INTRODUCTION

1. Preliminaries

2. 1987 Constitution:

b. Interpretation of the constitutional provisions:

Case Name: Francisco Jr. vs. House of Representatives

FACTS:

The House of Representatives on its 12th Congress adopted a different rule on impeachment from that

of the 11th Congress. On June 22, 2002, the HR adopted a resolution to investigate the disbursement of

funds of the JDF under Hilario Davide. In June 2, 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint against Chief Justice Davide for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public

trust and other high crimes. The House Committee on Justice ruled that the impeachment complaint

was "sufficient in form,"but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in

substance. A day after dismissing the first impeachment complaint, a 2nd complaint was filed against

Davide based on the investigation of fund disbursement of JDF under Davide. Petitions were filed to

declare the 2nd impeachment unconstitutional for it violates the provision that no impeachment

proceedings shall be initiated twice against the same official. Petitions also claim that the legislative

inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF infringes on the constitutional doctrine of

separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the

judiciary. Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene and Comment,

praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues

affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the

Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the

Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the

Constitution." In summary, petitioners plea for the SC to exercise the power of judicial review to

determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether Or Not judicial review power extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings

HELD:

Power of judicial review is the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which

are legally demandable and enforceable. Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate

system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers,

forms the bedrock of republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only

for the benefit of the people for which it serves. Separation of powers is not absolute. The SC is the final

arbiter to determine if acts by the legislature and the executive is in violation of the Constitution.

Moreover, the power of judicial review is expressly stated in the Constitution.

*2nd Impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is unconstitutional.

Case Name: Manila Prince Hotel Vs. GSIS

Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila

Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid was

at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically

considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs

bid but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the

sale to RB.

HELD: MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the

Filipino First Policy. Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to

individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities.

Another digest for: Manila Prince Hotel Vs. GSIS

FACTS:

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during bidding in

September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong

Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner which is a

Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the

winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the formers bid prize also with Php 44.00

per share followed by a managers check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to

accept both the bid match and the managers check.

One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the

respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the

Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51%

shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the

petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of

the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and

needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that

qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall

within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The

Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on

the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-

Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting

rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that

the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew

the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

Case Name: Pamatong Vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC

declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign

and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a

national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming

that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section

26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who

can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC

supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential

candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president,

he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his

leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in

other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to

limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an

enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or

justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of

Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-

executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"

provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any

judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive

action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would

accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves

much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the

clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly

defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be

entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"

are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not

the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which

innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some

valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the

Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally

without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long

as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a

certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the

limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates

who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling

interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the

State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the

number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the

increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an

election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no

serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process.

This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke.

The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most

probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the

part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of

the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of

further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to

determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as

contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

3. Bill of Rights

b. Doctrine of Hierarchy of rights

Case Name: Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. Vs. PBM

FACTS:

Petitioners herein alleged that they informed the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills of their decision

to have a mass demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. The

company respondent pleaded to exclude the employees in the first shift to join the mass demonstration,

however the petitioners still included them. As a result, the company respondent filed a case thru the

city prosecutor and charged the demonstrating employees of violation of the CBA. Trial court rendered

judgment in favor of the respondent company, and the petitioners failed to file a timely motion for

reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WON (whether or not) the case dismissal as a consequence of a procedural fault violates due process.

HELD:

Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition based on technicality (being 2 days late) was

rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have dominance over procedural rules.) And, the

company was directed to reinstate the eight officers with full backpay from date of separation minus the

one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their

separation from service. (The removal from employment of the officers were deemed too harsh a

punishment for their actions).

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

1. Inherent powers of the State: definition, distinctions and limitations

2. Police Power

a. Definition

b. Scope and Characteristics

Case Name: Inchong vs. Hernandez

101 Phil 1155

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships

adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance,

and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.

Facts:

RA 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Businessnationalizes the retail trade business -The

main provisions of the Act are: (1) prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Phils.,and against

associations, partnerships and corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the

Phils., from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade

(2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of

additional stores or branches of retail business.

-Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and

partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial

declaration that said Act is unconstitutional because it denies to alien residents the equal protection of

the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law and that it violates

international treaties.

-in answer, the solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed in

the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the

interest of national economic survival and that no treaty or international obligations are infringed.

