People vs. Mariano

Facts: The office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing Mariano of estafa. Mariano was the Liaison Officer of Mayor Nolasco and is authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of the municipality. The property received were electric cables and cable powers amounting to P4,797.35 which he had a duty to deliver to the Mayor. However he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the items.

Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information claiming that the court had no jurisdiction. He claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco was indicted by the Military Commission under a charge of malversation and found guilty. He claimed that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco has already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over him. Respondent judge granted the motion to quash stating that since the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation case involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court, the case for estafa has already been heard and decided.

Issue:Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over estafa and committed by a civilian

Held: there is no concurrent jurisdiction

Ratio:The question of jurisdiction of respondent CFI is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1948 in Section 44 (f) provides the CFI shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months or fine of more than 200 pesos. Estafa falls under the original jurisdiction of CFI.

Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. At the time the criminal case was filed on Dec 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said court is the Judiciary Act of 1948. General Order No. 49 dated Oct 4, 1974, redefines the jurisdiction of military tribunals over certain offenses, and estafa and malversation are not enumerated therein. Therefore, the Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.

We do not have here a situation involving two tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that whoever takes cognizance first acquires jurisdiction exclusive of the other. The Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the crime of estafa against Mariano hence there is no concurrent jurisdiction to speak of. Estafa falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.

UNITED STATES VS. JUEVES

The defendants/appellants were charged with the crime of brigandage or highway robbery for having committed the following acts:(1) On the evening of December 31, 1903, in Alabat, Tayabas Province, a band of armed men entered the municipal building, bound the presidente, took seven guns, and killed the Justice of Peace of that town.

(2) On the evening of February 04, 1904, a band of some twenty men ( 3 armed with guns and the rest with bolos ) entered the house of Doroteo Maraver, situated in the sitio of Capalohan (at that time, a part of the town of Capalongan, Ambos Camarines ), tied and bound four men, and ordered the women to prepare a meal for them. After eating, they left with them men whom they bound and also some tobacco and rice. They went to the house of Francisco Ambas, one of their prisoners, where they took a hog and other things. Afterwards, they proceeded to a river where they liberated Angelo Lunasco and Doroteo Maraver ( two of their prisoners ).

(3) On Holy Thursday of 1904, a band of men, armed with a revolver, 3 shotguns, and bolos, went to the barrio of Basiad ( also within the jurisdiction of Capalongan, Ambos Camarines at that time ) taking 3 men as prisoners, conducting them from place to place. One of the prisoners, Juan Talento, managed to escape.

(4) One morning of August 1910, two of the accused, Agustin Jueves and Felix Jueves, with their younger brother, Esteban Jueves, all armed with large bolos, entered the house of Serapio Juego, situated near the sea of sitio of Pangas, municipality of Calauag, Tayabas, and took possession of a small quantity of rice.

Graciana Laiman, wife of Francisco Ambos, and Doroteo Maraver identified all seven of the accused of having committed the unlawful acts.Angelo Lunasco identified 5 of the accused and Juan Talento identified 3 of the accused of having committed the unlawful acts.The testimonies of the witnesses show conclusively that the guilt of the appellants has been established beyond any question of doubt.

NOTE: A small portion of the Province of Ambos Camarines was transferred to the Province of Tayabas.

The Court of First Instance of Tayabas took jurisdiction of the crime committed within the transferred territory PRIOR to the time jurisdiction was conferred and convicted the appellants.

ISSUES:1.) W/N the Court of First Instance of Tayabas has jurisdiction of the crime committed within the transferred territory PRIOR to the time jurisdiction was conferred.2.) W/N the assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before jurisdiction was conferred is in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Philippine Bill.

RATIO:1.) YES. The territory where the acts complained of in the case at bar were committed having been transferred to the Province of Tayabas prior to the institution of this action, the court of that province had jurisdiction to hear and determine this case.The change of the territory after the crime was committed and before the institution of this action does not touch the offense nor change the punishment therefor. It only includes the place of the commission of the offense within another judicial district, and subjects the Appellants to trial in that district. The court held that the jurisdiction of Tayabas court was complete.2.) NO. The assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before jurisdiction was conferred is not in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Philippine Bill having said that the change of the territory after the crime was committed and before the institution of this action does not touch the offense nor change the punishment. It does not prejudice the rights of the accused.

DECISION:The Supreme Court held that CFI of Tayabas has jurisdiction of the crime and affirmed the conviction of the appellants.

Reyes v. Diaz

Facts: Some election protest case (it didnt expound)

Doctrine:1) The issue of jurisdiction which confers appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not such question as is dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere construction of the pleadings, but that which has reference to the more important question of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter as determined by law.2) Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers. The question of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land.3) In order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the defendant cannot be said to have been served with process as to that issue. At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court.

Velunta vs. Chief, Philippine Constabulary

Facts:

Petitioner is a regular member of the Integrated National Police (INC) of Tacloban City, with rank of Patrolman. On April 16, 1982, at around 6pm while directing traffic, petitioner tried to apprehend Romeo Lozano, a tricycle driver, for violation of traffic rules and regulations. An altercation occurred between them and resulted in the shooting at the left cheek leading to the death of Romeo Lozano. The widow of Lozano, Mrs. Lozano, filed an administrative complaint against petitioner in NAPOLCOM. NAPOLCOM issued a decision which held petitioner guilty of grave misconduct with a penalty of Dismissal from Service. On a motion for reconsideration, petitioner was held guilty for Less Grave Misconduct and modified the penalty to suspension for 6 months without pay. During the pendency of the administrative case, Mrs. Lozano filed a complaint for homicide with the City Fiscals Office of Tacloban. After finding prima facie evidence of petitioners intent to kill and he was on the performance of his duties when the shooting occurred, the City Fiscal recommended the case be referred to the Tanodbayan for further investigation. The Tanodbayan endorsed the filing of information for homicide against petitioner. The case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to P.D.1850 which authorizes the Chief of Phil. Constabulary (PC) to convene court martials to try, hear, and decide cases for criminal acts committed by members of the INC. Petitioner challenges the assumption of jurisdiction by the General Court Martial over his case pursuant to E.O 1040 in relation to E.O. 1012 whereby supervision and control over all units and members of the INC have been placed under NAPOLCOM directly under the Office of the President.

