Consti Digest - Fundamental Principles & State Policies

7/30/2019 Consti Digest - Fundamental Principles & State Policies

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1. Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639

Facts:Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyonthe latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers.A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor wnot able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.

Held:The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but therewas no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, saithe court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutionalenjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression couconsidered tantamount to slavery.

The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode. "Ours is a governmenlaws and not of men."

2. Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

Facts:The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret

operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in the Philippines. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanspy by US Army Counter Intelligence Corps. The People's Court ordered his release but the Deportation Board taking hiscase found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an illegal alien in this country and must referred the matter to theimmigration authorities. After corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board of Commissioners declared that Mejoffentered the Philippine illegally and therefore must be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitione

was then under custody. After repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid Prison atMuntinlupa where he has been confined up to the present time. Two years had elapsed but the Government has not foundways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country although it should be said in fairness to the deportationauthorities that it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.

Issue:WON Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation.

Held:The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a generally accepted principle of

international law. It should be applied also to illegal aliens like Mejoff so that it would be a violation of the said internationato detain him for an unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing to take him. Considering that thGovernment desires to expel the alien and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is ma

efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of the presumption, assurances weremade during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of Mejoff. The petitioner can released if there is a record shown that the deportee is being imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance fordeportation or unless the Government admit that it can not deport him or he is being held for too long a period our courts wnot interfere. Article 2 of the Philippine Constitution states that, "The Philippines renounces war as instrument of nationalpolicy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policypeace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. The protection against deprivation of liberty withodue process of law, and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens butextends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.


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3. Agustin Vs. Edu Case Digest

Agustin Vs. Edu88 SCRA 195G.R. No. L-49112February 2, 1979

Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users

drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from source depending on the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner Leov

Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land TransportaCommissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of PuWorks, Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public Highways. Becausesuch contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a period omonths. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles already have hazard lig(blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of instrucviolates the delegation of police power because it is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for motorists and those dealers of EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit.

Held: Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may interfere wpersonal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Asuch letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence that scontention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases where therabsence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Maron the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the implementation of instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country mabide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution that the Philippines adopts the gener

accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the VieConvention also requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by lPetitioners allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order regarding implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory.


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4. Ichong vs Hernandez Case Digest

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Ac1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, andMARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporationcapital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception fromabove prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless

licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years afteapproval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entitithe United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged iretail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to prefor registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the busitheir assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisioRepublic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finand all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutioof the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due proof law.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process?

HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the eprotection of laws and due process.

We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and contthe retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police powthe State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.

The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of dangeoccasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; whahave are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centepopulation. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the natholds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and ci

in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise jussimply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliensclass than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aconstitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

DUE PROCESS

The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engagthe occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be pevident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogatithe Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.

The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall hareal and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained.

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt wha

economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The care without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to hareasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfiedjudicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . .

To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generalldistinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary foraccomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitiwhich overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonaArbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have here tofore engaged thereinthus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, ifree national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considnot to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.


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5. In Re: GarciaFacts:

Facts:Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. Iverified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken andfinished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" foradmission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; andthereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees andExercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to threquired bar examinations.

Issue:Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?

Held:The court resolved to deny the petition.

Ratio Decidendi:The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applSaid treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring topractice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is thereforesubject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in thePhilippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on thecontracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations

governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not enc roach upon theconstitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power torepeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

6. ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent SolEscritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada ispersonally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is comman immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear tha

court condones her act.Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. Ba member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangeis in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of PledFaithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between EscritorQuilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct."

HELD:Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalizedshe has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interesmust be upheld in order that freedomsincluding religious freedommay be enjoyed.

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to upholdreligious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws issecular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling stateinterests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonsthe compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest.the respondents stance that the respondents conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of freeexercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts actwould be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look atrespondents claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government must be heard on tissue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which can overriderespondents religious belief and practice.


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7. LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with thePhilippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treatybilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.

On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-caBalikatan 02-1, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibitionagainst the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with tconstitutional processes of each country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, againstof them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US militaassistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engain combat operations in Philippine territory.

