q J ; l r ~ ~ d the cloclc .., - .l . . '. . 1-- ,operations. T h ~ dem"JI)4s on t h ~ ~ _ d r ~ y e ; ~ the t ~ H - c k . 'companies w i t h o u t _ a u g l ' n : e J , \ ~ ~ . ( ) ~ t t e a . m , ! t . , b a v ; ~ J r ~ C J . u e n ~ Y b;en , '.unreasonable and r e s u l ~ ~ ; C i ; ~ ! s . e r i o u t d ; r ~ v e r f a t ~ $ H 5 . On, ' s o ~ e occasions t ~ s .bas been the . d J r e c t , ~ ~ s F - : ~ f t l ; 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ J ) ! . s ? t ~ e r s . and destruction of a u ~ ~ o t j ~ . ~ u i P l J l e ~ ~ (RESTRIC'l'F;D) .

)J '..,' . ' : ; ; : . :. I . ,; ," ; . , .Command R e p o ~ ~ aZd A.A.A AW Bn (SP) . ,' I ',', . JJ . . .... r. r? ';.' :

Janua'ry,195Z ... " ~ - - ~ ' . " " " " ...... ~ . - - _ "_'" .... " .... ~ . a ~ p 3,29 ,* " ';", ,', ':." J!r. or, .... I' * . " "

A " X ' l N S T R U C T O t t ~ S ' TO FECOM ."..... _. ....( J l , i

It is recommended that AA Instructor T ~ ~ m s be detailedfl'l'.Qrn. .theContiftelltal ' 9 ~ i . . t . 4 c l - S i a t q s ; ~ i i ' ~ C p M for the purposeof bringing AA units up to date on new firing techniques andemployment and operation of AA mater ia l . (RESTRICTED)

UNCLASSIFIED Over15 rForm No 73 elf "GUrtpe ( I ~ : m n t ((Revised 15 Oct 51) j ~ " r ' ~ ~ r f IW.
http:///reader/full/hqwev.erhttp:///reader/full/hqwev.er


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16 .UNCLASSIFlED . ..SOURCE: Command :R:eport . Zd ' C h e ~ i c a : l Mortar 'Sn.. ' ...... ,,t"i ' . ~ ( ; > \ : " : r ~ ~ ' DATE: October. 1951' ,

I , ; , ' J ,"j. .. ,.RP;CORDING LOT NUMl3ERS OF MORTAR AMMutaTIo,N. , ......__ .... , . . . . . . . . . . \ . . . . . . . . ' $' UZI ""O_'._ ..... _ .. AmmUnition supply: On Z6 September 1951: this o r g ~ zation. initiated t h ~ p r ~ ~ i c e of ~ ~ c o . ~ ~ the lot numbers of~ ~ ~ . b r o ~ ~ ~ i J . : ~ 4 .. f ~ c m l _ e . ~ ~ J L m 1 L ~ ! ' ...._.Thl.' . P ~ ~ c Y . . . Y ! ~ ! . ! - ~ o ~ ~ ~ ? ..in o r ~ e r that, should an accident be caused by faulty ammunition. the lot number of the r O U n d ; V r i ~ d 'be"known;imiheaiately.Another reason for this poliey:is-,that 7atiUnunitionfrom the : ;'same manufacturerslot has'the'same weight r a . t i i l g ~ hl orderto get the most accurate resUlts,: ammunition containing identical ~ e i g h t ratings (marked"on each;iiliilIl):;s'hoUld be. fired oneach mis.sion. {RESTRICT'ED)';'' ' ' ' ':; '>;., :. 1. :);'. : ~ . ' < ,

. ~ ~ , t j: ; . t 1 ~ , " , SOURCE: Command Report .. . ,Zd ;Chemi,q.a.l.. M o r ~ r . B,n, ; " ! " .S", " , .# .,........................ .. . . , , ,.. _ ........... . . . . . ' .. " . . . . . . .4. . . . . ..... ... _ . _-_ .. ., ,. ' ~ - - _ j \

, . , , : : . , ~ J

UNCLASSIFiEDpE?"T; ! i Ai iGiiOCAFF Form No 71 1(Revised 15 Oct 8 8 ~ J " I Q i ~ J T I A L
http:///reader/full/cartrid.gehttp:///reader/full/cartrid.ge


