G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990

G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY,respondents.FELICIANO,J.:On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court.Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for comment. Responding to the Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having been previously consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be given due course.After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by lawdoes not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both. . .." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period;at that time therefore, the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) toprision mayor in its medium period.It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged.1Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty which a city court could impose.The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . " We do not believe so.In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information. InPeople v.Purisima,2the Court stressed that:xxx xxx xxx. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a caseab origine.In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.3(Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)The same rule was set forth and amplified inPeople v.Buissan,4in the following terms:xxx xxx xxx. . .in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial(People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814)or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial(People v. Co Hick 62 Phil. 503)but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal obligations,on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information(People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged,for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information(People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330)5(Emphasis supplied.)Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court.InPeople v.Buissan,6the Court also said:xxx xxx xxx. . . It is unquestionable thatthe Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the reason already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal court.7(Emphasis supplied.)In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prison mayorin its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up toprision correccionalin its minimum period).Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.G.R. No. L-35825 February 20, 1989CORA LEGADOS, represented by ROSA LEGADOS, and HON. JESUS ANGELES,petitionersvs.HON. DOROTEO DE GUZMAN, Judge, CFI, Br. II, Zamboanga, VILMOR ICAO, represented by his mother, SOFIA L. ICAO,respondents.Lacaya & Tabiliran Law Office for petitioners.Felipe G. Tac-an for respondents.NARVASA,J.:Section 32 ofBatas Pambansa Bilang129, effective August 14, 1981, grants to Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts1"(e)xclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof.2The proviso altered and superseded the long standing doctrine first laid down in a 1911 case3that an inferior court had no jurisdiction over the crime of simple seduction although the penalty imposed isarresto mayor because conviction thereof carried with it the liability imposed by Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code to acknowledge and give Support to the offspring. The doctrine was made applicable whatever the peculiar circumstances of the offender and offended party might be, it not being permitted, upon considerations of consistency and orderliness, "to speculate on whether or not an offspring may still arise from the crime, whether or not the complainant or the accused may be sterile or incapable of procreation, whether or not the complaint was already pregnant by another man when the crime was committed and various other factual considerations before the jurisdiction may be fixed.4In the case at bar, long before the passage of B.P. Big. 129,5a complaint for simple seduction6was filed with the then City Court of Dipolog (Branch 11)7against Vilmor Icao. The complaint was presented by the offended girl, Cora Legados, represented by her mother, Rosa, and was subsequently made the basis of an information filed by the First Assistant City Fiscal.8After entering a plea of not guilty on arraignment, Icao moved to quash the information on the ground that the City Court had no jurisdiction to try the offense, and the fiscal who filed the information bad no authority to do so. The Court denied the motion and scheduled the case for trial on the merits. Icao thereupon instituted an action of prohibition9with the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City10which, in due course, granted the petition and permanently enjoined the proceedings in the City Court. It is this Order which is now assailed in this Court as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.The writ of prohibition was, of course, correctly issued by the respondent Judge, being consistent with the doctrine obtaining at the time, i.e., that an inferior court had no jurisdiction over the crime of simple seduction. But, as already pointed out, the doctrine has since been changed. Now, the offense is explicitly declared by law to be within the exclusive original jurisdiction, no longer of Courts of First Instance (since abolished and replaced by Regional Trial Courts), but of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.WHEREFORE, the disputed Order of respondent Judge of October 9, 1972 is SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City (which replaced the City Court) for further proceedings. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.G.R. No. 123263 December 16, 1996PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, Branch 32, and ISAH V. RED,respondents.NARVASA,C.J.:pWhether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the Metropolitan Trial Court or other first level court which has exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal actions of libel, is the issue raised by the People of the Philippines, as petitioner in the special civil action ofcertiorari, prohibition andmandamusat bar. The fairly simple facts from which the issue has arisen are hereunder briefly narrated.On January 30, 1995 an information for libel was filed against Isah V. Red in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case thereby initiated was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-60134 and raffled to Branch 82.Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction of the offense. The Judge found merit in the motion and by an Order dated March 29, 1995, remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City "for proper action/disposition in the premises." His Honor declared that "(u)nder Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, exclusive original jurisdiction over 'all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof is vested in the Municipal Trial Court. . . " The case was accordingly transferred to the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court where it was docketed as Case No. 43-00548 and raffled to Branch 43.Thereafter, the private prosecutor, "under the control and supervision of the Fiscal," filed a "Manifestation and Motion to Remand" dated August 1, 1995 praying that the case be returned to the RTC. The movant invoked Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which pertinently provides that:1xxx xxx xxxThe criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation, as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with theCourt of First Instanceof the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense . . .",and argued that . . . Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court (such as the Court of Tax Appeals) are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law. (De Joya vs. Lantin, 19 SCRA 893). Moreover, a general law cannot repeal or amend by implication a specific provision or a special law. Otherwise stated: a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and operation, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifested. This is so, even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. (Philippine Railway Co. vs. CIR, 91 Phil. 35; Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 207 SCRA 487).The MetroTC denied the motion by Order dated August 14, 1995. It opined that "Rep. Act No. 7691, which took effect onApril 15, 1994, would partake of the nature of a 'modern' law which impliedly repeals an 'ancient' law (the Revised Penal Code) which is of 1932 vintage, which is inconsistent with the later law . .; (and that) if the repeal makes the penaltylighterin the new law, the new law shall be applied."2Later, the MetroTC also denied the private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration, by Order dated September 7, 1995. Still later, in an Order dated October 18, 1995, it denied another motion by the same counsel reiterating the plea to remand the case back to the RTC, and further directed "the prosecution to present . . (its) next witness," trial having in the meantime commenced.Now, in this proceeding, the State prays for judgment: "(1) declaring the questioned Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 as null and void for having been issued by the respondent court acting without jurisdiction; (2) enjoining the respondent court from further conducting trials in Criminal Case No. 43-00548; and (3) commanding the respondent court to remand Criminal Case No. 43-00548 to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition." It citesJalandoni v.Endaya(55 SCRA 261 [1974]), where this Court (a) drew attention to the categorical language of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "it is a court of first instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case," and (b) indicated "thirteen (13) cases, fromPeople v.Topacio, 59 Phil. 356 (1934) toTime, Inc.v.Reyes, 39 SCRA 303 (1971), wherein this . . Court ruled that municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over libel cases."3It further argues that in light ofJalandoni,andBerces v.Guingona(241 SCRA 539 [1995]) to the effect that a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between them Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code may not be deemed to have been superseded by Republic Act No. 7691.This Court has already had occasion to resolve the issue, substantially in line with the position taken by the People, account having been taken of substantially the same arguments adduced by the opposing parties in this case. In G.R. No. 122126 entitledLydia Caro vs.Court of AppealsandVioleta Sarigumba, involving the same jurisdictional issue as that specifically presented in the case at bar, this Court promulgated a Resolution on June 19, 1996 pertinently reading as follows:Anent the question of jurisdiction, we . . find no reversible error committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention . . that R.A. No. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Courts' jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [21]), said law, however, excludes therefrom ". . cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts . . ." The Court inBocobo vs.Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 andJalandoni vs.Endaya,55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases.Moreover, Administrative Order No. 104-96 treating of the subject:". . DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES" issued on October 21, 1996 by the Chief Justice upon the advice and consent of the CourtEn Banc,inter aliaprovides, in categorical acknowledgment of the validity of the doctrine just adverted to, that "LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS."The proposition is hereby reaffirmed, the Court perceiving no argument advanced by respondents justifying its abrogation or modification.Concerning respondents' contention that the challenged orders are now immutable, having become final and executory for failure of the prosecution to take an appeal therefrom, it suffices to advert to the familiar and uniformly applied axiom thatonly final ordersi.e., those that finally dispose of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the court respecting the merits of a case can become final and executory in the sense of becoming unalterable through an appeal or review proceeding.4Interlocutory orders, on the other hand i.e., those which resolve incidental motions or collateral matters but do not put an end to the case never become final in the sense of becoming unchangeable and impervious to impugnation after expiration of the period prescribed for taking an appeal from a final judgment.5Respecting respondents' claim that venue is merely procedural, suffice it to point out that unlike in civil cases, in criminal cases venue is jurisdictional.6WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent Court's Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition.IT IS SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.G.R. Nos. 154239-41 February 16, 2005FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, SHERLITA R. GALLEGO, and EMMA C. DAGONDON,petitioners,vs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the March 20, 2002 Resolution1of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 24505-07 as well as the June 13, 2002 Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.The AntecedentsSometime in 1994, in a meeting held at the residence of Atty. Bernadette P. Encinareal, then Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. promised to giveP10,000.00 to each of the 33 barangay captains of the Municipality of Tudela, Misamis Occidental. The Congressman assured the barangay captains that the amount was his personal gift to each of them.It turned out that the amount provided by Congressman Ramiro came from his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) which was remitted to the Municipal Treasurer of Tudela per Allotment Advice No. F2-6781-94-315 in the amount ofP220,000.00 under Check No. 497664; and Allotment Advice No. F2-7784-94-415 in the amount ofP110,000.00 under Check No. 497679. Forthwith, petitioner Mayor Felix Sarigumba secured a cash advance chargeable against the CDF of Congressman Ramiro and submitted to the Municipal Treasurer Voucher Nos. 9411-422 and 9412-445 in the total amount ofP330,000.00. The particulars contained in the said vouchers read: "to cash advance the CDF for payment of snacks during assembly meeting for peace and order meeting of 33 barangays of Tudela, Misamis Occidental."Petitioner Sarigumba, thereafter, gaveP9,500.00 to each of the barangay captains through two members of his staff, Loreta Salinasal and Crosita Singidas. As per his agreement with the barangay captains, each of the latter was to giveP500.00 to the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) which would serve as contributions for projects. The barangay captains thought that the amount given to each of them was a "cash gift" or "pahalipay" from Congressman Ramiro.2Petitioner Sarigumba later liquidated his cash advance ofP220,000.00viaLiquidation Voucher No. 9412-478, stating therein that the said amount was used as follows:(1) "For the liquidation of cash advance amounting TWO HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS, to furnish to various barangays of Tudela under check #497664 for meals and snacks during peace and order meeting as per supporting papers hereto attached in the total amount ofP220,000."3The petitioner-mayor also liquidated his cash advance ofP110,000.00viaVoucher No. 9412-488, in which he stated that he used the amount (2) "For the liquidation of cash advance under check #497679 on V #9412-445 to cover up expenses on peace and order meeting to various