Korean War Dissemination of Combat Information 23 Oct 1952

8/7/2019 Korean War Dissemination of Combat Information 23 Oct 1952

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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES C:16954-/0For t Monroe , Virginia

ATTNG-26 350. 05/60(DOCI)(C)(23 Oct 52 ) 23 October 1952SUBJECT: Disseminat ion of Combat Informat ion

TO: See distribution

1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5,format ion, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded to Department ofthe A r m y , Army F ie ld Forces , and the serv ice schools for evaluat ionand necessary action. I t m ay be appropriate , in cer ta in cases , forthese agencies to take action upon a single extracted i tem; in others ,i t m ay be desirable to develop a eros s -sect ion of accumulated extractson a par t icu la r subject before ini t iat ing action; and often, the extractedi tem serves to reaff i rm our doctr ines and tec'hniques.

2. Copie s are. furnished to other mili tary agencies to keepthem informed concerning thea te r problems from thef rmt l ine throughthe logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are der ived f rom repor ts which are c l as sified SECRET. F or th e gr ea te r convenience of the user , this Officedowngrades each extended i tem to the lowest class i f ica t ion compat iblewith securi ty. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any port ionof the ext rac ted r emar ks , so that none of the original intent is los t .

4. Combat informat ion EXTRACTS here in which a re applicableto training a t the company-bat tery level also appear in A r m y FieldForces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

1Extrac ts f rom sources Lt Col, AGe51 5 thru 54 5 As st Adjutant Genera l

DISTRIB UTION: " ,1UNCLASSIfIED Copy No '. '_(Over) - - - - CN 27342V',',"', 'nn #: 5 ' " ~ ~ ' ' ' - l t


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~ ' l j l . i r iUNCLASSIFIED smnil 'f P IDISTRIB UTION:Copy No 102-111 Chief Signal Officer1- 3 ACOFS. G- l , DA 112-121 The Surgeon Genera l4- 6 ACOFS, G-2, DA

122-125 Chief of Transportat ion7- 21 ACOFS, G - ~ . DA CG's22- 41 ACOFS, G-4, DA 126-127 The Armored Center42- 43 The Adjutant General The Arti l lery Center44- 45 Chief of Chaplains 128-129130-131 The Infantry Center46- 55 Chief Chemical Officer56- 65 Chief of Engineers Comdt132-133 Army War College66-- 67 Chief of Finance68- 69 Chief of Information 134-135 CGSCArmy Genera l School70- 71 The Inspector General 136-13772- 73 The Judge Advocate 138-139 Asst Comdt, TheArtille ry School ,Genera l

AA&GM Br74- 75 Chief of Military History Pre s 76- 77 Chief, National Guard 140 A FF Board No 1Bureau 141 AFF Board No 278- 87 Chief of Ordnance A FF Board No 388- 89 The Provos t Marshal 142143 A FF Board No 4General CO, Art ic Test Branch90- 99 The Quar termaster 144 ChiefsGeneral 145 AFF HR U No 1100-101 Executive for Reserve and 146 A FF HRU No 2ROTC AffairsCopie s furnished: 147-246 TAG (4 0 CINC, Fa r East ; 10 ea CINC's and CG's other

Major Oversea Commands) CGls

247-248 Fi r s t Army 249-250 Second Army 251-252 Third Army 253-254 Four th Army 255-256 Fifth Army 257-258 Sixth Army 259-262 A rm y AA Command 263-264 Military Distr ic t of Washington 265-266 Tactical A ir Command

26 7 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, Dept of the Navy268-269 CO, Mountain & Cold Weather Tng Command270 Chief, Army Advisory Gp, Air Command and Staff271-272 School, Air Unive rsi ty (Se e next page).. -- ; . UNCLASSIFIED


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ATTNG-26 350. 05/60(DOCI)(C)(23 Oct 52) 23 October 1952Subject: Disseminat ion of Combat Information

Copies furnished: (Cont)273-274275-276277-278279-280281-282283-284

285

286287288-321322-323324-328329-332

33 333433533633733833934034134 2343344345

346-355

Comdt of Cadets , US Military AcademyComdt

Armed Forces Staff CollegeMarine Corps SchoolUSAF Air-Ground Operat ions SchoolCounter intelligence Corps SchoolThe Provos t Marshal Genera l ' s School

Officer in Charge, Atlantic Flee t Intel l igence Cen.Attn: Ground Forces Officer

