Consti 1 Finals Case Digest

7/27/2019 Consti 1 Finals Case Digest

1/22

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - FINALS CASE DIGEST

"No matter how thorough our observation of the present, the (unobserved) past, like the future, is indefinite and exists only

as a spectrum of possibilities." Stephen Hawking, The Grand Design

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Imelda Marcos (Petitioner) wished to run for representative of First District of Leyte, she filed her

COC wherein she indicated 7 months as her period of residency. Cirilo Montejo, her rival and

incumbent representative (Private Respondent) filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification

with COMELEC, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency

which is 1 year. Thereafter, Imelda filed an amended/corrected COC, changing the 7 months to

since childhood. In her answer to the disqualification case against her, she averred that her entry

of 7 months was a result of honest misinterpretation, thinking that what was asked was her

actual and physical presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin/domicile in the First Legislative

District of Leyte, and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile/residence.

COMELEC struck off Imeldas COC.

ISSUE:WON Imelda is qualified to run for representative of First District of Leyte

HELD:

YES. Domicile means permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for business or for

pleasure, one intends to return. Residence implies the factual relationship of an individual to a

certain place, it is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The

essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves intent to

leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a persons intent be

to remain, it becomes his domicile. A person can have many residences but only one domicile. But

for the purpose of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile.

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a COC, which ought to be decisive in determiningWON an individual has satisfied the Constitutions residency qualification requirement. An

individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different

places. Petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in

Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province,

instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a

political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power. In spite of the

fact that petitioners being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation

of law which was established only when she reached the age of eight when her father brought his

family back to Leyte. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of

domicile, one must demonstrate the actual removal or actual change of domicile, bona fide

intention of abandoning former place of residence and establishing a new one, and absence of

clear and positive proof, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Upon marriage,

jurisprudence tells that female spouse does not automatically lose her domicile of origin in favor of

the husbands choice of residence upon marriage. What she gained upon marriage to Marcos was

actual residence, not a new domicile.


2/22




MAQUILING VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Arnado (Respondent) is a natural born Filipino citizen. He subsequently became a

naturalized American citizen, thus losing his Filipino citizenship. He applied for repatriationunder RA 9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the RP on 10 July 2008, which was

approved on the same day. In 3 April 2009 he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his

foreign citizenship. In 30 November 2009, he filed his COC for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao

del Norte. Linog Balua (Respondent), another mayoralty candidate, filed a disqualification

case against Arnado, presenting a certification from BI ind icating that Arnados nationality is

USA-American and his travel record dated 01/12/2010 and 03/23/2010 as DOA using his

American passport. Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed

Mayor. COMELEC 1stDivision granted the cancellation of Arnados COC. In Arnados MR,

he averred that he used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuanceof his PH passport, and that he used his PH passport after he obtained it. Casan Maquiling

(Petitioner) who garnered the 2nd highest number of votes intervened in the case,

asseverating that as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful

votes should be proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En Banc ruled in favor of Arnado.

ISSUE:

WON COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion and reversible error for

ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite continued use of US passport

HELD:

YES. The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive

and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest

Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required

to qualify one to run for an elective position. By using his foreign passport, Arnado

positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before

immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all the

attendant rights and privileges granted by USA. While the act of using foreign passport is

not one of the acts constituting renunciation and loss of PH citizenship, it is nevertheless an

act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who

is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. When

Arnado used his US passport on 14 Apr 2009 or just 11 days after he renounced his US

citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation, thus reverting to his status as dual

citizen. Dual citizens are qualified to vote but not qualified to run for a local elective

position. It was also shown that Arnado, despite obtaining his PH passport in June 2009,

continued using his US passport as indicated in his TR dated 24 Nov 2009.


3/22




TECSON VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) filed his COC to run for President

of RP in 2004 elections. Victorino Fornier (Petitioner) filed a disqualification case against FPJ,contending that FPJ is not a natural born Filipino citizen because his parents were foreigners, his

mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American, and his father Allan Poe was a Spanish national,

being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject; that granting Allan Poe was a Filipino citizen, he

could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an

alien mother; that Allan Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his

marriage to Bessie Kelley, and Allan Poe married Bessie Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ.

