Crimpro Fifth

8/10/2019 Crimpro Fifth

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SUMMERVILLE GENERAL G.R. No. 163741MERCHANDISING & CO., INC.,

Petitioner, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,Chairperson,

CARPIO,- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, andVELASCO, JR., JJ.

HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR.,in his capacity as PRESIDINGJUDGE of RTC-MANILA, BR. 24,and ELIDAD KHO, VIOLETA KHO, Promulgated:and ROGER KHO,

Respondents. August 7, 2007VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]under Rule 45which seeks to reverse and set aside the May 26, 2004 Decision [2]ofthe Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77180, which upheld theOctober 24, 2001,[3]August 21, 2002,[4]and April 2, 2003[5]Orders ofthe Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24.

The instant petition originated from a complaint for unfaircompetition filed by petitioner against private respondents ElidadKho, Violeta Kho, and Roger Kho, before the City Prosecutors Officeof Manila. After due investigation, the City Prosecutors Office ofManila came out with its May 31, 2000 Resolution recommending theprosecution of private respondents for unfair competition and

dismissing private respondents counterclaim against petitioner.Pursuant to the Resolution, an Information[6]for unfair competitionwas filed against private respondents Khos before the Manila RTC,Branch 24, which was docketed as Crim. Case No. 00-183261. Thecharge as contained in the Information is hereby reproduced asfollows:

That on or about January 10, 2000 and forsometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City ofManila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and

confederating together and helping one another, thenengaged in a business known as KEC CosmeticLaboratory, located at 2407 Topacio Street and 2412Raymundo Street, San Andres, this City, in an unfaircompetition, and for the purpose ofdeceiving/defrauding the public in general and theSummerville General Merchandising and Co.(Summerville) which is engaged, among others, in the

importation and distribution of facial cream productswith the trademark known as Chin Chun Su, hereinrepresented by VICTOR CHUA, its General Manager,did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly andjointly sell/dispose and/or cause to be sold/disposedto the public facial cream products using tools,implements and equipments in its production, labelingand distribution, which give and depict the generalappearance of the Chin Chun Su facial creamproducts and likely influence the purchasers to believethat the same are those of the said Summerville.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Arraignment was scheduled for July 13, 2000; however, onJune 22 of the same year, private respondents filed a petition forreview with the Department of Justice (DOJ), assailing the May 31,2000 Resolution of the City Prosecutors Office of Manila.

On August 17, 2000 the DOJ through Undersecretary Regis V.Puno issued a Resolution[8]affirming the May 31, 2000 Resolution ofthe City Prosecutor.

Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents,then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez issued his June 18, 2001Resolution which recalled and set aside the August 17, 2000Resolution of Undersecretary Puno, but without however issuing aruling on the propriety of the complaint and merely indicated that thecase would be further reviewed and the corresponding resolutionwould be issued.[9]

The arraignment pushed through on October 11, 2000. Sincethe accused refused to plea to the charge, a plea of not guilty wasentered for each of them. In the meantime, pending the resolution ofthe petition for review, private respondents filed a motion to suspend
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proceedings, but it was denied in the July 18, 2001 Order of the trialcourt.

On September 28, 2001, the DOJ issued aResolution[10]dismissing both the complaint filed by petitioner andthe counterclaim filed by private respondents. Feeling aggrieved,petitioner immediately filed a motion for reconsideration of theSecretarys ruling.

On October 23, 2001, the prosecution filed with the trial courta Motion to Withdraw Information [11]on the basis of the September28, 2001 Resolution issued by Secretary Perez. The next day, the RTCissued the first assailed Order, dated October 24, 2001. The pertinentportion of the Order reads as follows:

Acting on the Motion to Withdraw Informationfiled by the trial prosecutor dated October 22, 2001,and for the reason therein cited the motion is herebygranted.

The Information against the accused is herebyordered withdrawn.

This order likewise renders the Motion toDismiss filed by the accused through counseldated October 9, 2001, moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.[12]

On November 23, 2001 petitioner filed its Motion forReconsideration of the October 24, 2001 Order.

On June 6, 2002, the trial court issued an Order[13]holding inabeyance all pending incidents to await the final resolution of themotion filed before the DOJ. Private respondents Khos filed a Motionfor Reconsideration, arguing that the trial court has all the factsnecessary to resolve the pending incidents.

On July 31, 2002, the Khos filed a supplemental motioninsisting that the case be dismissed on the ground of doublejeopardy.

On August 21, 2002, the trial court issued the secondassailed Order,[14]holding that due to its Order withdrawing theInformation, there is no necessity to order the dismissal of the case.The re-filing of the Information would constitute double jeopardy.[15]

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the August21, 2002 Order.