Relevant Issue:1. Whether the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:1. Yes

Ratio:1. It is specifically stated under EO 1012 that only the operational supervision and direction over all units of the INC force stationed or assigned in the diff. cities and municipalities that was transferred from the PC to the city or municipal govt. concerned. Under EO 1040, it is the exercise of administrative control and supervision over all units of the INC forces throughout the country that was transferred to the President of the Phils. The distinction between operational supervision and direction over the INC and jurisdiction or authority of a court-martial to hear, try and decide a criminal proceeding is that in the former, it refers to how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance, while in the latter, it refers to the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them.

Subido v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 122641; January 20, 1997)

Facts:

On June 25, 1992, Bayani Subido Jr., then a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and Rene Parina, a BID special agent, while in the performance of their official functions, issued and implemented a warrant of arrest against James J. Maksimuk, knowing fully well that the BID decision requiring Maksimuks deportation was not yet final and executory. This resulted to the detention of Maksimuk for a period of 43 days, causing him undue injury.

Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention defined and punished by Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. For their part, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, contending that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case since when it was filed, Subido was no longer part of the service and Parina was not occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 27. Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

Yes. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case by virtue of Section 2 of R.A. 7975, which amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606

Section 2: Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Section 4: Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;

1) Officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. 6758), specificially including: xxx5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to the office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with the Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14, and 14-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in said R.A. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested n the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Blg. 129. Contrary to the claims of the petitioners, R.A. 7975 applies since what is considered is the time of the commission of the crime, during which Subido was still Commissioner of BID. Similarly, although Parina was holding a position with a classification lower than salary grade 27, it still applies to him since he is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of Subido, the principal accused. Jurisdiction is only vested on the other courts if none of the principal accused where occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27.

CUYCO VS. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. Nos. 137017-18, February 8, 2000

FACTS:Graft Investigation Officer Ma. Lourdes M. Vilaria-Yap found probable cause for the indictment of Ramon G. Cuyco (petitioner), Generoso P. Germino and Melcy V. Wee for violation of Section 3(a), R.A.3019, and Cuyco with Rolando R. Madarang for violation of Section 3(e) of the same Act. She recommended the filing of two informations against Cuyco.The Ombudsman approved the recommendation, and the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against Cuyco for both offenses. Cuyco filed a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the cases. The Sandiganbayan issued resolutions denying the motion to quash and ordering the preventive suspension of Cuyco and his co-accused for ninety (90) days.Cuyco filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to set aside the resolutions in question and to dismiss the criminal cases for want of jurisdiction. This was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the cases against petitioner for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e), R.A.3019, as amended.HELD: No. The Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction. RATIO:The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses and felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, where the accused holds a position with salary grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.At the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II,Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), R.A., as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. 6758) in relation to their office.Buaya v. Polo

Facts:

Buaya is the insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Company. She is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to Country Bankers. The account of Buaya was audited and it was showed that P358,850 was unremitted.

She was charged with estafa in the Manila RTC. Buaya filed a motion to Quash on the ground that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction because she is from Cebu and that the case is civil in nature (a separate civil case was filed) but was denied. She filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was also denied. So now, she filed a certiorari in the Supreme Court questioning the denials of such motion by Judge Polo.

The case did not go through the Court of Appeals

Issue: Did the court have jurisdiction over the case?

Held:

YES. Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Estafa was sufficiently addressed in the information. Estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and the case can be instituted upon any place where any of the essential requisites of Estafa were committed. One of the essential requisites of Estafa is damage or prejudice to 3rd persons. Here, given that the main office of Country Bankers is in Manila, the non remittance of Buaya which caused damage to Country Bankers was committed in Manila.

The information in this case reads as follows: that during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corp represented by Banez duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws of the Philippines, with principal address at 9th floor, GR Antonio Bldg, TM Kalaw, ERmita in said city in the following manner: the said accused.

The City of manila was alleged in the information so the Manila RTC has jurisdiction.

US v Gallegos

Facts:

Criminal complaint for adultery Mariano Gallegos had relations with Benita Antioquia several times, and as a result Antioquia gave birth to a daughter Complaint includes both Gallegos and Antioquia, but only Gallegos was arrested, because Antioquia could not be apprehended after due diligence

Issue:

1. W/N, in a criminal action for adultery one of the defendants may be tried alone when for some reason or other his co-defendant has not been arrested and brought to trial2. W/N prosecution, after closing its case, may present additional proof relating to the jurisdiction of the court

Held/Ratio:

1. Yes. While the law provides that the complaint must be presented, in a criminal action for adultery (a) by the offended person and (b) against both of the alleged culprits, there is no provision of law requiring that they shall be tried jointly. In fact, there is a positive provision of law permitting them to be tried separately (section 33, general orders no. 58)

2. Yes. Section 31, General Orders no. 58 provides that after both parties have presented their evidence, they may offer rebutting testimony only, unless the court, in the furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new and additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question.

The question of jurisdiction of the court is always a question of importance. If evidence is necessary to prove that fact, so far as the place of the commission of the rime is concerned, in the interest of justice the court may always permit it to present additional evidence, if that fact appears before the trial of the case is closed

REPUBLIC vs. SUNGAJune 20, 1988FACTS:An information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. A hearing was set but was postponed since Rafael Anadilla was not yet arrested by the authorities. The court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set a new trial date. However, 4 months before the trial date, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads: Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio.Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect. The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled. In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order. SO ORDERED. The order was based on an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE which was executed and notarized by the victim and mentioned that:a. he was no longer interested in the further prosecution of the caseb. he had forgiven the accusedc. his material witnesses could not be located, and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt.The provincial fiscal moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but was also denied. Hence the petition and issue of the case.ISSUE:Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. RATIO:The court cites a similar case Crespo v. Mogul in its when it answered that the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.The rule is that once a complaint is filed, the disposition of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. The fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the court when the case has been submitted to it as his jurisdiction ends in the direction and control of the prosecution of the case. Only the court can decide what the best direction is for the case, as it is within its exclusive jurisdiction.In this case, almost 10 years have elapsed since the date of the filing of the information, hence it was not unusual that the victim could not find his witnesses, the testimonies of whom are needed to convict the accused. The fiscal still believed that he could convict the accused without thee testimonies in his MR!Although the Crespo doctrine holds that it is the courts duty to judge whether a case should be dismissed, any move of the offended part to dismiss the case, even without objection of the accused, should first be submitted to the fiscal. It is only after the fiscals hearing that the court should exercise its duty to continue or dismiss the case.Petition dismissed.US v De la Santa

*This case was decided in 1907, when the old Penal and Civil Codes were still in effect. The old Penal Code provision on seduction covered the age range of 12-23, while the old Civil Code places a womans age of majority at 23.