barangays of Tudela, Misamis Occidental from CDF Fund under AA #F2-6781-94-315 in the total amountP110,000. "4He then supported his liquidation vouchers with attendance sheets bearing the signatures of those who purportedly attended the assembly meetings. Petitioner Emma C. Dagondon approved Voucher No. 9412-478, while petitioner Sherlita R. Gallego approved Voucher No. 9412-488.Subsequently, Flaviano Zaide, William Gumisad, Edilberto Quinalagan, Maria Pacaro and Virginia Tampoog, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against the petitioners Sarigumba, Gallego and Dagondon, alleging,inter aliaThat we strongly deny that there had been an assembly or meeting where free meals and snacks during a peace and order meeting were given to the barangay people in the year 1994 and 1995 except during the SOT at Barangays Napurog, Duangican and Maribojoc but we knew for a fact that the said snacks were not given from the above vouchers but the money out of the above disbursements were given as cash gifts to the Barangay Captains of Tudela, Misamis Occidental. In support to the liquidation of the withdrawal of the aforesaid amount were the signatures of the barangay people not for the purpose as alleged in those vouchers but obtained in different manners like attendance during the monthly barangay assembly, or signatures for the retention of the Tudela, Public High School at the Tudela Central School while other signatures were obtained to reimburse payment of a hand-set radio (two-way) procured for the different barangays by the Mayor;That signatures of the undersigned and numerous signatures of barangay folks including children were forged or obtained under other pretense by the aforesaid mayor in support of the vouchers thereby cheating the people of their money.5The Ombudsman requested the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct an investigation of the Peace and Order Campaign Funds for 1994. The Auditor directed each of the barangay captains who received theP9,500.00 from petitioner Sarigumba to remit the said amounts to their respective barangay treasurers and to submit the receipts the latter would issue thereon.When the barangay captains received the letter of the COA, they were surprised. They then secured receipts from their respective barangay treasurers which indicated that they had returned the amount they received from petitioner Sarigumba although no such amounts had yet been received by the former. The barangay captains were thereafter accorded a chance to re-liquidate the amounts they received from the petitioner-mayor and they did so.In their Memorandum Report to the Provincial Auditor dated December 3, 1995, the auditors declared that, with the barangay captains submission of official receipts, there had been, in effect, no loss of government funds.When theSandiganbayanreceived a copy of the COA Report, its Committee on Legal Matters and Committee on Finance, Budget and Appropriations, conducted an investigation, which yielded the following findings as per Committee Report No. 96-13:4. That the amount released to each Barangay Captain was onlyP9,500.00 and othersP9,400.00 per affidavit submitted by Loreta Salinasal, the Private Secretary to the Mayor.5. That sometime in 1994 Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, [Jr.] assured the Barangay Captains of a personal cash gift ofP10,000.00 for each Barangay from his own pocket, but it was never meant that the amount would come from Congressman Ramiros CDF for peace and order campaign in the Municipality of Tudela. All Barangay Captains received the amount as promised by Congressman Ramiro and disbursed it for their personal benefit. But later on re-submitted liquidation papers for Peace and Order Campaigns in their respective barangays.6. That the barangay captains changed their positions and denied, as shown in their uniform testimonies, that the amount was indeed for Peace and Order Campaign and not a personal cash gift from Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. The illegal act was already consummated.7. That COA initiated the investigation of the release of said amounts only after the directive of the Ombudsman arrived. Directing all Barangay Captains to return the amount ofP10,000.00 and to produce official receipts acknowledging that said amount had been received by the Barangay Treasurers even if no actual cash was turned over. It appears also that the Municipal Treasurer issued official receipts without actual cash involved to make it appear that said amounts were returned by the barangay captains. The barangay then re-submitted liquidations to justify the earlier liquidations where the forged signatures of barangay constituents were first presented to COA as liquidation of said vouchers. The amounts released were already disbursed. The liquidation papers forP220,000.00 andP110,000.00 were already submitted to COA as final liquidation. For all intent and purposes the act was already consummated. The second liquidation would appear to have been fabricated and had been compromised to legalize the unlawful act.After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding probable cause for malversation against petitioner Sarigumba; two counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code also against the petitioner-mayor; and one count of falsification of public documents against petitioners Dagondon and Gallego.Accordingly, the Ombudsman filed an Information for malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Sarigumba with the Sandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 24505 reads:That sometime in November and December 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Tudela, Province of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official positions, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, embezzle and appropriate unto himself and/or thru abandonment, or gross negligence allowed other parties to misappropriate, embezzle and/or use to some other purpose the total sum ofP330,000.00 he had earlier obtained as cash advance from the Municipality intended for the Peace and Order Campaign of the different Barangays of the same municipality, thereby constituting him a special disbursing officer and for which he is accountable, to the damaged (sic) and prejudice of the government and of public interest.CONTRARY TO LAW.6Another Information for falsification of public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioners Sarigumba and Gallego was filed with the Sandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 24506 reads:That sometime in December 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Tudela, Province of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, and SHERLITA R. GALLEGO, a low-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Accountant, both accused, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official positions, in order to cover up the misuse of public funds advanced by respondent FELIX L. SARIGUMBA intended for the Peace and Order Campaign of the 33 Barangays of the same Municipality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Liquidation Voucher No. 9412-488 amounting toP110,000.00 by making it appear it was for expenses during the peace and order meeting when, in truth and in fact, both accused knew well that there were no such peace and order meetings being held; furthermore, fabricated attendance sheets and list of signatures were used as supporting documents causing it to appear that persons attended such peace and order meetings when, [in] truth and in fact, they did not for there was no such meetings being held, to the damaged(sic)and prejudice of the government and of public interest.CONTRARY TO LAW.7A third Information was filed with the graft court against petitioners Sarigumba and Dagondon for falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The inculpatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 24507, reads:That sometime in December 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Tudela, Province of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, and EMMA C. DAGONDON, a low-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Accountant-Designate, both accused, while in the performance of their official functions committing the offense in relation to their office, were taking advantage of their official positions, in order to cover up the misuse of public funds advanced by respondent FELIX L. SARIGUMBA intended for the Peace and Order Campaign of the 33 Barangays of the same Municipality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Liquidation Voucher No. 9412-478 amounting toP220,000.00 by making it appear it was for meal and snacks during the peace and order meeting when, in truth and in fact, both accused knew well there were no such peace and order meetings being held and much more on the serving of meals and snacks; furthermore, fabricated attendance sheets and list of signatures were used as support documents causing it to appear that persons attended such peace and order meetings when, [in] truth and in fact, they did not for there was no such meetings being held, to the damaged(sic)and prejudice of the government and of public interest.CONTRARY TO LAW.8During the hearing of March 30, 1998, the Sandiganbayan expressed anxiety over the number of crimes committed, and issued a Resolution worded as follows:This morning, this court expressed its anxieties over the correctness of the accusation herein against the Mayor and separately against the municipal accountant for the alleged malversation of sum of money and acts of falsification involving the conversion of portions of the total amount by the accused. It would appear that, considering that there are two amounts, two (2) offenses may have been committed; furthermore, the prosecution can clarify whether or not the alleged falsification took place after the completion of the malversation or was part of the total plan in order to effect the malversation without the same coming to the attention of the examining authorities. Answers to these questions might result in the re-arrangement of the statement of accusation against the accused charged for separate offenses.9This prompted the Special Prosecutor to ask for a period of fifteen (15) days within which to respond to the misgivings of the graft court. In the meantime, the trial court deferred the issuance of any warrants of arrest against the petitioners.During the hearing of April 29, 1998, the trial court issued an Order, quotedinfra:This morning, the Court expressed its uncertainty over the propriety of proceeding with these cases as they stand at this time considering that, on the basis of the very records of the prosecution at preliminary investigation, it would appear that there is a need to determine whether or not the barangay captains did, in fact, receive the amounts allegedly distributed by the accused mayor to them or whether or not any deficiency in the liquidation of these cash advances were deficiencies in the submissions by the barangay captains alone or the barangay captains in conspiracy with any other official.Considering the concurrence of Prosecutor Victorio U. Tabanguil with the doubts expressed by this Court on this matter, as prayed for by him, he is given sixty (60) days from today within which to determine whether or not there exists probable cause against Mayor Felix L. Sarigumba as well as the subordinate officials of the Municipality of Tudela, Misamis Occidental, or against any other persons not yet charged. Should he wish, he may summon other witnesses herefor, including the initiation of another preliminary investigation to summon the barangay captains or such other persons who may have been involved in the receipt and distribution of these funds. The prosecution shall furnish this Court with all of its issuances and orders both in Manila and in Mindanao, should the Deputy Ombudsman for that area deem it wise to take over the case one more time.10In the meantime, during the period of July 22 to 31, 1998, Graft Investigation Officer I Elmer Ben V. Pasion of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao conducted clarificatory hearings. In the course of the proceedings, petitioner Sarigumba admitted that he and the barangay captains had agreed that each of the latter would contributeP500.00 for the ABC projects, and that the amount actually received by each was onlyP9,500.00. The said accused submitted deposit slips showing that the barangay captains had deposited the amounts they received to the barangay treasurers. It appears that the barangay captains executed separate affidavits explaining the circumstances under which they received the amounts from the petitioner Sarigumba through his employees, and how the said amounts were spent.In a Memorandum to the Ombudsman dated December 21, 1998, Graft Investigator Pasion summarized his findings:1. That the barangay captains did, in fact, receive the amount distributed by Mayor Sarigumba through his representatives Loreta Salinasal and Crosita Singidas. That the amount actually received by the barangay captains was onlyP9,500.00 as the barangay captains agree to contributeP500.00 each to the project of the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC).2. That some of the Barangay Captains in good faith had spent the money for their personal use having thought all along that the amount distributed was a "cash gift" or "pahalipay" promised by Congressman Ramiro. It was, however, refunded back to the barangay government by the barangay captains concerned as barangay funds upon learning that the amount distributed was from the CDF of Congressman Ramiro and intended for the Peace and Order Campaign.3. The requirement of COA for the 33 barangay units to issue Official Receipts(Record, pp. 340-372)for the receipts of the money corrected the recording in the Municipal Government of Tudela and properly recorded the transfer of funds and accountability to the 33 different barangay governments.4. That the 33 different barangay governments subsequently submitted their liquidations with the municipal government of Tudela.5. That based on the corresponding liquidation reports submitted by different barangay units, only some of the barangays conducted the barangay assemblies where meals and snacks were served particularly during the Service Orientation Training (SOT) with the 32nd Infantry battalion. That generally, the amount distributed was not spent by the different barangay units for meals and snacks in the peace and order assembly but on some other immediate needs for their peace and order programs as determined by the barangay captains.11Graft Investigator Pasion thus recommended the withdrawal of the Information for malversation and the retention of the Informations for falsification, as follows:1. Considering that during the clarificatory hearing, it was duly established by evidence and by admissions that the barangay captains did, in fact, receive the amount distributed by respondent Mayor Sarigumba, the Information for Malversation against the respondents is hereby recommended to be withdrawn in the absence of evidence of shortage, taking, appropriation, conversion or loss of public funds.For lack of criminal intent, probable cause could not be established against the barangay captains who, in an honest mistake of fact, spent the money for their personal use, believing in good faith that the money distributed was a cash gift or "pahalipay" promised by Congressman Ramiro.2. Respondents, however, were unable to satisfactorily explain and justify the preparation of falsified Liquidation Vouchers No. 9412-478 and 9412-488 by making it appear therein that the amount distributed [was] expended for meals and snacks during the peace