COMELEC dismissed the petition and MR. Tecson (Petitioner), among others, challenged the

jurisdiction of COMELEC, asserting that only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive

jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

ISSUES:1. WON Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case at bar

2. WON FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen

HELD:

1. NONE. The Constitution provides that, The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole

judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-

President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. RA 1793 created the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal, which shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the

SC as members. An election contest is initiated by filing of an election protest or petition for quo

warranto against the President or VP. Only the registered candidate for the President or VP of

the PH who receivedthe second or third highest number of votes may contest the election

of the President or VP, within 30 days after the proclamation of the winner.

2. YES. There was no such term as Philippine citizens during the Spanish regime but subjects of

Spain or Spanish subjects. The term citizens of the Philippine Islands appeared for the first

time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, which provides that all inhabitants of the Phil.Islands continuing

to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11 thday of April 1891, and then resided in said

Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to be citizens of the

Phil. Islands.. Lorenzo Pou, having died at 84 yrs old in 1954, he would have been born in year

1870, when PH was still under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of

residence upon his death, absent any other evidence, could have been his place of residence

before his death, and he would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Phil. Bill

of 1902 had effected, and his citizenship would extend to his son, Allan Poe, FPJs father. 1935

Constitution, the governing fundamental law during FPJs birth, confers PH citizenship to all

persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens, regardless of whether such children are

legitimate or illegitimate.


4/22




ATONG PAGLAUM INC. VS COMELEC

FACTS:

The 54 petitioner-parties were disqualified from participating in the May 2013 elections by:

(1) denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or (2) bycancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations, for

failure to show that they are representing the marginalized and underrepresented.

ISSUE:

WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion from disqualifying the petitioners

from participating in the party-list system

HELD:

NO. The SC remands to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to

determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system and participate in the

2013 elections.The party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties

that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the HoR. It may

include SECTORAL and NON-SECTORAL parties. They cannot expect to win in legislative

district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of

votes the winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. It is composed of 3

different groups: (1) NATIONAL PARTIES or ORGANIZATIONS, (2) REGIONAL, (2)

SECTORAL.

Political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an

ideology, principle, platform, policies for the general conduct of the government.

Sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the

sectors whose principal advocacy is the special interests and concerns of their

sector.

National or Regional parties are not required to represent the marginalized

and underrepresented sectors.

The economically marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall below

the low income group as classified by National Statistical Coordination Board. Major

political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is

expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections.


5/22




NAVARRO VS ERMITA

FACTS:

RA 9355, an act creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, was passed Gov. Villaroman (Respondent). The

petitioners contend that the act is unconstitutional for it didnt meet the territorial or population requirement in

the Local Government Code of 1991. When Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province, it had a

population of about 106k, lower than the required 250k. It also failed to comply with the requirement of 2,000

km2 for it only had an approximate lamd area of 802.12 km 2. The respondents asserted that PDI is

composed of more than one island, therefore exempted from the land area requirement, based on the

provision of the IRR of the LGC of 1991.

ISSUE:

WON RA 9355 is unconstitutional

HELD:

YES. The SC held that the IRR is null and void, because when there is a conflict between the basic law and

IRR, the basic law shall prevail. The exemption as to the land area requirement is not found in the basic law.

The LGC provides that in creation of a local government unit, a land area must be contiguous andsufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of the populace. A

sufficient land area must be at least 2,000 sq. km. The exemptions from the requirement of territorial

contiguity are: (1) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands, or (2) is

separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

Nowhere in the law states that when a province is composed of more than one island, it is exempted from

the 2,000 sq. km. land area requirement. NSO provides that an LGU will be created by either meeting the

2,000 sq. km. territorial requirement or 250k population requirement. It has also failed to comply with the

population requirement. The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the LGC must be followed in

the creation of provinceany derogation of or deviation from such violates the Constitution.