Issue:

WON the enactment falls within the scope of the police power of the state.

Ruling: Yes.

RD: The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed

by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and

control; the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by

which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.

Case Name: Ortigas and Co. vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with

several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for residential purposes,

among others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA)

reclassifying the area as commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from

Hermoso and built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Ortigas &

Co. filed a petition a complaint which sought the demolition of the constructed car sales company to

against Hermoso as it violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of

Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.

HELD:

Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any standing

contract. Hence, petition is denied.

RATIO:

A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions

could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power

legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-

impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise

by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and

general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into

every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court already

upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power measure.

Other digest for Ortigas vs. CA:

Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to

Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma

Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the

use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer

Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and

Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to

be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to

stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to

the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of

EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of

Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial

zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy

Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the

Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be liberally

construed in its favour, to give more power to the local government in promoting economic

conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found in the General Welfare

Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not

absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to

promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.

Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace

and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential

area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial

and commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

Case Name: Acebedo Optical Company vs. Court of Appeals

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC.,petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Hon.

MAMINDIARA MANGOTARA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, 12th Judicial Region, Br. 1,

Iligan City; SAMAHANG OPTOMETRIST Sa PILIPINAS Iligan City Chapter, LEO T. CAHANAP, City Legal

Officer, and Hon. CAMILO P. CABILI, City Mayor of Iligan, respondents.

Facts:

Acebedo Optical in Iligan city applied for a business permit. After hearing the sides of local optometrists,

Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically

made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptions to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not

allowed to practice optometry within the city.

Conditions:

1. Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store;

2. Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because

these are functions of optical clinics;

3. Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by

an independent optometrist (not its employee) or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell

directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses;

4. Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses

and frames;

5. Acebedo is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.[1]

Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Upon investigation,

the municipal mayor found that there was a breach on the conditions imposed upon Acebedo Optical.

Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that

Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the

imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were

entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract.

City Mayor therein banned the corporation from operating in his City. The Appeal and certiorari of

herein petitioner was set aside by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Did the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid

exercise of police power.

Held:

Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the

latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is

ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a

valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of

permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires.

Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply.

Ultra Vires Act:

Definition of 'Ultra Vires Acts'

Any act that lies beyond the authority of a corporation to perform. Ultra Vires acts fall outside the

powers that are specifically listed in a corporate charter or state law. They can also be any action that is

specifically prohibited by the corporate charter.

Investopedia explains 'Ultra Vires Acts'

Ultra Vires acts can also be defined as any excessive use of corporate power that has been granted.

These acts cannot be legally defended in court. They will, in fact, leave the corporation vulnerable to

lawsuits by employees or other parties.

Other digest for Acebedo Optical vs. CA:

Municipal Corporation Proprietary Functions Police Power

Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local

optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which

basically made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptions to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is

not allowed to practice optometry within the city. Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions

and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was

subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached

conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions

because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of

police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the

permit is actually a contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry

(the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor

is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither

a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of

permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires.

Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply.

c. Who exercises the power

Case Name: MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association

Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency

tasked with the delivery ofbasic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent

herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the

use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenientmovement of

persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic

Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the

subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary

injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to

do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the

lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is

an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery ofbasic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open NeptuneStreet to public traffic pursuant to

its regulatory and police powers.

Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power

is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government

units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the

MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit

of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve

resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no

syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national

government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector

for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

Case Name: MMDA vs Garin

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was

issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally

along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA

Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for

his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary

injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep.

Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-

empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process

clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against

undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified

and therefore unlimited fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.

Issue:

1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.

HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by

any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however,

may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of

municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only

such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local

government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial

control of local affairs." 16 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and

barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage

of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and

administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed

under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the

purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,

people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and

expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in

nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself

* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila

Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and

administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations

of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or

revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep.

Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the

Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation

center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed

security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain

authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."

d. Test for valid exercise

1. Lawful subject

Case Name: Lim vs. Pacquing

G.R. 115044, January 27, 1995

Facts: On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) filed a petition

for prohibition seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authority that had been

granted them to operate jai-alai. ADC's franchise was invalidated by PD No.771, which expressly revoked

all existing franchises to operate all forms of gambling facilities issued by local governments.

