Dickie on Artifactuality.pdf

8/22/2019 Dickie on Artifactuality.pdf

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Dickie on Artifactuality

Author(s): Thomas C. RyckmanSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1989), pp. 175-177Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/431830

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Discussion

Dickie on ArtifactualityIn The Art Circle,' George Dickie offers thefollowing institutional heoryof art:AC: x is a workof art if andonly if

(i) x is anartifact,and(ii) x is of a kind created to be presentedto anartworldpublic. (p. 80)In whatfollows, I shall show thatthere is a problemwithwhatDickie saysaboutartifactuality.Giventherole that artifactualityplays in AC, AC should notbe accepteduntilthe problemis solved.In his earlier Art and the Aesthetic, Dickie pro-posed an institutionaltheory which, like AC, listsartifactualityas a necessary feature of art.2 There,Dickie treatedartifactualityas a propertyan objectcould acquireby mere conferral. As the followingpassage makes clear, in The Art Circle, conferredartifactualityhasbeen abandoned:InArt andtheAestheticandelsewhereI maintained hattheartifactswhich are art become so in two distinctways:bybeing made (painted, sculpted, composed, andthe like) orby having artifactuality conferred on them. I maintainedthat art such as the Night Watch s made, but that someworks of art had artifactuality conferred on them. Thissecond notion was an attemptto show how such things asunaltereddriftwoodhungon wallsand theurinalDuchampused fall withinthe limits of artifactualityof artists. I nowbelieve it was a mistake to think thatartifactualitycan beconferred: anartifactmust be made in some way.(p. 44)Clearly,asartifactualitys understoodnAC, it is notaproperty nobjectacquiresviamereconferral.If not in virtue of mere conferral, in virtue of whatis something an artifact? Dickie writes:I wrote of picking up and hanging on a wall and ofconferring artifactualityas if they were one and the samething;thatis, I thoughtof picking upandhangingon a wallas a way of conferringartifactuality.But while conferringartifactuality s impossible(as it nowseems),pickingupand

hangingon awall is quite easyto do. Picking upandhangingand similar actions are ways of achieving (not conferring)artifactuality.Of course, it is notjust the motion of liftingandaffixingor thelike whichmakessomethinganartifact, tis liftingandaffixing or the likeplus somethingelse. (p. 44)Of course, to say that x is an artifact if and only if xhas been lifted and affixed or the like plus somethingelse is not to analyze artifactuality.Presumably, o help sharpenourunderstanding f"lifting and affixing or the like plus something else,"Dickie presents a series of examples. In some, but notall, of the examples an artifact is produced from anon-artifact.The examples follow Dickie's orderofpresentation:3El: Onepicksupa piece of driftwoodandmovesitto anotherpartof thebeachmerelyto get it outof theway.E2: One picks up a piece of driftwood and with aknife whittlesa handleon one end and a pointon the other with the intentionof using it tospearflounderson thesurf.E3: Onepicksupa piece of driftwoodandwithoutaltering t inany waydigs a hole in the sand.E4: Onepicksupa piece of driftwoodandwithoutalteringit in any waybrandishes t at a threat-eningdog.E5: A piece of driftwood s pickedup by someonewho is familiarwiththe worldof artandtakenhome andhung on a wall, unaltered,with the

intentionto display its characteristicsas thecharacteristics f a paintingaredisplayed.E6: A piece of driftwood s pickedupandhungona wall withoutany artisticcontextandjust toget it out of the way (the wall being a conve-nient place to put it).E7: A world famous artist points to a piece ofdriftwood, calls it art (with the intention ofgetting others to attend to its characteristics asthey would to the characteristics of a sculp-ture), and claims it is art.According to Dickie, in each of E2, E3, E4 and E5,a piece of driftwood became an artifact, whereas in

The Journalof Aesthetics andArt Criticism47:2 Spring 1989


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The Journal of Aesthetics and Art CriticismEl, E6 and E7 no artifactwas produced.In E3, E4and E5 the driftwood became an artifact withoutbeingaltered,but, apparently,n virtueof beingusedto serve a purpose. In E2 the driftwoodbecame anartifactwithoutbeing used to serve a purpose, but,apparently,n virtue of being altered with the inten-tion that it might be fit for such use. Apparently, nEl, E6 and E7, whereno artifactwas produced,thedriftwood is neither used to serve a purpose noralteredso that tmightbe so used. All of thissuggeststhatDickie thinks hatanobjectbecomes an artifact fandonly if it is used to serve a purposeorit is alteredwith the intention hat t mightbe so used.The abovesuggestionseems evenmore credible inlightof Dickie'shavingwritten:The driftwood[of E3 andE4] has been made into a tool oraweaponby theuse to which it is put.Thesecasesdifferfromthe driftwood-spear ase [E2] in thatthe tool or weaponisnot madepriorto an intendeduse andthe piece of wood isnot altered nany way.But whatexactlyhas been made f thepiece of driftwood has not been altered?In the driftwood-spear case what is made is the complex object: the woodcarved in a certain way for use as a spear. In the other twocases what has been made are also complex objects: thewood used as a digging tool and the wood used as a weapon.In neithercase is the driftwoodalone the artifact; heartifactis the driftwoodmanipulated nd used in a certain way. Forthe purposes of the immediate discussion the driftwoodalone (unaltered and unused) is a simple object and thedriftwoodalteredor used is a complexobject. The complexobjects are complex because their original (simple) objectshaveundergonea change at the handsof an agent. (p. 45)