On September 17, 2002, the DOJ, through Secretary Perez,issued a Resolution[16]granting the Motion for Reconsideration filedby petitioner and ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manilato file the appropriate Information for Unfair Competition. Privaterespondents Khos then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with theOffice of the Secretary of Justice. Petitioner on the other hand filed amanifestation before the trial court informing it of the recentdevelopment with a prayer to reinstate the case.

On April 2, 2003, the trial court issued its last assailedOrder[17]holding that the revival of the case is now barred by theimpregnable wall of double jeopardy.[18]

On July 17, 2003, then Secretary of Justice SimeonDatumanong finally disposed of the petition for review by denying theMotion for Reconsideration filed by private respondents Khos.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamuswith the CA which sought to annul the October 24, 2001, August 21,2002, and April 2, 2003 Orders issued by the Manila RTC. In its May26, 2004 Decision, the CA held that double jeopardy had set in andthat Judge Eugenio cannot be faulted for dismissing the case. The CAratiocinated that:

This is because once a complaint or

information has been filed in court, any disposition ofthe case rests in the sound discretion of the court(Mamburao v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 139141-42,Nov. 15, 2000), and the said undulating stance of theprosecution was reason enough to grant its withdrawalwithout the judge having to divine and weigh theprobable evidence of both the prosecution and thedefense.[19]
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Finding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed bythe trial court, the CA, in its May 26, 2004 Decision, denied duecourse and dismissed the petition.[20]

Petitioner now comes before this Court assailing the Decisionof the CA on the following grounds:

1. The [CA] erred in not finding that respondent

judge committed grave abuse of discretion inproceeding with the arraignment despite the fact thatthe petition for review is still pending with the DOJ.

2. The [CA] gravely erred in not finding that therespondent judge gravely abused his discretion inallowing the withdrawal of the information withoutmaking an independent assessment of the evidence.

3. The [CA] failed to apply the doctrine laiddown by the Hon. Supreme Court in Martinez versusCourt of Appeals, G.R. No. 112387, promulgated

October 12, 1994 in consonance with another

doctrinal ruling in Crespo v. Mogul(151 SCRA 462), bynot finding that the trial court gravely abused itsjurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction inallowing the withdrawal of the Information in Crim.Case No. 00-183261 and in disregarding the latestResolution of the DOJ directing the continuation of theprosecution of the Respondents for UnfairCompetition.

4. The [CA] seriously erred in law in ruling thatthe reinstatement of the Information in Crim. Case No.00-183261 pursuant to the DOJ Resolution directing

the continued prosecution of the respondents forUnfair Competition will constitute double jeopardy.[21]

The issues submitted for our resolution can be summarizedinto (1) whether Judge Eugenio committed grave abuse of discretionin allowing the withdrawal of the Information against the accusedwithout making an independent assessment of the evidence, contraryto established jurisprudence; and (2) whether the re-filing or thereinstatement of the Information would constitute double jeopardy.

The petition has merit.

We have ruled time and again that once a case is filed withthe court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of thecourt. This rule, however, is not without restrictions. We heldin Santos v. Orda, Jr. that:

[T]he trial court is not bound to adopt theresolution of the Secretary of Justice since it ismandated to independently evaluate or assess themerits of the case and it may either agree or disagreewith the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary ofJustice would be an abdication of the trial courts dutyand jurisdiction to determine aprima faciecase.[22]

Thus, the courts should not blindly follow the resolutionsissued by the DOJ. On the contrary, it should determine on its own

whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial.In this case, it can be readily seen from the October 24, 2001

Order of Judge Eugenio, granting the withdrawal of the Information,that the trial court glaringly failed to conduct its own determinationof aprima faciecase, and simply adopted the September 28, 2001

Resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice. Where the prosecutionis, as in this case, disappointingly unsure, irresolute, and uncertainon whether it should prosecute the accused, the court should havebeen most circumspect and judicious in the resolution of the Motionto Withdraw Information, and should have conducted its owndetermination whether or not there is probable cause to hold theaccused for trial.

This failure of Judge Eugenio to independently evaluate andassess the merits of the case against the accused violates thecomplainants right to due process and constitutes grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. And, all other actswhich trace their roots from this act committed in excess of hisjurisdiction, including the assailed Orders, lose their standing andproduce no effect whatsoever. Thus, it is only but proper for thisCourt to remand the case to the trial court to rule on the merits ofthe case to determine if aprima faciecase exists and consequentlyresolve the Motion to Withdraw Information anew.
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On the issue of double jeopardy, we hold that it does not barthe reinstatement of the Information.

The right against double jeopardy is contained in Sec. 21, Art.III of the Constitution, which reads: No person shall be twice putin jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act ispunished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal

under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for thesame act.