Respondent contends that Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Mayor to allow ADC to operate Jai-Alai in

the City of Manila. ADC also assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal

protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether PD 771 is a valid exercise of police power, in a sense, that it has a lawful subject?

Held: PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State. Gambling is essentially

antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good honest and hard work. It

is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not

eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development. Jai-alai is not a mere economic activity which

the law seeks to regulate. It is essentially gambling and whether it should be permitted and, if so, under

what conditions are questions primarily for the law making authority to determine, talking into account

national and local interests. Here, it is the police power of the State that is paramount. On the alleged

violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be

remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more

importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate

and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject

to the exercise of police power for the public welfare. ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate

the jai-alai therefore, it may not operate even if it has a license from the Mayor to operate the jai-alai in

the City of Manila.

Case Name: Department of Education vs. San Diego

Facts:

The respondent failed to pass the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) 3 times and he was denied

admission to take the test for another time by the petitioner under its rule that a student is allowed only

to take the NMAT 3 times and after 3 consecutive failures a student shall not be allowed to take NMAT

the 4th time. Respondent invoke his constitutional rights on academic freedom and quality education in

his petition for mandamus before the court. Respondent judge rendered decision citing the admission

rule of the petitioner as an arbitrary exercise of police power, depriving respondent of his right to

pursue medical education thus this petition for review before the higher court.

Issue:

Whether or not the admission rule implemented by petitioner an arbitrary exercise of police power.

Held:

The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as

distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means

employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not

unduly oppressive upon individuals. The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of

a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the

ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the

medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives

and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the

law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and

ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The State

needs to implement decisive steps to regulate system of education by directing students to the course

where he is best suited through initial tests and evaluation. The decision of the respondent judge was

reversed.

Case Name: Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Lawful subject:

Cruz, Constitutional Law: The subject of the measure is within the scope of the police power, that is,

that the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the general welfare. If it does, the

enjoyment of private rights may be subordinated to the interest of the greater number, on the time-

honored principle that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

Nachura, Political Law: The interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular

class, require the exercise of power. This means that the activity or property sought to be regulated

affects the general welfare; if it does, then the enjoyment of the rights flowing therefrom may have

yield to the interest of the greater number.

Sangalang v. Intermediate Appeallate Court, 176 SCRA 719

Facts:

Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.) across a

stretch of commercial block from Reposo Street in the west up to Zodiac Street in the east,

When Bel-Air Village was planned, this block between Reposo and Zodiac Streets adjoining

Buendia Avenue in front of the village was designated as a commercial block.

Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential subdivision in the 1950s by Makati

Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as MDC), which in 1968 was merged with

appellant Ayala Corporation.

Appellees-spouses Sangalang reside at No. 11O Jupiter Street between Makati Avenue and

Reposo Street; while appellee Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as BAVA)

is the homeowners' association in Bel-Air Village which takes care of the sanitation, security,

traffic regulations and general welfare of the village.

The lot which was acquired by appellees Sangalang which were bought in 1960; was sold by

MDC subject to certain conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed

a part of each deed of sale.

That the lot was affected by Ordinance No.81 of Makati and was later followed under the

Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and later was adopted by the

Metro Manila Commission as Ordinance 81-01.

That the lots location was affected and later on classified as High Intensity Commercial Zone

and was later exposed to the public for use to congest traffic and public convenience.

Issue:

1.) Whether the opening of the private roads to the public was a violation or impairment of their

right?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court sustained the act of the mayor of Makati in opening two erstwhile private roads

in Bel Air Village on the basis of the stipulations in the deeds of donation covering the said streets

that they would be available to the general public under certain conditions. The rationale was the

demands of the common good, in the terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience.

[Note: Dear 401 classmates,,, kani ang digest na akong assignment palihug na lang ko sabot, taas

kayo ang caso ako ra gi kuha anr relevant sa iya topic para dili ra ta ma lipat. If naa mo questions

palihug ra pangutana nako. Maayong gabii ninyo.]

Case Name: Ople vs. Torres

Blas F. Ople vs Ruben D. Torres, et al.

293 SCRA 141 / GR No. 127685, 23 July 1998, J. Puno

FACTS:

Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference

System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.Senator Blas F. Ople filed a

petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is that: The establishment of

a National ComputerizedIdentification Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O.

No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of congress.

Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but alaw and hence, beyond the

power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a system of identification that is

all-encompassing in scope, affects thelife and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and

more particularly,violates their right to privacy.On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No.