Facts: De la Santa allegedly seduced Teofila Sevilla in 1902, under promise of marriage, when she was under 21. The complaint was filed only in 1906, when she was already 24. It was at Esteban Sevillas instance, private prosecutor and Teofilas dad, that the complaint was filed. The Marinduque CFI convicted De la Santa of Seduction. Hindi na dumaan sa CA yung case.

Issues:1. Does the father have such right to institute a Seduction complaint, taking Teofilas age (of majority, upon filing) into consideration? 2. Does De la Santas lack of objection over the complaint, being outside the CFIs jurisdiction, effectively make him waive his right to such defect?3. With Teofilas attendance and testimony in the CFI proceedings, may she be said to have instituted the proceedings, though the complaint was signed and sworn by her father?

Held/Ratio1. No. Article 448 of the old Penal Code[endnoteRef:2] does not automatically authorize the institution of criminal proceedings by all the mentioned parties. Though the act may only be committed upon a woman still legally incapacitated, all other alternative parties mentioned, like the father, lose their right to do so when the victim reaches the age of majority. [2: ]

Though mentioned disjunctively, the right to institute criminal proceedings in seduction is exclusively and successively conferredin the order they are named. (victim muna, then parents, then grandparents, then guardian)Also, the lawmakers did not intend this conjunction of rights, bearing in mind the possibility of pardon by the offended party while these other persons are attempting to file complaints.2. No. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, in the trial court or on appeal.Jurisdiction may only be conferred by law, and the accused cannot confer jurisdiction, by waiver or otherwise.3. No. Nothing on record indicated such, and the fact that she was subpoenaed compelled her to appear, voluntary or not. (beside the point daw, taking active part in the proceedings is not sufficient basis for this unless she herself submitted and formally maintained the complaint)

NoteCriminal proceedings for seduction can only be instituted on the complaint of the offended person or her parents, grandparents, or guardian.x x xIf the person injured should, by reason of her age or mental condition, lack the requisite personality to appear in court, and should, besides, be wholly unprotected, not having parents, grandparents, brothers, or guardian of person or property to denounce the crime, the procurador sindico or the or the public prosecutor may do so, acting on the strength of public rumor.In all the cases of this article the express or implied pardon of the offended party shall extinguish penal action or the penalty, if it should have been already imposed on the culprit.The pardon shall never be presumed, except by the marriage of the offended party with the offender.

US vs ReyesFactsThe defendant was charged with the crime of estafa and falsification. He is an employee of the Manila-Dagupan Railway. He issued a ticket to a passenger who was going from Manila to Caloocan who continued his trip to Malolos. The ticket issued that simulated the trip was from Manila to Bocaue which costs 18 cents. There was a 1 peso and 22 cents difference in the fare.The complaint does not designate the place where the falsification was committed.Issue: Where must the jurisdiction be vested?The case must be tried in Tarlac and not in Manila. According to the testimony of the accused, he rendered an account to the station master at Tarlac of the Money collected during the trip. It is also there where he delivered the stub in which the simulation or falsification was committed. In an itemized account of the collections made him on the trip, an entry corresponding to the stub alleged to have been falsified was dated in Tarlac and contains an invoice of delivery signed by the accused and a receipt signed by the station master for the sum of 6 pesos and 48 cents. Because it was within the territory of the court that the appropriation constituting the crime of estafa was committed and the accused made use of the document alleged to be false at the same territory.People of the Philippines v Alex Regalario et.al.GR no. 101451 March 23,1993

Facts:Regalario and 6 others were found guilty of murder of a Menardo Garcia. (CrimPro relevant) Judgment of conviction was promulgated on Jan 17 and a copy of which was received by the appellants counsel the next day, Jan 18. Appellants filed MR on Jan 31 but the court denied on Feb 22. On March 14, appellants filed notice of appeal but the trial court denied for having been filed out of time. (Syllabus topic relevant)Neither the State nor private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the appeal made by the appellants nor objected to the order of the trial court to forward the records to the SC for appellate reviewIssue: 1. On the matter of filing within the reglamentary period:Whether the lower court erred in denying notice of appeal on the ground of being filed out of time Appellants claim: computation of 15 days within which to file notice of appeal should have been counted from Feb 23(day after the MR was denied) and not from Jan 31 (day the verdict pre-MR was given) In short, the appellants claim that the 15 day reglamentary period should have restarted on the day of the denial of the MR2. On the matter concerning the syllabus topic, Estoppel by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction (Counsel for the state questions authority of the Supreme Court to review the case)Ruling of the lower court:(Issue on procedure is being questioned for the first time in the Supreme Court)Ruling of the Supreme Court: (TRIAL COURT DENIAL OF NOTICE OF APPEAL AFFIRMED): 1. The notice of appeal was filed beyond the reglamentary period set by law Section 6 of Rule 122 states that: appeal must be taken 15 days from promulgation or notice of judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his attorney... The rule states period shall only be interrupted thus appellants only had 1 day with which to file notice of appeal with the trial court2. Estoppel by laches to bar attacks of jurisdiction of the court had already attachedNeither the public or private prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the appeal or objected to the order of the trial court to forward records to the Supreme Court for appellate review. It was only after appellants had already filed their briefs with the SC that counsels for the state raised the issue of belated appeal and lack of appellate jurisdiction of the SC in the case.Dela Cruz vs. Moya

Facts:-Dela Cruz is a Member of the Armed Forces Intelligence and Operations Section- armed with a MISSION ORDER, DelaCruz proceeds to Maco, Davao del Norte to investigate reports of illegal cockfighting being conducted- Delacruz and company catches operators of cockfighting, including deceased Eusebio Cabito in flagrante-Delacruz and co.fails to arrest operators but confiscates evidence of the crime (eg. Gaffs, fighting cocks, etc)-Delacruz and co. were followed by the cockfight operators on their way back to the PC headquarters, fighting ensued wherein Delacruz shot CabitoAug 2, 1979 Delacruz is charged with homicide in the CFI of Davao

Issues:W/N CFI has jurisdiction over the subject matter

Held:NO.

