Dickie, George - Defining Art

7/30/2019 Dickie, George - Defining Art

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Defining ArtAuthor(s): George DickieSource: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1969), pp. 253-256Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American PhilosophicalPublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009315

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American Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 6, Number 3, July 1969

X. DEFINING ARTGEORGE DICKIE

INrecent years it has been argued that the

expression "work of art" cannot be defined andMorris Weitz has even argued that being an artifactis not a necessary condition for being a work of art.1More recently, however, Joseph Margolis hasoffered a definition2 and Maurice Mandelbaum hasmade tentative suggestions about defining "art."3I shall not repeat the well-known argument ofWeitz, whose views I take to be representative ofthose who maintain that "art" cannot be defined,but shall state his main conclusion and comment on

one of his arguments. Neither shall I repeat thearguments of Margolis or Mandelbaum, but I dowant to note (i) that they agree that artifactualityis a necessary condition of art, and (2) thatMandel?baum points out the significance of the nonexhibited characteristics of art for the definition of"art."

Weitz's main conclusion is that there are nonecessary and sufficient conditions for the definitionof "art" or for any of the subconcepts of art, suchas "novel," "tragedy," "painting," and so on. Allof these notions are open concepts and their in?stances have

"familyresemblances."

Weitz rejects artifactuality as a necessary con?dition of art because we sometimes make statementssuch as "This driftwood is a lovely piece of sculp?ture."4 We do sometimes speak this way of naturalobjects, but nothing follows from this fact. Weitzis confused because he takes the driftwood remarkto be a descriptive statement and it is not. Weitzhimself, quite correctly, distinguishes between anevaluative use and a descriptive use of "work ofart,"5 and once this distinction is understood itcan be seen that the driftwood remark is an evalu?ation of the driftwood. But it is, of course, thedescriptive sense of "work of art" which is at issue

when the question of whether "art" can be definedis raised. I maintain that the descriptive use of"work of art" isused to indicate that a thing belongsto a certain category of artifacts. By the way, theevaluative sense can be applied to artifacts as wellas nonartifacts, as when we say, "That painting isa work of art." Such remarks are not intended astautologies.Before going on to discuss the second condition ofthe definition of the descriptive sense of "art," itwill be helpful to distinguish the generic concept ofart from the various subconcepts which fall underit. It may very well be the case that all or some ofthe subconcepts of art, such as novel, tragedy,ceramics, sculpture, painting, and so on, may lacknecessary and sufficient conditions for their appli?cation as subconcepts and it still be the case that"work of art," which is the genus of all these subconcepts, can be defined. For example, there maynot be any characteristics which all tragedies havewhich would distinguish them from comedies, satyrplays, happenings, and the likewithin the domain ofart. Even if this were the case, in the light of theforegoing, tragedies and all other works of artwould have at least one characteristic in common,namely, artifactuality. Perhaps artifactuality andsome one or more other features of works of artdistinguish them from nonart. If all or some of thesubconcepts of art cannot be defined and, as Ithink is the case, "art" can be, then Weitz is rightin part.

* * *

Assuming that artifactuality is the genus of art,the differentia is still lacking. This second conditionwill be a social property of art. Furthermore, this

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1Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 15 (1956), pp. 27-35;reprinted in Philosophy Looks at the Arts, ed. by Joseph Margolis (New York, 1962); Paul ZifF, "The Task of Defining aWork of Art," reprinted in Aesthetics and thePhilosophy of Criticism, ed. by Marvin Levich (New York, 1963) ;William Kennick,"Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake," Mind, vol. 66 (1958), pp. 317-334.2The Language of Art and Art Criticism (Detroit, 1965), pp. 37-47. Margolis' definition is not satisfactory, however; see AndrewHarrison's review in Philosophical Books, vol. 7 (1966), p. 19.3 "Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2 (1965), pp. 219-228.4 Op. cit., p. 57.5 Ibid., p. f\6.


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254 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

social propety will, inMandelbaum's terminology,be a nonexhibited, relational property.W. E. Kennick contends that such an approachto the definition of "art" is futile. He argues fromsuch facts as that the ancient Egyptians sealed uppaintings and sculptures in tombs to the conclusionthat "The attempt to define Art in terms of what wedo with certain objects is as doomed as any other."6There are several difficulties with Kennick'sargument. First, the fact that the Egyptians sealedup paintings and sculptures in tombs does notentail that they generally regarded them differentlyfrom the way in which we regard them. Indeed,they might have put them there for the dead toappreciate, or simply because they belonged tothe dead person, or for some other reason. The

Egyptian practice does not prove a radical differ?ence between their conception of art and ours suchthat a definition which subsumes both is impossible.Secondly, there is no need to assume that we andthe ancient Egyptians (or any other group) share acommon conception of art. I would be happy to beable to specify the necessary and sufficient condi?tions for the concept of art which we have (wepresent-day Americans, we present-day Westerners,we Westerners since the organization of the systemof the arts in or about the 18th century?I am notsure of the exact limits of the "we"). Kennicknotwithstanding, we are most likely to discover thedifferentia of art by considering "what we do withcertain objects," that is, "works of art." But, ofcourse, there is no guarantee that any given thingwe or an ancient Egyptian might possibly do with awork of art will throw light on the concept af art.Not every doing will reveal what is required.