Issue:Whether Balikatan 02-1 activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?

Ruling:To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basisactivities, the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in United States personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any politica

activity.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreemenclearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the partieintentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the contextthe treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.

It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .activities arose from accident. It was deliberately madeway to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposeother than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect thenations marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projectsuch as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that .Balikatan 02-1, amutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise, falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the cont

of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-relatedactivities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.


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8. Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others anuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by aregistered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to equal access topportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only t

those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred indisqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legalqualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizationsunder his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neitherbestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provisiowhich suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. Tprovisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatmto the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceconstitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise tocause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people aspossible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positiverights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properlydefined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrasuch as equal access, opportunities, and public service are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherentimpreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from whicinnately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on theprivilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates. As long as thelimitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificedlong as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fidintention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objectivand orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater thnumber of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resourcepreparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mixcandidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not tomention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevantminutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be asenseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is no

before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC foreception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate ascontemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum:One of Pamatongs contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likeErap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1)natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of theelection; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.


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9. Calalang vs. Williams

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940Petitioner: Maximo CalalangRespondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.Ponente: Laurel,J:

Facts:Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondIt is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Directorthe Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing alonRosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pmand along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of oneyear from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposedthe resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with theapproval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the usand traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations madthe Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on

August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules andregulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentionedthe detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issue:1.Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 54

constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom oflocomotion?

2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of socialjustice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest andconvenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfaIt was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom opromulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, withproperty, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order tosecure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual subordinated.Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority

made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailmenliberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to inseconomic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in theinterrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles ofsalus popu l i est suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and othe protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent wthe fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet ofall persons, and of bringing about thegreatest good to the greatest number.

THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.


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10. Oposa v. Factoran

Different Compilation of Digests-------------------------------------------------FACTS:A taxpayers class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network Incorporated (PENI) together with the minors Opand their parents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to the full benefit, use andenjoyment of the natural resources of the countrys rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering HonorabFactoran Jr, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreem

in the country and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenseagreements.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanceand healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies thejudicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial oviolation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to acause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.--------------------------------------------------

FACTS:The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timb

license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing orapproving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but th ey are alssuing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right t obalanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestatiohave resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbondioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect.

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage andirreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regardthe plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case2. Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance to theprayer of the complaints3. Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs areagainst the non-impairment clause of the Constitution

HELD:The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants cfor themselves, and for others file a class suit.The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by

other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The grantingthe TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthfuecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have alsosubmitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violatof their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially.Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot beinvoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated inSection 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution expliprovides that: The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythmand harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain fromimpairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers afunctions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.Needleto say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the dueprocess clause of the Constitution.


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------------------------------------------Facts:Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is thePhilippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the HonorFulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this peby the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint winstituted as a taxpayers' classsuit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitlethe full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed forthemselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticablebring them all before the Court."

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namelythe plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to tlegislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complshows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves thedefendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only wasthedefendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the responJudge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by thefundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescindset aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, theparents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning tright to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Laand the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely onrespondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreemen(TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does notapply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clauit is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

(2) Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.

(3) Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled.

(4) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

Held:As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same ca

neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of theagreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without therequisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequesince the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffstherein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for thefiling of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instanpetition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of thesucceeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healtecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve thatrhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environmconstitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.


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The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in ounation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under thBill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right beloto a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittinglystressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of facthese basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they arenow explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanand healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importaand imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far

when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inheri t nothing butparched earth incapable of sustaining life.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisionsthe Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C.

Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment andNatural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper uthe country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservationwatershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided forlaw in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of FilipinoSection 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of theenvironment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particreference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the rof the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers andfunctions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cauof action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their riga balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the quessubmitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should beconsidered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitPolicy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principa

involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasthat the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executivissuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invokNevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still bestigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only bepassed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthfulecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin therespondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, ncontract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matteright.

Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is herebset aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned t imblicense agreements.