OCAFFG lG2G3 (14 cy G3(26))G4RDCombat Arms Advisory GpChaplainCmlComptEngrInfoMedO rdPMQMSigTransDCOFSAG RecordsExtra copie s

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C:16954/()U ~ ~ L A S S 1 F I E D SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corp-s

Source No 515ATE:

(SECRET)DEFENSE TACT1CS. - Due to th e development of the recoil less r i f le ,

both s ides now have the capabil i ty of employing these weapons in direc tf i re roles against bunkers . It, therefore , becomes m ore impor.tant thanever that combat outposts be employed extensively well beyond the mainl ine of res is tance to keep the enemy at "a r m s -length, I I in order to main""tain the in tegr i ty of main l ine of res is tance bunkers .

Due to direct fire weapons and the demonstra ted capabil i ty of theenemy to employ massed ar t i l lery against forward slopes , a re -evaluation.needs to be made concerning defense works. Forward slopes should beused as little as possible under th e above conditions and tunnels dug frOomr e a r to front with slnal l aper tures toward the enemy for observat ion pur poses;.. reverse slope bunkers should be employed with cover sufficient towithstand our own VT f ires ; machine guns should be si ted to cover r e a rand flank approaches; high ground and observat ion points should be deniedthe enemy by the use of VT and high explosive ar t i l lery concentra t ions;and tact ical wire should be used to the maximum.

The above is a sound concept fo r defense.

SOURCE: Command Report - 17th Infant ry R egimentDATE: May 1952 Source No 516

(RESTRICTED)CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMORED VEST. - Pr i o r to use of the body

a r m o r by personne l of this regiment , the m en were oriented as to the capabil i t ies of the vest . F or example, the ves t is excellent in stopping shel lf ragments , but can not be expected to stop enemy smal l a r m s f i re . Alsoin several cases , the vest has deflected enemy 7.62 -m m fire result ing inno injury to the wearer . Several of the m en f rom the 17th Infantry worethese vests on patrols , and in one ins tance, a m an f rom Company I wassaved f rom a possible fatal injury when shel l f ragments s truck th e vestwithout penetrating it. On another occasion, a m an from Company A wasknocked down by smal l a r m s fire str iking him in the s tomach, but th e miss i ledid not penetrate the vest .

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2RECOMMENDATIONS: That al l personnel exposed to enemy fire be

equippe,d with this ve st.

SOURCE: Command Report - 65th Infant ry RegimentDATE: March 1952 Source No 51'7

(CONFIDENTIAL)AN/PRC 10 RADIO. - The advantage s of this se t a re numerous but

there are cer ta in recommendat ions that this unit would advocate . Theconstruct ion of the hand se t is ext remely weak. I t seems to have beendesigned for r ight hand operat ion which is not the usual case . Also thecircuits a re so demanding on the bat te ry that the set tends to drif t .offf requency as the battery is drained. This demands more than the averagec;Lmount of cal ibra t ion.

The gang plug to the bat tery has too much space between i t and thel i d ~ a l l o w i n g i t to work loose. I t is recommended that a ta l le r plug be usedwith a rubber bumper to take up the space.

The contact plug on th e hand set loses contact when fully seated andregains contact when removed sHghtiy f rom i ts base .

SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth United States Army Korea Ar mor DATE: January 1952 Source No 518

(RESTRICTED)MINE CLEARING WITH DEMOLITION. - Recently the 3d Engineer

Combat Bat ta l ion conducted a tes t in the use of demoli t ions fo r mine field c lea r ing .. Six s tandard TMD-B box mines were placed in a typical Korean roada t depths varying from eighteen to thirty inches, covered with damp ear thand left in the ground for a day to f reeze .

The mined area was covered with a network of demoli t ion blocks.After detonation i t was found that all mines under the network of demoli t ionblocks had been detonated or completely crushed and disarmed, but minestwo feet outs ide the network of demolit ion blocks were not affected.

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S ~ 2 : g , 'liZ:SOURCE: Command Repor t - 981 st Field Arti l lery Battal ionDATE: June 1952 Source No 519

(RESTRICTED)ARTILLER Y RAMMER. - In recent months units have been exper i

menting with a new typ'e r a m m e r for the I55-mm howitzer project i le . Theseexper iments were made because three deficiencies were noted with the conventional bronze s t a r r ammer ; these deficiences are :

a . The s t a r r a m m e r sl ips from the base of the project i le and catchesin the breech r ecess .

b. In slipping i t m a r s the recess and i t has resu l ted in the droppingof the project i le .

c. The slipping of the s t a r rammer resu l ts in the improper seat ingof the project i le .