Ratio: -Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing must have jurisdiction over of the subject matter of the case. Determined by the statute at force at the time the action was commenced-at that time General Order.59 was operative giving military tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel while in the performance of their official duty-Delacruz was executing a Mission Order=performing official duties-court records contain a copy of Mission Order; certificate from secretary of DND is unnecessary -CFI was without jurisdiction to try the case

People vs MagallanesFacts: Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder (of Gargar and Lumangyao) were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against 14 persons, 5 whom are members of the PNP Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment Prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to receive the evidence for the accused Private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan (SB) on the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994 inRepublic of the Philippines vs. Asuncion,the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers RTC issued an order denying the motion The prosecution, represented by the OSG, prayed for a TRO challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge Magallanes to transfer the cases to the SBIssue:w/n RTC of Bacolod City has jurisdiction over the case instead of the SB - YESRuling: At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the SB was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,and not by the result of evidence after trial. For lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the RTC and not of the SB The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed in relation to public office." The SB partly lost itsexclusive original jurisdictionin cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corruption), it retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsectiona, Section 4 (R.A. 7975) and officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758) Also, upon express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the SB shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the SB under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the SB CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINION: Padilla: the act of Torres was undoubtly connected with his position as station commander of PNP; others were performing as law enforcers such that the case must be prosecuted in the SB. The informations must have been filed with the SB. Kapunan: in favor of granting bail

Uy v. CAFacts: Uy formed a partnership with Leong to contribute to the formers lumber business. A lumber store was erected using the funds Leong contributed. Their relationship soured and this prompted Leong to ask for her investment back. The checks issued by Uy were all dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Leong lodged a complaint for Estafa and a violation of BP 22. Manila RTC acquitted Uy from Estafa but was convicted for BP 22.Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law Whether the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel appliesHeld: The RTC of Manila did not acquire jurisdiction. No.Ratio: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by the courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or anyone of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The various dealings were held in Manila, and thus the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the Estafa case. However, there is no evidence that shows that jurisdiction over the BP 22 was acquired. (related sa issue ng crimpro) The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117 Sec.3, states that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on the ground of (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the accused or the offense charged. Sec. 8 of the same rule says that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, is deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash. However, Section 3(b) states that an exception to this is the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. In this case, it cannot be said that Uy is estopped to question the jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila even if she questioned it 5 years into the trial already. It can be questioned at any stage of the proceeding. Binay vs. SandiganbayanFACTS: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 3 separate informations against Binay for violation of Art 220 RPC, 2 violations of Sec3(e), RA3019, alleging that these crimes were committed during Binays incumbency in Makati Sandiganbayan denied motion to quash (filing of charges to filing of information took 6 years thus denied his right to due process Sandigan granted motion to suspend accused pendente lite and ordered him suspended for 90 days RA 7975 took effect redefining the jurisdiction of the sandigan Binay filed a motion to refer his case to the proper court for further proceedings, alleging that the resolutions denying motion to quash and granting preventive suspension were issued when the Sandiganbayan had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases (DENIED) Municipal Mayor-classified as grade 27; at the time of the commission of the offenses, Binay was municipal mayor, although he received salary less than that received by grade 27, the compensation act was not yet in existence at the time of the commission of the crimeAt the time the act was passed, Binay was receiving salary under grade 28 SC issued a TRO based on Binays motion

Magsaysay-mayor of San Pascual, Batangas; charged w/ violation of RA3019, w/ the RTC of Batangas; another info. was filed w/ the Sandiganbayan, for overpricing a landscaping project Magsaysay filed a motion to quash the info. w/ the Sandiganbayan-no jurisdiction over the matter-DENIED prosecutor Mallonga filed a petition w/ the RTC to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan by virtue of RA7975 SC: it is the Sandiganbayan w/c has jurisdiction over the cases

*when RA7975 took effect, Binay had not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan; on the other hand, the RA was already in effect when the info. against Magsaysay was filed w/ the RTC; while the cases were pending, RA8249 was enacted

ISSUE:1. Had the sandigan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor after the pages of RA 7975 coupled with the filing earlier of an information for the same offense before the RTC having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense

-Binay and Magsaysay contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because 1)at the alleged time of the commission of the offenses, they were not classified as grade 27; 2)municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration of Sec.4(a)(1) of PD1606 as amended by RA7975; 3)congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; also contend that pay scales determine salary grade classifications

HELD:SANDIGANBAYAN RETAINS JURISDICTION OVER BINAYs CASE

the constitution states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of govt officials and EEs, congress shall take into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the positions; RA6758 provides that differences in pay are to be based upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions; grade, as defined in PD958: all classes of positions w/c, although different with kind of subject matter or work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions w/in one range of basic compensation; grade w/c determines salary; possible that an officials salary may be less than prescribed for his grade to determine WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, reference should be made to RA6758 and the index of occupational services, position titles and salary grades; salary grade is a matter of law, not of proof; index lists municipal mayors under salary grade 27, therefore, are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan the rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute. RA7975, Sec.7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule; the provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in w/c trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan the trial of Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the approval of RA7975, therefore, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over the case Binay invokes the rule that the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character w/c would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the 1st instance; filing of the info. in Sandiganbayan-subsequent happening or event no application; RTC never had jurisdiction over the case estoppel cannot be successfully invoked; jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel; estoppel remains the exception rather than the rule no double jeopardy when the accused enters a plea in a court that has no jurisdiction

