Consti Digest Due Process of Law

8/10/2019 Consti Digest Due Process of Law

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Ermita Malate Hotel vs City of Manila

FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760.

There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact

insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any

other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional andvoid for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose fees per annum for motels;

that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized

representative of a hotel (OMKA) , motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest

or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed

form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and

middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the

number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, withdata furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification

that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of OMKA

That the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from

being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or

a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the OMKA of such establishments to lease any room or portionthereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for

its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 ofthe challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of

the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once

again a transgression of the due process clause.

In the answer, after setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challengedordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper

exercise of the police power.

The trial court ruled based on evidence or the lack of it, on the authority of the City of Manila to regulate

motels, and came to the conclusion that the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 would be unconstitutional and,

therefore, null and void. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.

HELD: The validity of the ordinance must be upheld.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF.An ordinance, having been enacted bycouncilors who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular

municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action,must be presumed to be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property

rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for

evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual foundation laid foroverthrowing Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut itis unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here. No such factualfoundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the

stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside

POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF.Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is a manifestation of

a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such it is immune from anyimputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold

otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly


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characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does to all the

great public needs.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices

hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the

alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the

existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus

become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.

LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO.Municipal license fees can be classified into those imposed for regulating

occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and

for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right

to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the amount of license feesthe municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this class of cases. Aside from applying the well

known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts

have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon

the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an

important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922],42 Phil,, 818, 828).

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinancefor both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required

to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier

announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the states police power.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN.The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City ofManila making it unlawful for OMKA of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to

lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full

payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as transgression against the command of due process. Theprohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the

undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, everyregulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

Ichong vs Hernandez

FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to

prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not

wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail tradealiens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless

their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical

persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on

nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce

and industry.provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additionalstores or branches of retail business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the

Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property

without due processthe subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

the Act violates international and treaty obligations


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the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the

laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which

fully justify the legislative classification adopted.

RATIO: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires

that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred

and liabilities enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the

exercise of police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this

domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The

alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and

makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in

times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may

become the potential enemy of the State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his

profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolisticcontrol on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2012)(ODES no power to try and decide cases E.O. No. 13 empowering it is unconstitutional)

FACTS:On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O.13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for

Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division(IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a

complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board ofTrustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the

LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr.

and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand

Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance

therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving

the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, etal.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-judicial

function through and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.


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HELD:NO.The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292. In the case

of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a

reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by

virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the

policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have thecontinuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President."

The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize

his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of

the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being

shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. Afterall, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the

ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative

authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.

The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 shouldbe distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO

292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging

units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the

Office of the

President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to

Departments or gencies, and vice versa.

The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it

touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the

limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of aChairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and

was placed directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which thefunctions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper.11

Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of

abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O.292.

What actions does reorganization include?

The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and

functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is anexisting office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere

alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third divisionthe

Investigative and Adjudicatory Divisionthrough which ODESLA could take on the additional functions ithas been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units

therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of

personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases,

its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of

recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."

Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaintsagainst


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all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President."

The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to

settlecontroversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, and

later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a

quasi- judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a

controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving atfactual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual

conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and

definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primaryjurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier

filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the

Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal

cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary

jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by anotherinvestigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the

adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limitedto that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by

the President.

Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal,

contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The

mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation isnot equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. Petitioner must present substantial proof to

show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such

evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the performance of the fact-findinginvestigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be aclear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner has failed

to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the

President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.

Oroquiola vs. Tandang Sora Development Corp.

Facts:

- Ledesma was the registered owner of a lot in Tandang Sora, QC. The parcel of land was adjacent to certainportions of registered in the name of Piedad Estates and other portions to Herminigilda Pedro.

- On October 29, 1964, Herminigilda sold her lot to Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the

name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots

- Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor

and Honorata Orquiola. Other portions were registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and

other third persons.- In 1969, Ledesma filed a complaint Pedro and Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the

pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of

an assignment made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial continued for three decades.

- On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liablefor encroaching on plaintiffs land and ordered them:

(a) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally constructed by defendants on

plaintiffs property at defendants expense;


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(b) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own expense;

As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff directed petitioners (Orquiola spouses) to remove the house

they constructed on the land they were occupying and issued a writ of demolition

However, despite the service of the said writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the subject

property, they failed to comply therewith

Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and preliminaryinjunction to stop the demolition

Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they were

parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded, the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot

be enforced against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process oflaw.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It held that as buyers and successors-in-interest of Lising,

petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be

reached by the execution orderPetitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners; and (2) whetherpetitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.

HELD

On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced against them. Where acase like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system

1, the applicable rule is

that a person dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely

on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. It is ourview here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection

of their lot by the Torrens system.

Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value? A buyer in good

faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest insuch property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he

has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. The sale to petitioners was made before

Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which atthe time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this

case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.

The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? On this score, we find that

petitioners are indeed builders in good faith.A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is ignorant of

any defect or flaw in his title. As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without

knowledge of any defect in the title of Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land.

It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918,that they had notice of private respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannotserve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties.

1Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred to therein, and a strong

presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against

any informacion possessoria, or other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens

title. Moreover, persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond

what appears on its face.


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As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject property

and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private respondents should

have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by

the decision in said case. In our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious

cause to resist the demolition of their house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of

property without due process of law.

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Consti Digest Due Process of Law