Crimpro Rule 110

MAE NIAGARA M. BALANAYSubject: Criminal Procedure

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA vs HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR.211 SCRA 277

FACTS:

Luz M. Zaldivia was charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor’s permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990 and the corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. Zaldivia moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had already prescribed. She also argued that the crime charged is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure and further invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled, “An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription or Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,” and since the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed. The prosecutor contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor invoking Section 1 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the period of prescription of the offense charged was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

HELD:

The period of prescription of the offense charged was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to Zaldivia commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court o Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.


ISABELITA REODICA vs COURT OF APPEALS292 SCRA 87

FACTS:

Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Dona Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of Norberto Bonsol, which Bonsol sustained injuries while the damage of his car amounted to Php8,542.00. Three (3) days after the incident, or on October 20, 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint against Reodica with the Fiscals Office. On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging Reodica with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injuries. Reodica was thereafter convicted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prescription period for the quasi-offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office.

HELD:

The prescription period for the quasi-offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of the case. In the instant case, the offenses involved are covered by the Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that, “the period of prescription shall commenced to run from the day on which the crime is discovered xxx and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information xxx.” Thus, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, without being distinguished whether the said complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits, could only mean that, the filing of the complaint even


with the fiscals office suspends the running of the Statute of limitations.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS AMADEO ABUYEN213 SCRA 569

FACTS:

On December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, Amadeo Abuyen entered the premises of Vicente Chua and while inside, he robbed the former of his cash and by reason or on occasion of the robbery, he attacked, assaulted and employed personal violation upon the two minor children of Chua and stabbed them thereby inflicting serious and mortal stab wounds which resulted to their deaths. An information for Robbery with Homicide was filed with the RTC Quezon City Branch against Abuyen without the qualifying circumstance of Treachery. Abuyen was later convicted of the crime Robbery with Homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the information filed is sufficient to inform Abuyen that the manner of his attack is treacherous.

HELD:

The information filed is sufficient to inform Abuyen that the manner of his attack is treacherous. Abuyen’s act or repeatedly stabbing two (3) minor children clearly constitutes treachery and qualifies the killing to murder. It has time and again, be held that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense is considered attended with treachery even if the manner of the attack was not shown. It


must be stressed that even if in cases of robbery with homicide where the accused may be convicted of homicide or murder, the fundamental rule that the qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the information cannot still be ignored. To allow otherwise would be denial of the accused’s right to be sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. In the present case, the allegation in the Information that the victims are both minors is to be considered compliance with the abovementioned rule. Further, the information in the case at bar is sufficient to inform Abuyen that the manner of attack is alleged to be treacherous and as such, he could be held liable for the crime of murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BIENVENIDO VENUS63 Phil. 435

FACTS:

The Prosecuting Attorney of the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an information charging the defendant, Bienvenido Venus, with the crime of robbery in an inhabited house committed on or about the March 9, 1936. The information alleges among other, “that the said accused is a habitual delinquent, having previously been convicted by final judgment rendered by a competent court, once for the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house and once for theft, the date of his last conviction being November 14, 1934.” The accused pleaded guilty to the information and the trial court in imposing the prison sentence upon him, took into account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism because the date of the conviction of the accused for the crime of theft is specified in information, but refused to consider him as a habitual delinquent under the provision of Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:


Whether or not habitual delinquency was sufficiently alleged in the information.

HELD:

Habitual delinquency cannot be into account in the present case because of the insufficiency of the allegation in the City Fiscal’s information. In this case, the information of which the defendant was alleged to have previously been convicted and also the date of the last conviction for theft which occurred prior to the date of the commission of the offense now charge. But this does not make the information sufficient in law for it fails to specify the date of the convictions for attempted robbery in an inhabited house and theft may have been taken on the same date or on two different dates so close together as to warrant the court in considering two convictions as only one for the purpose of that application of habitual delinquency law. Upon the other hand, it may happen that a person accused of robo, hurto, estafa or falsification may have been convicted of any said offenses after the commission of the crime which he is charged. As the court already held, in order that previous convictions to be considered for the purpose of imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, it must precede the commission of the crime charged.

Thus, it is therefore urge upon the prosecuting attorneys that in the prosecution of cases of this nature, they should not content themselves with a general averment of habitual delinquency but should specify the dates (1) of the commission of the previous crimes, (2) of the last conviction or release, and (3) of the other previous convictions or release of the accused. Informations filed in these cases should be sufficiently clear and specific to avoid the improper imposition of the additional penalty on a plea of guilty to a general allegation of habitual delinquency, no less than the frequency with which hardened criminals escape the imposition of the deserved additional penalty provided by law.

UNITED STATES vs YAO SIM31 Phil. 301

FACTS:

Yao Sim was charged and convicted with violation of opium law after having been found in his possession, 3 grams of opium. On appeal they alleged that his conviction should not be sustained because the prosecution failed to negate by affirmative evidence that the accused was lawfully entitled to have the opium


in his possession for medicinal use upon the prescription of a practicing physician.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint was sufficiently alleged in the information.