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11. Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) vs Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA)

FACTS: PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development andgrowth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become directparticipants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is alsocharge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued BoardResolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as acondition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protectiveregulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically icongested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The APCD then filed a petitionmandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.

ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation.

HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle.Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the powto intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal ofprotective regulations for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clea r ththe government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the publicinterest so requires.

12. Topic:Personal Dignity and Human Rights (Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution)

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTSG.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

FACTS:On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desistfromdemolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before theCommission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.

On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion todismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined on

to the investigationof violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civiand political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".

On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. Andpetitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayto prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".

ISSUE:Is the issuance of an "ord er to desist"within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

HELD:No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1provides the power and functions of the CHR to " investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human riviolation, involving civil and political rights".

The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess. TheConstitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivilegedwhose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Notbeing a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only beissued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.

The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1


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13.PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Facts:Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workemale and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLentitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers bonly to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being aninvalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for workparticipation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the

police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some stateswhere there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguardsensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue:Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Held:SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics workingabroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no questiothat Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination betweensexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rightsamong all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law3. They are not confined to existing conditions4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to trav

does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety amay be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power abeen defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order topromote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalidexercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

14. PRC vs. De Guzman

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician

Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission

(PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed

the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exa

Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examine

scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-G

For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the

conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.

Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject

fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their

exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and

general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledg

may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.

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Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. de Guzman[GR 14681, 21 June 2004]Second Division, Tinga (J): 4 concur

Facts: Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera And GeraldineElizabeth M. Pagilagan, Elnora R. Raqueno, Marissa A. Regodon, Laura M. Santos, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, MariaRosario L. Leonor, AliciaS. Lizano, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Fernando F. Mandapat, Aleli A. Gollayan, Elcin C. ArriHerminigilda E. Conejos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Evelyn S. Acosta, Margarita BeliL. Vicencio, Valentino P. Arboleda, Evelyn O. Ramos, Achilles J. Peralta, Corazon M. Cruz, Leuvina P. Chico, Joseph A. Jao, Ma. LuisaGutierrez, Lydia C. Chan, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Fernando T. Cruz, Melvin M. Usita, Rafael I. Tolentino, Grace E. Uy, Cheryl R. Triguero,Michael L. Serrano, Federico L. Castillo, MelitaJ. Caedo, Samuel B. Bangoy, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Frederick D. Francis

Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Hubert S. Nazareno, Clarissa B.Baclig, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Nancy J. Chavez, MarCuaresma, Ernesto L. Cue, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Rhoneil R.Deveraturda, Derileen D. Dorado, Saibzur N. Edding, Violeta C. Felipe,Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana, Norma G.Lafavilla, Ruby B. Lantin, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari, Clarisa Sj. Nicolas,Percival H. Pangilinan, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Robert B. Sanchez, Merly D. Sta.Ana and Yolanda P. Unica are all graduates of the FatimaCollege of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by Board of Medicine (Board). Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medlicensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the 79 successful examinees from Fatima College in thtwo most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology(OB-Gyne), wereunusually and exceptionally high. Eleven (11) Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and 10 got 100% in OB-Gyne, another 11 g99% in Bio-Chem, and 21 scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks ofor better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schoowas made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. On 7 June 1993, the Board issued Resolution 19, withholdthe registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination. Priorthe NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, and laterpresident of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the saidexamination. On 10 June 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gynethe Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed thathe scores of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that thmust be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate thenormal variations that one should expect from the examinees of Fatima College in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc." For its part, the Nfound that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that theFatiexaminees gained early access to the test questions." On 5 July 1993, Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. NavarroJose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan filed a special civil action formandamus, with prayfor preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case 93-66530) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition wasadopted by the other respondents as intervenors. Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution 26,dated 21 July 1993, charging de Guzmaal. with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommendedthat the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified (Administrative Case 1687) by the PRC. On 28 July 1993, the RTC issued an O