19/26


20/26

18 'UNCLASSIFIEDSOURCE: C Q m m a . ~ 9 . l J . e p o r t ,- JLC " - 1 , 1 . . _. .,' ; \

" 'l . ,:.. ,"DATE: December 1951 Sour


21/26

_Aeakl I I lUi S i a : O t l ; ~ .., j"COIQF aDEN.; lAGUNCLASSlF\O

SOURCE: Commal'ld Repol" .. 18th FA Bn. ,. ' : S o u r ~ e 'No 365ATE:

LEADERSHIP TRAINING.Noncommissioned Officers: GeneraUy noncommissioned

officers are well trained and qualified in their MOS, butapproximately fifty per cent are not trained in leadership andtheir responsibilities of taking care of the men in t h e i : r _ $ . e , c . ~ , ..t i o n s ~ . It is very difficult and time consuming to conduct thisj 1 : r A i . " , \ b : ~ g , under combat conditions. It is recommended thatm o r e , , ~ ~ p h a s i s be p l a ~ e d on NCO LeadershipTrainingiri 'Continental United States. During Field Exercises and Maneu

,rers, th e practical .speets of .the above training should bel e r . n p h a s i z e d a ~ illllevels. ,,(RESTRICTED) . l;, 'SOURCE: Command Report - 17th In f

; or :. I., " .,DATE: December 1951 Source No 366 1. i: -.PUG-IN ,TANKS.

F i ~ i n g p o s i t i o n s ~ e ~ e dug in with the guns jutting"obt'over,. ,the ~ b u J , l k e r ; ~ o f the friend!y rifle troops. ' The ta.'nks wered u g j : n : f o u ~ feet;deep forward and a minimum of two feet deepa,long:the.sides. Defilade positions were1prepared fust:tiacko , f t ~ e , r ~ z o r ..1ine ridge, amat t e t of ten yards . There'washardlY J;P9m to t u ~ around:, but after firing 'the ' t ~ n k s i ~ ! j t i l l ' ~ d s.afety by the short distance into defilade, The area was glirenthe a ~ ~ e d ; security of th'e' antitank and mine platoon who hada s . ~ ~ ~ t e d in the preparation of the positi'ons '111d remained in'the,a'.J;ea. ..:'" . " , ' .' ;;"

; ). '; "On the first day. the .pla*o,on demonstrated its tactical

a a : V a n ~ B ~ ~ y ~ o m . p l e t e l y destrOying '19 bunkers. damaging52 others, and blowing up an a m . m u n i t h m . , ~ b m : ) . p . . .0,1'1. the.. sameday, the "tanks accoUnte'ci f ~ r ' ~ ~ e stirnated 35 ,enemy killed "and 'an' 'esdmat'ed 75 wounded. (RESTRICTED)

.' ) ' f ' .. : ..,.. , .....

UNCLASS\F\EO Overg t G e : l I ~ IN6RIQIAI IOi4

.... ..CAFF Form No 73 .(Revised 15 Oct 51) eeUFIBEHT'At


22/26

UNCLASSIFIED SOURCE:DATE:

SOURCE:DATE:

Command Report - Hq, EUSAKDecember 1951 Source No 167CCF AND NK ATTACK DOCTRINE .

The Communist attack doct!rine as observed in allmajor enemy attacks in Korea, is inflexible. Subordinateunits were not permitted to make adjustments which terrain.friendly defenses, or other factors might have indicated asbeing desirable. Alternate or secondary missions were notassigned to assaulting units. Enemy patrols always u.tilizedthe shortest routes of a p p r o a c ~ ~ n ~ :return. Enemy patrolformations were standard and rna'de DO allowance foZ! dif ferences in terrain or friendly d!.position. P r e p a r a t i 4 ~ 1 J for an attack followed an inflexible and unvarying pattetnwhich soon Qecame apparent to friendly forces. And fin411y,enemy insistence, due t b ' i n f l e ~ i b i l i t y , on mass employmenttactic s proved costly '.mth.e face .of,: U ~ i t ~ d Nations air a.ndartillery firth : ,.; , < . ~ ~ " ,. ' ."''', .