G.R. No. 120011 September 7, 1999LT. COL. LINO A. SANCHEZ and MAJOR VICENTE S. MANAGAY,petitioners,vs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE OMBUDSMAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Facts:Petitioners are officers of the Philippine Army (PA). Lt. Col. Lino A. Sanchez at times material hereto was Commanding Officer, 9th Post Engineer Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Support Group (HHSG), Philippine Army. Major Vicente S. Managay was G-4, HHSG, Philippine Army.A pre-trial investigating officer, submitted a report to the Commanding General, Philippine Army, stating that there was aprima faciecase against petitioners for violation of the Articles of War for causing the wrongful release of P599,547.00 for payment of renovation of an office in the Phil. Army.On the basis of the report, they initiated court martial proceedings against petitioners before the Philippine Army Permanent General Court Martial. Both of the petitioners were arraigned before the Court Martial and both pleaded not guilty. The investigating officers also referred the findings to the Provincial Prosecutor while there were court martial proceedings against the petitioners recommending the filing of an information with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners for violation of R.A. No. 3019. The Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal endorsed the records to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman filed with Sandiganbayan information against them for the violating the said RA. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and was denied through a resolution stating that the offenses charged in the court martial are distinct and separate from each other. Thus, the petitioners were also arraigned in Sandiganbayan and they pleaded not guilty.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial reiterating that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case as the court martial had acquired original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to R.A. No. 7055, and that the acts complained of in the charge sheet in the court martial and the Information before the Sandiganbayan were the same or identical. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for lack of merit.Hence, the petitioners filed the case to the Supreme Court. Issue:W/N Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case.Ruling:No. Though the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction when the case was filed, it no longer had jurisdiction over the case under RA 7975. This law removing the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the case was passed before the motion for reconsideration was submitted. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction when the motion for reconsideration was denied. LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYAdherence of Jurisdiction (Exceptions) & Action of the Court when determined that it has no jurisdiction & Jurisdiction of the SB (Offense deemed committed in relation to Public Office)Facts:11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Petitioner Lacson and petitioners-intervenors Acop and Zubia were members of ABRITG.SPO2 de los Reyes exposed to the media that what actually happened between the members of the Kuratong Baleleng and the ABRITG was a summary execution (rub-out) and not a shoot-out. Ombudsman Desierto formed a panel to investigate the incident. Upon investigation, all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the incident were absolved from any criminal liability because it was a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels ruling and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against 26 respondents, including Lacson, Acop and Zubia. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation and 11 informations for murder were filed against Lacson, as principal, Acop and Zubia as accessories before the Sandiganbayans Second DivisioUpon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, the SB allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed 11 amended informations before the SB, wherein Lacson was charged only as an accessory. The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the SB, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They said that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the SB to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. They did not qualify under the said requisites because the highest ranking principal has the rank of only a Chief Inspector and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Thus, the SB admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the QC RTC, which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975.The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting the cases should remain with the SB. Petitioner and some of the accused opposed.Pending the motions for reconsideration, RA 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the SB by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 (a & c) of R.A. 7975. Even before the issue of jurisdiction came up with the filing of the amended informations, the house bill for that was already introduced in Congress. ISSUES:(1) WON Sections 4 & 7 of R.A. 8249 is unconstitutional.a. WON the statute violates the petitioners right to due process and equal protection clause because the provisions seemed to have been designed for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the case.b. WON the statute is an ex-post facto law.(2) Whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.a. WON the offense of multiply murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers, making the case fall within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.HELD:(1) SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF R.A. 8249 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.The issue on due process and equal protection is too shallow to deseve merit. There were no concrete evidence and convincing argument presented. The classification made by the law was reasonable and not arbitrary.There is nothing ex post facto in the statute. Generally, ex post facto laws deal with the retroactive effect of penal laws and the said R.A. is procedural in nature.(2) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES.For a case to be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it must be shown that the offense charged in the information was committed in relation to the office of the accused.In People v. Montejo, the court held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimacy must be alleged in the information, which is what determines the jurisdiction of the court. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would show the close intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged. It does not even matter whether the phrase committed in relation to his office appears in the information or not.In the case at bar, what the amended information contains is a mere allegation that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office and that is not sufficient. Such phrase is merely a conclusion of law. Since it was not proven that the crime of murder was committed in the discharge of their duties, the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the cases.

US v Morales

Facts: Morales was convicted of brigandage under Section 1 Act No. 518 by the CFI in Manila. He contended, however, that CFI Manila has no jurisdiction on him because he was arrested in Malabon and was subsequently brought to Manila from their place of arrest contrary to Sec.1 Act No 518 which states that person guilty of brigandage must be punished in the place in which they may be taken or from which they may have fled.

Issue: Does CFI Manila have jurisdiction?

Held and Ruling: No, it does not have jurisdiction since Morales was arrested in Malabon and not in Manila. Pursuant to Sec. 1 Act No. 518, they must be punished in the place where they may be taken or where they may have fled.

REPUBLIC VS. ASUNCION

FACTS:

Private Respondent Alexander Dionisio Y Manio, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street, Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded there, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. Pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed a case with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an information charging Dioniso with the crime of homicide.

While trial was already in progress, the respondent Judge issued an order, motu propio, an order requiring the prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court should still proceed with the trial of the case. In view of the decision of the SC in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo, the Sandiganbayn has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense id higher than prision correcional. The murder charge against petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death hence it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it. Respondent Judge dismissed the Criminal Case for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Private prosecutor moved for reconsideration, citing the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan because they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts as provided in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court. The respondent judge denied the motion.

Hence this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 6975 VESTS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES INVolVING pnp MEMEBERS ONLY IN THE regular courts which excludes the sandiganbayan since it is constitutionally and statutorily a special court.

RATio:

INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM REGULAR COURTS IN R.A. 6975

Police forces have traditionally been under the civil authority. The overwhelming sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution against martial law regime and the militarization of the police forces prompted them to explicitly direct the establishment and maintenance of one police force. R.A No. 6975 on the PNP are intended to implement Section 6, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, national in scope and civilian in character. This civilian character is unqualified and unconditional and is therefore, all-embracing. The Declaration of Policy (Section 2) of R.A. No. 6975 faithfully carried out this mandate. The civilian character refers to its orientation and structure. The mandate of Section 46 R.A 6975 is to divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and to return or transfer that jurisdiction to the civil courts and was explicitly provided for in the original Section 68 of the House Bill No. 23614. The terms civil courts and regular courts were used interchangeably or were considered as synonymous by the Bicameral Conference Committee and then by the Senate and House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. There could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP.

IS SANDIGANBAYAN INCLUDED IN THAT TERM

Regular Courts are those within the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law. Per Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987, such lower courts include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shara District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Sharia Circuit Courts. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486 pursuant to the mandate of Section 5, Article xiii of the 1973 Constitution. This was revised by P.D. 1606 and amended by P.D. 1860 then 1861. Under the amendments introduced by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases: a. Exclusive original jurisdiction: Violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, R.A. 1379, and Chapter 2 Title VII of the RPC; 2. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their officeb. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction Undoubtedly then, Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term regular courts of Sec. 46 R.A. No. 6975. Courts of special jurisdiction, which are permanent in character, are also regular courts. The Sandiganbayan is a court with special jurisdiction because its creation as a permanent anti-graft court is constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited to certain classes of offenses This is further strongly indicated by Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1606 which vests upon it all the inherent powers of a court of justice and places it on the same level as the Court of Appeals, and by Section 4 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which grants it appellate jurisdiction over certain case decided by the RTC, MeTC, MTC, and MCTC.