in Civil Case 93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by de Guzman, et. al.. It ordered PRC, etc. to administer thphysicians oath to De Guzman et al., and entertheir names in the rolls of the PRC. PRC, etc/ then filed a special civil action for certiorawith the Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ (CA-GR SP 31701). On 21 October 1993, the appellate court grantethe petition, nullifying the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower court against PRC, etc. De Guzman, et al., thenelevated the foregoing Decision to the Supreme Court in GR 112315. In the Supreme Court's Resolution dated 23 May 1994, it denied tpetition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate court. Meanwhile, on 22 November 1993, during the pendency of above petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil Case 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of theirrespective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to cross-examination by the opposing counsel. On 13December 1993, PRCs counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15. The trial court truled that PRC, etc. waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses. On 27 January 1994, counsel for PRC, etc. filed a Manifestation Motion stating the reasons for her non-appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties bereset. The trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed the ground that adverse counsel was notified less than 3 days prior to the hearing. Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board fromproceeding with Administrative Case 1687, De Guzman, et. al. moved for the issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granin its Order dated 4 April 1994. PRC, etc. then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari (GR 115704), to annul the Orders of

trial court dated 13 November 1993, 28 February 1994, and 4 April 1994. The Supreme Court referred the petition to the Court of Appea(CA-GR SP 34506). On 31 August 1994, the appellate court granted the petition for certiorari, and thus allowing the PRC, etc. to presentheir evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties. The trialthen set and notices were sent to the parties. A day before the first hearing, on 22 September 1994, PRC, etc. filed an Urgent Ex-ParteManifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate courts decision in CA-GR SP 34506, for the outrightdismissal of Civil Case 93-66530, and for the suspension of the proceedings. In its Order dated 23 September 1994, the trial court granthe aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28,1994. Meanwhile, on 25October 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for reconsideration in CA-GR SP 34506. Thus, PRC, etc. filed with theSupreme Court a petition for review (GR 117817, entitled Professional Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.)On 11November 1994, PRC's counsel failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case 93-66530. Upon motion of De Guzman, et. al., the trial court ruthat PRC, etc. waived their right to cross-examine De Guzman, et. al. Trial was reset to 28 November 1994. On 25 November 1994, PRcounsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On 28 November 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to heard, PRC, etc. failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case 93-66530 deemed submitteddecision. On 19 December 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case 93-66530 in favor of De Guzman, et. al., orderinthe PRC to allow De Guzman, et. al. to take the physicians oath and to register them as physicians. As a result of these developments,


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PRC, etc. filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari (GR 118437, entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. HDavid G. Nitafan), praying inter alia, that:(1) GR 118437 be consolidated with GR 117817;(2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 August 1994 in CA-GR SP 34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of CCase 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhhimself, and Civil Case 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch.

On 26 December 1994, PRC, etc. filed their Notice of Appeal in Civil Case 93-66530, thereby elevating the case to the Court of Appeals(CA-GR SP37283). Meanwhile, in the Supreme Court's Resolution of 7 June 1995, GR 118437 was consolidated with GR 117817. On 9July 1998, the Court disposed of GRs 117817 and 118437 by dismissing them for being moot. The petition in GR 118437 was likewisedismissed on the ground that there is a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. While CA-GR SP 37283 was awaiting disposition b

the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners in Civil Case 93-66530, joined by 27 intervenors, manifested that thewere no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by other intervenors. The Court of Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-GR SP 37283 would not apply to them. On 16 May 2000, the Court

Appeals decided CA-GR SP 37283, affirming the decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal. PRC, etc. filed the petition forreview, seeking to nullify the 16 May 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP 37283.

Issue: Whether De Guzman, et. al. may compel the PRC, etc. to administer them the Hippocratic oath, even in light of unusually highscores acquired by the examinees from Fatima College.

Held: A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with respect to the issuanc

of certificates of registration. Thus, PRC, etc. "shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied w

the requirements of the Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, w

an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physicians license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and

register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical Act of 1959.

However, the surrounding circumstances in the present case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Boa

requirements by De Guzman, et. al. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebr

the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. Under the second paragrap

Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative investigations and "disapprove applications for examination or

registration," pursuant to the objectives of RA 2382 as outlined in Section 126 thereof. Herein, after the investigation, the Board filed bef

the PRC, Administrative Case 1687 against De Guzman, et. al. to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as requ

by Section 927 of RA 2382.