The enemy l a c k e d , . s l i f f i c i e ~ ~ logistical support to sus tain an extended o f f e n s i v e ~ ' : .J j"The enemy lacked c o i h t n u n i ~ a t i o n s facilities. This

hampered cC?ntrol of unite i f t . t h . ~ titta:c.k. and may have beenthe basic caus-e for the i n f l ~ x i b i l l f Y ' 0 f enemy tactics.I., .JIJ f/ "#'.1., L , . . ' , .p

E n e m y ~ ' units employed' little .flank support or securityduring a t a d i e a l ; ~ a r e h . (RE'ST.ruCTED) , '".

. ,. . : 1.)1 .. ...... ', _ 0" . ILetter :,,'Hq i . ; ~ t h . inf Div .' ,. :;"

, . ; . , ; .. -, .. 'J' i '5 D e c ~ b e r 19'.(,... ". ~ ~ . Source No 368 . ' : . ~ . '; ~ v " ., : . I ;-_., ~ * , q ' : ; ; . ~ ~ t h Engr C Bn, investigated f e a s i b i l i ~ y . of

e l e c t r i ~ x i \ i : : , b ~ ! - b ~ i r e fences so that any unprotected:eon tact would' ~ e t e t h a l . '.

..-...,....: ' , ,"... (:"SSllQ'TX ",[SRPSST:O"OCAFF Form No 73,Revised 15 Oct )

....Q g ~ l F . I B E ~ l T l 1 t . , ~


23/26

- r' SFGIIQ'T?f PI iii .Ai is,S

, O ~ 4 F ~ e E P ~ T I A L .UNCLf\SS\f\ED

M a t ~ t 1 4 U . u.ed: standal'd barbed wire: 7.5 KW transformer: 3 KW 110 v o l t ~ single phase, gasoline driven generator; porcelain insulators, 3 inches in diameter.

I,

i Dese,l'iption of test set-up:! !I .. : A d'our-.strandcattle,yp,e fence 100 yards IOIl,g. '!las'.,

erected. P,QSts lwere lum'ber. Bottom strand was: J ? ~ c e ~ : . , ; , : .. :.eight {8) inches ~ f r o ~ the grouncJ... R e ~ . i . t . U n g s t l : " a n d s , , 7 " Y ~ , ~ ~ j a p p r o x i m a t e l y _ ~ ,(Qat apart. All & ~ r a , n 4 " , w e r e ~ n . . i n s u 1 a t ~ r . s . '" ' . !Vertical wire strands (any medium size) were then used'toelectrically tie t h e h o r ~ ~ o n t a l barbed w ~ . r e ~ . t r i l A 4 ~ ; ~ g e t h e r . These ver1;ical s t . a n d s , w e ~ e 9..inehes a p a r t r b e t w ~ e n the "bottqm two h o . d z o ~ t a l s t r ~ n d s of barbed, ~ i ~ ~ . a n ~ i 18 i D c h e ~ apart-between ~ e l o t h e r horizontal stran!ois., ' .. . ' . f

z. A l e ~ d was brought in to the high side of a' I 0 5 ~ ) 3 6 0 0 volt t ~ a n s f o r m e r . The other lead of th e t ransformer was w e l ~ ,.groundpd to a wire buried 6 inches deep, tw o feet from the '. -.fence and running its length. The low side of the transforme,twas connected to the generator.

Results of the'fe,st:, I ,' . '.1. The lethal effectiveness of the fence against a full- .scale attack cannot be determined at this time, as the onI'y :( I .

CCF reaction so far has been to send a patrol which leaned asteel rod against it, then withdrew . . Z. Dry and wet logs were thrown across th e fence.

Voltage readings were nO,t. appreciably c h a n g e ~ . ,3 . Strands of the wire were cut. As long as:one strand

of wire remained intact, voltage ~ ~ d i . n g s r ~ i n , a i n e d . s u ~ ! 5 t a n : ' : i " " '.tiaUy unchanged on both sides of the break.. . . ,

'" . i ., ' . .... , : " 1 . 4. Steel pickets leaned against the fence caused adrop of 10 per cent in \foltage beyond the -picket.5, Voltage across the fence measured 3300 volts.(RESTRICTED) , :). .

UNCLf\SSlF\E.DOCAFF Form No 73(Revised 15 Oct 51)


24/26

" ......UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE:DATE:

SOURCE:DATE:

Command'Report ... 37th FA BnJanuary 1952 ' "i" " Source No 369

- '!