2011 Amended Resolution:

The LGC provides that when an LGU to be created is a municipality or city that consists of more than one

island, it is exempted from the land area requirement. However this exemption is absent in the creation of a

province, although expressly stated in its IRR. There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption

should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration

of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of

the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer

that the exemption was inadvertently omitted from the LGC for the creation of a province, and to correct

such error, it was included in its IRR. The LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee, which is

composed of both members from the Executive and Legislative branches, thus it amounted to executive and

legislative construction which is given greater weight by the Court. The SC upheld the validity of LGC-IRR.

What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is notconclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual

income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government

Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a

province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and

sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait

accomplicircumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats exis tence as a province, they must be

seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.


6/22




ALDABA VS COMELEC

FACTS:

RA 9591 lapsed into a law amending Malolos City charter by creating a separate

legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos during the bill was around

223k. House Bill relied on an undated certification issued by the Regional Director of

the NSO that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be around

254k by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to

2000. Petitioners filed the petition seeking the unconstitutionality of RA 9591 for

failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250k for a city to merit

representation in the Congress.

ISSUE:

WON RA 9591 is unconstitutionalHELD:

YES. A city whose population has increased to 250k is entitled to have a legislative

district only in the immediately following election after the attainment of the 250k

population requirement. The certification of the Regional Director Miranda, which is

based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because RD has no basis

and no authority to issue the certificate. It can only be issued by the NSO

Administrator or his designated officer.


7/22




AQUINO III VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioners Noynoy Aquino and Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens,seek the nullification as unconstitutional of RA 9716, a law reapportioning the composition

of 1st and 2nd legislative districts of Camarines Sur and creating a new legislative district

therefrom. They contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional

standard that requires a minimum population of 250k for the creation of legislative district,

where the proposed 1stdistrict will end up with a population of less than 250k.

ISSUE:

WON the population of 250k is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation

of a new legislative district in a province

HELD:

NO. The Constitution provides:

Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall

have at least one representative.

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between entitlement of a city to a district

on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a

province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a

city must first meet a population minimum of 250k in order to be similarly entitled.

LGC also provides that a province may be created if the average annual income, as

certified by DOF, is not less than 20 million based on 1991 constant prices and (1) a

contiguous territory of at least 2,000 sq. km., as certified by LMB, or (2) a population of not

less than 250k, as certified by NSO. The requirement of population is not and

indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable

income requirement.


8/22




FERNANDEZ VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)

FACTS:

Ramon Fernandez (Petitioner) filed a candidacy as Representative of the First District of

Province of Laguna in the May 2007 elections. Jesus Vicente (Respondent) filed a petitionopposing such candidacy, contending that there was an alleged material misrepresentation

in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during the past elections, he had

declared Pagsanjan as his address, which is located in the Fourth Legislative District of

Laguna, and that he also maintained another house in Cabuyao Island. Petitioner was

proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of First District of Laguna. Respondent filed

a petition before the HRET, contending that the petitioner lacked the required one-year

residency requirement. HRET granted the petition.

ISSUE:

1. WON HRET has jurisdiction over the case2. WON Petitioner has complied with the one-year residency requirement

HELD:

1. YES, since petitioner has already been proclaimed as the winner. The authority

conferred upon the HRET and SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning

candidate is full, clear and complete. The Electoral Tribunal shall be the sole judge for all

the election, returns and qualifications of its members.

2. YES. The law does not require a person to be in his home 24 hours a day, 7 days a

week, in order to fulfill the residency requirement. The fact that a few barangay health

workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner whenever they allegedly made

rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment, especially when there are other witnesses who

proved that he was actually a resident of the Villa. It may be that whenever these health

workers do their rounds, petitioner was out of the house to attend to his employment or

business. There is nothing in the residency requirement for candidates that prohibits them

from owning property and exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places aside

from the address they indicated as their place of residence in their COCs. The Constitution

does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner (he was leasing a

residential house in Sta. Rosa) in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides

in that district for at least one year prior to election day.