Arthur Danto's stimulating article, "The Artworld,"7 is helpful here. In speaking of Warhol'sBrillo Carton and Rauschenberg's Bed, he writes,"To see something as art requires something theeye cannot de [s] cry?an atmosphere of artistictheory, a knowledge of history of art :an artworld."8What the eye cannot descry is a complicated nonexhibited characteristic of the artifacts in question.

The "atmosphere" of which Danto speaks is elusive,but it has a substantial content. Perhaps thiscontent can be captured in a definition. I shall firststate the definition and then go on to defend it.

A work of art in the descriptive sense is (/) an artifact(2) upon which some society or some sub-group of a

society has conferred thestatus of candidatefor appreciation.The definition speaks of the conferring of thestatus of candidate for appreciation :nothing is saidabout actual appreciation and this leaves open thepossibility of works of art which, for whateverreason, are not appreciated. Also, not every aspectof a work is included in the candidacy for ap?preciation, for example, the color of the back ofa painting is not ordinarily an object of appreci?ation. The problem of which aspects of a work of artare to be included within the candidacy for appreci?ation is a question which I have pursued else?where. 9

Just how is the status of candidate for appreci?ation conferred? An artifact's hanging in an artmuseum, a performance at a theater, and the likeare sure signs that the status has been conferred. Butmany works of art never reach museum walls and

some are never seen by anyone but the artist him?self. The status, therefore, must be conferrable bya single person's treating an artifact as a candidatefor appreciation, usually the artist himself, althoughnot always, because someone might create anartifact without ever considering it as a candidatefor appreciation and the status be conferred by someother person or persons. But can status be conferredso easily? We associate status with ceremony?the

wedding ceremony and the status of being married,for example. However, ceremony

is not theonlyway of getting married, in some jurisdictions

common-law marriage is possible?a status ac?quired without ceremony. What I want to suggestis that, just as two persons can acquire the statusof common-law marriage within a legal system, anartifact can acquire the status of a candidate forappreciation within the system which Danto hascalled "the artworld."

A number of questions arise about this notionof status of candidate for appreciation and perhapsthe whole matter can best be clarified by statingthem and trying to answer them. Probably thefirst question is: what kind of appreciation?Surely the definition does seem to suggest thatthere is a special kind of "aesthetic" appreciation.Appreciation is not crucial, but something should

6Kennick, op. cit., p. 330.7The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61 (1964), pp. 571-584.8 Ibid., p. 580.9 In my "Art Narrowly and Broadly Speaking," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 5 (1968), pp. 71-77, where I analyzethe notion of aesthetic object. The subject of the present essay is the concept of art which, although related to the notion ofaesthetic object, is distinct from it.


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DEFINING ART 255be said about it to prepare the way for thecrucial point. The kind of appreciation I have inmind is simply the kind characteristic of ourexperiences of paintings, poetry, novels, and thelike. This remark seems to collapse the definitioninto circularity, but it does not because "work ofart" (the term defined) does not appear in theexplanation of appreciation, only subconcept termsappear. Another apparent problem is that works ofart differ so much from one another?for example,comedies are very different from tragedies?that itseems unlikely that the appreciation characteristicof our experience of one kind of work has somethingin common with the appreciation characteristic ofour experience of another kind of work. Butpaintings, poems, and plays are the objects of ourappreciation and the fact that the objects differconsiderably does not mean that the variousappreciations differ. Indeed, if we mean by"appreciation" something like "in experiencing thequalities of a thing one finds them worthy orvaluable," then there is no problem about thesimilarity of the various appreciations.It can now be seen that appreciation will notserve to pick out the subclass of works of art fromthe class of artifacts?it is too broad: many artifactswhich are obviously not works of art are appreci?ated. To pick out the class of works of art one muststress the conferring of the status of candidate ratherthan appreciation. When, for example, a salesmanof plumbing supplies spreads his wares before us,he presents them for our appreciation all right, butthe presenting is not a conferring of status ofcandidate, it is simply a placing before us. But whatis the difference between "placing before" and"conferring the status of candidate?" The differ?ence is analogous to the difference between myuttering "I declare this man to be a candidate foralderman" and the head of the election boarduttering the same sentence while acting in hisofficial capacity. When I utter the sentence it hasno effect because I have not been vested with anyauthority in this regard. Of course the analogy isnot a complete one?lines of authority in thepolitico-legal world are by and large explicitlydefined and incorporated into law, while lines ofauthority (or something like authority) in the artworld are nowhere codified. The artworld carrieson its business at the level of customary practice.Still there is a practice and this defines a socialinstitution. To return to the plumbing line, thesalesman's presentation is different from Duchamp'ssuperficially similar act of placing a urinal which he