For double jeopardy to set in, the following requisites mustconcur: (1) there is a valid complaint or information; (2) the complaintshould be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) theaccused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused has beenconvicted, acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminatedwithout the express consent of the accused.[23]

Since we have held that the October 24, 2001 Order grantingthe withdrawal of the Information was committed with grave abuse of

discretion, then the accused was not acquitted nor was there a validand legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fourthrequisite on the conviction and acquittal of the accused in thedismissal of the case, without the approval of the accused, was notmet. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE,and the assailed May 26, 2004 Decision of the CA and the October24, 2001, August 21, 2002, and April 2, 2003Orders of the ManilaRTC are hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The caseis REMANDEDto the Manila RTC, Branch 24 to independentlyevaluate or assess the merits of the case to determine whether or not

probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
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[G.R. No. 130026. May 31, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIOMAGAT y LONDONIO, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:batas

Before this court for automatic review is the joint decision of theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal CasesNos. Q-96-68119 and Q-96-68120, finding accused-appellantAntonio Magat y Londonio guilty of raping his daughter, Ann Fideli L.Magat, on two occasions and sentencing him to suffer the extremepenalty of death for each case, and to pay the sum of P750,000.00 ascompensatory, moral and exemplary damages.

The two (2) Informations, charging accused-appellant with rapereads:

CRIMINAL CASE NO.Q-96-68119

"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of theoffended party, nineteen year old (19) ANN FIDELILIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT yLONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape definedand penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal code,as amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:

"That on or about the 14th day of August 1994, duringthe 17th birthday of Ann Fideli L. Magat inKasunduan, Quezon City and within the jurisdiction ofthe Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT YLONDONIO, with lewd designs, and by means of threatand violence, did then and there, unlawfully andfeloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexualintercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat."[1]

CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68120

"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of theoffended party, nineteen year old (19) ANN FIDELILIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined andpenalized under Article 335, Revised Penal Code, asamended by RA 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of September1996, inBarangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City, and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accusedANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with lewd designsand by means of threat and violence, did then andthere, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded inhaving sexual intercourse with Ann Fideli LimpocoMagat."[2]

Upon arraignment on January 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleadedguilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant'smother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and the public prosecutor, RioEspiritu agreed with the plea bargain. Consequently, the trial courtissued, on that same day, an Order, thefalloof whichreads: katarungan

"On arraignment, accused with the assistance of hiscounsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano and upon therequest of the accused, the information was read andexplained to him in tagalog, a dialect known to himand after which accused entered a plea of "GUILTY" tothe crime charged against him, and further pleads for

a lower penalty to which the Hon. Public Prosecutorinterpose no objection.

ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby finds the accusedANTONIO LON DONIO MAGAT, GUILTY beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Article335, RPC in relation to RA 7659 and he is herebysentenced to suffer a jail term of ten (10) yearsimprisonment for each case."[3]
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After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of thecomplainant on the ground that the penalty imposed was "toolight."[4]As a consequence, accused-appellant was re-arraigned onboth Informations on April 15, 1997 where he entered a plea of notguilty.[5]

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presentingDr. Ida Daniel, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of

Investigation and complainant's mother.

On July 3, 1997 accused-appellant entered anew a plea ofguilty.[6]The court read to him the Informations in English and

Tagalog and repeatedly asked whether he understood his change ofplea and propounded questions as to his understanding of theconsequences of his plea.[7]

Convinced of accused-appellant's voluntariness of his plea of guilty,the court required the taking of complainant's testimony. Theaccused-appellant did not present any evidence.

On July 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretalportion of which reads: HTML

"CONSEQUENTLY, the court renders judgment findingthe accused ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, GUILTYof the crime of Rape in violation of Article 335 of theRevised Penal Code, as amended, beyond reasonabledoubt and accordingly, sentences him as follows:

1.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68119, the accusedAntonio Magat y Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by

lethal injection; and

2.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68120, the accusedAntonio Magat y Londonio is sentenced to DEATH bylethal injection.

On the civil aspect, the accused Antonio Magat yLondonio is hereby ordered to pay Ann Fideli LimpocoMagat the sum of P50,000.00 as compensatorydamages; further sum of P200,000.00 as moral

damages and another sum of P500,000.00 asexemplary and corrective damages.

SO ORDERED."[8]

Hence, this automatic review.

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning

and proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was alreadyconvicted per Order of the trial court dated January 10,1997 basedon his plea of guilt. He also argues that when the court renderedjudgment convicting him, the prosecution didnot appeal normovefor reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently,the conviction having attained finality can no longer be set aside ormodified even if the prosecution later realizes that the penaltyimposed was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posit that the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his rightagainst double jeopardy.