9/22




JALOSJOS VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Svetlana Jalosjos (Petitioner) started construction of a residential house and other

infrastructures of the resort since January 2009, and while the construction is on-going, sheused to stay in the house of her friend Lourdes Yap, at Brgy. Punta Miray, Baliangao,

Misamis Occidental. She wants her stay at Brgy Punta Miray to be credited in her

residency. She asserted that she was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the

latter part of 2008. She also registered as a voter on May 7, 2009 and claimed that she had

been a resident of Brgy Tugas for 6 months prior to filing. For her claim to be true, she must

have resided in Brgy Tugas on or before Nov. 8, 2008. But records show that she

purchased her property only in Dec. 9, 2008.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner is qualified to become Mayor of Municipality of BaliangaoHELD:

NO. To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place

where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase

of a parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential structure

where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction in the lot she purchased

means that she has not yet established actual and physical presence in the barangay.

Petitoners stay in the house of Mrs. Yap was only temporary and intermittent stay that

does not amount to residence. It was never the intention of petitioner to reside in that

barangay, as she only stayed there at times when she was in Baliangao while her house

was being constructed. Her temporary stay in Brgy Punta Miray cannot be counted as

residence in Baliangao.

The fact that the petitioner failed to prove that she has been a resident of the locality for at

least one year prior to the elections reveals the falsity of her assertions in her COC that she

is qualified to run for a local elective position. This false material representation justifies the

cancellation of her COC.


10/22




PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS:

Then President of the Philippines Diosdado Macapagal issued Executive Orders Nos. 93-121, 124,

126-129 creating 33 municipalities pursuant to Sec. 68 of Revised Administrative Code. EmmanuelPelaez (Petitioner), then VP of the Phils., filed a writ of prohibition against the Auditor General to

restrain him from passing in audit of any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said EOs

and any disbursement therefor. He alleged that the EOs are null and void on the ground that Sec.

68 has been impliedly repealed by RA 2370, in which it states that Barrios shall not be created or

their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act

of Congress, therefore constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. He argues that If

the President, under RA 2370, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is

composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?

ISSUE:

WON the President can validly create municipalities pursuant to delegation upon him in Sec. 68 ofRAC

HELD:

NO. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially and strictly legislative in nature.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in details in

the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the

principle of separation of powers, that said law: (1) be complete in itselfit must set forth

therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate, and (2) fix a

standardthe limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinableto which the

delegate must conform in the performance of his functions, which Sec. 68 of RAC did not

meet. Without these standards, there would be no means to determine whether the delegate has

acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Jurisprudence also upheld that public welfare

and public interest are sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the

law, but only insofar as administrative officers in the exercise of their administrative function are

concerned. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in Sec. 68. The creation of

municipalities is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently

legislative in character. If the validity of the delegation of powers made in Sec. 68 were upheld,

there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to

do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. The 1935

Constitution also provides that The President shall have control of all the executive departments,bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by

law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Such power is only limited to that checking

whether said LG or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by laws. The alleged power

of the President to create municipalities would necessary connote the exercise by him of an

authority greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus and

offices. Sec. 68 of RAC clearly failed to comply with the constitutional mandate.


11/22




SEMA VS COMELEC

FACTS:

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned 2 legislative districts for Province of

Maguindanao, the first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM created under RA 6734, as amended by RA 9054, although

Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in the ARMM plebiscite. The ARMM Regional Assembly,

exercising its power to create provinces under Sec. 19 Art. IV of RA 9054, enacted MMA Act 201

creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the 1stdistrict of

Maguindanao. What was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its 2ndlegislative

district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos 1st legislative district, is not part of the

Province of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a

plebiscite. Upon clarification of the status of Cotabato City, COMELEC resolved that Cotabato City

as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the 1stLegislative District of Maguindanao pending the enactment

of the appropriate law by Congress.COMELEC promulgated Resolution 7845 that Maguindanaos1stlegislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.