and order meetings when, in truth and in fact, peace and order meetings were conducted only in some of the barangays. Moreover, fabricated attendance sheets and list of signatures were used as supporting documents for the questioned Liquidation Vouchers causing it to appear that persons named therein attended such peace and order meetings when, in truth and in fact, they did not so attended(sic).Premised, therefore, on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Domagas vs. Malana, 223 SCRA 359, that"In the crime of falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed," it is hereby maintained that the Informations for Falsification of Public Documents against the accused Municipal Mayor Felix L. Sarigumba and Municipal Accountants Emma C. Dagondon and Sherlita R. Gallego be prosecuted before the Sandiganbayan.12The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., approved the said Memorandum, a copy of which was filed with the Sandiganbayan by Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil on February 4, 1999.13On February 22, 1999, Special Prosecutor Tabanguil submitted a Review Memorandum to the Ombudsman recommending that the three Informations be withdrawn. However, the Ombudsman denied the recommendation with the following notation: "Present the Documents containing the false entries for the scrutiny of the Court."In their comment on the Memorandum of the Graft Investigator Pasion, the petitioners reiterated that, as found by the investigator, they had acted in good faith and that there was an absence of damage and prejudice to the government. They, thus, prayed that the cases against them be dismissed. Appended thereto was the joint affidavit of the barangay captains.Despite the Ombudsmans denial of his Review Memorandum, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion for the withdrawal of the three Informations for falsification of public documents on March 29, 1999.14During the proceedings on October 17, 2000, the graft court addressed clarificatory questions to the Special Prosecutor regarding the Memorandum of Graft Investigator Pasion which the Ombudsman concurred with.Despite the responses of the Special Prosecutor, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause against the petitioners and ordered the cases to remain in the court docket.15Warrants were issued for the arrest of the petitioners. They forthwith posted cash bail bonds for their provisional release16which were later approved by the graft court.On December 26, 2000, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation17with the Sandiganbayan reiterating his March 29, 1999 Manifestation and Motion.The petitioners then filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Arraignment and to Motion to Quash" the Informations. However, on February 15, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order denying the motion.18The graft court, likewise, denied the oral motion for reconsideration thereof made by the petitioners.All of the petitioners were arraigned on February 19, 2001 and pleaded not guilty.19On May 28, 2001, the petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial and Trial, Motion to Dismiss" the cases, claiming that:4. In the early part of May 2001, undersigned counsel, however, received from the accused a copy of the Settlement and Balances dated April 16, 2001, from the Commission on Audit, Province of Misamis Occidental, Oroquieta City, clearly showing that the amount ofP330,000.00 subject of the controversy in the instant case and which was disallowed in 1995 for lack of proper documentation, had been fully settled and allowed as of April 16, 2001.20The complaining witnesses, through counsel, opposed the motion; the Special Prosecutor, however, concurred with the said motion. After due hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution21denying the motion of the petitioners on March 20, 2002. The graft court reiterated its finding of probable cause against them. The petitioners then filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated June 13, 2002.The Present PetitionIn the present petition, the petitioners assert that the court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it found probable cause against them, denied their motion to dismiss the cases, as well as their motion for reconsideration thereof. The petitioners proffer the following arguments:First. Petitioner Sarigumba did not make use of theP330,000.00 subject of the Informations in Criminal Cases No. 24506, considering that the said amount came from Congressman Ramiros CDF, and was distributed to and received by the 33 barangay captains of Tudela, Misamis Occidental, who submitted the appropriate documents liquidating said amounts. Moreover, as per the COA Report, the government did not suffer any loss of funds and until clearance of the barangay captains.Second. The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao and Special Prosecutor Tabanguil recommended the withdrawal of the three Informations in said case.The Ruling of the CourtThe petition has no merit.For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground forcertiorari, it must first be demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or office, has jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted without authority.22In a case where a lower court or quasi-judicial body commits an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction and which is only one of judgment, such error is reviewable only by appeal. On the other hand, if the act complained of was issued by such court or body with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.23In the present cases, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party.24Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.l^vvphi1.netIn determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.25Specifically, probable cause to warrant arrest requires "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."26Once the Informations are filed with the trial court, the determination of the presence or absence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused, or for the withdrawal of the Informations, or for the dismissal of the cases, is addressed to its sound discretion. As such, the trial court is not bound by the recommendation of the Prosecutor. The trial courts exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed,certiorariwill not lie to cure errors in the trial courts appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the conclusions of law. The general rule is that as long as the trial court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by appeal.27Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.In the present case, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the petitioners for one count of malversation and two counts of falsification of public documents against petitioner Sarigumba. The graft courts finding was based on the allegation in the Information, the Resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable cause for the filing of the said Informations, the documentary evidence appended thereto, as well as the facts and circumstances unearthed during the clarificatory hearing of October 17, 2000. After the clarificatory hearings on the petitioners motion to dismiss the cases, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for their arrest and for the court to proceed to trial, on the following ratiocination:It was not denied by the accused that theP330,000.00 came from the Countrywide Development Fund of Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. The documentation for the cash advances taken out by the accused mayor shows that the money was to be used for "peace and order campaign."Mayor Sarigumba is charged in the instant cases for malversation of the total amount ofP330,000.00, as well as for falsification of the attendance sheets attached