***That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office must, however, be alleged in the information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Sec. 4(a)(2). This allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondent Judge to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office and

1. If it was in relation to his office, DIRECTING the respondent judge to transmit the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall docket and proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it; or2. If he determines otherwise, DIRECTING him to set aside the Challenged Orders, to proceed with the hearing of the case and to render judgment thereon.

MORALES V. CA

GR No.: 126623Date: December 12, 1997

Petitioner: Ernesto MoralesRespondents: Court of Appeals, Hon. Alfredo Gustilo, as presiding judge of RTC, and People of the Philippines

Facts

Petitioner was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground the penalty for the offense charged should not exceed prision correccional or six years worth of imprisonment and that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the case.

In denying this motion, the RTC reasons out that, while MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases with penalties of not more than six years of imprisonment, an exception is provided in the said Act. It provides the Court of First Instance (currently, the RTC) shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable under the Act.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the case.

Hence, this petition

In raising the same to SC, petitioner furthers that, since only about 0.5 gram of shabu was involved, the imposable penalty would not exceed prision correccional. Therefore, RTC doesnt have jurisdiction over his case.

Issue

Whether RTC has jurisdiction to try petitioners alleged violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act

Held

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, but only insofar as the issue of jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 is concerned. The Resolutions of 8 August and 13 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, while the challenged orders in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 116, are AFFIRMED. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 96-8443 with all reasonable dispatch.

Ratio

Whether RTC has jurisdiction to try petitioners alleged violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act

YES. Section 32 of RA 7691 reads:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offender or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.It must be noted, however, that the exclusive jurisdiction of these courts does not cover those cases which, by law, fall within the RTCs and Sandiganbayans exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the prescribed penalty. In the case at bar, the Dangerous Drugs Act specifically confers upon the RTC the jurisdiction over cases such as this.

Sanchez vs. Demetriou

Facts:The Presidential Anti Crime Commission requested the filing of charges against Sanchez in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez. DOJ conducted a preliminary investigation. A PNP Commander invited Sanchez for questioning. He was identified by two people who executed extrajudicial confessions implicating Sanchez as principal in the rape-slay. He was put on arrest status and taken to DOJ. A warrant was subsequently issued from the RTC of Manila. Cases were filed in the RTC of Laguna but the case was transferred to the RTC of Manila. Motion to quash was filed because 1) Only the Ombudsman had the competence to investigate and 2) As a public officer, he can only be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

Issues:1) Did the Ombudsman have the sole competence to investigate?2) Can he be tried in the regular courts?

Held and Ratio: 1) No. Though the Ombudsman is empowered to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public officials, the authority is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority

2) Yes. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioners office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office.

(The case did not state the decisions of the lower courts.)

Bartolome v PeopleFacts: Rolando Bartolome and Elino Coronel are both officers of Ministry of Labor, NCR, Manila. They conspired to falsify the Civil Service Personal Data Sheet of Bartolome making it appear that he passed the career service exam and that he was a 4th year AB student of FEU. Ricardo Buenviaje, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor filed a case at the Sandiganbayan accusing them of the crime of Falsification of Official Document.Sandiganbayan convicted them. Petitioners now question the validity of Sandigabayans ruling. Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioners caseSC Ruling: Proceedings in Sandiganbayan are null and void ab initio. Under Section 4 of PD 160, Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:1. Violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and RA 13792. Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those in (Govt Owned or Controlled Corporations) GOCCs, embraced in Title VII of the RPC3. Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees including those employed in GOCCS in relation to their office.Nowhere does the act of falsification belong to the abovementioned cases where the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction. Falsification of Public Document is embraced in Title IV of the RPC. Perhaps the nearest reason for Sandiganbayans taking cognizance of the case is scenario 3 in the above enumeration. However, it does not appear that the official positions of Bartolome and Coronel were connected to the offense they committed. They did not need to be government employees to falsify a public document. In the light of the Montilla case, it was upheld that when public office is not an essential ingredient of the offense such that the offense cant exist without the office, it does not fall under Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

Natividad v. FelixFebruary 4, 1994

Facts:

PNP requested Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate Mayor Natividads involvement in the death of Lourdes Aquinos husband, Severino Aquino, at the Ramos Police Station.

During the investigation, PNP filed another complaint with the Tarlac Municipal Circuit Court, which directed Mayor Natividads arrest with bail. He posted bail with the Manila RTC, which later issued an order recalling warrant.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, MCTC determined that there was probable cause to hold Natividad for murder with bail. The Provincial Prosecutor approved the filing of information against Natividad and Llerina in the Tarlac RTC (where Hon. Felix was the judge). Warrant of arrest was issued.

Upon seeing that the MCTC judge failed to conduct the second staged in the preliminary investigation, RTC recalled the warrant and remanded the case for further preliminary investigation. A panel of prosecutors later held that probable cause exists. The information was amended, additionally charging Cabaong, Llerina and Millado. An arrest warrant was issued without bail.

Mayor Nativadad alleged that there was no preliminary investigation, and that Hon. Felix had no jurisdiction because it was the Ombudmans, not the provincial prosecutor, who had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation and that the proper court was the Sandiganbayan. Hon. Felix denied Mayor Natividads motion, and committed the latter to Tarlac Penal Colony.

Issue:

Whether or not Hon. Felex committed grave abuse off discretion in admitting the amended information filed by the provincial fiscal and in directing Natividads arrest

Held:

No.

Ratio:

The latest law on Sandiganbayan (PD 1606) states that there are 2 requirements for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction: 1) offense committed by a public officer must be in relation to his office, and 2) that the penalty be higher that prision correccional or imprisonment for 6 years or a fine of P6,000.

The 2nd requirement was met, but the 1st requirement wasnt because the offense charged wass murder. The offense could not have been committed in the performance of the mayors responsibility to maintain peace and order. The alleged act doesnt fall under any of the functions of the municipal mayor in the Local Government Code.