The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that

accused-appellant's plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated andallowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where aplea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accusedpleads guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of RevisedRules of Court provides:

"Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.-Theaccused, with the consent of the offended party andthe fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to pleadguilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not

it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or iscognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than thetrial court. No amendment of the complaint orinformation is necessary. CODES

"A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to aconviction of the offense charged for purposes ofdouble jeopardy."

Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of theplea ofguilt to a lesser penalty.
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It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to alesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and onlybargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly observed by theSolicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on thepenalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guiltyto the offense charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to thepenalty to which he pleaded.

It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutelyand unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offenseimputed to him.[9]Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional pleaof guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certainpenalty will be meted unto him.[10]

Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea.Hence, the trial court should have vacated such a plea and entered aplea of not guilty for a conditional plea of guilty, or one subject to theproviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent toa plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trialbefore judgment may be rendered.[11]

In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was basedon a void plea bargaining is also void ab initioand can not beconsidered to have attained finality for the simple reason thata voidjudgment has no legality from its inception.[12]Thus, since thejudgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void,double jeopardy will not lie.

Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of theaccused-appellant was rectified when he was re-arraigned andentered a new plea. Accused-appellant did not question the

procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so,he is deemed to have abandoned his right to question thesame[13]and waived the errors in procedure.[14]yacats

Accused-appellant also maintains that assuming that there wasproper basis for setting aside the Order of January 10,1997, the trialcourt erred in not finding that he made an improvident plea of guilty.He faults the trial court in not complying with the procedure laiddown in the Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court.[15]Heclaims that the record of the case fails to support the trial court'sassertion that it conducted a searching inquiry to determine that the

accused-appellant voluntarily entered his plea of guilty with fullunderstanding of the consequences of his plea. He claims that thereis no evidence that the trial court conducted searching inquiry inaccordance with the rules.

Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense,trial courts are now enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry intothe voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his

plea; (b) to require the prosecution to present evidence to prove theguilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (c)to ask the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalfand allow him to do so if he desires.[16]

This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges tocomply with the procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment,particularly the rules governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense inorder to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of eitherthe trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility thatthere might have been some misunderstanding on the part oftheaccused as to the nature of the charges to which he pleaded

guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to thecommission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of agreater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribedpenalties.[17]Apart from the circumstances that such procedure mayremove any doubt that the accused fully understood theconsequences of his plea is the fact that the evidence taken thereonis essential to the fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review ofautomatic appeals from death sentences.[18]

We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are convincedthat the trial judge has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as

minister of the law to determine the voluntariness and fullunderstanding of accused-appellants' plea of guilty. The absence ofthe transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during thearraignment do not make the procedure flawed. The minutes of theproceedings[19]indubitably show that the judge read the Informationsto the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked himquestions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea,his educational attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant couldhave known of the consequence of his plea having pleaded twice tothe charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters sent to the trialcourt judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his "sins" but alsoasked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform.[20]olanski
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Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus,even assuming that there was an improvident plea of guilt, theevidence on record can sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant.

The testimony of the complainant, as summarized by the SolicitorGeneral, reveal:

"Complainant's x x x parents separated when she wasonly seven (7) years old and she and her youngerbrother David were left with her father, accused-appellant, while another brother, Jonathan, and sister,Abigail, stayed with their mother (TSN, July 15, 1997,p. 46; May 22, 1997, pp. 38-41; 49-51).

"On her 9th birthday, her father first raped her andshe was beaten when she resisted, thus, she found itfutile to resist every time her father touched her afterthat (TSN, supra, pp. 24-25).

"August 14, 1994, was complainant's 17th birthday.That evening, while sleeping together with accused-appellant and her brother in their rented house atKasunduan, Quezon City, she was awakened by thekisses of her father. He then removed her clothes andafter removing his own clothes, went on top of her andinserted his penis inside her vagina as he had done toher many times before this incident. After he hadfinished, he told her to wash her vagina which she did(TSN, supra, pp. 12-17).