COMELEC issued an another Resolution 7902 amending its first resolution by renaming the

legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First

District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City). Sema (Petitioner) who was a candidate for

Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City filed a petition for the nullification of Res.

7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of votes in Cotabato City, contending that Shariff

Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress.

ISSUE:

1. WON Sec. 19 Art VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to

create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional

2. WON a province created by ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA 201 pursuant to RA 9054 is

entitled to one representative in the HoR without need of a national law creating a legislative district

for such province

3. WON Res. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the 1st legislative district of

Maguindanao despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district

excluding Cotabato City

HELD:

1-2. NO. The creation of a province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with 3 conditions:

(1) the creation of an LGU must follow the criteria fixed in LGC, (2) such creation must notconflict with any provision of the Constitution, (3) there must be a plebiscite in the political

units affected. Congress has delegated to provincial boards and city and municipal councils the

power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, but under the LGC only an Act of

Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities. There is no provision in the

Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create

municipalities and barangays, but the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. The


12/22




Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least 250k, or each province, shall

have at least one representative, and appended to it Any province that may hereafter

increase to more than 250k shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least

1 member. Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it willviolate the Constitution. The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power

to create a legislative district. The power to increase the allowable membership in the HoR, and

to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in the Congress. Nothing in the

Constitution authorizes the autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion

legislative districts for Congress. RA 9054 further provides that Regional Assembly may exercise

legislative power except on National elections. The office of a legislative district representative to

Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the HoR, is a national official. A

province cannot be legally created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates

that each province shall have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of

Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.3. YES. Resolution 7902 complies with Sec. 5 Art VI and Sec 20 Art. X of the Constitution.


13/22




BAGABUYO VS COMELEC

FACTS:

RA 9371 apportioning and increasing the legislative district of CDO from one to two was passed by

its then Congressman Jaraula. Rogelio Bagabuyo (Petitioner) filed a petition for nullification of thesaid law, contending that it was enacted without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines

for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of an LGU.

ISSUE:

Whether RA 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of CDO or involves the

division and conversion of an LGU

HELD:

LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT. Legislative apportionment is the determination of the

number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative

body. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by

changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality ofrepresentation. The legislative district may be called a political unit but it is not a political

subdivision. It is described a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city

or a province but it is not a corporate unit unlike a political subdivision. It does not have its own

chief executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people

of the district is heard in the Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. It has no

legal personality that must be created or dissolved. Local government units are political and

corporate units. They possess legal personality. The Constitution defines them as entities that

Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge or whose boundaries can be altered. No

division of CDO as a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. It remains a single

unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. There is only the addition of another

legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in

the HoR. The Constitution and the LGC expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation,

division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of an LGU. In contrast, no plebiscite

requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.


14/22




DIMAPORO VS MITRA

FACTS:

Mohammad Ali Dimaporo (Petitioner) was elected Representative for the 2ndLegislative District of

Lanao del Sur during 1987. In 1990, he filed with COMELEC a COC for the position of RegionalGovernor of ARMM. Upon being informed by this development by the COMELEC, Speaker Ramon

Mitra (Respondent) of HoR excluded petitioners name from the Roll of Members of the HoR

pursuant to Sec. 67 Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code. Having lost the ARMM regional

elections, petitioner addressed a letter to Mitra expressing his intention to resume performing my

duties and functions as elected Member of the Congress, in which he failed to regain his seat.

ISSUE:

WON the exclusion of petitioners name from Roll of Members of HoR was valid

HELD:

YES. The Sec. 7 of Constitution provides for the grounds on which the term of the Members of

HoR may be shortened: forfeiture of seat by holding any other office or employment in thegovernment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs; expulsionas

disciplinary action for disorderly behavior; disqualificationas determined by resolution of Electoral

Tribunal in an election contest; and voluntary renunciation. The voluntary act of resignation

contemplated in Sec. 67 Art. IX of OEC falls under the voluntary renunciation in Sec. 7 Art. VI of

the Constitution. As the mere act of filing of the COC for another office produces

automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held , it is not

necessary that the other position be actually held. Furthermore, such provision was to ensure that

such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another

public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their

candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the

constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle

with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.