20 POWER SPOTTING SCOPE FOR ARTILLERY USE."; The M':"49 , 1.20 power spotting scope has proved invaluable

in locating neo# t ' ' fgets. Any battalion without this instrumentis greatly handicapped, perhaps unknowingly. I t should beauthorized to e.aeh battery on the basis of two (2) each.(RESTRICTED) : : . . I:

.fl

Command Report - XVI Corps:December 1951.RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED SECURITY INFORMATION TONEWS AGENCiES .

PROBLEM: Security training has been hampered byrelease to various public news media of information whiehis still c 1 a s 8 i t H ~ d 'security information to military personnel., t 1, ,

, EVALUATION: This practice tends to nullify th e securitytraining given to troops. In additlbnl. when' ,the general publicknows more a,b.'out wncit isg'oing to happen to th e solaier thanthe soldier h i p i s e l f ~ ' it ~ i e w e d as a bloW t ( ) ~ h i s ' p l ; ~ s t i ' g e and s e l f ~ e s t e e m with a'esultant dr'op in morale. ' ( J ; < ~ . '

. '." '! i: ,; .

, ~ E C ' b M M ~ ~ D A T I q ~ : 'It is: s ~ r o n ; t y . r e c o , m ~ e n d ~ ~ thatthe sa!me c ~ i t e r i ' a for the classification-of"informatfon'be': ' > ~ , applied to the press ana bther news rhedia as that w h i ~ h : b' !applied to military dissemination of information, with particula r effort being made to notify troops affected through military channels p ~ i o r to the' time that they may hear the samen e ~ s , ~ h r o u , g h public s o u r c e ~ ~ (RESTRICTED)

r:."t'

UNCLASS\F\EO ~ r . m " ? ! T X INERRMOH ,OCAFF Form No 73 es

{Revised 15 Oct ) e 9 P J F I B E ~ 4 i , . " ' "


25/26

e r e " ' ~ i , q ; L _ ., ... ~ \ ~ . " ., ~ p . i n i n g , from infantry $ o ~ r ~ ~ e ~ . ~ o r m a t i o n , b a s t ; ~ 9 ~ crater aqysis . 'The reason for this difficulty appears to be lack of knOwledgeof ..to make c ~ ~ : t " ~ l y l i j 1 s " - " ' ( C O N F I D E N T I A L )

'r ... . , . , _ . '\ . '" .

.... ._- ...... - ~ - - .... '.-............ ....... .:', ", I , ':

", L q A :t ) .: ,", , . .1\... .. .'OverZ3

U I ~ C L A S S \ F I E D 1-,OCAFF Form No 73(Revised 15 Oct 51)


26/26

U N C L ~ S S \ F \ E D Z4

SOURCE: Command Report 31 s t FA Bn. 7th Inf DivDATE: December 1951 Source No 374

REDUCED STRENGTH:GUN, CREWS.; , d.,of "," ''- ,. ,.. . ' ' : r ~ ';', .' , ~ ; . . . . ' ~ . ' Twenty-four h.oult, o p ' J " a . ~ i o n & ~ ~ r . n a n d that:.h.owitzer',c:rews" , . ie divided into. tw9' group,s. This'.means tha.t each howitz 'er :" 'operated by a 5 or 6 man crew. As a result, each cannoneeris requirect-to :pefform the duties of tw o persons as outlined

in FM 6-81. "Service of th e Piece 155-mm Howitzer M I. ItThiS"collsolidation of duties has been worked out w'liliin the" ..-........Battalion; however, it is believed that more study should bemade of this problem. (RESTRICTED)

. ;..,;..

30URCE: Command Report - 5th R e ~ i m e n t a l Combat Team r. ' . ' .. . .' . ' .' ':. ., '. r p ~ . ' , ....DATE: January 195Z S o u r ~ ~ , N ~ : :375" . ..- ,.....

I,"

" SNOW CAMOUFLAGE. .The Regiment m a d . r e X t ~ i i s i v e use of the white snow suit

for purposes' of camouflage over snow covered terrain. Itis difficult to"distingiii'sh a'-man'at even-s'hort 'ranges while - ..he is wearing 'one of these suits. (RESTRICTED)'"

' . . . . . . . . . . . , "J .. .__ ,_ ...... ... _.__ '

,) I

, \

. -,...."., . ~ . ." ' ~ " "

%SIIR:U '8'52?P 7OCAFF Form No 73

Documents

Korean War Dissemination of Combat Info 10 June 2