"On September 1, 1996, complainant who was already19 years old, was at home with accused-appellant andher brother after 'selling' when her father ordered herand her brother to go to sleep. Her brother fell asleepbut complainant could not sleep and was restless thatnight. Again, accused-appellant raped her on the samebed where her brother was also sleeping. She did notresist him anymore because nothing would happenanyway and he would just beat her if she did (TSN,supra, 21-25). haideem

"x x x complainant further revealed that she was notonly sexually abused but also physically abused byaccused-appellant who even beat her with a whipwhile being tied and struck her with a bag containingtin cans causing head injuries necessitating herhospitalization. She also confirmed that her fatherstarted raping her on her 9th birthday which wasrepeated several times after that. She likewise revealed

that she felt some fluid ('katas') coming out of herfathers penis every time he raped her but she did notbecome pregnant because her father made her drinkthe water from boiled guava leaves and a medicine sheidentified as 'Gextex' (should be Gestex) if hermenstruation was delayed. In fact, when hermenstrual period was delayed for three (3) months, herfather even boxed her stomach after making her drinkthe water boiled from guava leaves and Gextex therebycausing her to bleed profusely. She was not able toreport or reveal what her father did to her because shewas warned by him that he would kill her, her brother,

her mother and her relatives if ever she would escapeand reveal the rape. Besides, she had nowhere else togo and was further made to believe by her father thatthere was nothing wrong with what he was doing toher because it was not forbidden by the Bible."

The medical examination confirmed complainant's testimony. Dr. IdaP. Daniel of the NBI testified that complainant had "lax fourchette"and "distensible hymen" which may be caused by sexual intercourseor penetration of a hard blunt object such as a penis. She alsoconcluded that the "shallow rugosities" inside her vagina lead to theconclusion that there was more than one or even more than ten (10)

times of sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object thatpassed through her vaginal canal. Moreover, her hymen orifice canallow complete penetration of an average-sized Filipino adult penis inits erect stage which is from 2.5 to 3.0 cms. in diameter.[21]hustisya

Surprisingly, accused-appellant did not present any evidencetorebutthe prosecution's evidence nor testified in his behalf to deny the inculpatory testimony of the complainant, giving us the impression thathe acknowledges the charges against him.
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While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions basedonpleas of guilty in capital offenses because of the improvidence of theplea, we did so only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgmentof the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the trial court inobedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determineprecisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, themanner in which the plea of guilty is made loses legal significance,for the simple reason that the conviction is predicated not on the plea

but on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of theoffense charged.[22]In such case, it cannot be claimed that defendantwas sentenced to death without having been previously informed ofthe nature of the charges against him and of the qualifying andaggravating circumstances recited in the information, as he is fullyapprised not only of the allegations in the information but of theentire evidence of the prosecution.[23]

Additionally, accused-appellant's second plea of guilty validated hisfirst plea of guilt. It removed any reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[24]

Accused-appellant further impugns the trial court's imposition of the

death penalty in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 contendingthat thecomplainant was already nineteen (19) years old when the allegedrape occurred.

Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the RevisedPenal Code provides:

"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crimeof rape is committed with any of the followingattendant circumstances:

1.......when the victim is under eighteen (18) yearsof age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinitywithin the third civil degree, or the common-lawspouse of the parent of the victim." (Underscoringsupplied)

Complainant was born on August 14, 1977.[25]On September 1,1996, when the rape was committed (Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120),complainant was already nineteen (19) years of age. Therefore, thesame does not fall under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659. The proper penaltyshould be reclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of the Revised

Penal Code. Jksm

However, the extreme penalty of death should be imposed in CriminalCase No. Q-96-68119, complainant being only 17 years of age whenaccused-appellant, his father, raped her.

Finally, accused-appellant likewise assails the award of P750,000.00damages claiming that the same is excessive.

With regard to the award of compensatory damages, we have ruled inPeople vs. Victor,[26]which was later reaffirmed in People vs.Prades,[27]that "if the crime of rape is committed or effectivelyqualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penaltyis authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity of thevictim shall be in the increased amount of not less thanP75,000.00."[28]Accordingly, in Criminal Case NO. Q-96-68119, theaward of compensatory damages should be increased fromP50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120however, while appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the

compensatory damage should be the same (P75,000.00). As rightlyargued by the Solicitor General, the trauma, ignominy, pain andshame suffered by the complainant can not be treated or regardedany lesser.

The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apatheticsocietal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuationsovertime, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court overthe incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."[29]More so, if thecrime is committed by the father against his own flesh and blood.

With respect to the award of moral damages, we have in People vs.Prades[30]held: Chiefx

" x x x The Court has also resolved that in crimes ofrape, such as that under consideration, moraldamages may additionally be awarded to the victim inthe criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Courtdeems just, without the need for pleading or proof ofthe basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice.Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et
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probatain civil procedure and for essentially civil

cases should be dispensed within criminal prosecutionfor rape with the civil aspect included therein, since noappropriate pleadings are filed wherein suchallegations can be made.

"Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered thetrauma of mental, physical and psychological

sufferings which constitute the bases for moraldamages are too obvious to still require the recitalthereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itselfeven assumes and acknowledges such agony on herpart as a gauge of her credibility. What exists bynecessary implication as being ineludibly present inthe case need not go through the superfluity of stillbeing proved through a testimonial charade."