In an endeavor to eliminate these deficiencies an exper imental r a m m e rwas constructed from the rubber cushion found in the xnetal axnxnunitioncontainers for 105-mm howitzers . It was found that this raxnmer elixninatedall of thf! deficiencies noted in th e bronze s t a r r ammer .

Recommend that a new type rubber r a m m e r be developed for separa teloading amxnunition.

SOURCE: Coxnxnand Report - 143d Field Arti l lery Battal ionDATE: June 1952 Source No 52 0

(RESTRICTED)SWITCaBOARD ALLOWANCE IN FA BN. - When switchboard BD-71

o r BD-72 is used as an "in l ieu of" i tem for swi tchboard SB -22/PT r ecommend that i t be accompl ished on a "drop for drop" bas is , 1. e. t two eachBD-71 o r on e each BD-72 for each SB -22/PT.

Recomxnend that an additional switchboard , BD -72, be allowed afield ar t i l le ry battal ion on T IO&E to handle the many direc t l ines feedinginto fire direction center . This would eliminate the many EE-8 te lephonescur ren t ly fulfilling this requi rement .

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SOURCE: Command Repor t - 2d Division Arti l leryDATE: June 1952 Source No 521

(RESTRICTED)LANGUAGE BARRIER WITH ROK FO's . - Constant efforts were made

to improve the coordinat ion between the ROK infantry and forward observersand the US FA battal ions. Missions from ROK FO's were handled by severa ldifferent methods in order to speed up the del ivery of f i re . Some missionswere sent direct ly to the battal ion and regimental l iaison officers, wherethey were processed by in te rpre te r s and called in to the FDC by te lephone.Others came direct ly to the battal ion FDC, where an in te rpre te r wasconstantly on duty. This la t ter system proved to be th e m o s t effective.But even so the weakness of in te rpre te r s in ar t i l le ry te rms and phrasesfrequently delayed fire and on many occasions the volume of fire del iveredwas l arger than necessary . Training of both forward observers andin te rpre te r s has gradually reduced these defic iencies .

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Infantry DivisionDATE: May 1952 Source No 522

(RESTRICTED)CLEARING FIELDS OF FIRE. - With the advent of s u m m e r growing

weather , a new hazard to the securi ty of the main line of resis tance hasdeveloped in the form of heavy foliage on the steep and rugged slopes fac,ingthe enemy. The t r ees and underbrush r es t r i c t visibi l i ty and aid the enemyin his efforts to work in close to snipe and ra id . This problem 'does notexis t on enemy high ground, because his posit ions have been blas ted a lmostbare by friendly mor ta r and ar t i l le ry fire.

To alleviate this si tuat ion, efforts have been made in all regimentsto c lear f ields of fire by cutting, by using f lame th rowers , by pouring gasolineover areas and then igniting, and by pouring gasoline over areas and leavingi t to wither the vegetation.

None of these expedients proved sat is factory . Cutting par t ies werehandicapped by the wide and dense mine fields, marked and unmarked,

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UNCLASSIFIED Stf'8l2b__ ~ _ , -across the entire Division front , and by the enemy 's abil i ty to place accuratemor ta r and ar t i l lery fire on . targets of opportuni ty. All methods of usinggasoliner.equir.ed ex.c.essiveamounts of fuel and produced m eager resu l ts .