Assuming arguendo that the 1st requirement was satisfied, Ombudsman has only primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, not exclusive original jurisdiction. The Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but a concurrent authority with similarly authorized agencies. He may take over the investigation at any stage from any investigative government agency. His investigatory powers are but directory in nature.

(Also, Natividad wasnt denied due process as he has been afforded every opportunity to present his counter-affidavit. He was notified, but it was he who did not appear.)

Olaguer v Regional Trial CourtFacts: Philippine Journalists Inc (PJI) executed a mortgage in favor of Developmen Bank of Philippines(DBP) for certain financing accomodations.PJI assigned 67% of stocks to DBP. DBP appointed certain PJI stockholders as proxies.PJI failed to comply with its obligation to DBP leading to the cancellation of appointment of petitioners and designated Olaguer, Velez, and De Leon (Petitioners).Olaguer also asked some of respondent to assign shares not only to the three proxies by DBP but also to two others to be chosen by him so they can sit in the PJI board of directors.Though Olaguer was voted chairman of the board and CEO of PJI, he failed to comply with his commitment which gave respondents to cancel the assignment. He also did some illegal acts which gave rise to several complaints in court against herein Petitioners.Before the cases were resolved, then president Cory Aquino terminated his his appointment as member of the board of directors of DBP.Despite the termination, Olaguer still continued with the performance of his functions. There was an agreement enetered into b DBP and herein respondents calling for a special stockholders meeting to elect a new board of directors. Olaguer contends that the agreement cannot be implemented because Olaguer claims that he has just been designated the fiscal and team leader of the PCGG assigned to PJI and that all his actions are sanctioned and reported to PCGG, and that it is PCGG which exercises the voting rights of all PJI common stocks sequestered since 1986. .Olaguer then filed a motion to dismiss the cases against him on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of herein petitioners. The motion to dismiss was denied thus this petitionIssueW/N the trial court has jurisdiction over the case HeldNo, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. It is the Sandiganbayan who has jurisdiction over PCGG cases.RatioThere is no dispute that PJI is now under sequestration by the PCGG and that civil case no. 0035 was filed in Sandiganbayan wherenin the PJI is listed as among the corporations involved in the unexplained wealth wealth case against Marcos. Records also show that Olaguer was acting in behalf of the PCGG and under Section 2 of EO !$, the Sangiganbyana has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding the unexplained wealth of Marcos. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the RTC and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.

Presidential Commission on Good Governance v Pea159 SCRA 556

FACTS:PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms, American Inter-Fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. Both firms have been organized by joint venture agreement with the approval of the Textile Export Board. 2/3 of the two corporations were subscribed to Local Investors and the 1/3 was subscribed to Hongkong Investors.

The PCGG appointed Saludo as OIC of the two corporations with authority to manage and operate it. Saludo and Yeung Chun Ho were the authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. Yam Kam Shing became a co-signatory of Yeung Chun Ho. However, in a Memorandum addressed to the depository banks Saludo revoked the authorization previously issued because Yiam Kam Shing was a Hongkong Chinese International staying in the country on a mere tourist visa. When OIC Saludo withdrew money from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company for the payment of salaries Yim Kam Shing instituted an action for damages with a writ of preliminary injunction against Metropolitan bank, PCGG, PCGG Commissioner Bautista and OIC Saludo. He questions the revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing as a co-representative.

PCGG filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Regional Trial court has no jurisdiction over PCGG or over the subject of the case.

The Judge denied PCGGs motion to dismiss.

The PCGG filed this petition to the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the Trial Court over it.

ISSUES:I. Whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over the PCGG and properties sequestered and placed in its custodia legis in the exercise of its powers.

II. Whether Regional Trial Courts may interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of PCGG.

HELD:I. NO. The RTC do not have jurisdiction over the PCGG.

II. NO. Jurisdiction over all sequestered cases of ill-gotten wealth, assets and properties under the past regime fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review only by the SC.

RATIO:

I. The RTC and the CA have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under applicable Executive Orders and Article XVIII, section 26 of the Constitution. It may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of PCGG.

Under Section 2 of EO 14, all cases of the PCGG regarding the Funds, moneys, assets, and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by Former Pres. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessary fall likewise under the Sandiganbayans exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.

II. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, PCGG is a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.

EO no 14, section 2 also provides that the PCGG shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. All those who wish to question or challenge the PCGGs acts or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with the exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the SC.

Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-54558, 22 May 1987, 150 SCRA 144.

FACTS:Petitioners were detained by the military for subversion. The Armed Forces Chief of Staff created Military Commission No. 34 to try the petitioners criminal case. Petitioners filed for a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. While the petition was pending, the Military Commission convicted and sentenced the petitioners to death by electrocution.

ISSUE:Do military commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians for crimes allegedly committed during martial law when civilian courts are open and functioning?

RULING: The trial contemplated in the due process clause of the Constitution is by judicial and not by executive or military process. Military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. By the principle of separation of powers, interpreting the law as to when a person has violated it is a judicial function vested in the judiciary. As long as civil courts are open and functioning, military courts have no jurisdiction over civilian offenses. Also, Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 lifted martial law and revoked General Order No. 8 (creating military tribunals). Cases under military courts should be immediately transferred to civilian courts.