308 was issued within theexecutive and administrative powers of the president without encroaching on

thelegislative powers of congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress to

legislate.

RULING:

Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. TheConstitution has

vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power toCongress is broad, general, and

comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislativeby usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by

Congress, unless the Constitutionhas lodged it elsewhere.The executive power, on the other hand, is

vested in the President. It is generallydefined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the

power of carrying thelaws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of

theExecutive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents thegovernment as a whole

and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials andemployees of his department. He has control

over the executive department, bureausand offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also

has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and

publicorder. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under hiscontrol to

enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of

applying policies and enforcingorders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the

President to fix auniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of

hisagents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.From these precepts,

the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is notappropriate to be covered by an

administrative order.

Other digest for Ople vs. Torres:

FACTS: Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification

Reference System," was issued by the President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996.

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of said Administrative Order on two grounds:

(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and

(2) Its impermissibility intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy

Petitioner contends that the Administrative Order is not a mere administrative order but a law and,

hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He further alleges that said Administrative Order

establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of

every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

ISSUE:

1) WON the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress to

legislate.

2) WON Administrative Oder No. 308 violates the right to privacy.

HELD:

1)The president is allowed to issue an Administrative Order, however in this case the Supreme Court

held that the Administrative Order involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by said

administrative order(The A.O. 308 was not just an Administrative Order but a LAW) Hence, there is

encroachment done by the Executive Department

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the

administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole

purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

2) The Administrative Order is null and void for being unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy.

Assuming, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as

an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. A.O. 308 is so vague. The

vagueness, the over breadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy

in clear and present danger.

2. Lawful means

Case Name: Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the

station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a carabao

or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon

his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court

sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the

confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order,

as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

The same result was decided in the trial court.

In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright

confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by due

process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former president under

Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of

instruction that had the force of law.

Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?

Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:

The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.

Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.

Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the

constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more

deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,

promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of legislative

authority over the president under Amendment number 6.

Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the due process

clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance

of an iron rule laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to

adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.

Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined to its

interpretation like a straitjacket.

There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.

There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as long

as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between facts proved and

fact presumed. An example is a passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both restrains and

is restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits

slaughter of carabos with an exception.

While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, it cant be said that it complies

with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.

Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical only

due to the urgency needed to correct it.

There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice with

the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.

The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method to confiscate

carabos was oppressive.

Due process was violated because the owner was denied the right to be heard or his defense and

punished immediately.

This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separation of powers.

The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.

Case Name: JMM Promotion and Management vs. Court of Appeals

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of the Labor and

Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and

Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration, respondents.

Facts:

Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino

ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign

destinations.

The government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department

Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with

issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.

On January 6, 1994, they Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements

for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of

the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were

to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of

employment by the POEA.

Petitoners then filed a suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1)

violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3)

deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that

the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the

constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance

of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the Artist Record Book and the other Department Orders was legal

and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The issuances of the said Department orders were constitutional and as such, were valid

exercises of the states police power.

A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels

us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its

issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.

Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance

of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing

artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground,

the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring

reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals

adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be

gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and

agencies.

Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where

those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and

vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement goes one step further, however,

attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from

entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by

experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or

performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore

exposing themselves to possible exploitation.

On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for

Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth.

Case Name: Lucena Grand Central Terminal vs. JAC Liner

G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005

Facts:

The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance Ordinance No. 1778 which provides, inter alia, that: all buses,

mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are

hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers;

and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the

effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand

central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground

that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private

property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ordinance 1778 satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful

subject and lawful means.

Held:

The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the

following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a

particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably

necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon

individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the

City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite

for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of

whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective

were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein

are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic

problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject

the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by

the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and

then to stop it right there.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that

rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to

rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the

constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified

whenever they happen to be effective.

Case Name: City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio

Police Power

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE

ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,

ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES

FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as

bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously

viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers

that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering

amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as

tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot

prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as

provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote

morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be

valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must

be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following

substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the

constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable

and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of

delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

Case Name: Social Justice Security System vs. Atienza

Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in an original

petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.

Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed

the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from

operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the

businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies.