Further, Section 830 of RA 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have

"satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered "to

physicians who qualified in the examinations." The operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or

obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance." Gleaned from Board Resolution 26, the licensing authority apparently did not fi

that De Guzman, et. al. "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination resultsobtained by the latter.

Thus, while it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to

fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements; like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exe

may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and genera

welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be

required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the

of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice

medicine.

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercise

the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privileg

has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, requirgiving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an

arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in

public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribin

definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power. Herein, the guidelines are provided for in RA

2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the

board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians license, or revok

a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possess

all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the

conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as bei

less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may b

demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the

courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.


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15. [ G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002 ]

MANUEL CAMACHO, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS, JR., GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER I AND/OR OFFICE

THE OMBUDSMAN - MINDANAO, SIXTO O. DALEON, AIDA AGULO, DESIDERIO ALABA, NORMA TECSON, AND THE BOARD O

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES; SECRETARY RICARDO GLORIA, ASSISTANT SECRETAR

RENO CAPINPINOF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), DR. EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, A

NEDA REGIONAL DIRECTOR SANTIAGO ENGINCO, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N:

QUISUMBING, J.:

Subject of the present petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated June 3, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, hereafter simply the

Office, which dismissed the administrative and criminal complaints against respondents Sixto O. Daleon, Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba, Norma Tecson

the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP), Davao City, for violation of Section 3 [a], [e] and [j] of Republic Act 3019 al

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[1]

Also sought to be nullified is the Order of the Office dated September 10, 1997, denying

petitioners motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of said university, since January 1994 to the present. He has served the university as faculty mem

and as administrator for almost 13 years.[2]

Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate School of USP, with a salary grade of CS 29. The other

respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are faculty members of said university. They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D. 317, which is a

Seminar in Curriculum Development, during the first semester of 1994-1995. At the end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three final passing gra

of 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5, respectively.[3]

They were graded without requiring them to attend regular classes. Instead, Dr. Daleon gave them a special pro

of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial meetings, quizzes, and term papers.

Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner that during the first semester of school year 1994-1995, there were gh

students in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon. According to them, these ghost students, namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given passing grad

despite their failure to attend classes.[4]

On June 13, 1995, petitioner informed Dr. Daleon of the complaint. Petitioner requested the latter to furnish him with photocopies of exams, term

papers, and record of attendance of the students involved. Dr. Daleon ignored the request.[5]

On July 28, 1995, the matter was raised in a university council meeting where it was agreed that the University President, Dr. Edmundo Prantilla, wo

create a committee to investigate the complaint.

In a letter dated August 10, 1995, Dr. Daleon apologized for the delay in responding to petitioners letter-request dated June 15, 1995. Dr. Daleon

admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without petitioners approval.

Thereafter, petitioner wrote Dr. Prantilla recommending that Agulo, Tecson and Alaba be required to attend regular classes in school year 1995-199

and comply with the course requirements in Ed.D. 317. Dr. Prantilla approved the recommendations. However, on December 1, 1995, Dr. Prantilla

entertained the appeal of Agulo for the validation of the grades given by Dr. Daleon to the three of them. On December 23, 1995, the Board of Rege

passed its Resolution No. 2432 Series of 1995, upholding the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo.

Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The complaint for gross

incompetence, insubordination and violation of R.A. 6770[6]

was docketed as OMB-ADM-3-96-0132.

On May 28, 1996, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Prayer, with a Supplement to Complaint-Affidavit for Violation of R.A. 3019 and/or suc

other penal laws against Dr. Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson and members of the USP Board of Regents, [7] including Dr. Prantilla. On July 24, 1996, the

Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order directing respondent members of the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear

Administrative Case No. 96-602 to desist from conducting further proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of said criminal complaint

forwarded to the Office for possible consolidation with the administrative complaint.