Nevertheless, we find the award of P200,000.00 moral damagesexcessive. An award of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is to ourmind more reasonable. However, we are deleting the award of

exemplary or corrective damages, in the absence of any legal basistherefor.

Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic ActNo. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, isunconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court,by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penaltyshould be imposed accordingly.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1.......In Criminal Case No. Q - 96 - 68119, thedecision of the Regional Trial Court convictingaccused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio of rapeand sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of DEATHis hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that theaward of compensatory damages be increased toSeventy - Five Thousand Pesos (75,000.00), moraldamages is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos(P50,000.00) and exemplary damages deleted. Esm

2.......In Criminal Case No. Q- 96-68120, the decisionof the Regional Trial Court convicting accused -appellant of rape and sentencing him to the SupremePenalty of DEATH is hereby reduced to RECLUSIONPERPETUA. The award of compensatory damages isincreased to Seventy - Five Thousand Pesos(P75,000.00) , moral damages is reduced to FiftyThousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages

is deleted.

In accordance with Section 25 of the RA 7659, amending Article 83 ofthe Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let therecords of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of thePresident for the possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoningpower.

SO ORDERED.


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[G.R. No 153714-20. August 15, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs. MARIO K.ESPINOSA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy mustbe clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule,

the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must beunmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise, theplea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1]under Rule 65 of the Rulesof Court, seeking to nullify the April 10, 2002 Resolution [2]of theSandiganbayan (SBN) in Criminal Case Nos. 26422-26428. The anti-graft court dismissed the criminal cases against Respondent Mario K.Espinosa on the ground of double jeopardy as follows:

That being the case, the Court is constrained to concur with theaccused that jeopardy has set in and that he is now at peril ofpunishment twice for the same offense in violation of the protectionafforded by Sec. 21, Art. III of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, these cases are DISMISSED as against accused MarioK. Espinosa alone.[3]

The Antecedents

On February 4, 1998, separate cases of estafa and attemptedcorruption of public officers were filed before the SBN by the Office ofthe Ombudsman (OMB) against (1) Respondent Espinosa, thenprovincial administrator of Masbate; (2) Emma Vasquez; and (3)

Romeo Sanano. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.24438 and 24439.

Prior to his arraignment, Espinosa filed a Motion forReinvestigation of the cases. The SBN Fourth Division granted theMotion in an Order[4]dated March 23, 1988, and directed the Officeof the Special Prosecutor to evaluate the evidence against theaccused.

While the cases were being reevaluated, Espinosa filed with theSBN a Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad for the period May 2-13,1999.

On the date set for the hearing of the Motion, the SBN (FourthDivision) issued an Order resetting the hearing to April 22, 1999. Itrequired private respondent to be conditionally arraigned on thatdate[5]before it would act on his Motion to Travel.

As ordered, private respondent was arraigned, and thereaftergranted his Motion to Travel. The Order of Arraignment dated April22, 2000, stated that upon being duly arraigned, [he] entered a pleaof Not Guilty to both Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 24438 and

24439.[6]The Court also ordered the deferment of the pretrial of thecases, pending the reinvestigation then being conducted by theOmbudsman.

On December 28, 2000, the OMB -- through the Office of theSpecial Prosecutor -- moved to withdraw ex partethe two cases

against private respondent. The SBN granted the Motion in aResolution dated January 9, 2001.

Thereafter, the OMB filed in the same court seven Informationsfor Malversation of Public Funds against Espinosa and severalothers. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.

24622 to 24628 and raffled to the SBN First Division.On January 22, 2001, Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the

Informations. He argued that double jeopardy had already attached,because (1) he had been arraigned in the previous estafa cases; and(2) the Motion to Withdraw the two earlier ones had been grantedwithout his express consent.

Petitioner countered that the arraignment for the two previouscases was conditional, because it was made solely for the purposeof accommodating private respondents request to travel abroad whilethe matters were pending reinvestigation.
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Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In its assailed Resolution, the SBN First Division ruled thatjeopardy had attached in the first instance when Criminal Case Nos.24438-24439 were dismissed upon the prosecutions ex partemotionto withdraw the information. It noted that the dismissal had beensought and obtained without respondents knowledge, much lessexpress consent.

It likewise held private respondents actual arraignment to bestraightforward and unqualified. The records did not disclose anycircumstance showing that the accused knew that his arraignmentwas subject to certain conditions.

Hence this recourse.[7]

Issue

Petitioner submits the following issue for the Courtsconsideration:

Whether or not [the SBN] acted with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or x x x excess of jurisdiction in dismissingCriminal Cases Nos. 34622 to 24628 as againstRespondent Espinosa.[8]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

Preliminary Issue:Procedural Lapses

Before tackling the main issue raised by petitioner, the Court willpoint out some procedural lapses.