to the first set of vouchers he had submitted to liquidate the cash advances forP220,000.00 and forP110,000.00. It is claimed by the accused, however, that since the liquidation was finally approved, no injury resulted from the cash advances he had made.It will be noted that the cash advances were taken out by the accused mayor with the following particulars: "To cash advance the CDF for the payment of various expenses during the assembly meeting for peace and order of 33 barangays of Tudela, Misamis Occidental" as shown by the Prosecutions findings.From the clarificatory hearings conducted during the review hereof, it appeared that the barangay captains were also under the impression that the amounts given to them were the cash gifts or "pahalipay" earlier promised by then Congressman Ramiro. That was the reason why, as one of them explained, they spent the amounts on personal matters although, later, they were required to refund the same.The complainant made a list of her own findings after going over the receipts made by the barangay captains. According to her, these documents were inappropriate for the liquidation of the cash advances. Her findings ranged from inadequacy in the amounts accounted for to impropriety of the expenditures madevis--visthe purpose for which the funds were intended per the terms of the voucher. Furthermore, there is also the finding by the prosecutor at review that these were understood by the barangay captains to be cash gifts and not for the purpose for which they were purportedly drawn by the mayor.28What militates against the petition at bench is the failure of the petitioners to append thereto certified copies of the transcripts taken during the clarificatory hearings. Without such transcripts, the Court cannot review the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan and determine whether or not it committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against the petitioners, and in denying their motion to dismiss the cases.Indeed, petitioner Sarigumba failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in finding probable cause against him for malversation. Malversation is defined in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:ART. 217.Malversation of public funds or property - Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation of malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:1. The penalty ofprision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.2. The penalty ofprision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.3. The penalty ofprision mayorin its maximum period toreclusion temporalin its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than 6,000 pesos but is less than 12,000 pesos.4. The penalty ofreclusion temporalin its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,000 pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall bereclusion temporalin its maximum period toreclusion perpetua.In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly- authorized officer, shall beprima facieevidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1060, approved June 12, 1954.)The elements of the crime are the following:(a) The offender is a public officer;(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.29The felony consists not only in misappropriation or converting public funds or property to ones personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate the same.30The felony may thus be committed bydolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to negligence.31An accountable officer may thus be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in the officers account which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. All that is essential is proof that the accountable officer has received public funds but that when demand therefor is made, he is unable to satisfactorily account for the same.32The law declares that the failure of the public officer to account for such public funds or property upon demand by any duly-authorized officer shall beprima facieevidence that he has appropriated the same for his personal use.1vvphi1.ntBased on the record, it is true that petitioner Sarigumba did not make use of theP330,000.00 which he received from the Municipal Treasurer which was chargeable to the CDF of Congressman Ramiro; hence, there is no probable cause for the charge of malversation bydoloagainst him. It must be stressed, however, that the petitioner-mayor is also charged with malversation byculpaunder the Information, allegedly committed by distributingP9,500.00 to each of the barangay captains without bothering to inform them that the amount was from the CDF of Congressman Ramiro and that the money should be used for the peace and order campaign in their respective jurisdictions. All along, the barangay captains were of the belief that the amounts they received were from the personal funds of the Congressman and that they had unfettered use of the money, for whatever purpose they chose.Indeed, Barangay Captain Cosme D. Sarabia admitted that he used theP9,500.00 he received from the petitioner to pay his personal debts. The petitioner and the barangay captains agreed to remitP500.00 each from the amounts they received from petitioner Sarigumba to the ABC for its projects. Indeed, the barangay captains were astounded when they received the directives from the Auditor to remit the amounts they received from the petitioner to the barangay treasurers, and to submit receipts as proof that they had followed the directive. However, the barangay captains merely secured receipts from the barangay treasurers without actually refunding the amounts, and were only later given a chance to liquidate the same.The bare fact that the barangay captains were able to return the amounts they received from the petitioner or liquidate the same after demand therefor does not preclude the finding of probable cause for malversation. As this Court held inKimpo v. Sandiganbayan: In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of funds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect the accuseds civil liability thereunder and be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.33Indeed, the matter of whether the barangay captains were able to liquidate the said amounts and whether the bases thereof are justified are matters of defense during trial, and not before trial, in a motion to dismiss the case.Whether or not the barangay captains acted in good faith is a matter of defense on the part of the petitioner Sarigumba. Even if the barangay captains had indeed acted in good faith, still, if petitioner Sarigumba had failed to make it clear before or when he distributed the money to them that the money was for the peace and order campaign in their respective barangays, he may be criminally liable for malversation byculpa.Likewise barren of merit is the petitioners claim that there is colorable truth in the allegations of petitioner Sarigumba in his liquidation vouchers, that the amounts given to the barangay captains were used mostly or substantially for snacks or related expenses and that there was no probable cause against him for malversation, and against all the petitioners for falsification. It must be stressed that the barangay captains themselves disavowed such claim in their respective affidavits.Demosthenes Singidas of Barangay Cahayag declared that there was a peace and order assembly which coincided with their Barangay Assembly in 1994, where he gaveP50.00 for meals to those who attended and that he spent a total of onlyP4,000.00. Adelaida Paigan of Camating admitted that she spent the money for seminar registration (no specific amount), a hand- held radio antennae (no amount also),P85.00 for the peace and order campaign, food and snacks for the soldiers who guarded the election at aroundP1,000.00; Service Orientation Training (SOT) meals and snacks in the