On the basis of this passage and Dickie's examples,we may conclude thatthe following is Dickie'sanaly-sis of artifactuality:A: x is an artifact f and only if eitherx has been (oris being) used to serve a purpose or x has beenalteredwith the intention hat t mightbe usedtoserve a purpose.Analysis A will now be tested against a series ofnew examples. The artist of each new example doeswhat he does so that the artist and other membersofthe artworldmight consider the characteristics f thedriftwood involved as they wouldthe characteristicsof a sculpture.That s, the artistof each new exampledoes what he does for roughly he same reasonsas theperson in Dickie'sE5. Here are the new examples.NE1: An artist buildshis home (or gallery of art)so as to incorporate s one of its walls a cliffside containing a ledge upon which rests apiece of driftwood droppedby an ambitiousgull).NE2: An artist constructsa large frame aroundapiece of driftwood ocated as in NE1.

NE3: An artist describes the rock formations

arounda piece of driftwood located as inNE1 in a waythat framesthedriftwood.NE4: An artistconstructsa frame arounda pieceof driftwoodfoundon a beach.NE5: Walking n the sand, an artist traces a framearound a piece of driftwood found on abeach.NE6: An artistpointsto a piece of driftwoodon abeachanddescribes its frameas a circlewitha radius of ten meters and mid-pointat thedriftwood'scenterof gravity.NE7: Anartistpointsto a pieceof driftwood oundon a beach and describes its frame as theworldexternal o it.Dickie holds thatthe objectin E5 is an artifactandthat heobject n E7 is not. Thenewexamplessuggestthat he is mistakenabout E5 or about E7. For E5'sobject is no more of an artifact than are some of thenew examples'objects; if any of the new examples'objects are artifacts, then all of the new examples'objects are artifacts; and if all of the new examples'objects are artifacts, then the object in E7 is anartifact. Therefore, if E5's object is an artifact,thenE7's object is an artifact.Dickie cannot say that because the objects in thenew examples have not been altered to serve a pur-pose they are not artifacts. For, according o analysisA, having been altered to serve a purpose is a non-necessary, sufficient conditionfor being anartifact.If Dickie is to reject he claim that he objects n thenew examples are artifacts, he must arguethat theyhave not been, or are not being, used to serve apurpose. Recall the following:it is not just the notion of lifting and affixing or the likewhich makes somethingan artifact, it is liftingandaffixingor the like plus somethingelse. (p. 44)the artifact s the driftwoodmanipulated. p. 45)The objects are complex because their original(simple)ob-jects haveundergone changeat the handsof anagent.(p.45)In E3, E4 and E5, Dickie's examples of driftwoodbecome artifacts without being altered, rathertheobjects were just touched and moved. AccordingtoDickie, in E7, where despite the artist'sintention omake art out of driftwood no artifactwas produced,the driftwood was neither touched nor moved, norlifted. All of this suggests that Dickie's analysis ofartifactuality s infectedby a principleentailingthatan object is not used to serve a purpose unless anduntil it has been touched, or touched andmoved.Such a principle s incorrect.Unmoved,untouchedobjects can and sometimes are used to serve a pur-pose. It is possible to use an objectto serve a purposewithout changingits internalstate, changingits spa-tial location, or touching it. This should be apparentfrom the new examples;however, f it is not, it is easy

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Discussioniscussioniscussionto conceive of examples outside the realm of artwhereunmoved,untouchedobjectsare used to serveapurpose.Hereare three suchexamples.NE8: A says to B, "Note thatpiece of driftwood.If, whenyoureturn ater oday t is gone, I'vegone to town, and if not, then I've gonesailing." When B returns to find the drift-woodwhere heandA lastsawit, he will havebeen informed hatA hasgone sailing.NE9: A uses the cliff in NE1 as a marker o thatshe knows whatpartof the beachto return owhen hersailingis over.NE10: B uses a largemapletree nearthe beach asshade so that he can wait for A without