SOURCE: C.ommand Report - 40th Division Arti l leryDATE: June 1952 Source No 523

(RESTRICTED)FLAK SUPPRESSION. - A system for m ore effective f lak suppress ion

has heen worked out by the FSCC, and has been tested on one occasion,but will requi re fur ther testing to prove i ts effectiveness. After the ta rge thas heen approved for an a ir s tr ike. a plot of all known and suspect anti ai rcra i tpos i t ions within a radius of four thousand mete r s of the ta rge tcen te r i s made by the 52 and a TOT schedule i s se t up fi ring all possiblear t i l lery pieces a t all of the antia ircraf t posi t ions s imul taneously. Whenthe i i :ghter bombers arr ive in :the ta rge t a rea . the T6 Mosquito observer .wh.o is to direc t the s tr ike. leads them over the target and the ar t i l lerymar ks the t arget with a smoke round. When the Mosquito is sat isf ied thatall of the fighter pilots have identified the target . he sends them away f romi t .on a course which will c lear the t ra jector ies of the ar t i l lery pieces . andcalls for the flak suppres sion. Knowing the t ime of flight of the art i l lery ,be turns the fight ers and s tar t s them back toward the t a rge t to arr ive i m m e diately following the ar t i l lery "sp lash ." and they go in while the hosti leant ia i rc ra f t is s t i l l neutralized. All art i l lery is fired with VT fuze and asa precaut ion against late rounds arr iving af te r the fighters s ta r t in , an"a l l c lear" round of smoke is f i red on Division Art i l le ry order when aUunits have repor ted "rounds comple te . " This f inal smoke round is loadedand ready and should arr ive at the target within seconds of the ar t i l leryconcentration.

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 7th Division Arti l leryDATE: June 1952 Source No 524

(CONFIDENTIAL)COUNTERMORTAR SYSTEM. - The disposi t ion and use of enemy

mor ta r s remained approximately the same as during the preceding month.However . due to the increased volume of t i re falling on patrols . the

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p SSSfJiTsA:! UNCLASSIFJED 6 countermor tar sect ion adopted slightly different tactics to meet the si tuat ion.Previous ly only known or st rongly suspected mor ta r locat ions were plot tedand included in the countermor tar programs. Too grea t re l iance wasplaced on the radar sets and visual s ight ings by the ground and a ir observation posts for the protection of patrols advancing into enemy te r r i to ry . Anew system was ini t iated in which the enemy area surroWlding each objective was divided by concent r ic circ le s . the radius of each represent ing therange of known enemy types of mor ta r s . F o r example. the inner circlerepresented the maximum distance that 60-mm mor ta r s could be placedf rom the objec t ive for the weapons to be brought to bear on th e area . Thenext circle indicated the range of BZ-mm mor ta r s and the outer circle therange of the lZO-mm mor ta r . This overlay was then given to the photointerpretat ion sect ion for intensive study. The object being that within theinner c irc le , a reas where these smal l weapons could be mounted werecareful ly char ted, the second circle located only areas of sufficient sizefor 82-mm mor ta r s , and the outer circle emplacement s capable of housinga l 20 -mm weapon. In this manner individual f i re plans were se t up fo reach patrol , and, by fi ring VT fuzed ammunit ion on the locat ions so char ted ,maximum s ~ p p r e s s i o n was achieved with only a sl ight increase in ammuni t ion expended.

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 10th Field Art i l le ry Battal ionDATE: May 1952 Source No 52 5

(RESTRICTED)MOBILE FDC. - I t is recommended that ordnance i s sue to each

field art i l lery battal ion a vehicle speci f ical ly designed as a mobile FDC;al ternate ly , i t is recommended that ordnance cause to be manufactured,and then i s sue to field ar t i l le ry bat ta l ions, necessary mater ia l and ins t ruct ions for modificat ion of cur ren t T IO&E t rucks such as GMC 1/2- tonLWB to be used as a mobile FDC. The mobile FDC should be designedto provide sufficient space for normal FDC operat ion with crew includingthe S2 sect ion. I t is to be s t ressed that the normal efficiency of a batt a l ionFDC and S2 sect ion operat ing in a permanent bunker- type instal lat ion m u s t not and need not be sacr i f iced for mobil i ty .

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(RESTRICTED)ART ILLER Y CALIBRA TION. - I t i s recommended that sufficient ord

nance cal ibra t ion team s be detai led to Korea and any future combat zones ,so the l ight ar t i l le ry , as well as me'dium and heavy, can be periodicallycal ibra ted. The role of l ight ar t i l le ry as di rec t support of infantry, withthe inherent requirement of delivering close f ires , makes accurate ca l i brat ion es sential . I t is recognized that fall of shot cal ibrat ion can be usedand that i t can i tse lf be modified by f ield expedients. but i t is believed thatordnance calibration would be of grea te r value.

SOURCE: 70th Tank Bat ta l ion, (Undated)Source No 52 6

(RESTRICTED)BATTALION TANK COMPANIES IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF IN

FANTRY REGIMENTS. - I t is recommended tha t the tank companies ofthe battal ion be placed in di rec t support of the regiments of the divisionra ther than being attached to these regiments . The at tachment of oneunit to another automat ical ly renders the unit to which at tached responsiblefor the adminis t ra t ive and logistical support of the at tached unit. In actualprac t ice , regard less of whether or not the tank companies are attached orplaced in direct support , the tank battalion must adminis t ra t ively andlogist ical ly support them. Therefore , the at tachment of a tank unit to aninfantry regiment , even though specified ordE.:rs, can never be anactual i ty.

