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Crisis Action Planning Crisis Action Planning 01 January 2006 CTF Staff Estimates CTF Staff Estimates UNCLASSIFIED CTF Training

Crisis Action Planning

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Page 1: Crisis Action Planning

Crisis Action PlanningCrisis Action Planning

01 January 2006

CTF Staff EstimatesCTF Staff Estimates

UNCLASSIFIED

CTF Training

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Purpose

The purpose of this class is to discuss formulating and using the staff estimate as part of the Crisis Action Planning (CAP) / Commander’s Estimate military course of action (COA) development process.

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Agenda

• Definition• Staff Estimate Objectives• Staff Estimate Process• Staff Estimate Steps• Staff Estimate Submission• Staff Estimate Format

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References

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint OperationsJP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

JP 5-00.2 JTF Planning JP 5-00.2 JTF Planning Guidance & ProceduresGuidance & Procedures

MNF SOPMNF SOPMULTINATIONAL FORCE

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES(MNF SOP)

Version 1.6February 2006

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Definition

• Staff Estimate: Assessments of courses of action by the various staff elements of a command that serve as the foundation of the commander’s estimate.

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Staff Estimate Objectives

• Ensures COAs developed are complete from staff element’s perspective

• Refines COAs prior to analysis and provides staff input for COA comparison and selection

• Provides analysis, recommendations and conclusion of staff sections on applicable COAs

• Serves as the basis for Commander’s Estimate

• Create concepts and products for CTF order

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Crisis Action Planning Process

CRISIS

ISituation

Development

IICrisis

Assessment

IVCourse of

ActionSelection

VExecutionPlanning

AND/OR

IIICourse of

ActionDevelopment

IMission Analysis/Restated Mission

IIIAnalysis of Opposing

Courses of Action

IICourse of Action

Development

Commander’s Estimate Process

OPORD

Deployment Data Base

VIExecution

PlanningOrder

AlertOrder

WarningOrder

ExecuteOrder

IVComparison of OwnCourses of Action

VCommander’s

Decision

Staff Estimates

The Staff Estimate

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Staff Estimate Process

• Staff estimates begin with mission analysis and continue throughout the planning process to ensure the commander has the best information on the supportability of the operation

• Staff estimates are a comprehensive review that translate threat/enemy and friendly strengths and weaknesses into capabilities and estimates of supportability

• Staff estimates are a repetitive process and are in a constant state of refinement

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Staff Estimate Process

• Staff estimates ensure COAs have all planning in place prior to COA analysis to facilitate and maximize the benefits of “Wargaming”

• Staff estimate focus is on the KEY information that is needed to develop a COA for acceptance or rejection

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Staff Estimates

• Mission Analysis

• COA Development

• Gathers information for later use in planning, identifies any obvious problems

• Staff elements use functional area expertise to ensure COA is fully fleshed out and has best probability of success from functional perspective

Step Staff estimate purpose

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Staff Estimates

• COA Analysis • Staff elements adjust estimates as a result of information gathered in “Wargaming”. Staff elements identify and address any shortfalls. Staff elements gather information on each COA to make recommendations to Commander.

Step Staff estimate purpose

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Staff Estimates

• COA Comparison/Selection

• Staff elements provide an estimate judging validity (suitable, acceptable, feasible, distinct) of each COA, identify shortfalls or issues, and finally, make a recommendation to the CCTF.

Step Staff estimate purpose

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STAFF ESTIMATES

Mission Analysis

MISSION STATEMENT

MISSION ANALYSIS

BRIEFSTRATEGIC

COMMANDER’S PLANNING DIRECTIVE

MISSIONANALYSIS

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STAFF ESTIMATES

COA Development

WARNING ORDER

STAFF ESTIMATE UPDATES

MISSION AND TASKS

STATEMENTS SKETCHES AND

TASK ORGANIZATION

COMMANDERS GUIDANCE

COADEVELOPMENT

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STATEMENTS SKETCHES AND

TASK ORGANIZATION

COA Analysis

STAFF ESTIMATE UPDATES

WARGAME RECORD

ADVANTAGES AND

DISADVANTAGES

UPDATED STAFF

ESTIMATES

COAANALYSIS

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STAFF/DEPUTY COMMANDER, CTF

RECOMMENDATIONS

COA SELECTION

COA Selection

CTF COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE TO

THE SUPPORTED STRATEGIC

COMMANDER

FINAL DECISION

COA MODIFICATIONS

COMMANDER’S OWN ANALYSIS

AND COMPARISON

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Staff Estimate Submission

• C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7• Special staff sections

– Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)– Information Operations (IO)– Media Support Staff / PAO– Force Protection– Coalition/Combined Logistics Coordination

Center (CLCC)– Coalition Coordination Center (CCC)

• Other sections as directed

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Staff Estimate In Support of COA Comparison

Format

• Mission: Staff Section Mission as a function of the CTF mission

• Suitability: • Acceptability:• Feasibility:

– Assessment of the Suitability, Acceptability and Feasibility of the respective COAs. States which COA is most Suitable, Acceptable or Feasible from the staff elements’ perspective.

• Concerns/Issues: Staff elements state concerns or issues with each COA as applicable.

• Shortfalls: The staff section identifies significant shortfalls that may impact accomplishment or success of each COA.

• Recommended COA: The staff element recommends a COA based on their perspective with brief reasoning why.

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EXAMPLE: AIR CELL ESTIMATES

• Differences in COA Characteristics– CFACC ashore in COA 1 & 2; afloat in # 2

Either concept supportable Infrastructure already in place on CVBG Preponderance of air assets land based

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• Mission Areas– Air Superiority: 100 sorties/day

(s/d)– Air to Ground (CAS, AI): 300 s/d– Strat Lift: 5 s/d– Tac Lift: 32 s/d

– ISR: – Air Refueling: – CSAR: – Airborne C2:

Enemy Sortie Capability

Estimated 60 per day(D Day)

Estimated 0 per day(D+1)

EXAMPLE: AIR CELL ESTIMATES

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• Validity Tests

– Suitable – Feasible – Acceptable – Complete

• Recommendations– Tanker/Bomber/Airlift basing at

XX,YY,ZZ– Fighter basing at XX,XX,TT,CC

Force capability ratios:

An overwhelming air advantage!

EXAMPLE: AIR CELL ESTIMATES

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EXAMPLE: MARITIME STAFF ESTIMATES

• Mission: COA 1 – Light Footprint• Suitability: Yes. (4.1 of 5)• Feasibility: Yes. (3.9 of 5)• Acceptability: Yes. (4.0 of 5)• Concerns / Issues:

– Consider movement of the ISB from XXXX to XXXX to reduce inorganic sealift requirement.

– Mines could be an issue. – Anti-ship Missiles will need to be defended against.

• Shortfalls: – Small organic lift capability.

• Recommended COA:– Smallest Naval (warships + contracted lift)

footprint – least exposure to enemy forces• OVERALL ESTIMATE: (4.2 of 5)

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EXAMPLE: C1 STAFF ESTIMATES COA1

• Mission. LIGHT FOOTPRINT

• Suitable. Yes. Allows for rapid deployment of personnel.

• Feasible. Yes. The required resources to accomplish the mission are readily available.

• Acceptable. Yes. However, it is the highest risk of personnel losses due limited forces and offensive capability.

• Concerns/Issues: Casualties may be higher due to lack overwhelming force

• Shortfalls. Limited FP and ground forces

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• Mission. MEDIUM FOOTPRINT

• Suitable. Yes. Allows for rapid deployment with more robust force.

• Feasible. Yes. The required resources to accomplish the mission are readily available

• Acceptable. Yes. More forces available which limits risks to personnel

• Concerns/Issues: More personnel increases the requirement for more robust FP and intel resources

• Shortfalls. None.

EXAMPLE: C1 STAFF ESTIMATES COA2

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• Mission. HEAVY FOOTPRINT

• Suitable. Yes. However, size of force may be more than what is required.

• Feasible. Yes. However, it will take longer to deploy all forces to AO.

• Acceptable. Yes. More FP available for the increase in personnel

• Concerns/Issues: Heaviest drain on personnel requirements.