getting even more sunburned han he al-ready s.In each of NE8, NE9 and NE10 an untouched,unmovedobjectis usedto serve apurpose.Of course, since I contendthatthe objectsin NE1throughNE7 and the object in E7 are being used toserve a purpose, I should be ready to specify thatpurpose. Dickie has made this an easy task; for,whereP is thepurposeforwhichtheobjectinE5 wasused, P will do asthepurposeforwhichtheobjects nthe new examples and the object in E7 were used.Assuming,of course,that heobjectinE5 was usedtoserve a purpose.Finally,since I holdthat heobjectsin E7 andNE1throughNE7 are ust as qualifiedforartifactuality stheobjectin E5, Dickiemightdemand hatI saywhat"complex object" they became as a result of theartists' behavior. Anyone of the following three"complexobject"typeswill do:1. Workof art.2. Objectregarded orused)as a workof art.3. Objectused to distractorworry philosophersofart.It seems likely that if the object in E5 is now a"complexobject,"then it too is a "complexobject"of one of theabove"complexobject"types.One mightobjectthata crucialelementof Dickie'sanalysis of artifactuality s absent from A, that it isnot simply in virtue of being used but in virtue ofbeing used in some special way that an object quali-fies as an artifactandcomplexobject.Thisobjectionseems wide of the mark;for Dickie has not told uswhat this special way of using might be, andcareful

to conceive of examples outside the realm of artwhereunmoved,untouchedobjectsare used to serveapurpose.Hereare three suchexamples.NE8: A says to B, "Note thatpiece of driftwood.If, whenyoureturn ater oday t is gone, I'vegone to town, and if not, then I've gonesailing." When B returns to find the drift-woodwhere heandA lastsawit, he will havebeen informed hatA hasgone sailing.NE9: A uses the cliff in NE1 as a marker o thatshe knows whatpartof the beachto return owhen hersailingis over.NE10: B uses a largemapletree nearthe beach asshade so that he can wait for A withoutgetting even more sunburned han he al-ready s.In each of NE8, NE9 and NE10 an untouched,unmovedobjectis usedto serve apurpose.Of course, since I contendthatthe objectsin NE1throughNE7 and the object in E7 are being used toserve a purpose, I should be ready to specify thatpurpose. Dickie has made this an easy task; for,whereP is thepurposeforwhichtheobjectinE5 wasused, P will do asthepurposeforwhichtheobjects nthe new examples and the object in E7 were used.Assuming,of course,that heobjectinE5 was usedtoserve a purpose.Finally,since I holdthat heobjectsin E7 andNE1throughNE7 are ust as qualifiedforartifactuality stheobjectin E5, Dickiemightdemand hatI saywhat"complex object" they became as a result of theartists' behavior. Anyone of the following three"complexobject"typeswill do:1. Workof art.2. Objectregarded orused)as a workof art.3. Objectused to distractorworry philosophersofart.It seems likely that if the object in E5 is now a"complexobject,"then it too is a "complexobject"of one of theabove"complexobject"types.One mightobjectthata crucialelementof Dickie'sanalysis of artifactuality s absent from A, that it isnot simply in virtue of being used but in virtue of

being used in some special way that an object quali-fies as an artifactandcomplexobject.Thisobjectionseems wide of the mark;for Dickie has not told uswhat this special way of using might be, andcareful

to conceive of examples outside the realm of artwhereunmoved,untouchedobjectsare used to serveapurpose.Hereare three suchexamples.NE8: A says to B, "Note thatpiece of driftwood.If, whenyoureturn ater oday t is gone, I'vegone to town, and if not, then I've gonesailing." When B returns to find the drift-woodwhere heandA lastsawit, he will havebeen informed hatA hasgone sailing.NE9: A uses the cliff in NE1 as a marker o thatshe knows whatpartof the beachto return owhen hersailingis over.NE10: B uses a largemapletree nearthe beach asshade so that he can wait for A withoutgetting even more sunburned han he al-ready s.In each of NE8, NE9 and NE10 an untouched,unmovedobjectis usedto serve apurpose.Of course, since I contendthatthe objectsin NE1throughNE7 and the object in E7 are being used toserve a purpose, I should be ready to specify thatpurpose. Dickie has made this an easy task; for,whereP is thepurposeforwhichtheobjectinE5 wasused, P will do asthepurposeforwhichtheobjects nthe new examples and the object in E7 were used.Assuming,of course,that heobjectinE5 was usedtoserve a purpose.Finally,since I holdthat heobjectsin E7 andNE1throughNE7 are ust as qualifiedforartifactuality stheobjectin E5, Dickiemightdemand hatI saywhat"complex object" they became as a result of theartists' behavior. Anyone of the following three"complexobject"typeswill do:1. Workof art.2. Objectregarded orused)as a workof art.3. Objectused to distractorworry philosophersofart.It seems likely that if the object in E5 is now a"complexobject,"then it too is a "complexobject"of one of theabove"complexobject"types.One mightobjectthata crucialelementof Dickie'sanalysis of artifactuality s absent from A, that it isnot simply in virtue of being used but in virtue of