The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April 25, 2003, Chevron had filed a complaint

against respondent and the City of Manila in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, for the

annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and

preliminary mandatory injunction. 14 The case was docketed as civil case no. 03-106377. On the same

day, Shell filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus likewise assailing the validity of Ordinance No.

8027 and with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory

injunction. 15 This was docketed as civil case no. 03-106380. Later on, these two cases were

consolidated and the RTC of Manila, Branch 39 issued an order dated May 19, 2003 granting the

applications for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction:TAacCE

WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a total bond of TWO MILLION (Php2,000,000.00) PESOS, let a Writ of

Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] and the City of Manila, their officers,

agents, representatives, successors, and any other persons assisting or acting in their behalf, during the

pendency of the case, to REFRAIN from taking steps to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, and let a Writ of

Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] to issue [Chevron and Shell] the

necessary Business Permits to operate at the Pandacan Terminal. 16

Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also attacking the validity of

Ordinance No. 8027 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary

restraining order (TRO). This was docketed as civil case no. 03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004,

the RTC enjoined the parties to maintain the status quo. 17

Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila

Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. 18 This was approved by respondent on

June 16, 2006.19

Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for the

nullification of Ordinance No. 8119. 20 This was docketed as civil case no. 06-115334. Petron filed its

own complaint on the same causes of action in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41. 21 This was docketed as

civil case no. 07-116700. 22The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the City of Manila and

respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8119. 23

ISSUE: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the

removal of the Pandacan Terminals?

RULING: THE ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCENO. 8027 IS A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power

only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from

those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for

the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be

a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. 122

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health,

public safety and general welfare" 123 of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take

measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack

on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the

ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of

the City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:

(1)the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products

which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel

oil among others;

(2)the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;

(3)it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacaang Palace and

(4)in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring

communities. 124 EASIHa

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of

Manila and not just of a particular class. 125 The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a

representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a

target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove

these terminals to dissipate the threat. According to respondent:

Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which showed that what was perceived to

be impossible to happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is actually possible. The

destruction of property and the loss of thousands of lives on that fateful day became the impetus for a

public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued [such] that it

became imperative for governments to take measures to combat their effects. 126

Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the

public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. 127 Clearly,

the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and

burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. 128 Otherwise stated, the government may

enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to

promote the general welfare. 129However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And

to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare

must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. 130

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the

area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local

city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political

subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. 131 As a result of the

zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no

longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is

derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a

locality. 132 Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the

Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said

to be unjust:

There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its territory into residential and

industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be

established exclusively in the latter zone.

"The benefits to be derived by cities adopting such regulations (zoning) may be summarized as follows:

They attract a desirable and assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and attachment to the

city; they promote happiness and contentment; they stabilize the use and value of property and

promote the peace, [tranquility], and good order of the city. We do not hesitate to say that the

attainment of these objects affords a legitimate field for the exercise of the police power. He who owns

property in such a district is not deprived of its use by such regulations. He may use it for the purposes

to which the section in which it is located is dedicated. That he shall not be permitted to use it to the

desecration of the community constitutes no unreasonable or permanent hardship and results in no

unjust burden."

xxx xxx xxx

"The 14th Amendment protects the citizen in his right to engage in any lawful business, but it does not

prevent legislation intended to regulate useful occupations which, because of their nature or location,

may prove injurious or offensive to the public." 133

We entertain no doubt that Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a

concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method.

CONCLUSION

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose

billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected

rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. 171 The reason is obvious: life is

irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU's exercise of police power clashes with a few

individuals' right to property, the former should prevail. 172

Case Name: White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila

Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time

admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of

Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be

nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of

WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the

Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under

the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,

restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar

establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty.

It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary

regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels

and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed

rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is

more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be

adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public

interest or public welfare.

e. When police power is exercised by Local Government Units

Case Name: Magtajas vs. Pryce Propeties

Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion

of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and

prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.

Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so

did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators.

The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.

The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro

City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.

3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.

On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and

regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the

Philippines.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid

Held: No.Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances

for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power

under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:

***Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly

granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for

its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general

welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,

among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance

the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate

and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic

prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and

order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an

ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are

only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers

conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the

principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local

government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first

place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be

amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.

Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Case Name: City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE

ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,

ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES

FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as

bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously

viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers

that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering

amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as

tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot

prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as

provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote

morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be

valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must

be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following

substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the

constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable

and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of

delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.