HELD:

The complaint was sufficiently alleged in the information. Since there is no evidence offered by the accused in support of his claim that he was lawfully entitled to have the contraband drug in his possession, and the prosecution having established the fact of possession by competent testimony, the judgment convicting and sentencing him should therefore be affirmed.

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. vs JUDGE JOB B. MADAYAG207 SCRA 134

FACTS:


Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged in an information for the crime of frustrated murder. After the prosecution had rested its case, Teehankee Jr. was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman, the victim in the said case, had died. Consequently, Private Prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information for murder and to admit said amended information. The court admitted the information and thereafter ordered the prosecution to present it evidence.

ISSUE:Whether or not the filing of the amended information for

murder is proper.

HELD: The filing of the amended information for murder is proper.

There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings for the orders of the trial court. Section 14, Paragraph 1 and 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, “Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves substantial change from the original change,” “Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed.” In determining therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the information is sufficient, otherwise, where the new information charges and offense which is distinct and different from the initially charged, a substitution is in order.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration pf, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.


In this case, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. There being the case, the court held that an amendment of the original information will suffice and consequent thereto, the filling of the amended information for murder is proper.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs JUDGE NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, G.R. No.

L-74053-54

FACTS:

Manuel Parulan is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Bulacan. He was charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial court of Pampanga for having issued a check in favor of SMC but which was dishonoured for having been drawn against “insufficient funds” and in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. Further, on the same court, he was charged with Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having made out a check in favor of SMC inpayment of beer he had purchased, but which check was refused payment for “insufficient funds” and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. The two cases were tried jointly and were consequently dismissed on the principal ground that, deceit and damage, being the two essential elements that make up the offenses involving dishonoured checks did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga but in Bulacan where the checks issued were dishonored. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the venue was sufficiently conferred in the RTC Pampanga in two cases.

HELD:

The venue was sufficiently conferred in the RTC Pampanga in two cases. Section 14 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that, “in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province


wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.” In other words, a person charged with transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others. However, if the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.

Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate places. In this case, the deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan where the check was dishonoured by the drawee bank in that place. Jurisdiction may therefore, be entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.

In respect of the Bouncing Checks case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed b the very fact of its performance and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonour of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. The case therefore could have been filed also in Bulacan. However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense, is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the RTC Pampanga.

Jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information, which are controlling. The information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC Pampanga.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JOVITA V. BUENVIAJE47 Phil. 536

FACTS:

Jovita Buenviaje was accused of violating the Medical Act. It was alleged in the information, that she, without having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners the corresponding certificate of registration for the practice of medicine, illegally practiced medicine by assisting, treating and manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble for the purpose of curing him of the ailments, diseases, pains and physical defects from which he pretends to suffer, and advertising and offering her services as physician, by means of cards which she distributed and by letterheads and signs which she exposed on the door of her office and in newspapers which are published and circulated within the City of Manila, in which cards, letterheads, signs and advertising she added and prefixed to her name the letters, ‘Dra.,” which is the abbreviation of the word ‘doctor’ for the purpose of causing the public to believe that she had received the corresponding title


of doctor. Buenviaje, demurred in the court on the ground that the information charged more than one offense, that in reality, she should be accused of two separate and distinct offenses, namely, illegal practice of medicine and illegally representing oneself as a doctor.

ISSUE:

Whether not the information is duplicitous.

HELD:

The information is duplicitous. The offense here penalized is the “violation of the Medical Law.” The statute makes no distinction between illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. Both are in violation of the Medical Law and carry the same penalty. They are merely different ways or means of committing the same offenses and both of these means are closely related to each other and usually employed together.

In these circumstances and where, as alleged in the information in the present case, the various violations have taken place simultaneously, the court do not think it was the intention of the legislator that each single act should be regarded as a separate offense and separate informations presented for each. It is not objectible, when a single offense may be committed by the use of different means, to charge, in the alternative, the various means by which the crime may have been committed. The various means of committing the offense is described in more than one section of the statute does not necessarily effect the general principle involved. The subdivision of a statute into section is merely a matter of convenience and while it sometimes may be of some aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, it is of course, not conclusive thereof.

UNITED STATES vs TICZON25 Phil. 67

FACTS:

A complaint was filed by the woman stating that “while the offended party was inside her house at night and all the doors were locked and all the windows were closed, the accused surreptitiously entered the house and approached the offended


party who was asleep, raised her skirt and at that very moment, the woman woke up and resisted.” In the information, the crime committed was captioned as trespass to dwelling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the caption of the crime trespass to dwelling in the information should prevail.

HELD:

The caption of the crime trespass to dwelling in the information should prevail. When the facts appearing in the complaint or information are stated that they are capable of two or more interpretations, then the designation of the offense in the caption controls.

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Crimpro Rule 110