SOURCE: Command Report- I US Corps Arti l leryDATE: May 1952 Source No 527

(CONFIDENTIAL)VEST, BODY ARMOR. - Nylon body a r mor vests were int roduced

to the a ir sect ion during the month but were found to be uncomfortablewhen worn under a parachute . I t is suggested tha t a chest protec tor beincorporated into the, parachute harness of the same mater ia l ; as theparachute i tself would protect the back. I t is also recommended that theupholstery in the L-19 a irc ra f t be replaced with laminated nylon. This

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* * *HELICOPTERS. - The need for A r m y a i rc ra f t in 1st FA Obsn Bn,helicopters in .par t icular , was never more posit ively shown than duringthis month when survey par t ies ran connecting schemes across mountainouste 'rrain a t the expense of days of reconnaissance and climbing mine-coveredhil ls . A hel icopter would have per formed the job with a saving of hundredsof man hours and less danger to personnel . Officers and m en of every ba t tery, and battalion headquar ters exper ienced grea t difficulty obtainingA rm y a i rc ra f t for reconnaissance. em.ergency administrat ive fl ights. andlong distance l iaison fl ights. In many cases tr ips by jeep of hundreds ofmiles were made for br ie f l iaison visi ts or coordinated visi ts with otherdetached sect ions of the battal ion.

I t is recommended that s t rong considerat ion be given to the require ments of an observat ion battal ion for l ight type ai rcraf t ; in par t icu la r ,hel icopters for survey work.

SOURCE: Command Report - 12th Fie ld A r t i l le ry Battal ionDATE: June 1952 Source No 528

(RESTRICTED)OFFICER TRAINING. - Inexperience and lack of t ra ining of officers

was the m ost cr i t ica l deficiency. While most off icers are school t rained.they need mor e on-the-job training before being placed in combat units.Officer schools are being conducted by battal ion in survey, forwardobservat ion, and duties of the executive officer.

SOURCE: Command Report - 38th f ' ic ld Arti l lery Battal ionDATE: May 1952 Source No 529

(RESTRICTED)LANGUAGE BARRIER IN SUPPORT OF ROK UNITS. - The main

difficul t ies, when support ing ROK units. s temmed from th e languagebar r ie r . This caused delays in the exchange of informat ion, order s , andthe del ivery of ar t i l lery f ires . UJ\' 'l'; ." .. "H.I r'.).)irltU

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JI1i its l>"ecommemded that cellUlar units of ROK in terpreters , t ra inedinartil1eli ' j{ conduct of f i re , be organized. One such unit could he attachedto a direct support f ield art i l lery battal ion, upon' receiving th.e D/S miss ion .

A cel lular unit is suggested: T / 0 - One officer - ten enl is ted men.Assignments:One officer - Commander of unit Two enlisted m en - Battal ion Fi re Direct ion Six enlisted m en - Two to each Battal ion Liaison sect ion Two enl is ted m en - Utility

SOURCE,;: Command Repor t - X Corps Art i l le ryDATE: Source Nn 510

(RESTRICTED)CORPS REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PILOT. - An extended unsea

sonal per iod of good weather and the need for aer ia l survei l lance fromsunr i se to sunset necess i ta ted an extensive revision of the aer ia l surve i l lance schedules . This schedule was being publ ished a t the end of theperiod. The need for ai rcraf t maintenance, the l imitat ions on the nw n ber Gi combat hours to be flown by each pilot . and the inadequate numberof pl'anes and pilots avai lable presented a considerable prob lem. Therev ised surveil lance schedule is expected to offer a par t ia l solut ion tothis problem. I t i s recommended that additional pilots and ai rcraf t bemade avai lable to a Corps Al ' t i l lery when the ass igned a i rc ra f t do notprovide adequate survei l lance.