On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., graft investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, dismissing the

administrative and criminal complaints against respondents. Approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, the resolution in its dispositive portion rea

follows:

WHEREFORE, finding insufficient evidence to hold respondent Dr. Daleon liable for the administrative charges of incompetence, insubordination an

favoritism or unjust discrimination, or of any other laws, let the instant case be ordered DISMISSED.

Likewise, finding no prima facie case of violation of Section 3(a), (e) and (j ), the criminal complaint filed by Dr. Camacho against Professor Daleon, M

Desiderio Alaba, Misses Aida Agulo, Norma Tecson, and the Members of the Board of Regents of USP is hereby DISMISSED outright for want of palp

merit.


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AS RESOLVED.[8]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated September 10, 1997.

Before us, petitioner now anchors the present petition on the following grounds:

1. THE SAID QUESTIONED DISPOSITIONS FAILED TO FIND THE ACTS OF RESPONDENTS DALEON AND HIS RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS-AGULO,

ALABA AND TECSON TO BE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY THE UNIVERSITY CODE,

PARTICULARLY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 128, 140, 141, 152 (LAST PARAGRAPH) THEREIN; AND OF THE ACTS OF RESPONDENT BOARD

REGENTS AS ULTRA VIRES AND CONTRARY TO THE SAID LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY WHEN IT PASSED BOARD OF REGENTS (BOR) RESOLUT

NO. 2432 S. OF 1995 ON DECEMBER 23, 1995 AND NO. 2449 S. 1996, RESPECTIVELY;2. THERE WAS OBVIOUS ABUSE AND GRAVE ERROR IN MISAPPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM TO ABSOLVE RESPONDENT

DALEON OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT; AND THE RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS AND THE BOARD OF REGENTS (ALONG WITH SAID

RESPONDENT DALEON) OF THE ANTI-GRAFT CHARGES;

3. THE SAID RESOLUTION AND ORDER OF RESPONDENT GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER AND/OR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDA

WERE ATTENDED BY PATENT DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS AS THEIR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS EMANATED FROM SELF-SERVING,

INCREDIBLE AND HEARSAY PROFFERS; AND DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER.[9]

In issue is whether or not public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in exonerating Dr. Daleon from

administrative as well as criminal liability arising from his giving passing grades to Agulo, Tecson and Alaba without requiring them to attend classes

Petitioner avers that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the impugned

resolution as it is contrary to the University Code, violates due process and is based on self-serving hearsays. He argues that the BOR resolution is b

on a wrong interpretation of the constitutional provision on academic freedom.

In its Comment, the Office of Solicitor General posits a contrary view. The OSG argues that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of

discretion.[10]

According to the OSG, there is no provision in the University Code of USP which prohibits a professor or teacher from giving a special

program or arrangement tailored to meet the requirements of a particular course.[11]

We are in agreement with the position taken by the respondents through the OSG. The petition lacks merit and ought to dismissed.

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invo

the Courts power of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer exerc ising judicial or quasi- jud

functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in th

ordinary course of law.[12]

Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be subjected to our review under Rule 65.

From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the respondent Office had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assaResolution dated June 3, 1997. We note that the conclusions in said resolution are based on substantial evidence easily verifiable from the records.

established is the principle that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, provided s

findings are supported by substantial evidence,[13]

as in this case. Graft Investigation Officer I Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of said Office gave weight to the

counter-affidavit of Dr. Daleon[14]

as corroborated by the affidavit of Prof. Concesa P. Lagare,[15]

Professor 2 of the College of Education, USP. These

affidavits averred that during the graduate school orientation program sometime in July 1995, the universitys Vice President for Academic Affairs,

Luz D. Ancheta, declared that special arrangements between a professor and a graduate student may be allowed on a case-to-case basis. Dr. Anche

made this statement in reply to Dr. Daleons query on the policy of USP on attendance of graduate school students and whether Dr. Daleon could g

grades to students who do not attend classes. In her reply to Dr. Daleons query, the VPAA even cited her experience when she pursued her doctora

course at UP Los Baos. According to Dr. Ancheta, she was given a special arrangement by one of her professors. She added that she, too

Documents

Consti Digest - Fundamental Principles & State Policies