Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)The warrantless wiretapping of a public pay phone violates the unreasonable search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment.FACTSThe petitioner, Charles Katz, was charged with conducting illegal gambling operations across state lines in violation of federal law. In order to collect evidence against Katz, federal agents placed a warrantless wiretap on the public phone booth that he used to conduct these operations. The agents listened only to Katz's conversations, and only to the parts of his conversations dealing with illegal gambling transactions.In the case of Olmstead v. United States (1928), the Supreme Court held that the warrantless wiretapping of phone lines did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. According to the Court, physical intrusion (a trespass) into a given area, and not mere voice amplification (the normal result of a wiretap), is required for an action to constitute a Fourth Amendment search. This is known as the "trespass doctrine." Partly in response to this decision, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of 1933. This Act required, among other things, federal authorities to obtain a warrant before wiretapping private phone lines. In the case of Silverman v. United States (1961), the Supreme Court refined the Olmstead trespass doctrine by holding that an unreasonable search occurs only if a "constitutionally protected area" has been intruded upon.

At his trial, Katz sought to exclude any evidence connected with these wiretaps, arguing that the warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search of a "constitutionally protected area" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The federal agents countered by saying that a public phone booth was not a "constitutionally protected area," therefore, they could place a wiretap on it without a warrant.

ISSUEDoes the warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth violate the unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

RULINGYes

REASONINGBy a 7-1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Katz and held that placing of a warrantless wiretap on a public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The majority opinion, written by Justice Potter Stewart, however, did not address the case from the perspective of a "constitutionally protected area." In essence, the majority argued that both sides in the case were wrong to think that the permissibility of a warrantless wiretap depended upon the area being placed under surveillance. "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected," the Court stated.Building upon this reasoning, the Court held that it was the duty of the Judiciary to review petitions for warrants in instances in which persons may be engaging in conduct that they wish to keep secret, even if it were done in a public place. The Court held that, in the absence of a judicially authorized search warrant, the wiretaps of the public phone booth used by Katz were illegal. Therefore, the evidence against him gathered from his conversations should be suppressed.

CONCURRENCEJustice John Marshall Harlan's Concurrence: Test for Constitutionally Protected SearchesAlthough he agreed with the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Harlan went further to provide a test for what is a constitutionally protected search. He said it was necessary to clarify when private actions, conducted in a public place, may be constitutionally protected. Expanding upon the general principles enunciated by the majority opinion, Justice Harlan proposed the following two-pronged test to address this issue: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior judicial decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have looked to this two-pronged test, and not the majority holding per se, to determine when private actions in public places may be constitutionally protected. In essence, this concurrence has come to be seen as the main point of the Katz decision, and it is the test that, typically, has been used when deciding upon the constitutionality of warrantless wiretaps.

Board of commissioners vs dela rosa

facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.

Issue:

Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen

Held:

William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.

PEOPLE VS VELOSO48 PHIL. 169 (1925)MALCOLM, J.Facts:-

In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organizationknown as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House ofRepresentative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.-The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more thana gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been tothe club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secretservice of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduo of themunicipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three inthe afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred.Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter awindow of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of themwas the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and thatthe police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe.As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to showhim the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemenand the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submitto the search.-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only tomeet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part ofthe body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend andRosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards,cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.-All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refusedto obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemento conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were neededto place him in the patrol wagon.-The warrant read as follows:SEARCH WARRANT (G)The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of thePolice Force of the City of Manila.GREETINGProof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that hehas good reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in hispossession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely inthe building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certaindevices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards,chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with thegame commonly known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals saiddevices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation ofthe Gambling Law.Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or nightwithin ten (10) days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said JohnDoe and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, PhilippineIslands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and if you find the sameor any part thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as providedfor by law.Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.(Sgd.) L. GARDUOJudge, Municipal Court

Issue:WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid.Ruling:Yes

RD:

It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that a search warrantshall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describingthe place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized.The name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where thename is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer toidentify him when found.A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or"Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions ofthe person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such awarrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person orpersons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person orpersons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance andpeculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of whichhe can be identified.In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the buildingto be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, withoutdoubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the buildingoccupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, themanager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without

difficultyPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS

FACTS: On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaveswere abducted and brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque. Nimfa was able to recognizedone of the kidnappers

as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employers office.14Thekidnappers called Jepson and demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls of the kidnappers,

Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business transactions. After,numerous times of negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million, some in ash and the

balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransomalone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center and ordered him to put the bag in the trunk,leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back. P/Insp. Escandor andP/Supt. Chan were assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center and brought a camera to takephoto and video coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with appellant and thelatter as the one who took the ransom.

Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was alreadygone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Stationalong South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seatedat the corner of the gas station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio then heard on

their radio that the suspects vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes

later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. When said carslowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle.23They introduced themselves aspolice officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him.Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz sawmoney, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?DOCTRINE: The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of theRules of Court, which provides:A

peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest aperson: x x x; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of factsindicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) x x x. A search incident to a lawful

arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:A person lawfullyarrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constituteproof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited abovenecessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense hasjust been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating thatthe person to be arrested has committed it. Records show that both requirements are present in theinstant case. The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to theother police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by. Personalknowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonablegrounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to personally witness thecommission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the arresting team that they weremonitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeedappellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented tosuch. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can stillvalidly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrests,it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search notonly on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it isonly but expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he wasarrested.Umil vs. Ramos

FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the confidential information that the authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New Peoples Army.

RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a continuing crime together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA. The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.

2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs. Marti -- Marti and his wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to examine and inspect the packages. However, before the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package and found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution

VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESGR 164815 February 22, 2008Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSORespondent: The People of the PhilippinesFACTS:On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco received a dispatch order which directed him and three (3)other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom.Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City,where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team put thepetitioner under arrest when they found tucked in his waist a Charter Arms with five (5) liveammunition.Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the subject firearm at theFirearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to the petitioner but toanother person. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition underPD No. 1866 as amended.On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner moved to reconsider but hismotion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTCdisposition.ISSUES:I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THECONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.RULING:In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the twinelements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accusedwho possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.[53]The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through the testimony of SPO2Disuanco.[54] Defense witness Yuson also identified the firearm.[55] Its existence was likewise admittedby the petitioner himself.[56]The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certificationfrom, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not alicensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element ofpossession of illegal firearms.[59] The prosecution more than complied when it presented both

1

JERRY VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESSeptember 3, 2009G.R. No. 164815STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

A petition for review on certiorari involving the decision of the Hon. Court ofAppeals which affirmed that of the RTC of Quezon City in finding the petitioner-accused Jerry Valerosoliable of illegal possession of firearm.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition underP.D. 1866 and was found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon City.On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued warrant of arrest to Sr.Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP CentralStation in Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily searched and afterwhich a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was laterverified by the Firearms and Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed to havenot been issued to the petitioner but to another person.The defense on the other hand contended that Valeroso was arrested and searched in theboarding house of his children in New Era Quezon City. He was aroused from his slumber when fourheavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. The pointed their guns on him and pulled him outof the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later anoperative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. Adrian Yuson, an occupant tothe adjacent room testified for the defense. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that the firearm with liveammunition was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.The petitioner was found guilty as charged by the RTC. On appeal, the appellate court affirmedthe same. Hence this petition. Petitioner raised the issue of legalilty of the search and the admissibilityand validity of the evidence obtained as the same was the fruit of the poisonous tree.ISSUE

: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid.

RULING

: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegalpossession of firearm and ammunition.

RATIONALE/REASON:From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arrestingofficers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed himimmediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with hishands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer beconsidered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take anyweapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDOvs.GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZG.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005

FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the same was denied. The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus was validHELD: YES

For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.

The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.A mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.

AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to counsel.

AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.

Case: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENTAGENCY (GRs. 157870, 158633 and 161658)Date: November 3, 2008Ponente: J. Velasco Jr.Facts:

Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 36

1

of RA 9165 or theComprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons chargedbefore the prosecutor

s office with certain offenses.According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, saidmandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided by theConstitution. No provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualificationrequirements of candidates for senator.Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes unduedelegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner ofdrug testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee deemedundesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached.In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintainsthat said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the rightagainst unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the dueprocess and equal protection guarantees.

Issue:

WON Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional

Held:

Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not.

Ratio:

Section 36 (c) and (d)

as to students and employees of private and public offices

Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Section 36(c) applying the following reasonabledeductions: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor studentshave contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians,and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students andmay adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right toimpose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.Therefore, the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students areconstitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it issubject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, themandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private officesis justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason

Unconstitutional

The Philippine Supreme Court has partially granted my petition in connection with the unconstitutionality of certain parts of Section 36 of R.A. 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). My petition was docketed as GR No. 158633 and entitled Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, et. al.

The Supreme Court agreed with me that the random, suspicionless and mandatory drug tests required of elective candidates and of respondents facing criminal complaints before the Prosecutors with an imposable penalty of more than 6 years is unconstitutional. However, it disagreed with me insofar as students and workers are concerned.

The other petitioners were Sen. A. Pimentel and the Social Justice Society. Our petitions were consolidated. The ponente was Assoc. Justice P. Velasco.

Philippine dailies reported the SC decision on Nov. 5, 2008. I have summarized below the salient parts of my petition. I have also posted below the news items that carried the report.

Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 imposes the requirement of mandatory, suspicionless and random drug tests nationwide among all high school and college students, all public and private officers, workers and employees, all local and national candidates for elective and appointive government positions, and all respondents facing preliminary investigations of the criminal complaints filed against them with an imposable penalty exceeding 6 years and 1 day.

My position was that the said provision was violative of the Filipino citizens constitutional right to privacy, right against unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination, and right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws.

The relevant portions of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165 read:

(a) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with notice to parents, undergo a random drug testing; Provided, That all drug testing expenses whether in public or private schools under this Section will be borne by the government;

(b) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(c) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one day shall have to undergo a mandatory drug test; and(d) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. - A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions therein shall apply.

Under Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165, the following constitutional infirmities are evident:

1. High school and college students (the great bulk of whom are minors) shall undergo MANDATORY drug tests. It may be random (the adjective used in Sec. 36 [c]) but it is mandatory and compulsory. The provision merely requires notice to the parents, but not their consent, making its mandatory nature more evident. It appears that the implementing rules of Sec. 36 to be issued soon by the respondent DDB must be compulsorily included in the schools student handbook (requiring mandatory amendments to the student handbook). Although Sec. 36 is silent about it, it appears that a student found positive of use of dangerous drugs may be administratively expelled by the school authorities. (Sec. 36 [c], R.A. No. 9165). Aside from the said administrative sanction, there is the probability that they would be exposed to potential criminal proceedings under the law (Sec. 15, R.A. No. 1965).

2. Public and private workers, employees, and officers, whether domestic or overseas, shall likewise undergo MANDATORY drug tests. Again, it may be random (the adjective used in Sec. 36 [d]) but it is mandatory and compulsory. It appears that the implementing rules of Sec. 36 to be issued soon by the respondent DDB must be compulsorily included in the companys work rules and regulations (requiring mandatory amendments to the companys work rules and regulations). Sec. 36 (d) expressly provides that any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs may be administratively suspended or terminated from work subject to the provisions of Art. 282 of the Labor Code and the pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law. (Sec. 36 [d], R.A. No. 9165). Aside from the said administrative sanction, there is the probability that they would be exposed to potential criminal proceedings under the law (Sec. 15, R.A. No. 1965).

3. All persons charged before the prosecutors office (that is, whose criminal cases are still undergoing preliminary investigation) with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day shall undergo MANDATORY drug tests. (Sec. 36 [f], R.A. No. 9165). A citizen facing a preliminary investigation for a pending criminal complaint (whatever its nature or type might be) shall now be required to undergo a mandatory drug test, regardless of whether or not his pending case is related to dangerous drugs use and regardless of whether or not the result of such mandatory drug test is relevant or material to the pending criminal complaint against him. (Sec. 36 [g], R.A. No. 9165). Aside from their pending criminal complaints, there is the probability that they would be potentially exposed to additional criminal proceedings under the law (Sec. 15, R.A. No. 1965).

4. All candidates for public office whether appointive or elective both in the national of local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test. (Sec. 36, [g], R.A. No. 9165). The Constitution alone may provide for the qualifications of national elective and appointive officials, the constitutional officials of the land, and the members of the independent constitutional commissions, agencies and bodies. (As to the local elective and appointive officials and employees, Congress may provide for their qualifications, e.g., the Local Government Code, the Civil Service Law, the Revised Administrative Code, and other laws). R.A. No. 9165 in effect adds a new mandatory qualification for national elective officials, like the President, the Vice President, and the Senators, and other constitutional officials, such as the members of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the members of the Judicial and Bar Council, and the members of the independent constitutional bodies, that is, they must all pass the mandatory drug tests under that law. It will be noted that constitutional officials may only be removed from office by IMPEACHMENT, and not by operation of R.A. No. 1965; and the specific procedures for their nomination and appointment are clearly spelled out in the Constitution (which R.A. No. 9165 may not amend). Finally, the public and private officials and employees would be exposed to other potential criminal cases arising from the mandatory drug tests.

5. The high school and college students, the public and private officials and employees, the respondents in criminal complaints undergoing preliminary investigations, and the local and national candidates (elective or appointive positions) would all be exposed to unreasonable search and their right to privacy violated by Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165.

Sec. 1 and Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provide:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, xxxx. (See also: Art. 32, Civil Code).

The right of privacy is both constitutional and statutory. (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution; Art. 26, Civil Code). Any evidence obtained in violation of a citizens right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec. 3 [2], Art. III, id.).The 1987 Constitution provides that no person may be compelled to be a witness against himself (Sec. 17, Art. III, 1987 Constitution). No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (Sec. 14, id.).

The provisions of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution have their roots in the Bill of Rights of the US Constitution. The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the schools and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that mandatory drug tests violate a citizens constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. I cited various US cases in support of my legal theory.