I t is fur ther recommended that an additional pilot be ass igned toeach. Corps Arti l lery Battal ion in order to effect maximum ut i lizat ion ofa irc ra f t . and yet comply with recommendat ions concerning the number ofcombat hours flown per pilot per month.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 981 5t Field Arti l lery BattalionDATE: May 1952 Source No 531

(RESTRICTED)DEFICIENCIES IN FIELD KITCHEN EQUIPMENT. - An invest igat ion

of a f ire that occur red in this organization disclosed the need fo r a detailedinspection of al l f i re units for Field Ranges,.MI937. This inspection dis closed the following deficiencie s:

a. All filler caps engage only two and one quar te r or fewer of thethreads , although there a re in excess of six threads available in each cap.Because of the soft composit ion (brass) of the f i l ler caps the useablethreads a re easi ly stripped, thus rendering the fire unit unsafe to use.

b. In threading the f i l ler pipes , th e pipes have become taperedfur ther decreasing the engaging thread surfaces .

c. Many f i l ler caps have s t ruc tura l flaws and cracks .d. Fire units returned to using organizat ions have had solder used

in repair ing o r seal ing pipe connections. The use of solder is a dangerouspractice because these pipes are in close proximity to th e ex t reme heatf rom the unit and could easi ly soften and blow under 40 to 50 pounds opera t ing pressu re .

e . C02 f i re extinguishers smal le r than five pounds a re not suffi c ient to fight a gasoline fire in th e confines of a mess tent; and further, thatext inguishers of this size have the valve frozen open while operating andthe CO is exhausted with one applicat ion, necess i ta t ing refi l l ing i m m e d i a t e l y ~ This often means doing without f i re protection for a per iod oft ime because the servicing of fire extinguishers is a slow process in thefield.

It is recommended that:a . A CO fire ext inguisher with a t r igger type discharge mechanism

and a capacity 01 grea te r than five pounds be made a T /O&E i tem for allfield ki tchens.

b. An asbestos type blanket be authorized for each field ki tchen toaid in putting out f i res on personnel.

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c. A study be made of fire units with the object of redesigning themor eliminating the f i re hazard now present in th e filler plugs and the pipeconnections.

SOURCE: Command Report - l343d Engineer Combat BattalionDATE: Apri l 1952 Source No 532

(RESTRICTED)DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF ROADS. - The most

important lesson learned was that the teachings of the Army School Systemare sound. The problems encountered were solved by judicious applicati6n of the principles taught.

SOURCE: Command Report - 13th Engineer Combat BattalionDATE: Apri l 1952 Source No 533

(RESTRICTED ).105 CFM AIR COMPRESSOR. - This Battalion finds that the 105

CFM a ir compressor is unsuitable for performing the desired mission.In this theatre, a compressor i s needed with a higher capacity in orderto operate more tools simultaneously. At the present t ime, with shapedcharges and other demoli t ions very cr i t ical , much black powder is beingused in blasting rock. This necessi tates drilling, and with the 105 CFMcompressor this is' a very t ime consum ing job, thus delaying completionof projects. One solution would be to double the capacity of the presenta ir compressor to 21 0 CFM with provision for addit ional pneumatic tools.

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Engineer (C ) BattalionDATE: May 1952 Source No 53 4

(RESTRICTED)SHORTAGE OF SPARE PARTS FOR ENGINEER EQUIPMENT.

The lack of spare par ts for nonstandard or experimental engineer equip- 'ment continues to be a major problem.

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SOUR.CE: C o m ~ Report - 13th Engineer (C ) Battal ionDATE: : ~ r c h 1952 Source No 53 5

(RESTRICTED)G ~ . N ~ R A T O R S . - Genera tors continue to be a problem. I f they are

to be' ~ s e d in the field for lights and power they should be designed forlong .hours of continuous usage. The 1-1/2 and 3-Kilowatt genera torsnow issued are not sat isfactory for this use. I t is recommended . . . .t thee n g i n ~ u s ~ d to drive the genera tors be of a s tandard mili tary des. inorder to help relieve the already cr i t ical par ts supply problem.

SOURCE: COillInand Report - 7th Infantry RegimentDATE: May -1''152 Source No 53 6

(CONFIDENTIAL)COMMUNICA TrONS.Discussion: The number of wire miles for a regimental type in

stallation one, i . e . , l ines originat ing from regiment , is approximately12 0 to 150 miles. The present basic load of wire is not sufficient toadequately handle this amount of ins.tallation.

Recommendation: That the basic load of wire be do.ubled a ta l !echelons within the regiment.