15/22




PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS

FACTS:

Romeo Jalosjos (Respondent) is a full-fledged member of the Congress who is now confined at the

national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on and acts of lasciviousness is pendingappeal. He filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,

including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been

convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. He contends that his reelection is an

expression of popular will that cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, not even the police power

of the State.

ISSUE:

WON he may be allowed to discharge his duties as a Congressman outside the penitentiary

HELD:

NO. Privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of HoR, as provided by theConstitution, does not extend to offenses punishable by more than 6 years imprisonment.


16/22




ANTONINO VS VALENCIA

FACTS:

In 1963 local elections, official candidate of the Liberal Party (Lorenzo Sarmiento) for governor in

Davao lost to the Nacionalista Party standard bearer (Vicente Duterte), and Senator GaudencioAntonino (Plaintiff), LP Head, attributed the loss of LP candidate to the support given by Brigido

Valencia (Defendant), then Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to independent LP

candidate (Constancio Maglana) which divided LP votes. Antonino filed a formal request with the

Senate Blue Ribbon committee to investigate the actions of defendant as Secretary of PWC in

connection with certain specified alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and

equipment. Subsequently, a two-page press release was issued by the office of the Secretary of

PWC and the contents thereof were published on the front pages of the 6 metropolitan

newspapers. It indicated that Antonino had suspicious connections with several corporations when

he became a member of the Monetary Board and threaten and American with deportation to make

him cower from getting a concession with the Govt. Plaintiff filed a suit for damages againstdefendant, of which the latter claimed in his answer that he did not cause the publication of the

press release and they were qualifiedly privileged in character. Plaintiff died in a plane crash but

was succeeded by his wife.

ISSUE:

WON the libelous press release was protected as a qualified privileged communication

HELD:

NO.As defendants imputations against plaintiff were not made privately nor officially as to be

qualifiedly privileged under Art. 354 of RPC, the trial court correctly held that by virtue of their

defamatory and libelous nature against the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff, malice in law

was presumed. Had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty, and not because of malice,

the charge at least with respect to the alleged threat made against an American, should have been

filed with the Senate or any of its committees. The defendant did not do so but instead made the

accusations publicly by causing them to be given widest publication by all metropolitan

newspapers, obviously in retaliation to the charge filed against him by the plaintiff with the Blue

Ribbon Committee. On the other hand, the charges made by the plaintiff, even assuming that they

contain defamatory imputation, would not be libelous because the letter sent by the plaintiff was a

privileged communication.


17/22




BONDOC VS PINEDA

FACTS:

In the local and congressional elections in 1987, Marciano Pineda (Respondent) of LDP and

Emigdio Bondoc (Petitioner) of Nacionalista Party were rival candidates for the position ofRepresentative for 4th District of the province of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner.

Bondoc filed a protest with HRET, composed of 3 Associate Justices of the SC, 5 members from

LDP and 1 member from NP. A decision has been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a

margin of 23 votes, but the LDP members insisted on recount of ballots. The reexamination and re-

appreciation of ballots resulted in increasing Bondocs lead over Pineda to 107 votes.

Congressman Camasura of LDP together with the SC Justices and Cong. Cerilles of NP voted to

proclaim Bondoc the winner. Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary-

Genral, that he voted for Bondoc consistent with truth and justice and self-respect. Consequently,

JCJr informed Camasura that the latter was already expelled from LDP. JCJr also notifed Speaker

Mitra about the ouster of Camasura. On the basis of this letter, the HoR during its session decidedto withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Camasura to HRET. It also cancelled the

promulgation of Bondoc because without Camasuras vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of 5

members as required by the Rules of Tribunal.