First, prior to submitting the instant Petition to this Court,

petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration before theSBN. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari will lie only if there isno appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law.[9]

Here, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy expressly providedby law[10]is a motion for reconsideration to be filed within fifteen (15)days from promulgation or notice of the final order or

judgment.[11]The purpose of the motion[12]is x x x to afford publicrespondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied errorattributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factualaspects of the case.

Explaining further, the Court said:

x x x. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstances istantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of therespondent commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittinglycommitted or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. An

improvident resort to certiorari cannot be used as a tool to

circumvent the right of public respondent to review and purge itsdecision of an oversight, if any. x x x.[13](Italics supplied)

Second, the proper remedy is appeal under Rule 45,not certiorariunder Rule 65. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No.1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, provides that[d]ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall beappealable to the Supreme Court by [a] petition for review oncertiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court.Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, likewiseprovides that a judgment or final order or resolution of theSandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court via a verifiedpetition for review on certiorari.

Clearly then, the remedy of appeal was available to petitioner.For unexplained reasons, it chose not to pursue this recourse.Neither has it cited grounds to exempt the Petition from the stringentrule forbidding a substitution of remedies. Verily, its cavalierdisregard of procedural requirements, especially its erroneous choiceof remedy, is indeed enough reason to throw out this Petitionsummarily.

Main Issue:
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Attachment of Legal Jeopardy

Even if we are to gloss over these procedural infirmities, thePetition should nonetheless be dismissed for its lack of substantivemerit.

Petitioner argues that the dismissal of the later Informationsagainst private respondent on the ground of double jeopardy had no

factual or legal basis,[14]because his arraignment in the earlier caseswas only conditional.

We are unconvinced.

Previous cases[15]have mentioned the SBNs practice ofconditionally arraigning the accused pending the Ombudsmansreinvestigation of the case.[16]This practice is not mentioned orprovided for in the regular rules of procedure.

Section 9 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975,[17]provides:

Sec. 9.Rules of Procedure. -The Rules of Court promulgated by the

Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with theSandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power topromulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rulesgoverning the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation ofjustices among them, and other matters relating to the internaloperations of the court which shall be enforced until repealed ormodified by the Supreme Court."

The Revised Internal Rules of theSandiganbayan,[18]promulgated by this Court, do not mention anyconditional arraignment. Neither do the regular Rules of Court.

Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process. It

consists of the judges or the clerk of courts reading of the criminalcomplaint or information to the defendant. At this stage, the accusedis granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be officially informedof the nature and the cause of the accusation.[19]Thus, arraignmentcannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.

Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on April 22,1999. No unusual ceremony punctuated his arraignment. The SBNitself found this simple process inconsistent with its studied mannerof conditionally arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation inother cases. We quote from its assailed Resolution as follows:

Since it is the accused who wishes to travel even while his case ispending review, and in order that the Court might not losejurisdiction over him while he is abroad, the accused and counsel areadvised as part of the arraignment process, that the arraignment isconditional, i.e., that arraignment is without prejudice to the results ofthe reinvestigation or review; that if the prosecution shouldrecommend the filing of new charges, in lieu of the present charge,which would necessarily include or be included in the present

accusation, the accused would now be understood as having waivedhis right against double jeopardy; and that if the prosecution soughtto withdraw the information, the arraignment would be deemed tohave been of no effect. If the accused accepts these conditions forarraignment, then he is arraigned and allowed to travel. In otherwords, in this instance, the accused is clearly aware of what is goingon; at the time of his arraignment, there is an explicit waiver againstthe protection against double jeopardy as a condition for histravel.[20](Italics supplied)

Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, thearraignment shall be suspended for a period not exceeding 60 dayswhen a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at either theDepartment of Justice or the Office of the President. However, weshould stress that the court does not lose control of the proceedingsby reason of such review. Once it had assumed jurisdiction, it is nothandcuffed by any resolution of the reviewing prosecutingauthority.[21]Neither is it deprived of its jurisdiction by suchresolution.[22]The principles established in Crespo v. Mogul[23]still

stands, as follows:

"Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it wasdue to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary ofJustice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, theCourt in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it

and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the properdetermination of the case.

x x x x xx x x x

"The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint orinformation is filed in Court any disposition of the case as to itsdismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in thesound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains thedirection and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even whilethe case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
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court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the casebefore it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive

jurisdiction and competence.A motion to dismiss the case filed by thefiscal should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grantor deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after thearraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after areinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice whoreviewed the records of the investigation."[24](Italics supplied)

In any event, petitioner insists that private respondent haswaived his right to invoke double jeopardy in the light of his allegedlyconditional arraignment.

Again, the Court is not persuaded.