amount ofP1,184.00, and leveling and improving barangay roads in the amount ofP2,000.00. She also declared that papers were passed for signatures of the population of Camating, but there had been no peace and order assembly held for the release of said amount. For his part, Francisco Jerusalem of Barangay Casilak San Agustin alleged that he was givenP10,000.00 by the mayor for no stated purpose; that he did not want to receive it; and that it was given to him as "cash gift." He did not even know that the money was for the peace and order campaign. He stated further, however, that he spent the money for meals and snacks during the peace and order assembly and for the SOT but did not state a specific amount. Gaudencio Olarte of Barangay Upper Centro averred, among others, that he used theP10,000.00 for the jackets and flashlights of three (3) barangay tanods; and for the construction of an outpost and a playhouse for the day-care center. There was also a peace and order assembly in his Barangay in 1994 where the attendance was taken, and he served meals and snacks with no statement as to where he got the funds. Edilberto Castro of Barangay Centro Hulpa declared that he received theP10,000.00 which he thought came from Congressman Ramiro for the election of the ABC President, Emeterio Valmoria and that he divided theP10,000.00 among his councilmen and the members of the peace and order council. Edilberto Cobrado of Barangay Colambutan Bajo asserted that he did not have his constituents sign for peace and order assembly. He maintained that he served snacks during the peace and order assembly but out of his personal money. TheP10,000.00 which he believed to be a cash gift from Congressman Ramiro was spent for abarangay tanodoutpost, posts for everypurokand meals for visitors of the barangay. Delio Cagas of Barangay Colambutan Settlement admitted that he received theP10,000.00 and thought that the money was for his own use and that it was up for him to spend it or share it with his councilmen. Perlito Yamaro of Barangay Duanguican alleged that in 1995 a"Barkadahan"which was a sort of peace and order assembly was held, during which the attendees signed their attendance in the record book. He also admitted that he received theP10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayor through Mrs. Salinasal, and it was up for him to spend it.1awphi1.ntEqually damaging to the petitioners is the admission of Juan Gumilos of Barangay Gala that he received theP10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal with no mention as to its purpose. Eduardo Rara of Barangay Gumbil was as candid when he stated that he received theP10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal and learned that it was a "cash gift" coming from Congressman Ramiro. Nido Madrazo of Barangay Maikay likewise stated that he received theP10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal with no mention as to its purpose. It was somehow conveyed to him that the money was for his own use, and that it was up to him how to spend it. Feliciano Sumader of Barangay Mitugas also admitted that he receivedP10,000.00 which he shared with his councilmen. He also bought a battery charger for a hand-held radio, aerial antennae, battery pack, and also spent some for the Lupong Tagapayapa. He had no receipts to prove his claim.Cosme Sarabia of Barangay Nailon alleged that he received theP10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal which he believed was a "cash gift" promised to him by Congressman Ramiro. Luther Limbaga of Barangay Silongon declared that he received theP10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayors secretary, and that he believed it was a "cash gift" to encourage him to vote for Emeterio Valmoria who was then running as ABC president. He added that he gaveP150.00 each to seven (7) CVOs from December 1994 to July 1995, meals and snacks for the assembly and the SOT. Sabino Dagondon of Barangay Taguima averred that he received theP10,000.00 in cash from Mrs. Salinasal and it was said to be for his own use. Vicente Lagas of Barangay Tigdok even admitted that he did not hold a peace and order assembly in 1994, only the monthly regular meeting, and that no meals and snacks were served. He also stated that he used theP10,000.00 for wire and antennae in the amount ofP500.00 (no receipt); gaveP200.00 each for councilmen including his secretary and treasurer;P3,800.00 for food items when barangay officials conducted patrols around the barangay; and spentP100.00 during the seminar of hand held radio users. Cipriano Sumondong of Barangay Yahong alleged that he received theP10,000.00 as cash gift from Congressman Ramiro and that he presumed the money as the promised "cash gift." Caridad Lagunay of Barangay Bongabong alleged that she received theP10,000.00 as "cash gift" and was told that it was up to her how to spend it. She alleged that there was no peace and order assembly but only the monthly barangay assembly where the names of those present were checked against the logbook. When asked what she did with theP10,000.00, she answered: "I bought some things for the barangay office like curtains, plates, chairs and dividers and others." Bebiana Saligan of Barangay Barra declared that she received theP10,000.00 as "cash gift" from Congressman Ramiro for voting for Emeterio Valmoria as ABC president but after three weeks, she was required to submit an attendance sheet. This confused her, and it was only then that she decided to return theP10,000.00 to the municipality. Rodolfo Ontulan of Barangay Basirang averred that he received theP10,000.00 from Loreta Salinasal at the mayors office for the incoming election of the ABC president. He, however, stated further that he used theP10,000.00 to buy a hand-held radio antennae in the amount ofP500.00 and that he gaveP100.00 to each member of the barangay council.34In fine, no less than the barangay captains belied petitioner Sarigumbas claims in his liquidation vouchers that the cash advances the latter received from the CDF of Congressman Ramiro were used for meals and snacks during the peace and order meetings.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004ARNEL ESCOBAL,petitioner,vsHON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca,respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariwith a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21.The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at theSa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurantlocated along Barlin St., Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun Bombita" with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended Information reads:That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his death,and as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.1On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.2The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash4the Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408,5in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23, 1993,6the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994.7Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss8the case. Citing Republic of thePhilippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10denying the motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP.In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting any evidence in connection with the petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit the offense charged in connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. According to the prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense was committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the company of civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant."11For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at theSa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurantat Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the aforestated date.12On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion14and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.lawphi1.ntThe petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration15of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.16The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission when the crime was committed.On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened.The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that after preliminary hearing, this Court has found that the offense charged in the Information herein was committed by the accusedin his relation to his function and duty as member of the then Philippine Constabulary.Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended Information alleging that the offense charged was committed by the Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of this case, together with the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted immediately to the Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for appropriate proceedings.17On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975,18the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial.Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the RTC.The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while in the performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below "27" committed in relation to office are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the law should be referred to the proper trial court.The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitioner when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive effect.The Ruling of the CourtThe respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information.19Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.20Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine ofP6,000.00 .21However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.22The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.23IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ.,concur.A.M. No. MTJ-04-1552 December 16, 2004DANTE M. QUINDOZA,complainant,vs.JUDGE EMMANUEL G. BANZON,respondent.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:On August 9, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received theLetter-Complaint1dated August 1, 2002 filed by complainant Dante M. Quindoza against Judge Emmanuel G. Banzon, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mariveles, Bataan. Complainant charges respondent with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in connection with respondents disposition of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-7326, and 02-7332, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Dante Quindoza, et al." for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and Light Coercion.The antecedents follow.On May 8 and 22, 2002 respectively, complainant ordered the disconnection of the water and electrical service of the housing unit illegally occupied by Renato Caralipio (Caralipio),2and the electrical services of the housing unit of Hermito de Asis (de Asis) for non-settlement of accounts with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority and expiration of lease.3Because of the incidents, criminal cases were filed against the complainant with the court of respondent judge. Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 stemmed from the incident involving Caralipios house,4while Criminal Case No. 02-7332 related to the disconnection of electric service in the house occupied by de Asis.5On June 4, 2002, the complainant filed anUrgent Motion to Quashin the three criminal cases on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to allege an offense. Complainant averred that he is the incumbent Zone Administrator of the Bataan Economic Zone (BEZ) and that his position has a salary grade "28" under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.6He contended that it is not respondents court but the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the three criminal cases.Complainant claims that in open court during the hearing of his motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 on June 20, 2002, respondent ordered his incarceration, without right to file bail, until such time that he shall have ordered the reconnection of the water and electrical services of Caralipio and de Asis. According to the complainant, respondent should not have ordered the reconnection of electricity in de Asiss housing unit during the hearings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 because the disconnection incident relating to de Asis is the subject of the third case, Criminal Case No. 02-7332, and the motion to quash therein was to be conducted on June 27, 2002 yet.7He also points out that it was erroneous for the respondent judge to include the reconnection of thewaterservices in de Asiss house because only the disconnection of electricity was complained of in Criminal Case No. 02-7332.8Complainant further avers that he made a formal written request9for a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes of the June 20, 2002 hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 to avail of the proper judicial remedies but respondent refused to release the transcript. He prays that his pending cases be reassigned to another court and that respondent judge be ordered to inhibit himself from handling any case involving BEZ or any of its officers and employees.10The OCA indorsed the complaint and required respondent to file his comment thereon.11Thereafter, respondent submitted hisCommentdated September 20, 2002 and anotherCommenton November 29, 2002. Respondent has not disputed complainants allegations in the latters September 20, 2002Comment.He argues, however, that it is improper and premature for complainant to insinuate bias and improper conduct on his part when the issues which gave rise to theLetter-Complaintare still being ventilated in court.12He asserts that complainant should have appealed the assailed order instead of filing an administrative case against him because as the Court held inBarroso v. Arche,13when a litigant disagrees with a ruling of the judge the proper remedy is not to file an administrative complaint but an appeal which points out the errors in the decision.14Respondent further claims that complainant was arbitrary in effecting the disconnection of water and electrical services of residents within the BEZ alleging that complainant disconnected the electrical and water supplies of the occupants who could not afford to file a case against him, without even bothering to explain the disconnections although they were effected in violation of due process of law.15Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed and that complainant instead be held administratively and criminally liable for his illegal acts.16Complainant submitted on October 25, 2002 hisReply, pointing out that respondent judge failed to refute the charges against him but instead made unsubstantiated allegations against the complainant.On March 3, 2004, the OCA submitted itsMemorandum, recommending that respondent be fined Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for oppression and abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.On August 4, 2004, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they would be willing to submit the case based on the pleadings filed within ten (10) days from notice. Both parties complied and replied in the affirmative,17with respondent adducing additional documents and arguments in his defense.The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.Section 4(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 824918clearly provides that employees of the executive branch classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 198