ISSUE:

WON there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of HoR in ousting Camasura from HRET

HELD:

YES. The Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of HRET as sole judge of contests

relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of HoR. It was created to function

as nonpartisancourt although 2/3 of its members are politicians. To be able to exercise exclusive

jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent. Its members must discharge their functions with

complete detachment, impartiality, and independenceeven independence from the

political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline

are not valid grounds for expulsion of a member of a tribunal. In expelling Camasura from

HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the

examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of votes by the tribunal, the HoR

committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Moreover,

his expulsion violates his right to security of tenure. Members of HRET are entitled to such just as

members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution. They may not be

terminated except for a just cause. Therefore, the expulsion against Camasura is therefore null andvoid.


18/22




GONZALES VS MACARAIG

FACTS:

In 1988, Congress passed General Appropriations Bill for the fiscal year 1989. The President, upon

signing the bill into law, vetoed 7 Special Provisions and Sec. 55, a General Provision. In 1989, theSenate declared the veto of General Provisions of GAB 1989 is unconstitutional. In the

Appropriations Act of 1990, Sec. 16 was likewise vetoed. The same reason for veto was given by

the President: that the section violates the Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution and would nullify

the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, Senate President, Speaker of the House,

Chief Justice, Heads of the Constitutional Commissions to augment any item in the general

appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective

appropriations.

ISSUE:

WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 FY89 and Sec. 16 FY90 were unconstitutional

HELD:NO. The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different.

An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts. It is an

indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. Explicit is the requirement that a provision

in the Appropriation Bill should relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein. The

challenged provisions fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed provisions do not relate to

any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced

by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to

be found on the face of the bill. Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of

Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary

appropriation. Consequently, Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 although labeled as provisions, are actually

inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto

power. Moreover, they are held to be inappropriate conditions and are actually general law

measures more appropriate for substantive and separate legislation. They also impair the

constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or

any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency.


19/22




GARCIA VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed

to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accordwith RA 7227. The petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambansang Kapasyahan. The

municipality of Morong did not take any action so the petitioners exercised their power of initiative

and started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution. Vice

Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan Edilberto de Leon wrote a letter to

COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for it will just promote divisiveness, counter

productiveness and futility. The COMELEC en banc denied the petition on the ground tha t the

subject was merely a resolution and not an ordinance, thus cannot be a subject of a local

initiative.

ISSUE:

WON the Pambansang Kapasyahan was a proper subject of an initiativeHELD:

YES. The Constitution provides that The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a

system of initiative and referendum and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly

propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the

Congress, or local legislative body. An act includes a resolution. Furthermore, RA 6735, an act

providing for a system of initiative and referendum, expressly includes the resolution as subjects of

initiative on local legislation.


20/22




LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY & POVERT (LAMP) VS SECRETARY OF DBM

FACTS:

LAMP is a group of lawyers with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social

monopoly in the country. They filed an action assailing the constitutionality and legality of PDAF asprovided in RA 9206 or the General Appropriations Act of 2004 and sought the issuance of TRO

against the Secretary of DBM from making and releasing budgetary allocations to individual

members of Congress as pork barrel out of PDAF. The provision about PDAF is silent and

therefore prohibits automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual members of the

Congress for the funding of project. It does not empower them to propose, select and identify

programs or projects to be funded out of PDAF, unlike in previous GAA which was the main feature

of CDF. Such situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers. The power of

appropriation granted to Congress as collegial body does not include the power of the members to

individually propose, select identify which projects are to be actually implemented and fundeda

function which is essentially and exclusively pertains to the Executive branch.ISSUE:

WON PDAF is unconstitutional

HELD:

NO. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and burden of proof is

on the party alleging that there is clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The

allegations of the petitioners lack substantiation. There was no pertinent evidentiary support that

the illegal misuse of PDAF. Newspaper or electronic reports showing the appalling effects of PDAF

cannot be appreciated by the Court. The facts must be established in accordance with the rules of

evidence.