D i s c u s , ~ i o n : The total number of AN/PRC -1 0 radios within the infantry r e g i m ~ ! ( l t is 95, of th is number 6 to 15 are out of orde r fo ' ra3- to5-day per iod "awaiting replacement of par t s or components. As 95 radiosis t h e b a r e s t , , ~ i n i m u m for effective combat efficiency, i t is felt that stepsshould be taken to provide the regiment with sufficient equipment to providea "float" for repair purposes .

Recommendations:a. That th e regiment be fllrnished at least 10 addit ional AN/PRC

lO radiosb. That running spares and repair equipment be furnished for

this equipment at the r e g i ~ e n t a l level. UNCLASSIFIED " ' \ i ~ .. 3EC}hW

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16/23


17/23

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noncommissioned officers . This need has been par t ia l ly m et by movingt ra ined personnel within the units. These in turn will be lost within thenext two months . and while some of these losses can be replaced byintensive training a t unit level. cr i t ical special is ts must come f rom thepipeline i f combat efficiency is to continue at a high level . A smal l per centage of the replacements received during the month were school t ra inedand highly capable; however. the grea t major i ty were bas ics with no unittraining.

SOURCE: C o m m a ~ d Report 2l3th Field Art i l le ry BattalionDATE: Apr i l 1952 Source No 539

(RESTRICTED)PLASTIC GRID SHEET FOR FA. - I t i s recommended that the plas t ic

grid sheet as advocated by The Art i l le ry School. F or t Sill . Oklahoma. beadopted as a standard i tem of issue. to field ar t i l lery battalions. Thisplas t ic gr id sheet has been ut i l ized in combat in place of the paper gridsheet and has .proven to be m ore durable . accurate and lends i tse lf toeasy cleaning.

* * *(RESTRICTED)GENERATORS. - I t is s t rongly recomm ended that field ar t i l le rybattalions be author ized a minimum of six generators type P E 210 ra therthan only five as a re now authorized by per t inent T/O&E's . Experiencehas proven the P E 21 0 to be a cr i t ica l piece of equipment. essentia l tothe maintenance of continued operat ion of radio equipment. par t icu la r lyin a stat ic si tuat ion. It is fur ther recommended that considerat ion be givento the procurem ent of a genera tor to replace the P E 210 in that th e cu r ren tmodels of the PE 210 have been found to be temperamenta l in operat ion.requir ing constant attent ion and frequent overhaul .

* * *(RESTRICTED)

ENGINEER SUPPORT. - I t i s recommended that separa te fieldar t i l lery battal ions and corps ,art i l lery units be provided with engineersupport comparable to that rendered divisional ar t i l lery units by organicdivisional engineers . fU N C l P \ S ~ : n E D

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18/23

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(RESTRICTED)ENGINEER EXPENDABLE SUPPLIES. - I t is strongly recommended

that engineer expendable supplies include plotting needles in conformityto specifications prescribed.by The' Art i l lery School.i t ems should be a t l e a ~ t each 30 days. Issue cycle of these

* * *(RES TRi,C1'ED)

BATTERIES. - I t is recommended that field ar t i l lery battalions beau.thorize


19/23

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UNCLASSIFIED 16

SOURCE:. COJ:mlJlnand Repor t - IX Corps , Book II, Pa r t 3

DATE: Feb.Jfuary 1952 Source No 54 1(RESTRlC TED)

~ E I t S O N N E L RECOMMENDATIONS FO R POSTAL UNIT (\'It'1l'1P1ti F).d i . ~ The distance involved in serving t roops through the Army Pos ta l

Unit, as wehl. as the number of t roops served , influences the nu.m.ber ope:rsE).ns. m;eeded to effect ively receive and dispatch mail .b. ]n . a nonstable si tuat ion where t roops a re constantly bemg shifted,the. 1engtllll: o t ime requi red for approval of another type posta l uni t makes

i t aCilvisa.b.l'e to resolve the problem by other means.c. l'b is suggested that a plan be imple:me-J:IJIed to provide a fle-xible

scale io,r. nile T /08tE within the speci f ied type oJ! postal unit to permi t theincrea.:se decrease of persoJasael without undue delay in orde r to ma.intaitlo e.xp.edit'ious and efficient P.Q$ ta l s e rvlce .

&. 'iJqis problem is ilJitl.Strated by the operation of the 11th APU(Type 'F).