christened "Fountain" in that now famous artshow. The point is that Duchamp's act took placewithin a certain institutional setting and that makesall the difference. Our salesman of plumbing sup?plies could do what Duchamp did, that is, converta urinal into a work of art, but he probably wouldnot?such weird ideas seem to occur only to artistswith bizarre senses of humor. Please remember thatwhen I say "Fountain" is a work of art, I am notsaying it is a good one. And in making this lastremark I am not insinuating that it is a bad oneeither.

Duchamp's "ready-mades" raise the question?"If urinals, snowshovels, and hatracks can becomeworks of art, why can't natural objects such asdriftwood become works of art?" and, of course,driftwood and other natural objects can becomeworks of art if any one of a number of things isdone to them. One thing which would do the trickwould be to pick it up, take it home, and hangit on the wall. Another thing which would dothe trick would be to pick it up and enter it inan exhibition. (I was, by the way, assuming thatWeitz's sentence about driftwood referred to apiece of driftwood in its ordinary situation on abeach and untouched by human hand.) This meansthat natural objects which become works of artacquire their artifactuality (are artifactualized) atthe same time that the status of candidate forappreciation is conferred on them. But perhaps asimilar thing ordinarily happens with paintings,poems, and such ; they come to exist as artifacts atthe same time that they have conferred on them thestatus of candidate for appreciation. (Of course,being an artifact and being a candidate forappreciation are not the same thing?they are twoproperties of a single thing which may be acquiredat the same time.) A somewhat more complicatedcase would be an artifact from a primitive culturewhich played a role in a religious system and whichhad no artistic function in the sense developed here.Such an artifact might become a work of art in ourculture in a way similar to that in which driftwoodmight become a work of art. However, such areligious object which becomes a work of art wouldbe an artifact in two senses, but the driftwood inonly one. (I am not suggesting that somethingcannot be a religious object and work of art at thesame time?there are many counter-instances to thisin our own culture.)A question which frequently arises in connectionwith discussions of the concept of art is "How arewe to conceive of paintings done by individuals such


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256 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYas Betsy the chimpanzee from the Baltimore Zoo?"It all depends on what is done with the paintings.(Note that I unhesitatingly call the objects

paintings, although I am uncertain about theirstatus as works of art.) For example, The FieldNatural History Museum in Chicago recentlyexhibited some chimpanzee paintings. In the caseof these paintings we must say that they are notworks of art. However, if they had been exhibited afew miles away at the Chicago Art Institute theywould have been works of art. (If, so to speak, thedirector of the Art Institute had gone out on alimb.) It all depends on the institutional setting.In concluding, itmay be worthwhile to considerinwhat ways the definition offered here differs fromsome traditional definitions, (i) It does not attemptto smuggle a conception of good art into thedefinition of "art." (2) It is not, to use Margolis'term, "overloaded," as is the one Margolis cites asa horrible example :"Art is a human activity whichexplores, and hereby creates, new reality in a

suprarational, visional manner and presents itsymbolically or metaphoncally,10 as a microcosmic whole signifying a macrocosmic whole."11(3) It does not contain any commitment to any

metaphysical or unempirical theory, as contrastedwith, for example, the view that art is unreal.(4) It is broad enough so that those things generallyrecognized as art can be brought under it withoutundue strain, as contrasted with, for example, theimitation definition which involves enormous strainin trying to show that every work of art is animitation of something or other. (5) It takes intoaccount (or at least attempts to) the actual practicesof the artworld of the past and of the present day.Now what I have been saying may sound likesaying, "a work of art is an object of which someonehas said, 'I christen this object a work of art'."And I think it is rather like that. So one canmakea work of art out of a sow's ear, but of course thatdoes not mean that it is a silk purse.12

University of Illinois at Chicago Circle Received March18, 1968

10There are apparently two typographical errors here. Margolis quotes the word as "metaphonically" and the original textreads "metaphoncally." A reading of the original text indicates that it should have been "metaphorically."11Op. at., p. 44. The passage is quoted from Erick Kahler's "What isArt?," in Problems in Aesthetics, ed. by Morris Weitz(New York, 1959).12Thanks are due toMonroe Beardsley, Marcia Eaton, William Hayes, Arnold Levison, and Maurice Mandelbaum who readthis paper in manuscript and made many helpful suggestions.

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Dickie, George - Defining Art