21/22




JALOSJOS VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Rommel Jalosjos (Petitioner) was born in QC and migrated to Australia when he was 8 years old

and acquired Australian citizenship. In 2008, at the age of 35, he decided to return to thePhilippines, lived with his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, took an oath of allegiance to RP and

renounced his Australian citizenship in compliance with RA 9225. He acquired properties in the

same village where he lives and applied for registration as voter in Ipil. But Erasmo (Respondent),

Brgy. Captain of the village, opposed such. Nonetheless, petitioners registration was approved.

Petitioner filed his COC to run for governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province, which Erasmo

opposed on the ground that petitioner failed to comply with requirements of RA 9225 and the one-

year residency requirement. COMELEC granted Erasmos petition, on the ground that petitioner

was a mere transient/visitor in his brothers house thus he cannot claim Ipil as domicile. Petitioner

won and was proclaimed winner of gubernatorial race.

ISSUE:WON petitioner complied with the one-year residency requirement

HELD:

YES. The LGC requires a candidate for gubernatorial race be a resident of the province where he

seeks to run for one year immediately preceding the elections. For the purpose of election laws,

residency and domicile are used synonymously. To determine a candidates compliance with

residency requirement, jurisprudence laid out the following guidelines: (1) every person has

residence or domicile somewhere; (2) where once established, that domicile remains until he

acquires a new one; (3) a person can have but one domicile at a time. Clearly, petitioner met all of

these requirements. QC was his domicile of origin, Australia his domicile by operation of law and

by choice, but when he came back to the Philippines and lived with his brother, renounced his

allegiance to Australia and reacquired Philippine citizenship, it is evident that he did so with the

intent of changing his domicile for good. Furthermore, a candidate is not required to own a house in

the community where he seeks to run. It is sufficient that he lives there whether in a rented house

or in the house of a relative or friend. What matters is the actual physical presence in the

community and the intention of making it his domicile.


22/22




ARNAULT VS NAZARENO

FACTS:

The Philippine Government, through Rural Progress Administration, bought Buenavista Estate and

Tambobong Estate from a non-resident American, Ernest Burt. A sum of 1.5 million was paid to Jean

Arnault, attorney-in-fact of Burt, for the latters interest in the estates. It turned that the PH government could

have bought the Buenavista Estate from San Juan De Dios Hospital which remained the owner of the estate

for Burts failure to pay the remaining amount of the selling price, while the Tambobong Estate is already

owned by the PH government through Philippine Trust Company also for the rescission of previous sale

between PTC and Burt. A special committee was created to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong

deals, wherein Jean Arnault was the important witness. He testified that the 1.5 million check paid to him

was deposited in a PNB account which he opened under the name of Ernest Burt, of which he withdrew

500k and transferred to Associate Agencies, Inc. account, and another 440k payable to cash of which he

himself encashed. It was the desire of the committee to know to whom Arnault gave the 440k. However,

Arnault refused to identify the person, invoking that he cant remember the name of the person to whom he

gave the money, then later on invoking his right to self-incrimination. He was arraigned by the Senate forcontempt until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said Special

Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the 440k as well as answer pertinent connections

connected therewith.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault with contempt for refusal to answer the questions

asked of him by the Special Committee

2. WON the Senate lacks authority to contempt Arnault for term beyond the period of legislative sessions

HELD:

1. YES. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or

necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a

Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be

material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to

answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow

that every question that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible

legislation. The transaction involved large amount of public funds which is a matter of public concern and it

is the duty of the Legislative to investigate the parties thereto for their prosecution.

2. NO. The Senate is a continuing body. The very reason for the power to punish for contempt is to enable

the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. The investigation

has not been complete because of the refusal of the petitioner to answer certain questions pertinent to the

inquiry. The Senate has empowered the Committee to continue the investigation during recess. By refusing

to answer the questions, the petitioner has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislativefunction, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the

questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. The power subsists as long as the

Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. But

such power may not be exerted beyond its bounds.

Documents

Consti 1 Finals Case Digest