(1 ) Authorized strength ........ 1 officer - 14 enliste.d :men (2 ) Presen t s t rength .......... 1 officer - 21 enl is ted men (3) The 7 EM overs t rength is required by establ i shing a forward

echelon 32 miles f rom the main h:ranch to serve 25 units . The maintenanceof this subunit saves these t:roops 64 miles t ravel , enables ' lu icker mailserv ice , and saves t ime, manftau:rs, and equipment of the units beingserved.

'4 ) Recommend that a flexible T /O&tE be published, based ondistance 01 units served f rom APU plus the numher of t roops se rved . Thistype of T I08tE would be more prac t ica l in a combat si tuat ion and providefor bet te r u.tilization of persol'Ullel.

UNCLASSiF\ED....eR E 4 .,

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20/23

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SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Engineer Combat GroupDATE: Apri l 1952 Source No 542

(RESTRICTED)ENEMY MINE TACTICS. - One new method of booby-t rapping the

Russian wooden box mine, TMD-B, was discovered and successful lyneutra l ized. In one instance, the TMD-B mines were laid two deep withthe upper mine level with the surface of the ground. Under the lower boxmine a shu-mine , PMD-7, was placed in an inverted posit ion. A wire wasconnected f rom the safety pin of the MUV fuse of the shu-mine to a nailin th e upper box mine. The booby t rap was se t so that a di rec t pull inremoving the upper box mine would pull the safety pin f rom the shu-minefuse and cause the str ike to be released and the ent ire group of mines tobe detonated. I t is considered significant that only one such booby t rappedse t of mines was located in this field. This projec t was succes sfully com pleted without casual t ies .

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 1st Cavalry DivisionDATE: May 1951 Source No 54 3

(RESTRICTED)INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. - Soldiers a re far f rom sat isf ied that wehave the bes t individual a rm. The carbine lacks range and power (hi thngpower) , and the M l is heavy and sensit ive to weather and dir t . Infantrym en a re divided over the mer i t s of the semiautomatic weapon versus thesingle-loader . Obviously we have a problem that is t ied up not only withthe weapons, but in the psychology of our training. There is considera blefeeling that a ll training needs more s t r es s on accuracy in fir ing, use ofthe pat t les ight a t var iable ranges , and smal l unit musketry . Exper iencehas also' shown that the bayonet is far from obsolete. I t is not so muchthe abil i ty to use i t skillfully, but the determinat ion to close with i t .No one has much ::;tomach for a bayonet attack, including the fanatical lyindoctrinated enemy in Korea.

OverUNCLASSIFIED 17


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SOURCE: Command Report - WAC Battalion, Headquar ters and Service CommandF a r Eas t Command

DATE: Apri l 1952 Source No 544

(RESTRICTED)WA C REPLACEMENTS. - Replacements from the continental United

States have included former member s of this command who were rotatedfor discharge. At the t ime some of the enlis ted women depar ted for theco ntinental United States, low character and efficiency ra t ings were in Cluded in thei r 201 file s with recommendat ions that they not be re -enlistedin the service for cer ta in cogent reasons.

Conclusions are that upon return to the continental United States fordischarge , a few undesirable ,women expressed the i r desi res to remainin the service and were re-enl isted. They then volunteered for secondtours in the F a r Eas t Command., "

Recommend that pr ior to shipment of any enlis ted woman former lyass igned to the F a r Eas t Command who has completed l ess than one year1ssubsequent service in the continental United States, the application beforwarded to this command for comment , recommendations, or concurrence .

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Infantry DivisionDATE: March 1952 Source No 545

(RES TRICTED)AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS TO IDENTIFY TARGETS. - I t i s apparent

that the biggest problem encoun,tered in the conduct of a ir s t r ikes is inthe aCtual direct ion of the f ighters on the target . I t has been found thatthe" use of aer ia l photographs in "mosquito!! conducted str ikes providesan excel lent means of identif ication of the des i red t arget to the mosquitoaircraf t since both the Forward A ir Control ler and mosquito pilot are ineffect looking at the same ground.

* * *UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED(RESTRICTED)

USE OF SCOUT DOGS WITH PATROLtJ. - The use of dogs, on patrolsoers- increased securi ty without ha.mpering activity. Bes t resu l ts a re~ i n e d when dogs work with members of patrol a t leas t two AAY,S- pr io r

actual patrol . Some ambush patrols exper ienced di f f itul ty du.e ton'ervousness when the enforced inactivity necessar i ly exceederi 3 hours .

UNCLASSIFIED 19

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Documents

Korean War Dissemination of Combat Information 23 Oct 1952