Abadilla vs RamosFACTS:A group of officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radio-television broadcasting facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7). The takeover might have been a prelude to similar operations throughout the national capital, however it did not succeed. After the incident another group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort Bonifacio military facility in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as "The Black Saturday Revolt," did not succeed either. The investigations for both incident disclosed that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the AFP was one of the leaders of both the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA radio-television facilities as well as The Black Saturday Revolt. The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against him. A charge sheet was prepared against the Colonel. Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted. Respondent Major General Renato De Villa, Commanding General of the PC and Vice-Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the arrest and confinement of Colonel Abadilla. Also, respondent AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued General Orders No. 342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular officers of the AFP.Later, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed charges against Colonel Abadilla. Colonel Abadilla was arrested by a group composed of the Philippine Army and the PC. He was detained by the military. The spouse of Colonel Abadilla together with their minor children went to the Supreme Court and filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging the validity of the detention of Colonel Abadilla. There main contention was (as to jurisdiction) when Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers, he became a civilian and as such, the order for his arrest and confinement is null and void because he was no longer subject to military law. On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that military jurisdiction had fully attached on Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service in the military.ISSUE: Is the detention of Colonel Abadilla illegal? (The resolution of this issue will relate to the jurisdiction of the military authorities over the person of Colonel Abadilla.)HELD Col. Abadilla is under military jurisdictionRatioAs early as March, 1987, months before Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers, the military authorities began the institution of proceedings against him. As of that time, he was certainly subject to military law. He was under investigation for his alleged participation in the unsuccessful mutinies when he was an officer of the AFP. His superiors could not confine him during the period of investigation because he was at large. This disregard for military duty and responsibility may have prompted his superiors to cause him to be dropped from the rolls of officers. The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should not lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer would be his shield against prosecution in the first place.The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. The rule that jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his arrest applies only to criminal proceedings instituted before the regular courts. It does not apply to proceedings under military law. At the time the military investigations were commenced, Colonel Abadilla was an officer of the AFP subject to military law. As such, the military authorities had jurisdiction over his person. His earlier arrest could not be effected because he was at large. PSThe petitioner cited various cases with regards to the lost of jurisdiction of military tribunals over discharged from the service but the Court found that this cases were inapplicable to the case (one of the cases deals with being honorably discharged). WILLIAM TAN, ET. AL. V.BARRIOS, ET. AL.G.R. Nos. 85481-82. October 18, 1990

FactsThen President Ferdinand E. Marcos authorized the creation of military tribunals to try and decide cases of military personnel. Its jurisdiction was modified (exclusive of the civil courts) to include violations of the law on firearms and other crimes directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the countrys safety and security. Yet, the President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts and vice versa. Twelve people were arrested and charged for the crimes of murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm and unlawful possession of a pistol with ammunition before the Military Tribunal. Since this was a celebrated case, Marcos withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts and for the Military Tribunal to retain it. All the accused pleaded not guilty. Martial rule ended and the military tribunals and commissions were abolished.In Cruz vs. Enrile, SCnullified the proceedings in military courts against the civilians and ordered the re-filing of informations against them in the proper civil courts. In Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (Olaguer was sentenced to death without receiving evidence in his defense), SC said that even during the period of martial law as long as those courts are open and functioning, military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts. It declared unconstitutional the creation of the military commissions to try civilians and nullified the proceedings convicting non-political detainees. Without conducting an investigation, State Prosecutor Barrios filed with RTC two informations for the mentioned crimes. He also failed to provide the RTC Judge the supporting affidavits and the SC order which is the basis of filing them because there is no SC order to re-file the criminal cases. The petitioners filed before SC a petition for certiorari to annul the informations. RTC issued warrants of arrest. SC issued a TRO and ordered the respondents to comment.The Solicitor General argued that the proceedings involving civilians before a military commission were null and void because SC ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over civilians, hence, their decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal; do not bar re-prosecution for the same crime before a civil court. Barrios defended the re-prosecution on the ground that it will not constitute double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction of the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy from attaching, thereby nullifying their acquittal.

IssueWhether or not Barrios committed grave abuse of discretion by re-filing the informations

Held: YES.

RatioThe petitioners had been acquitted by the military court.Cruz vs. Enrile should be given a limited application for those who sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings and prayed for retrial in the civil courts, not all who had been tried and sentenced by a court martial during the period of martial law. The petitioners re-prosecution, based on Cruz in which they took no part and were not heard, would be violative of their right to due process. In Cruz, the Secretary of Justice was ordered to file the necessary informations in the proper civil courts but it did not nullify the court martial proceedings against the other civilians petitioners who: (1) had finished serving their sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3) had been acquitted by the military courts. SC applied retroactively the rule on re-prosecution before the proper civil courts and prospectively for those released from custody. The doctrine in Olaguer is that the trial of civilians by military process was not due process. However, only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered. If a retrial, is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the case. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" if, such as in this case, the proceedings were fair, there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court.The re-filing of the information against the petitioners would place them in double jeopardy. Furthermore, depriving them of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the military commission would amount to an ex post facto law or ruling.

ADDITIONAL CASES

Isip vs. PeopleHe who alleges must prove his allegations. Isip is charged with the crime of estafa. Apparently, Isip received jewelries that he was supposed to sell. On the due date, he failed to return neither the jewelries nor the proceeds of the supposed sale to the rightful owner. In his petition, he claimed that the trial court in Cavite, the tribunal that tried the case, had no jurisdiction. He claimed that that the transaction was entered into in Manila. The Court rejected such claim stating that Isip failed to prove such allegations. In such case, jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENE RALLA BELISTAG.R. NO. 164631FACTSBelista inherited 8 parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the lots under the coverage of CARP for which she is claiming for just compensation. DAR and LBP estimated the lots at P277, 582.58 and P317, 259.31, respectively. Believing that her lots were grossly, she filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against LBP at the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V. The Adjudicator decided that subject lots are valued at P2.8M and ordered LBP to pay Belista. Both parties filed for motion for reconsideration. This time, the Adjudicator, reduced the value of the lots to P2.5M. Aggrieved, LBP, petitioned with the RTC.RTC Ruling: RTC dismissed the case motu proprio for failure to exhaust first administrative remedies and in violation of 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure which states that appeal of Regional Adjudicators decision should first be filed at DARAB and not the RTC. CA affirmed the rulingTo summarize,LBP did this:Adjudicator RTC CARTC & CA said LBP should have done this:Adjudicator DARAB RTC CA

However, LBP contends that DARAB Rules of Procedure is not applicable to them because its effectivity began February 8, 2003 while petition was filed at RARAD on November 11, 2002. Furthermore

ISSUEW/N CA was correct in ruling that decision of Adjudicator

HELD1. NO. Decision of DARAB may be appealed directly to the RTC.

RATIOThe dates are irrelevant to determine the jurisdiction of the RTC. SC ruled that, according to R.A. No. 6657, which instituted CARP, decision of the Adjudicator need NOT be appealed first to DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

Main ratio:Sec. 57 of RA 6657 provides that RTC sitting as SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowner. If 2003 DARAB rules are to be applied, the RTC would have appellate jurisdiction, which is contradictory to RA 6657.

Sub-ratio:Another source of conflict is Sec. 50 of RA 6657, which provides that DAR shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. SC made a distinction between the SAC and DAR. DAR as an administrative agency cannot be granted the exclusive power to exercise eminent domain, which is a judicial functio