being used in some special way that an object quali-fies as an artifactandcomplexobject.Thisobjectionseems wide of the mark;for Dickie has not told uswhat this special way of using might be, andcareful

reflectionon E5, E7, and NE1 throughNE7 suggeststhat any attemptto do so would not save Dickie'sanalysis. Even if there is a special way of using, theobject in E5 is not used in this special way until it isresting on the wall. It is not at all unreasonable oclaim that the objects in E7 and NE1 throughNE7may be used in exactly the same special way eventhough heyare nottransported.Movingandhangingon a wall are not necessary to using in whateverspecial wayDickie mighthave in mind. Moving andhanging are merely ways of making such use moreconvenientandpractical.I have notargued hat the objectin E7 oranyof theobjects in NE1 throughNE7 are artifacts,but onlythattheyhave ustas mucha claim to artifactualityasthe object in E5. Unless I am mistaken, Dickie'sviews about artifactualityare problematicand weshouldrefrain romacceptingAC.4THOMAS C. RYCKMANLawrenceUniversity

1. George Dickie, The Art Circle (New York:Haven,1984). All quotationsare fromthis work.2. GeorgeDickie, ArtandtheAesthetic CornellUniver-sity Press, 1974).3. E7 is myown summaryof anexamplethatDickiecitesthroughout he chapterwhere he gives El throughE6. ElthroughE6 arepresentedon pages44 through46.4. I wish to thankan anonymousJAACeferee forhelpfulcommentson anearlierdraft.

Reply to Ryckman1. I did not give ananalysis of artifactuality.2. I did not speak in a general way of "used toserve a purpose" or "the intentionthat it might beused to servea purpose."I spoke in a specific wayofDali's rocks: "The rocks are not altered in any wayby the 'pointingandcalling.' Norare the rocksusedin any way similar to the way in which driftwoodmaybe usedto dig a hole in the sand orthe like orthewayin which Duchampused the famousurinal."

GEORGE DICKIEUniversityof Illinois, Chicago




GEORGE DICKIEUniversityof Illinois, Chicago




GEORGE DICKIEUniversityof Illinois, ChicagoEditor's Note

The Discussion sectionof the Journalreplaces"Afterwords:CriticismandCountertheses." The changeinname is meant to indicate a broadeningin scope of this forum for the discussion of issues in theoreticalaestheticsand artcriticism. Submissionsneednotbe restricted o criticalcomments on previousarticles in theJournal althoughwe continue to welcomethese), butmayextend to issues raised in other ournalsandbooks.Weare also willing to considerself-containedessays thatare not of articlelength (upto 10manuscriptpages).Authorsshouldfollow the regular nstructions orthe preparationandsubmission of manuscripts see page 2of this issue), keepingfootnotesto anabsoluteminimum,andindicating n a cover letterthat thesubmissionisintendedforthe Discussion section of the Journal.Weexpect to be able to publishdiscussion entries withinafew months of theiracceptance,and we look forward o receivingyoursubmissions.

Editor's NoteThe Discussion sectionof the Journalreplaces"Afterwords:CriticismandCountertheses." The changeinname is meant to indicate a broadeningin scope of this forum for the discussion of issues in theoreticalaestheticsand artcriticism. Submissionsneednotbe restricted o criticalcomments on previousarticles in theJournal althoughwe continue to welcomethese), butmayextend to issues raised in other ournalsandbooks.Weare also willing to considerself-containedessays thatare not of articlelength (upto 10manuscriptpages).Authorsshouldfollow the regular nstructions orthe preparationandsubmission of manuscripts see page 2of this issue), keepingfootnotesto anabsoluteminimum,andindicating n a cover letterthat thesubmissionisintendedforthe Discussion section of the Journal.Weexpect to be able to publishdiscussion entries withinafew months of theiracceptance,and we look forward o receivingyoursubmissions.

Editor's NoteThe Discussion sectionof the Journalreplaces"Afterwords:CriticismandCountertheses." The changeinname is meant to indicate a broadeningin scope of this forum for the discussion of issues in theoreticalaestheticsand artcriticism. Submissionsneednotbe restricted o criticalcomments on previousarticles in theJournal althoughwe continue to welcomethese), butmayextend to issues raised in other ournalsandbooks.Weare also willing to considerself-containedessays thatare not of articlelength (upto 10manuscriptpages).Authorsshouldfollow the regular nstructions orthe preparationandsubmission of manuscripts see page 2of this issue), keepingfootnotesto anabsoluteminimum,andindicating n a cover letterthat thesubmissionisintendedforthe Discussion section of the Journal.Weexpect to be able to publishdiscussion entries withinafew months of theiracceptance,and we look forward o receivingyoursubmissions.

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Dickie on Artifactuality.pdf