• Shortfalls. None

EXAMPLE: C1 STAFF ESTIMATES COA3

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• Suitable - YES• Feasible - YES• Acceptable - YES• Concerns/Issues - WEATHER TERRAIN COMM• Shortfalls - CRYPTOLINGUISTS TROJAN SPIRIT PHL MIG ANALYSIS TEAM J2X HUMAN EXPLOITATION TEAM

EXAMPLE: C2 STAFF ESTIMATES COA1/2

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• Suitable - YES• Feasible - YES• Acceptable - YES• Concerns/Issues - WEATHER TERRAIN COMM• Shortfalls - CRYPTOLINGUISTS TROJAN SPIRIT PHL MIG ANALYSIS TEAM J2X

EXAMPLE: C2 STAFF ESTIMATES COA3

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Mission: Provide transportation and logistics support for HA operation in JOA. - Facilitate transition of logistics to NGO/IO.Suitability: COA 1 is most suitable because it best meets commander’s guidance to minimize footprint.Acceptability: All COAs are equally Acceptable.Feasibility: COA 1 is most feasible because places less emphasis on CTF logistics assets.Concerns/issues: The time required to transition to NGO/IO based HA support is not fixed. This may lead to extending limited CTF resources past their maintenance cycle timelines. Shortfalls: The CTF has only 80% of the anticipated HET support required for any selected COARecommended COA: CTF J4 recommends COA 1 based on current and anticipated requirements and capabilities.

Example C4 Staff Estimate

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EXAMPLE: C4 STAFF ESTIMATE COA1

• Mission: SOF Option – Light Footprint (All SOF forces, USN forces including MEU(SOC), USAF forces and all AFP forces)

• Suitability: YES, logistics can support the time line.

• Feasibility: YES, resources required are available to accomplish the mission (HSVs, LCUs, Tactical Airlift, LCACs)

• Acceptability: YES, minimal logistical losses expected

however, will require more time and resources to push supplies forward.

• Concerns / Issues: Time for establishment of ISB and forward movement into offensive operations.

• Shortfalls: Limited HNS and inland transportation.

• Recommended COA: No

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EXAMPLE: C4 STAFF ESTIMATE COA 2

• Mission: Medium Footprint (Expeditionary Option), All forces not to include US Army (Hooaa)

• Suitability: YES, logistics can support the time line.

• Feasibility: YES, organic resources are sufficient for 30 DOS for US MEB and 3 DOS for RP Forces.

• Acceptability: YES, minimal logistical losses expected

however, will require more time to source transportation requirements.

• Concerns / Issues: Movement and re-supply of RP Forces to and throughout the JOA.

• Shortfalls: Limited HNS, inland transportation and lack Level III care.

• Recommended COA: No

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• Mission: Heavy Footprint, Utilize all forces listed. • Suitability: YES, logistics can support the time line.

• Feasibility: YES, organic resources are sufficient for 30 DOS for US Forces and 3 DOS for RP Forces.

• Acceptability: YES, however, it will require extensive

HN infrastructure improvements to flow in personnel.

• Concerns / Issues: Very time consuming.

• Shortfalls: Limited HN APODs, inland transportation and lack Level III care.

• Recommended COA: COA 3 – best accomplishes mission

EXAMPLE: C4 STAFF ESTIMATE COA 3

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EXAMPLE: C5 STAFF ESTIMATE COA 1/2/3

• Mission: Conducts the initial planning to Transition to a Peace Keeping Force, or the Host Nation of Camry governmental agencies and armed forces.

• Suitability: Yes

• Feasibility: Yes

• Acceptability: Yes

• Concerns / Issues: None

• Shortfalls: None

• Recommendations: None

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EXAMPLE : C7 STAFF ESTIMATE COA 1/2/3

• Mission. CCATF (or CMOTF) Evaluates HNS capabilities, conducts CMO, PRC. Be prepared to conduct HA/DR in post hostility phases

• Suitable. Yes CCATF / CMOTF is doctrinally supportable. Missions are within scope of CA force Structure

• Feasible. Yes Forces (RC & AC) are available within timeline constraints

• Acceptable. Yes Recommend organic forces T/O with habitually assigned services

• Concerns/Issues: Takes up to 30 days to mobilize and deploy CA units (RC) Minimal staff & troop augmentation during initial phases

• Shortfalls: • Linguist requirements unknown, CCATF/CCMOTF can assume mission• COA 2 & 3 transition period too brief for adequate completion of HA/DR

- addressed in COA 2 with extended CA deployments

• Recommended COA: All supportable

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Summary

• Definition• Staff Estimate Objectives• Staff Estimate Process• Staff Estimate Steps• Staff Estimate Submission• Staff Estimate Format

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Questions?

CTF Training

Enhancing Multinational OperationsEnhancing Multinational Operations

UNCLASSIFIED