The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 ofArticle III of the Constitution, which reads:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the sameoffense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance convictionor acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to anotherprosecution for the same act.

This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressedby Section 17 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure.[25]To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, thefollowing must be demonstrated:

x x x (1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) thesecond jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offenseincludes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the firstinformation, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustrationthereof.

And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b)before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea[has] been entered;and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise

terminated without the express consent of the accused.[26]

It has been the unwavering position of this Court thatsubstantial rights cannot be trifled with or cast aside on the basis ofmere suppositions and conjectures. The relinquishment of aconstitutional right has to be laid out convincingly. Such waivermust be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent.[27]

As can be gleaned from the Memorandum of petitioner, thealleged waiver falls short of the above requirement:

Unfortunately, the records reveal that a lawyer for respondentEspinosa was present when the April 19,1999 Order of the FourthDivision was issued in open court. Thus, said lawyer must haveheardthat the hearing of the motion to travel was reset to April 22,1999 so that the movant could be conditionally arraigned.[28]

x x x x xx x x x

x xx. As stressed in the petition, the arraignment wasconditionalfor if it was not so, respondent Espinosa would have beendeemed to have abandoned his recourse for the reevaluationof his

cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.[29](Italics supplied)

As correctly pointed out in the challenged Resolution, thedismissal of the estafa and the corruption cases was made uponpetitionersex parteMotion for the withdrawal of the

Informations. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that privaterespondent was not notified of this Motion. Neither was a hearing

held thereon.

On the other hand, private respondent has amply shown that helearned of the Motion only after the cases had been dismissed. It isclear that the dismissal, having been secured by petitioner withoutthe expressconsent of the accused, does not amount to a waiver of

the right against double jeopardy. But it does unequivocally showthe fourth requisite for the proper invocation of such right.

In a nutshell, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignmentmust be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Theymust be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the

arraignment. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple andunconditional.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR,Petitioner,vs.HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of theMetropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, andEVANGELINE PONCE,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review1of the Orders2of the Regional TrialCourt of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts rulingfinding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a secondprosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide andDamage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous convictionfor Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arisingfrom the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler

(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of PasigCity, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) RecklessImprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting inHomicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for thedeath of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage tothe spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporaryrelease in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge inCriminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of publiccensure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash theInformation in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardyof second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the twocases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated thematter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), ina petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitionersought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in CriminalCase No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting onpetitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered hisarrest.4Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denyingpetitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing hisarraignment until after his arrest.5Petitioner sought reconsideration

but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Poncesought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitionersloss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No.2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture ofstanding to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order

to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment inCriminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A.No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner soughtreconsideration but this proved unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A.No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedingsin Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case fromthe line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for
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absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was aspecial civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal ofa judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petitionin S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that hisconstitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishmentfor the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No.

82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal CaseNo. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of suchcrime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCsdecision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition inS.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courtsattention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slightphysical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of theRevised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide).Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in

Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries fromCriminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of theSolicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as thepublic respondent judge is merely a nominal party and privaterespondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner

forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTCordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment inCriminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whetherpetitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clausebars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment inCriminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality tomaintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded

by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placinghim in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense barsfurther proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment inCriminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing

to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape fromcustody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by thesecond paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8in relation to Section 1,Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizingthis Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of theappellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapesfrom prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign countryduring the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated inSection 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari toreview a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the

Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCsreliance on People v. Esparas9undercuts the cogency of its rulingbecause Esparasstands for a proposition contrary to the RTCsruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accusedwho was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs eventhough she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried andconvicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatoryreview of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as anexception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance athis arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss ofstanding becomes more evident when one considers the Rules ofCourts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411of the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely rendershis bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellationshould the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days);the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender,will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed,the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
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underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso factoconvert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "noexplanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12atthe MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings inCriminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in

S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment(the order for which was released days after the MeTC orderedpetitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motionremained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accuseds negative constitutionalright not to be "twice put injeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13protects him from,among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, withthe prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a

valid information.14It is not disputed that petitioners conviction inCriminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competentjurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on thequestion whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No.82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmativeview, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense ofreckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding thatReckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is anentirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting inHomicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of anadditional fact which the other does not."15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,its Consequences on Persons andProperty are Material Only to Determinethe Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, wereprosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence.Any person who, by recklessimprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arrestomayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its mediumperiod; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of

arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed;if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arrestomenor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commitan act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall sufferthe penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; ifit would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arrestomayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have onlyresulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be

punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of saiddamages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be lessthan twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall beimposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would haveconstituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise theirsound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article

sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article sh

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